

Supplementary Materials for: Do Belief Systems Exhibit Dynamic Constraint?

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A Dynamic constraint if Y_A can affect I


In this section, we consider the implications of a slight elaboration of the theoretical framework presented in Figure 1 of the main text. In the basic model, we defined dynamic constraint as an effect of Z_A on Y_A and Y_B that was mediated by I .

However, it would be consistent with a dynamic constraint story if Z_A affected Y_A directly, then Y_A changes I , which in turn changes Y_B . That is, it might be that an attitude moves “first,” which then affects ideology, which then affects other attitudes. The model in the text rules out this possibility by Assumption 2 (Acyclicity): if I affects Y_A , then Y_A cannot affect I . If we elaborate the model to index ideology by time, then we can accommodate the possibility that attitudes move first while still satisfying acyclicity.

Figure A.1 displays this elaboration graphically. We have relabeled I as I_1 and added a fifth node, I_2 . These nodes represent ideology at time 1 and time 2, respectively. We have also added the two edges that point to I_2 and one edge from I_2 to Y_B . These three edges blow up the possible number of graphs from the 32 in Table 1 to 256. Of these, we would consider any model in which Z_A affects Y_A (directly or through I_1) and Y_A affects Y_B through I_2 to exhibit dynamic constraint.

The implications of this complication of the theory for our data analysis remain as in the main text. If we observe that Z_A affects Y_A and Y_B , the system may or may not exhibit dynamic constraint. However, if Z_A affects Y_A only, then none of the models consistent with this elaborated framework are consistent with dynamic constraint.

Figure A.1: Elaboration of Basic Model



B Study 1

B.1 Study 1: Outcome Variables

Amtrak Outcomes:

1. Do you think the government should spend more, less, or about what it does now on transportation and infrastructure? [1: A lot more, A lot less]
2. Would you prefer government pay for building and maintaining roads and infrastructure through raising taxes for transportation spending, or through charging user-fees, like paying tolls when you drive on the highways? [1: Fund entirely through tax increases, 4: Both Equally, 7: Fund entirely through user fees]
3. If the government raised taxes to pay for more transportation spending, do you expect that money would primarily go toward building new infrastructure projects or maintaining and improving existing infrastructure? [1: Entirely toward NEW infrastructure projects, 4: Both Equally, 7: Entirely toward maintaining EXISTING infrastructure]
4. For every dollar the government spends on transportation and infrastructure projects, about how many cents do you think are spent inefficiently? [Slider 0 - 100, How Many Cents Spent Inefficiently?]

Flat Tax Outcomes:

1. Would you favor or oppose changing the federal tax system to a flat tax, where everyone making more than \$50,000 a year pays the same percentage of his or her income in taxes? [1: Strongly Favor, 7: Strongly Oppose]
2. What percentage of income, from 0 to 100, do you think Americans should pay in federal taxes on average? [Slider 0 - 100, Average Tax Rate]
3. Do you favor or oppose reducing the business and corporate tax rate to 14.5% percent? [1: Strongly Favor, 7: Strongly Oppose]
4. Do you think a flat tax on incomes over \$50,000 without tax deductions or credits will do more to help all Americans or do more to help wealthy Americans? [1: Do more to help ALL Americans, 7: Do more to help WEALTHY Americans]

Veterans Outcomes:

1. How would you rate your feelings toward the Department of Veterans Affairs (the VA) on a scale of 0 to 100, where a rating of 100 means you feel as warm and positive as possible and 0 means you feel as cold and negative as possible? How do you feel toward... [Department of Veterans Affairs]
2. How much confidence do you have in the Department of Veterans Affairs' ability to care for veterans? [1: A Great Deal, 7: None At All]

3. Would you favor or oppose changing the healthcare system for Veterans to a system where the government provides additional money sufficient for Veterans to purchase a government-approved health insurance plan from private health insurance companies? [1: Strongly Favor, 7: Strongly Oppose]
4. For every dollar the government spends on Veterans Benefits, about how many cents do you think are spent inefficiently? [Slider 0 - 100, How Many Cents Spent Inefficiently?]

