

Test-Optional Admissions

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 - 4 Application: society bans AA \implies colleges may drop SAT, harming society.

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- Perhaps declaring test-optional provides info about *what college wants?*

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 - ▶ Mini-lit on SAT-optional (mostly liberal-arts) colleges; apps up but no impact on URM enrollment (Belasco et al (2015); Sweitzer et al (2018); Rosinger and Ford (2019); Saboe and Terrizzi (2019); Bennett (2022) is a partial exception.)

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 - ▶ Borghesan (2023): (1) SAT is informative and not more biased than other measures; (2) dropping it in eqbm would harm elite colleges; not help minorities.
 - ▶ Dynarski et al (2022): little evidence that SAT-optional improved 1st-year diversity.
- Empirically, doesn't look like dropping exams has worked out so far, except perhaps in cases involving *legal* commitment + transparency (e.g. TTP).

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


Figure 1 – Disagreement cost from accepting ($A = 1$) and rejecting ($A = 0$) an student.

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 - ▶ Journalism and litigation worse for colleges if there are obvious cases.

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 - ▶ U.S. has competing private exams, unlike other countries w/ national college entrance exams.

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- Is world in 2023 very different from 2018? Maybe we want model with multiple eqba?

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- A lot of interesting stories involve multiple firms:
 - ▶ Many questions for next paper...