

# Estimating Demand Elasticity in the Stock Market

## Evidence from the 2016 Tick Size Pilot

**Shidong Shao**

Chinese University of Hong Kong

**Jason Jushen Zou**

Cornell University

December 2, 2024

# The Elasticity of Stock Market is a Mystery

- Canonical Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM):
  - A supply shock of  $-10\%$  reduces prices by  $0.0016\%$  (Petajisto, 2009).
  - Stocks are perfect substitutions.
- Kojien and Yogo (2019) assume *logit* demand function and estimate 5% price impacts.
  - Becomes the new norm in literature.
- However, their estimators are probably biased (Fuchs et al., 2023)
  - BLP-style IV is NOT exogenous.
  - Mechanical demand elasticity.
  - Ignore cross-asset substitutions.

## What We do

- Use an exogenous *supply* shock to estimate the demand elasticity in the stock market.
  - This shock comes from the SEC quasi-RCT in 2016.
- This RCT reduces share repurchase by 0.1% of total asset value.
- Repurchasing 1% of total assets increases the share price by 3.9%.
- Larger and more liquid firms have higher demand elasticity.

### Contributions:

- The first paper using the *supply* shock to estimate demand elasticity.
- The nature of this experiment allows us to avoid concerns on biased estimators.

# Outline

Academic Background

Three Challenges

Empirical Settings

Empirical Results

Conclusion

Investors have CARA utility

$$\max_{\mathbf{q}_i} \mathbb{E} [-\exp(-\gamma_i A_{1,i})]$$

$$A_{1,i} = \mathbf{q}'_i (\mathbf{D}_2 - \mathbf{P}_1)$$

Investors have heterogeneous beliefs in the future profitability:

$$\mathbf{D}_2 = \mu_i + \rho_i \mathbf{F} + \eta$$

$$\mu_i(n) = \Phi_i^{\mu'} x(n) + \varepsilon_i^{\mu}(n)$$

$$\rho_i(n) = \Phi_i^{\rho'} x(n) + \varepsilon_i^{\rho}(n)$$

*Logit* demand function from portfolio choice problem:

$$\frac{w_{i,t}(n)}{w_{i,t}(0)} = \exp \left\{ \beta_{0,i,t} p_t(n) + \sum_{k=1}^{K-1} \beta_{k,i,t} x_{k,t}(n) + \alpha_{K,i,t} \right\} \varepsilon_{i,t}(n)$$

- **IV** for  $p_t(n)$ :

$$z_{i,t}(n) = \log \left( \sum_{j \notin \{i,1\}} A_{j,t} \frac{\mathbf{1}_j(n)}{1 + |\mathcal{N}_{j,t}|} \right)$$

# Outline

Academic Background


Three Challenges

Empirical Settings

Empirical Results

Conclusion

## Challenge I: Invalid IV




- Instrument  $D_2$  using other investors' investment mandates;
- However, demand identification requires shift in  $D_2$  is orthogonal to  $D_1$ .
- Are investors' investment mandates really orthogonal?

$$z_{i,t}(n) = \log \left( \sum_{j \notin \{i,1\}} A_{j,t} \frac{\mathbf{1}_j(n)}{1 + |\mathcal{N}_{j,t}|} \right)$$



## Challenge I: Invalid IV



- Instrument  $D_2$  using other investors' investment mandates;
- However, demand identification requires shift in  $D_2$  is orthogonal to  $D_1$ .
- Are investors' investment mandates really orthogonal?

$$z_{i,t}(n) = \log \left( \sum_{j \notin \{i,1\}} A_{j,t} \frac{\mathbf{1}_j(n)}{1 + |\mathcal{N}_{j,t}|} \right)$$

## Challenge II: Mechanical Elasticity (van der Beck, 2023)

Suppose a passive investor equally allocates her asset into 100 stocks:

$$S_1(n) = \frac{1}{P_1(n) \times 100}$$


$$w_1(n) = \frac{1}{100}$$

Now, if  $P_2(n) > P_1(n)$  increases, all else equal,

$$w_2(n) = \frac{\frac{P_2(n)}{100 \times P_1(n)}}{1 + \frac{P_2(n) - P_1(n)}{100 \times P_1(n)}} = \frac{P_2(n)}{99P_1(n) + P_2(n)} > \frac{1}{100}$$


- Can be easily solved by taking first-difference:  $\Delta Q$ .

