The Pacific Review, Vol. 23 No. 5 December 2010: 579–601

Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group

Crafting and dismantling the egalitarian social contract: the changing state-society relations in globalizing Korea

Sang-Young Park

Abstract Between the late 1960s and the early 1980s, the Korean developmental state implemented a series of drastic egalitarian educational policies that were primarily geared toward social integration. While promoting social mobility and educational expansion, they provided the basis of the egalitarian social contract in Korea's educational policymaking for decades. Since the 1990s, however, the Korean state has implemented neoliberal education reforms that led to the rapid dismantling of the egalitarian framework for the country's educational policymaking. These neoliberal reforms were strongly supported by the affluent middle class that prefer elitist education and can afford expensive private education. The general direction of change in Korea's educational policymaking suggests both significant change and continuity in the character of the Korean state and its relations to society since the 1990s. The contemporary Korean state still maintains a highly strategic and activist orientation in adopting and implementing policies although its policies are increasingly neoliberal in content. In doing so, the Korean state is gradually abandoning its broad social base and mobilizational capacity, while increasingly connecting with the upper segments of the middle class.

Keywords Korea; developmental state; neoliberal state; post-developmental state; education; social contract.

A debate that continues to generate substantial interest among students of the political economy of Third World development concerns the

Sang-Young Park is currently a post-doctoral fellow at The Australian National University's Korea Institute and the Department of Political and Social Change. His primary research interests include Korea's 'post-developmental' state and its changing relations with society, globalization and its impact on Korea's political economy, and the class reproduction strategies of the Korean middle class in the education sector.

Address: Department of Political and Social Change, Hedley Bull Centre (bldg#130), School of International, Political and Strategic Studies (IPS), ANU College of Asia and the Pacific, Canberra ACT 0200, Australia. E-mail: sangyoungp@gmail.com; sang-young.park@anu.edu.au

The Pacific Review
ISSN 0951-2748 print/ISSN 1470-1332 online
http://www.informaworld.com/journals
DOI: 10.1080/09512748.2010.522247

transformation of the developmental state in the newly industrialized economies of East Asia.[1] The general trend in the global capitalist system in recent decades brought significant changes in the political economies of the East Asian countries, as it did everywhere in the world, and led to some important changes in the character and role of the state in these economies. In the case of the contemporary state in South Korea (Korea hereafter), there are diverging opinions about its changing nature and characteristics. One group of scholars argue that Korea's postwar developmental state is being eclipsed, or that it is being transformed into a neoliberal regulatory state (Hall 2003; Minns 2001; Pirie 2005). Pirie (2005: 38) points out that 'a set of institutions and procedural structures fully attuned to the dictates of the contemporary neoliberal order now lie at the heart of the Korean state', thus making it completely appropriate to 'categorize Korea as a neoliberal state'.

Another group of scholars, on the other hand, insists that the Korean state, despite many significant changes, remains developmental, maintaining its purposive and proactive role in economic policy implementation (Cherry 2005; Stubbs 2009; Thurbon and Weiss 2006; Weiss 2000; Wong 2004). Based upon his analysis on Korea's biotechnology industry, Wong (2004: 513–4, emphasis in original) points out that 'the developmental state in Korea has begun to respond to the challenges of moving from an industrial learning paradigm to a technology creativity paradigm', and argues that 'the postindustrial *transformation* of the developmental state in South Korea has primarily been driven by its continual *adaptation* to new industrial imperatives'. Weiss (2000: 22) elaborates that the post-developmental state may be defined by a new competitive logic of 'keeping up', rather than 'catching up', aiming at continuous upgrading of the industrial economy. Thurbon and Weiss (2006: 19) also point out that, despite Korea's recent neoliberal policy shift, 'strategic' (i.e., developmental) policy orientations appear still to shape the Korean state's FDI policies.

We can see that both sides make a compelling case with appropriate empirical evidence to support their theses. But, so far, the debate on the changing characteristics of the Korean state has been largely confined to the economic policy domain with little attention to the role that it had performed in broader social settings during the period of rapid economic development. It is important to recognize that a crucial aspect of a developmental state is its exceptional capacity to set a national goal and mobilize the population to achieve it. This mobilizational capacity, along with a high degree of autonomy from societal groups, was in fact an important element in Chalmers Johnson's original conceptualization of the developmental state. The developmental state is thus understood in this paper as a type of regime that is strongly devoted to an overarching societal project, and a 'quasi-revolutionary' regime for which legitimacy comes from the overarching social projects its society endorses and it carries out (Johnson 1999: 52). While many students of East Asian political economy have recognized

the unique ways the state relates to society in East Asia, including its tendency to mobilize the population with strong nationalism, few studies have investigated systematically the manner in which these developmental states have sought to define societal projects and to mobilize people around these goals.

It is the presumption of this paper that one way we can interrogate the changing nature of the developmental state is to examine the changing role of the state not only in economic policymaking but also in social policies. This study takes educational policymaking as a strategic vantage point to examine the changing state–society relations in Korea and to discern the extent to which the contemporary Korean state has moved away from the postwar developmental state model in that regard. Given the paramount importance of education among the Korean population, educational policies have been used frequently by the Korean state as one of the most effective tools to mobilize broad societal support. Korea's major educational policies often have been heavily charged with socio-political considerations to serve the overarching goals of the state. It has been widely recognized that the Korean developmental state approached its educational system as a crucial basis of economic growth (Green *et al.* 1999; Jeong and Armer 1994). However, it is equally important to see that the Korean developmental state's educational policies have been used as very effective tools for social integration and the mobilization of broad societal support (Cheng 1992–3; Doner *et al.* 2005; Green 1999, 2007). Andy Green (1999: 261) in particular emphasizes that education and training were vital for the developmental state's national project, not only for developing skills for economic growth, but first, and equally important, as a means of promoting national unity and social cohesion and discipline. Korea's educational policymaking therefore provides an excellent venue to examine the Korean developmental state's broad relations with the general population and the changes in these relations since the 1990s.

Crafting the egalitarian social contract

Nation with 'education fever'

Korean people's unusual zeal for education, often referred to as 'education fever (*kyoyukyeol*)', is deeply-rooted in the society (Seth 2002). This education fever certainly contributed to the rapid expansion of Korea's educational system. During the Rhee Syngman regime (1948–1960), the main objective of educational policymaking was to respond to the explosive social demand for basic education, and the Rhee regime provided universal and uniform basic education in a relatively short period of time. The enrollment rate reached 83 per cent in 1954, 96 per cent in 1959, and primary school education became universal in Korea by 1960 (Ministry of Education 1988: 153). Compared to other developing countries with a similar

level of income per capita at the time, Korea's educational record is a very impressive achievement; the same level of educational achievement can be found only in those countries with per capita incomes that were three or four times higher (McGinn *et al.* 1980: 62).

