Pride and Shame Track the Evaluative Psychology of Audiences: Preregistered Replications of Sznycer et al. (2016, 2017)

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# Abstract

Evolutionary–functional analyses suggest that pride and shame are adaptations for promoting others’ valuations of the self and limiting the costs of being devalued, respectively. Recent findings indicate that the intensities of anticipatory pride and shame regarding various potential acts and traits closely track the degree to which fellow community members value those acts and traits. Thus, these emotions appear to be engineered to balance the competing demands of effectiveness and efficiency in their operation. Here we report the results of two preregistered replications of the original pride and shame reports (Sznycer et al., 2016, 2017). We required the data to meet three criteria, including frequentist and Bayesian replication measures. Both replications successfully met the three criteria. This new evidence invites a shifting of prior assumptions about pride and shame: These emotions are elegantly engineered to gain the benefits of being valued and avoid the costs of being devalued.

Keywords: emotion, cooperation, reputation, replication

# Pride and Shame Track the Evaluative Psychology of Audiences: Preregistered Replications of Sznycer et al. (2016, 2017)

Recent research suggests that pride and shame are emotion programs designed by natural selection because they helped our human ancestors solve adaptive problems of social living. Pride and shame regulate motivation and behavior in ways that promote others’ valuations of the self and limit the threat of being devalued by others, respectively (de Hooge, Zeelenberg, & Breugelmans, 2011; Fessler, 1999; Gilbert, 1997; Sznycer, 2019; Tracy, 2016; Weisfeld & Dillon, 2012).

Being valued by others is a critical resource for humans (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). Our hominin ancestors evolved in a harsh and challenging world characterized by high rates of mortality, high variance in food acquisition (Kaplan & Hill, 1985), a high incidence of disease and injury (Sugiyama, 2004), and attacks by humans and non-humans (Keeley, 1997). Modern conditions that buffer those risks (e.g., stored food, hospitals) were absent, and our ancestors depended on the goodwill of fellow group members for the assistance necessary for survival and reproduction (Clutton-Brock, 2009). Given this feature of human evolutionary history, natural selection would have crafted cognitive mechanisms to target the programs in the minds of others that value (or disvalue) people based on their actions and characteristics in ways that would (1) induce others to value and help the self, and (2) minimize the threat of being devalued by others.

When others (an audience) detect new information about an individual that is at odds with their current level of valuation, their valuation is recalibrated either upward or downward, with correspondingly positive or negative effects on the individual’s fitness (Tooby, Cosmides, Sell, Lieberman, & Sznycer, 2008). Such shifts in others’ valuation of the individual appear to be the target domains of the pride and shame systems.

Consider pride. This emotion appears to capitalize on opportunities to promote the social value of the individual in the minds of others by motivating the pursuit of acts or the cultivation of characteristics that others value (and that would increase others’ valuations of the individual), and by advertising the achievement of those acts and characteristics (Tracy, 2016; Fessler, 1999; Weisfeld & Dillon, 2012; Sznycer et al., 2017; Williams & DeSteno, 2008).

This theory of adaptive function can account for many facts about pride. Pride is triggered by achievements (Lewis, Alessandri, & Sullivan, 1992) and other socially valued characteristics (Peristiany, 1965). Pride is a highly pleasant emotion (Mauro, Sato, & Tucker, 1992); this internal reward can motivate people to undertake and persevere at costly but socially valued courses of action (Williams & DeSteno, 2008). Pride has a full-body display featuring an erect and expanded posture, bodily relaxation, and gaze directed at the audience (Lewis et al., 1992; Tracy & Robins, 2007; Weisfeld & Dillon, 2012). This display conveys achievement or dominance (Shariff & Tracy, 2009), is produced by congenitally blind individuals (Tracy & Matsumoto, 2008), and is recognized by young children (Tracy, Robins, & Lagattuta, 2005) and by adults within and across cultures (Tracy & Robins, 2008).

Shame too bears the mark of adaptive functionality. Humans would have been selected to devalue and shun individuals who are poor social partners (Kurzban & Leary, 2001). This would have selected, on the recipient’s end, for regulatory mechanisms to minimize the spread of negative information about the self and the adverse effects of being devalued when negative information spreads (Fessler, 1999; Gilbert, 1997; Sznycer et al., 2016; Weisfeld & Dillon, 2012).

