

Filling in the Gaps: Using Consumer Products to Replace Missing Pollution Data

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Abstract

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1 Introduction

A critical input to good air quality regulation is good air quality measurements. Specifically, the relative efficiency of current pollution regulation hinges on our ability to accurately assess air quality across the country. In the United States, air quality is assessed by the government using a network of monitors that measure levels of ambient air pollution to a high degree of accuracy. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) requires these monitors to measure average daily air quality at specific frequencies to ensure enough data is collected for effective regulation.¹ During the days that are required to be measured, the goal is to accurately measure the daily average pollution concentration at the site of the monitor. Statistics of these daily averages, called *design values*, are then used to decide if a region is in or out of compliance with the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS).

Though these air quality monitoring stations are regulated by the EPA, they are managed by local and state officials who control when the monitors are on or off. For added flexibility, the EPA allows for some portion of air quality readings to be missing when calculating the design values that determine a region's compliance with the NAAQS. For instance, when

¹The three main measurement frequencies require measuring daily average air quality every 1, 3 or 6 days.

measuring particulate matter in the air (one of the most common types of pollution), the EPA allows more than 25% of measurements to be missing or omitted (EPA, 2017).² In effect, this flexibility means that local managers of monitoring stations can choose up to 25% of readings to omit – readings that would otherwise be used in determination of compliance. Though the measurements of air quality at the site of the monitor are fairly accurate when the monitor is on, omitting some measurements (by turning the monitor off) can bias the daily average and compliance statistics calculated from reported measurements. Additionally, if a region is out of compliance with the standards, the region or state can potentially face large penalties and forced adoption of expensive abatement technology.

The combination of large penalties and the ability to affect compliance statistics indicates misaligned incentives between federal regulators and local officials in charge of monitoring air quality, potentially leading to mismeasured air quality statistics. Indeed, previous research suggests that there is mismeasurement of air quality statistics occurring; Zou (2021) and Mu et al. (2021) provide evidence of strategic behavior in pollution measurement on behalf of local pollution regulators. This paper focuses the size of mismeasurement occurring and the effects this mismeasurement has on determining compliance.

Specifically, I explore the question: is there a bias in reported air quality data and how might this bias affect NAAQS compliance? To explore these issues, I utilize a new dataset of air quality measurements collected from consumer products (PurpleAir sensors). These data help provide an independent groundtruth comparison to air quality reported to the EPA. The most promising new data coming from these consumer products are PM2.5 measurements – the concentration of particles in air that are 2.5 micrometers and below. Specifically, I combine wind speed data with PM2.5 measurements from PurpleAir sensors that are near to federally-regulated monitoring stations to estimate the PM2.5 value at the monitoring

²Design values are used to decide compliance with NAAQS and are statistics of daily averages. In calculating daily averages, the daily average is valid if at least 75% of the hourly readings (18 of 24 hours) are reported and valid. In calculating the design values, the design value is valid if at least 75% of daily averages in each year are reported and valid. Combined, the minimum reporting standard is actually 56-57% of all required hourly PM2.5 readings. This is slightly different for each site depending on their reporting frequency (every 1, 3, or 6 days).

station; wind speed and direction allow for different PurpleAir sensors to have predictive power depending on their relative location to the regulated monitor. This allows me to construct predicted values of PM2.5 at the station during times when the station’s readings would be used to calculate NAAQS compliance but when the station was shut down. I first examine how these predicted missing PM2.5 values compare to the reported values, then use the combination of reported and predicted values to generate counterfactual NAAQS compliance statistics.

The NAAQS compliance statistics for PM2.5, called *design values*, are functions of the daily averages reported by air quality monitors. There are two primary design values for PM2.5: the “annual” design value is a three-year average of the daily averages; and “24-hour” design value is a three-year average of the annual 98th percentile of daily averages.³ Each quarter (3-month period), these two design values are calculated and compared to the NAAQS for PM2.5. If a station’s design value is above the standard, then the station (and associated region) is determined to be in *non-attainment* (non-compliance) with the standard for that quarter. Using the reconstructed dataset of PM2.5 (PM2.5 estimates for all hours that would be reported from a given station), I construct counterfactual estimates of the design values that determine if a region is in or out of attainment. I use these counterfactuals to determine which regions would have changed compliance status if they reported 100% of their PM2.5 measurements – I call these “flipped regions”. I also examine how close these flipped regions were to the regulatory threshold and report a measure of the bias related to the station’s missing PM2.5 readings.

Though I am examining the affect of pollution data that is missing from a monitor’s record (data missing *in time*), there is also the issue of attempting to measure a region’s ambient air quality using spatially sparse locations of monitors (you could consider this and issue of data missing *in space*). Previous literature has examined the sparse distribution of regulation-grade monitors and the resulting sensitivity of CAA air quality regulation.

³these statistics are discussed more in the Data section. Specific formulas for these statistics are listed in the appendix.

Grainger et al. (2019) and Grainger and Schreiber (2019) identify a principle-agent problem with the initial spatial placement of sparse pollution monitors; they find evidence that local regulators may be strategically locating their air quality monitors based on pollution, and possibly socioeconomic characteristics. To address the issue of sparse data and fill in the gaps, several authors have used satellite data products to provide finer resolution pollution data (Sullivan and Krupnick 2018, Fowlie et al. 2019). Moving to more time-based issues, Zou (2021) also uses satellite estimates to discuss the issue of strategic behavior in reaction to the timing of pollution monitoring. He provides evidence that some areas have significantly worse air quality on unmonitored days. In related work, Mu et al. (2021) show potential for strategic monitor shutdowns on days of expected high pollution, contributing to air quality data that is missing *in time*.