As primary education became universal in the 1950s, the social demand for secondary education began to increase rapidly in the 1960s. At the secondary level, however, Koreans' education fever began to take its toll on the Korean population by driving the whole nation into endlessly increasing competition for elite schools and private tutoring. The prime cause of this intense educational competition was a well-established ranking system among secondary schools and colleges. Entering one of the first-tier elite middle schools nearly ensured entrance to elite high schools, and eventually success in life in Korean society. Thus, for most Koreans, the preparation for the entrance examinations for elite schools and colleges became a nearly life-and-death matter, driving the whole society into an 'examination hell'.

Examination hell, nearly unbearable for both parents and students, grew most acute during the period of rapid economic development, creating serious educational and social problems. The fierce competition and the enormous pressures from the entrance examination hampered the elementary school students' normal physical development. The number of students who repeated their sixth grade just to prepare for first-tier middle school exams was increasing, generating a great deal of social concern. More seriously, private tutoring became rampant in Korean society, even threatening the normal operation of the country's formal schooling system. It was reported that, in 1967, about 90 per cent of sixth graders were getting private tutoring in Seoul (*Chosun Ilbo*, 22 October 1967). In 1971, about half of the seventh grade students in Seoul were getting private tutoring; the figures went up to 70 per cent for the eighth grade students, and almost to 90 per cent for the ninth grade students (*Chosun Ilbo*, 15 June 1971).

Although a majority of students at the middle school level received some form of private tutoring, it was largely the middle class families with adequate resources that participated in the private market of tutoring most actively, constantly seeking the most strategic ways to prepare their children to enter elite secondary schools and colleges. A study conducted by a Korean sociologist (Kim 1973: 138–40) indicates that, between the late 1950s and the early 1970s, more than 80% of the students attending the elite middle/high schools were from middle class families who were largely propertied and white-collar. A report prepared by the Korean Educational Development Institute in 1980 also shows that it was Korea's urban middle classes that were driving the soaring demand for private tutoring (Kim 1981).

The well-to-do families often generated a great deal of noise about the entrance examinations of elite schools, making the educational competition in Korean society more acute. In the mid-1960s, several stories about angry parents who would not accept the results of the entrance examinations

administered by the elite schools began to appear in the media. The so-called 'Radish Juice Incident' occurred in 1965, when about 40 students from well-to-do families failed to pass the entrance exams of Korea's most prestigious public middle school at the time by only two points. The students and their parents later came to learn that one answer students picked in the science test, 'radish juice', was regarded as the wrong answer. The parents of the failed students did not accept this, arguing that 'radish juice' was also a correct answer to the question. They collectively protested to the Seoul Board of Education and the Ministry of Education, and even took this case to court, and scientifically proved that 'radish juice' also could be the correct answer. The court ruled in favor of the parents, granting the students admission to the school. In the meantime, as some 'privileged class' people tried to get their children accepted along with the students who won the case, this incident evolved into a social scandal.

Similarly, in 1966, it was reported that about 140 parents collectively filed a suit against a public middle school in Seoul to make sure that its entrance examination was administered without any error (*Chosun Ilbo*, 11 January 1966). In 1967, the number of administrative lawsuits filed by upset parents against two elite middle schools in Seoul amounted to more than 90 cases (*Joongang Ilbo*, 26 December 1967). The 'Chisel Incident', another symbolic entrance examination-related scandal, also occurred in 1967, and it was very similar to the 'Radish Juice Incident', except that in this case 'chisel' was the second correct answer. It is noteworthy that these social disputes about the entrance examinations of elite middle schools were largely led by the well-to-do middle class parents who could at least afford the expensive costs of legal procedures and knew how to voice their opinions in society.[2] Social scandals like this one led to increasing social discontent regarding the country's overcompetition for elite schools and excessive private education, spreading a sense of relative deprivation (*wihwagam* in Korean) among the general population. In this period, such aggravating educational problems were becoming a source of growing social unrest in Korean society.

MSEP and HSEP

In order to tackle these problems, the Park Chung Hee regime (1961–1979) took extraordinary measures in education reform, which would be almost unthinkable in other societies. The Park regime began to implement the Middle School Equalization Policy (MSEP) in 1968 and the High School Equalization Policy (HSEP) in 1974. Under the MSEP, middle school entrance examinations were completely abolished, and students were allocated to middle schools within their school districts through a lottery system. The first-tier elite middle schools, which were considered the main source of excessive educational overcompetition, were systematically

targeted by the state, and then converted to general high schools (Ministry of Education 1998: 252).

Like the MSEP, the HSEP also aimed to tackle the main source of the problem by breaking down the hierarchy among Korea's high schools. All schools, whether public or private, had to give up their right to select new students and were required to take all students assigned by the Ministry of Education through a district-wide lottery. The difference in the amount of tuition between public and private high schools was leveled by the state, and private schools became in fact quasi-public in terms of financing and governance. At the same time, public school teachers were shuffled around, eliminating between-school differences in teaching quality. In each board of education, the Park Chung Hee regime established a 'School Evaluation Committee', which came to have oversight of the progress in the implementation of the HSEP (Ministry of Education 1988: 396). With the implementation of the MSEP and the HSEP, the Park Chung Hee regime effectively destroyed an elitist educational system that had worked in favor of the well-to-do middle class.

Without a doubt, the equalization policies of the Park regime were quite draconian and authoritarian, even to the eyes of the Korean masses at the time, and they were met with some resistance and objections from society. Some influential elite schools and private school organizations were vocal in their displeasure. Some educational experts also raised concerns about a possible 'downward leveling effect' of the MSEP and the HSEP, suggesting that students' academic achievements would become poorer once the policies were implemented. However, these objections were outright dismissed by the state. The Park regime publicly warned private high schools that opposed the government policies that they would be shut down forcefully, and their students would be transferred to public schools if they refused to comply with the state policies (*Chosun Ilbo*, 1 March 1973). The alleged downward-leveling effect of the equalization policies was also quickly disputed by many reports produced by quasi-governmental research organizations (Kim *et al.* 1978, 1979).

There seem to be at least three major reasons for the implementation of the equalization policies in such a drastic manner. First, the most obvious reason, as the Park regime claimed, was to combat the educational problems of the time. With the drastic implementation of the equalization policies, the Park regime tried to address the educational crises caused by the excessive educational competition in society. Certainly, in the late 1960s and the early 1970s, there existed a widely shared discontent among the general population that educational competition was too severe and too costly, and that the private tutoring market was overdeveloped to the detriment of family budgets and students' physical and mental health. The implementation of the MSEP and the HSEP was the Park regime's response to these educational problems.

Second, because it was implemented during Korea's high growth period based on export-oriented industrialization, it is very likely that the Park Chung Hee regime implemented this educational reform to produce a large enough, moderately educated, and disciplined labor force to meet the demand from the expanding manufacturing industry. This view, that the Park regime's education policies were geared toward rapid export-oriented industrialization, is supported by those scholars who argue that the East Asian states generated a distinctive skill formation model, or the so-called 'developmental skill formation system' (Green *et al.* 1999). It is, however, somewhat unclear whether Park's state planners adopted the equalization policies primarily for the purpose of economic development, considering the fact that the regime's education planning for economic development largely involved vocational schools and post-school training. Yet the implementation of the equalization policies by the Park regime certainly gave a boost to the educational expansion in Korea in the late 1960s and the 1970s, which again facilitated economic development by providing a capable, mostly literate, labor force that was in great demand at the time (see McGinn *et al*. 1980).

