

# Post-quantum cryptography in the automotive industry



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#### Presenter



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- TTA PG504 committee member
- Korea Cryptography Forum committee member

#### **ETAS GmbH**

- Parent company: Robert Bosch GmbH (100% subsidiary of the Bosch Group)
- Year of establishment: 1994
- Number of Employees: About 1,500 (2021)
- Sales: 321.5 million euros (2021)
- Locations: 31 branches/offices in 12 countries
- ESCRYPT, cybersecurity brand




# Post-quantum cryptography in the automotive industry

Agenda

- 1. Introduction & motivation
- 2. Quantum computers and post-quantum algorithms
- 3. Challenges for the automotive industry
- 4. Summary








#### Introduction and motivation

Example communication flow for an average future car








#### A story of Bits and Qubits

- Quantum computer leverages quantum mechanical phenomena, such as quantum entanglement and superposition in order to perform computations
- Any problem that QC can solve, can be solved by classical computers – given enough time! It is however assumed, that quantum supremacy can be achieved, i.e. using a quantum computer to solve a problem that cannot be solved by a classical computer in any feasible amount of time.





A story of Bits and Qubits

#### Grover's algorithm

• improves brute-force algorithms that check every possible key. The square-root factor halves the exponent of the time complexity. A brute-force attack on AES-128 with a cost of at most 2<sup>128</sup> AESoperations on a classical computing system can be finished with about 2<sup>64</sup> AES-operations on a quantum computer

#### Shor's algorithm

 solves integer factorization and discrete logs (RSA, ECC) in polynomial time on a quantum computer







- https://www.eetimes.com/quantum-computers-on-path-to-extinguish-current-encryption-techniques/
- https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-019-03213-z
- https://research.ibm.com/blog/ibm-guantum-roadmap-2025

- 433 qubit (IBM Osprey)
- 미팅 이후에 더 찾아보니 IBM에서 11월 9일에 새로운 양자 프로세서를 발표 하였습니다

https://newsroom.jbm.com/2022-11-09-IBM-Unveils-400-Qubit-Plus-Quantum-Processor-and-Next-Generation-IBM-Quantum-System-Two

Should we worry?

#### Public Key cryptography is the most time critical use case!

Especially public key encryption

#### The quantum computer threat is a medium-term one but

- Preparation is necessary for products with a long life-cycle
- Several standardization activities are already taking place (e.g. NIST competition, BSI recommendations)

```
x = Security shelf life  y = Migration time
z = Time to compromise
```

If x+y > z, then worry!

Michele Mosca: "Cybersecurity in an era with quantum computers: will we be ready?"



#### Post-quantum cryptography

NIST's competition aims at standardizing algorithms for digital signatures and Key encapsulation Mechanisms (KEMs), and is currently in its 4<sup>th</sup> round.

The post-quantum (PQ) algorithms that are currently in discussion can be divided into five families, according to the different mathematical problems they are based on:


- Hash functions
- Isogenies of elliptic curves
- Lattices
- Linear codes

Status	Public-Key Encryption/KEMs	Digital Signatures
Algorithms to be Standardized	Kyber	Dilithium Falcon SPHINCS+
Algorithms advancing to the 4 <sup>th</sup> Round	BIKE Classic McEliece HQC SIKE	<del>-</del>





Finding the correct algorithms




Finding the most suitable algorithms in the automotive context is a work in progress.

The algorithms need to be compared with respect to:

- Secret & public key and signature sizes, code size
- Performance of key generation, signing and verifying algorithms
- Memory consumption during runtime
- Security levels achieved/Confidence in security of gorithms

Level	Security Description	
1	At least as hard to break as AES128 (exhaustive key search)	
H	At least as hard to break as SHA256 (collision search)	
III	At least as hard to break as AES192 (exhaustive key search)	
IV	At least as hard to break as SHA384 (collision search)	
V	At least as hard to break as AES256 (exhaustive key search)	

Finding the correct algorithms




https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2022/NIST.IR.8413-upd1.pdf




PQ schemes do require more resources –in general-but implementing them in embedded devices, even small ones, is not out of the question


 various benchmarks for embedded devices are available and reference implementations on embedded devices, like a Cortex M4, are widely available





Can PQ-Algorithms even be used in automotive targets?








https://cryptoeng.de/pqdb/comparison

Can PQ-Algorithms even be used in automotive targets?