Wall Street Outcomes:

1. How would you rate your feelings toward the following on a scale of 0 to 100, where a rating of 100 means you feel as warm and positive as possible and 0 means you feel as cold and negative as possible. How do you feel toward... [CEOs; Wall Street Bankers; Government Regulators]
2. What percentage of Wall Street bankers, from zero to one hundred, do you think are corrupt? [Slider 0 - 100: % Wall Street Bankers Corrupt]
3. How much confidence do you have in Wall Street bankers and brokers to do the right thing... [1: A Great Deal, 7: None at all]
4. Compared to what it's doing now, do you think the federal government needs to regulate banks and financial institutions [1: A lot more, A lot less]

C Study 1: Demographics

Table C.1: Study 1: Demographics by Experimental Sample

	Elites	MTurk
18 - 29	7.2	45.1
30 - 39	17.6	30.7
40 - 49	19.2	12.2
50 - 59	25.0	8.8
60+	31.1	3.2
Male	67.9	52.1
Female	32.1	47.9
Black	3.1	6.5
Hispanic	4.1	5.8
White	83.0	77.5
Other	9.7	10.2
Less than High School	0.0	0.5
High School	0.5	9.8
Some College	3.1	38.3
College	24.9	39.0
Graduate School	71.6	12.4
Strong Democrat	31.5	19.8
Not very strong Democrat	14.3	25.4
Lean Democrat	10.1	15.5
Independent	11.9	15.4
Lean Republican	7.0	7.1
Not very strong Republican	12.3	11.0
Strong Republican	12.8	5.7
Liberal	28.2	44.5
Moderate	36.7	26.5
Libertarian	11.7	6.2
Conservative	19.3	18.2
Other	4.2	4.6
N	2181	3001

All entries are sample percentages.

Within demographic category, all cross-sample differences are statistically significant ($p < 0.001$ in all cases).

C.1 Study 1: Experimental Stimuli

This section includes reproductions of four op-eds:

Treatment	Title	Author	Publication
Amtrak	The Amtrak Crash: Is More Spending the Answer?	Randal O'Toole	Newsweek
Flat Tax	Blow Up the Tax Code and Start Over	Rand Paul	The Wall Street Journal
Veterans	The Other Veterans Scandal	Michael F. Cannon and Christopher Preble	The New York Times
Wall Street	Wall Street Offers Very Real Benefits	Thaya Knight	USA Today



The Amtrak Crash: Is More Spending the Answer?

BY RANDAL O'TOOLE 5/13/15 AT 4:46 PM

It is too soon to tell what caused the Amtrak train crash that killed seven people on May 12. But advocates of increased government spending are already beginning to use the crash to promote more spending on infrastructure and are criticizing Republicans who voted to reduce Amtrak's budget the day after the crash.

Yet there is a flaw in the assumption that spending more money would result in better infrastructure. In fact, in some cases, the problem is that too much money is being spent infrastructure, but in the wrong places.

The reason for this is that politicians prefer to spend money building new infrastructure over maintaining the old. The result is that existing infrastructure that depends on tax dollars steadily declines while any new funds raised for infrastructure tend to go to new projects.

We can see this in the Boston, Washington, and other rail transit systems. Boston's system is \$9 billion in debt, has a \$3 billion maintenance backlog, and needs to spend nearly \$700 million a year just to keep the backlog from growing. Yet has only budgeted \$100 million for maintenance this year, and instead of repairing the existing system, Boston is spending \$2 billion extending one of its light-rail lines.

Similarly, Washington's Metro rail system has a \$10 billion maintenance backlog, and poor maintenance was the cause of the 2009 wreck that killed nine people. Yet, rather than rehabilitate their portions of the system, Northern Virginia is spending \$6.8 billion building a new rail line to Dulles Airport; D.C. wants to spend \$1 billion on new streetcar lines; and Maryland is considering building a \$2.5 billion light-rail line in D.C. suburbs.

On the other hand, infrastructure that is funded out of user fees is generally in good shape. Despite tales of crumbling bridges, the 2007 Minnesota bridge collapse was due to a construction flaw and the 2013 Washington state bridge collapse was due to an oversized truck; lack of maintenance had nothing to do with either failure.

Department of Transportation numbers show that the number of bridges considered structurally deficient has fallen by more than 50 percent since 1990, while the average roughness of highway pavement has decreased. State highways and bridges, which are almost entirely funded out of user fees, tend to be in the best condition while local highways and bridges, which depend more on tax dollars, tend to be the ones with the most serious problems.