The third, and probably most important, reason may have been the Park regime's desire to boost its political legitimacy by implementing popular social policies. Although South Korea had a relatively low level of economic inequality at the early stage of export-oriented industrialization in the 1960s, by the mid-1970s income distribution began to deteriorate, enlarging economic gaps between the rich and the poor and increasing a sense of relative deprivation among the working class and the lower middle class citizens (see Campos and Root 1996: 9).[3] The Park regime was very sensitive to the growing social gaps among the general population and took several preventive measures to curb it. For example, the Park regime promulgated in 1969 a set of simplified 'Standard Rules for Family Ceremonies' to discourage and control the excessive expenditure of the affluent class on common family rituals such as weddings and funerals.

In educational policymaking, the Park Chung Hee regime underlined the role of education as an important means for social integration (Office of the President 1969: 35, 224).[4] The Park regime was greatly concerned about the excessive competition over the small number of elite high schools because they believed that the 'pathological' degree of educational competition had begun to make Korean students increasingly 'selfish', working against the government's efforts to produce 'desirable Koreans' who were supposed to 'love their motherland and cooperate with one another' (*Seoul Shinmun*, 28 February 1973). In this sense, the implementation of the equalization policies was a tool of social integration to maintain political stability. Education was believed to serve a sociopolitical purpose for the nation, and therefore such social ills as educational overcompetition among the Korean middle classes needed to be disciplined. The equalization policies,

therefore, were related more to what Andy Green (1999: 264) calls 'citizen formation' rather than to 'skills formation'.

The ban on private tutoring

With the implementation of the HSEP and the rapid expansion of high school enrollment throughout the 1970s, there emerged a sharp increase in demand for higher education and private tutoring in Korean society, making the entrance exams of the universities increasingly competitive. It was again Korea's urban middle class that drove the soaring demand for private tutoring. They were known to take aggressive measures, investing a considerable portion of their monthly household income in private tutoring, or moving their residence to 'better' school districts even under the HSEP, making the educational competition in Korean society increasingly unsupportable. Their education fever often became contagious, spreading even to the lower class families who could not afford expensive private tutoring, as they tried hard not to fall behind in the educational competition. Excessive private tutoring began to amplify a sense of division between the poor and the rich in Korean society, and private tutoring was often blamed as a 'nation-destroying illness (*mang-guk-byong*)' or the 'No. 1 public enemy'. According to a report by the Korean Educational Development Institute (Kim 1981: 23), in 1980 a national average of about 26 per cent of academic high school students was getting private tutoring, but this figure sharply increased to 44 per cent in metropolitan areas.

General Chun Doo Hwan, who came to power in 1980 through a military coup, selected this educational problem to address as one of his first measures of social reform. Chun's combined military–civilian Special Committee for National Security Measures (SCNSM) announced the 7.30 Education Reform, which was also called the 'Measures for Educational Normalization and the Elimination of Excessive Private Tutoring'. This was another drastic measure in the history of educational policymaking in Korea that was in line with the Park Chung Hee regime's implementation of the MSEP and the HSEP. The SCNSM announced that it would implement the 7.30 Education Reform measures to 'facilitate the nation's social integration and eradicate the sense of relative deprivation among the Korean population', because 'the excessive private tutoring became an urgent matter for the state to deal with not only in terms of educational policymaking but also in terms of social policymaking' (*Chosun Ilbo*, 31 July 1980). The 7.30 Education Reform consisted of about ten specific educational policies dealing with secondary and higher education, but an all-out ban on private tutoring across the country received the most attention.

These drastic measures met mixed responses from the population. Although the reportable evidence is small, the general understanding is that the lower classes were generally in favor of these measures while the middle class, the well-to-do segment of the middle class in particular, were unhappy

about the draconian state control on educational opportunities and the ban on private tutoring. One survey conducted by the Committee for Social Purification (*Sahoe Jeonghwa Wiwonhoe*) in 1981 confirmed diverging attitudes toward the 7.30 Educational Reform according to the level of living standards (*Hyeondae sahoe yeonguso* 1981: 112). For the mainstream middle class and working class parents, the Chun regime's strict ban on private tutoring was a beneficial policy measure to their deficient family budgets. Several surveys conducted from 1981 to 1986 show that the majority of the Korean population supported the ban on private tutoring: 82.9 per cent in 1981, 76.8 per cent in 1982, 85.3 per cent in 1983, 61.4 per cent in 1984, and 79.6 per cent in 1985 (Han 1990: 168; *Hyeondae sahoe yeonguso* 1981: 111–7; *Sahoe jeonghwa wiwonhoe* 1986: 162).

The affluent middle class, on the other hand, was not as pleased with the repressive policies. By the late 1970s, Korea was seeing the rise of a small segment of the middle class whose economic conditions were substantially higher than the majority of the middle class. This affluent middle class was composed of high income managerial and professional workers as well as owners of small-and-medium scale enterprises. Many of them accumulated capital through investment in the rising real estate market in addition to their occupational income. By the early 1980s, there emerged a gradual separation within the larger middle class between the affluent middle class and the mainstream middle class, and this internal class division further developed during the 1980s and the 1990s (Koo 2007). In any event, it was this upper segment of the middle class that was dissatisfied with the state's new crackdown on private off-school education. In fact, the affluent middle class families often violated the ban, taking the risk of being punished by the regime, in order to provide private tutoring to their children discreetly. They relied on a variety of tactics such as using condominiums, tape-recorders, telephones, etc., to arrange private tutoring secretly. Stories about the government's crackdowns on underground illegal private tutoring by the affluent middle class families abounded in media reports throughout the 1980s.

The Chun regime was nevertheless quite adamant about controlling illegal private tutoring. Chun charged the three repressive organs of the state – the Committee for Social Purification, the Ministry of Education, and the Police – with enforcing the ban on private tutoring and punishing the violators. The national ban on private education was given a legal basis in 1981, and became even more stringent in 1984 in revised legislation (*Sahoe Jeonghwa Wiwonhoe* 1986: 161). The penalties for breaking these laws were quite harsh. The students who were caught, for example, were subject to severe disciplinary measures including suspension and disadvantages in grading at school; their parents were raided by the National Tax Service and were given disadvantages in promotion at work; illegal private instructors and tutors were either arrested or fired (*Sahoe Jeonghwa Wiwonhoe* 1986: 162). According to the Committee for Social Purification (*Sahoe Jeonghwa*

Wiwonhoe 1986: 163), between 1981 and 1986, there were 177 crackdowns, and as a result 259 illegal instructors and private tutors, 1074 students, and 961 parents were penalized for illegal private tutoring. It would be fair to say that, due to the regime's strong enforcement measures, the ban on private tutoring was largely effective throughout the 1980s. The well-to-do middle class families occasionally resisted the ban by secretly hiring private tutors, but it was not serious enough to threaten the implementation of the ban itself.

