#### The CP deters Chinese aggression

Cole 15 — J. Michael Cole, Associate Researcher at the French Centre for Research on Contemporary China, Senior Non-Resident Fellow at the China Policy Institute at the University of Nottingham, China Correspondent for *Jane's Defence Weekly*, Senior Member and Editor in Chief at the Thinking Taiwan Foundation—a Taiwanese English-language publication founded by current Taiwanese President Dr. Tsai Ing-wen that provides nonpartisan analysis and commentary, former Deputy News Chief and Reporter for the *Taipei Times*, former Analyst with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, holds a Master’s in War Studies from the Royal Military College of Canada, 2015 (“If the Unthinkable Occurred: America Should Stand Up to China over Taiwan,” *The National Interest*, May 7th, Available Online at http://nationalinterest.org/feature/if-the-unthinkable-occured-america-should-stand-china-over-12825?page=show, Accessed 06-30-2016)

Another flaw in White’s argument is that it only provides binary options—capitulation, or the descent into major (perhaps nuclear) war and the collapse of the global economy. He leaves no room for other (and in my opinion, far more plausible) scenarios. The key to the continued existence of Taiwan (or the Republic of China) as a free, democratic and independent state lies not in the ability of the island and its security guarantors to defeat China in a major war, but rather in the strength of its deterrent, a concept that is inexplicably ignored by White. Everybody agrees that major war in the Taiwan Strait, especially one that drags the United States and perhaps Japan into hostilities, would be as devastating as it is undesirable. But the answer to that reality isn’t the abandonment of one’s principles (not to mention that of 23 million people), but instead a firm commitment to war avoidance. As I argued in a previous article, a multifaceted deterrent strategy involving both military and nonmilitary components (sanctions, naval embargo and so on), combined with clear red lines based upon international law, would lower the risk that China—export reliant and beholden to foreign energy sources—would miscalculate and choose the military option to resolve the Taiwan “issue” once and for all.

#### should openly clarify that it would US friends and allies in the ECS and SCS against unprovoked Chinese aggression.

The U.S. can’t effectively defend Taiwan and China knows it — deterrence fails.

White 15 — Hugh White, Professor of Strategic Studies at the Australian National University, former Intelligence Analyst with Australia’s Office of National Assessments and Senior Official with Australia’s Department of Defence, 2015 (“The harsh reality that Taiwan faces,” *The Straits Times*, April 15th, Available Online at http://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/the-harsh-reality-that-taiwan-faces, Accessed 06-25-2016)

But the stark reality is that these days, there is not much the US can realistically do to help Taipei stand up to serious pressure from Beijing.

Back in 1996 when they last went toe-to-toe over Taiwan, the US could simply send a couple of aircraft carriers into the area to force China to back off. Today the balance of power is vastly different: China can sink the carriers, and their economies are so intertwined that trade sanctions of the kind the US used against Russia recently are simply unthinkable.

This reality does not yet seem to have been understood in Taiwan. The overwhelming desire on the island is to preserve its democracy and avoid reunification by preserving the status quo. But it understands that China's patience is not inexhaustible — eventually China wants to get Taiwan back.

Taiwan also understands that it cannot stand up to the mainland by itself, but it hopes that by slowly expanding its international status and profile within the status quo — without seeking independence — it can build support among regional countries as well as from the US, which will help it resist Beijing's ambitions for eventual reunification.

Alas, this seems an illusion. There is a real danger that the Taiwanese overestimate the international support they can rely on if Beijing decides to get tough.

No one visiting Taipei can fail to be impressed by what the Taiwanese have achieved in recent decades, not just economically but also politically, socially and culturally. But the harsh reality is that no country is going to sacrifice its relations with China in order to help Taiwan preserve the status quo. China is simply too important economically, and too powerful militarily, for anyone to confront it on Taiwan's behalf, especially when everyone knows how determined China is to achieve reunification eventually.