Dilithium 2



■ Encrypt (kCycles)

FALCON1024

Decrypt (kCycles)

Dilithium 3



FALCON512

KeyGen (kCycles)

https://cryptoeng.de/pqdb/comparison

Finding the correct algorithms... and beyond

#### OEMs then need to identify:

- which functions/use cases use asymmetric cryptography
  - Different use cases have different requirements, e.g. latency of C2X communication vs latency accepted for communication in production environment
- which use cases are the most time -critical
- which protocols are used and how are they affected by the migration to PQ algorithms

Apart from the selection of the suitable algorithms, many issues need to be considered, such as:

- enabling a smooth transition to quantumsecure systems
- flexible and secure algorithm selection
- adapting the protocols in use
- restructuring the respective PKIs/migrating to new ones
- redesigning of key and certificate management




... and possible solutions

#### Be quantum secure by design:

- Focus on gateways, connectivity ECUs and make them post quantum crypto enabled
  - These handle the most critical use cases using asymmetric crypto and have less resource constraints
- Use classical certificates to perform updates for ECUs in the field or migrate to another PKI

#### Important:

- Careful redesigning of the respective PKIs
- Enable migration to a post-quantum PKI, change Root of trust
- Planning for and reserving the necessary resources (RAM/ROM consumption, include hardware security) at an early design phase of the central ECUs






PQ-PKI: Parallel PKI

# PKI for ECUs already in the field with no post-quantum upgrade possibilities: parallel PKI

- The OEM PKI could handle this by issuing different certificates in parallel (classical and post-quantum), with only the new ECUs being able to handle the PQ certificates.
- Older ECUs could either use the classical certificates while they are still valid or only get updates in a controlled repair-shop environment, in case the classical certificates are already broken.






PQ-PKI: Hybrid X.509 certificates

PKI for ECUs already in the field with no post-quantum upgrade possibilities: hybrid PKI

- Certificates contain PQ and classical signature
- If implemented accordingly (e.g. PQ signatures in non-critical extensions of X.509v3 certificates), they offer backwards compatibility
  - An end-entity with no PQ-capabilities can verify only the classical signature
- Used during transition to PQ systems: important to mitigate the risks of downgrade attacks
- Hybrid certificates are already widely studied, different implementations are available




Abstract structure of hybrid certificate



#### PQ-PKI: Hybrid X.509 certificates

- Implementations of hybrid certificates
  - Open Quantum Safe Project
    - Concatenated keys and signatures inside the certificate
    - no compatibility with non PQ-capable ECUs
  - Nested certificates
    - Include the PQ-signature and the PQ-public key as part of a custom extension.
    - If extension flagged non-critical, then backwards compatible.
    - Outer-certificate non-separable (inner is part of the signed data).




Structure of hybrid certificate-custom extension




#### Mixed PKI

- Increase security by operating a PKI
  - where the root certificate uses a signing algorithm which is assumed to be more secure (e.g. because of chosen parameter set, or by choosing a well-studied algorithm)
  - end-entities (EE) and intermediate CAs use a different signing algorithm
- Pros:
  - Performance has been shown to be comparable or even better to pure algorithm certificate chains
  - Root of trust offers greater security
  - Requires no changes to X.509 format (compared to hybrid solution)
- Cons:
  - No ad-hoc compatibility non PQ-capable targets
  - Implementation of at least 2 algorithms for signature verification in EE is necessary









# **Summary**

Post-quantum cryptography in the automotive industry



The transition to quantum-secure systems requires flexible solutions.

- Designing the transition solutions to the post-quantum world is necessary in order to avoid big disruptions
  - For example, hybrid certificates and key exchange can and should be taken into consideration
- Replacing RSA and ECC in the most critical systems takes time and alternative algorithms can already be taken into consideration before NIST's new standards are finalized







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