## Challenge III: Isolated Cross-Asset Substitutions



- Demand for asset  $j$  depends on other asset characteristics and prices:  $D_j = D_j(P_j, P_{-j}, Q_{-j})$ .
- Koijen and Yogo (2019) only consider cross-substitutions through investor's wealth distributions.
- Also, they restrict the price spillovers between assets.

## Challenge III: Isolated Cross-Asset Substitutions



- Demand for asset  $j$  depends on other asset characteristics and prices:  $D_j = D_j(P_j, P_{-j}, Q_{-j})$ .
- Koijen and Yogo (2019) only consider cross-substitutions through investor's wealth distributions.
- Also, they restrict the price spillovers between assets.

# Outline

Academic Background


Three Challenges

Empirical Settings

Empirical Results


Conclusion

# Identification Intuitions



- **Exogenous shock:** reduction in the share repurchases (*de facto* a supply shock) from a Quasi-RCT.
- **Matching:** Pre-shock characteristics so that two groups are substitutable.
- **Elasticity:**  $\Delta P \sim \Delta Q$ .

# Identification Intuitions



- **Exogenous shock:** reduction in the share repurchases (*de facto* a supply shock) from a Quasi-RCT.
- **Matching:** Pre-shock characteristics so that two groups are substitutable.
- **Elasticity:**  $\Delta P \sim \Delta Q$ .

## Quasi-RCT by the SEC

- Regulators concern reduced tick size caused the decline in small firm IPOs.
  - 2012 Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act directed SEC to investigate it.
- **Tick-Size-Pilot:** Launched on Oct 3, 2016 (2016Q4), and terminated on Oct 1, 2018 (2018Q4).
- Three treatment groups with 400 stocks each ( $3 \times 400 = 1,200$ ), control group with 1,200 stocks (2,400 in total,  $\sim 55\%$  **of the 4,300 listed stocks**).
  - Share price  $\geq \$1.50$ , VWAP  $\geq \$2$ , market cap  $\leq \$3B$ , avg. volume  $< 1M$  shares.
  - The assignment follows a stratified **random** sampling procedure.
- 2016 TSP features:
  - Controls: \$0.01 tick size.
  - Group 1: \$0.05 quotes, \$0.01 trades.
  - Group 2: \$0.05 quotes and trades.
  - Group 3: same as Group 2 + Trade-at Rule (priority to displayed orders).



## An Exogenous Supply Shock

- The change of tick sizes is NOT intended to change share repurchase.
- Stocks are randomly selected.
- Yet, share repurchases significantly decreases (Li et al., 2024).

	Repurchase (1)	Dividend (2)	Total Payout (3)	Payout Ratio (4)
<b>Treatment×Post</b>	<b>-0.096***</b> <b>(-2.90)</b>	<b>-0.008</b> <b>(-0.57)</b>	<b>-0.103***</b> <b>(-2.92)</b>	<b>-0.084***</b> <b>(-2.85)</b>
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year-quarter FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	20,205	20,205	20,205	20,205
Adj. R-squared	0.341	0.706	0.461	0.356

# Identification

1. Match each of the Treatment firm  $i$  with two Control firms in the same SIC 2-digit industry based on pre-treatment average size, growth, profitability, and repurchase payout.

2. Calculate the return differences between treatment and controls,

$$\Delta p = \log \left( \frac{p_{\text{Treatment},t+1}}{\bar{p}_{\text{Treatment},t-1}} \right) - \log \left( \frac{p_{\text{Control},t+1}}{\bar{p}_{\text{Control},t-1}} \right). \text{ Stock price is adjusted by stock split.}$$

3. Calculate differences of the repurchase expenditure (scaled by total shares outstanding) between treatment and control firms,  $\Delta q = \Delta \text{Repo}_{\text{Treatment},t} - \Delta \text{Repo}_{\text{Control},t}$ .

4. Estimate  $\Delta p_{i,t} = \xi \Delta q_{i,t} + \gamma' X_{i,t} + \alpha_t + \eta_j + \varepsilon_{i,t}$

- $\xi$ : the price impact of repurchasing 1% value of total asset;
- $X_{i,t}$ : the difference of controls between treatment and control firms;
- $\alpha_t$  and  $\eta_j$ : year-quarter and industry fixed effects.

# Identification

1. Match each of the Treatment firm  $i$  with two Control firms in the same SIC 2-digit industry based on pre-treatment average size, growth, profitability, and repurchase payout.

