

Technology and Disenchantment in Heidegger and Carnap

Phoenix Ada Rose Mandala

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The famous contestation between Heidegger and Carnap is often seen as an early example of the divide between the analytic and continental traditions in philosophy. Recent research has indicated the increasing importance of understanding the political and sociocultural backgrounds of our two thinkers in order to make sense of their positions. This paper will discuss the shared background and show how it expresses itself in terms of our thinkers' metaethical philosophies, and how their metaethics is shaped by their epistemological projects and conceptions of language. I will argue that Heidegger's theory of dwelling provides a better basis for metatheoretical discussion than Carnap's embrace of scientific-technological thinking.

Technology and Disenchantment

(Damböck 2022a) argues that Carnap and Heidegger follow Weber in maintaining an existentialist ethical decisionism. Carnap's preference for scientific rationality results in a non-cognitivism, essentially shifting the ethical into a psychological field of study. Heidegger will argue that, while scientific (cognitive) reasoning cannot capture values, we still have a method for determining which values to choose through resolute action toward an archetypal ideal. Damböck claims that Heidegger, in moving away from the Enlightenment value of instrumental reasoning, wants to remove science from philosophy altogether. While I agree with Damböck on Carnap, I will argue his understanding of Heidegger is naïve in this respect.

Carnap and Heidegger were young men in 1914 when the world went to war. The horror of industrial warfare and the decline of Western religious practices prompted a youth movement whose primary concern was the overcoming of Enlightenment sensibility and the disenchantment that came with it. In 1917, Max Weber addressed the following to students of the youth movement:

...what is the meaning of science as a vocation, now after all these former illusions ...have been dispelled? Tolstoy has given the simplest answer, with the words: "Science is meaningless because it gives no answer to our question, the only

question important for us: 'What shall we do and how shall we live?'" That science does not give an answer to this is indisputable. The only question that remains is the sense in which science gives "no" answer, and whether or not science might yet be of some use to the one who puts the question correctly. (Weber 2014, p139)

So in disenchantment the classic dilemma of is and ought had come to characterize modernity: What are we to do about the incommensurability of empirical-scientific facts, as embodied by technology, and theological-existential meaning, as embodied by faith? This split was felt politically as well, with the scientifically-oriented drawn to socialism and the theologically concerned drawn to fascism.¹

For Carnap and the Vienna Circle, the limitations of science are themselves the limitations of knowledge. Taking physics as their model, they believed that anything that can be said about material things can and must be stated in logical-empirical language. The guiding star of their approach was the verification principle: Any meaningful statement must be subject to logical-empirical verification. If a statement fails to meet this criterion, it is considered "nonsense" (*Sinnlos*, lit. without sense). Metaphysical statements are inherently unverifiable, so the positivists claim, and so are not subject to proper scientific-philosophical discourse. Instead, they are considered to have only expressive meaning. This attitude is not to be taken as strictly austere, however, as the scientific attitude is meant to serve life.² It is from an existential and political concern with the well-being of the common man that the Vienna Circle proclaims their attitude. To them, metaphysics not only poses a threat to science, but to organized human life.

1. This movement to overcome modernity may alternately be described as a Nietzschean "revaluation of all values." Heidegger's involvement with Nietzsche is well-known. Carnap's interest in Nietzsche is less obvious, but he is known to have read and thought rather highly of him. See (Sachs 2011), (Stone 2017, n22) for Nietzschean interpretations of Carnap's faith in science.

2. This paragraph summarizes the primary argument used against Heidegger in Carnap's famous "Überwindung" (Carnap 1966). Although Carnap's logical arguments fall flat on a modern reading, the argument's focus on the verification principle and the notion of metaphysics as nonsense remains.

In “The Scientific Conception of the World” (Hahn et al. 1973), the Circle explicitly link their worldview with contemporaneous socialist movements. They acknowledge a widespread disenchantment among Weberian lines, connected with the industrial mode of production. They claim that “The European public with their socialist attitudes tend to lean towards a down-to-earth empiricist view. In previous times *materialism* was the expression of this view; meanwhile, however, modern empiricism has ... taken a strong shape in the *scientific world-conception*” (p21f). Their solution to disenchantment can be found in the hope they place in science and collectivist movements taking shape throughout the continent. If disenchantment is defined as the crisis emerging from the loss of theological and royal authority, then the Circle’s solution is to *lean in*, to root out the old and make room for the new.