#### China’s nuclear deterrent prevents US intervention

**Karim, 14**- Qualitative Social Researcher, Specializes in International Relations and Foreign Policy. MSS (Political Science), MDS (Defense Studies), PhD at the University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur (Mohd, “China’s Power Politics and Modernization: Implications for Taiwan and the South China Sea,” Pacific Focus: Inha Journal of International Studies, 8/6/2014, Wiley Online Library)//DK

Latest Weapons and their Likely Employment in Taiwan and the South China Sea. A robust nuclear deterrent of China is likely to discourage the United States to come to the aid of Taiwan in case of a contingency. And rightly so, China’s Strategic Missile Force (SMF) is believed to be equipped with 110–140 nucleararmed strategic missiles, each carrying a single warhead.33 The Pentagon has been speculating that China may also be building multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles.34 China conducted its first successful submarine test launch of its JL-1 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). Its Jin-class (Type-094) nuclear-powered and nuclear-missile-equipped submarine (SSBN) appears to be ready but JL-2 SLBM, with a range or 8,000–12,000 km, has faced problems. As already indicated, the Pentagon doubts whether these SLBM have become fully operational, although their initial estimate of operational deployment was 2007– 2010.35 Another source claims five Chinese submarines are now capable of launching JL-2 nuclear-armed missiles.36 Pentagon analysis indicates China has launched three Jin-class SSBNs; and has more under construction. Once operational, they may be capable of striking the east coast of the continental United States. Type 094 would bolster survivability of China’s nuclear deterrent, buttressing the deterrent of the land-based, solid-fuelled long-range ballistic missiles. A 095 SSBN is thought to be under development. China’s modernization objective, as could be true to any such power, is to secure a second-strike capability for assured retaliation. All these missiles would be very effective and potent, especially against the US and allied forces operating in the South China Sea and around the Taiwan Strait. Without assured nuclear second strike capability it would be well nigh difficult for China to conduct even conventional operations on these frontiers.

#### economic cooperation is resolving tensions.

Lingwall 15 — Noah Lingwall, Student at the Schreyer Honors College and Paterno Fellow majoring in History and Global & International Studies at the Pennsylvania State University, Intern at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, 2015 (“The Taiwan Problem: If It Ain't Broke, Don't Fix It,” *The Diplomat*, August 8th, Available Online at <http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/the-taiwan-problem-if-it-aint-broke-dont-fix-it/>, Accessed 06-30-2016)

No Panacea

The concept of a U.S.-China grand bargain offers a creative attempt at a strategy to resolve some of the most intractable issues hindering improved cooperation between the two countries. Even if implemented, this proposed strategy would not serve as a panacea to all the issues facing the United States and China. Any bargain would face serious pitfalls that would cast doubt over the longevity of its provisions. In light of the contentious land disputes in the South China Sea and continuing tension over the unresolved question of Taiwan, an idealistic resolution might seem a productive step forward.

The Taiwan problem is deeply entrenched within China and Taiwan’s political culture and it cannot be solved in one fell swoop. A grand bargain is an encouraging, yet illusive notion. The framework of a grand bargain might serve as a useful blueprint for future cooperation, but the current status quo already acts as a positive foundation for future China-Taiwan relations and should remain in place.

As Taiwan’s March 2016 presidential election rapidly approaches, the concept of a grand bargain appears particularly ill-conceived. In all likelihood, neither party’s candidate will risk alienating public support by pushing a radical plan for unification or separation. Increased economic cooperation will continue to maintain the equilibrium between the two nations and could even mitigate the most contentious issues that bedevil U.S.-China and China-Taiwan relations. While it is possible that these issues may pose a future threat, the current Taiwan problem is not broken, and there is no need to fix it.

#### Economics trump other frictions

Shuli ’16

Hu Shuli is the editor-in-chief of Caixin Media. She was Knight Journalism Fellow at Stanford in 1994. She was awarded the 2003 International Editor of the Year by the World Press Review and the 2007 Louis Lyons Award for Conscience and Integrity in Journalism by the Nieman Foundation at Harvard University. She is also the professor of the School of Communication and Design at Sun Yat-sen University. She was also once an international editor and chief reporter at China Business Times. Caixin Online - “China-U.S. Relations: Hostage to None” – June 8th - http://english.caixin.com/2016-06-08/100952795.html

Friction points shadowing the recent U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue won't damage this crucial relationship The eighth session of the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) in Beijing on June 6 and 7 received more than the usual attention amid signs of increased tension between the two countries. In addition to tensions over disputed islands and reefs in the South China Sea, friction has been generated in recent months by China's attempt to be recognized as a "market economy" and America's plan to deploy an anti-missile system in South Korea. Anti-China rhetoric spilling over from the U.S. presidential campaign has also fueled tension. The China-U.S. bilateral relationship has matured to a point where neither country can hurt the other without inflicting damage on itself. The line between cooperation and conflict, however, is constantly adjusting to reflect the dynamics of a fast-changing external environment and domestic politics. Regardless of how the line changes, though, each government has agreed – and should maintain this key position – that strengthening cooperation yields more benefits for all than does dwelling on diversions and friction points.