Research suggests shame was engineered to counter devaluation. For example, when facing the prospect of being devalued, the individual inhibits actions that would cause others to devalue her (de Hooge, Breugelmans, & Zeelenberg, 2008; Fehr & Gächter, 2000). The individual can also withdraw from the situation to avoid damage, and conceal or destroy incriminating information (de Hooge, Zeelenberg, & Breugelmans, 2010; Leach & Cidam, 2015; Sznycer, Schniter, Tooby, & Cosmides, 2015). When ashamed, the individual produces a stereotyped nonverbal display that deters attacks by signaling subordination (Fessler, 1999; Tracy & Matsumoto, 2008; Weisfeld & Dillon, 2012). Compared to other displays (e.g., displays of anger) or the absence of a display, the shame display mollifies observers of transgressions (Keltner et al., 1997).

Although pride and shame have been studied extensively, dissecting these emotions from the standpoint of their hypothesized target domain—the evolved social-evaluative psychology of audiences—are comparatively infrequent. But over evolutionary time the evaluative psychology of audiences dictated (*i*) the courses of action an individual was to adopt if others were to value her, and (*ii*) the information-processing structure of the pride and shame systems tasked with gaining valuation and avoiding devaluation. Thus, the evaluative psychology of audiences is key to mapping the cognitive architecture of pride and shame. Indeed, recent reports applying this research strategy have demonstrated close quantitative correspondences between pride and shame on the one hand and audience psychology on the other hand.

## Pride and shame track the valuations of audiences

A well-engineered pride system must mobilize not only reactively but also prospectively, in order to motivate the pursuit of socially valued actions that might increase others’ valuations of the self (Sznycer et al., 2017; Tracy, Shariff, & Cheng, 2010). In this way, prospective pride helps the individual decide which courses of action to take.

It has been hypothesized that the anticipatory feeling of pride is an internally generated prediction that signals the magnitude of audience valuation one would accrue if one took an action that others value (Sznycer et al., 2017). A pride system that accurately forecasts and precisely tracks audience valuation allows the individual to avoid two types of costly errors: (*i*) *under-activation of anticipatory pride*, which would cause the individual to insufficiently pursue socially valued courses of action, and (*ii*) *over-activation of anticipatory pride*, which would cause the individual to over-pursue actions in excess of their actual return. This analysis suggests the existence of a feature: The pride system should forecast the magnitude of valuation people in one’s social ecology would express if one took a given act that they favor and deliver an internal signal (anticipatory pride) whose intensity is proportional to it.

Experiments conducted in 16 countries supported this prediction: The intensity of anticipatory pride in every country closely tracked the magnitude of valuation expressed by local audiences—in the absence of any communication between participants reporting their pride vs. audiences reporting their valuation regarding each of various potential acts and traits, such as generosity, trustworthiness and skills (Sznycer et al., 2017).

Analogous reasoning suggests that the anticipatory feeling of shame is an internal prediction of the degree to which local audiences would devalue the individual if she took an action that they disfavor, such as theft, sexual infidelity, or stinginess (Sznycer et al., 2016; see Kurzban & Leary, 2001; Neuberg & Cottrell, 2006; Sznycer, 2010). By forecasting and tracking the precise magnitude of audience devaluation, the aversive signal of anticipated shame allows the individual to steer adaptively between a dangerous disregard of others’ views, which would yield excessive devaluation, and an excessive timidity about one’s possible disgraceful behavior, which would yield insufficient personal payoffs. As predicted, shame closely tracked audience devaluation in three countries (Sznycer et al., 2016).

The original pride and shame studies were subsequently replicated in traditional small-scale societies (Sznycer, Xygalatas, Alami, et al., 2018; Sznycer, Xygalatas, Agey, et al., 2018). Although multiple replications with positive results are encouraging and suggest a reliable effect, the findings could still reflect false-positives or misestimate an effect size for at least two reasons: 1) undisclosed flexibility in data analysis, and 2) experimenter error in the study design, implementation, or analysis. The present work addresses these issues.

## The present work

Here we present the results of two preregistered replications addressing the following questions: Does anticipatory pride track the magnitude of audience valuation (Sznycer et al., 2017)? And, does anticipatory shame track the magnitude of audience devaluation (Sznycer et al., 2016)?

The present work addresses two issues surrounding the replicability of the original pride and shame studies. First, here we perform preregistered confirmatory analyses. This allows us to validly conduct null hypothesis significance testing while controlling long-run error rates that otherwise would be inflated by undisclosed flexibility in data analysis (Nosek & Lakens, 2014; Wagenmakers et al., 2012). If the replications are successful, that would make it less likely that the original findings were false-positives or that the original effect sizes were misestimated due to undisclosed flexibility in data analysis.