2. Calculate the return differences between treatment and controls,

$$\Delta p = \log \left( \frac{p_{\text{Treatment},t+1}}{\bar{p}_{\text{Treatment},t-1}} \right) - \log \left( \frac{p_{\text{Control},t+1}}{\bar{p}_{\text{Control},t-1}} \right). \text{ Stock price is adjusted by stock split.}$$

3. Calculate differences of the repurchase expenditure (scaled by total shares outstanding) between treatment and control firms,  $\Delta q = \Delta \text{Repo}_{\text{Treatment},t} - \Delta \text{Repo}_{\text{Control},t}$ .

4. Estimate  $\Delta p_{i,t} = \xi \Delta q_{i,t} + \gamma' X_{i,t} + \alpha_t + \eta_j + \varepsilon_{i,t}$

- $\xi$ : the price impact of repurchasing 1% value of total asset;
- $X_{i,t}$ : the difference of controls between treatment and control firms;
- $\alpha_t$  and  $\eta_j$ : year-quarter and industry fixed effects.

# Identification

1. Match each of the Treatment firm  $i$  with two Control firms in the same SIC 2-digit industry based on pre-treatment average size, growth, profitability, and repurchase payout.

2. Calculate the return differences between treatment and controls,

$$\Delta p = \log \left( \frac{p_{\text{Treatment},t+1}}{\bar{p}_{\text{Treatment},t-1}} \right) - \log \left( \frac{p_{\text{Control},t+1}}{\bar{p}_{\text{Control},t-1}} \right). \text{ Stock price is adjusted by stock split.}$$

3. Calculate differences of the repurchase expenditure (scaled by total shares outstanding) between treatment and control firms,  $\Delta q = \Delta \text{Repo}_{\text{Treatment},t} - \Delta \text{Repo}_{\text{Control},t}$ .

4. Estimate  $\Delta p_{i,t} = \xi \Delta q_{i,t} + \gamma' X_{i,t} + \alpha_t + \eta_j + \varepsilon_{i,t}$

- $\xi$ : the price impact of repurchasing 1% value of total asset;
- $X_{i,t}$ : the difference of controls between treatment and control firms;
- $\alpha_t$  and  $\eta_j$ : year-quarter and industry fixed effects.

# Identification

1. Match each of the Treatment firm  $i$  with two Control firms in the same SIC 2-digit industry based on pre-treatment average size, growth, profitability, and repurchase payout.

2. Calculate the return differences between treatment and controls,


$$\Delta p = \log \left( \frac{p_{\text{Treatment},t+1}}{\bar{p}_{\text{Treatment},t-1}} \right) - \log \left( \frac{p_{\text{Control},t+1}}{\bar{p}_{\text{Control},t-1}} \right). \text{ Stock price is adjusted by stock split.}$$

3. Calculate differences of the repurchase expenditure (scaled by total shares outstanding) between treatment and control firms,  $\Delta q = \Delta \text{Repo}_{\text{Treatment},t} - \Delta \text{Repo}_{\text{Control},t}$ .

4. Estimate  $\Delta p_{i,t} = \xi \Delta q_{i,t} + \gamma' X_{i,t} + \alpha_t + \eta_j + \varepsilon_{i,t}$

- $\xi$ : the price impact of repurchasing 1% value of total asset;
- $X_{i,t}$ : the difference of controls between treatment and control firms;
- $\alpha_t$  and  $\eta_j$ : year-quarter and industry fixed effects.

# Why is it better?



1. Use supply shock to identify demand function.
2. First-difference to avoid mechanical substitutions:  $\Delta P \sim \Delta Q$ .
3. Diff-in-Diff to control for price spillovers/ cross-asset substitutions.

# Outline

Academic Background

Three Challenges

Empirical Settings

**Empirical Results**

Conclusion

## Main Results


	$\Delta p_{i,t}$ (%)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\Delta q_{i,t}$ (%)	<b>6.110***</b> (3.59)	<b>4.255***</b> (4.60)	<b>3.914***</b> (4.10)
Controls	No	Yes	Yes
Industry FE	No	No	Yes
Year-quarter FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	3,669	3,655	3,655
Adj. R-squared	0.010	0.548	0.582

- Repurchasing 1% of total assets increases the share price by 3.9%.



# Event Study

- This figure shows the dynamics of our estimation.



## Robustness Checks: the Same Demand Curve

- Placebo test (1): Pre- and post-treatment period as 2013Q4–2014Q3, 2014Q4–2015Q3.
- Pre-treatment (2): Estimation in pre-treatment period (2014Q4–2016Q3).

