

Cashu Book of NUTs

TODO

Abstract

This is the abstract.
It consists of two paragraphs.

Contents

Git Commit	6
Mandatory NUTs	7
NUT-00: Notation, Utilization, and Terminology	8
Blind Diffie-Hellmann key exchange (BDHKE)	8
Variables	8
Protocol	8
0.1 - Models	9
0.2 - Protocol	9
0.3 - Methods	10
NUT-01: Mint public key exchange	14
Description	14
Supported Currency Units	14
Keyset generation	14
Example	14
Example response	15
NUT-02: Keysets and fees	17
Keyset properties	17
Example: Get mint keysets	19
Requesting public keys for a specific keyset	20
Wallet implementation notes	20
NUT-03: Swap tokens	21
Swap to send	21
Swap to receive	21
Example	21
NUT-04: Mint tokens	23
Supported methods	23
General Flow	23
Common Request and Response Formats	23
Adding New Payment Methods	24
Settings	24
Unblinding Signatures	25
NUT-05: Melting tokens	26
Supported methods	26
General Flow	26

Common Request and Response Formats	26
Adding New Payment Methods	29
Settings	29
NUT-06: Mint information	30
Example	30
Optional NUTs	32
NUT-07: Token state check	33
Use cases	33
Example	33
Mint info setting	34
NUT-08: Lightning fee return	35
Description	35
Example	35
Wallet flow	35
Mint flow	35
Example	36
Example	36
Mint info setting	37
NUT-09: Restore signatures	38
Mint info setting	38
NUT-10: Spending conditions	39
Basic components	39
Well-known Secret	39
Examples	40
Mint info setting	40
NUT-11: Pay to Public Key (P2PK)	41
Basic Case	41
Signature scheme	41
Tags	42
Signature flag	42
Locktime Tag	43
Multisig	44
Use cases	45
Mint info setting	45
NUT-12: Offline ecash signature validation	47
The DLEQ proof	47
Alice (minting user) verifies DLEQ proof	48
Carol (another user) verifies DLEQ proof	49
Mint info setting	49
NUT-13: Deterministic Secrets	50
Deterministic secret derivation	50
Restore from seed phrase	54
NUT-14: Hashed Timelock Contracts (HTLCs)	56
HTLC Locked Proof	56
Spending HTLC Proofs	56
Hash lock	57
Witness format	57
Complex Example	58

Mint info setting	58
NUT-15: Partial multi-path payments	59
Multimint payment execution	59
Melt quote	59
Mint info setting	59
NUT-16: Animated QR codes	61
Introduction	61
Resources	61
NUT-17: WebSockets	62
Subscriptions	62
Specifications	62
Mint info setting	65
NUT-18: Payment Requests	67
Flow	67
Payment Request	67
Locking conditions	67
Transport	68
Payment payload	68
Encoded Request	69
NUT-19: Cached Responses	70
Requests & Responses	70
Settings	70
NUT-20: Signature on Mint Quote	72
Mint quote	72
Example	72
Signing the mint request	73
Minting tokens	73
Example	74
Errors	74
Settings	74
NUT-21: Clear Authentication	76
OpenID Connect service configuration	76
Mint	76
Wallet	77
Error codes	77
NUT-22: Blind Authentication	79
Blind authentication tokens are ecash	79
Endpoints	80
Minting blind authentication tokens	81
Using blind authentication tokens	81
Mint	82
Error codes	82
NUT-23: BOLT11	83
Mint Quote	83
Mint Settings	84
Melt Quote	84
NUT-24: HTTP 402 Payment Required	87
Payment response	87

NUT-25: BOLT12	88
Mint Quote	88
Multiple Issuances	89
Mint Settings	90
Melt Quote	90
Conclusion	93

Welcome to the Cashu Book of NUTs. This book is nuts. It is a streamlined guide to the Cashu Notation, Usage, and Terminology (NUTs).

I want to be clear: I didn't write the NUTs. All the credit goes to the original authors and contributors of these notes. My contribution has been to organize these NUTs into a single larger document.

Thanks for picking up this book! I hope it helps you navigate the exciting waters of Cashu more easily and encourages you to dive deeper into this innovative project. Let's explore and build the future of decentralized communication together!

Git Commit

To provide readers with the most up-to-date information, this page showcases the latest git commit from the cashubtc/nuts repository on GitHub. This commit log offers a snapshot of the most recent changes, updates, and enhancements made to the Notation, Usage, and Terminology (NUTs). By incorporating this information, readers can gain insight into the ongoing development and evolution of Cashu ecash, ensuring they are informed about the latest contributions and modifications from the community. This inclusion underscores the dynamic nature of the project and highlights the collaborative efforts driving its progress.

```
commit dcfc47bdcc7b3d87be957ae31f04565c7454934
Author: Michael <742710244KvngMikey@users.noreply.github.com>
Date:   Sun Jan 18 21:46:40 2026 +0100
```

Fix grammar: use 'inactivate' when rotating keysets (#330)

Mandatory NUTs

These NUTs MUST be implemented by each wallet and mint.

NUT-00: Notation, Utilization, and Terminology

mandatory

This document details the notation and models used throughout the specification and lays the groundwork for understanding the basic cryptography used in the Cashu protocol.

- Sending user: Alice
- Receiving user: Carol
- Mint: Bob

Blind Diffie-Hellmann key exchange (BDHKE)

Variables

- G elliptic curve generator point

Bob (mint)

- k private key of mint (one for each amount)
- K public key corresponding to k
- C_ blind signature (on B_)

Alice (user)

- x UTF-8-encoded random string (secret message), corresponds to point Y = hash_to_curve(x) on curve
- r blinding factor
- B_ blinded message
- C unblinded signature

hash_to_curve(x: bytes) -> curve point Y

Deterministically maps a message to a public key point on the secp256k1 curve, utilizing a domain separator to ensure uniqueness.

Y = PublicKey('02' || SHA256(msg_hash || counter)) where msg_hash is SHA256(DOMAIN_SEPARATOR || x)

- Y derived public key
- DOMAIN_SEPARATOR constant byte string b"Secp256k1_HashToCurve_Cashu_"
- x message to hash
- counter uint32 counter(byte order little endian) incremented from 0 until a point is found that lies on the curve

Protocol

- Mint Bob publishes public key K = kG
- Alice picks secret x and computes Y = hash_to_curve(x)
- Alice sends to Bob: B_ = Y + rG with r being a random blinding factor (**blinding**)
- Bob sends back to Alice blinded key: C_ = kB_ (these two steps are the DH key exchange) (**signing**)
- Alice can calculate the unblinded key as C_ - rK = kY + krG - krG = kY = C (**unblinding**)
- Alice can take the pair (x, C) as a token and can send it to Carol.
- Carol can send (x, C) to Bob who then checks that k*hash_to_curve(x)== C (**verification**), and if so treats it as a valid spend of a token, adding x to the list of spent secrets.

0.1 - Models

BlindedMessage

An encrypted (“blinded”) secret and an amount is sent from Alice to Bob for minting tokens or for swapping tokens. A BlindedMessage is also called an *output*.

```
{  
  "amount": int,  
  "id": hex_str,  
  "B_": hex_str  
}
```

amount is the value for the requested BlindSignature, id is the requested keyset ID from which we expect a signature, and B_ is the blinded secret message generated by Alice. An array [BlindedMessage] is also referred to as BlindedMessages.

BlindSignature

A BlindSignature is sent from Bob to Alice after minting tokens or after swapping tokens. A BlindSignature is also called a *promise*.

```
{  
  "amount": int,  
  "id": hex_str,  
  "C_": hex_str  
}
```

amount is the value of the blinded token, id is the keyset id of the mint keys that signed the token, and C_ is the blinded signature on the secret message B_ sent in the previous step.

Proof

A Proof is also called an *input* and is generated by Alice from a BlindSignature it received. An array [Proof] is called Proofs. Alice sends Proofs to Bob for melting tokens. Serialized Proofs can also be sent from Alice to Carol. Upon receiving the token, Carol deserializes it and requests a swap from Bob to receive new Proofs.

```
{  
  "amount": int,  
  "id": hex_str,  
  "secret": str,  
  "C": hex_str,  
}
```

amount is the amount of the Proof, secret is the secret message and is a utf-8 encoded string (the use of a 64 character hex string generated from 32 random bytes is recommended to prevent fingerprinting), C is the unblinded signature on secret (hex string), id is the keyset id of the mint public keys that signed the token (hex string).

0.2 - Protocol

Errors

In case of an error, mints respond with the HTTP status code 400 and include the following data in their response:

```
{  
  "detail": "oops",  
  "code": 1337  
}
```

Here, detail is the error message, and code is the error code. Error codes are to be defined in the documents concerning the use of a certain API endpoint.

0.3 - Methods

Serialization of tokens

Tokens can be serialized to send them between users Alice and Carol. Serialized tokens have a Cashu token prefix, a versioning flag, and the token. Optionally, a URI prefix for making tokens clickable on the web.

We use the following format for token serialization:

```
cashu[version][token]
```

cashu is the Cashu token prefix. [version] is a single base64_urlsafe character to denote the token format version.

URI tags To make Cashu tokens clickable on the web, we use the URI scheme cashu:. An example of a serialized token with URI tag is

```
cashu:cashuAeyJwcm9vZn...
```

V3 tokens

V3 tokens are deprecated and the use of the more space-efficient V4 tokens is encouraged.

Version This token format has the [version] value A.

Format V3 tokens are base64-encoded JSON objects. The token format supports tokens from multiple mints. The JSON is serialized with a base64_urlsafe (base64 encoding with / replaced by _ and + by -). base64_urlsafe strings may have padding characters (usually =) at the end which can be omitted. Clients need to be able to decode both cases.

```
cashuA[base64_token_json]
```

[base64_token_json] is the token JSON serialized in base64_urlsafe. [base64_token_json] should be cleared of any whitespace before serializing.

Token format The deserialized base64_token_json is

```
{
  "token": [
    {
      "mint": str,
      "proofs": Proofs
    },
    ...
  ],
  "unit": str <optional>,
  "memo": str <optional>
}
```

`mint` is the mint URL. The mint URL must be stripped of any trailing slashes (/). `Proofs` is an array of `Proof` objects. The next two elements are only for displaying the receiving user appropriate information: `unit` is the currency unit of the token keysets (see Keysets for supported units), and `memo` is an optional text memo from the sender.

Example Below is a TokenV3 JSON before base64_urlsafe serialization.

```
{
  "token": [
    {
      "mint": "https://8333.space:3338",
      "proofs": [
        ...
      ]
    }
  ]
}
```

```
{
  "amount": 2,
  "id": "009a1f293253e41e",
  "secret": "407915bc212be61a77e3e6d2aeb4c727980bda51cd06a6afc29e2861768a783",
  "C": "02bc9097997d81afb2cc7346b5e4345a9346bd2a506eb7958598a72f0cf85163ea"
},
{
  "amount": 8,
  "id": "009a1f293253e41e",
  "secret": "fe15109314e61d7756b0f8ee0f23a624acaa3f4e042f61433c728c7057b931be",
  "C": "029e8e5050b890a7d6c0968db16bc1d5d5fa040ea1de284f6ec69d61299f671059"
}
]
},
],
"unit": "sat",
"memo": "Thank you."
}
```

When serialized, this becomes:

```
cashuAeyJ0b2t1biI6W3sibWludCI6Imh0dHBz0i8v0DMzMj5zcGFjZTozM4IiwichJvb2ZzIjpbeYJhbW91bnQi0jIsImlkIjoimDA5YTFnMjkzMjUzZTQxZSiIsInNl
```

V4 tokens

V4 tokens are a space-efficient way of serializing tokens using the CBOR binary format. All keys are single characters and hex strings are encoded in binary. V4 tokens can only hold proofs from a single mint.

Version This token format has the [version] value B.

Format Wallets serialize tokens in a base64_urlsafe format (base64 encoding with / replaced by _ and + by -). base64_urlsafe strings may have padding characters (usually =) at the end which can be omitted. Clients need to be able to decode both cases.

```
cashuB[base64_token_cbor]
```

Token format For readability, the structure of a TokenV4 object is shown below in its equivalent JSON form.

```
{
  "m": str, // mint URL
  "u": str, // currency unit
  "d": str <optional>, // optional memo
  "t": [
    {
      "i": bytes, // keyset ID (short or long form)
      "p": [ // proofs with this keyset ID
        {
          "a": int, // amount
          "s": str, // secret
          "c": bytes, // signature
          "d": { <optional> // optional DLEQ proof
            "e": bytes,
            "s": bytes,
            "r": bytes
          },
          "w": str <optional> // optional witness
        },
      ],
    }
  ]
},
```

```

        ...
    ],
},
...
],
}

```

`m` is the mint URL. The mint URL **MUST** be normalized by stripping any trailing slashes (/). `u` is the currency unit of the token keysets. Supported units are defined in Keysets. `d` is an optional, human-readable memo provided by the sender.

Within the `t` (token) array, `i` denotes the keyset ID associated with the proofs contained in `p` which are grouped by `i`. `p` is an array of Proof objects with the original keyset ID field `id` omitted. All proofs in the corresponding `p` array **MUST** belong to the same keyset ID.

Unless otherwise stated, fields of type bytes represent byte strings in the CBOR encoding. In the original JSON representation of Proof objects, these values are encoded as hexadecimal strings. Implementations **MUST** convert between hex strings and raw byte arrays when translating between JSON and CBOR representations.

Optional fields **MAY** be omitted if not present. Receivers **MUST** ignore unknown fields to preserve forward compatibility.

Short keyset ID To reduce the size of the `i` field and the overall Token encoding, wallets **MAY** use the short keyset ID representation (`s_id`).

The short keyset ID is defined as the first 8 bytes of the full 33-byte keyset ID:

- Byte form: `s_id = id_bytes[:8]`
- Hex form: `s_id = id_hex_str[:16]`

Wallets receiving a Token **MUST** support both short and full keyset ID representations. When a short keyset ID is encountered, the wallet **MUST** resolve it to the corresponding full keyset ID before processing the contained Proof objects.

If a short keyset ID resolves to more than one known full keyset ID, the identifier is considered ambiguous. In this case, the wallet **MUST** fail token parsing and return an error.

The mint is unaware of the `s_id`. All API endpoints exposed by the mint use the full keyset ID.

Example Below is a TokenV4 JSON before CBOR and `base64_urlsafe` serialization.

```

{
  "t": [
    {
      "i": "h'00ffd48b8f5ecf80",
      "p": [
        {
          "a": 1,
          "s": "acc12435e7b8484c3cf1850149218af90f716a52bf4a5ed347e48ecc13f77388",
          "c": "h'0244538319de485d55bed3b29a642bee5879375ab9e7a620e11e48ba482421f3cf",
        },
      ],
    },
    {
      "i": "h'00ad268c4d1f5826",
      "p": [
        {
          "a": 2,
          "s": "1323d3d4707a58ad2e23ada4e9f1f49f5a5b4ac7b708eb0d61f738f48307e8ee",
          "c": "h'023456aa110d84b4ac747aebd82c3b005aca50bf457ebd5737a4414fac3ae7d94d",
        },
      ],
    }
  ]
}

```

```
{
  "a": 1,
  "s": "56bcbb7cc6406b3fa5d57d2174f4eff8b4402b176926d3a57d3c3dcbb59d57",
  "c": h'0273129c5719e599379a974a626363c333c56caf0e6d01abe46d5808280789c63',
},
],
},
],
{
  "m": "http://localhost:3338",
  "u": "sat",
}
}
```

The `h'` values are bytes but displayed as hex strings here.

We serialize this JSON using CBOR which can be seen here. The resulting bytes are then serialized to a string using `base64_urlsafe` and the prefix `cashuB` is added. This leaves us with the following serialized TokenV4:

```
cashuBo2F0gqJhaUgA_9SLj17PgGFwgaNhYQFhc3hAYMNjMTI0MzV1N2I4NDg0YzNjZjE4NTAxNDkyMThhZjkwZjcxNmE1MjrnNGE1ZnQzNDd1NDh1Y2MxM2Y3NzM4OGF
```

Binary Token Token can be transmitted in a binary format when applicable (for example when transmitting via NFC). For this the serialised token is prepended with a prefix and a version byte.

```
utf8("craw") || utf8(<token_version>) || <serialised_token>
```

- Binary Encoding V4: `utf8("craw")|| utf8("B")|| cbor(token_v4_object)`

NUT-01: Mint public key exchange

mandatory

This document outlines the exchange of the public keys of the mint Bob with the wallet user Alice. Alice uses the keys to unblind Bob's blind signatures (see NUT-00).

Description

Wallet user Alice receives public keys from mint Bob via GET /v1/keys. The set of all public keys for a set of amounts is called a *keyset*.

The mint responds only with its active keysets. Keysets are active if the mint will sign outputs with it. The mint will accept tokens from inactive keysets as inputs but will not sign with them for new outputs. The active keysets can change over time, for example due to key rotation. A list of all keysets, active and inactive, can be requested separately (see NUT-02).

Note that a mint can support multiple keysets at the same time but will only respond with the active keysets on the endpoint GET /v1/keys. A wallet can ask for the keys of a specific (active or inactive) keyset via the endpoint GET /v1/keys/{keyset_id} (see NUT-02).

Supported Currency Units

A mint may support any currency unit(s) they can mint (NUT-04) and melt(NUT-05), either directly or indirectly, including:

- btc: Bitcoin (Minor Unit: 8) - though use of the sat unit is generally preferred
- sat: Bitcoin's Minor Unit (ie: 100,000,000 sat = 1 bitcoin)
- msat: defined as 1/1000th of a sat (ie: 1,000 msat = 1 sat)
- auth: reserved for Blind Authentication (see NUT-22).
- ISO 4217 currency codes (eg: usd, eur, gbp)
- Stablecoin currency codes (eg: usdt, usdc, eurc, gyen)

[!IMPORTANT] For Bitcoin, ISO 4217 currencies (and stablecoins pegged to those currencies), Keyset amount values **MUST** represent an amount in the Minor Unit of that currency. Where the Minor Unit of a currency is "0", amounts represent whole units. For example:

- usd (Minor Unit: 2) <amount_1> = 1 cent (0.01 USD)
- jpy (Minor Unit: 0) <amount_1> = 1 JPY
- bhd (Minor Unit: 3) <amount_1> = 1 fils (0.001 BHD)
- btc (Minor Unit: 8) <amount_1> = 1 sat (0.00000001 BTC)
- eurc (Pegged to EUR, so Minor Unit: 2) <amount_1> = 1 cent (0.01 EURC)
- gyen (Pegged to JPY, so Minor Unit: 0) <amount_1> = 1 GYEN

Keyset generation

Keysets are generated by the mint. The mint is free to use any key generation method they like. Each keyset is identified by its keyset id which can be computed by anyone from its public keys (see NUT-02).

Keys in Keysets are maps of the form {<amount_1> : <mint_pubkey_1>, <amount_2> : <mint_pubkey_2>, ...} for each <amount_i> of the amounts the mint Bob supports and the corresponding public key <mint_pubkey_1>, that is K_i (see NUT-00). The mint **MUST** use the compressed Secp256k1 public key format to represent its public keys.

Example

Request of Alice:

```
GET https://mint.host:3338/v1/keys
```

With curl:

```
curl -X GET https://mint.host:3338/v1/keys
```

Response GetKeysResponse of Bob:

```
{  
  "keysets": [  
    {  
      "id": <keyset_id_hex_str>,  
      "unit": <currency_unit_str>,  
      "active": <bool>,  
      "input_fee_ppk": <int|null>,  
      "final_expiry": <unix_timestamp_int|null>  
      "keys": {  
        <amount_int>: <public_key_str>,  
        ...  
      }  
    }  
  ]  
}
```

Here, `active` indicates whether the mint will sign new outputs with this keyset, and `input_fee_ppk` is the fee in parts per thousand (ppk) per input spent from this keyset (see NUT-02).