It is well-known that Heidegger took the rectorate at Freiburg under Nazi reign and delivered lectures on the “inner greatness” of the Nazi party, but that he was later taciturn about his involvements in the regime. While Heidegger’s fascism and antisemitism are subjects of much debate and are themselves worthy of discussion, we will leave aside any positive account of his politics in order to focus on his critique of socialism.

Heidegger argues that communism and “Americanism” (what I assume to be liberal-democratic industrial capitalism) are forms of “planetary technicity” (Heidegger 1981, p206). This critique is not a row against science or technology in the sense of tool-use or objectivity. Rather, it is an expression of disenchantment which takes the form of a desire for a secularized sense of divinity. Modern technology reveals itself as an enframing (*Ge-stell*) and challenges mankind to see all beings as essentially physical. Instead of allowing the Being of beings to speak to us through *poesis*, the enframing aspect of technology forces us to view all being as potentially technological. This ultimately leads to a technological conception of mankind itself, as expressed in the

science of cybernetics (Heidegger 2008d). It is exactly the scientific world-view which Heidegger is opposing, and which Carnap represents.

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger argues for a metaethic of resolute decision. In essence, he will argue that what founds ethics is our ability to choose ourselves, to make an authentic decision about who we want to be within the society we live in. His metaethic is then both highly personal while allowing for a cultural ethic to emerge. The later Heidegger, especially in "Building Dwelling Thinking" (Heidegger 2008b), will argue for a metaethic based on "dwelling within the fourfold." This is a foundational relation to the metaphorical ententeis of earth, sky, divinities, and mortals. In dwelling, Being reveals itself to us as Being; the question of Being becomes possible to pose. I read dwelling as a being-alongside beings in the world, to the extent that we allow Being to show itself in the fourfold. I will explain this conception in more detail later, but what is important for our overview is the idea that the scientific worldview enframes us in such a way that the question of Being becomes impossible for us. We are no longer able to dwell, and in this way we lose the safeguarding of the fourfold, and so we lose the potentiality for being as we truly are.

As shown, our thinkers are concerned with Weberian disenchantment, and both are looking for metaethical solutions to the social problems it causes. But their methods differ as dramatically as their political goals. Carnap wants to bring the Enlightenment project to a conclusion with the total empiricization of philosophy. He does so in order to clear space for a collectivist world free from metaphysics. Heidegger, however, wants to destruct this method and worldview in order to open up the possibility of a new, poetic kind of philosophy.

Next we will focus on our thinkers' stances on the nature of logic and value theory. I will show how for each author: (1.) Scientific thought is formal in nature and cannot capture values; (2.) Language is a key aspect of relating between the mind and

the world; (3.) The manner in which we use language corresponds directly to our practical, political, and ethical aims.

Logic, Science, and Social Democracy

For Carnap, the end of science is to “find and order the true statements about the objects of experience” (*Aufbau*, §179). This can be split into two further goals: to create a constructional system corresponding to formal logic, and to investigate the relationships between objects of non-constructed experience. We then have two foundational aspects of construction theory: conventional stipulation of logical syntax and verification through empirical investigation.

Carnap proceeds from unanalyzable phenomenological units which he calls basic experiences. These are whole-field conscious experiences which appear epistemically prior to the analysis of their constitutive parts. They are precisely the object of phenomenological analysis in Husserl’s sense (*Aufbau*, §64).³ However, basic experiences do not have any relation to a subject; the “for-me-ness” is analyzed into it after the fact. Similar to how we can only call integers “integers” in contradistinction to the real numbers once we have constructed them, we only understand our basic experiences as autopsychological in contrast with the later-constructed physical and heteropsychological objects. (*Aufbau*, III.C *passim*.).

Despite the inability to analyze the experiences themselves, he “quasi-analyzes” them by creating a formal allegory and examining the structures thereof. This amounts to a functionalization of objects, a switch from an ontological/material perspective to a structural/functional perspective. In this way, he constructs the world through a purely formal analysis of basic experience. On this basis he claims to transform foundational

3. Carnap believed his system to be compatible with the three major epistemological movements: realism, idealism, and phenomenism (*Aufbau*, §177f). Nonetheless, he chose the Husserlian phenomena as his starting point.

epistemology from a speculative practice into a mathematically rigorous, logistical process.