Second, the original and replication studies were conducted and analyzed by different individuals. Following best practices to design and implement replication studies (Brandt et al, 2014; Simons, Holcombe, & Spellman, 2014), the first two authors collaborated with the third author (the lead author of the original studies). The first two authors conducted the studies and analyzed the data, while the third author shared original materials and data, provided feedback about the accuracy of the study implementation, and helped identify discrepancies with the original studies. This allowed us to implement replication studies that were closely aligned with the original studies and document any remaining differences. Therefore, a successful replication would reduce uncertainty in the original findings by arguing against experimenter error in the original study design, implementation, or analysis.

The procedures were the same as in Sznycer et al. (2016, 2017), with the following exceptions: 1) The original studies included a number of measures/stimuli testing other hypotheses, which were dropped from the replications; 2) the replications were administered online, as the original studies were, but were conducted exclusively in lab rather than a mix of inside and outside of lab; and 3) participants were students completing the tasks as part of a course assignment rather than paid participants, as was the case in some of the original samples. Successful replications would suggest the original effects are robust to these modified procedures. Although there were not strong theoretical reasons for expecting these procedural differences to alter the original effects, these differences were preregistered, as they would be among the first factors to consider as moderators in explaining any failures to replicate.

Following Brandt et al.’s template (2014), we preregistered hypotheses, a priori power analyses,[[1]](#footnote-1) and data analysis plans on the Open Science Framework for Study 1 ([preregistration](https://osf.io/uyfqw/?view_only=36050b395f424994b062220bf51df8fb); [materials, data, and analyses](https://osf.io/3cdr2/?view_only=5fdfda3d898c4556bf36a7f586547df1)) and Study 2 ([preregistration](https://osf.io/gvmun/?view_only=0bb675258bee4c50840ae546996e7317); [materials, raw data, and analyses](https://osf.io/sthf3/?view_only=2497a257832548f28da340153dce1c5c)).

Since no individual measure of replication success is without limitation (Simonsohn, 2015; Valentine et al., 2011; Verhagen & Wagenmakers, 2014), we defined replication success as meeting three criteria: 1) a correlation between emotion and audience evaluations that is statistically significant (p < .05) and in the same direction as in the original study, 2) an effect size that is different from zero and not different from the original effect size, and 3) a replication Bayes Factor (Ly, Etz, Marsman, & Wagenmakers, 2018) that exceeds 3,[[2]](#footnote-2) which is considered at a minimum “substantial evidence” in favor of the alternative hypothesis relative to the null hypothesis (Jeffreys, 1961).

# Study 1 – Pride

## Method

Participants**.**

We recruited 87 participants. Six were removed from analyses for failing an attention check, leaving a final sample size of 81 participants (*M* = 20.8 years, *SD* = 4.55, 57 females). Participants were students from the University of Hawai'i at Mānoa who were enrolled in a research methods course (Saxe & Frank, 2012). After participating in the study, students worked with the data as part of a course project but were naïve to hypotheses at the time of testing. Bootstrapping simulations on the Study 1 data from the US sample of Sznycer et al. (2017) indicated that 95% power would be achieved with 10 participants. However, because participation was part of a course requirement, the stopping rule[[3]](#footnote-3) for the frequentist tests (Replication Criteria 1 and 2) was determined by the number of students enrolled in the course (n = 87). The actual sample, after exclusion criteria were applied (n = 81), was well in excess of the sample size that would produce 95% power.

Design**.**

Study 1 tested whether the anticipated intensity of pride an individual feels with respect to a given prospective act or trait tracks the degree of positive valuation in the social world of the individual. Participants rated 25 brief hypothetical scenarios in which someone’s acts, traits, or circumstances might lead them to be viewed positively. The scenarios were designed to elicit reactions in a wide range of evolutionarily relevant domains, such as such as social exchange, skills, mating, parenting, and leadership.

Participants were randomly assigned to an *audience* condition or a *pride* condition. Participants in the audience condition were asked to provide their reactions to 25 scenarios involving a third-party: an individual other than the participant who is of the same sex and age as the participant (e.g., “She is trustworthy,” “She has many unique skills,” “She is physically attractive”). Participants in this condition were asked to “indicate how you would view [someone of your same sex and age] if they were in those situations,” using scales ranging from 1 (I wouldn’t view her positively at all) to 7 (I’d view her very positively). These ratings provide situation-specific measures of the extent to which members of a population would value the individual described in the scenarios.

In the pride condition, a different set of participants was asked to “indicate how much pride you would feel if you were in those situations” (i.e. in each of the 25 scenarios; e.g., “You are trustworthy,” “You have many unique skills,” “You are physically attractive”), with scales ranging from 1 (no pride at all) to 7 (a lot of pride). The stimuli in the audience and pride conditions were identical on a scenario-by-scenario basis, the only difference being the perspective from which the events are described. The scenarios were presented in randomized order in both conditions. To conduct the replications, we used original materials provided by the third author.