The egalitarian social contract

Although authoritarian and draconian, the Korean developmental state's drastic implementation of the egalitarian education policies more or less resolved the educational problems of the time, garnering enormous popularity among the Korean population. Following the implementation of the MSEP and the HSEP, school education was normalized, educational opportunities broadened, substantial gaps among schools were bridged, and several 'school ills' caused by the nation's obsession about elite schools had disappeared (Kang *et al.* 2005: 44–5). The overall tone of the media on the implementation of the school equalization policies was quite favorable at the time. The Association of Elementary School Principals in Seoul expressed their support for the implementation of the MSEP (*Chosun Ilbo*, 21 July 1968). One survey conducted by the Korean Federation of Education Association (KFEA) in 1970 shows that about 67 per cent of 15,250 respondents thought that the MSEP's original objectives had been generally achieved (J. Kim 1971). Another survey by KEDI (Kim *et al.* 1978: 42) indicates that, in the five major cities where the HSEP was implemented, the percentage of middle school students who were getting private tutoring plummeted to 18.6 per cent. The number of *jaesusang*, those students who failed the yearly university entrance examinations and then decided to spend the next year studying to retake those exams, which reached nearly 120,000 in 1973, quickly decreased (*Chosun Ilbo*, 28 April 1981).

The implementation of these egalitarian policies also accompanied Korea's rapid educational expansion in almost every aspect in the 1970s and 1980s, including enrollment rates, and the number of schools, students, and teachers of middle and high school (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 1998). Furthermore, the egalitarian education policies promoted a substantial degree of social mobility in Korean society. In fact, many of those who experienced the MSEP, the HSEP, and the ban on private tutoring acknowledge that the implementation of those policies in large part overlapped with the image of the 'dragon from streams' (Ryu 2007; Kwon 2007). In Korea, a 'dragon from streams' usually refers to a successful person, or self-made man, who succeeds in spite of a humble background. Particularly, those of poor family background who made it to prestigious universities usually have been considered the 'dragons' in

Korean society. During the 1970s and the 1980s, it was considered that the series of egalitarian educational policies of the Park and the Chun regimes helped the educational system produce a number of 'dragons from streams' in Korean society.

Social contracts in Western societies normally represent a 'shared will that would create and maintain new institutionalized patterns of social cohesion' (Zunz *et al.* 2002: 2) and have arisen out of a long and sometimes contentious democratic process (Birdsall and Haggard 2000: 3). The egalitarian social contract in Korea's educational policymaking was, however, largely shaped by the drastic policies of the Korean developmental state. Andy Green (1999: 261) points out that developmental states 'have generally been underpinned by exceptionally "cohesive" or "disciplined" societies with a high degree of national unity and strong national identity', and that those orderly societies 'were not given, but have been achieved or constructed, largely through the work of the state' due to 'the nature of the political project' that was in essence about 'national survival and sovereignty'. In this sense, the egalitarian social contract in Korea's educational policymaking suggests that the Korean developmental state was attentive to the issue of social cohesion and unity. It was, however, not so much a social contract in a substantial sense as a *de facto* social contract, mainly because it was a somewhat implicit and loose social consensus as the outcome of the state's 'authoritarian paternalism' (Birdsall and Haggard 2000: 15). The state-led process of social contract making has resulted in an egalitarian social contract that is top-down and implicit rather than explicit and consensual.

By arguing that the Korean developmental state crafted a *de facto* egalitarian social contract vis-à-vis society in the field of educational policymaking, I propose a more nuanced understanding than the conventional view of 'strong state and weak society' in Korea during the postwar period. The view of strong state and weak society clearly points to an asymmetrical power balance between the state and society in Korea during the postwar period, but it fails to show the nature of the relations and their inner dynamics. The formation of the egalitarian social contract between the Korean developmental state and society indicates that the strong Korean developmental state imposed the egalitarian education policies on a relatively weak society. It is, however, also important to understand that Korea's authoritarian developmental state built and sustained a broad social base by forcefully keeping the upper middle class in check, while deliberately connecting with the general population. This also implies that Korea's affluent middle class was not powerful enough to influence the state's policies at that time, and that it was the general population that the Korean developmental state mainly tried to connect with. The making of Korea's egalitarian social contract in the arena of educational policymaking thus suggests somewhat synergic, although lopsided, relations between the Korean developmental state and the general population.

Dismantling the egalitarian social contract

Neoliberal education reforms

Globalization is a complex and multi-faceted, even contradictory, social process. As it is increasingly influencing almost every society in the world, so it has been one of the most salient forces driving the changes in Korea since the 1990s. In terms of economic structure, it is well reflected in Korea's on-going 'postindustrial restructuring', a shift of the industrial focus from 'conventional manufacturing sectors' based on the 'industrial learning paradigm' toward 'higher-tech, value-added industrial sectors' based on 'a new knowledge creation paradigm' (Wong 2004). Regarding the role of the state in Korea's rapid globalization, it seems widely agreed among scholars that the Korean state has taken a critical part in its neoliberal project since the 1990s. Thurbon and Weiss (2006) may refer it to the post-developmental state's 'strategic' policymaking, while, for Pirie (2005), the proactive role that the Korean state has played in economic globalization since the 1990s is the neoliberal state's 'rational response' to the structural changes in the global economy.

It was the Kim Young Sam regime, the first civilian government for three decades, that took the initiative in the early 1990s to begin neoliberal reforms. In the 'Sydney Declaration' of November 1994, President Kim Young Sam, citing ever-increasing competition in a rapidly globalizing world, announced his government's drive for *segyehwa*, or globalization. With this neoliberal reform drive, the Kim Young Sam government 'attempted a top-down reform of the South Korean political economy to meet the rapidly changing conditions of the world economy' (Kang 2000: 77). As an integral part of the *segyehwa* project, President Kim launched the Presidential Commission on Education Reform (PCER) that later drafted the 'New Education System' or the so-called '5.31 Education Reform Proposal' in the years from 1995 to 1997. The PCER's New Education System was strongly influenced by neoliberalism and market-oriented ideas. Ahn Byung-young, a prominent scholar who served as the Minister of Education from 1995 to 1997, openly admits that PCER's 5.31 Education Reform Proposal was strongly influenced by globalization and neoliberalism (Ahn 2007).

One of the most significant changes in Korea's egalitarian educational system since the Kim Young Sam regime is the diversification of school types. The Ministry of Education announced in the early 1990s that the number of Special Purpose High Schools (SPHS), or *teukmokko*, would be increased to help cultivate and produce the nation's most talented minds in the sciences, the arts, athletics, and foreign languages, and to attenuate the purported 'downward leveling effects' of the High School Equalization Policy on students' academic performances. The origin of the SPHS goes back to the mid-1970s when a very limited number of such schools were

established by the Park Chung Hee regime in the fields of the arts and sports. Science High Schools and Foreign Language High Schools, which began as pilot programs in 1982 and 1984, respectively, were included in the SPHS program in 1986 and 1992 (*Gukjeong Briefing*, 19 October 2007; Kim 2003).