Example response

```
{  
  "keysets": [  
    {  
      "id": "009a1f293253e41e",  
      "unit": "sat",  
      "active": true,  
      "input_fee_ppk": 100,  
      "final_expiry": 1896187313,  
      "keys": {  
        "1": "02194603ffa36356f4a56b7df9371fc3192472351453ec7398b8da8117e7c3e104",  
        "2": "03b0f36d6d47ce14df8a7be9137712c42bcdd960b19dd02f1d4a9703b1f31d7513",  
        "4": "0368be6e026e42852498efb82014ca91e89da2e7a5bd3761bdad699fa2aec9fe09",  
        "8": "0253de5237f189606f29d8a690ea719f74d65f617bb1cb6fbea34f2bc4f930016d",  
        ...  
      }  
    }  
  ]  
}
```

Note that for a keyset in an ISO 4217 currency, the key amounts represent values in the Minor Unit of that currency (keys truncated and comments added for clarity):

```
{  
  "keysets": [  
    {  
      "id": "00a2f293253e41f9",  
      "unit": "usd",  
      "active": true,  
      "input_fee_ppk": 100,  
      "final_expiry": 1896187313,  
      "keys": {  
        "1": "0229...e101", // 1 cent (0.01 USD)  
        "2": "03c0...7512", // 2 cents (0.02 USD)  
      }  
    }  
  ]  
}
```

```
"4": "0376...fe00", // 4 cents (0.04 USD)
"8": "0263...016e", // 8 cents (0.08 USD)
...
}
]
}
```

NUT-02: Keysets and fees

mandatory

A keyset is a set of public keys that the mint Bob generates and shares with its users. It refers to the set of public keys that each correspond to the amount values that the mint supports (e.g. 1, 2, 4, 8, ...) respectively.

Each keyset indicates its keyset `id`, the currency unit, whether the keyset is `active`, and an `input_fee_ppk` that determines the fees for spending ecash from this keyset.

A mint can have multiple keysets at the same time. For example, it could have one keyset for each currency unit that it supports. Wallets should support multiple keysets. They must respect the `active` and the `input_fee_ppk` properties of the keysets they use.

Keyset properties

Keyset ID

The keyset `id` is the identifier for a specific keyset and can be derived from the public keys and the metadata of a keyset. Wallets **SHOULD** compute the keyset `id` for a given keyset themselves to verify that the mint is using the correct keyset in its responses.

The keyset `id` is part of each `Proof` object which allows wallets to identify which mint and keyset it was generated from. The keyset field `id` is also contained in the `BlindedMessages` sent to the mint and in the `BlindSignatures` returned from it. It is also included in a serialized Cashu Token (see NUT-00).

Active keysets

Mints can have multiple keysets at the same time but **MUST** have at least one `active` keyset (see NUT-01). The `active` property determines whether the mint allows generating new ecash from this keyset. `Proofs` from inactive keysets with `active=false` are still accepted as inputs but new outputs (`BlindedMessages` and `BlindSignatures`) **MUST** be from active keysets only.

To rotate keysets, a mint can generate a new active keyset and deactivate an old one. If the `active` flag of an old keyset is set to `false`, no new ecash from this keyset can be generated and the outstanding ecash supply of that keyset can be taken out of circulation as wallets rotate their ecash to active keysets.

Wallets **SHOULD** prioritize swaps with `Proofs` from inactive keysets (see NUT-03) so they can quickly get rid of them. Wallets **CAN** swap their entire balance from an inactive keyset to an active one as soon as they detect that the keyset was deactivated. When constructing outputs for a transaction, wallets **MUST** choose only active keysets (see NUT-00).

Fees

Keysets indicate the fee `input_fee_ppk` that is charged when a `Proof` of that keyset is spent as an input to a transaction. The fee is given in parts per thousand (ppk) per input measured in the unit of the keyset. The total fee for a transaction is the sum of all fees per input rounded up to the next larger integer (that can be represented with the keyset).

As an example, we construct a transaction spending 3 inputs (`Proofs`) from a keyset with unit `sat` and `input_fee_ppk` of `100`. A fee of `100 ppk` means `0.1 sat` per input. The sum of the individual fees are `300 ppk` for this transaction. Rounded up to the next smallest denomination, the mint charges `1 sat` in total fees, i.e. `fees = ceil(0.3)== 1`. In this case, the fees for spending 1-10 inputs is `1 sat`, 11-20 inputs is `2 sat` and so on.

Wallet transaction construction When constructing a transaction with ecash inputs (example: `/v1/swap` or `/v1/melt`), wallets **MUST** add fees to the inputs or, vice versa, subtract from the outputs. The mint checks the following equation:

$$\text{sum(inputs)} - \text{fees} = \text{sum(outputs)}$$

Here, `sum(inputs)` and `sum(outputs)` mean the sum of the amounts of the inputs and outputs respectively. `fees` is calculated from the sum of each input's fee and rounded up to the next larger integer:

```
def fees(inputs: List[Proof]) -> int:
    sum_fees = 0
    for proof in inputs:
        sum_fees += keysets[proof.id].input_fee_ppk
    return (sum_fees + 999) // 1000
```

Here, the `//` operator in `(sum_fees + 999)// 1000` denotes an integer division operator (aka floor division operator) that rounds down `sum_fees + 999` to the next lower integer. Alternatively, we could round up the sum using a floating point division with `ceil(sum_fees / 1000)` although it is not recommended to do so due to the non-deterministic behavior of floating point division.

Notice that since transactions can spend inputs from different keysets, the sum considers the fee for each `Proof` indexed by the keyset ID individually.

Deriving the keyset ID

Keyset ID V2 Keyset IDs are 33 byte hex strings with a version byte (two hexadecimal characters). The currently used version byte is `01`.

Keyset IDs are derived from public data. To derive the keyset ID of a keyset, execute the following steps:

- 1 - sort public keys by their amount in ascending numerical order
- 2 - concatenate each amount and its corresponding lowercase public key hex string (as "amount:publickey_hex") to a single byte array, separating each pair with a comma (",")
- 3 - add the lowercase UTF8-encoded unit string prefixed with "lunit:" to the byte array (e.g. "lunit:sat")
- 4 - If `input_fee_ppk` is specified and non-zero, add the UTF8-encoded string prefixed with "linput_fee_ppk:" (e.g. "linput_fee_ppk:100"). If `input_fee_ppk` is omitted, null, or 0, it MUST be omitted from the preimage.
- 5 - If a final expiration is specified, add the UTF8-encoded string prefixed with "lfinal_expiry:" (e.g. "lfinal_expiry:1896187313")
- 6 - HASH_SHA256 the concatenated byte array
- 7 - prefix it with a keyset ID version byte "01"

An example implementation in Python:

```
def derive_keyset_id_v2(keys: Dict[int, PublicKey], unit: str, input_fee_ppk: Optional[int], final_expiry: Optional[int]) -> str:
    sorted_keys = dict(sorted(keys.items()))
    keyset_id_bytes = b"01".join(
        [f"{k}:{v.serialize()}.encode('utf-8') for k, v in sorted_keys.items()]
    )
    keyset_id_bytes += f'lunit:{unit}'.encode('utf-8')
    if input_fee_ppk is not None and input_fee_ppk != 0:
        keyset_id_bytes += f'linput_fee_ppk:{input_fee_ppk}'.encode('utf-8')
    if final_expiry is not None and final_expiry != 0:
        keyset_id_bytes += f'lfinal_expiry:{final_expiry}'.encode('utf-8')
    return "01" + hashlib.sha256(keyset_id_bytes).hexdigest()
```

V1 Keysets (deprecated) V1 keysets are 8 bytes long, including a version byte prefix `00`.

- 1 - sort public keys by their amount in ascending order
- 2 - concatenate all public keys to one byte array
- 3 - HASH_SHA256 the concatenated public keys
- 4 - take the first 14 characters of the hex-encoded hash
- 5 - prefix it with a keyset ID version byte

An example implementation in Python:

```

def derive_keyset_id_v1(keys: Dict[int, PublicKey]) -> str:
    sorted_keys = dict(sorted(keys.items()))
    pubkeys_concat = b''.join([p.serialize() for p in sorted_keys.values()])
    return "00" + hashlib.sha256(pubkeys_concat).hexdigest()[:14]

```

[!CRITICAL] Wallet implementations should reject any attempt at importing new keysets which IDs collide with any of the previously added keysets.

Keyset Final Expiry

A unix epoch number for a future point in time that represents the final expiry of the keyset. After the keyset's final expiry, the Mint is no longer obliged to fulfill promises signed with the keys from that keyset.

This effectively implies that the Mint can irrevocably remove all of the nullifiers (Y values/spent ecash) associated with the expired keyset.

The final expiry is optional and **MAY** be omitted or `null` if the keyset has no final-expiry.

Example: Get mint keysets

A wallet can ask the mint for a list of all keysets via the GET `/v1/keysets` endpoint.

Request of Alice:

```
GET https://mint.host:3338/v1/keysets
```

With curl:

```
curl -X GET https://mint.host:3338/v1/keysets
```

Response GetKeysetsResponse of Bob:

```
{
  "keysets": [
    {
      "id": <hex_str>,
      "unit": <str>,
      "active": <bool>,
      "input_fee_ppk": <int|null>,
      "final_expiry": <int|null>
    },
    ...
  ]
}
```

Here, `id` is the keyset ID, `unit` is the unit string (e.g. “sat”) of the keyset, `active` indicates whether new ecash can be minted with this keyset, and `input_fee_ppk` is the fee (per thousand units) to spend one input spent from this keyset. If `input_fee_ppk` is not given, we assume it to be `0`.

Example response

```
{
  "keysets": [
    {
      "id": "015ba18a8adcd02e715a58358eb618da4a4b3791151a4bee5e968bb88406ccf76a",
      "unit": "sat",
      "active": true,
      "input_fee_ppk": 100,
      "final_expiry": 2059210353
    },
  ]
}
```

```
{
  "id": "012fb01a4e200c76df911eeba3b8fe1831202914b24664f4bccbd25852a6708f8",
  "unit": "sat",
  "active": false,
  "input_fee_ppk": 0,
  "final_expiry": null
}
]
}
```

Requesting public keys for a specific keyset

To receive the public keys of a specific keyset, a wallet can call the GET `/v1/keys/{keyset_id}` endpoint where `keyset_id` is the keyset ID.

Example

Request of Alice:

We request the keys for the keyset `015ba18a8adcd02e715a58358eb618da4a4b3791151a4bee5e968bb88406ccf76a`.

```
GET https://mint.host:3338/v1/keys/015ba18a8adcd02e715a58358eb618da4a4b3791151a4bee5e968bb88406ccf76a
```

With curl:

```
curl -X GET https://mint.host:3338/v1/keys/015ba18a8adcd02e715a58358eb618da4a4b3791151a4bee5e968bb88406ccf76a
```

Response of Bob (same as NUT-01):

```
{
  "keysets": [
    {
      "id": "009a1f293253e41e",
      "unit": "sat",
      "active": true,
      "input_fee_ppk": 100,
      "keys": {
        "1": "02194603ffa36356f4a56b7df9371fc3192472351453ec7398b8da8117e7c3e104",
        "2": "03b0f36d6d47ce14df8a7be9137712c42bcdd960b19dd02f1d4a9703b1f31d7513",
        "4": "036b6e6e026e42852498efb82014ca91e89da2e7a5bd3761bdad699fa2aec9fe09",
        "8": "0253de5237f189606f29d8a690ea719f74d65f617bb1cb6fbea34f2bc4f930016d",
        ...
      },
    },
    ...
  ]
}
```

Wallet implementation notes

Wallets can request the list of keyset IDs from the mint upon startup and load only tokens from its database that have a keyset ID supported by the mint it interacts with. This also helps wallets to determine whether the mint has added a new current keyset or whether it has changed the active flag of an existing one.

A useful flow is:

- If we don't have any keys from this mint yet, get all keys: GET `/v1/keys` and store them
- Get all keysets with GET `/v1/keysets`
- For all new keyset returned here which we don't have yet, get it using GET `/v1/keys/{keyset_id}` and store it
- If any of the keysets has changed its active flag, update it in the db and use the keyset accordingly

NUT-03: Swap tokens

mandatory

The swap operation is the most important component of the Cashu system. A swap operation consists of multiple inputs (**Proofs**) and outputs (**BlindedMessages**). Mints verify and invalidate the inputs and issue new promises (**BlindSignatures**). These are then used by the wallet to generate new **Proofs** (see NUT-00).

The swap operation can serve multiple use cases. The first use case is that Alice can use it to split her tokens to a target amount she needs to send to Carol, if she does not have the necessary amounts to compose the target amount in her wallet already. The second one is that Carol's wallet can use it to receive tokens from Alice by sending them as inputs to the mint and receive new outputs in return.

Swap to send

To make this more clear, we present an example of a typical case of sending tokens from Alice to Carol.

Alice has 64 sat in her wallet, composed of three **Proofs**, one worth 32 sat and another two worth 16 sat. She wants to send Carol 40 sat but does not have the necessary **Proofs** to compose the target amount of 40 sat. For that, Alice requests a swap from the mint and uses **Proofs** worth [16, 16, 32] as inputs and asks for new outputs worth [8, 32, 8, 16] totalling 64 sat. Notice that the first two tokens can now be combined to 40 sat. The **Proofs** that Alice sent Bob as inputs of the swap operation are now invalidated.

Note: In order to preserve privacy around the amount that a client might want to send to another user and keep the rest as change, the client **SHOULD** ensure that the list requested outputs is ordered by amount in ascending order. As an example of what to avoid, a request for outputs expressed like so: [16, 8, 2, 64, 8] might imply the client is preparing a payment for 26 sat; the client should instead order the list like so: [2, 8, 8, 16, 64] to mitigate this privacy leak to the mint.

Swap to receive

Another useful case for the swap operation follows up the example above where Alice has swapped her **Proofs** ready to be sent to Carol. Carol can receive these **Proofs** using the same operation by using them as inputs to invalidate them and request new outputs from Bob. Only if Carol has redeemed new outputs, Alice can't double-spend the **Proofs** anymore and the transaction is settled. To continue our example, Carol requests a swap with input **Proofs** worth [32, 8] to receive new outputs (of an arbitrary distribution) with the same total amount.

Example

Request of Alice:

```
POST https://mint.host:3338/v1/swap
```

With the data being of the form PostSwapRequest:

```
{  
  "inputs": <Array[Proof]>,  
  "outputs": <Array[BlindedMessage]>,  
}
```

With curl:

```
curl -X POST https://mint.host:3338/v1/swap -d \  
{  
  "inputs":  
  [  
    {  
      "amount": 2,  
      "id": "009a1f293253e41e",  
    }  
  ]  
}
```

```

    "secret": "407915bc212be61a77e3e6d2aeb4c727980bda51cd06a6afc29e2861768a7837",
    "C": "02bc9097997d81afb2cc7346b5e4345a9346bd2a506eb795859a72f0cf85163ea"
},
{
...
},
],
"outputs":
[
{
  "amount": 2,
  "id": "009a1f293253e41e",
  "B_": "02634a2c2b34bec9e8a4aba4361f6bf202d7fa2365379b0840afe249a7a9d71239"
},
{
...
},
],
}

```

If successful, Bob will respond with a PostSwapResponse

```
{
  "signatures": <Array[BlindSignature]>
}
```

NUT-04: Mint tokens

mandatory

used in: NUT-20, NUT-23

Minting tokens is a two-step process: requesting a mint quote and minting new tokens. This document describes the general flow that applies to all payment methods, with specifics for each supported payment method provided in dedicated NUTs.

Supported methods

Method-specific NUTs describe how to handle different payment methods. The currently specified models are:

- NUT-23 for bolt11 Lightning invoices
- NUT-25 for bolt12 Lightning offers

General Flow

The minting process follows these steps for all payment methods:

1. The wallet requests a mint quote for the `unit` to mint, specifying the payment `method`.
2. The mint responds with a quote that includes a `quote id` and a `payment request`.
3. The user pays the `request` using the specified payment method.
4. The wallet then requests minting of new tokens with the mint, including the `quote id` and new `outputs`.
5. The mint verifies payment and returns blind signatures.

Common Request and Response Formats

Requesting a Mint Quote

To request a mint quote, the wallet of Alice makes a POST `/v1/mint/quote/{method}` request where `method` is the payment method requested (e.g., `bolt11`, `bolt12`, etc.).

```
POST https://mint.host:3338/v1/mint/quote/{method}
```

Depending on the payment method, the request structure may vary, but all methods will include at minimum:

```
{  
  "unit": <str_enum[UNIT]>  
  // Additional method-specific fields may be required  
}
```

The mint Bob responds with a quote that includes some common fields for all methods:

```
{  
  "quote": <str>,  
  "request": <str>,  
  "unit": <str_enum[UNIT]>,  
  // Additional method-specific fields will be included  
}
```

Where `quote` is the quote ID, `request` is the payment request for the quote, and `unit` corresponds to the value provided in the request.

[!CAUTION]

`quote` is a **unique and random** id generated by the mint to internally look up the payment state. `quote` **MUST** remain a secret between user and mint and **MUST NOT** be derivable from the payment request. A third party who knows the quote ID can front-run and steal the tokens that this operation mints. To prevent this, use NUT-20 locks to enforce public key authentication during minting.

Check Mint Quote State

To check whether a mint quote has been paid, the wallet makes a GET /v1/mint/quote/{method}/{quote_id}.

```
GET https://mint.host:3338/v1/mint/quote/{method}/{quote_id}
```

The mint responds with the same structure as the initial quote response.

Executing a Mint Quote

After requesting a mint quote and paying the request, the wallet proceeds with minting new tokens by calling the POST /v1/mint/{method} endpoint.

```
POST https://mint.host:3338/v1/mint/{method}
```

The wallet includes the following common data in its request:

```
{  
  "quote": <str>,  
  "outputs": <Array[BlindedMessage]>  
}
```

with the quote being the quote ID from the previous step and outputs being BlindedMessages (see NUT-00) that the wallet requests signatures on, whose sum is amount as requested in the quote.

The mint then responds with:

```
{  
  "signatures": <Array[BlindSignature]>  
}
```

where signatures is an array of blind signatures on the outputs.

Adding New Payment Methods

To add a new payment method (e.g., BOLT12), implement the following:

1. Define the method-specific request and response structures following the pattern above
2. Implement the three required endpoints: quote request, quote check, and mint execution
3. Update the settings to include the new method

Settings

The settings for this NUT indicate the supported method-unit pairs for minting. They are part of the info response of the mint (NUT-06) which reads:

```
{  
  "4": {  
    "methods": [  
      <MintMethodSetting>,  
      ...  
    ],  
    "disabled": <bool>  
  }  
}
```

MintMethodSetting indicates supported method and unit pairs and additional settings of the mint. disabled indicates whether minting is disabled.

MintMethodSetting is of the form:

```
{  
  "method": <str>,  
  "unit": <str>,  
  "min_amount": <int|null>,  
  "max_amount": <int|null>,  
  "options": <Object|null>  
}
```

`min_amount` and `max_amount` indicate the minimum and maximum amount for an operation of this method-unit pair. `options` are method-specific and can be defined in method-specific NUTs.

Unblinding Signatures

Upon receiving the `BlindSignatures` from the mint, the wallet unblinds them to generate `Proofs` (using the blinding factor r and the mint's public key K , see BDHKE NUT-00). The wallet then stores these `Proofs` in its database.