Procedure**.**

Participants were tested in a computer lab. They participated in Study 1, Study 2, and a third unrelated study in random order. Participants entered their gender and age, were randomly assigned to one of the two conditions, and completed the task. The scenarios were gendered according to the participant’s gender. Participants were given an attention check before completing the study.

## Results

Is the correlation between pride and audience valuation significantly different from zero and in the same direction as in the original study?

Yes. For each scenario, we calculated the mean pride ratings provided by participants in the pride condition, and the mean valuation ratings provided by participants in the audience condition. As in the original study, the pride means and the valuation means were positively correlated, *r*(23) = 0.90, *p* < 0.001, 95% CI [0.79, 0.96] (Figure 1; Mean pride and valuation ratings are displayed in Table 1). Recall that the pride and valuation ratings originate from different participants. Consequently, this high correlation cannot be attributed to participants matching their pride and valuation ratings.

*Figure 1*.

Scatter plot: Pride as a function of valuation.Each point represents the mean valuation rating and mean pride rating of one scenario. Valuation and pride ratings were given by different participants. N = number of scenarios = 25. Effect size: R2 linear.

Is the effect size different from zero and not different from the original effect size?

Yes.Using *r* as a measure of effect size, the 95% confidence interval from the replication study, 95% CI [0.79, 0.96], was not consistent with an effect size of 0. Second, the *r*from the replication study, *r*(23) = 0.90, fell within the 95% confidence interval from the original study, 95% CI [0.69, 0.93].

Is the replication Bayes Factors greater than 3 and in favor of the alternative hypothesis relative to the null hypothesis?

Yes.We complemented the previous two frequentist criteria by computing an Evidence Updating Bayes Factor (EU-BF). The EU-BF indicates whether an effect is present in a replication experiment factoring in the data from the original experiment (Ly et al., 2018). The EU-BF is calculated as follows: (replication | original) = (original + replication) / (original). We took two approaches to calculate a valid Bayesian measure of replication success (E.J. Wagemakers and Alexander Ly, personal communication).[[4]](#footnote-4) First, we combined the 25item pairs from the original and the replication studies as if they were separate items, yielding 50 item pairs, to calculate (original + replication). Dividing this by BF10(original) yielded BF10 (replication|original) = 1.03 x 109, which exceeded a Bayes factor of 3. For the second approach, we generated a posterior probability for  from the original study and used it as the prior for the replication study. The recalculated BF10 (replication|original) was 1.17x108, which also exceeded a Bayes factor of 3. The two measures are off by almost a factor of 9 because the second approach approximates the first using a stretched beta distribution, which is less accurate for correlations towards the tails of the distribution (e.g., near  = 1), as in the current case. Both replication Bayes Factors provide evidence consistent with the frequentist approaches, satisfying the third criterion for a successful replication.

# Study 2 – Shame

## Method

### Participants.

The sample for Study 2 consisted of 87 participants (*M* = 20.8 years, *SD* = 4.42, 60 females). The participants were selected using the same method as in Study 1. There was no attention check, so no participants were excluded from analyses.[[5]](#footnote-5) Bootstrapping simulations on the Study 1 data from the US sample of Sznycer et al. (2016) indicated that 95% power would be achieved with 14 participants. However, because participation was part of a course requirement, the stopping rule for the frequentist tests (Replication Criteria 1 and 2) was determined by the number of students enrolled in the course (n = 87). Therefore, the actual sample well exceeded the sample size that would produce 95% power.

### Design.

Study 2 tested whether the anticipated intensity of shame felt by an individual with respect to a prospective act or trait tracks the degree of devaluation expressed by local audiences regarding that act or trait. Participants rated 29 brief hypothetical scenarios in which someone’s acts, traits, or circumstances might lead them to be viewed negatively. The scenarios were designed to elicit reactions in various evolutionarily relevant domains, such as mating, parenting, social exchange, status, skills, and the violation of coordinative norms.

Participants were randomly assigned to either an *audience* condition or a *shame* condition. Participants in the audience condition were asked to provide their reactions to 29 scenarios involving a third-party: an individual other than the participant who is the same sex and age as the participant (e.g., “He is not generous with others,” “He has poor table manners.”) Participants in this condition were asked to “indicate how you would view this person if they were in those situations”; they indicated their reactions using scales ranging from 1 (I wouldn’t view him negatively at all) to 7 (I’d view him very negatively). These ratings provide situation-specific measures of the degree to which members of a population would devalue the individual described in the scenarios.