In the *Aufbau*, Carnap aims to formulate a “one true language” from which to construct the world. In response to formal difficulties arising from the construction of the physical from the autopsychological, he is forced to reconsider his stance on logic, eventually realizing that there are many valid formal logics. Once we reach the *Syntax*, this stipulatory nature is formalized into the principle of tolerance.

In logic, there are no morals. Everyone is at liberty to build up his own logic, i.e. his own form of language, as he wishes. All that is required of him is that, if he wishes to discuss it, he must state his methods clearly, and give syntactical rules instead of philosophical arguments. (*Syntax*, §17)

Since logistics is the ideal evaluative framework, but there are multiple valid logistical systems, it is up to us to find the ideal system to relate to our practical aims, whatever they may be.

Analogous to the ontological and functional perception of gestalt phenomena, Carnap distinguishes between two modes of speech, the material and the formal. The distinction is defined by a translation between the formal-structural semantic statements of the kind discussed in the *Syntax* and the material-ontological mode of speech which postulates properties of objects with little concern for structural soundness. Crucially, some material sentences, specifically those that propose spurious universal properties, cannot be translated into formal syntax. While Carnap claims that the material mode of speech is perfectly acceptable, and in fact unavoidable, he warns us that untranslatable material statements lead us to speak metaphysically. Metaphysical statements are a kind of expression, but they cannot be subject to claims about truth and falsity in the sense of logical-empirical validity, and so have no place in a scientific philosophy.

Translatability into the formal mode of speech constitutes the touchstone for all philosophical sentences ...Sentences which do not give even a slight indication to determine their translation are outside the realm of the language of science and

therefore incapable of discussion, no matter what depths or heights of feeling they may stir. (*Syntax*, §81)

So Carnap has his linguistic prescription: if you wish to be intelligible, you must speak in a manner consistent with the formal mode of speech.

It is precisely this attitude which spells out the dangers of metaphysics. Metaphysical speech has the appearance of scientific rationality, while in fact only prescribing an orientation toward the world. This can lead to an unearned sense of authority for the individual. Carnap's argument against metaphysics - and especially against Heidegger - consists in this: speculative metaphysics is inherently authoritarian by lack of verifiability. In contrast, a social-scientific ethics undoubtedly places a large emphasis on the authority of the group and the sentiment of comradeship which is essential for the scientific enterprise.

Carnap claims in a 1932 lecture that ethical claims are in essence prescriptive statements, specifically imperatives. These statements are manifestations of an attitude toward life. Importantly, imperatives are *not* translatable into formal language. We can see how easy it is to spin up spurious universals by analyzing ethical statements. "Do not kill," for example, is clearly an imperative, while "killing is evil" is an assertion about a universal property which does not admit of empirical evidence (Carnap 1996, §1.4). "Evil" is not a material thing, nor a property thereof. Carnap's own prescription, the scientific worldview, must then itself be an expression of an attitude toward life, and admits of no proper evidence other than a particular kind of faith in science.

Whence then our confidence that our call for clarity, for a science that is free from metaphysics, will be heard? It stems from the knowledge or, to put it somewhat more carefully, from the belief that these opposing powers belong to the past. ...Our work is carried by the faith that this attitude will win the future. (*Aufbau*, xvii.f)

The inability to formalize value statements leads Carnap directly into the famous argument against positivism, that the verification principle itself is a prescription, and

cannot be verified. Any justification for a value must be made within the language of science, but the objects of its study are a matter of *psychology* and not something which can be derived from universal principles of reason. Carnap was not ignorant of this problem. Although he cannot ground the scientific worldview on rational grounds, he argues that approaching the world scientifically is the only way to ensure the survival of the sciences.

(Damböck 2022b) proposes three key aspects of Carnap's relationship between science and practical philosophy. (Note that these are exactly the points Weber makes in "Science as a Vocation.") First, scientific attitudes allow us to evaluate the consistency of our beliefs. Second, they can show us the causal relations between events, thus giving us a good idea of the outcomes of our decisions. Third, science can reveal to us a relationship between our means and ends. This final point is crucial for us, as it is here Carnap's noncognitivism bridges into socialism. In order to understand this we need to understand what makes an ethical statement sound.