Before 1970, almost all of our transportation infrastructure was funded out of user fees and the United States had the best transportation system in the world. Since then, funding decisions have increasingly been made by politicians who are more interested in getting their pictures taken cutting ribbons than in making sure our transportation systems run safely and smoothly.

Proponents of higher gas taxes and other increased funding on infrastructure may talk about crumbling bridges, but what they really want is to spend more money on new projects that are often of little value. For example, they want high-speed trains that cost more but go less than half the speed of flying and light-rail trains that cost more but can move fewer people than buses.

This country doesn't need more infrastructure that it can't afford to maintain. Instead, it needs a more reliable system of transport funding, and that means one based on user fees and not tax subsidies.

Randal O'Toole is a senior fellow with the Cato Institute and author of Gridlock: Why We're Stuck in Traffic and What to Do About It.

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL.

Blow Up the Tax Code and Start Over

Apply a 14.5% flat tax to personal income and to businesses. Cut deductions. Watch the economy roar.

By RAND PAUL

June 17, 2015 7:09 p.m. ET

Some of my fellow Republican candidates for the presidency have proposed plans to fix the tax system. These proposals are a step in the right direction, but the tax code has grown so corrupt, complicated, intrusive and antigrowth that I've concluded the system isn't fixable.

So on Thursday I am announcing an over \$2 trillion tax cut that would repeal the entire IRS tax code—more than 70,000 pages—and replace it with a low, broad-based tax of 14.5% on individuals and businesses. I would eliminate nearly every special-interest loophole. The plan also eliminates the payroll tax on workers and several federal taxes outright, including gift and estate taxes, telephone taxes, and all duties and tariffs. I call this “The Fair and Flat Tax.”

President Obama talks about “middle-class economics,” but his redistribution policies have led to rising income inequality and negative income gains for families. Here's what I propose for the middle class: The Fair and Flat Tax eliminates payroll taxes, which are seized by the IRS from a worker's paychecks before a family ever sees the money. This will boost the incentive for employers to hire more workers, and raise after-tax income by at least 15% over 10 years.

Here's why we have to start over with the tax code. From 2001 until 2010, there were at least 4,430 changes to tax laws—an average of one “fix” a day—always promising more fairness, more simplicity or more growth stimulants. And every year the Internal Revenue Code grows absurdly more incomprehensible, as if it were designed as a jobs program for accountants, IRS agents and tax attorneys. Polls show that “fairness” is a top goal for Americans in our tax system. I envision a traditionally All-American solution: Everyone plays by the same rules. This means no one of privilege, wealth or with an arsenal of lobbyists can game the system to pay a lower rate than working Americans.

Most important, a smart tax system must turbocharge the economy and pull America out of the slow-growth rut of the past decade. We are already at least \$2 trillion behind where we should be with a normal recovery; the growth gap widens every month. Even Mr. Obama's economic advisers tell him that the U.S. corporate tax code, which has the highest rates in the world (35%), is an economic drag. When an iconic American company like Burger King wants to renounce its citizenship for Canada because that country's tax rates are so much lower, there's a fundamental problem.

Another increasingly obvious danger of our current tax code is the empowerment of a rogue agency, the IRS, to examine the most private financial and lifestyle information of every American citizen. We now know that the IRS, through political hacks like former IRS official Lois Lerner, routinely abused its auditing power to build an enemies list and harass anyone who might be adversarial to President Obama's policies. A convoluted tax code enables these corrupt tactics.

My tax plan would blow up the tax code and start over. In consultation with some of the top tax experts in the country, including the Heritage Foundation's [Stephen Moore](#), former presidential candidate Steve Forbes and Reagan economist Arthur Laffer, I devised a 21st-century tax code that would establish a 14.5% flat-rate tax applied equally to all personal income, including wages, salaries, dividends, capital gains, rents and interest. All deductions except for a mortgage and charities would be eliminated. The first \$50,000 of income for a family of four would not be taxed. For low-income working families, the plan would retain the earned-income tax credit.

I would also apply this uniform 14.5% business-activity tax on all companies—down from as high as nearly 40% for small businesses and 35% for corporations. This tax would be levied on revenues minus allowable expenses, such as the purchase of parts, computers and office equipment. All capital purchases would be immediately expensed, ending complicated depreciation schedules.

The immediate question everyone asks is: Won't this 14.5% tax plan blow a massive hole in the budget deficit? As a senator, I have proposed balanced budgets and I pledge to balance the budget as president.