In the shame condition, a different set of participants was asked to “indicate how much shame you would feel if you were in those situations” (i.e. in each of the 29 scenarios; e.g., “You are not generous with others,” “You have poor table manners”), with scales ranging from 1 (no shame at all) to 7 (a lot of shame). The scenarios were presented in randomized order in both conditions. To conduct the replications, we used original materials provided by the third author.

### Procedure.

The procedures were the same as in Study 1, except here participants were randomly assigned to an audience condition or a shame condition and no attention check was administered.

## Results

**Is the correlation between shame and devaluation significantly different from zero and in the same direction as in the original study?**

Yes. For each scenario, we calculated the mean shame ratings provided by participants in the shame condition, and the mean devaluation ratings provided by participants in the audience condition. The shame means and the devaluation means were positively correlated, *r*(27) = 0.75, *p* < 0.001, 95% CI [0.53, 0.88] (Figure 2; Mean shame and devaluation ratings are displayed in Table 2).

*Figure 2*.

Scatter plot: Shame as a function of devaluation. Each point represents the mean devaluation rating and mean shame rating of one scenario. Devaluation and shame ratings were given by different participants. N = number of scenarios = 29. Effect size: R2 linear.

**Is the effect size different from zero and not different from the original effect size?**

Yes. Using *r* as a measure of effect size, the 95% confidence interval from the replication study, 95% CI [0.53, 0.88], was not consistent with an effect size of zero. Second, the *r*from the replication study, *r*(27) = 0.75, fell within the 95% confidence interval from the original study, 95% CI [0.48, 0.86].

**Is** the replication Bayes Factors greater than 3 and in favor of the alternative hypothesis relative to the null hypothesis?

Yes.We used the same two Bayesian approaches from Study 1. On the first approach, we combined the *29 item pairs from the original and replication studies* as if they were separate items (total = 58 item pairs) to calculate (original + replication). Dividing this by BF10(original) yielded BF10(replication|original) = 5.86 x 104, which exceeded a Bayes factor of 3. On the second approach, we generated a posterior for  from the original study and used it as the prior for the replication study. The recalculated BF10 (replication|original) was 4.55 x 104, which also exceeded a Bayes factor of 3. Both replication Bayes Factors are consistent with the frequentist replication analyses, and together provide evidence for replication of the original results.

# Discussion

Two preregistered replications provided confirmatory evidence in support of evolutionary–functional theories of shame and pride, as reported originally by Sznycer and colleagues (2016, 2017). The intensity of anticipatory pride felt with respect to a prospective action or trait closely tracks the magnitude of positive valuation audiences express with respect to that action or trait. Similarly, anticipatory shame closely tracks audience devaluation.

There is no single, definitive measure of replication success, so we required the data to meet three different criteria to classify the replication as successful: 1) significant replication p-values, with effects in the same direction as in the original studies; 2) replication effect sizes different from zero and within the 95% confidence interval of the original effect sizes, and 3) replication Bayes Factors, conditioned on the original results, supporting the presence of a correlation, compared to the hypothesis of no-correlation. In both studies, all three criteria of replication success were met. Because the data analysis plans were preregistered and neither the last author nor any of the other authors involved in the original studies participated in the data collection or analyses of the present replications, the original findings are unlikely to be false positives due to researcher degrees of freedom in data collection or analysis (Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011) or experimenter error.

A recent large-scale replication study showed that replication success largely does not depend on the study sample (Klein et al., 2018, November 21). Consistent with this, differences between the original and replication samples did not impact the results. Even though the replication sample was drawn from the 6th most ethnically diverse campus in the US (The Chronicles of Higher Education, 2018), likely making it less homogenous than most of the samples from the original studies, both pride and shame effects replicated.

Although the evidence for replication is strong, there are potential limitations that remain unaddressed. First, in the pride and shame conditions there were likely multiple scenarios that were not relatable to most participants (e.g., “You finished first in a marathon” in Study 1; “You were in an accident and your face was permanently disfigured” in Study 2). How does an individual generate a specific rating of anticipatory pride (or shame) regarding a situation she has never directly encountered? One possibility is that the individual generates those ratings by imagining how she (or others) would view someone else in that situation. But, if so, that would be equivalent to the task in the audience condition, and a high correlation between audience evaluations and “pride” (or “shame”) ratings would be inevitable. Under this hypothesis, the ostensible pride ratings in fact reflect ratings of valuation, so the finding is only apparently about pride tracking valuation but in reality is about consensus in valuation. And, similarly, the shame-devaluation findings might simply reflect consensus in shame. It is possible, then, that the observed correlations are unduly inflated by uncommon scenarios that may induce an audience perspective in the pride or shame conditions. Future studies would alleviate these conceptual validity concerns by attempting to replicate the effects with hypothetical events more relatable to participants or with events actually experienced by participants.