A proper ethical statement must be logically consistent, and the feeling which underlies it must be temporally persistent. We need to discard temporary feelings in favor of long-term deliberative consensus. This is akin to a thermodynamic process, where stochastic motion of particles (in this case, feelings) eventually evens out into a long-term "temperature" (attitude). Rational discourse and deliberation plays a key factor in this process. In addition to private deliberation, we must be able to reconcile our beliefs with those of others. In order to do so objectively, we must remain open to emotive and organizational challenges. Damböck gives the examples of the staunch Christian, who must remain committed to their religious doctrine, and the Neoliberal, who is closed to centralized organization (p515). If we are to adopt a scientific attitude everywhere, then it is only Marxist material analysis which can provide a consistent empirical account of the causes and effects of our economic and political actions. So it is socialism which most adequately responds to the demands of science, and which can

best provide us a formal/empirical metaethic. Any other mode of thought must necessarily proceed from dogmatic assumptions, and so must result in an ultimately authoritarian politic.

In summary: (1.) Science is logistic in nature, proceeding from basic experiences to the construction of the world, while value postulation is a matter of irrational prescription, an animal reaction to chance situation. (2.) The material mode of speech is natural but insufficient, leading us into confusion. If one is to proceed scientifically, they must speak in a way which is translatable into the formal mode of speech. (3.) Material language has potentially deleterious psychological effects. The formal mode of speech most clearly aligns itself with a communitarian ethic, and specifically, the communist politic, while the material mode of speech aligns itself most easily with authoritarianism.

Beyond Logic

Heidegger, like Carnap, begins his analysis from phenomenological grounds. But his idea of a phenomenon is quite different. His system is very intricate, so we will only have the space to cover a small fraction of it here, mainly as it appears in *Being and Time*.⁴ We will focus only on what is necessary to contrast his understanding of scientific rationality from Carnap's through a reading of his critique of Descartes.

Heidegger's project is to study what it means for anything to be at all. This is the question of Being. For Heidegger, the question of Being is the proper aim of philosophy; it will take shape as a fundamental ontology. The goal of ontology is to set the *a priori* foundations for the study of beings in general. In analogy with Carnap, Heidegger's approach is to analyze both the ontic, object-oriented sciences and the ontological, functional structure of consciousness in general. In doing so he and Carnap take on Husserl's goal of uniting the phenomena and the grounds of our rational faculties.

4. References to *Being and Time* are to the original page numbers, prefixed with an H. in the cited edition.

However, in contrast to Carnap, in order to understand the object Heidegger believes we must understand it *as* an object, i.e., as it appears. We cannot functionalize it, proceed by analogy, and consider this to be a full explanation. We must consider phenomena in their relation to our Being as a *whole*, picking apart the various equiprimordial roots of our phenomenal experiences. For Heidegger, this entails an essential relation of Being to the horizon of time, and especially to death. In considering Being we will come to a better understanding of the ambiguity inherent in the material mode of speech.

We humans are exceptional in that our ontic existence is in fact ontological; that is, our Being is something we recognize, and which forms a problematic for us. This recognition makes us naturally capable of ontology. Because of this exceptional feature, it is through an analysis of *our* Being, what Heidegger calls Dasein (lit. “being-there”) that we can come to an understanding of Being in general. Further, this analytic must occur as Dasein exists “proximally and for the most part,” in its everydayness. In so doing we will not only found the sciences, but all other meaningful orientation toward the world. (*Basic Writings*, Int. I)

The method of this analysis is phenomenology. Though the term “phenomenology” implies a scientific approach, the form of *lógos* Heidegger has in mind is quite different from both the traditional syllogistic logic and the new mathematical logistics. What Heidegger means by *lógos* is attained through an etymological analysis of the original Greek terms. *Lógos* is the manner in which a discussion allows the object of discourse to be seen (in Aristotle, *apophaínesthai*). In this way, truth (*aléthia*, lit. “not to escape notice”) becomes a manner of “disclosing” or “discovering” (*phaínesthai*, lit. “letting-be-seen”) the phenomenon, with falsity being a manner of “covering up” (*pseúdesthai*) to hide the “true” nature of the being as the object of discourse. So in this way, *lógos* as logistics cannot be the locus of truth. It is only in the phenomenon, or aesthetic experience, in which we find truth. “*Aísthesis*, the sheer sensory perception of something, is ‘true’ in the Greek sense, and indeed more primordially than the *lógos*