Here's why this plan would balance the budget: We asked the experts at the nonpartisan Tax Foundation to estimate what this plan would mean for jobs, and whether we are raising enough money to fund the government. The analysis is positive news: The plan is an economic steroid injection. Because the Fair and Flat

Tax rewards work, saving, investment and small business creation, the Tax Foundation estimates that in 10 years it will increase gross domestic product by about 10%, and create at least 1.4 million new jobs.

And because the best way to balance the budget and pay down government debt is to put Americans back to work, my plan would actually reduce the national debt by trillions of dollars over time when combined with my package of spending cuts.

The left will argue that the plan is a tax cut for the wealthy. But most of the loopholes in the tax code were designed by the rich and politically connected. Though the rich will pay a lower rate along with everyone else, they won't have special provisions to avoid paying lower than 14.5%.

The challenge to this plan will be to overcome special-interest groups in Washington who will muster all of their political muscle to save corporate welfare. That's what happened to my friend Steve Forbes when he ran for president in 1996 on the idea of the flat tax. Though the flat tax was surprisingly popular with voters for its simplicity and its capacity to boost the economy, crony capitalists and lobbyists exploded his noble crusade.

Today, the American people see the rot in the system that is degrading our economy day after day and want it to end. That is exactly what the Fair and Flat Tax will do through a plan that's the boldest restoration of fairness to American taxpayers in over a century.

Sen. Paul, a Republican from Kentucky, is running for his party's presidential nomination.

The New York Times

The Other Veterans Scandal

By **MICHAEL F. CANNON** and **CHRISTOPHER A. PREBLE** JUNE 15, 2014

WASHINGTON — THE Department of Veterans Affairs is mired in scandal. More than 57,000 veterans have been waiting at least three months for a doctor's appointment. Another 64,000 never even made it onto a waiting list. There are allegations that waits for care either caused or contributed to veterans' deaths.

But another, even larger problem with the Department of Veterans Affairs is being overlooked: Even when the department works exactly as intended, it helps inflict great harm on veterans, active-duty military personnel and civilians.

Here's how. Veterans' health and disability benefits are some of the largest costs involved in any military conflict, but they are delayed costs, typically reaching their peak 40 or 50 years after the conflict ends. Congress funds these commitments — through the Department of Veterans Affairs — only once they come due.

As a result, when Congress debates whether to authorize and fund military action, it can act as if those costs don't exist. But concealing those costs makes military conflicts appear less burdensome and therefore increases their likelihood. It's as if Congress deliberately structured veterans' benefits to make it easier to start wars.

The Department of Veterans Affairs is supposed to help wounded veterans, but its current design makes soldiers more likely to get killed or injured in the first place. The scandal isn't at the Department of Veterans Affairs. The scandal is the Department of Veterans Affairs.

Is there a better way? We propose a system of veterans' benefits that would be funded by Congress in advance. It would allow veterans to purchase life,

disability and health insurance from private insurers. Those policies would cover losses related to their term of service, and would pay benefits when they left active duty through the remainder of their lives.

To cover the cost, military personnel would receive additional pay sufficient to purchase a statutorily defined package of benefits at actuarially fair rates. The precise amount would be determined with reference to premiums quoted by competing insurers, and would vary with the risks posed by particular military jobs.

Insurers and providers would be more responsive because veterans could fire them — something they cannot do to the Department of Veterans Affairs. Veterans' insurance premiums would also reveal, and enable recruits and active-duty personnel to compare, the risks posed by various military jobs and career paths.

Most important, under this system, when a military conflict increases the risk to life and limb, insurers would adjust veterans' insurance premiums upward, and Congress would have to increase military pay immediately to enable military personnel to cover those added costs.


Consider how this system might have prevented Congress's misbegotten decision to authorize President George W. Bush to invade Iraq. In 2002, the Bush administration played down estimates that the war would cost as much as \$200 billion, insisting the cost would be less than \$50 billion. To give you a sense of how mistaken this was: The economists Linda J. Bilmes and Joseph E. Stiglitz put the cost of veterans' benefits alone, from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, at roughly \$1 trillion.