Furthermore, due to the decentralization process in educational policy-making that began in the early 1990s, the authority to open an SPHS in a given area was transferred from the Ministry of Education to local educational authorities in 2001. This also facilitated a rapid increase in the number of Foreign Language High Schools (FLHS) across the country beginning in 2002. Among all the SPHS, the rapid growth of Foreign Language High Schools is most noteworthy: there were 11 FLHS in 1992, and there were 30 by 2008. The pace of growth has been quite steep in comparison to the somewhat gradual growth of the Science High Schools (see Table 1). Moreover, other types of SPHS similar to the Foreign Language High Schools, including the Independent Private High Schools and the International High Schools, have been increasing as well. Overall, as Table 1 shows, the number of SPHS amounted to 102 in 2008 – almost four times as many as in 1990.

Although Special Purpose High Schools make up only a small portion of the schools in Korea's overall high school system (less than 7 per cent as of 2008), the emergence and growth of the SPHS since the 1990s have had tremendous ramifications in Korean society, where the 'education fever' of the well-to-do middle class for elite schools has been strictly restrained by the state for decades. Unlike the general academic high schools, to most of which the HSEP applies, the SPHS are given a high degree of autonomy in student selection and school operations. They are allowed to select and educate the most 'gifted' students nationwide in the fields of science, the arts, and foreign languages with their own curricula, while being exempt from the application of the HSEP. Not surprisingly, many of the SPHS have started to show impressive track records in college admissions, which has

Table 1 The growth of the Special Purpose High Schools in Korea, 1990–2008

	1990	2000	2005	2006	2007	2008
Science	6	16	18	19	20	21
Foreign languages	.	18	25	29	29	30
Arts	11	22	25	26	27	26
Sports	8	12	14	14	15	15
Independent Private	.	.	6	6	6	6
International	.	.	.	1	2	4
Total	25	68	88	95	99	102

Source: Adjusted from Center for Education Statistics (2008) and Korean Educational Development Institute (2009).

attracted national attention. The SPHS are now considered 'elite schools', and the fast track for social prestige and success in Korean society.

The egalitarian social contract contested

Since the financial crisis in the late 1990s, neoliberalism has become a hegemonic ideology in Korean society, penetrating more deeply into the state's policymaking processes. In educational policymaking, the state's strong grip on education in general, and the HSEP in particular, became the main object of opposition from the neoliberal conservatives. Conservatives claimed that Korea's educational system, which had functioned as a 'building block' for Korea's rapid economic development during the postwar period, had become a 'stumbling block' for Korea's increasingly globalizing economy (Lee 2002). A series of 'HSEP-bashing' articles appeared in both mass media and academic journals in the early 2000s. In one major newspaper, for example, the HSEP's continuing implementation was framed as a 'policy failure' (*Chosun Ilbo*, 16 February 2002), a 'road to death' (*Chosun Ilbo*, 28 February 2002), 'educational populism' (*Chosun Ilbo*, 22 February 2002), and even as a 'cult' (*Chosun Ilbo*, 11 October 2003).

In the political arena, the egalitarian framework for educational policymaking is also becoming an object of heated contestation. In order to attract the votes of the middle classes, Korea's local politicians often attack the HSEP and make pledges to establish new types of elite schools in their districts. In fact, announcing a plan to establish a Special Purpose High School is one of the most popular pledges among Korean politicians who run in a general election. In *Kyeonggi* Province, for example, 31 per cent of 51 elected National Assembly members in the 2008 general election promised that they would help establish Special Purpose High Schools in their own districts (*Yonhap*, 11 April 2008). Furthermore, in Seoul, 44 per cent of 48 elected National Assembly members pledged the establishment of Independent Private High Schools in their districts, and 54 per cent also pledged the establishment of Special Purpose High Schools, including Foreign Language High Schools (*Ohmynews*, 18 April 2008).

Furthermore, since the 1980s, the upper segments of the middle classes have been increasingly critical of the HSEP's 'excessive' egalitarianism, demanding the revival of elite high schools and parents' right to choose schools. Even under the HSEP, they often tried to resist the implementation of the HSEP by fabricating their residencies on paper so that their children would be assigned to their preferred schools districts where there were believed to be schools with 'better' track records. Practically, since they could not choose schools they preferred under the HSEP, they instead chose to build 'inner' school districts within the HSEP system. In 1982, the Committee for Social Purification and the Police investigated the households with ninth graders in an affluent residence in Seoul, and found that more than 40 per cent of 3695 students had counterfeit residencies (*Gukjeong Briefing*

Teukbyeol Gihoekteam 2007: 232). It was also estimated in 1983 that the number of students with false residencies amounted to 60,000 in the Seoul metropolitan areas (*Chosun Ilbo*, 10 December 1983). The state tried to stem this trend by sending students back to their original school districts once they were found to have false residencies. However, this practice by the well-to-do middle class has continued even today, while it has become more difficult than before for the state to track and investigate it. In 2002, the Seoul Metropolitan Office of Education estimated that, out of about 4000 transfer students, about half of them were considered to have false residencies (*Chosun Ilbo*, 2 March 2002). Furthermore, despite the fact that it is still unlawful to have a false residence even for 'educational' purposes, it is becoming a rather common practice for many well-to-do middle class families, including the current incumbent President Lee Myung-Bak himself and many other top government officials in his regime, to continue to violate the law.

In this context, it is not surprising that the expansion of the SPHS since the 1990s was welcomed particularly by the upper segments of the middle classes that prefer elitist education and can afford expensive private education costs. The SPHS are usually about three times more expensive than general and vocational high schools to begin with, and it is the conventional wisdom among Korean parents that, in order to send their children to one of the SPHS, particularly the Foreign Language High Schools or the Independent Private High Schools, a substantial amount of financial investment in private tutoring and education will be required from a very early stage. In fact, several recent surveys suggest that it is the upper segments of the middle classes that dominate the Special Purpose High Schools. The households of the general academic high school students have an average monthly income of 4,220,000 won, while the average monthly incomes of the households of the Foreign Language High School students and the Science High School students are 6,480,000 won and 6,520,000 won respectively (Korean Educational Development Institute 2007). It is also pointed out that the parents of the students attending the Science High Schools and the Foreign Language High Schools are more educated and earn higher incomes than the parents of the students attending general academic schools (Kwon 2009).

It has been pointed out by the media and several education experts in Korea that the Foreign Language High Schools and the other types of Special Purpose High Schools are the main reason that Korea's private education industry has mushroomed since the 1990s, and has even threatened the workings of the nation's public educational system. In fact, the Korean state's ban on after-school private education had been gradually relaxed throughout the 1990s.[5] According to the Korean government's first official statistical report on private education (Korea National Statistical Office 2008b), as of 2007, more than three out of four students, or 77 per cent, are getting some form of private education including cram schools,

private tutoring, worksheets, or online classes. The upper middle class families' enthusiastic and even aggressive strategies for their children's education are often contrasted with those of the lower class families in Korea. Although the development of Korea's private education market is clearly driven by well-to-do middle class families, it does not mean that educational competition is only limited to the wealthy middle class families. Unlike the well-to-do families, however, lower middle class families have very limited resources to support their children's private education. Instead of expensive tutoring or overseas English classes, they send their children to somewhat cheaper cram schools, or join the worksheet programs in which the instructors visit their homes a couple of times a week.

