Name:	 	
Partner(s):_		

Buffer Overflows and the Stack

A. Introduction

In IC221, you recently learned about some attacks on system programs. In this activity, we focus on one of those attacks:

Overflow Attacks: Where the attack overflows a buffer to alter program state.

Previously, you saw the harmful effects when the contents of one buffer can overflow into another, different buffer. What happens, though, if a buffer overflow actually causes changes to the program stack? Since you have already studied the MIPS program stack in great detail, you are prepared to investigate!

<u>Scenario:</u> You are an attacker and have managed to steal the source code for an ATM control program. You can't modify the code, but by studying the code can you find a stack-related weakness that allows you to take control of the ATM?

B. Review of the Program Stack

Recall that, when a function begins executing, it typically allocates new space on the stack using a command like this:

That command would save space for <u>three</u> items on the stack (each of size 4 bytes). Recall also that the stack grows <u>downward</u> (e.g. towards lower addresses) – thus the shift of -12 instead of +12 in the stack pointer.

The stack is potentially used to "save" four types of information:

- 1. Argument registers (e.g., \$a0, \$a1, etc.)
- 2. The return address (\$ra)
- 3. "Saved" registers (\$s0, \$s1, etc.) if the function wants to modify them.
- 4. Local arrays or structures note this might include a buffer!

Consider #4: suppose a user manages to overflow a buffer of characters that is stored on the stack. This might possibly overwrite the contents of any of those 4 things in the list above. Any such change could cause problems, but changing which kind of thing (from the list above) is most likely to cause <u>major</u>

problems for the executing program? Answer the question by circling 1, 2, 3, or 4 above.

C. Getting Started with the Target Program

1. Ask your instructor if you have any "group number".

	→ Enter group number:				
2.	Follow directions from your instructor to download the source code to the ATM program.				
	Be sure to get the right source code for your group!				
	Remember, you may <u>not</u> modify this program.				
3.	Open qtSpim.				
4.	Select File->Reinitialize and Load File, then open the file you saved above.				
5. 6.					
7.	You probably can't guess the password, but you should still be able to crash the ATM/program without too much difficulty – keep trying until you can!				
8.	→ What is a password that crashes the program?				
D. S	tudying the Target Program				
1.	Open the target program in a text editor (or refer to a printed copy if available).				
2.	Look first at main().				
	a. What <u>function</u> does main() first call? \rightarrow				
	b. What <u>function</u> does main() ultimately call if the password is correct?				
	(not just a label, but a proper function)				
	Remember this function — your goal is to trick the program into executing it!				
3.	Look back at 2(b) – double-check that what you wrote down is definitely a <u>function</u> and not something else – this will be important later!				
4.	Now look at the functions below main(). What function actually <u>reads</u> the password from the				
••	user? →				
	(Hint: the password is read as a string. What syscall <u>reads</u> a string into an array/buffer?)				
	(Hint: this is NOT necessarily the same function that prompts the user – we want to know where				
	a character string is actually read, via a syscall, into the program)				
5.	Examine the function that you just found (in Question 3). If you could crash the program by				
	simply entering a password, then quite likely there is a bug or flaw in that function!				
	This may take a little time, but review the function with your partner to find the flaw.				
	Talk to your instructor if you need help.				
	What is the bug/flaw? ->				

E. In-depth Recon on the Target Program

The flaw that you discovered allows an attacker to possibly overwrite the contents of a return address that was stored on the stack. Big problem! When the program later reloads the return address and then uses it $(jr \ \$ra)$, then the program "returns" to the wrong return address! Let's watch how this works:

- 1. In qtSpim, select "Data Segment" from the menu up top. Remove the check from "User Data", but ensure that the check is present for "User Stack."
- 2. Restart the program (Reinitialize and Load File), but do NOT yet run.
- 3. Find address [0040009c] in the program this is inside the readAndCheckPassword() function, just <u>before</u> actually reading the password string from the user.
- 4. Verify that the instruction at this address is "syscall" if not, see instructor.
- 5. Right click on that address, and select "Set breakpoint." A small "hand" icon should appear on that line. [NOTE: if you reset the program, you'll have to add this breakpoint again]
- 6. Run the program (F5). You may see (in the console) that it has printed the password "prompt" string, but do NOT enter a password yet.
- 7. When the "Breakpoint" dialog window appears, select "Abort".
- 8. In qtSpim, click on the "Data" tab (next to the "Text" tab, near top of screen, just below the menu bar). You should see something resembling this (numbers will be different):

Make sure it says "User Stack." Note the first row shown is the "top" of the stack (e.g. where the most recent data goes).