	$\Delta p_{i,t}$ (%)	
	Placebo (1)	Pre-treatment (2)
$\Delta q_{i,t}$ (%)	<b>2.339</b> <b>(1.50)</b>	<b>-0.328</b> <b>(-0.69)</b>
Controls	Yes	Yes
Industry FE	Yes	Yes
Year-quarter FE	Yes	Yes
Obs.	1,472	3,364
Adj. R-squared	0.512	0.214

## Robustness Checks: Subsample Analysis

- Column (1): Repurchasing firms only (firms ever repurchased in pre-treatment period).
- Column (2): Group G1 & G2 only.
- Column (3): Group G3 only.

	$\Delta p_{i,t}$ (%)		
	Repurchasing firms (1)	G1&2 (2)	G3 (3)
$\Delta q_{i,t}$ (%)	<b>4.282***</b> (3.90)	<b>3.579**</b> (3.03)	<b>3.538*</b> (1.94)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year-quarter FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	1,811	2,525	1,130
Adj. R-squared	0.606	0.575	0.619

## Robustness Checks: Alternative Measures

- Column (1): 1% shares repurchased relative to total shares outstanding.
- Column (2): One-to-one match.

	$\Delta p_{i,t}$ (%)	
	1% share (1)	1-to-1 match (2)
$\Delta q_{i,t}$ (%)	<b>1.009***</b> <b>(3.82)</b>	<b>3.692***</b> <b>(6.16)</b>
Controls	Yes	Yes
Industry FE	Yes	Yes
Year-quarter FE	Yes	Yes
Obs.	3,655	3,455
Adj. R-squared	0.580	0.591

## Heterogeneity Analysis: Kojien and Yogo (2019) Price Impact

- A stock is assigned to "low impact" ("high impact") subsample if its pre-treatment average price impact from Kojien and Yogo (2019) is below (above) the cross-sectional median.

Panel A: Kojien and Yogo (2019)

	$\Delta p_{i,t}$ (%)	
	High KY impact (1)	Low KY impact (2)
$\Delta q_{i,t}$ (%)	<b>5.268***</b> (4.73)	<b>4.264**</b> (2.84)
Controls	Yes	Yes
Industry FE	Yes	Yes
Year-quarter FE	Yes	Yes
Obs.	1,688	1,237
Adj. R-squared	0.586	0.611

## Heterogeneity Analysis: Quote Spread

- A stock is assigned to "large spread" ("small spread") subsample if its pre-treatment average percent quote spread is above (below) the cross-sectional median.

Panel B: Tick Constraints		
	$\Delta p_{i,t}$ (%)	
	Large spread (1)	Small spread (2)
$\Delta q_{i,t}$ (%)	<b>3.890***</b> (3.55)	<b>2.630**</b> (2.66)
Controls	Yes	Yes
Industry FE	Yes	Yes
Year-quarter FE	Yes	Yes
Obs.	1,376	1,320
Adj. R-squared	0.577	0.632

## Heterogeneity Analysis: Firm Size

- A stock is assigned to "small firm" ("large firm") subsample if its pre-treatment average market cap is below (above) the cross-sectional median.

Panel C: Firm Size		
	$\Delta p_{i,t}$ (%)	
	Small firm (1)	Large firm (2)
$\Delta q_{i,t}$ (%)	<b>4.234**</b> <b>(2.39)</b>	<b>2.058</b> <b>(1.89)</b>
Controls	Yes	Yes
Industry FE	Yes	Yes
Year-quarter FE	Yes	Yes
Obs.	1,368	1,826
Adj. R-squared	0.586	0.630

# Outline

Academic Background

Three Challenges

Empirical Settings

Empirical Results

Conclusion



- This paper is the first to estimate the demand elasticity in the U.S. stock market through the lens of supply shocks.
  - Evidence from the Tick Size Pilot shows that, market value decreases by 3.9% for an 1% decrease of share supply in total asset value.
  - More to be done: a structural model to rationalize our identification methods.
- Policy Implications: “save” the market with a little amount of money, *i.e.*, quantitative easing.

# References I

- Fuchs, W., Fukuda, S., and Neuhaan, D. (2023). Demand-system asset pricing: Theoretical foundations. *Available at SSRN 4672473*.
- Koijen, R. S. and Yogo, M. (2019). A demand system approach to asset pricing. *Journal of Political Economy*, 127(4):1475–1515.
- Li, X., Ye, M., and Zheng, M. (2024). Price ceilings, market structure, and payout policies. *Journal of Financial Economics*, 155:103818.
- Petajisto, A. (2009). Why do demand curves for stocks slope down? *Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis*, 44(5):1013–1044.
- van der Beck, P. (2023). Demand-based asset pricing: Theory, estimation and applications. Technical report, EPFL.