Interestingly, however, the expansion of the SPHS, and the Foreign Language High Schools in particular, was briefly suppressed during the Roh Moo Hyun regime (2002–2007) whose political platform was based on 'pro-union, pro-distribution, and anti-elite approaches' (Song 2003). The Roh regime considered the rapid expansion of the FLHS a main influence promoting excessive private education, threatening the foundation of the HSEP and eventually hurting social integration. Since the early 2000s, the Ministry of Education has often criticized the Special Purpose High Schools, particularly the Foreign Language High Schools, for turning themselves from *hakkyo* (schools) to *hagwon* (cram schools), undermining the HSEP at the most fundamental level. The Roh Moo Hyun regime even pointed out that the Foreign Language High Schools have become the schools for the haves and their class reproduction, and not the schools for the have-nots and their social mobility (Ministry of Education, 29 October 2007). The Roh regime also announced in 2007 that, in order to curb the further growth of the SPHS, local education authorities should begin to 'consult' with the government regarding the establishment of new SPHS in their regions. In the same year, the Minister of Education went on an 'informal' national tour to pressure local authorities and the presidents of universities to abide by the government's guidelines on college admissions, which were in line with the country's egalitarian educational system.

The Roh regime's strong advocacy for the HSEP was mainly due to its realization that the majority of the Korean population was still in favor of maintaining the egalitarian framework in educational policymaking. According to two nation-wide surveys conducted by KEDI in 2003 and 2004 (Yoon *et al.* 2003; Kang *et al.* 2005), about 67 per cent and 66 per cent of the population respectively still supported the continuing implementation of the HSEP as the main framework for the country's educational policymaking, although they also indicate that those parents who are more educated with higher income tended to oppose it. The egalitarian framework is also widely supported and considered a viable social consensus for the country's

educational policymaking by a number of progressive civil society organizations including the Korean Teachers and Education Workers' Union, the National Parents' Association for Genuine Education, and Citizen Movement for Educational Reformation. The Roh regime tried to stem the rapid growth of SPHS and their transformation into a new type of aristocratic elite schools, and even seriously considered their complete abolition or conversion into general high schools. However, this idea was fiercely attacked by the conservative opposition party, the SPHS, and the well-to-do middle class, who emphasized the importance of elite education in the globalizing world. In the end, the Roh regime had to postpone its final decision on the fate of the SPHS to the mid-2008 in order to 'collect more diverse public opinions' on the matter.

A push toward neoliberal education reform has been made by the newly elected conservative regime of Lee Myung-Bak in a far more decisive and consistent manner. The current conservative administration and its newly overhauled Ministry of Education, Science and Technology Development (MEST) are pushing a wide range of deregulation plans in educational policymaking. In April 2008, the Lee administration and the MEST disclosed a wide range of deregulation plans to free elementary and middle schools from state control, and to hand over much of its supervisory role to local education authorities. The Lee administration's announcement of the educational deregulation measures is considered a historic decision for the country's educational policymaking, as it is the first-ever hands-off approach to school operations by the central government.

Regarding the country's high school system, the Lee government announced that it would launch the High School Diversification 300 Project, in which the new government would open 300 specialized high schools across the country, including 88 public boarding schools and 100 Independent Private High Schools. Furthermore, the recent establishment of four International Middle Schools, the equivalent of the SPHS at the middle school level, signals increasingly fierce educational competition at the lower secondary level, which could lead to the rapid weakening of the implementation of the MSEP. Ahn Byong-man, the current head of MEST, openly claims that the Lee Myung-Bak regime has been pursuing an innovative strategy to move away from the previous uniform and equalized education system and brought a greater volume of autonomy and diversity to education (*Korea Times*, 18 February 2009). Many of the deregulation measures of Lee's conservative government are likely to pave the way for the emergence of a more explicit school hierarchy, promoting competition and the growing private education market while dismantling the country's decades-long egalitarian approach to educational policymaking. The egalitarianism previously embedded in Korea's educational system is being rapidly undermined, replaced by such neoliberal slogans as 'competition' and 'autonomy'.

Conclusion

The general direction of change in Korea's educational policymaking that I have examined in this paper suggests both significant changes and continuities in the Korean state and its relations to society since the 1990s. The contemporary Korean state is abandoning its decades-old egalitarian orientation through a series of neoliberal reforms since the 1990s, while retreating from regulating the private education market. The autonomy of the Korean state seems to have eroded since Korea's upper middle class has become far more powerful than before and, aided by the ascending neoliberal ideology, has become far more effective in persuading policy makers in their favor, or bypassing the state's policy goals. On the other hand, the Korean state has been implementing neoliberal reforms in a top-down manner pursuing the prime objective of national development and competitiveness, indicating that the Korean state still maintains very 'strategic' policymaking in the field of education in spite of its neoliberal makeover since the 1990s.

More importantly, this analysis of educational policy changes has demonstrated that there are some significant changes in the way the Korean state connects with society. It is well-known that South Korea's postwar developmental state was based on a narrow coalition between the state and big conglomerates. It has not been fully recognized, however, that the Korean developmental state maintained a broad societal base through strong egalitarian social policies – for example, in its educational policymaking. Through its egalitarian educational policies, the Korean developmental state could offer an integrative social contract in the absence of adequate welfare policies, and so was able to mobilize the general population for state-led developmental projects. In order to maintain a high degree of mobilizational capacity as well as political legitimacy, both the Park and the Chun governments were willing to suppress the interests of the privileged segments of the middle classes, and to promote the egalitarian social agenda above the technical priorities of educational policies.

In this context, it is my contention that the contemporary Korean state has moved away from the postwar developmental state model. Neither egalitarianism nor social integration is the dominant goal of current educational policies. Instead, the major policy objectives in the educational arena are based on such neoliberal values as competition and efficiency. Increasingly, the Korean state is abandoning its broad social base and is willing to connect with the upper middle class that supports policy changes toward more educational choices and a more competitive system. This neoliberal direction of educational change necessarily increases gaps in educational opportunities between the affluent middle classes and the working class, and generates growing social tensions and discontents. Thus, my analysis of educational policy changes in Korea indicates that important differences between the postwar developmental state and the current state in Korea are to be found

not so much in the changing state–market relations as in the remaking of state–society relations.

Acknowledgements

I am grateful to Hagen Koo and two anonymous reviewers for insightful comments on an earlier draft. Many thanks also go to Stephan Haggard and Jong-Sung You for organizing a stimulating workshop on Korea's social policy at UCSD in May 2009.