NUT-05: Melting tokens

mandatory

used in: NUT-08, NUT-15, NUT-23

Melting tokens is the opposite of minting tokens (see NUT-04). Like minting tokens, melting is a two-step process: requesting a melt quote and melting tokens. This document describes the general flow that applies to all payment methods, with specifics for each supported payment method provided in dedicated method-specific NUTs.

Supported methods

Method-specific NUTs describe how to handle different payment methods. The currently specified models are:

- NUT-23 for bolt11 Lightning invoices
- NUT-25 for bolt12 Lightning offers

General Flow

The melting process follows these steps for all payment methods:

1. The wallet requests a melt quote for a request it wants paid by the mint, specifying the payment method and the unit the wallet would like to spend
2. The mint responds with a quote that includes a quote id and an amount demanded in the requested unit
3. The wallet sends a melting request including the quote id and provides inputs of the required amount
4. The mint executes the payment and responds with the payment state and any method-specific proof of payment

Synchronous vs Asynchronous Processing

Synchronous (Default): The melt request blocks until payment completion. This ensures immediate finality but may result in long request times for slow payment methods.

Asynchronous (Optional): When the Prefer: respond-async header is included and supported by the mint, the request returns immediately after validation with a "PENDING" state. The wallet must then monitor the payment progress through polling or websocket notifications.

Common Request and Response Formats

Requesting a Melt Quote

To request a melt quote, the wallet of Alice makes a POST /v1/melt/quote/{method} request where method is the payment method requested (e.g., bolt11, bolt12, etc.).

```
POST https://mint.host:3338/v1/melt/quote/{method}
```

Depending on the payment method, the request structure may vary, but all methods will include at minimum:

```
{  
  "request": <str>,  
  "unit": <str_enum[UNIT]>  
  // Additional method-specific fields will be required  
}
```

The mint Bob responds with a quote that includes some common fields for all methods:

```
{  
  "quote": <str>,  
  "amount": <int>,  
  "unit": <str_enum[UNIT]>,
```

```

"state": <str_enum[STATE]>,
"expiry": <int>
// Additional method-specific fields will be included
}

```

Where `quote` is the quote ID, `amount` and `unit` the amount and unit that need to be provided, and `expiry` is the Unix timestamp until which the melt quote is valid.

`state` is an enum string field with possible values "UNPAID", "PENDING", "PAID":

- "UNPAID" means that the request has not been paid yet.
- "PENDING" means that the request is currently being paid.
- "PAID" means that the request has been paid successfully.

Check Melt Quote State

To check whether a melt quote has been paid, the wallet makes a GET `/v1/melt/quote/{method}/{quote_id}`.

```
GET https://mint.host:3338/v1/melt/quote/{method}/{quote_id}
```

The mint responds with the same structure as the initial quote response.

Executing a Melt Quote

To execute the melting process, the wallet calls the POST `/v1/melt/{method}` endpoint.

```
POST https://mint.host:3338/v1/melt/{method}
```

Synchronous Processing (Default)

[!IMPORTANT] For methods that involve external payments (like Lightning), this call may block until the payment either succeeds or fails. This can take a long time. Make sure to **use no (or a very long) timeout when making this call!**

Asynchronous Processing The wallet can include the `Prefer: respond-async` header to request asynchronous processing:

```
POST https://mint.host:3338/v1/melt/{method}
```

```
Prefer: respond-async
```

When the `Prefer: respond-async` header is included:

- **If the mint supports asynchronous processing:**
 1. The mint will verify the request (including proof validation)
 2. If valid, the mint responds immediately with a 200 OK status and the quote state set to "PENDING"
 3. The payment processing begins in the background
 4. The wallet can poll the quote state endpoint or subscribe to websocket notifications to monitor payment progress
- **If the mint does not support asynchronous processing:**
 - The mint ignores the `Prefer` header and processes the request synchronously
 - The response follows the standard synchronous flow with final payment state

The wallet includes the following common data in its request:

```
{
  "quote": <str>,
  "inputs": <Array[Proof]>
  // Additional method-specific fields may be required
}
```

where `quote` is the melt quote ID and `inputs` are the proofs with a total amount sufficient to cover the requested amount plus any fees.

Synchronous Response For synchronous processing, the mint responds with a structure that indicates the final payment state and includes any method-specific proof of payment when successful.

Asynchronous Response For asynchronous processing with `Prefer: respond-async`, the mint responds with:

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json
```

```
{
  "quote": <str>,
  "amount": <int>,
  "unit": <str_enum[UNIT]>,
  "state": "PENDING",
  "expiry": <int>
  // Additional method-specific fields may be included
}
```

The wallet should then either:

- Poll the quote state using `GET /v1/melt/quote/{method}/{quote_id}`
- Subscribe to websocket notifications for real-time updates (if supported by the mint)

Example Asynchronous Flow

1. Request asynchronous melt:

```
POST https://mint.host:3338/v1/melt/bolt11
```

```
Prefer: respond-async
```

```
Content-Type: application/json
```

```
{
  "quote": "TRmjduhIsPxd...",
  "inputs": [...]
}
```

2. Immediate response (200 OK):

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
```

```
Content-Type: application/json
```

```
{
  "quote": "TRmjduhIsPxd...",
  "amount": 10,
  "unit": "sat",
  "state": "PENDING",
  "expiry": 1701704757
}
```

3. Poll for status:

```
GET https://mint.host:3338/v1/melt/quote/bolt11/TRmjduhIsPxd...
```

4. Final status response:

```
{
  "quote": "TRmjduhIsPxd...",
  "request": "lnbc100n1p3kdrv5sp5...",
  "amount": 10,
  "unit": "sat",
  "fee_reserve": 2,
```

```

"state": "PAID",
"expiry": 1701704757,
"payment_preimage": "c5a1ae1f639e1f4a3872e81500fd028bece7bedc1152f740cba5c3417b748c1b"
}

```

Adding New Payment Methods

To add a new payment method (e.g., BOLT12), implement the following:

1. Define the method-specific request and response structures following the pattern above
2. Implement the three required endpoints: quote request, quote check, and melt execution
3. Update the settings to include the new method
4. Document any method-specific fields or behaviors that differ from the general flow

Settings

The mint's settings for this NUT indicate the supported method-unit pairs for melting. They are part of the info response of the mint (NUT-06):

```

{
  "5": {
    "methods": [
      <MeltMethodSetting>,
      ...
    ],
    "disabled": <bool>
  }
}

```

`MeltMethodSetting` indicates supported method and unit pairs and additional settings of the mint. `disabled` indicates whether melting is disabled.

`MeltMethodSetting` is of the form:

```

{
  "method": <str>,
  "unit": <str>,
  "min_amount": <int|null>,
  "max_amount": <int|null>,
  "options": <Object|null>
}

```

`min_amount` and `max_amount` indicate the minimum and maximum amount for an operation of this method-unit pair. `options` are method-specific and can be defined in method-specific NUTs.

NUT-06: Mint information

mandatory

This endpoint returns information about the mint that a wallet can show to the user and use to make decisions on how to interact with the mint.

Example

Request of Alice:

```
GET https://mint.host:3338/v1/info
```

With the mint's response being of the form GetInfoResponse:

```
{
  "name": "Bob's Cashu mint",
  "pubkey": "0283bf290884eed3a7ca2663fc0260de2e2064d6b355ea13f98dec004b7a7ead99",
  "version": "Nutshell/0.15.0",
  "description": "The short mint description",
  "description_long": "A description that can be a long piece of text.",
  "contact": [
    {
      "method": "email",
      "info": "contact@me.com"
    },
    {
      "method": "twitter",
      "info": "@me"
    },
    {
      "method": "nostr",
      "info": "npub..."
    }
  ],
  "motd": "Message to display to users.",
  "icon_url": "https://mint.host/icon.jpg",
  "urls": [
    "https://mint.host",
    "http://mint8gv0sq5ul602uxt2fe0t80e3c2bi9fy0cxedp69v1vat6ruj81ww.onion"
  ],
  "time": 1725304480,
  "tos_url": "https://mint.host/tos",
  "nuts": {
    "4": {
      "methods": [
        {
          "method": "bolt11",
          "unit": "sat",
          "min_amount": 0,
          "max_amount": 10000
        }
      ],
      "disabled": false
    },
    "5": {
      "methods": [
        ...
      ]
    }
  }
}
```

```

{
  "method": "bolt11",
  "unit": "sat",
  "min_amount": 100,
  "max_amount": 10000
},
],
"disabled": false
},
"7": {
  "supported": true
},
"8": {
  "supported": true
},
"9": {
  "supported": true
},
"10": {
  "supported": true
},
"12": {
  "supported": true
}
}
}

```

- (optional) **name** is the name of the mint and should be recognizable.
- (optional) **pubkey** is the hex pubkey of the mint.
- (optional) **version** is the implementation name and the version of the software running on this mint separated with a slash “/”.
- (optional) **description** is a short description of the mint that can be shown in the wallet next to the mint’s name.
- (optional) **description_long** is a long description that can be shown in an additional field.
- (optional) **contact** is an array of contact objects to reach the mint operator. A contact object consists of two fields. The **method** field denotes the contact method (like “email”), the **info** field denotes the identifier (like “contact@me.com”).
- (optional) **motd** is the message of the day that the wallet must display to the user. It should only be used to display important announcements to users, such as scheduled maintenances.
- (optional) **icon_url** is the URL pointing to an image to be used as an icon for the mint. Recommended to be squared in shape.
- (optional) **urls** is the list of endpoint URLs where the mint is reachable from.
- (optional) **time** is the current time set on the server. The value is passed as a Unix timestamp integer.
- (optional) **tos_url** is the URL pointing to the Terms of Service of the mint.
- (optional) **nuts** indicates each NUT specification that the mint supports and its settings. The settings are defined in each NUT separately.

With curl:

```
curl -X GET https://mint.host:3338/v1/info
```

Optional NUTs

These NUTs can be optionally implemented by wallets and mints to further improve Cashu.

NUT-07: Token state check

optional

used in: NUT-17, NUT-11, NUT-14

With the token state check, wallets can ask the mint whether a specific proof is already spent and whether it is in-flight in a transaction. Wallets can also request the witness data that was used to spend a proof.

Token states

A proof can be in one of the following states

- A proof is **UNSPENT** if it has not been spent yet
- A proof is **PENDING** if it is being processed in a transaction (in an ongoing payment). A **PENDING** proof cannot be used in another transaction until it is **live** again.
- A proof is **SPENT** if it has been redeemed and its secret is in the list of spent secrets of the mint.

Note: Before deleting spent proofs from their database, wallets can check if the proof is **SPENT** to make sure that they don't accidentally delete an unspent proof. Beware that this behavior can make it easier for the mint to correlate the sender to the receiver.

Important: Mints **MUST** remember which proofs are currently **PENDING** to avoid reuse of the same token in multiple concurrent transactions. This can be achieved with for example mutex lock whose key is the Proof's Y.

Use cases

Example 1: Ecash transaction When Alice prepares a token to be sent to Carol, she can mark these tokens in her database as *pending*. She can then, periodically or upon user input, check with the mint if the token is **UNSPENT** or whether it has been redeemed by Carol already, i.e., is **SPENT**. If the proof is not spendable anymore (and, thus, has been redeemed by Carol), she can safely delete the proof from her database.

Example 2: Lightning payments If Alice's melt operation takes a long time to complete (for example if she requests a very slow Lightning payment) and she closes her wallet in the meantime, the next time she comes online, she can check all proofs marked as *pending* in her database to determine whether the payment is still in flight (mint returns **PENDING**), it has succeeded (mint returns **SPENT**), or it has failed (mint returns **UNSPENT**).

Example

Request of Alice:

```
POST https://mint.host:3338/v1/checkstate
```

With the data being of the form PostCheckStateRequest:

```
{  
  "Ys": <Array[hex_str]>,  
}
```

Where the elements of the array in **Ys** are the hexadecimal representation of the compressed point $Y = \text{hash_to_curve}(\text{secret})$ of the Proof to check (see NUT-00).

Response of Bob:

Bob responds with a PostCheckStateResponse:

```
{  
  "states": [  
    {  
      "Y": <hex_str>,  
      "state": <str_enum[STATE]>,  
    },  
  ],  
}
```

```

    "witness": <str|null>,
},
...
]
}

```

The elements of the `states` array MUST be returned in the same order as the corresponding `Ys` checked in the request.

- `Y` corresponds to the `Proof` checked in the request.
- `state` is an enum string field with possible values "UNSPENT", "PENDING", "SPENT"
- `witness` is the serialized witness data that was used to spend the `Proof` if the token has a NUT-10 spending condition that requires a witness such as in the case of P2PK (NUT-11) or HTLCs (NUT-14).

With curl:

Request of Alice:

```
curl -X POST https://mint.host:3338/v1/checkstate -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{
  "Ys": [
    "02599b9ea0a1ad4143706c2a5a4a568ce442dd4313e1cf1f7f0b58a317c1a355ee"
  ]
}'
```

Response of Bob:

```
{
  "states": [
    {
      "Y": "02599b9ea0a1ad4143706c2a5a4a568ce442dd4313e1cf1f7f0b58a317c1a355ee",
      "state": "SPENT",
      "witness": "{\"signatures\": \"\\"b2cf120a49cb1ac3cb32e1bf5ccb6425e0a8372affdc1d41912ca35c13908062f269c0caa53607d4e1ac4c8563246c4c8a869e6ee124ea826fd4\"\"}"
    }
  ]
}
```

Where `Y` belongs to the provided `Proof` to check in the request, `state` indicates its state, and `witness` is the witness data that was potentially provided in a previous spend operation (can be empty).

Mint info setting

The NUT-06 `MintMethodSetting` indicates support for this feature:

```
{
  "7": {
    "supported": true
  }
}
```

NUT-08: Lightning fee return

optional

depends on: NUT-05

This document describes how the overpaid Lightning fees are handled and extends NUT-05 which describes melting tokens (i.e. paying a Lightning invoice). In short, a wallet includes *blank outputs* when paying a Lightning invoice which can be assigned a value by the mint if the user has overpaid Lightning fees. This can be the case due to the unpredictability of Lightning network fees. To solve this issue, we introduce so-called *blank outputs* which are blinded messages with an undetermined value.

The problem is also described in this gist.

Description

Before requesting a Lightning payment as described in NUT-05, Alice produces a number of `BlindedMessage` which are similar to ordinary blinded messages but their value is yet to be determined by the mint Bob and are thus called *blank outputs*. The number of necessary blank outputs is $\max(\text{ceil}(\log_2(\text{fee_reserve})), 1)$ which ensures that there is at least one output if there is any fee. If the `fee_reserve` is 0, then the number of blank outputs is 0 as well. The blank outputs will contain the overpaid fees that will be returned by the mint to the wallet.

This code calculates the number of necessary blank outputs in Python:

```
def calculate_number_of_blank_outputs(fee_reserve_sat: int) -> int:
    assert fee_reserve_sat >= 0, "Fee reserve can't be negative."
    if fee_reserve_sat == 0:
        return 0
    return max(math.ceil(math.log2(fee_reserve_sat)), 1)
```

Example

The wallet wants to pay an invoice with `amount := 100 000 sat` and determines by asking the mint that `fee_reserve` is 1000 sats. The wallet then provides 101 000 sat worth of proofs and 10 blank outputs to make the payment (since $\text{ceil}(\log_2(1000)) = \text{ceil}(9.96..) = 10$). The mint pays the invoice and determines that the actual fee was 100 sat, i.e., the overpaid fee to return is `fee_return = 900 sat`. The mint splits the amount 900 into summands of 2^n which is 4, 128, 256, 512. The mint inserts these amounts into the blank outputs it received from the wallet and generates 4 new promises. The mint then returns these `BlindSignatures` to the wallet together with the successful payment status.

Wallet flow

The wallet asks the mint for the `fee_reserve` for paying a specific bolt11 invoice of value `amount` by calling `POST /v1/melt/quote` as described in NUT-05. The wallet then provides a `PostMeltBolt11Request` to `POST /v1/melt/bolt11` that has (1) proofs of the value `amount+fee+fee_reserve`, (2) the bolt11 invoice to be paid, and finally, as a new entry, (3) a field `outputs` that has `n_blank_outputs` blinded messages that are generated before the payment attempt to receive potential overpaid fees back to her.

Mint flow

Here we describe how the mint generates `BlindSignatures` for the overpaid fees. The mint Bob returns in `PostMeltQuoteBolt11Response` the field `change` **ONLY IF** Alice has previously provided outputs for the change **AND** if the the inputs provided were greater then the `total_amount_paid - fees`.

If the `overpaid_fees = input_amount - fees - total_paid` is positive, Bob decomposes it to amounts supported by the keyset, typically 2^n , and imprints them into the `blank_outputs` provided by Alice.

Bob then signs these blank outputs (now with the imprinted amounts) and thus generates `BlindSignatures`. Bob then returns a payment status to the wallet, and, in addition, all blind signatures it generated for the overpaid fees.

Importantly, while Bob does not necessarily return the same number of blind signatures as it received blank outputs from Alice (since some of them may be of value 0), Bob **MUST** return all blank signatures with a value greater than 0 in the same order as the blank outputs were received and should omit all blind signatures with value 0. For example, if Bob receives 10 blank outputs but the overpaid fees only occupy 4 blind signatures, Bob will only return these 4 blind signatures with the appropriate imprinted amounts and omit the remaining 6 blind signatures with value 0. Due to the well-defined order of the returned blind signatures, Alice can map the blind signatures returned from Bob to the blank outputs it provided so that she can further apply the correct unblinding operations on them.

Example

Request of Alice:

```
POST https://mint.host:3338/v1/melt/bolt11
```

With the data being of the form PostMeltBolt11Request:

```
{
  "quote": <str>,
  "inputs": <Array[Proof]>,
  "outputs": <Array[BlindedMessage]> <-- New
}
```

where the new output field carries the `BlindMessages`.

The mint Bob then responds with a PostMeltQuoteBolt11Response:

```
{
  "quote": <str>,
  "request": <str>,
  "amount": <int>,
  "unit": <str_enum[UNIT]>,
  "fee_reserve": <int>,
  "state": <str_enum[STATE]>,
  "expiry": <int>,
  "payment_preimage": <str|null>,
  "change": <Array[BlindSignature]> <-- New
}
```

where the new change field carries the returned `BlindSignatures` due to overpaid fees.

Example

Request of Alice with curl:

```
curl -X POST https://mint.host:3338/v1/melt/bolt11 -d \
'{
  "quote": "od4CN5srMM3K3QVHkbGGNCTxfcAIyIXeq8IrfhP",
  "inputs": [
    {
      "amount": 4,
      "id": "009a1f293253e41e",
      "secret": "429700b812a58436be2629af8731a31a37fce54dbf8cbbe90b3f8553179d23f5",
      "C": "03b01869f528337e161a6768b480fcf9f75fd248b649c382f5e352489fd84fd011",
    },
    {
      "amount": 8,
      "id": "009a1f293253e41e",
      "secret": "4f3155acef6481108fcf354f6d06e504ce8b441e617d30c88924991298cdcad",
      "C": "0278ab1c1af35487a5ea903b693e96447b2034d0fd6bac529e753097743bf73ca9",
    }
  ]
}'
```

```
[
  "outputs": [
    {
      "amount": 1,
      "id": "009a1f293253e41e",
      "B_": "03327fc4fa333909b70f08759e217ce5c94e6bf1fc2382562f3c560c5580fa69f4"
    }
  ]
}'
```

Everything here is the same as in NUT-05 except for outputs. The amount field in the BlindedMessages here are ignored by Bob so they can be set to any arbitrary value by Alice (they should be set to a value, like 1 so potential JSON validations do not error).