#### Squo solves miscalculation

Kulacki 16 — Gregory Kulacki, China Project Manager in the Global Security Program at the Union of Concerned Scientists, former Associate Professor of Government at Green Mountain College, former Director of External Studies at Pitzer College, former Director of Academic Programs in China for the Council on International Educational Exchange, holds a Ph.D. in Political Theory from the University of Maryland-College Park, holds graduate certificates in Chinese Economic History and International Politics at Fudan University (Shanghai), 2016 (“The Risk of Nuclear War with China: A Troubling Lack of Urgency,” Union of Concerned Scientists, May, Available Online at <http://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/attach/2016/05/Nuclear-War-with-China.pdf>, Accessed 06-28-2016)

The two militaries have agreed to regular exchanges intended to keep political disagreements and diplomatic maneuvering from escalating into armed conflict. These exchanges include meetings between senior defense officials, academic conferences, and ship visits. The U.S. Department of Defense claims the exchanges have “sustained positive momentum and achieved notable accomplishments,” especially two memoranda of understanding on confidencebuilding measures to reduce the risk of misunderstanding and accidents (OSD 2016). General Fang Fenghui, the chief of the Joint Staff Department under the Central Military Commission, told former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger that the Chinese military was fully committed to implementing these memoranda, as well as to building a “healthy and stable military-to-military relationship that was beneficial to increasing strategic trust between the PRC and the United States” (MOD 2016).

#### Nuclear weapons prevent escalation

**Christensen, 15 –** William P. Boswell Professor of World Politics of Peace and War and Director of the China and the World Program at Princeton(Thomas, The China Challenge: Shaping the Choices of a Rising Power, p. 50)

The Role of Nuclear Weapons

In addition to the lack of true multipolarity, there is another difference between twenty-first-century Asia and the world before World War II: nuclear weapons. Unlike the United States, Germany, and Japan in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, China is rising as a nuclear power into a world in which several other great powers have nuclear arsenals (including a few of China's immediate neighbors and the United States itself)- The existence of these weapons does not preclude war, but it makes conquest much more difficult to imagine and thereby removes entirely one traditional incentive for great power war: an effort to invade, subdue, and occupy the territory of a great power or its ally. Even if China, the United States, Russia, and India somehow decided to abandon all of their nuclear weapons in the twenty- first century, a scenario in which these states tried to conquer each other entirely through blitzkrieg attacks or long attritional wars would still seem fantastic. With nuclear weapons, the scenarios seem simply ridiculous.

When the fear of domination and occupation by other great powers goes away, so do some of the ancillary reasons to become aggressive. China will almost certainly continue to fear the United States and other great powers, but it has little incentive to launch full-scale invasions of South Korea and Japan in an attempt to surround or occupy those U.S. allies in the way that Germany did to France and Belgium in the early stages of both world wars. Similarly, it is hard to imagine contemporary Japanese concerns about great power competition and dependence on mineral resources overseas leading Japan to launch colonial wars of occupation against Asian neighbors as it did in the 1930s. More likely scenarios include limited coercive struggles in Asia over disputed territories, shipping lanes, basing rights, and so on, and these could always escalate. But American and Chinese nuclear weapons should provide a major incentive for prudence and caution on all sides.