Notes

1 For a detailed overview of the current debates on the East Asian developmental state, see Stubbs (2009).
2 It is reported that a mother of a student who could not afford the legal cost grumbled, 'Because we did not have power or money, we could not afford the legal procedures. If we had known something like this would happen, we would have filed a suit by mortgaging my house' (*Chosun Ilbo*, 10 July 1965).
3 Korea's Gini Index was 0.34 between 1965 and 1970, but increased to 0.38 between 1971 and 1980 (Campos and Root 1996:9).
4 President Park himself coined the term the 'second economy' in 1968 to emphasize the importance of education as some form of public good. Park defined the 'second economy' as 'people's voluntary cooperation with the state's economic policy' and a spiritual attitude toward 'the modernization and regeneration of the nation', whereas 'the first economy' he defined as any common economic behavior directly related to material production. According to Hyung-A Kim (2004:136), however, Park Chung Hee's second economy movement received a very poor response from the public, generating a strong sense of cynicism and confusion among the media.
5 The ban was officially lifted by the Constitutional Court's historic ruling in 2000.

References

Ahn, B.-y. (2007) 'Ahn Byung-young jeon gyoyuk bu chongri yonseidae toeim gobyeol gangyeon' [Professor Byung-young Ahn, a former Education Minister and Deputy Prime Minister, made a farewell speech at Yonsei University], *Shindonga* 568: 198–221.

Birdsall, N. and Haggard, S. (2000) *After the Crisis: The Social Contract and the Middle Class in East Asia*, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Campos, J. E., and Root, H. L. (1996) *The Key to the Asian Miracle: Making Shared Growth Credible*, Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution.

Center for Education Statistics. (2008) *2008 Ganchurin Gyoyuk Tonggye [2008 Selected Education Statistics]*, Seoul: Korean Educational Development Institute.

Cheng, T.J. (1992–3) 'Dilemmas and choices in educational policies: the case of South Korea and Taiwan', *Studies in Comparative International Development* 27(4): 54–79.

Cherry, J. (2005) "'Big deal" or big disappointment? The continuing evolution of the South Korean developmental state', *The Pacific Review* 18(3): 327–34.

Chosun Ilbo. (1965a) 'Gyeonggi joong ipsi padong' [Dispute about entrance examination at Gyeonggi Middle School], 18 December.
Chosun Ilbo. (1965b) 'Moojeup gyeolsan' [The End of the Radish Juice Incident], 10 July.
Chosun Ilbo. (1966) 'Gyeonggi joong ipsi padong' [Disputes about entrance examination at Gyeonggi Middle School], 11 January.
Chosun Ilbo. (1967) 'Gawoe Gongbu Sibi' [The good and bad of private tutoring], 22 October.
Chosun Ilbo. (1968) 'Gong-saripgukgyojangdeul ipsigaehyeok jiji' [Public and private elementary school principals support the MSEP], 21 July.
Chosun Ilbo. (1971) 'Dasi Siryeone Budichin Ipssi Gyoyuk <Gawoe Sueop> Buhwal' [Another trial for entrance exam: the comeback of private tutoring], 15 June.
Chosun Ilbo. (1973) 'Gogyo Pyeongjunhwa Siwolkkaji' [The high school equalization by October], 1 March.
Chosun Ilbo. (1980) 'Gukbowi, Gyoyuk Jonghap Daechaek Balpyo' [SCNSM announces education reform measures], 31 July.
Chosun Ilbo. (1981) 'Hankook-1970 nyon dae <10> Gogyopyeongjunhwa' [Korea in the 1970s <10> the HSEP], 28 April.
Chosun Ilbo. (1983) 'Seoul wijang jeoniphak yukmanmyeong' [Students with fake residencies are about 60,000], December 10.
Chosun Ilbo. (2002a) 'Jaekyeongbu Dae Gyoyukbu "Gyoyuk Nonjaeng"' [MOFE vs. MOE 'educational debate'], 16 February.
Chosun Ilbo. (2002b) 'Gyoyuk Popyulism' [Educational populism], 22 February.
Chosun Ilbo. (2002c) 'Pyeongjunhwanun Jukeumida' [HSEP is 'death'], 28 February.
Chosun Ilbo. (2002d) 'Jeonhak julseogi 30 nyeonjjae gyesok' [Line for transfer students continues for 30 years], 2 March.
Chosun Ilbo. (2003) 'Pyeongjunhwanun Saibi Jongkyoda' [HSEP is a cult], 11 October.
Doner, R.F., Bryan, K. R. and Slater, D. (2005) 'Systemic vulnerability and the origins of developmental states: Northeast and Southeast Asia in comparative perspective', *International Organization* 59(2): 327–361.
Green, A. (1999) 'East Asian skill formation system and the challenge of globalisation', *Journal of Education and Work* 12(3): 253–79.
Green, A. (2007) 'Globalisation and the changing nature of the state in East Asia', *Globalisation, Societies, and Education* 5(1): 22–38.
Green, F., James, D., Ashton, D. and Sung, J. (1999) 'Post-school education and training policy in developmental sates: the cases of Taiwan and South Korea', *Journal of Educational Policy* 14(3): 301–15.
Gukjeong Briefing. (2007) 'Woegukeogo, Ipsigyoyukui Sasangah' [Foreign language high schools, an illegitimate child of exam-oriented education], 19 October.
Gukjeong Briefing Teukbyeol Gihoekteam. (2007) *Daehanminkuk Kyoyuk 40 nyeon [The 40 Years of Education in Korea]*, Seoul: Hans Media.
Hall, R. B. (2003) 'The discursive demolition of the Asian development model', *International Studies Quarterly* 47(1): 71–99.
Han, M. (1990) 'Gwawoe jeongchaek byonhwaui jeongchi kyeongjejeok uimi' [The political economy of the private tutoring policies and their changes], *Kyoyukbipyeong* 1.
Hyeondae sahoe yeonguso. (1981) 'Sahoe jeonghwa undongui junggan pyeongkka' [Mid-term evaluation of social purification campaigning].
Jeong, I. and Armer, J. M. (1994) 'State, class, and expansion of education in South Korea: a general model', *Comparative Education Review* 38(4): 531–45.

Johnson, C. (1999) 'The developmental state: odyssey of a concept', in M. Woo-Cumings (ed), *The Developmental State*, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, pp. 32–60.

Joongang Ilbo. (1967) 'Ipsi sosong 91 geon' [The lawsuits against elite middle schools are ninety one cases], 26 December.

Kang, C. S. (2000) '*Segyehwa* reform of the South Korean developmental state,' in S. S. Kim (ed), *Korea's Globalization*, New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 76–101.

Kang, Young-Hae, Yoon, J. H., Kim, M. S., Lee, H. S. and Kim, N. K. (2005) 'Gogyo pyeongjunhwa jeongchakui jeokhapseong yeongu (III)' [On the relevancy of high school leveling policy (III)], Seoul: Korean Educational Development Institute.

Kang, Young-Hae, Yoon, J. H., Lee, H. S. and Kim, N. K. (2005). 'Gogyo pyeongjunhwa jeongchakui jeokhapseong yeongu (II)' [On the relevancy of high school leveling policy (II)], Seoul: Korean Educational Development Institute.

Kim, Hyung-A. (2004) *Korea's Development under Park Chung Hee: Rapid Industrialization, 1961–79*, London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon.

Kim, Jongchol. (1971) 'Impact and problems of the middle school non-examination admission policy', *Korea Journal* 11(5): 4–7.

