

Problem Set 1: Due Oct 7, 11:59pm PST.

## Question 1

Type I Extreme Value distribution has the following CDF:

$$F(\tau) = \exp(-\exp(-(\tau + \alpha))),$$

where  $\alpha$  is a parameter of the distribution.

Let  $\varepsilon_1, \dots, \varepsilon_J$  be distributed type I EV, with parameters  $\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_J$ . Assume that  $\varepsilon_1, \dots, \varepsilon_J$  are also independent.

(a) Show that  $u = \max\{\varepsilon_1, \dots, \varepsilon_J\}$  is also distributed Type I Extreme Value.

(b) Consider the following discrete choice model:

$$\begin{aligned} U_j &= u_j + \varepsilon_j \\ Y &= \arg \max_{j \in J} \{U_j\}, \end{aligned}$$

where  $(u_1, \dots, u_J)$  is a  $J$ -vector and  $\varepsilon_j$  is distributed type I EV with parameter  $\alpha_j$ . Show the following

$$\Pr(Y = j) = \frac{\exp(u_j - \alpha_j)}{\sum_i^J \exp(u_i - \alpha_i)}.$$

## Question 2

Consider the following model

$$Y = \max \left\{ 0, \frac{u_1(X)}{u_2(X)} + \frac{1}{u_2(X)} \varepsilon \right\}, \quad X \perp \varepsilon,$$

where  $(Y, X)$  are observed,  $\varepsilon$  is not observed. **Assume further that**  $\Pr(Y = 0|X) < 1$ , **for all**  $X$  and  $u_2(X) > 0$  for all  $X$ . What we want to identify are  $u_1(\cdot)$ ,  $u_2(\cdot)$  and the distribution of  $\varepsilon$ ,  $F_\varepsilon$ .

(a) Show that the primitives are not identified.

(b) Suppose we make the following normalization,  $u_2(\mathbf{x}_0) = 1$ , at some  $\mathbf{x}_0$  that is **known**. Show that  $u_2(\cdot)$  is identified.

(c) Continue to assume  $u_2(\mathbf{x}_0) = 1$ , at some  $\mathbf{x}_0$  that is **known**. Assume also that median of  $\varepsilon$  is zero,  $Med(\varepsilon) = 0$ . Assume also that  $\Pr(Y = 0|\mathbf{x}_0) < 1/2$ . Show that  $u_1(\cdot)$  is identified.

### Question 3

Consider a static entry model. Assume that in each market  $t$ , there are two potential entrants,  $i = 1, 2$  (you can think of Walmart and Kmart, for example). The profit from entry in market  $t$  is given as follows:

$$\pi = \beta_i Z_t - \alpha_i \mathbf{1}_{\{\text{competitor}\}} + \epsilon_{i,t},$$

where  $Z_t \in \mathbb{R}^L$  is a vector of market characteristics,  $\mathbf{1}_{\{\text{competitor}\}}$  is an indicator function for whether or not there is a competitor, and  $\epsilon_{i,t} \in \mathbb{R}$  is an idiosyncratic shock distributed independently across  $i$  and  $t$ . If firm  $i$  is a monopolist, the profit is  $\beta_i Z_t + \epsilon_{i,t}$ . If the firm is a duopolist, the profit is  $\beta_i Z_t - \alpha_i + \epsilon_{i,t}$ . Profit from staying out of the market is normalized to 0. Assume that you know the distribution of  $\epsilon_{i,t}$  (you can assume that it is uniform  $[-1, 0]$ ). The primitives of the model are  $\{\alpha_i, \beta_i\}_{i=1,2}$ . The researcher has access to data  $\{\chi_{1,t}, \chi_{2,t}, Z_t\}_{t=1}^T$ , where  $\chi_{i,t} \in \{0, 1\}$  is an indicator variable that corresponds to whether or not firm  $i$  is in market  $t$ . Each firm makes an entry decision in each market.

(1) Assume that firms observe their own realization  $\epsilon_{i,t}$  as well as their opponent's real-

ization  $\epsilon_{-i,t}$  (The researcher does not observe the realizations however). Firm  $i$ 's strategy is  $\sigma_i(Z_t, \epsilon_{i,t}, \epsilon_{-i,t}) : \mathbb{R}^L \times \mathbb{R} \times \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ . Assume that firms are playing Nash equilibrium in each market. Are the primitives of the model identified? Discuss.

(2) Propose an estimator of  $\{\alpha_i, \beta_i\}$  that is consistent.

(3) Suppose now that firms only observe their own realization of  $\epsilon_{i,t}$ , so that their strategy is  $\sigma_i(Z_t, \epsilon_{i,t}) : \mathbb{R}^L \times \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ . Are the primitives of the model identified? If so, propose an estimator.

## Question 4

Recall the function  $Q$  we defined in class that maps  $(J - 1) \times 1$  vector of utilities into  $(J - 1) \times 1$  vector of probabilities. Recall that we defined  $r$  as a mapping from  $(J - 1) \times 1$  vector of utilities to  $(J - 1) \times 1$  vector implicitly using  $Q$ .

- a) Show that the  $\sum_j \left| \frac{\partial}{\partial u_j} r_k \right| < 1$  for all  $k$ .
- b) Make sure you understand the proof that  $Q$  is onto and one-to-one.

## Question 5

- (a) Tell me if there are any suggestions/comments about the class.
- (b) Tell me briefly what you are thinking of doing in terms of your class project.