

Logic and Metaphysics in Early 20th Century

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Heidegger and Carnap share a cultural background which informs their philosophical insights and methodologies. This background is Weberian. Both thinkers wish to answer the question: What do we do about the incommensurability of facts and meaning?

Both thinkers are reacting to the Neo-Kantianism which was highly prevalent in the late 19th and early 20th century in Germany. Heidegger's teacher and the renowned logician Edmund Husserl had recently published his books *Logical Investigations* and *Ideas*, which were designed to put formal logic on new grounds. These grounds were phenomenological in nature; that is, in order to ground logic, Husserl believed we needed a strong understanding of our intuitive capacity to reason. In Kantian terms, Husserl was responding to the sentiment that the intuitions of reason espoused in the first critique were in need of a grounding. Husserl's solution was to create an idealist structure of phenomena: abstract, absolute ideas of experience. These were to structure and govern our rational thinking in all realms of life.

Carnap, as a founding member of logical positivism and a follower of Russell and Wittgenstein, was keen to find a logical structure by which to understand the world. He did so in his book, *The Logical Structure of the World*. His project was constructivist. He would proceed from the atomic structures of our reason - the phenomenological basis, akin to Husserl's phenomenology, though far simpler. Instead of proposing a realm of abstract entities, Carnap would propose a single phenomenal structure, that of [FIXME]. His aim is to show the unified basis of all the sciences, that is, to show that there is only one proper science, and that the separation of the sciences into epistemologically and ontologically distinct subfields is a mistake. Additionally, his emphasis is on the prior ontological status of structure: "...the object and its concept are one and the same. This identification does not amount to a reification of the concept, but, on the contrary, is a 'functionalization' of the object." (Carnap 2003, 10)

Bibliography

Carnap, Rudolf. 2003. *The Logical Structure of the World and Pseudoproblems in Philosophy*. Open Court Classics. Chicago, Ill: Open Court.