If the mint has made a successful payment, it will respond the following.

Response PostMeltQuoteBolt11Response from Bob:

```
{
  "state": "PAID",
  "payment_preimage": "c5a1ae1f639e1f4a3872e81500fd028bece7bedc1152f740cba5c3417b748c1b",
  "change": [
    {
      "id": "009a1f293253e41e",
      "amount": 2,
      "C_": "03c668f551855ddc792e22ea61d32ddfa6a45b1eb659ce66e915bf5127a8657be0"
    }
  ]
}
```

The field change is an array of BlindSignatures that account for the overpaid fees. Notice that the amount has been changed by the mint. Alice must take these and generate Proofs by unblinding them as described in NUT-00 and as she does in NUT-04 when minting new tokens. After generating the Proofs, Alice stores them in her database.

Mint info setting

The NUT-06 MintMethodSetting indicates support for this feature:

```
{
  "8": {
    "supported": true
  }
}
```

NUT-09: Restore signatures

optional

used in: NUT-13

In this document, we describe how wallets can recover blind signatures, and with that their corresponding Proofs, by requesting from the mint to reissue the blind signatures. This can be used for a backup recovery of a lost wallet (see NUT-13) or for recovering the response of an interrupted swap request (see NUT-03).

Mints must store the BlindedMessage and the corresponding BlindSignature in their database every time they issue a BlindSignature. Wallets provide the BlindedMessage for which they request the BlindSignature. Mints only respond with a BlindSignature, if they have previously signed the BlindedMessage. Each returned BlindSignature also contains the amount and the keyset id (see NUT-00) which is all the necessary information for a wallet to recover a Proof.

Request of Alice:

```
POST https://mint.host:3338/v1/restore
```

With the data being of the form PostRestoreRequest:

```
{  
  "outputs": <Array[BlindedMessages]>  
}
```

Response of Bob:

The mint Bob then responds with a PostRestoreResponse.

```
{  
  "outputs": <Array[BlindedMessages]>,  
  "signatures": <Array[BlindSignature]>  
}
```

The returned arrays outputs and signatures are of the same length and for every entry outputs[i], there is a corresponding entry signatures[i].

Mint info setting

The NUT-06 MintMethodSetting indicates support for this feature:

```
{  
  "9": {  
    "supported": true  
  }  
}
```

NUT-10: Spending conditions

optional

used in: NUT-11, NUT-14

An ordinary ecash token is a set of `Proofs` each with a random string `secret`. To spend such a token in a swap or a melt operation, wallets include `proofs` in their request each with a unique `secret`. To authorize a transaction, the mint requires that the `secret` has not been seen before. This is the most fundamental spending condition in Cashu, which ensures that a token can't be double-spent.

In this NUT, we define a well-known format of `secret` that can be used to express more complex spending conditions. These conditions need to be met before the mint authorizes a transaction. Note that the specific type of spending condition is not part of this document but will be explained in other documents. Here, we describe the structure of `secret` which is expressed as a JSON `Secret` with a specific format.

Spending conditions are enforced by the mint which means that, upon encountering a `Proof` where `Proof.secret` can be parsed into the well-known format, the mint can require additional conditions to be met.

Caution: If the mint does not support spending conditions or a specific kind of spending condition, proofs may be treated as a regular anyone-can-spend tokens. Applications need to make sure to check whether the mint supports a specific kind of spending condition by checking the mint's info endpoint.

Basic components

An ecash transaction, i.e., a swap or a melt operation, with a spending condition consists of the following components:

- Inputs referring to the `Proofs` being spent
- Secret containing the rules for unlocking a `Proof`
- Additional witness data satisfying the unlock conditions such as signatures
- Outputs referring to the `BlindMessages` with new unlock conditions to which the `Proofs` are spent to

Spending conditions are defined for each individual `Proof` and not on a transaction level that can consist of multiple `Proofs`. Similarly, spending conditions must be satisfied by providing signatures or additional witness data for each `Proof` separately. For a transaction to be valid, all `Proofs` in that transaction must be unlocked successfully.

New `Secrets` of the outputs to which the inputs are spent to are provided as `BlindMessages` which means that they are blind-signed and not visible to the mint until they are actually spent.

Well-known Secret

Spending conditions are expressed in a well-known secret format that is revealed to the mint when spending (unlocking) a token, not when the token is minted (locked). The mint parses each `Proof`'s `secret`. If it can deserialize it into the following format it executes additional spending conditions that are further specified in additional NUTs.

The well-known `Secret` stored in `Proof.secret` is a JSON of the format:

```
[  
kind <str>,  
{  
  "nonce": <str>,  
  "data": <str>,  
  "tags": [[ "key", "value1", "value2", ...], ... ], // (optional)  
}  
]
```

- `kind` is the kind of the spending condition
- `nonce` is a unique random string
- `data` expresses the spending condition specific to each kind
- `tags` hold additional data committed to and can be used for feature extensions

Tag format

The optional `tags` field, is an array of arrays of non-empty strings.

Each individual tag is an array of **ONE or more strings**. The first element of the tag array is known as the tag *name* or *key* and the subsequent string(s) are the *tag value(s)*.

Examples of valid tags:

`["pubkeys"]` - a tag with the key, "pubkeys" and no tag values.

`["pubkeys", "021..."]` - a tag with the key, "pubkeys" and ONE tag value.

`["pubkeys", "021...", "022..."]` - a tag with the key, "pubkeys" and TWO tag values.

Examples of invalid tags:

`[]` - a tag array must contain at least **ONE** or more strings

`["locktime", 1765300829]` - a tag must contain **strings** only

`["locktime", ""]` - a tag must contain **non-empty strings** only

Examples

Example use cases of this secret format are

- NUT-11: Pay-to-Public-Key (P2PK)
- NUT-14: Hashed Timelock Contracts (HTLCs)

Mint info setting

The NUT-06 MintMethodSetting indicates support for this feature:

```
{  
  "10": {  
    "supported": true  
  }  
}
```

NUT-11: Pay to Public Key (P2PK)

optional

depends on: NUT-10, NUT-08

This NUT describes Pay-to-Public-Key (P2PK) which is one kind of spending condition based on NUT-10's well-known Secret. Using P2PK, we can lock ecash Proofs (see NUT-00) to a receiver's ECC public key and require a Schnorr signature with the corresponding private key to unlock the ecash. The spending condition is enforced by the mint.

Caution: If the mint does not support this type of spending condition, Proofs may be treated as regular anyone-can-spend Proofs. Applications need to make sure to check whether the mint supports a specific kind of spending condition by checking the mint's NUT-06 info endpoint.

Basic Case

NUT-10 Secret kind: P2PK

If for a Proof, Proof.secret is a Secret of kind P2PK, the proof must be unlocked by providing a witness Proof.witness and one or more valid signatures in the array Proof.witness.signatures.

In the basic case, when spending a locked Proof, the mint requires one valid Schnorr signature in Proof.witness.signatures on Proof.secret by the public key in Proof.secret.data.

To give a concrete example of the basic case, to mint a locked Proof we first create a P2PK Secret that reads:

```
[  
  "P2PK",  
  {  
    "nonce": "859d4935c4907062a6297cf4e663e2835d90d97ecdd510745d32f6816323a41f",  
    "data": "0249098aa8b9d2fbec49ff8598feb17b592b986e62319a4fa488a3dc36387157a7",  
    "tags": [["sigflag", "SIG_INPUTS"]]  
  }  
]
```

Here, Secret.data is the public key of the recipient of the locked ecash. We serialize this Secret to a string in Proof.secret and get a blind signature by the mint that is stored in Proof.C (see NUT-03).

The recipient who owns the private key of the public key Secret.data can spend this proof by providing a signature on the serialized Proof.secret string that is then added to Proof.witness.signatures:

```
{  
  "amount": 1,  
  "secret":  
    "[\"P2PK\", {\"nonce\": \"859d4935c4907062a6297cf4e663e2835d90d97ecdd510745d32f6816323a41f\", \"data\": \"0249098aa8b9d2fbec49ff8598feb17b592b986e62319a4fa488a3dc36387157a7\", \"C\": \"02698c4e2b5f9534cd0687d87513c759790cf829aa5739184a3e3735471fbda904\", \"id\": \"009a1f293253e41e\", \"witness\": {\"signatures\": [\"60f3c9b766770b46caac1d27e1ae6b77c8866ebaeba0b9489fe6a15a837eaa6fcfd6eaa825499c72ac342983983fd3ba3a8a41f5\"}]}  
}
```

Signature scheme

To spend Proofs locked with P2PK, the spender needs to include signatures in the Proofs used as "inputs" for the spending operation. We use libsecp256k1's serialized 64 byte Schnorr signatures on the SHA256 hash of the message to sign. The message to sign is the field Proof.secret in the inputs, unless otherwise indicated by the Secret.tags.sigflag in the inputs, as detailed below.

An each spending operation like swap and melt can have multiple inputs and outputs. If we have more than one locked input, we either provide signatures in each input individually (for SIG_INPUTS) or only in the first input for the entire transaction (for SIG_ALL). The inputs are the Proofs provided in the inputs field and the outputs are the BlindedMessages in the outputs field in the request body (see PostMeltRequest in NUT-05 and PostSwapRequest in NUT-03).

[!NOTE]

The field `Proof.secret` contains escaped JSON for transport. The message to sign MUST be constructed using the **unesaped** secret string, eg: ["P2PK", {"nonce": "c7f280eb55c1e856..."}

Witness format

Signatures are stored in P2PKWitness objects and are provided in either each `Proof.witness` of all inputs separately (for SIG_INPUTS) or only in the first input of the transaction (for SIG_ALL). P2PKWitness is a serialized JSON string of the form

```
{  
  "signatures": <Array[<hex_str>]>  
}
```

The signatures are an array of signatures in hex and correspond to the signatures by one or more signing public keys.

Tags

More complex spending conditions can be defined in the tags in `Secret.tags`. All tags are optional. Tags are arrays with two or more strings being ["key", "value1", "value2", ...]. We denote a specific tag in a proof by its key.

Supported tags are:

- `sigflag`: <str_enum[SIG_FLAG]> sets the signature flag
- `pubkeys`: <hex_str> are additional public keys (together with the one in the `data` field of the secret) that can provide signatures (*allows multiple entries*)
- `n_sigs`: <int> specifies the minimum number of Locktime Multisig public keys providing valid signatures
- `locktime`: <int> is the Unix timestamp of when the lock expires
- `refund`: <hex_str> are additional public keys that can provide signatures after `locktime` (*allows multiple entries*)
- `n_sigs_refund`: <int> specifies the minimum number of Refund Multisig public keys providing valid signatures after `locktime` expires

[!NOTE]

The tag serialization type is [<str>, <str>, ...] but some tag values are int. Wallets and mints must cast types appropriately for de/serialization.

Signature flag

Signature flags are defined in the tag `Secret.tags['sigflag']`. Currently, there are two signature flags.

- `SIG_INPUTS` requires valid signatures on all inputs independently. It is the default signature flag and will be applied if the `sigflag` tag is absent.
- `SIG_ALL` requires valid signatures on all inputs and on all outputs of a transaction.

If any one input has the signature flag `SIG_ALL`, then all inputs are required to have the same kind, the flag `SIG_ALL` and the same `Secret.data` and `Secret.tags`, otherwise an error is returned.

`SIG_INPUTS` is only enforced if no input is `SIG_ALL`.

Signature flag SIG_INPUTS

`SIG_INPUTS` means that each `Proof` (input) requires its own signature. The signature is provided in the `Proof.witness` field of each input separately. The format of the witness was defined earlier on.

Signed inputs A Proof (an input) with a signature P2PKWitness.signatures on secret is the JSON (see NUT-00):

```
{  
  "amount": <int>,  
  "secret": <str>,  
  "C": <hex_str>,  
  "id": <str>,  
  "witness": <P2PKWitness | str> // Signatures on "secret"  
}
```

The secret field is **signed as a string**.

Signature flag SIG_ALL

SIG_ALL is enforced only if the following conditions are met:

- If one input has the signature flag SIG_ALL, all other inputs MUST have the same Secret.data and Secret.tags, and by extension, also be SIG_ALL.
- If one or more inputs differ from this, an error is returned.

If this condition is met, the SIG_ALL flag is enforced and only **the first input of a transaction requires a witness** that covers all other inputs and outputs of the transaction. All signatures by the signing public keys MUST be provided in the Proof.witness of the first input of the transaction.

Message aggregation for SIG_ALL The message to be signed depends on the type of transaction containing an input with signature flag SIG_ALL.

Aggregation for swap A swap contains inputs and outputs (see NUT-03). To provide a valid signature, the owner (or owners) of the signing public keys must concatenate the secret and C fields of all Proofs (inputs) with the amount and B_ fields of all BlindedMessages (outputs, see NUT-00) to a single message string in the order they appear in the transaction. This concatenated string is then hashed and signed (see Signature scheme).

If a swap transaction has n inputs and m outputs, the message to sign becomes:

```
msg = secret_0 || C_0 || ... || secret_n || C_n || amount_0 || B_0 || ... || amount_m || B_m
```

Here, || denotes string concatenation. The C of each input and B_ of each output are **hex strings** and amount is a UTF-encoded string.

Aggregation for melt For a melt transaction, the message to sign is composed of all the inputs, the quote ID being paid, and the NUT-08 blank outputs.

If a melt transaction has n inputs, m blank outputs, and a quote ID quote_id, the message to sign becomes:

```
msg = secret_0 || C_0 || ... || secret_n || C_n || amount_0 || B_0 || ... || amount_m || B_m || quote_id
```

Here, || denotes string concatenation. The C of each input and B_ of each output are **hex strings** and amount is a UTF-encoded string.

Locktime Tag

The locktime tag signals which set of locking rules the mint should apply. There are three possible states the locktime tag can represent:

Permanent Lock

If the locktime tag is not present, or is not a valid unix time, the lock is considered “permanent”.

Locktime Multisig conditions apply if the pubkeys tag is present, Basic Case conditions if not.

Active Lock

If the `locktime` tag is a valid unix time and the mint's local clock is less than `locktime`, the lock is "active".

Locktime Multisig conditions apply if the `pubkeys` tag is present, Basic Case conditions if not.

Expired Lock

If the `locktime` tag is a valid unix time and the mint's local clock is greater than `locktime`, the lock has "expired".

Both Locktime Multisig and Refund Multisig conditions apply if the `refund` tag is present, otherwise the proof is considered unlocked and spendable without a witness signature.

[!NOTE] A Proof is considered spendable by anyone if it only requires a `secret` and a valid unblinded signature `C` to be spent (which is the default case in NUT-00).

Multisig

Cashu offers two multi-signature pathways: `Locktime MultiSig` and `Refund MultiSig`, which are activated depending on the status of the proof's `locktime` tag.

[!NOTE] Each pathway has a self-contained set of conditions which must be satisfied for that pathway to be valid. You cannot mix/blend conditions between pathways.

Locktime MultiSig

Locktime Multisig extends the Basic Case by allowing proofs to be locked to multiple public keys. The additional locking public keys are stored in the `pubkeys` tag.

If the `pubkeys` tag is present, the Proof is spendable only if a valid signature is given by **at least ONE** of the public keys contained in the `Secret.data` field or the `pubkeys` tag.

If the `n_sigs` tag is a positive integer, the mint will require at least `n_sigs` of those public keys to provide a valid signature.

If the number of public keys with valid signatures is greater or equal to the number specified in `n_sigs` (or 1 if `n_sigs` is not present), the transaction is valid. The signatures are provided in an array of strings in the `P2PKWitness` object.

Expressed as an "n-of-m" scheme, $n = n_sigs$ is the number of required signatures and $m = 1$ (`data` field)+
`count(pubkeys tag keys)` is the total number of public keys that *could* sign.

[!CAUTION]

Because Schnorr signatures are non-deterministic (due to auxiliary random data), we expect a minimum number of unique public keys with valid signatures instead of expecting a minimum number of signatures.

Refund MultiSig

Refund Multisig allows proofs to be *additionally spendable* by a separate set of public keys once the `locktime` has expired. These public keys are stored in the `refund` tag, and can include keys previously listed in `data` or `pubkeys`.

Locktime Multisig conditions continue to apply, and the proof can continue to be spent according to Locktime Multisig rules.

In addition, the Proof can be spent if a valid signature is given by **at least ONE** of the public keys contained in the `refund` tag.

If the `n_sigs_refund` tag is a positive integer, the mint will require at least `n_sigs_refund` of those refund public keys to provide a valid signature.

If the number of `refund` public keys with valid signatures is greater or equal to the number specified in `n_sigs_refund` (or 1 if `n_sigs_refund` is not present), the transaction is valid. The signatures are provided in an array of strings in the `P2PKWitness` object.

Expressed as an “n-of-m” scheme, $n = n_sigs_refund$ is the number of required signatures and $m = \text{count}(\text{refund tag keys})$ is the total number of refund keys that *could* sign.

[!CAUTION]

Because Schnorr signatures are non-deterministic (due to auxiliary random data), we expect a minimum number of unique public keys with valid signatures instead of expecting a minimum number of signatures.

Complex Example

This is an example Secret that locks a Proof with a Pay-to-Pubkey (P2PK) condition that requires 2-of-3 signatures from the public keys in the data field and the pubkeys tag.

If the locktime has passed, the Proof continues to be spendable with 2-of-3 signatures from the public keys in the data field and the pubkeys tag. But now it **ALSO** becomes spendable with a single signature from any ONE of the public keys in the refund tag.

The signature flag `sigflag` indicates that signatures are necessary on the inputs and the outputs of the transaction this Proof is spent by.

```
[  
  "P2PK",  
  {  
    "nonce": "da62796403af76c80cd6ce9153ed3746",  
    "data": "033281c37677ea273eb7183b783067f5244933ef78d8c3f15b1a77cb246099c26e",  
    "tags": [  
      ["sigflag", "SIG_ALL"],  
      ["n_sigs", "2"],  
      ["locktime", "1689418329"],  
      [  
        "refund",  
        "033281c37677ea273eb7183b783067f5244933ef78d8c3f15b1a77cb246099c26e",  
        "02e2aeb97f47690e3c418592a5bcd77282d1339a3017f5558928c2441b7731d50"  
      ],  
      [  
        "pubkeys",  
        "02698c4e2b5f9534cd0687d87513c759790cf829aa5739184a3e3735471fbda904",  
        "023192200a0cf3867e48eb63b03ff599c7e46c8f4e41146b2d281173ca6c50c54"  
      ]  
    ]  
  }  
]
```

Use cases

The following use cases are unlocked using P2PK:

- Publicly post locked ecash that can only be redeemed by the intended receiver
- Final offline-receiver payments that can't be double-spent when combined with an offline signature check mechanism like DLEQ proofs
- Receiver of locked ecash can defer and batch multiple mint round trips for receiving proofs (requires DLEQ)
- Ecash that is owned by multiple people via the multisignature abilities
- Atomic swaps when used in combination with the locktime feature

Mint info setting

The NUT-06 MintMethodSetting indicates support for this feature:

```
{  
  "11": {  
    "supported": true  
  }  
}
```

NUT-12: Offline ecash signature validation

optional

In this document, we present an extension of Cashu's crypto system to allow a user **Alice** to verify the mint **Bob**'s signature using only **Bob**'s public keys. We explain how another user **Carol** who receives ecash from **Alice** can execute the DLEQ proof as well. This is achieved using a Discrete Log Equality (DLEQ) proof. Previously, **Bob**'s signature could only be checked by himself using his own private keys (NUT-00).