Each row shows some contents from the stack. Examine the first row:

- At far left (e.g., [7ffff4d4]) is the starting address for that row of data.
- Next is the hex value for each word of data. For instance, 00422740 is one word (4 bytes). Key point: we have here a "Little Endian" machine. That means that for data value 00422740, the bytes are actually stored in memory in reverse order: 40 27 42 00.
- Finally, on the right hand side is the ASCII representation of each byte. So the bytes 40 27 42 00 are shown as the equivalent characters **@ ' B** . (a period is used for any "non-printing" value, like 0).
- Find an ASCII chart (hardcopy or online). Verify that ASCII hex 42 is the letter B.
 - → What is the ASCII hex value for the letter g (small G)? _____

9.		again at <u>your</u> "User Stack" in qtSpim. n addresses (hex values starting with	Within the first 2-3 rows of data you should see <u>two</u>	<u>)</u>
		are the two return addresses? (shou	•	
		·	(are stored return addresses, point to <u>code</u>)	
		at address on the stack are they stor		
	\rightarrow	and	(are addresses on the stack, point to storage)
		: if both partners do this, the address		
10	-		ose two return addresses are on the stack. Things ma	зу
	change	ge soon, so make sure you know whe	re they are to begin with!	
11.	. Now le	et's see what goes wrong when you	enter a password that is too long for the buffer:	
	a.	Click on the "Text" tab of qtSpim (instead of "Data")	
	b.	Verify that you are still at PC=[00	10009c] (a syscall instruction)	
	c.	Press "F10" to "step" one instruct	on.	
		(If a window pops up about a brea	kpoint, select "Single Step")	
	d.	. If the input "console" does not im	mediately pop up, find it in your Windows taskbar, o	r
		via selecting Window->Console (p	ossibly twice) from the qtSpim menu at top.	
	e.	, ,		
		-	ce/Delete key won't work to correct errors!!)	
	f.		• •	
	g.	•	_	
	h.	, , ,		
		(if not, try again or ask the instruc		
	i.		und where <u>two</u> return addresses were being stored o	nc
		the stack). One of them is not the		
		→ Which return address was clol	obered? 004 (complete the address)	
		→ What four bytes (in hex) are the	nere now instead?	
		(write down in same order as s	hown on your screen)	
		→ What four <u>ASCII characters</u> do	es that correspond to?	
		(write down in same order as t	ne raw bytes above)	
		→ Which part of the password d	d those characters come from?	_

F. Exploiting the Target Program

1.		ack at what you just did. You overwrote a return address with a password – in other
	words,	with some characters that <u>you</u> can control!
	a.	Look back at Part D, Question 2(b) – this identified your goal function. Look <u>carefully</u> in
		qtSpim. \rightarrow What is the <u>address</u> of the <u>start</u> of that function?
	b.	→ What four characters does that correspond to?
	c.	So what complete password would cause the program to "return" to that location?
		→ Enter a "candidate" working password here:
		(This is a key step, so please write especially clearly!)
		(Think carefully about the order and placement of your characters!)
2.	Let's se	ee if it works!
	a.	File->Reinitialize and Load File
	b.	Set breakpoint at PC=[0040009c]
	c.	F5 to run, then click "Abort".
	d.	F10 to step, then click "Single Step."
	e.	Switch to console, enter your "candidate" password and hit return.
	f.	Cick on the "Data" tab and examine the stack. Does it have the address you want (see question 1(a) above)? Is it in the right place (replacing where a return address used to be)?
	g.	
	J	If it does, press F5 to continue.
		i. Do you get an error? If so, something is wrong.
		ii. Did you reach the goal? If so, celebrate (!) and then
		→ Enter account #:
G. V	Vrap	ping up
1.	This pr	ogram was exploitable because
	a.	There were return addresses on the stack.
	b.	There was a buffer on the stack.
	c.	It was possible to overflow the buffer.
2.	We pro	bbably can't avoid (a), but we could put the buffer somewhere else (where?). And we
	could t	ry to prevent the buffer from overflowing (how?). Be prepared to discuss this.
3.	How el	se could we subvert this program?
	(Bonus) Can you find a "valid" password – e.g. that grants access to the program, but does NOT
	overflo	ow the buffer? ->
	(Hint: l	Look at the hash function!)
	(contin	ued on next page)

H. Assessment

(answers will <u>not</u> affect your grade)

After completing this activity....

Do you think this activity was useful for your learning?	YES	NO	SOMEWHAT
Do you have a better understanding of buffer overflow attacks?	YES	NO	SOMEWHAT
Do you have a better understanding of return addresses?	YES	NO	SOMEWHAT
Do you have a better understanding of how data goes on the stack?	? YES	NO	SOMEWHAT
What was the most interesting part of this activity?			

Any suggestions for improvement?

Any other comments?