which we have been discussing” (*Basic Writings*, p33). *Aísthesis* cannot cover up, as it displays itself as itself (as *noeîn*, cf Husserl’s *noema*); at worst it can be a kind of non-perceiving (*agnoeîn*). The object of *aísthesis* is the *ídia* as, and for example, color is the object of sight. Though *aísthesis* shows things as they are, covering-up occurs through synthesis, the showing of something as or through something else. *Aísthesis* does not occur through a faculty of cognition, but directly. For Heidegger, rationality in the scientific sense occurs only atop of apohpantic logos, which itself is derivative of aesthetic/phenomenal understanding. (*Basic Writings*, Int. II.A, B)

So, the task of phenomenology is to (literally) discover the ideas (*qua* principles) of aesthetic perception. In this way, *contra* Carnap, “for-me-ness” is an essential aspect of the phenomenon. It is clear then that the *manner* in which things appear to us is of deep importance to Heidegger, and that the manner in which we express ourselves will be key to disclosing Being. He contends that our language has developed in accordance with the ontic perception. In order to overcome this, he requires us to rethink the manner in which we relate to, understand, and discuss the world.

Things in the world can show themselves to us in different ways. Two of the most important orientations are readiness-to-hand and presence-to-hand. Ready-to-hand entities are visible in their tool-use: they make themselves apparent to us in their useful capacities toward some goal or another. But when the tool breaks, we stop to consider the entity as it is in itself, as a material thing with constitutive parts, etc. This viewpoint, when the entity is considered primarily *as* entity, is presence-at-hand.

Heidegger characterizes us as thrown into the world, made to orient ourselves. We do so through our state-of-mind, manifested as mood. Our moods turn us *away* from ourselves and toward the world, thus revealing beings to us in their factual nature. Entities only appear to us as present-at-hand (in their utility) or otherwise because we are already predisposed by our moods to find them in this way (*Basic Writings*, I.5 ¶29). Alongside mood, we find the equally basic relation of understanding. The world

discloses itself to us, and thus we to ourselves, in our possibilities, that is, in all the potential relations which they may hold. Potentiality is always future-oriented as something not yet actual, and never necessary. Understanding, then, as equiprimordial with state-of-mind, is a future-oriented disclosure of the potentiality of the world. This aspect of understanding is called projection. Our moods, as a turning-away, close off certain possibilities for us, thus restricting our sight. The manner in which projection works out its restricted possibilities is called interpretation, and the manner in which we then see something *as* something is called articulation. But this potential-utility of the ready-to-hand object, for example, manifests itself through a *totality* of involvements. Every potentiality of the ready-to-hand is such an involvement, and the ready-to-hand is only understood as relating to the entire mesh of these potential involvements.

Since only what is understood can be articulated, all predication always already has the structure of understanding. As a matter of fixed predication, assertion is itself a kind of interpretation. But, since all understanding relates entities to Dasein and in so doing wraps up their being within Dasein's world, any *meaning* as such will be discovered alongside the Being of Dasein. (*Basic Writings*, ¶31f)

So, Heidegger characterizes meaningful entities as just those entities which are understood in relation to our thrown projection, restricted in their possibilities (for utilization) by our state-of-mind. This interpretive structure is circular: we project meaningful possibility onto the ready-to-hand only because we already have a network of possibility structures in place by which to interpret them.

What is decisive is not to get out of the circle but to come into it in the right way. This circle of understanding is not an orbit in which any random kind of knowledge may move; it is the expression of the existential *fore-structure* of Dasein itself. ...In the circle is hidden a positive possibility of the most primordial kind of knowing. (*Basic Writings*, p153)

Logistical analysis then becomes a kind of interpretation, a tearing-apart of what has been seen together in synthesis. He characterizes logic as operating on the basis of an

ontic, “apophantical ‘as,’” in opposition to the “existential-hermeneutical ‘as’” of the ontological stance. In the ontic approach, “The judgement gets dissolved logistically into a system in which things are ‘co-ordinated’ with one another; it becomes the object of a ‘calculus’; but it does not become a theme for ontological Interpretation” (*Basic Writings*, p159). That is to say, within the ontic mode of speech, we are unable to pursue an ontological discourse which can account for the socio-psychological aspects of our understanding. Apophantic logos misses the character of “thought” in Heidegger’s sense, as it does not clear the space for an existential-hermeneutic analysis, and so is vastly limited in its possibilities.