The DLEQ proof

The purpose of this DLEQ is to prove that the mint has used the same private key a for creating its public key A (NUT-01) and for signing the BlindedMessage B' . **Bob** returns the DLEQ proof additional to the blind signature C' for a mint or swap operation.

The complete DLEQ proof reads

```
# DLEQ Proof
```

(These steps occur when Bob returns C')

Bob:

```
r = random nonce
R1 = r*G
R2 = r*B'
e = hash(R1,R2,A,C')
s = r + e*a
return e, s
```

Alice:

```
R1 = s*G - e*A
R2 = s*B' - e*C'
e == hash(R1,R2,A,C')
```

If true, a in $A = a*G$ must be equal to a in $C' = a*B'$

Hash function

The hash function `hash(x: <Array<[PublicKey]>)-> bytes` generates a deterministic SHA256 hash for a given input list of `PublicKey`. The uncompressed (32+32+1)-byte hexadecimal representations (130 characters) of each `PublicKey` is concatenated before taking the SHA256 hash.

```
def hash_e(*publickeys: PublicKey) -> bytes:
    e_ = ""
    for p in publickeys:
        _p = p.serialize(compressed=False).hex()
        e_ += str(_p)
    e = hashlib.sha256(e_.encode("utf-8")).digest()
    return e
```

[!NOTE] For examples of valid DLEQ proofs, see the test vectors.

Mint to user: DLEQ in `BlindSignature`

The mint produces these DLEQ proofs when returning `BlindSignature`'s in the responses for minting (NUT-04) and swapping (NUT-03) tokens. The `BlindSignature` object is extended in the following way to include the DLEQ proof:

```
{
  "id": <str>,
  "amount": <int>,
  "C_": <str>,
  "dleq": { <-- New: DLEQ proof
    "e": <str>,
    "s": <str>
  }
}
```

e and s are the DLEQ proof.

User to user: DLEQ in Proof

In order for Alice to communicate the DLEQ to another user Carol, we extend the Proof (see NUT-00) object and include the DLEQ proof. As explained below, we also need to include the blinding factor r for the proof to be convincing to another user Carol.

```
{
  "id": <str>,
  "amount": <int>,
  "secret": <str>,
  "C": <str>,
  "dleq": { <-- New: DLEQ proof
    "e": <str>,
    "s": <str>,
    "r": <str>
  }
}
```

e and s are the challenge and response of the DLEQ proof returned by Bob, r is the blinding factor of Alice that was used to generate the Proof. Alice serializes these proofs like any other in a token (see NUT-00) to send it to another user Carol.

[!IMPORTANT]

Privacy: The blinding factor r should not be shared with the mint or otherwise, the mint will be able to associate the BlindSignature with the Proof.

Alice (minting user) verifies DLEQ proof

When minting or swapping tokens, Alice receives DLEQ proofs in the BlindSignature response from the mint Bob. Alice checks the validity of the DLEQ proofs for each ecash token she receives via the equations:

```
R1 = s*G - e*A
R2 = s*B' - e*C'
e == hash(R1,R2,A,C') # must be True
```

Here, the variables are

- A – the public key Bob used to sign this Proof
- (e, s) – the DLEQ proof returned by Bob
- B' – Alice's BlindedMessage
- C' – Bob's BlindSignature on B'

In order to execute the proof, Alice needs e, s that are returned in the BlindSignature by Bob. Alice further needs B' (the BlindedMessage Alice created and Bob signed) and C' (the blind signature in the BlindSignature response) from Bob, and A (the public key of Bob with which he signed the BlindedMessage). All these values are available to Alice during or after calling the mint and swap operations.

If a DLEQ proof is included in the mint's BlindSignature response, wallets **MUST** verify the DLEQ proof.

Carol (another user) verifies DLEQ proof

Carol is a user that receives Proofs in a token from another user Alice. When Alice sends Proofs with DLEQ proofs to Carol or when Alice posts the Proofs publicly, Carol can validate the DLEQ proof herself and verify Bob's signature without having to talk to Bob. Alice includes the following information in the Proof (see above):

- (x, C) – the ecash Proof
- (e, s) – the DLEQ proof revealed by Alice
- r – Alice's blinding factor

Here, x is the Proof's secret, and C is the mint's signature on it. To execute the DLEQ proof like Alice did above, Carol needs (B', C') which she can compute herself using the blinding factor r that she receives from Alice.

To verify the DLEQ proof of a received token, Carol needs to reconstruct B' and C' using the blinding factor r that Alice has included in the Proof she sent to Carol. Since Carol now has all the necessary information, she can execute the same equations to verify the DLEQ proof as Alice did:

```
Y = hash_to_curve(x)
C' = C + r*A
B' = Y + r*G
```

```
R1 = ... (same as Alice)
```

If a DLEQ proof is included in a received token, wallets **MUST** verify the proof.

Mint info setting

The NUT-06 MintMethodSetting indicates support for this feature:

```
{
  "12": {
    "supported": true
  }
}
```

NUT-13: Deterministic Secrets

optional

depends on: NUT-09

In this document, we describe the process that allows wallets to recover their ecash balance with the help of the mint using a familiar 12 word seed phrase (mnemonic). This allows us to restore the wallet's previous state in case of a device loss or other loss of access to the wallet. The basic idea is that wallets that generate the ecash deterministically can regenerate the same tokens during a recovery process. For this, they ask the mint to reissue previously generated signatures using NUT-09.

Deterministic secret derivation

An ecash token, or a Proof, consists of a secret generated by the wallet, and a signature C generated by the wallet and the mint in collaboration. Here, we describe how wallets can deterministically generate the secrets and blinding factors r necessary to generate the signatures C.

The wallet generates a seed derived from a 12-word BIP39 mnemonic seed phrase that the user stores in a secure place. The wallet uses the seed, to derive deterministic values for the secret and the blinding factors r for every new ecash token that it generates.

In order to do this, the wallet keeps track of a counter_k for each keyset_k it uses. The index k indicates that the wallet **MUST** keep track of a separate counter for each keyset k it uses. The wallet **MUST** keep track of multiple keysets for every mint it interacts with.

Versioned Secret Derivation The secret derivation method depends on the keyset ID version the wallet derives secrets and blinding factors for.

- **Keyset V2** (keyset IDs starting with 01): Use HMAC-SHA256 Derivation
- **Keyset V1 (deprecated)** (keyset IDs starting with 00): Use BIP32 Legacy Derivation

HMAC-SHA256 Derivation

For keysets with version byte 01, the wallet uses counter_k, seed and keyset_id as inputs to a Key Derivation Function (KDF) which output is used to derive secret and r.

The HMAC-SHA256 KDF is built as the following:

1. message = b"Cashu_KDF_HMAC_SHA256" || keyset_id_bytes || counter_k_bytes || derivation_type_byte, where:
 - "Cashu_KDF_HMAC_SHA256" is the domain separation or purpose string, encoded to bytes as UTF-8.
 - keyset_id_bytes are the raw bytes of keyset_id (hex decoded).
 - counter_k_bytes is the counter encoded as an unsigned 64-bit integer in big-endian format.
 - derivation_type_byte is exactly 1 byte specifying the type of derivation required:
 - 0x00 for secrets
 - 0x01 for blinded messages
2. hmac_digest = HMAC_SHA256(seed, message), where HMAC_SHA256 is the hash-based message authentication code using SHA-256 as the hashing algorithm.
3. secret = hmac_digest and blinding_factor = hmac_digest % N.

Code Examples

Versioned Secret Derivation Below are code examples with keyset version-dependent derivation.

Python:

```
import hmac
import hashlib
```

```

def derive_secret_and_r(seed: bytes, keyset_id: str, counter_k: int):
    """
    Derive secret and blinding factor using appropriate method based on keyset version
    """
    # Determine keyset version from first two characters
    keyset_version = keyset_id[:2]

    if keyset_version == "00":
        # Use legacy BIP32 derivation for version 00
        return derive_secret_and_r_bip32(seed, keyset_id, counter_k)
    elif keyset_version == "01":
        # Use HMAC-SHA256 derivation for version 01
        return derive_secret_and_r_hmac(seed, keyset_id, counter_k)
    else:
        raise ValueError(f"Unsupported keyset version: {keyset_version}")

def derive_secret_and_r_hmac(seed: bytes, keyset_id: str, counter_k: int):
    """
    HMAC-SHA256 derivation for keyset version 01

    Semantics:
    - secret = HMAC-SHA256(seed, msg || 0x00)
    - r      = OS2IP(HMAC-SHA256(seed, msg || 0x01)) mod N
    - reject r == 0 (astronomically unlikely)
    """
    # secp256k1 scalar field (group) order
    SECP256K1_N = int(
        "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFEBAAEDCE6AF48A03BBFD25E8CD0364141", 16
    )

    # Step 1: Create the message
    message = b"Cashu_KDF_HMAC_SHA256" + bytes.fromhex(keyset_id) + counter_k.to_bytes(8, 'big')

    # Step 2: Compute HMAC-SHA256
    secret = hmac.new(seed, message + b"\x00", hashlib.sha256).digest()
    blinding_factor_digest = hmac.new(seed, message + b"\x01", hashlib.sha256).digest()

    # Step 3: Interpret digest as integer and reduce mod N
    x = int.from_bytes(blinding_factor_digest, "big", signed=False)
    r = x % SECP256K1_N

    if r == 0:
        raise RuntimeError("Derived invalid blinding scalar r == 0")

    return secret, r

def derive_secret_and_r_bip32(seed: bytes, keyset_id: str, counter_k: int):
    """
    Legacy BIP32 derivation for keyset version 00
    """
    # Convert seed to mnemonic and derive master key
    bip32 = BIP32.from_seed(seed)

    # Calculate keyset_id_int for BIP32 derivation path
    keyset_id_int = int.from_bytes(bytes.fromhex(keyset_id), "big") % (2**31 - 1)

    # Derive secret and r using BIP32 paths

```

```

secret_path = f"m/129372'/0'/{keyset_id_int}'/{counter_k}'/0"
r_path = f"m/129372'/0'/{keyset_id_int}'/{counter_k}'/1"

secret = bip32.get_privkey_from_path(secret_path)
r = bip32.get_privkey_from_path(r_path)

return secret, r

```

TypeScript:

```

import * as crypto from "crypto";
// secp256k1 scalar field (group) order
const SECP256K1_N = BigInt(
  "0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFEBAEDECE6AF48A03BBFD25E8CD0364141",
);

function deriveSecretAndR(seed: Buffer, keysetId: string, counterK: number) {
  // Determine keyset version from first two characters
  const keysetVersion = keysetId.substring(0, 2);

  if (keysetVersion === "00") {
    // Use legacy BIP32 derivation for version 00
    return deriveSecretAndRBip32(seed, keysetId, counterK);
  } else if (keysetVersion === "01") {
    // Use HMAC-SHA256 derivation for version 01
    return deriveSecretAndRHmac(seed, keysetId, counterK);
  } else {
    throw new Error(`Unsupported keyset version: ${keysetVersion}`);
  }
}

function deriveSecretAndRHmac(
  seed: Buffer,
  keysetId: string,
  counterK: number,
) {
  // Step 1: Create message
  const counterBuffer = Buffer.alloc(8);
  counterBuffer.writeBigUInt64BE(BigInt(counterK));
  const message = Buffer.concat([
    Buffer.from("Cashu_KDF_HMAC_SHA256"),
    Buffer.from(keysetId, "hex"),
    counterBuffer,
  ]);

  const secretDerivation = Buffer.from([0]);
  const blindingFactorDerivation = Buffer.from([1]);

  // Step 2: Compute HMAC-SHA256
  const secret = crypto
    .createHmac("sha256", seed)
    .update(Buffer.concat([message, secretDerivation]))
    .digest();
  const blindingFactorDigest = crypto
    .createHmac("sha256", seed)
    .update(Buffer.concat([message, blindingFactorDerivation]))
    .digest();
}

```

```

// Step 3: OS2IP + modulo reduction
const x = BigInt("0x" + blindingFactorDigest.toString("hex"));
const r = x % SECP256K1_N;

if (r === 0n) {
  throw new Error("Derived invalid blinding scalar r == 0");
}

return { secret, r };
}

function deriveSecretAndRBip32(
  seed: Buffer,
  keysetId: string,
  counterK: number,
) {
  // Legacy BIP32 derivation for version 00
  // Implementation would use BIP32 library (e.g., bip32, bitcoinjs-lib)
  // Calculate keyset_id_int for BIP32 derivation path
  const keysetIdInt = BigInt(`0x${keysetId}`) % BigInt(2 ** 31 - 1);

  // This is pseudocode - actual implementation depends on BIP32 library
  const secretPath = `m/129372'/0'/${keysetIdInt}'/${counterK}'/0`;
  const rPath = `m/129372'/0'/${keysetIdInt}'/${counterK}'/1`;

  // const secret = bip32.derivePath(secretPath).privateKey;
  // const r = bip32.derivePath(rPath).privateKey;

  // Return placeholder for demonstration
  throw new Error(
    "BIP32 derivation requires additional library implementation",
  );
}

```

Note: See the test vectors.

Legacy Derivation (For Keyset Version 00)

[!NOTE] This derivation method is used for keysets with version 00 (legacy keysets). Wallets **MUST** use this method when working with keysets that have IDs starting with 00.

BIP32 derivation paths are used. The derivation path depends on the keyset ID of keyset_k, and the counter_k of that keyset.

- Purpose' = 129372' (UTF-8 for □)
- Coin type' = Always 0'
- Keyset id' = Keyset ID represented as an integer (keyset_k_int)
- Coin counter' = counter' (this value is incremented)
- secret or r = 0 or 1

m / 129372' / 0' / keyset_k_int' / counter' / secret||r

This results in the following derivation paths:

```
secret_derivation_path = `m/129372'/0'/{keyset_k_int}'/{counter_k}'/0`
r_derivation_path = `m/129372'/0'/{keyset_id_k_int}'/{counter_k}'/1`
```

Here, {keyset_k_int} and {counter_k} are the only variables that can change. keyset_id_k_int is an integer representation (see below) of the keyset ID the token is generated with. This means that the derivation path is unique for each keyset. Note that the coin type is always 0', independent of the unit of the ecash.

[!NOTE] For examples, see the test vectors.

Counter The wallet starts with `counter_k := 0` upon encountering a new keyset and increments it by 1 every time it has successfully minted new ecash with this keyset. The wallet stores the latest `counter_k` in its database for all keysets it uses. Note that we have a counter (and therefore a derivation path) for each keyset k . We omit the keyset index k in the following of this document.

When encountering keysets with different versions, wallets **MUST** use the appropriate derivation method based on the keyset ID version and retain the existing `counter_k` value for each keyset to ensure consistent restore support across wallet implementations.

Keyset ID to Integer Mapping (deprecated)

[!CAUTION] This mapping is deprecated and unsafe to use due to its small keyspace.

The integer representation `keyset_id_int` of a keyset is calculated from its hexadecimal ID which has a length of 8 bytes or 16 hex characters. First, we convert the hex string to a big-endian sequence of bytes. This value is then modulo reduced by $2^{31} - 1$ to arrive at an integer that is a unique identifier `keyset_id_int`. Keyset IDs with version prefix `01` **MUST** be shortened to the first 8 bytes before conversion.

Example in Python:

```
keyset_id_int = int.from_bytes(bytes.fromhex(keyset_id_hex), "big") % (2**31 - 1)
```

Example in JavaScript:

```
keysetIdInt = BigInt(`0x${keysetIdHex}`) % BigInt(2 ** 31 - 1);
```

Restore from seed phrase

Using deterministic secret derivation, a user's wallet can regenerate the same `BlindedMessages` in case of loss of a previous wallet state. To also restore the corresponding `BlindSignatures` to fully recover the ecash, the wallet can either request the mint to re-issue past `BlindSignatures` on the regenerated `BlindedMessages` (see NUT-09) or by downloading the entire database of the mint (TBD).

The wallet takes the following steps during recovery:

1. Determine the keyset version from the keyset ID
2. Generate `secret` and `r` from counter and keyset using the appropriate derivation method:
 - For keyset version `00`: Use legacy BIP32 derivation
 - For keyset version `01`: Use legacy BIP32 derivation and HMAC-SHA256 derivation (more on this below)
3. Generate `BlindedMessage` from `secret`
4. Obtain `BlindSignature` for `secret` from the mint
5. Unblind `BlindSignature` to `C` using `r`
6. Restore `Proof = (secret, C)`
7. Check if `Proof` is already spent

Generate BlindedMessages To generate the `BlindedMessages`, the wallet starts with a `counter := 0` and, for each increment of the counter, generates a `secret` and `r` using the appropriate derivation method based on the keyset version.

[!CAUTION] We assume old wallets don't know the difference between `00` and `01` keyset ID and secret derivation: they might have generated secrets using the legacy derivation whereas the new derivation was required. Therefore, when performing a recovering for a `01` keyset, up-to-date wallets **MUST** check secrets with both derivation methods. (see Restoring batches)

For keyset version `00` (legacy):

```
secret = bip32.get_privkey_from_path(secret_derivation_path).hex()  
r = self.bip32.get_privkey_from_path(r_derivation_path)
```

For keyset version 01 (legacy and HMAC-SHA256):

First:

```
secret = bip32.get_privkey_from_path(secret_derivation_path).hex()  
r = self.bip32.get_privkey_from_path(r_derivation_path)
```

Then:

```
secret, r = derive_secret_and_r_hmac(seed, keyset_id, counter)
```

[!NOTE] For examples, see the test vectors.

Using the secret string and the private key r, the wallet generates a BlindedMessage. The wallet then increases the counter by 1 and repeats the same process for a given batch size. It is recommended to use a batch size of 100.

The user's wallet can now request the corresponding BlindSignatures for these BlindedMessages from the mint using the NUT-09 restore endpoint or by downloading the entire mint's database.

Generate Proofs Using the restored BlindSignatures and the r generated in the previous step, the wallet can unblind the signature to C. The triple (secret, C, amount) is a restored Proof.

Check Proofs states If the wallet used the restore endpoint NUT-09 for regenerating the Proofs, it additionally needs to check for the Proofs spent state using NUT-07. The wallet deletes all Proofs which are already spent and keeps the unspent ones in its database.

Restoring batches

Usually, the user won't remember the last state of counter when starting the recovery process. Therefore, wallets need to know how far they need to increment the counter during the restore process to be confident to have reached the most recent state.

The following approach is recommended:

- Set counter = 0
- Select key derivation function: legacy for 00 and HMAC-SHA256 for 01 keysets
- Restore Proofs in batches of 100, and increment counter
- Repeat restore until three consecutive batches are returned empty
- Reset counter to the value at the last successful restore + 1

Wallets restore Proofs in batches of 100. The wallet starts with a counter=0 and increments it for every Proof it generated during one batch. When the wallet begins restoring the first Proofs, it is likely that the first few batches will only contain spent Proofs. Eventually, the wallet will reach a counter that will result in unspent Proofs which it stores in its database. The wallet then continues to restore until *three successive batches are returned empty by the mint*. This is to be confident that the restore process did not miss any Proofs that might have been generated with larger gaps in the counter by the previous wallet that we are restoring.

NUT-14: Hashed Timelock Contracts (HTLCs)

optional

depends on: NUT-10

This NUT describes the use of Hashed Timelock Contracts (HTLCs) which defines a spending condition based on NUT-10's well-known `Secret` format. Using HTLCs, ecash proofs can be locked to the hash of a preimage and a timelock. This enables use cases such as atomic swaps of ecash between users, and atomic coupling of an ecash spending condition to a Lightning HTLC.