Participants may have treated the shame and pride conditions from an audience perspective for another reason. Participants completed one condition of Study 1, one condition of Study 2, and a third unrelated task, all in a random order. Consider a participant assigned first to the audience (valuation) condition of Study 1, and then to the shame condition of Study 2. It is possible that the initial assignment to the audience condition primed the participant to subsequently adopt an audience perspective when generating the shame ratings.[[6]](#footnote-6) If so, the correlation between those shame ratings and the devaluation ratings (provided by other participants) might have been artificially inflated. To test this priming alternative, we analyzed only the data from the replication study that was administered first, excluding from analyses the data from the replication study that was administered subsequently. This eliminated any possibility of one study priming the other. Analyses based only on the data of the study presented first did not change the results (see Priming-Control Analyses in the Supplementary Materials). Thus, priming of the other perspective cannot explain the observed effects.

Second, none of the scenarios in either study were negatively worded. Given this, some types of response biases (e.g., acquiescence) may have the effect of artificially inflating the emotion–evaluation correlations. Future studies can profitably assess whether the links between shame and pride on the one hand and the evaluative psychology of audiences on the other generalize to measures other than self-reports.

Because of their association with undesirable outcomes such as aggression and dominance, it has been argued that shame and the hubristic facet of pride are maladaptive emotions (Tangney, 1991; Tangney, Wagner, & Gramzow, 1992; Tracy & Robins, 2014; but see Tracy, 2016). However, the present results suggest a different view of shame and pride. The fact that anticipatory shame tracks the devaluative psychology of audiences suggests that the shame system is designed to steer precisely between a reckless disregard of others’ values and an excessive diffidence in the pursuit of personal payoffs. Notwithstanding shame’s association with aggression, this emotion comprises multiple features that appear well designed to counter the threat of being devalued (see above). Moreover, even aggression may be a best-response in situations where social benefits are no longer as abundantly provided because one is devalued and instead must be bargained for by threatening harm (see Leach & Cidam, 2015; Fessler, 1999; Weisfeld & Dillon, 2012). Similarly, the fact that anticipatory pride tracks audience valuation suggests that this emotion is naturally selected to avoid the insufficient pursuit of success on the one hand and the excessive pursuit, advertisement, and entitlement over one’s successes on the other.

The findings of close, functional matches between pride and shame and the evaluative psychology of audiences, now buttressed by confirmatory preregistered replications, add to a growing body of research indicating that an evolutionary–functional framework is a productive approach to uncover the architecture of human emotion.