Now, finally, we come to characterize discourse or speech (*Rede*) as equiprimordial with state-of-mind and understanding. As shown, meaning-making is a manner of interpretation, which takes the form of articulation. Meaning is that which is articulated. But what has been understood, and thus articulated, is always a totality of significations. The meaning of an utterance can be broken apart into separate significations, as in apophantic logos, and mapped to words. (*Basic Writings*, p161ff)

In order to communicate, we must be able both to speak and to listen. Listening takes the form of *being quiet*; through this we open ourselves up to be *with* others. But listening, that is, hearkening to the understanding which is to be communicated, can only occur because one is proximally alongside the Other. In this being-with, we find ourselves already with an understanding of the thing that any intelligible discourse is about. In order to be understood, one must already be in a shared state-of-mind (*Basic Writings*, p163ff). This is to say that understanding requires that one shares at least some portion of their “web of beliefs” with the other party, even if that understanding is as “minimal” as a shared natural language, or the same night sky.

With all this in mind we can understand Heidegger’s call to destruct the Cartesian logical-empirical project. To Descartes, mathematical clarity, as an unchanging eternal ideal, is the arbiter of truth. To the extent that something truly “is,” its existence can be

described in terms of mathematical rigor. But in order to do so, Descartes bases his ontology on the *res extensa*, i.e. on Nature. The mathematical mode of thought is apophantical, taking entities as they are present-to-hand, and reduced to their material-empirical properties, a deeply artificial state of mind. Descartes “prescribes for the world its ‘real’ Being, as it were, on the basis of an idea of Being whose source has not been unveiled and which has not been demonstrated in its own right – an idea in which Being is equated with constant presence-at-hand.” (*Basic Writings*, p96) This second-hand knowledge - of material substance as constantly present-at-hand - forces us to avoid the question of value. As Carnap says, anything which goes beyond what can be empirically verified is nonsensical, i.e., cannot be formalized. This is exactly right, and it is exactly the issue.

As in the “Question Concerning Technology,” Heidegger claims that the empirical project, through modern technology, has dissociated humanity from its primordial nature. In addition to being a means to an end and a human activity, to Heidegger technology is a kind of revealing, an interpretive apparatus. Modern technology reveals the world as standing-reserve, available to us only in its possibility for consumption, i.e. translation into physical energy. Throughout his later work, as in “The Task of Thinking” and “Only a God can Save Us,” Heidegger uses this argument in explicit opposition to socialism, which he calls “a form of planetary technicity” (Heidegger 1981, p206). A Marxist might consider this strange: it is the capitalist class who exploits his fellow-man with technology in order to gain the excess wealth of his production. But Heidegger would respond: the worker and capitalist are both enframed, driven to view the world as standing-reserve irrespective of their class status. Socialism will not fix this problem because it does not understand the essence on which it is grounded.

His alternative is found in the concept of dwelling. In *Being and Time*, the question of Being is phrased in terms of the meaning of Being. This provides an ontological analysis, which essentially takes the shape of a traditional scientific treatise. In this

treatise the final fundamental aspect of Dasein is revealed as temporality. The second, unfinished part of *Being and Time* was to be a reversal of the analysis, "Time and Being," in which he was to deconstruct the history of Being as understood in the Western philosophical canon. He found that the scientific-ontological mode of language was inappropriate for the task at hand. Scientific thought imposes our image on nature; it is inherently technic; our interpretation of the world is too "loud." When the question of Being shifted to ask, "how does Being unfold?", Heidegger likewise shifted to a poetic form of language, one which is more suited to *listening*. Under this new questioning, Being reveals itself to us through the fourfold character of dwelling. This fourfold character is unified, and reveals itself in the ecstatic (phenomenally prominent) characters of the earth, the sky, mortals, and gods. Each has its own characteristic interaction; we save the earth, we receive the sky, await the divinities, and initiate the mortals. Right away it is apparent that the scientific mode of language is inappropriate here. It is, in fact, inappropriate for the kind of at-home-ness that Heidegger is attempting to articulate.