Like others before her, Hillary Rodham Clinton has admitted that voting to authorize the Iraq invasion was a "mistake," though she "made the best decision I could with the information I had." How many members of Congress would have voted differently if confronted with the long-term health and disability needs of the troops they had already sent into Afghanistan and those they were sending into Iraq? How many would have pressed harder to end the wars sooner if they had to confront the mounting cost of veterans' benefits, in addition to the wars' other growing costs, every year the wars dragged on?

The alternative system we propose combines the universal goal of improving

veterans' benefits with conservative Republicans' preference for market incentives and antiwar Democrats' desire to make it harder to wage war. Pre-funding veterans' benefits could prevent unnecessary wars, or at least end them sooner. We can think of no greater tribute to the men and women serving in our armed forces.

[Michael F. Cannon](#) is the director of health policy studies, and [Christopher Preble](#) is the vice president for defense and foreign policy studies, at the Cato Institute.



Wall Street offers very real benefits: Opposing view

But headlines focus on the bad behavior.

Thaya Knight 7:16 pm May 26, 2015

Not every person on Wall Street is a morally corrupt Gordon Gekko. Do Wall Street traders want to make money? Yes. Are they generally people who thrive in a fast-paced, competitive environment? You bet. And that is a good thing.

At its core, here's what Wall Street does: It makes sure that companies doing useful things get the money they need to keep doing those things. Do you like your smartphone? Does it make your life easier? The company that made that phone got the money to develop the product and get it into the store where you bought it with the help of Wall Street.

When a company wants to expand, or make a new product, or improve its old products, it needs money, and it often gets that money by selling stock or bonds. That helps those companies, the broader economy and consumers generally.

When we have flashing headlines about Wall Street traders acting badly, as we had last week with news of five major banks pleading guilty to criminal charges, it is very easy to hate Wall Street. But we only hear headlines about the worst behavior.

No one writes news stories about traders who go about their business every day, carefully complying with the many (and there are many) rules and regulations that govern their work. Also, the financial sector, which is usually what people mean when they say "Wall Street," isn't only or even mostly the big banks.

There are small firms, banks, funds and advisers that make up a large portion of our financial industry. While the news about corruption, corporate welfare and lawbreaking is very bad, it doesn't mean the entire industry is rotten. Or, more important, that we don't need it.

Wall Street could be better. We could eliminate regulations that crowd out competition for the big banks. We could reform the system to do away with "too big to fail," making it harder for bad traders to get away with bad behavior. Either way, we shouldn't lose sight of the very real economic and social benefits Wall Street provides.

Thaya Knight is associate director of financial regulation studies at the Cato Institute.

D Study 2

D.1 Study 2: Demographics

Table D.2: Study 2: Demographics

	Lucid
18 - 29	15.8
30 - 39	17.7
40 - 49	16.2
50 - 59	20.0
60+	30.3
Male	37.7
Female	62.3
Less than High School	3.3
High School	20.3
Some College	39.8
College	23.8
Graduate School	12.7
Strong Democrat	20.5
Not very strong Democrat	16.7
Lean Democrat	5.4
Independent	17.7
Lean Republican	5.2
Not very strong Republican	13.5
Strong Republican	21.0
Liberal	22.2
Moderate	33.2
Conservative	31.4
Other / Prefer not to say	13.2
N	1087

All entries are unweighted sample percentages.

D.2 Study 2: Additional Experiments

The survey we conducted for Study 2 also contained two closely related additional experiments that we report here for completeness.

D.2.1 Welfare/Aid to the Poor

The first of these additional experiments used a very similar design to Study 2 in the main text. Subjects were first randomly assigned to see one version of the classic GSS redistribution question: “We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. We are going to name one of these problems, and we’d like you to tell us whether you think we’re spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount: [Welfare / Aid to the poor].”

This experiment has been conducted dozens of times over more than 50 years and consistently shows that subjects prefer spending money on aid to the poor than on welfare. We find this same pattern in our sample. Subjects who saw the welfare version of the question supported redistribution 0.59 scale points less than subjects who saw the aid to the poor version. This estimate is highly statistically significant and again provides evidence of a robust first-stage effect. We further assess the effects of this manipulation on two outcome questions:

- Some people think that the government in Washington ought to reduce the income differences between the rich and the poor, perhaps by raising the taxes of wealthy families or by giving income assistance to the poor. Others think that the government should not concern itself with reducing income differences between the rich and the poor. On a scale from 1 to 7, with a score of 1 meaning that the government ought to reduce the income differences between rich and poor, and a score of 7 meaning that the government should not concern itself with reducing income differences, what comes closest to the way you feel? [Reverse coded]
- Some people say Medicaid is a good thing because our society should provide health care to poor people, while others say Medicaid is a bad thing because escalating costs are unfair to the average taxpayer. Which comes closer to your view?