This paper is most similar to the analysis in Fowlie et al. (2019) where they use PM2.5 estimates generated from satellite data to examine counterfactual compliance status. However, they end their analysis noting that the satellite-based data commonly used in these applications has significant prediction error in some areas; this can cause result in incorrect conclusions about design values. This paper compliments their analysis and that of Mu et al., where I use a different form of ground-truth PM2.5 data to also address missing air quality data *in time*.⁴ In contrast to Mu et al. however, I am examining pollution at times when it is missing in the data but required to be reported, whereas their work was on pollution at times that are not required to be reported. While satellite-based PM2.5 estimates have potential for large prediction errors, PurpleAir sensors can be fairly accurate measures of their local air quality⁵ and can be averaged over multiple nearby sensors. PurpleAir data also have drawbacks however – the sensors are highly non-uniform in coverage across the US and are sensitive to specific placement by the consumer, perhaps leading to hyper-local

⁴PurpleAir data, and other on-the-ground pollution sensors, also have the potential to examine issues of spatial distributions of monitor networks – work left for future research.

⁵PurpleAir sensors have specifically been shown to be less accurate than regulation-grade monitors at high levels of PM2.5 concentration. However, the EPA has developed a correction technique that result in PurpleAir readings within 5% of co-located EPA monitors. This correction technique is used here and explained in more detail in the appendix.

estimates of air quality.

For these reasons, this analysis should be seen as a compliment to previous works. As consumer sensors become more widespread, we can augment reliable federal air quality measurements with a growing number of auxiliary data points to better understand the shape of mismeasurement in air quality. In this paper, I explore one way of leveraging these data to test for issues with biased reporting of air quality. After predicting missing observations using PurpleAir measurements, I find that XX of XX monitoring stations flipped their NAAQS compliance status in at least one quarter between 2018 and 2020 and that YY had more than one flipped status. On average, the design values for the monitor-quarters that flipped status had a difference of more than $AA\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$ and $BB\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$ of PM_{2.5} for the annual and 24-hour design values, respectively. We know from previous research that pollution in non-attainment areas has been decreasing at significantly faster rates since the introduction of the CAA (Currie et al., 2020); combined with my results, this suggests that changes in reporting standards to decrease allowable omitted observations may result in more non-attainment areas and further increases regulatory efficiency.

The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the history of air quality standard in the US and some key details of current regulations. Section 3 explains the theoretical framework applied to the problem of measuring pollution at specific points in space. Section 4 then discusses the data used and section 5 describes the empirical framework that will be applied to estimate the missing pollution and resulting policy outcomes. Section 6 reviews the results of the empirical study and discusses the implications. Section 7

2 Background

Amid growing public concern about air quality and pollution, the United States Congress passed the Clean Air Act of 1963 (CAA). Later additions to the CAA, the Clean Air Amendments of 1970, granted the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) the regulatory authority to create and enforce air quality standards in the US. One major way air quality is regulated is through the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS), which set concentration thresholds for a list of different “criteria” pollutants ([91st US Congress, 1970](#)). The EPA has since been in charge of setting and updating the NAAQS and require states to submit plans to bring their air quality to within NAAQS limits. An important aspect of enforcing the NAAQS is measuring criteria pollutants across the US by requiring states to install pollution monitoring stations in areas of questionable air quality. Because these monitoring stations are used for potentially costly enforcement, the equipment within each station must abide by specific regulations and are relatively costly to install and run.

Over the last decade, commercially available scientific equipment in measuring various air pollutants has evolved. There is now relatively cheap⁶ equipment available to measure particulate matter (one of the criteria pollutants that regulated by the NAAQS). Specifically, the PurpleAir company produces devices that can measure particulate matter that has a diameter of less than 2.5 micrometers (designated as PM2.5).⁷ PurpleAir is of particular interest because they have built an opt-out mechanism for end-users to allow their ambient air quality data to be stored in the cloud. They also provide multiple ways for researchers and the general public to use this crowd-sourced air quality data.

This paper is primarily concerned with the minimum reporting requirement. As with

⁶e.g., a PurpleAir outdoor air quality sensor is about \$250 to purchase with little upkeep from the end user, compared to roughly \$100,000-200,000 to install EPA regulation-grade criteria pollutant monitors and trained staff to upkeep and record measurements. The cost alone is not a good comparison because the EPA monitors use different technology that is known to be more accurate across a wider range of pollution concentrations, have a better sense the sensor error, and measure more pollutants than the PurpleAir monitors. For the purposes of this analysis, PurpleAir monitors should be seen as a compliment to EPA monitors, not a potential replacement.

⁷PurpleAir devices can measure a few other criteria pollutants (namely ozone and PM10) but the comparability of the PM2.5 measurements between PurpleAir and EPA monitors are currently better understood.

many federal regulations, there are many ways that states or emitters can cleverly navigate the rules to emit more than they are meant to according to the spirit of the regulation. One way of navigating the CAA regulations is through the choice of what data to report. The EPA currently requires a minimum threshold of air quality data to be reported – for PM 2.5 75% of daily measurements for

3 Theoretical Framework

4 Data and Descriptive Statistics

5 Empirical Framework

6 Results and Discussion

7 Summary and Concluding Remarks

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8 Appendix