HTLC spending conditions can be thought of as an extension of P2PK locks (see NUT-11) but with a hash lock in `Secret.data` and a new `Proof.witness.preimage` witness in the locked inputs to be spent. The preimage used to spend a locked Proof can be retrieved using NUT-07.

Caution: applications that rely on being able to retrieve the witness independently of the spender must check, via the mint's info endpoint, that NUT-07 is supported.

Caution: if the mint does not support this type of spending condition, proofs may be treated as regular anyone-can-spend proofs. Applications must ensure that the mint supports a specific kind of spending condition by checking the mint's info endpoint.

HTLC Locked Proof

NUT-10 Secret kind: HTLC

If for a `Proof`, `Proof.secret` is a `Secret` of kind HTLC, the hash of the lock is in `Proof.secret.data`. The preimage for unlocking the HTLC is in the witness `Proof.witness.preimage`. All additional tags from P2PK locks can also be used here, allowing a locktime, signature flag, and multisig (see NUT-11).

Here is a concrete example of a `Secret` of kind HTLC:

```
[  
  "HTLC",  
  {  
    "nonce": "da62796403af76c80cd6ce9153ed3746",  
    "data": "023192200a0cf3867e48eb63b03ff599c7e46c8f4e41146b2d281173ca6c50c",  
    "tags": [  
      [  
        "pubkeys",  
        "02698c4e2b5f9534cd0687d87513c759790cf829ad5739184a3e3735471fbda904"  
      ],  
      ["locktime", "1689418329"],  
      [  
        "refund",  
        "033281c37677ea273eb7183b783067f5244933ef78d8c3f15b1a77cb246099c26e"  
      ]  
    ]  
  }  
]
```

The hash lock in `Secret.data` and the preimage in `Proof.witness.preimage` are treated as 32-byte data, encoded as 64-character hexadecimal strings.

See NUT-11 for a description of the signature scheme, the additional use of signature flags, and how to require signatures from multiple public keys (Multisig).

Spending HTLC Proofs

A `Proof` with a `Secret` of kind HTLC can be spent in two ways.

Receiver Pathway (hash lock)

The receiver(s) listed in the `pubkeys` tag can spend the proof by providing **BOTH** of the following:

- The preimage to `Secret.data` in the `Proof.witness`
 - Signature(s) as per the NUT-11 rules for **Locktime MultiSig**.

This pathway is **ALWAYS** available to the receivers, as possession of the preimage confirms performance of the Sender's wishes.

Sender Pathway (timelocked refund)

The sender(s) listed in the `refund` tag can spend the proof once the `locktime` lock has “expired” by providing signature(s) as per the NUT-11 rules for **Refund MultiSig**.

NOTE: As per the NUT-11 rules, if the refund tag is not present, the HTLC proof would become “anyone can spend” after the locktime lock has “expired”. Likewise, if the locktime is not present, or is not a valid unix timestamp, the HTLC proof will be permanently locked and can only be spent using the Receiver (hash lock) pathway.

Hash lock

Aligned with Bitcoin's HTLC construction, the hash lock in `Secret.data` represents the **SHA-256 hash** of a 32-byte preimage.

When an HTLC-locked proof is created, the `Secret.data` field must contain:

```
hash_hex = bytes_to_hex(SHA256(preimage_bytes))
```

where:

- `preimage_bytes` is exactly 32 bytes of arbitrary data, commonly random and uniformly distributed
 - `hash_hex` is the 32-byte SHA-256 digest of `preimage_bytes`, encoded as a 64-character lowercase hexadecimal string

To successfully spend a Proof via the **Receiver Pathway**, the spender must present the matching `preimage_bytes`, encoded as a 64-character lowercase hexadecimal string in the `Proof.witness.preimage`.

Mints and wallets **must verify** this equality before accepting the spend as valid:

`SHA256(hex_to_bytes(Proof.witness.preimage)) = hex_to_bytes(Proof.secret.data)`

Here is an example of a matching hash / preimage pair:

This hash-lock mechanism ensures that the Proof can only be spent once the secret preimage is revealed, allowing interoperability with external HTLC systems (such as Bitcoin or Lightning Network contracts).

Witness format

HTLCWitness is a serialized JSON string of the form

```
{  
  "preimage": <hex_str>,  
  "signatures": <Array[<hex_str>]>  
}
```

The witness for a spent proof can be obtained with a `Proof` state check (see NUT-07).

Complex Example

This is an example Secret that locks a Proof with an HTLC condition that can be spent in either of the following ways:

Receiver Pathway - 2-of-3 signatures from the public keys in the pubkeys tag **PLUS** the preimage in `Proof.witness.preimage` of the hash in `Secret.data`.

Sender Pathway - One signature from the public keys in the refund tag, only available once the locktime has expired.

The signature flag `sigflag` indicates that signatures are necessary on the inputs and the outputs of the transaction this Proof is spent by.

```
[  
  "HTLC",  
  {  
    "nonce": "da62796403af76c80cd6ce9153ed3746",  
    "data": "023192200a0cf3867e48eb63b03ff599c7e46c8f4e41146b2d281173ca6c50c",  
    "tags": [  
      ["sigflag", "SIG_ALL"],  
      ["n_sigs", "2"],  
      ["locktime", "1689418329"],  
      [  
        "refund",  
        "033281c37677ea273eb7183b783067f5244933ef78d8c3f15b1a77cb246099c26e",  
        "02e2aeb97f47690e3c418592a5bcd77282d1339a3017f5558928c2441b7731d50"  
      ],  
      [  
        "pubkeys",  
        "02698c4e2b5f9534cd0687d87513c759790cf829aa5739184a3e3735471fbda904",  
        "0279be667ef9dcbbac55a06295ce870b07029bfcd82dce28d959f2815b16f81798",  
        "0249098aa8b9d2fbec49ff8598feb17b592b986e62319a4fa488a3dc36387157a7"  
      ]  
    ]  
  }  
]
```

Mint info setting

The NUT-06 MintMethodSetting indicates support for this feature:

```
{  
  "14": {  
    "supported": true  
  }  
}
```

NUT-15: Partial multi-path payments

optional

depends on: NUT-05

In this document, we describe how wallets can instruct multiple mints to each pay a partial amount of a bolt11 Lightning invoice. The full payment is composed of partial payments (MPP) from multiple multi-path payments from different Lightning nodes. This way, wallets can pay a larger Lightning invoice combined from multiple smaller balances on different mints. Due to the atomic nature of MPP, either all payments will be successful or all of them will fail.

The Lightning backend of the mint must support paying a partial amount of an Invoice and multi-path payments (MPP, see BOLT 4). For example, the mint's Lightning node must be able to pay 50 sats of a 100 sat bolt11 invoice. The receiving Lightning node must support receiving multi-path payments as well.

Multimint payment execution

Alice's wallet coordinates multiple MPPs on different mints that support the feature (see below for the indicated setting). For a given Lightning invoice of `amount_total`, Alice splits the total amount into several partial amounts $amount_total = amount_1 + amount_2 + \dots$ that each must be covered by her individual balances on the mints she wants to use for the payment. She constructs multiple `PostMeltQuoteBolt11Request`'s that each include the corresponding partial amount in the payment option (see below) that she sends to all mints she wants to use for the payment. The mints then respond with a normal `PostMeltQuoteBolt11Response` (see NUT-05). Alice proceeds to pay the melt requests at each mint simultaneously. When all mints have sent out the partial Lightning payment, she receives a successful response from all mints individually.

Melt quote

To request a melt quote with a partial amount, the wallet of Alice makes a POST `/v1/melt/quote/bolt11` similar to NUT-05.

```
POST https://mint.host:3338/v1/melt/quote/bolt11
```

The wallet Alice includes the following `PostMeltQuoteBolt11Request` data in its request which includes an additional (and optional) `options` object compared to the standard request in NUT-05:

```
{  
    "request": <str>,  
    "unit": <str_enum>["sat"],  
    "options": {  
        "mpp": {  
            "amount": <int>  
        }  
    }  
}
```

Here, `request` is the bolt11 Lightning invoice to be paid, `unit` is the unit the wallet would like to pay with. `amount` is the partial amount for the requested payment in millisats (msat). The wallet then pays the returned melt quote the same way as in NUT-05.

Mint info setting

The settings returned in the info endpoint (NUT-06) indicate that a mint supports this NUT. The mint MUST indicate each method and unit that supports mpp. It can indicate this in an array of objects for multiple method and unit pairs.

`MultipathPaymentSetting` is of the form:

```
{  
  [  
    {  
      "method": <str>,  
      "unit": <str>  
    },  
    ...  
  ]  
}
```

Example MultipathPaymentSetting:

```
{  
  "15": {  
    "methods": [  
      {  
        "method": "bolt11",  
        "unit": "sat"  
      },  
      {  
        "method": "bolt11",  
        "unit": "usd"  
      }  
    ]  
  }  
}
```

NUT-16: Animated QR codes

optional

This document outlines how tokens should be displayed as QR codes for sending them between two wallets.

Introduction

QR codes are a great way to send and receive Cashu tokens. Before a token can be shared as a QR code, it needs to be serialized (see NUT-00).

Static QR codes

If the serialized token is not too large (i.e. includes less than or equal to 2 proofs) it can usually be shared as a static QR code. This might not be the case if the secret includes long scripts or the token has a long memo or mint URL.

Animated QR codes

If a token is too large to be displayed as a single QR code, we use animated QR codes based on the UR protocol. The sender produces an animated QR code from a serialized Cashu token. The receiver scans the animated QR code until the UR decoder is able to decode the token.

Resources

- Blockchain commons UR
- Typescript library bc-ur

NUT-17: WebSockets

optional

depends on: NUT-07

This NUT defines a websocket protocol that enables bidirectional communication between apps and mints using the JSON-RPC format.

Subscriptions

The websocket enables real-time subscriptions that wallets can use to receive notifications for a state change of a MintQuoteResponse (NUT-04), MeltQuoteResponse (NUT-05), CheckStateResponse (NUT-07).

A summary of the subscription flow is the following:

1. A wallet connects to the websocket endpoint and sends a `WsRequest` with the `subscribe` command.
2. The mint responds with a `WsResponse` containing an ok or an error.
3. If the subscription was accepted, the mint sends a `WsNotification` of the current state of the subscribed objects and whenever there is an update for the wallet's subscriptions.
4. To close a subscription, the wallet sends `WsRequest` with the `unsubscribe` command.

Specifications

The websocket is reachable via the mint's URL path `/v1/ws`:

<https://mint.com/v1/ws>

NUT-17 uses the JSON-RPC format for all messages. There are three types of messages defined in this NUT.

Requests

All requests from the wallet to the mint are of the form of a `WsRequest`:

```
{  
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",  
  "method": <str_enum[WsRequestMethod]>,  
  "params": <str_WsRequestParams>,  
  "id": <int>  
}
```

`WsRequestMethod` is a enum of strings with the supported commands "subscribe" and "unsubscribe":

```
enum WsRequestMethod {  
  sub = "subscribe",  
  unsub = "unsubscribe",  
}
```

`WsRequestParams` is a serialized JSON with the parameters of the corresponding command.

Command: Subscribe To subscribe to updates, the wallet sends a "subscribe" command with the following `params` parameters:

```
{  
  "kind": <str_enum[SubscriptionKind]>,  
  "subId": <string>,  
  "filters": <string[]>  
}
```

Here, `subId` is a unique uuid generated by the wallet and allows the client to map its requests to the mint's responses.

`SubscriptionKind` is an enum with the following possible values:

```
enum SubscriptionKind {  
    bolt11_melt_quote = "bolt11_melt_quote",  
    bolt11_mint_quote = "bolt11_mint_quote",  
  
    bolt12_melt_quote = "bolt12_melt_quote",  
    bolt12_mint_quote = "bolt12_mint_quote",  
  
    proof_state = "proof_state",  
}
```

The `filters` are an array of mint quote IDs (NUT-04), or melt quote IDs (NUT-05), or Y's (NUT-07) of the corresponding object to receive updates from.

As an example, `filters` would be of the following form to subscribe for updates of three different mint quote IDs:

```
["20385fc7245...", "d06667cda9b...", "e14d8ca96f..."]
```

Note that `id` and `subId` are unrelated. The `subId` is the ID for each subscription, whereas `id` is part of the JSON-RPC spec and is an integer counter that must be incremented for every request sent over the websocket.

Important: If the subscription is accepted by the mint, the mint MUST first respond with the *current* state of the subscribed object and continue sending any further updates to it.

For example, if the wallet subscribes to a Proof.Y of a Proof that has not been spent yet, the mint will first respond with a `ProofState` with `state == "UNSPENT"`. If the wallet then spends this Proof, the mint would send a `ProofState` with `state == "PENDING"` and then one with `state == "SPENT"`. In total, the mint would send three notifications to the wallet.

Command: Unsubscribe The wallet should always unsubscribe any subscriptions that is isn't interested in anymore. The parameters for the "unsubscribe" command is only the subscription ID:

```
{  
    "subId": <string>  
}
```

Responses

A `WsResponse` is returned by the mint to both the "subscribe" and "unsubscribe" commands and indicates whether the request was successful:

```
{  
    "jsonrpc": "2.0",  
    "result": {  
        "status": "OK",  
        "subId": <str>  
    },  
    "id": <int>  
}
```

Here, the `id` corresponds to the `id` in the request (as part of the JSON-RPC spec) and `subId` corresponds to the subscription ID.

Notifications

`WsNotification`'s are sent from the mint to the wallet and contain subscription data in the following format

```
{
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "subscribe",
  "params": {
    "subId": <str>,
    "payload": NotificationPayload
  }
}
```

`subId` is the subscription ID (previously generated by the wallet) this notification corresponds to. `NotificationPayload` carries the subscription data which is a `MintQuoteResponse` (NUT-04), a `MeltQuoteResponse` (NUT-05), or a `CheckStateResponse` (NUT-07), depending on what the corresponding `SubscriptionKind` was.

Errors

`WsErrors` for a given `WsRequest` are returned in the following format

```
{
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "error": {
    "code": -32601,
    "message": "Human readable error message"
  },
  "id": "1"
}
```

Example: ProofState subscription

To subscribe to the `ProofState` of a `Proof`, the wallet establishes a websocket connection to `https://mint.com/v1/ws` and sends a `WsRequest` with a `filters` chosen to be the `a` `Proof.Y` value of the `Proof` (see NUT-00). Note that `filters` is an array meaning multiple subscriptions of the same kind can be made in the same request.

Wallet:

```
{
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "id": 0,
  "method": "subscribe",
  "params": {
    "kind": "proof_state",
    "filters": [
      "02e208f9a78cd523444aadf854a4e91281d20f67a923d345239c37f14e137c7c3d"
    ],
    "subId": "Ua_IYvRHoCoF_wsZFLJ1m4gBDB--00_6_n0zHg2T"
  }
}
```

The mint first responds with a `WsResponse` confirming that the subscription has been added.

Mint:

```
{
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "result": {
    "status": "OK",
    "subId": "Ua_IYvRHoCoF_wsZFLJ1m4gBDB--00_6_n0zHg2T"
  },
  "id": 0
}
```

The mint immediately sends the current ProofState of the subscription as a `WsNotification`.

Mint:

```
{  
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",  
  "method": "subscribe",  
  "params": {  
    "subId": "Ua_IYvRHoCoF_wsZFLJ1m4gBDB--00_6_n0zHg2T",  
    "payload": {  
      "Y": "02e208f9a78cd523444aadf854a4e91281d20f67a923d345239c37f14e137c7c3d",  
      "state": "UNSPENT",  
      "witness": null  
    }  
  }  
}
```

While leaving the websocket connection open, the wallet then spends the ecash. The mint sends `WsNotification` updating the wallet about state changes of the ProofState accordingly:

Mint:

```
{"jsonrpc": "2.0", "method": "subscribe", "params": {"subId": "Ua_IYvRHoCoF_wsZFLJ1m4gBDB--00_6_n0zHg2T", "payload": {"Y": "02e208f9a78cd523444aadf854a4e91281d20f67a923d345239c37f14e137c7c3d", "state": "PENDING"}},  
  
{"jsonrpc": "2.0", "method": "subscribe", "params": {"subId": "Ua_IYvRHoCoF_wsZFLJ1m4gBDB--00_6_n0zHg2T", "payload": {"Y": "02e208f9a78cd523444aadf854a4e91281d20f67a923d345239c37f14e137c7c3d", "state": "SPENT"}}}
```

The wallet then unsubscribes.

Wallet:

```
{  
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",  
  "id": 1,  
  "method": "unsubscribe",  
  "params": { "subId": "Ua_IYvRHoCoF_wsZFLJ1m4gBDB--00_6_n0zHg2T" }  
}
```

Mint info setting

Mints signal websocket support via NUT-06 using the following setting:

```
"nuts": {  
  "17": {  
    "supported": [  
      {  
        "method": <str>,  
        "unit": <str>,  
        "commands": <str[]>  
      },  
      ...  
    ]  
  }  
}
```

Here, `commands` is an array of the commands that the mint supports. A mint that supports all commands would return `["bolt11_mint_quote", "bolt11_melt_quote", "bolt12_mint_quote", "bolt12_melt_quote", "proof_state"]`. Supported commands are given for each method-unit pair.

Example:

```
"nuts": {  
    "17": {  
        "supported": [  
            {  
                "method": "bolt11",  
                "unit": "sat",  
                "commands": [  
                    "bolt11_mint_quote",  
                    "bolt11_melt_quote",  
                    "proof_state"  
                ]  
            },  
            ]  
        }  
    }  
}
```

NUT-18: Payment Requests

optional

This NUT introduces a standardised format for payment requests, that supply a sending wallet with all information necessary to complete the transaction. This enables many use-cases where a transaction is better initiated by the receiver (e.g. point of sale).

Flow

1. Receiver creates a payment request, encodes it and displays it to the sender
2. Sender scans the request and constructs a matching token
3. Sender sends the token according to the transport specified in the payment request
4. Receiver receives the token and finalises the transaction

Payment Request

A Payment Request is defined as follows

```
{  
  "i": str <optional>,  
  "a": int <optional>,  
  "u": str <optional>,  
  "s": bool <optional>,  
  "m": Array[str] <optional>,  
  "d": str <optional>,  
  "t": Array[Transport] <optional>,  
  "nut10": NUT10option <optional>,  
}
```

Here, the fields are

- i: Payment id to be included in the payment payload
- a: The amount of the requested payment
- u: The unit of the requested payment (MUST be set if a is set)
- s: Whether the payment request is for single use
- m: A set of mints from which the payment is requested
- d: A human readable description that the sending wallet will display after scanning the request
- t: The method of Transport chosen to transmit the payment (can be multiple, sorted by preference)
- nut10: The required NUT-10 locking condition

Locking conditions

The payment request can include *optional* locking conditions the payee requires from the payer. For example, the payee might require a P2PK-locked token so that they can receive payments offline.

The nut10 field specifies the payee's requested locking condition as a NUT10option object. Its elements are derived from NUT-10's well-known secret. The NUT10option is defined as follows:

```
{  
  "k": str,  
  "d": str,  
  "t": Array[Array[str, str]] <optional>  
}
```

- k: NUT-10 secret kind,
- d: NUT-10 secret data,
- t: optional NUT-10 payment tags

[!IMPORTANT] The payee must validate the incoming tokens themselves in order to decide whether they can accept the payment. This includes checking the DLEQ proof and whether the token includes a long-enough timelock to satisfy the payee.

Transport

Transport specifies methods for sending the ecash to the receiver. A transport consists of a type and a target.