The question for Heidegger, then, becomes the manner in which we ought to relate to Being as a whole. The task is to think "of the possibility that the world civilization that is just now beginning might one day overcome its technological-scientific-industrial character as the sole criterion of man's world sojourn" (Heidegger 2008c, p437). In order to do so, we must save the earth (by reconsidering our relation to spatiality), receive the sky (by dwelling temporally), await the gods (by finding essentially new social archetypes within a natural-technical world), and initiate mortals (by dwelling poetically and authentically toward death). Each of these essential relations to Being have parallels in *Being and Time*, in Being-in-the-world, the historicity of Being, our fallen and projective character toward Others, and finally our Being-toward-death and the character of resolute authenticity. Unfortunately, we do not have the time to discuss any of this further.

So, to conclude: (1.) Science is formal in nature, relying on an orientation which prefers ontic analysis over ontological. Values arise from existential considerations, which can be explicated only in terms of a hermeneutic analysis of Dasein. (2.) Our being-in-the-world, thus our understanding and our state-of-mind, is equiprimordial with and becomes intelligible through discourse, which reifies itself in language. (3.) The scientific worldview and its formal language lends itself to an ontic orientation which puts us at risk of dehumanization. Socialism and global capitalism, as technocratic regimes, reduce all Being into standing-reserve, potential for utilization toward an unexamined end. The challenge for post-modernity is to understand its relation to the new, technical world, and to create archetypal relations in which Being may reveal itself to us anew.

Conclusion

I have argued that Heidegger and Carnap are motivated by a Weberian disenchantment with modern technological existence. While Carnap strives to for a purely scientific world-view and philosophical discipline with social-democratic values, essentially leaning in to the Enlightenment project of world technicity, Heidegger argues for a poetic sense of dwelling in which we are to challenge our relationship to technological thought in order to build new relations to Being.

Carnap's scientific attitude proposes a non-cognitivism which relies on conciliatory democratic principles. He argues that Heidegger's brand of assertive material speech is dangerous because of its ability to propose spurious metaphysical properties and tendency toward authoritarianism. He favors a purely structural account on the grounds that logistics is the foundational mode of rationality. These arguments are based in Enlightenment-era thought, and are seen as a way to bring them to their completion. In this way Carnap tackles the problem of disenchantment by proposing a life-reform project based on scientific rationality, leaning into the primacy of rationality.

Heidegger's poetic attitude proposes a sort of non-cognitive contemplation which relies on a fundamental relationship to ourselves and our environment. He asks us to listen to Being rather than press our will on it through technology. The essence of technology is found in an enframing which forces us to view the world, and even ourselves, as a sort of resource, ready to be utilized to an end which we cannot examine through its lens. His analysis is at first based on a phenomenological hermeneutic of our lived experience, and later turned toward an analysis of Being as it expresses itself through poetic language. In this way Heidegger tackles the problem of disenchantment by leaning into the "more primordial truth" of poetic thinking.

It has been proposed that the gap between these two thinkers may be irreconcilable. On the contrary, Heidegger's position can account for the scientific presuppositions of Carnap's position. However, Carnap has a good eye for the sociopsychological character of group deliberation and the importance of democratic consensus, which Heidegger does not discuss. If there is to be a resolution, it must proceed from a natural-technic ground à la Heidegger, and must account for Carnap's sharp eye for the social good.

It has also been proposed that we might find a solution to our thinkers' differences in Cassirer. However, this proposal misses the crucial cultural link between them. Cassirer's methods are still steeped in Enlightenment-era philosophical aesthetics. His Kantian method is a representation of his commitment to conciliatory liberal republicanism (Friedman 2000, p3f), the very same which failed to account for modern technology's existential challenge. Although we can look to Cassirer for a remarkable fusion between the philosophies of Heidegger and Carnap, we cannot look to him for an overcoming of modernity.

Heidegger is not against science, and Carnap is not against poetry. These two thinkers are not as at odds as one may think. If Heidegger offers a critique of the scientific worldview, it is not to say that he is not a scientific realist, only that he sees the

technological mode of Being as one among many. Instead of proceeding from a highly developed technological world-view to reconstruct the world, Heidegger suggests we sit and listen, to allow the world to speak to us as it exists in us and alongside us.

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