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# Appendix

## Table 1

Ratings of valuation and pride, by scenario

| # | Scenario | Valuation | Pride |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 18 | You are trustworthy. / He is trustworthy. | 6.74 (0.54) | 6.15 (1.25) |
| 4 | You take very good care of your children. / He takes very good care of his children. | 6.64 (0.76) | 6.10 (1.25) |
| 14 | You are generous with others. / He is generous with others. | 6.36 (1.03) | 5.92 (1.29) |
| 5 | You can support your children economically. / He can support his children economically. | 6.17 (0.99) | 6.08 (1.33) |
| 15 | You are ambitious. / He is ambitious. | 6.07 (1.09) | 5.64 (1.39) |
| 22 | People love your sense of humor. / People love his sense of humor. | 5.98 (1.24) | 5.90 (1.31) |
| 8 | You are very smart. / He is very smart. | 5.79 (1.18) | 5.87 (1.47) |
| 10 | You have good table manners. / He has good table manners. | 5.69 (1.26) | 5.28 (1.85) |
| 16 | You have many unique skills. / He has many unique skills. | 5.69 (1.37) | 5.74 (1.27) |
| 19 | When there is a conflict in your community, people ask you to mediate between the two sides. / When there is a conflict in his community, people ask him to mediate between the two sides. | 5.67 (1.30) | 5.23 (1.46) |
| 25 | People think that you are the bravest man of your community. / People think that he is the bravest man of his community. | 5.67 (1.32) | 5.23 (1.75) |
| 2 | You host your extended family for a holiday meal; they think it’s the best meal they’ve ever had. / He hosts his extended family for a holiday meal; they think it’s the best meal they’ve ever had. | 5.64 (1.25) | 5.67 (1.38) |
| 17 | You have a lot of good friends. / He has a lot of good friends. | 5.62 (1.32) | 6.03 (1.22) |
| 9 | You have more years of education than those around you. / He has more years of education than those around him. | 5.48 (1.29) | 5.15 (1.68) |
| 24 | You finished first in a marathon. / He finished first in a marathon. | 5.40 (1.42) | 6.03 (1.27) |
| 6 | You are playing a throwing game with your friends. All your throws hit the target. / He is playing a throwing game with his friends. All his throws hit the target. | 5.38 (1.21) | 5.36 (1.66) |
| 3 | Your children are healthier and taller than average for their age. / His children are healthier and taller than average for their age. | 5.07 (1.24) | 5.38 (1.44) |
| 12 | You are physically attractive. / He is physically attractive. | 4.88 (1.38) | 5.05 (1.67) |
| 20 | Your wife is the most attractive woman of your community. / His wife is the most attractive woman of his community. | 4.64 (1.45) | 5.00 (1.81) |
| 1 | You look ten years younger than you are. / He looks ten years younger than he is. | 4.48 (1.31) | 4.23 (1.74) |
| 13 | You are wealthy. / He is wealthy. | 4.48 (1.25) | 4.56 (1.87) |
| 7 | You come from a wealthy family with high status and many connections. / He comes from a wealthy family with high status and many connections. | 4.31 (1.30) | 4.21 (1.70) |
| 23 | An acquaintance of yours had been bullying you for a while. At some point you got tired of it, and you beat him very badly. You were never bullied again. / An acquaintance of his had been bullying him for a while. At some point he got tired of it, and he beat him very badly. He was never bullied again. | 3.90 (2.00) | 3.69 (1.92) |
| 21 | You are the tallest in your circle of friends. / He is the tallest in his circle of friends. | 3.76 (1.54) | 2.74 (1.45) |
| 11 | You get into a fight in front of everybody and you completely dominate your opponent with punch after punch, until your opponent is knocked out. / He gets into a fight in front of everybody and he completely dominates his opponent with punch after punch, until his opponent is knocked out. | 3.14 (2.03) | 3.77 (1.99) |

Note. Displayed are means, with standard deviations in parentheses. Ns: valuation: 42; pride: 39.

The male versions of the pride and valuation scenarios are presented before and after the slash,

respectively. The female versions of the scenarios read “husband” (scenario # 20), “man”

(scenario # 20), and “woman” (scenario # 25), instead of “wife,” “woman,” and “man”. The

female version of the pride scenario # 23 read “her” instead of “him”. The female versions of the valuation scenarios featured a female target, so the pronouns were female pronouns. Otherwise,

the male and female scenarios were identical. Scenarios are displayed from highest to lowest

mean valuation scores.