[!IMPORTANT] The transport can be empty! If the transport is empty, we implicitly assume that the payment will be in-band. An example is X-Cashu where the payment is expected in the HTTP header of a request. We can only hope that the protocol you're using has a well-defined transport.

```
{  
  "t": str,  
  "a": str,  
  "g": Array[Array[str, str]] <optional>  
}
```

- t: type of Transport
- a: target of Transport
- g: optional tags for the Transport

Tags

Tags are an optional array of [tag, value, value, ...] tuples that can be used to specify additional features about the transport. A single tag can have multiple values.

Transport types

The supported transport types are described below.

Nostr

- type: nostr
- target: <nprofile>
- tags: [[{"n": "17"}]]

The n tag specifies the NIPs the receiver supports. At least one tag value MUST be specified. For NIP-17 direct messages, the sender sends a PaymentRequestPayload as the message content.

HTTP POST

- type: post
- target: <endpoint url>

To execute the payment, the sender makes a POST request to the specified endpoint URL with the PaymentRequestPayload as the body.

Payment payload

If not specified otherwise, the payload sent to the receiver is a PaymentRequestPayload JSON serialized object as follows:

```
{  
  "id": str <optional>,  
  "memo": str <optional>,  
  "mint": str,  
  "unit": <str_enum>,  
  "proofs": Array<Proof>  
}
```

Here, `id` is the payment id (corresponding to `i` in request), `memo` is an optional memo to be sent to the receiver with the payment, `mint` is the mint URL from which the ecash is from, `unit` is the unit of the payment, and `proofs` is an array of proofs (see NUT-00, can also include DLEQ proofs).

Encoded Request

The payment request is serialized using CBOR, encoded in `base64_urlsafe`, together with a prefix `creq` and a version `A`:

```
"creq" + "A" + base64_urlsafe(CBOR(PaymentRequest))
```

Example

This is an example payment request expressed as JSON:

```
{
  "i": "b7a90176",
  "a": 10,
  "u": "sat",
  "m": ["https://nofees.testnut.cashu.space"],
  "t": [
    {
      "t": "nostr",
      "a":
        "nprofile1qy28wumnn8ghj7un9d3shjtny9kh2uewd9hsz9rhwden5te0wfjkccete9curxven9eehqctrv5hszrthden5te0dehhxtrvdakqqgydaqy7c"
      "g": [["n", "17"]]
    }
  ]
}
```

This payment request serializes to (see here):

```
creqApWF0gaNhdGVub3N0cmFheKluchJvZmlsZTFxeTI4d3VtbjhnaGo3dW45ZDNzaGp0bn120WtoMnVld2Q5aHN60W1od2RlbjV0ZTB3ZmpY2N0ZTLjdXJ4dmVu0W1c
```

NUT-19: Cached Responses

optional

To minimize the risk of loss of funds to due network errors during critical operations such as minting, swapping, and melting, we introduce a caching mechanism for successful responses. This allows wallet to replay requests on cached endpoints and allow it to recover the desired state after a network interruption.

Requests & Responses

Any Mint implementation should elect a data structure D that maps request objects to their respective responses. D should be fit for fast insertion, look-up and deletion (eviction) operations. This could be an in-memory database or a dedicated caching service like Redis.

Derive & Repeat

Upon receiving a request on a cached endpoint, the mint derives a unique key k for it which should depend on the method, path, and the payload of request.

The mint uses k to look up a response = D[k] and discriminates execution based on the following checks:

- If no cached response is found: request has no matching response. The mint processes request as per usual.
- If a cached response is found: request has a matching response. The mint returns the cached response.

Store

For each successful response on a cached endpoint (status_code == 200), the mint stores the response in D under key k (D[k] = response).

Expiry

The mint decides the ttl (Time To Live) of cached response, after which it can evict the entry from D.

Settings

Support for NUT-19 is announced as an extension to the nuts field of the GetInfoResponse described in NUT-06.

The entry is structured as follows:

```
"nuts": {  
    ...  
    "19": {  
        "ttl": <int|null>,  
        "cached_endpoints": [  
            {  
                "method": "POST",  
                "path": "/v1/mint/bolt11",  
            },  
            {  
                "method": "POST",  
                "path": "/v1/swap",  
            },  
            ...  
        ]  
    }  
}
```

Where:

- `ttl` is the number of seconds the responses are cached for
- `cached_endpoints` is a list of the methods and paths for which caching is enabled.
- `path` and `method` describe the cached route and its method respectively.

If `ttl` is null, the responses are expected to be cached *indefinitely*.

NUT-20: Signature on Mint Quote

optional

depends on: NUT-04

This NUT defines signature-based authentication for mint quote redemption. When requesting a mint quote, clients provide a public key. The mint will then require a valid signature from the corresponding secret key to process the mint operation.

[!CAUTION]

NUT-04 mint quotes without a public key can be minted by anyone who knows the mint quote id without providing a signature.

Mint quote

To request a mint quote, the wallet of Alice makes a POST `/v1/mint/quote/{method}` request where `method` is the payment method requested. We present an example with the `method` being `bolt11` here.

```
POST https://mint.host:3338/v1/mint/quote/bolt11
```

The wallet of Alice includes the following `PostMintQuoteBolt11Request` data in its request:

```
{  
    "amount": <int>,  
    "unit": <str_enum["sat"]>,  
    "description": <str>, // Optional  
    "pubkey": <str> // Optional <-- New  
}
```

with the requested `amount`, `unit`, and `description` according to NUT-04.

`pubkey` is the compressed secp256k1 public key (33 bytes, hex-encoded) that will be required for signature verification during the minting operation. The mint will only mint ecash after receiving a valid signature from the corresponding private key in the subsequent `PostMintRequest`.

[!IMPORTANT]

Privacy: To prevent the mint from being able to link multiple mint quotes, wallets **SHOULD** generate a unique public key for each mint quote request.

The mint Bob then responds with a `PostMintQuoteBolt11Response`:

```
{  
    "quote": <str>,  
    "request": <str>,  
    "state": <str_enum[STATE]>,  
    "expiry": <int>,  
    "pubkey": <str> // Optional <-- New  
}
```

The response is the same as in NUT-04 except for `pubkey` which has been provided by the wallet in the previous request.

Example

Request of Alice with curl:

```
curl -X POST http://localhost:3338/v1/mint/quote/bolt11 -d '{"amount": 10, "unit": "sat", "pubkey": "03d56ce4e446a85bbdaa547b4ec2b073d40ff802831352b8272b7dd7a4de5a7cac"}' -H "Content-Type: application/json"
```

Response of Bob:

```
{  
  "quote": "9d745270-1405-46de-b5c5-e2762b4f5e00",  
  "request": "lnbc100n1pj4apw9...",  
  "state": "UNPAID",  
  "expiry": 1701704757,  
  "pubkey": "03d56ce4e446a85bbdaa547b4ec2b073d40ff802831352b8272b7dd7a4de5a7cac"  
}
```

Signing the mint request

Message aggregation

To provide a signature for a mint request, the owner of the signing public keys must concatenate the quote ID quote in PostMintQuoteBolt11Response and the B_ fields of all BlindedMessages in the PostMintBolt11Request (i.e., the outputs, see NUT-00) to a single message string in the order they appear in the PostMintRequest. This concatenated string is then hashed and signed (see Signature scheme).

[!NOTE]

Concatenating the quote ID and the outputs into a single message prevents maliciously replacing the outputs.

If a request has n outputs, the message to sign becomes:

```
msg_to_sign = quote || B_0 || ... || B_(n-1)
```

Where || denotes concatenation, quote is the UTF-8 quote id in PostMintQuoteBolt11Response, and each B_n is a UTF-8 encoded hex string of the outputs in the PostMintBolt11Request.

Signature scheme

To mint a quote where a public key was provided, the wallet includes a signature on msg_to_sign in the PostMintBolt11Request. We use a BIP340 Schnorr signature on the SHA-256 hash of the message to sign as defined above.

Minting tokens

After requesting a mint quote and paying the request, the wallet proceeds with minting new tokens by calling the POST /v1/mint/{method} endpoint where method is the payment method requested (here bolt11).

```
POST https://mint.host:3338/v1/mint/bolt11
```

The wallet Alice includes the following PostMintBolt11Request data in its request

```
{  
  "quote": <str>,  
  "outputs": <Array[BlindedMessage]>,  
  "signature": <str|nul> <-- New  
}
```

with the quote being the quote ID from the previous step and outputs being BlindedMessages as in NUT-04. signature is the signature on the msg_to_sign which is the concatenated quote id and the outputs as defined above. The mint responds with a PostMintBolt11Response as in NUT-04 if all validations are successful.

Example

Request of Alice with curl:

```
curl -X POST https://mint.host:3338/v1/mint/bolt11 -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d \
'{
  "quote": "9d745270-1405-46de-b5c5-e2762b4f5e00",
  "outputs": [
    {
      "amount": 8,
      "id": "009a1f293253e41e",
      "B_": "035015e6d7ade60ba8426cefaf1832bbd27257636e44a76b922d78e79b47cb689d"
    },
    {
      "amount": 2,
      "id": "009a1f293253e41e",
      "B_": "0288d7649652d0a83fc9c966c969fb217f15904431e61a44b14999fabcb1b5d9ac6"
    }
  ],
  "signature":
    "d9be080b33179387e504bb6991ea41ae0dd715e28b01ce9f63d57198a095bcc776874914288e6989e97ac9d255ac667c205fa8d90a211184b417b4ffd
  }
}'
```

Response of Bob:

```
{
  "signatures": [
    {
      "id": "009a1f293253e41e",
      "amount": 2,
      "C_": "0224f1c4c564230ad3d96c5033efdc425582397a5a7691d600202732edc6d4b1ec"
    },
    {
      "id": "009a1f293253e41e",
      "amount": 8,
      "C_": "0277d1de806ed177007e5b94a8139343b6382e472c752a74e99949d511f7194f6c"
    }
  ]
}
```

Errors

If the wallet user Alice does not include a signature on the PostMintBolt11Request but did include a pubkey in the PostMintBolt11QuoteRequest then Bob **MUST** respond with an error. Alice **CAN** repeat the request with a valid signature.

See Error Codes:

- 20008: Mint quote with pubkey but no valid signature provided for mint request.
- 20009: Mint quote requires pubkey but none given or invalid pubkey.

Settings

The settings for this NUT indicate the support for requiring a signature before minting. They are part of the info response of the mint (NUT-06) which in this case reads

```
{
  "20": {
    "supported": <bool>,
```

}

NUT-21: Clear Authentication

optional

used in: NUT-22

This NUT defines a clear authentication scheme that allows operators to limit the use of their mint to registered users using the OAuth 2.0 and OpenID Connect protocols. The mint operator can protect chosen endpoints from access by requiring user authentication. Only users that provide a clear authentication token (CAT) from the specified OpenID Connect (OIDC) service can use the protected endpoints. The CAT is an OAuth 2.0 Access token (also known as the `access_token`) commonly in the form of a JWT that contains user information, a signature from the OIDC service, and an expiry time. To access protected endpoints, the wallet includes the CAT in the HTTP request header.

Note: The primary purpose of this NUT is to restrict access to a mint by allowing registered users to obtain Blind Authentication Tokens as specified in NUT-22.

Warning: This authentication scheme breaks the user's privacy as the CAT contains user information. Mint operators SHOULD require clear authentication **only on selected endpoints**, such as those for obtaining blind authentication tokens (BATs, see NUT-22).

OpenID Connect service configuration

The OpenID Connect (OIDC) service is typically run by the mint operator (but it does not have to be). The OIDC service must be configured to meet the following criteria:

- **No client secret:** The OIDC service MUST NOT use a client secret.
- **Authorization code flow:** The OIDC service MUST enable the *authorization code flow* with PKCE for public clients, so that an authorization code can be exchanged for an access token and a refresh token.
- **Signature algorithm:** The OIDC service MUST support at least one of the two asymmetric JWS signature algorithms for access token and ID token signatures: ES256 and RS256.
- **Wallet redirect URLs:** To support the OpenID Connect Authorization Code flow, the OIDC service MUST allow redirect URLs that correspond to the wallets it wants to support. You can find a list of common redirect URLs for well-known Cashu wallets [here](#).
- **Localhost redirect URL:** The OIDC service MUST also allow redirects to the URL `http://localhost:33388/callback`.
- **Authentication flows:** Although, strictly speaking, this NUT does not restrict the OpenID Connect grant types that can be used to obtain a CAT, it is recommended to enable at least the `authorization_code` (Authorization Code) flow and the `urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:device_code` (Device Code) flow in the `grant_types_supported` field of the `openid_discovery` configuration. The `password` (Resource Owner Password Credentials, ROPC) flow SHOULD NOT be used as it requires handling the user's credentials in the wallet application.

Mint

Signalling protected endpoints

The mint lists each protected endpoint that requires a clear authentication token (CAT) in the `MintClearAuthSetting` in its NUT-06 info response:

```
"21" : {
  "openid_discovery": "https://mint.com:8080/realm/nutshell/.well-known/openid-configuration",
  "client_id": "cashu-client",
  "protected_endpoints": [
    {
      "method": "POST",
      "path": "/v1/auth/blind/mint"
    }
  ]
}
```

`openid_discovery` is the OpenID Connect Discovery endpoint which has all the information necessary for a client to authenticate with the service. `client_id` is the OpenID Connect Client ID that the wallet needs to use to authenticate.

`protected_endpoints` is an array of objects that specify each endpoint that requires a CAT in the request headers. `method` is the HTTP method and `path` the path for the endpoint that is protected.

The `path` can either be a string (exact match), such as `"/v1/auth/blind/mint"` or a regex pattern such as `"^/v1/mint/quote/bolt11/.+"`.

In this example, the entry in `protected_endpoints` is the NUT-22 endpoint for obtaining blind authentication tokens (BATs).

Clear authentication token verification

When receiving a request to a protected endpoint, the mint checks the included CAT (which is a JWT) in the HTTP request header (see below in section Wallet) and verifies the JWT. To verify the JWT, the mint checks the signature of the OIDC and the expiry of the JWT.

The JWT includes a `sub` field which identifies a specific user. The `sub` identifier can, for example, be used to rate limit the user.

Note: The JWT MAY include an *audience* field called `aud` that contains the mint's public key

More on OpenID Connect ID token validation here.

Wallet

To make a request to one of the `protected_endpoints` of the mint, the wallet needs to obtain a valid clear auth token (CAT) from the OIDC service. The wallet uses the `openid_discovery` URL in the `MintClearAuthSetting` from the info endpoint of the mint to authenticate with the OIDC service and obtain a CAT.

Obtaining a CAT

Depending on the wallet implementation and use case, an appropriate authorization flow should be used. For mobile wallets, the Authorization Code is recommended. For command-line wallets, the Device Code flow is recommended. For headless wallets, the ROPC flow may be used.

It is recommended to use language-specific libraries that can handle OpenID Connect authentication on behalf of the user. The wallet should be able to handle and store access tokens and refresh tokens for each mint that it authenticates with. If the wallet connects to a mint for the first time, or if the refresh token is about to expire, the wallet should allow the user to log in again to obtain a new access token (`access_token`) and a new refresh token (`refresh_token`).

The `access_token` is what is referred to as a clear authentication token (CAT) throughout this document.

CAT in request header

When making a request to the mint's endpoint, the wallet matches the requested URL with the `protected_endpoints` from the `MintClearAuthSetting` (either exact match or regex pattern match). If the match is positive, the mint requires the wallet to provide a CAT with the request.

After obtaining a CAT from the OIDC service, the wallet includes a valid CAT in the HTTP request header when it makes requests to one of the mint's `protected_endpoints`:

`Clear-auth: <CAT>`

The CAT is a JWT (or `access_token`) encoded with base64 that is signed by and obtained from the OIDC authority. The mint verifies the JWT as described above.

Error codes

See Error Codes:

- 30001: Endpoint requires clear auth

- 30002: Clear authentication failed

NUT-22: Blind Authentication

optional

depends on: NUT-21, NUT-12

This NUT defines a blind authentication scheme that allows mint operators to limit the use of their mint to a set of authorized users while still providing privacy within that anonymity set.

We use two authentication schemes in conjunction: *clear authentication* using an external OpenID Connect / OAuth 2.0 service (described in NUT-21), and *blind authentication* with the mint to access its resources. A user's wallet first needs to obtain a clear authentication token (CAT) from an OpenID Connect authority that the mint selected, which is not the subject of this specification. Once the user has obtained the CAT from the OpenID Connect service, they can use it to obtain multiple blind authentication tokens (BAT) from the mint. We describe this process in this document.

Blind authentication tokens (BATs) are used to access the protected endpoints of the mint and make sure that only users that previously presented a valid CAT can access the mint's features such as minting, melting, or swapping ecash. Wallets provide a BAT in the request header when making a request to one of the mint's protected endpoints. The mint parses the header for a BAT, verifies the signature (like with normal ecash as described in NUT-00), checks if the token has previously been spent, and if not, adds it to its spent BAT token database.

Blind authentication tokens are ecash

Blind authentication tokens (BATs) are essentially the same as normal ecash tokens and are minted in the same way. They are signed with a special keyset of the mint that has the unit auth and a single amount 1.

BATs can only be used a single time for each request that the wallet makes to the mint's protected endpoints. For each successful request, the BAT is added to the mint's spent token list after which they are regarded as spent. The BAT is not marked as spent if the request results in an error.

To summarize:

- Wallet connects to mint and user is prompted to register or log in with an OAuth 2.0 service
- Upon login, wallet receives a clear authentication (CAT) token that identifies the user
- CAT is used to obtain blind authentication tokens (BAT) from the mint
- BATs are used to access the mint

The diagram below illustrates the protocol flow.





The steps for 1. Clear authentication are described in NUT-21, whereas the steps in 2. Blind authentication are subject of this document.

Endpoints

The mint offers new endpoints that behave similarly to the endpoints for getting the keys, keysets, and minting tokens with normal ecash (NUT-01, NUT-02, NUT-04). These endpoints start with a prefix `/v1/auth/` to differentiate them from the normal endpoints of the mint. Using these endpoints, wallets can mint blind authentication tokens (BATs) and use them later when accessing the protected endpoints of the mint. Note that BATs cannot be swapped against other BATs.

Keys

Like in NUT-01 and NUT-02, the mint responds with its BAT keyset for the following request:

`GET /v1/auth/blind/keys`

or

`GET /v1/auth/blind/keys/{keyset_id}`

where the mint returns a `GetKeysResponse`:

```
{
  "keysets": [
    {
      "id": "000e479673849bf6",
      "unit": "auth",
      "keys": {
        "1": "024ec000e31e230e4c59760def29601557c0b1650617dc8f38d3b2cf21ad0351b"
      }
    }
  ]
}
```

Notice that the unit is `auth` and only a single amount of 1 is supported.

Keysets

Like in NUT-02 the mint also offers the endpoints returning the keysets:

`GET v1/auth/blind/keysets`

The mint returns the same `GetKeysetsResponse` response types as described in NUT-02.

Minting blind authentication tokens

To mint blind authentication tokens (BATs), the wallet makes a request to the following endpoint:

POST /v1/auth/blind/mint

To access this endpoint the wallet MUST provide a valid CAT (obtained via NUT-21) in its request header, IF this endpoint is marked as protected in the info response of the mint as per NUT-21.

Clear-auth: <CAT>

Like in NUT-04, the wallet includes a PostAuthBlindMintRequest in the request body:

```
{  
  "outputs": <Array[BlindedMessage]>  
}
```

where outputs are BlindedMessages (see NUT-00) from the blind auth keyset of the mint with a unit amount. The sum of all amounts of the outputs cannot exceed the maximum allowed amount of BATs as specified in bat_max_mint in the mint's MintBlindAuthSetting.

