

The background of the slide is a complex network diagram. It consists of numerous nodes, represented by small colored dots in shades of teal, orange, and grey. These nodes are interconnected by a web of thin, curved lines in various colors, including teal, orange, and grey. The network is dense in some areas, forming large, interconnected clusters, while other areas are more sparse, with isolated nodes or small groups. The overall effect is a sense of a large, interconnected system, likely representing a terrorist network as mentioned in the text.

How to Beat Terrorism Efficiently

Identification of Set of Key Players in Terrorist Networks

Marco Pietro Abrate


Natalie Bolon

Shahow Kakavandy

Jangwon Park

Introduction

- Terrorism as an obstacle for modern urban life, 2015 Paris attacks.
- New planned, and coordinated attacks hurt us much more. Clusters of networks.
- To counter this we need a modern approach, Palantir.
- Efficiency is key.
- What is our data about? Some figures about the original network.






Courtesy of Palantir/Carter Center

Problem Statement


- How do we define “vulnerability”?
 - Nodes whose removal will lead to the greatest fragmentation of the network
 - Nodes whose positions in the network are optimal for spreading misinformation quickly
- Two approaches:
 - **Fragmentation**
 - **Information Flow**
- Action items:
 - Arrest or assassinate the key individuals to destroy the network structure
 - Feed deliberate misinformation to a select few individuals to create distrust within the network

Data Processing and Cleaning

- Inverted graph
 - Easier to understand relationships
 - 244 nodes
 - 30 disconnected components
- Largest component
 - Carries most of the information
 - 129 nodes




Entire Terrorist Relationships Network



- Nodes size:
 - Eccentricity
- Edges color:
 - Family
 - Congregate
 - Colleague
 - Contact

Largest Component Network



- Nodes size:
 - Betweenness centrality
- Edges color:
 - Family
 - Congregate
 - Colleague
 - Contact


Greedy Optimization Algorithm

- Fragmentation (maximization problem)
 - Find the optimal set of key terrorists which *maximizes* the degree to which the network is **fragmented** upon its removal.
- Information flow (minimization problem)
 - Find the optimal set of key terrorists which *minimizes* **time to spread** information to all other terrorists in the network and the **number of nodes** it passes through.

Fragmentation: iteration 1

Initialize set $\mathcal{S} = \{\}$

Evaluate for each node:
 g = combination of three
metrics



Fragmentation: iteration 1


Find $\text{argmax}(\mathbf{g})$: node 38

Populate $\mathbf{S} = \{38\}$

Objective function:

$$f = \max(\mathbf{g}) - C * k$$


* k = size of \mathbf{S}



Fragmentation: iteration 1

Remove node 38

Evaluate g




Fragmentation: iteration 2

Find $\operatorname{argmax}(\mathbf{g})$: node 27

Populate $\mathcal{S} = \{38, 27\}$

Objective function:


If $f \leq 0$, then terminate



Fragmentation: iteration 2

Otherwise, remove node 27

Evaluate g




Fragmentation: iteration 3

Find $\operatorname{argmax}(\mathbf{g})$: node 22

Populate $\mathcal{S} = \{38, 27, 22\}$

$f > 0$, so continue



Fragmentation: iteration 3

Remove node 22

$f \leq 0$ in iteration 4:
Algorithm stops here

Key terrorists:

- $S = \{38, 27, 22\}$

*in order of decreasing
importance



Comparison to Benchmarks


- Compare our solution to other benchmarks
 - Benchmark 1: top 3 individuals based on degree centrality
 - Benchmark 2: top 3 individuals based on betweenness centrality
 - Benchmark 3: top 3 individuals based on closeness centrality

Benchmark	F measure	Information Entropy	Components
Degree	0.279	0.516	4
Betweenness	0.497	0.701	3
Closeness	0.497	0.701	3
Our solution	0.692	1.355	7

Table 1. Comparison of our solution to other benchmarks

Which Relations are Affected?

- “Contact” relations
(orange) are vital links




Which Relations are Affected?


- All modes of “contact” are cut off between communities

Green = congregates

Pink = colleagues



Information Flow:



GOALS:

Compare different sets of nodes as source of information based on:

- Distance
- Information diffusion


Information Flow:

Distance:

Max distance: 6


Source nodes generated by
optimization algorithm

- $S = \{27, 63, 87\}$ ●
- Average distance: 2.46
- Max. Distance: 6



Information Flow:

Distance:




Source nodes: highest
betweenness centrality.

- $S = \{26, 38, 93\}$ ●
- Average distance: 2.60
- Max. Distance: 5




Information Flow:

Distance:

• $S = \{27, 63, 87\}$ •



• $S = \{26, 38, 93\}$ •




Information Flow:

Information:

● High level of information

● Low level of information



Source nodes generated by
optimization algorithm


- $S = \{27, 63, 87\}$

Information Flow:

Information:

● High level of information

● Low level of information





Source nodes: highest
betweenness centrality.

- $S = \{26, 38, 93\}$

Information Flow:

Optimized source



Highest betweenness centrality as
source

So... who should we capture?

Mohamed El Bousklaoui



Limitations & Conclusion

- Limited data -- 129 terrorists
- Not all names are known
- Unweighted, undirected network
- The project focused more on developing an appropriate methodology.
- There is a possibility to adapt the methodology for weighted, directed network.
- Applications in various other contexts of social networks.

References

[1] Zhao, B., Sen, P. & Getoor, L. (2006). Entity and Relationship Labeling in Affiliation Networks

[2] Borgatti, S. (2006). Identifying sets of key players in a social network. Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory, 12(1), pp.21-34