Table D.3 presents estimated treatment effects on cognate issues. The effect of the prime on subsequent support for government reducing income gaps is slightly negative and is not significant at the 0.05% level. The effect on support for Medicaid very close to zero and is not statistically significant. We interpret these results to indicate that the inducement to respond in a way that is more supportive of social spending has little to no downstream effect on expressed views about reducing inequality or providing health care to poor people. In other words, respondents do not spontaneously offer answers that are consistent across questions, either because ideological consistency is a weak motivation or because they are unaware that they are being inconsistent.

Table D.3: Welfare Experimental Results

	Initial Outcome	Subsequent Outcomes	
	Too Little on Welfare	Gov't Should Reduce Ineq.	Medicaid a Good Thing
Welfare Wording	-0.593* (0.046)	-0.241 (0.130)	-0.002 (0.024)
Constant (Aid to the Poor)	2.383 (0.033)	4.678 (0.093)	0.813 (0.017)
N	1,087	1,086	1,084

* $p < .05$

Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

D.2.2 Correcting Inconsistency

In our second additional experiment, we gave subjects an opportunity to contradict themselves when expressing their opinion about spending preferences. Among people who did contradict themselves, we randomized whether we pointed out their inconsistency or not. We then measured their subsequent spending preferences to see if these subjects become more consistent with their “general” spending view.

The general spending view question asked: “Generally speaking, would you say you favor smaller government with fewer services, or larger government with more services?” The next question asks the following: “Thinking about the federal budget, do you want to see the President and Congress increase spending on education, decrease spending, or keep it about the same?”

Inconsistency between preferences for smaller government and increased social spending is well documented (Sears and Citrin 1982; Ahler and Broockman 2018). Of our 1,087 subjects, 325

expressed inconsistent views. Of the people who wanted smaller government, 299 people said they wanted to increase spending on education. Of the people who wanted larger government, 26 said they wanted to decrease spending on education. We randomly assigned approximately half of these 325 subjects to receive a query: “We noticed that you said that generally speaking, you preferred a [smaller/larger] government with [fewer/more] services but that you also want to [increase/decrease] federal spending on education. Just to check, we’d like to ask you about education spending again.” Among these treatment group subjects, 27% took the opportunity to change their answer to the education question.

The experimental outcome is not their response to the education spending question, but subsequent spending questions, asked directly after: “Still thinking about the federal budget, do you want to see the President and Congress increase spending on each of the following, decrease spending, or keep it about the same?” [Five spending categories, Social Security, Medicare, Health Care for Low-income Families, National Defense, Foreign Aid]. We average all five responses so that -1 on the resulting scale indicates that a respondent preferred decreasing spending in all five categories and +1 indicates a preference for increases in all categories.

The results are shown in Table D.4. When induced to become more consistent, people who prefer smaller government prefer less spending (-0.172 scale points, equivalent to incrementing a single response out of the five down by one response option). We see almost the identical coefficient in the opposite direction among those who prefer larger government, though that estimate is not statistically significant. If we reverse code the outcome scale for those those prefer smaller government so that higher values indicate a greater degree of consistency with subjects’ initially stated position, we obtain an average estimate of 0.172 scale points (robust SE: 0.046, $p < 0.001$). These results indicate a clear shift toward greater consistency among those who receive an encouragement, suggesting that respondents are capable of maintaining consistency when that becomes a salient concern.

Table D.4: Correction Experiment

	Average Federal Spending Preferences	
	Prefer Small Gov.	Prefer Large Gov.
	(1)	(2)
Correction Treatment	−0.172* (0.047)	0.174 (0.224)
Constant (Control Mean)	0.316 (0.030)	0.043 (0.174)
N	299	26

*p < .05

Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

References

- Ahler, Douglas J. and David E. Broockman. 2018. “The Delegate Paradox: Why Polarized Politicians can Represent Citizens Best.” *The Journal of Politics* 80(4):1117–1133.
- Sears, David O. and Jack Citrin. 1982. *Tax Revolt: Something for Nothing in California*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.