Notice that in contrast to NUT-04, we did not create a quote and did not include it in this request. Instead, we directly minted the maximum allowed amount of BATs.

The mint responds with a PostAuthBlindMintResponse:

```
{  
  "signatures": <Array[BlindSignature]>  
}
```

The wallet un-blinds the response to obtain the signatures C as described in NUT-00. It then stores the resulting AuthProofs in its database:

```
{  
  "id": <hex_str>,  
  "secret": <str>,  
  "C": <hex_str>,  
  "dleq": {  
    "e": <str>,  
    "s": <str>,  
    "r": <str>  
  }  
}
```

To prevent pinning, wallets MUST validate the DLEQ proofs dleq as defined in NUT-12. Should AuthProofs be sent to another user of the mint, it MUST include the dleq proof so that the receiving user can validate it.

Using blind authentication tokens

The wallet checks the MintBlindAuthSetting of the mint to determine which endpoints require blind authentication. Similar to NUT-21, the wallet performs a match on the protected_endpoints in the MintBlindAuthSetting before attempting a request to one of the mint's endpoints. If the match is positive, the wallet needs to add a blind authentication token (BAT) to the request header.

Serialization

To add a blind authentication token (BAT) to the request header, we need to serialize a single AuthProof JSON in base64 with the prefix authA:

authA[base64_authproof_json]

This string is a BAT.

[!CAUTION]

To protect the privacy of the wallet, the BAT MUST NOT contain the dleq proof when it is sent to the mint in the request header.

Request header

We add this serialized BAT to the request header:

Blind-auth: <BAT>

and make the request as we usually would.

AuthProofs are single-use. The wallet MUST delete the AuthProof after a successful request, and SHOULD delete it even if request results in an error. If the wallet runs out of AuthProofs, it can mint new ones using its clear authentication token (CAT).

Mint

DLEQs

The mint MUST return DLEQ proofs for every blind signature in PostAuthBlindMintResponse as defined in NUT-12

Signaling protected endpoints and settings

The mint lists each protected endpoint that requires a blind authentication token (BAT) in the MintBlindAuthSetting in its NUT-06 info response:

```
"22" : {
  "bat_max_mint": 50,
  "protected_endpoints": [
    {
      "method": "GET",
      "path": "^/v1/mint/*"
    },
    {
      "method": "POST",
      "path": "^/v1/mint/*"
    }
  ]
}
```

`bat_max_mint` is the number of blind authentication tokens (BATS) that can be minted in a single request using the POST /v1/auth/blind/mint endpoint.

`protected_endpoints` contains the endpoints that are protected by blind authentication. `method` denotes the HTTP method of the endpoint, and `path` is a regex pattern that must match the path of the URL. In this example, all `/v1/mint/*` endpoints are protected and require blind authentication. `path` entries without regex pattern are required to match exactly.

Error codes

See Error Codes:

- 31001: Endpoint requires blind auth
- 31002: Blind authentication failed
- 31003: Maximum BAT mint amount exceeded
- 31004: BAT mint rate limit exceeded

NUT-23: BOLT11

optional

depends on: NUT-04 NUT-05

This document describes minting and melting ecash with the bolt11 payment method, which uses Lightning Network invoices. It is an extension of NUT-04 and NUT-05 which cover the protocol steps of minting and melting ecash shared by any supported payment method.

Mint Quote

For the bolt11 method, the wallet includes the following specific PostMintQuoteBolt11Request data:

```
{  
    "amount": <int>,  
    "unit": <str_enum[UNIT]>,  
    "description": <str> // Optional  
}
```

The mint responds with a PostMintQuoteBolt11Response:

```
{  
    "quote": <str>,  
    "request": <str>, // The bolt11 invoice to pay  
    "amount": <int>,  
    "unit": <str_enum[UNIT]>,  
    "state": <str_enum[STATE]>,  
    "expiry": <int|null>  
}
```

state is an enum string field with possible values "UNPAID", "PAID", "ISSUED":

- "UNPAID" means that the quote's request has not been paid yet.
- "PAID" means that the quote's request has been paid but the ecash is not issued yet.
- "ISSUED" means that the quote has been paid and the ecash has been issued.

expiry is the Unix timestamp until which the request can be paid (i.e. the bolt11 invoice expiry).

Example

Request with curl:

```
curl -X POST http://localhost:3338/v1/mint/quote/bolt11 -d '{"amount": 10, "unit": "sat"}' -H "Content-Type: application/json"
```

Response:

```
{  
    "quote": "DSGLX9kevM...",  
    "request": "lnbc100n1pj4apw9...",  
    "amount": 10,  
    "unit": "sat",  
    "state": "UNPAID",  
    "expiry": 1701704757  
}
```

Check quote state:

```
curl -X GET http://localhost:3338/v1/mint/quote/bolt11/DSGLX9kevM...
```

Minting tokens:

```
curl -X POST https://mint.host:3338/v1/mint/bolt11 -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d \
'{
  "quote": "DSGLX9kevM...",
  "outputs": [
    {
      "amount": 8,
      "id": "009a1f293253e41e",
      "B_": "035015e6d7ade60ba8426cefaf1832bbd27257636e44a76b922d78e79b47cb689d"
    },
    {
      "amount": 2,
      "id": "009a1f293253e41e",
      "B_": "0288d7649652d0a83fc9c966c969fb217f15904431e61a44b14999fabcb1b5d9ac6"
    }
  ]
}'
```

Response:

```
{
  "signatures": [
    {
      "id": "009a1f293253e41e",
      "amount": 2,
      "C_": "0224f1c4c564230ad3d96c5033efdc425582397a5a7691d600202732edc6d4b1ec"
    },
    {
      "id": "009a1f293253e41e",
      "amount": 8,
      "C_": "0277d1de806ed177007e5b94a8139343b6382e472c752a74e99949d511f7194f6c"
    }
  ]
}
```

Mint Settings

A description option **MUST** be set to indicate whether the bolt11 payment method backend supports providing an invoice description.

Example MintMethodSetting

```
{
  "method": "bolt11",
  "unit": "sat",
  "min_amount": 0,
  "max_amount": 10000,
  "options": {
    "description": true
  }
}
```

Melt Quote

For the bolt11 method, the wallet includes the following specific PostMeltQuoteBolt11Request data:

```
{
  "request": <str>,
  "unit": <str_enum[UNIT]>,
  "options": { // Optional
    "amountless": {
      "amount_msat": <int>
    }
  }
}
```

Here, `request` is the bolt11 Lightning invoice to be paid and `unit` is the unit the wallet would like to pay with. The `options` field can include support for amountless invoices if supported by the mint.

The mint responds with a `PostMeltQuoteBolt11Response`:

```
{
  "quote": <str>,
  "request": <str>,
  "amount": <int>,
  "unit": <str_enum[UNIT]>,
  "fee_reserve": <int>,
  "state": <str_enum[STATE]>,
  "expiry": <int>,
  "payment_preimage": <str|null>
}
```

Where `fee_reserve` is the additional fee reserve required for the Lightning payment. The mint expects the wallet to include Proofs of *at least* $\text{total_amount} = \text{amount} + \text{fee_reserve} + \text{fee}$ where `fee` is calculated from the keyset's `input_fee_ppk` as described in NUT-02.

Melting Tokens

For the `bolt11` method, the wallet can include an optional `outputs` field in the melt request to receive change for overpaid Lightning fees (see NUT-08):

```
{
  "quote": <str>,
  "inputs": <Array[Proof]>,
  "outputs": <Array[BlindedMessage]> // Optional
}
```

If the `outputs` field is included and there is excess from the `fee_reserve`, the mint will respond with a `change` field containing blind signatures for the overpaid amount:

```
{
  "quote": <str>,
  "request": <str>,
  "amount": <int>,
  "unit": <str_enum[UNIT]>,
  "fee_reserve": <int>,
  "state": <str_enum[STATE]>,
  "expiry": <int>,
  "payment_preimage": <str>,
  "change": <Array[BlindSignature]> // Present if outputs were included and there's change
}
```

Example

Melt quote request:

```
curl -X POST https://mint.host:3338/v1/melt/quote/bolt11 -d \
'{"request": "lnbc100n1p3kdrv5sp5lpdxzghe5j67q...", "unit": "sat"}'
```

Melt quote response:

```
{  
  "quote": "TRmjduhIsPxd...",  
  "request": "lnbc100n1p3kdrv5sp5lpdxzghe5j67q...",  
  "amount": 10,  
  "unit": "sat",  
  "fee_reserve": 2,  
  "state": "UNPAID",  
  "expiry": 1701704757  
}
```

Check quote state:

```
curl -X GET http://localhost:3338/v1/melt/quote/bolt11/TRmjduhIsPxd...
```

Melt request:

```
curl -X POST https://mint.host:3338/v1/melt/bolt11 -d \
'{"quote": "od4CN5srMMS3K3QVHkbGNCTxfcAIyIXeq8IrfhP", "inputs": [...]}'
```

Successful melt response:

```
{  
  "quote": "TRmjduhIsPxd...",  
  "request": "lnbc100n1p3kdrv5sp5lpdxzghe5j67q...",  
  "amount": 10,  
  "unit": "sat",  
  "fee_reserve": 2,  
  "state": "PAID",  
  "expiry": 1701704757,  
  "payment_preimage": "c5a1ae1f639e1f4a3872e81500fd028bece7bedc1152f740cba5c3417b748c1b"  
}
```

Example MeltMethodSetting

```
{  
  "method": "bolt11",  
  "unit": "sat",  
  "min_amount": 100,  
  "max_amount": 10000,  
  "options": {  
    "amountless": true  
  }  
}
```

NUT-24: HTTP 402 Payment Required

optional

uses: NUT-12

depends on: NUT-18

This NUT describes how Cashu tokens can be used with HTTP 402 Payment Required responses to enable payments for HTTP resources.

Server response

HTTP servers may respond with the HTTP status code 402 with a X-Cashu header containing an encoded NUT-18 payment request with the following fields:

```
{  
    "a": int,  
    "u": str,  
    "m": Array[str],  
    "nut10": NUT10option <optional>  
}
```

- `a`: The amount required in the specified unit
- `u`: The currency unit (e.g., “sat”, “usd”, “api”)
- `m`: Array of mint URLs that the server accepts tokens from
- `nut10`: The required NUT-10 locking condition

Note that there is no transport field since we expect an in-band payment.

Client payment

After receiving a 402 response with a X-Cashu header, the client may retry the request with a `cashuB` token in the X-Cashu header as payment.

The token MUST be from one of the mints listed in the `mints` array, and MUST be of the same `unit` and greater than or equal to the `amount`.

Payment response

If the server receives tokens from a mint that is not in the `mints` array, an incorrect `unit`, an insufficient amount of tokens, or with insufficient locking conditions, it should respond with a HTTP 400 status code.

NUT-25: BOLT12

optional

depends on: NUT-04 NUT-05 NUT-20

This document describes minting and melting ecash with the bolt12 payment method, which uses Lightning Network offers. It is an extension of NUT-04 and NUT-05 which cover the protocol steps of minting and melting ecash shared by any supported payment method.

Mint Quote

For the bolt12 method, the wallet includes the following specific PostMintQuoteBolt12Request data:

```
{  
    "amount": <int|null>,  
    "unit": <str_enum[UNIT]>,  
    "description": <str|null>,  
    "pubkey": <str>  
}
```

Note: While a pubkey is optional as per NUT-20 for NUT-04 it is required in this NUT and the mint **MUST NOT** issue a mint quote if one is not included.

Privacy: To prevent linking multiple mint quotes together, wallets **SHOULD** generate a unique public key for each mint quote request.

The mint responds with a PostMintQuoteBolt12Response:

```
{  
    "quote": <str>,  
    "request": <str>,  
    "amount": <int|null>,  
    "unit": <str_enum[UNIT]>,  
    "expiry": <int|null>,  
    "pubkey": <str>,  
    "amount_paid": <int>,  
    "amount_issued": <int>  
}
```

Where:

- quote is the quote ID
- request is the bolt12 offer
- expiry is the Unix timestamp until which the mint quote is valid
- amount_paid is the amount that has been paid to the mint via the bolt12 offer
- amount_issued is the amount of ecash that has been issued for the given mint quote

Example

Request with curl:

```
curl -X POST http://localhost:3338/v1/mint/quote/bolt12 -d \  
'{"amount": 10, "unit": "sat", "pubkey": "03d56ce4e446a85bbdaa547b4ec2b073d40ff802831352b8272b7dd7a4de5a7cac"}' \  
-H "Content-Type: application/json"
```

Response:

```
{  
    "quote": "DSGLX9kevM...",
```

```

"request": "lno1qcp...",
"amount": 10,
"unit": "sat",
"expiry": 1701704757,
"pubkey": "03d56ce4e446a85bbdaa547b4ec2b073d40ff802831352b8272b7dd7a4de5a7cac",
"amount_paid": 0,
"amount_issued": 0
}

```

Check quote state:

```
curl -X GET http://localhost:3338/v1/mint/quote/bolt12/DSGLX9kevM...
```

Minting tokens:

```
curl -X POST https://mint.host:3338/v1/mint/bolt12 -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d \
'{
  "quote": "DSGLX9kevM...",
  "outputs": [
    {
      "amount": 8,
      "id": "009a1f293253e41e",
      "B_": "035015e6d7ade60ba8426cefaf1832bbd27257636e44a76b922d78e79b47cb689d"
    },
    {
      "amount": 2,
      "id": "009a1f293253e41e",
      "B_": "0288d7649652d0a83fc9c966c969fb217f15904431e61a44b14999fabcb1b5d9ac6"
    }
  ]
}'
```

Response:

```
{
  "signatures": [
    {
      "id": "009a1f293253e41e",
      "amount": 2,
      "C_": "0224f1c4c564230ad3d96c5033efdc425582397a5a7691d600202732edc6d4b1ec"
    },
    {
      "id": "009a1f293253e41e",
      "amount": 8,
      "C_": "0277d1de806ed177007e5b94a8139343b6382e472c752a74e99949d511f7194f6c"
    }
  ]
}
```

Multiple Issuances

Unlike BOLT11 invoices, BOLT12 offers can be paid multiple times, allowing the wallet to mint multiple times for one quote. The wallet can call the check bolt12 endpoint, where the mint will return the `PostMintQuoteBolt12Response` including `amount_paid` and `amount_issued`. The difference between these values represents how much the wallet can mint by calling the mint endpoint. Wallets MAY mint any amount up to this available difference; in particular, they can mint less than the amount mintable. Mints MUST accept mint requests whose total output amount is less than or equal to $(\text{amount_paid} - \text{amount_issued})$.

Mint Settings

A description option **SHOULD** be set to indicate whether the bolt12 payment method backend supports providing an offer description.

Example MintMethodSetting

```
{  
  "method": "bolt12",  
  "unit": <str>,  
  "min_amount": <int|null>,  
  "max_amount": <int|null>,  
  "options": {  
    "description": true  
  }  
}
```

Melt Quote

For the bolt12 method, the wallet includes the following specific PostMeltQuoteBolt12Request data:

```
{  
  "request": <str>,  
  "unit": <str_enum[UNIT]>,  
  "options": { // Optional  
    "amountless": {  
      "amount_msat": <int>  
    }  
  }  
}
```

Here, `request` is the bolt12 Offer to be paid and `unit` is the unit the wallet would like to pay with. For amount-less offers, the `options.amountless.amount_msat` field can be used to specify the amount in millisatoshis to pay to the offer. If `options.amountless.amount_msat` is defined and the offer has an amount, they **MUST** be equal.

The mint responds with a PostMeltQuoteBolt12Response:

```
{  
  "quote": <str>,  
  "request": <str>,  
  "amount": <int>,  
  "unit": <str_enum[UNIT]>,  
  "fee_reserve": <int>,  
  "state": <str_enum[STATE]>,  
  "expiry": <int>,  
  "payment_preimage": <str|null>  
}
```

Where `fee_reserve` is the additional fee reserve required for the Lightning payment. The mint expects the wallet to include Proofs of $at \ least \ total_amount = amount + fee_reserve + fee$ where `fee` is calculated from the keyset's `input_fee_ppk` as described in NUT-02.

`state` is an enum string field with possible values "UNPAID", "PENDING", "PAID":

- "UNPAID" means that the request has not been paid yet.
- "PENDING" means that the request is currently being paid.
- "PAID" means that the request has been paid successfully.

Melting Tokens

For the bolt12 method, the wallet can include an optional outputs field in the melt request to receive change for overpaid Lightning fees (see NUT-08):

```
{  
  "quote": <str>,  
  "inputs": <Array[Proof]>,  
  "outputs": <Array[BlindedMessage]> // Optional  
}
```

If the outputs field is included and there is excess from the fee_reserve, the mint will respond with a change field containing blind signatures for the overpaid amount:

```
{  
  "quote": <str>,  
  "request": <str>,  
  "amount": <int>,  
  "unit": <str_enum[UNIT]>,  
  "fee_reserve": <int>,  
  "state": <str_enum[STATE]>,  
  "expiry": <int>,  
  "payment_preimage": <str>,  
  "change": <Array[BlindSignature]> // Present if outputs were included and there's change  
}
```

Example

Melt quote request:

```
curl -X POST https://mint.host:3338/v1/melt/quote/bolt12 -d \  
'{"request": "lno1qcp4256ypqpq86q69t5w5629arxqurn8cxg9p5qrmaqy2e5xq...", "unit": "sat"}'
```

Melt quote response:

```
{  
  "quote": "TRmjduhIsPxd...",  
  "request": "lno1qcp4256ypqpq86q69t5w5629arxqurn8cxg9p5qrmaqy2e5xq...",  
  "amount": 10,  
  "unit": "sat",  
  "fee_reserve": 2,  
  "state": "UNPAID",  
  "expiry": 1701704757  
}
```

Check quote state:

```
curl -X GET http://localhost:3338/v1/melt/quote/bolt12/TRmjduhIsPxd...
```

Melt request:

```
curl -X POST https://mint.host:3338/v1/melt/bolt12 -d \  
'{"quote": "TRmjduhIsPxd...", "inputs": [...]}'
```

Successful melt response:

```
{  
  "quote": "TRmjduhIsPxd...",  
  "request": "lno1qcp4256ypqpq86q69t5w5629arxqurn8cxg9p5qrmaqy2e5xq...",  
  "amount": 10,  
  "unit": "sat",  
  "change": "lno1qcp4256ypqpq86q69t5w5629arxqurn8cxg9p5qrmaqy2e5xq..."  
}
```

```
"fee_reserve": 2,  
"state": "PAID",  
"expiry": 1701704757,  
"payment_preimage": "c5a1ae1f639e1f4a3872e81500fd028bece7bedc1152f740cba5c3417b748c1b"  
}
```

Example MeltMethodSetting

```
{  
    "method": "bolt12",  
    "unit": <str>,  
    "min_amount": <int|null>,  
    "max_amount": <int|null>  
}
```

Conclusion

Thank you for exploring the Cashu Book of NUTs. My hope is that this reorganized collection of Cashu Book of (NUTs) has provided you with a clearer and more structured understanding of the Cashu protocol. The aim was to make the information more accessible to everyone.

As we wrap up this book, remember that the journey with Cashu doesn't end here. The protocol is continuously evolving, and your engagement and contributions are crucial for its growth and refinement. I encourage you to participate in the discussions, contribute your ideas, and help in developing this open and decentralized platform.

Once again, all the credit for the content in this book goes to the original authors of the NUTs. This compilation is merely a tool to assist in navigating their innovative work. Whether you're a developer, researcher, or enthusiast, your insights and enthusiasm are what will propel Cashu forward.

Let's keep the spirit of innovation and collaboration alive. Here's to building a more connected and decentralized future together!