Kim, Yoon Tae, Chung, J. H., Kang, M. S. and Kwon, K. (1979) 'Gogyo Pyeongjunhwa Jeongchaekui Pyeonkka Yeongu, Iicha Yeondo Yeongu' [Assessment report of the HSEP, second year], Seoul: Korean Educational Development Institute.

Kim, Yoon Tae, Roh, J. H., Kang, M. S., Chung, J. H. and Kang, S. G. (1978) 'Godeunghakkyo Pyeongjunhwa Jeongchaekui Pyeongkkayeongu' [Assessment report of HSEP], Seoul: The Korean Educational Development Institute

Kim, Young Chul. (1981) 'Hakkyo Kyoyuk Jeongsanghwarul Ui Han Gwayeol Gwawoe Haesodaechaek' [Measures for the normalization of school education and the prevention of excessive private tutoring], Seoul: Korean Educational Development Institute.

Kim, Young Chul. (2003) 'Teuksumokjeokhyeong Godeuhakkyo Cheje Yeongu I' [A study on high school system pursuing special purposes], Seoul: The Korean Educational Development Institute.

Kim, Young Mo. (1973) 'Hankook Sahoeui Kyoyuk Kihoe-E Daehan Sahoe Gyecheungjeok Bunseok' [Class analysis on Korea's educational opportunity], *Jindan Hakbo* 35: 121–65.

Kim, Yoon Tae, Roh, J. H., Kang, M. S., Chung J. H. and Kang, S. G. (1978) 'Godeunghakkyo pyeongjunhwa jeongchaekui pyeongkkayeongu' [Assessment report of HSEP], Seoul: The Korean Educational Development Institute.

Koo, Hagen. (2007) 'Segyehwa sidaeui hankook gyegeup yeongureul wihan ironjeok mosaek' [A new approach to class analysis in South Korea in the age of globalization], *Gyeongjewa Sahoe [Economy and Society]*, 76 (Winter): 255–327.

Korean Educational Development Institute. (2007) 'Bodojaryo: Teukmokko Jedo Gaeseoneun Tueksumokjeokkoui Jejarireul Chajajuneun Banghyangeuro' [Press release: For the institutional improvement of the Special Purpose High Schools, we have to find them a right place].

Korean Educational Development Institute. (2009) 'Jariphyeong Saripkkowa Teukmokkoui Bigyo' [The comparison between independent private high school and special purpose high school], Seoul Korea.

Korea National Statistical Office. (2008a) '2007 Hankook ui Sahoejipyo' [2007 social indicators in Korea], Daejon, Korea.

Korea National Statistical Office. (2008b) '2007 Sakyoyukbi Siltae Josa' [The 2007 survey of private education expenditures], Daejon, Korea.
Korea Times. (2009) 'Autonomy, diversity key to school competitiveness', 18 February.
Kwon, Bokki. (2007) 'Chun Doo Whan Jeongkwoni geuriwun dan hangaji' [The only single reason I miss the Chun regime], *Hankyoreh*, 28 June.
Kwon, Young Gil. (2009) 'Woego Jasago Haksaeng Bumo Jigeop Bunseok Bogoseo' [An analysis on the occupations of the parents in foreign language high schools and independent high schools], Seoul: Democratic Labor Party.
Lee, J. (2002) *Education policy in the Republic of Korea: building block or stumbling block?*, Washington, DC: The World Bank.
McGinn, N. F., Snodgrass, D. R., Kim, Y. B., Kim, S.-B. and Kim, Q.-Y. (1980) *Education and Development in Korea*. Cambridge, MA: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University Press.
Ministry of Education. (1988) *Mungyo 40yon Sa [The 40 Years of the Ministry of Education of Korea]*, Korea: Ministry of Education of Korea.
Ministry of Education. (1998) *Gyoyuk 50yon Sa: 1948–1988 [The 50 Years of Education History in Korea]*, Korea: Ministry of Education of Korea.
Ministry of Education. (2007) 'Bodo Jaryo "Suwolseong Jegoreul Wihan Godeung Hakkyo Wunyeong Gaeseon Mit Cheje Gaepyeon Bangan Balpyo"' [Press Release 'Announcement of high school operation improvement and reform measures for excellence in education'], 29 October.
Minns, J. (2001) 'Of miracles and models: the rise of and decline of the developmental state in South Korea', *Third World Quarterly* 22(6): 1025–43.
Office of the President. (1969) *Park Chung Hee Daetongryeong Yeonseolmunjip 5 [President Park Chung Hee's Speeches 5]*, Seoul: Office of the President.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (1998) *Reviews of National Policies for Education: Korea*, Paris: OECD.
Ohmynews. (2008) 'Jasago-teukmokko seolip yaksok, je ii ui nyutaun gongyak' [Pledges on the Establishment of independent private high schools and special purpose high schools, another 'New Town'], 18 April.
Pirie, I. (2005) 'The new Korean state', *New Political Economy* 10(1): 25–42.
Ryu, Shimin. (2007) 'Gogyo pyeongjunhwanun sahoe hyeokmyeong iieotta' [HSEP was a social revolution]. *News Maker*, 30 October.
Sahoe Jeonghwa Wiwonhoe. (1986) *Sahoe Jeongwha Undongsa [The History of Social Purification Movement]*, Seoul: Sahoe Jeonghwa Wiwonhoe [Committee for Social Purification].
Seoul Shinmun (1973) 'Mungyobu Jangkwan Damwha' [Announcement by Minister of Education], 28 February.
Seth, M. J. (2002) *Education Fever: Society, Politics, and the Pursuit of Schooling in South Korea*, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
Song, H. K. (2003) 'Politics, generation, and the making of new leadership in South Korea', *Development and Society* 32(1): 103–23.
Stubbs, R. (2009) 'What ever happened to the East Asian developmental states? The unfolding debate', *The Pacific Review* 22(1): 1–22.
Thurbon, E. and Weiss, L. (2006) 'Investing in openness: the evolution of FDI strategy in South Korea and Taiwan', *New Political Economy* 11(1): 1–22.
Weiss, L. (2000) 'Developmental states in transition: adapting, dismantling, innovating, not "normalizing"', *The Pacific Review* 13(1): 21–55.
Wong, J. (2004) 'From learning to creating: biotechnology and postindustrial developmental state in Korea', *Journal of East Asian Studies* 4(3): 491–517.
Yonhap (2008) 'Kyunggido teukmokko shinseol ittareuna?' [Is Kyunggi Province going to add a number of the special purpose schools?], 11 April.

Yoon, Jong-Hyeok, Kim, Y. C., Kim, J. N., and Han, Y. K. (2003) 'Gogyo pyeongjunhwa jeongchakui jeokhapseong yeongu (I)' [On the relevancy of High School Equalization Policy I], Seoul: Korean Educational Development Institute.

Zunz, O., Schoppa, L. and Hiwatari, N. (eds) (2002) *Social Contracts Under Stress: The Middle Classes of America, Europe, and Japan at the Turn of the Century*, New York: Russell Sage Foundation.