#### Tsai won’t push for independence anytime soon

Bosco 16 — Joseph A. Bosco, Senior Associate and Sumitro Chair for Southeast Asia Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, former Senior Official in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, former Graduate Seminar Instructor on China-Taiwan-U.S. relations in the Asian Studies Program at the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, former Senior Fellow in the Asia-Pacific Program at the Atlantic Council of the United States, holds a J.D. from Harvard Law School and an L.L.M. in International Law from Georgetown University, 2016 (“Tsai Ing-wen: Hardly Beijing’s Worst Nightmare,” *The Diplomat*, January 25th, Available Online at <http://thediplomat.com/2016/01/tsai-ing-wen-hardly-beijings-worst-nightmare/>, Accessed 07-10-2016)

Beijing’s worst nightmare has materialized – and it turns out to be not so bad after all, if China can tolerate modest success. Taiwan’s pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party has swept the presidency and, for the first time, the national legislature.

But Tsai Ing-wen immediately used her landslide election to assure Beijing and Washington that she would be a reliable, predictable partner in preserving cross-strait stability. Now it is time for the other governments involved, China and the United States, to reciprocate her positive message.

Throughout the campaign and since her victory, the president-elect has had to address three different audiences: Taiwan’s voters, particularly her own enthusiastic supporters; China’s ruling Communist Party; and the United States government, which was more sensitive to the views of the latter than the former.

Tsai, a sober, scholarly lawyer, skillfully negotiated a political tightrope, adhering to her principles and those of her party while avoiding inflammatory language or a defiant tone whenever she addressed the issues separating China and Taiwan. She maintained that posture after her dramatic and historic win – Taiwan’s sixth direct presidential election since the end of martial law, the third peaceful transfer of power, and the elevation of the first female leader in a Chinese-speaking society.

#### Cross-Strait relations will default to negotiations

Wu 5-20-16

Debby, Nikkei staff writer, New Taiwan leader pledges to keep peace and stability with China, http://asia.nikkei.com/Features/Taiwan-s-transition-Challenge-ahead-for-President-Tsai/New-Taiwan-leader-pledges-to-keep-peace-and-stability-with-China?page=1, msm

TAIPEI -- New Taiwanese president Tsai Ing-wen said on Friday in her inaugural address that she will strive to maintain peace and stability in relations across the Taiwan Strait, while she avoided bowing to China's demand for her to explicitly recognize a highly controversial doctrine that Beijing sees as the island's commitment to eventual unification between the two sides. The statement by Tsai, 59, came shortly after she was sworn in as Taiwan's first female leader Friday morning. Her sentiments reflected those dominant among the Taiwanese public that while they do not wish for major conflicts between Taiwan and China, few want a political union with their communist neighbor. Key points about Tsai Ing-wen "I was elected President in accordance with the Constitution of the Republic of China, thus it is my responsibility to safeguard the sovereignty and territory of the Republic of China," Tsai said on Friday, citing Taiwan's formal name. "Cross-strait relations have become an integral part of building regional peace and collective security. In this process, Taiwan will be a staunch guardian of peace that actively participates and is never absent. We will work to maintain peace and stability in cross-strait relations," she said. Taiwan and China split amid a civil war in 1949 but Beijing continues to regard the island as part of its territory and refuses to abandon the option of using force to achieve unification when necessary. Since Tsai's election on Jan. 16, China has been pressuring her to recognize the so-called "1992 Consensus," an understanding reached by the Chinese Communist Party and Taiwan's then Nationalist Government that Beijing says represents a mutual agreement that the mainland and the island belong to "one China". Tsai and her Democratic Progressive Party were elected on promises to protect Taiwan's independence from China while continuing current exchanges on all levels with the mainland, and the leader has been reluctant to endorse the 1992 consensus. Ahead of the January election, a broad swath of voters expressed their discontent with then Nationalist President Ma Ying-jeou's efforts to forge closer ties with China, as they felt he had allowed Beijing undue influence over Taiwan's politics and economy. While Tsai did not directly mention the 1992 consensus in her speech on Friday, she appeared to make some concessions to Beijing by saying she "respects" the fact that the two sides "arrived at various joint acknowledgements and understandings" in 1992. She also said her administration will handle China affairs according to Taiwan's Constitution and to the Act Governing Relations Between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area, both of which are based on the premises that the island and China belong to the same country. Tsai further called for Beijing to continue to engage in positive dialogue with Taipei. Tsai's inauguration was warmly received by Washington, but less so by Beijing. The U.S. State Department Friday congratulated Tsai on her inauguration. "We also congratulate the Taiwan people on the occasion of this peaceful transition of power, which marks another milestone in the development of Taiwan's vibrant democracy," the U.S. agency said in a statement. Beijing, meanwhile, expressed dissatisfaction with Tsai's concessions. "(Tsai) was vague toward the fundamental issue of the essence of cross-strait relations, and she failed to recognize the '1992 Consensus' and its core belief. She did not come up with concrete solutions to ensure peaceful and steady development of cross-strait relations. This is an uncompleted exam paper," an unnamed official at China's State Council Taiwan Affairs Office told the official Xinhua news agency on Friday afternoon. The official repeated Beijing's longtime opposition to Taiwan independence, a fundamental value incorporated in the charter of Tsai's DPP, and said that the cross-strait exchanges can only be continued if Taipei recognizes that that the two sides belong to one China. Academics said that while Beijing may be unhappy with Tsai's address, it is unlikely there will be serious clashes in the short term. "(Chinese officials) don't want the issue to blow up right now either. They may growl about this is not good enough rather than take a strong, active response," said Shelley Rigger, a political scientist at Davidson College in the U.S. state of North Carolina. Rigger said that Beijing's plate is quite full with challenges on several fronts, including rows over disputed waters in the South China Sea. "Tsai was essentially talking about the '1992 Consensus' when she mentioned of the common understandings reached in 1992. She has already made the biggest concessions she could without using the exact wordings. While Beijing would not be entirely satisfied, Chinese officials should be able to live with it," said Yen Chen-shen, a political scientist at the Taipei-based National Chengchi University's Institute of International Relations.