## Table 2

Ratings of devaluation and shame, by scenario

| # | Scenario | Devaluation | Shame |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 3 | At the wedding of an acquaintance, you are discovered cheating on your wife with a food server. / At the wedding of an acquaintance, he is discovered cheating on his wife with a food server. | 6.09 (1.60) | 6.70 (0.88) |
| 21 | You stole goods from a shop owned by your neighbor. / He stole goods from a shop owned by his neighbor. | 5.86 (1.49) | 6.25 (1.08) |
| 7 | You do a bad job taking care of your children. / He does a bad job taking care of his children. | 5.79 (1.32) | 6.52 (0.90) |
| 10 | Everyone discovers that you are sexually unfaithful to your wife. / Everyone discovers that he is sexually unfaithful to his wife. | 5.79 (1.49) | 6.41 (1.13) |
| 20 | You stole goods from a shop owned by a foreign merchant. / He stole goods from a shop owned by a foreign merchant. | 5.42 (1.65) | 5.93 (1.40) |
| 28 | You are not generous with others. / He is not generous with others. | 4.91 (1.62) | 5.45 (1.61) |
| 19 | You have poor table manners. / He has poor table manners. | 4.16 (1.77) | 4.77 (1.78) |
| 23 | An acquaintance is inappropriately flirting with your wife in front of everybody. Because you’re too scared to pick a fight with your rival you remain silent without doing or saying anything. / An acquaintance is inappropriately flirting with his wife in front of everybody. Because he’s too scared to pick a fight with his rival he remains silent without doing or saying anything. | 3.74 (2.04) | 5.59 (1.62) |
| 29 | You are not very ambitious. / He is not very ambitious. | 3.60 (1.64) | 4.80 (1.65) |
| 24 | You get into a fight in front of everybody and your opponent completely dominates you with punch after punch until you’re knocked out. / He gets into a fight in front of everybody and his opponent completely dominates him with punch after punch until he’s knocked out. | 3.58 (2.04) | 5.80 (1.64) |
| 18 | You dropped out of school much earlier than others. / He dropped out of school much earlier than others. | 3.51 (1.91) | 5.23 (1.90) |
| 8 | You cannot support your children economically. / He cannot support his children economically. | 3.07 (1.68) | 6.27 (1.28) |
| 15 | Your brother stole money from a stranger. As soon as you found out about that, you reported him to the police. How much shame would you feel about your reporting your brother to the police? / His brother stole money from a stranger. As soon as he found out about that, he reported him to the police. How much shame would he feel about his reporting his brother to the police? | 2.93 (1.86) | 4.68 (2.08) |
| 1 | You are single. You have a promiscuous sexual life with women. / He is single. He has a promiscuous sexual life with women. | 2.91 (2.01) | 3.09 (2.03) |
| 17 | Your father defrauded a foreign company. / His father defrauded a foreign company. | 2.77 (1.63) | 4.70 (1.90) |
| 16 | You are not very smart. / He is not very smart. | 2.49 (1.44) | 4.59 (1.87) |
| 5 | You host your extended family for a holiday meal, but you burn the food. / He hosts his extended family for a holiday meal, but he burns the food. | 2.30 (1.52) | 4.34 (1.83) |
| 14 | Your brother stole money from a stranger. How much shame would you feel about your brother stealing money from the stranger? / His brother stole money from a stranger. How much shame would he feel about his brother stealing money from the stranger? | 2.16 (1.68) | 5.23 (1.68) |
| 11 | Everyone discovers that your wife is sexually unfaithful to you. / Everyone discovers that his wife is sexually unfaithful to him. | 2.12 (1.68) | 5.50 (1.92) |
| 4 | You look ten years older than you are. / He looks ten years older than he is. | 2.09 (1.34) | 3.75 (2.01) |
| 25 | You are performing a ceremony in front of your community. In the middle of it, your mind goes blank and you forget what to do next. / He is performing a ceremony in front of his community. In the middle of it, his mind goes blank and he forgets what to do next. | 1.98 (1.20) | 5.14 (1.77) |
| 9 | You receive welfare money from the government because you cannot financially support your family. / He receives welfare money from the government because he cannot financially support his family. | 1.81 (1.37) | 4.05 (2.06) |
| 26 | You are not physically attractive. / He is not physically attractive. | 1.77 (1.13) | 4.59 (1.82) |
| 12 | You are playing a throwing game with your friends. All your throws miss the target by a wide margin. / He is playing a throwing game with his friends. All his throws miss the target by a wide margin. | 1.72 (1.10) | 3.55 (1.89) |
| 2 | You were in an accident and your face was permanently disfigured. / He was in an accident and his face was permanently disfigured. | 1.70 (1.21) | 5.09 (1.83) |
| 6 | Your wife makes more money than you do. / His wife makes more money than he does. | 1.60 (1.45) | 2.14 (1.58) |
| 13 | You come from a very poor family with low status and no connections. / He comes from a very poor family with low status and no connections. | 1.60 (1.03) | 3.14 (1.82) |
| 27 | You are poor. / He is poor. | 1.49 (0.83) | 3.61 (1.82) |
| 22 | You have no idea how to load or fire a gun. / He has no idea how to load or fire a gun. | 1.47 (1.14) | 2.07 (1.66) |

Note. Displayed are means, with standard deviations in parentheses. Ns: shame: 44, devaluation: 43. The male versions of the shame and devaluation scenarios are presented before and after the slash, respectively. The female versions of the scenarios read “men” (scenario # 1) and “husband” (scenarios #3, 6, 10, 11, 23) instead of “women” and “wife”. Further, the female versions of the devaluation scenarios featured female pronouns. Otherwise, the male and female scenarios were identical. Scenarios are displayed from highest to lowest mean devaluation scores.

1. We report a different power analysis in the Method section of Studies 1 and 2 to address a problem with the preregistered power analyses. See the addendum on OSF for details: [https://osf.io/jymzk/] [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. The Bayes Factor quantifies the evidence in favor of one hypothesis relative to a second hypothesis. A Bayes Factor of 3 represents odds of 3:1 in support of one hypothesis compared to another, competing hypothesis. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Due to an oversight, the stopping rules for Studies 1 and 2 were not preregistered. However, no analyses were conducted before the stopping rule was reached and no additional data were collected after. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. An initial calculation of the replication Bayes Factor that was invalid is described in the Supplementary Materials. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. An attention check was used in the original study but was not provided with materials for Study 2, so the replication was run without an attention check. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. If a priming effect also went in the other direction, from the shame/pride condition to the audience condition, the effects would wash each other out, and priming would not be able to explain the results. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)