#### DPP victory doesn’t cause war

Boon and Char 1-28-16

Hoo Tiang Boon is Assistant Professor and James Char is Research Analyst with the China Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. China-Taiwan Cross-Strait Relations: No Return To Crisis Mode – Analysis, http://www.eurasiareview.com/28012016-china-taiwan-cross-strait-relations-no-return-to-crisis-mode-analysis/, msm

The common belief that cross-strait relations is headed for instability following the DPP’s election victory is overstated. Although there could be more friction with Beijing, the Taiwan Strait is unlikely to witness a return to previous crisis levels. The election of Tsai Ing-wen of the independence-leaning Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) as Taiwan’s new president has aroused a hostile reception from some Mainland Chinese media and led to concerns that cross-strait relations will become fraught once again. Some analysts had also feared that a cross-strait crisis could ensue if Tsai were to be elected. A closer look at events prior to Tsai and the DDP’s landslide victory over the Kuomintang (KMT) in the presidential and legislative elections, however, will reveal to the contrary: the widespread belief that this could lead to a period of instability seems to have been overstated. While the potential for miscalculation in the Taiwan Strait cannot be discounted and there could be more frictions between a Tsai-led Taipei and Beijing, cross-strait relations is unlikely to return to the acrimonious period of the Chen Shui-bian administration. A More Politically Sophisticated DPP For a start, today’s DPP is a considerably different political animal from the party under former president Chen. Under Tsai, the party’s cross-strait policy has evolved, becoming more centrist and ambiguous in its slant. Tsai’s DPP is of course still far less welcoming to China than the KMT, but it has moved away from the brand of pro-independence adventurism that had imperiled cross-strait ties and cost Chen dearly. There is in fact greater alignment between the DPP and KMT’s basic cross-strait positions than commonly perceived. Tsai’s declaration that she would preserve the “status quo of peace and stability” is in principle not fundamentally different from Ma Ying-jeou’s “Three Nos” policy (no unification, no independence, no use of force). In 2014, the DPP published its mainland policy review which called for the party to “proactively and confidently participate [in cross-strait dialogue]” and pursue cross-strait economic interactions “on the basis of the existing foundation” – exhortations not vastly out of sync with the KMT’s ideas. The main difference between the DPP and KMT’s positions is the degree of the tilt. The KMT’s notion of the status quo leans Taiwan closer to China (in particular, through greater economic integration); the DPP’s version is more about maintaining Taipei’s distance from Beijing. Some observers point out that Tsai has yet to explicitly endorse the 1992 Consensus which Beijing has stated is one of the preconditions for cross-strait dialogue. While that is true, the new Taiwanese leader has also not outrightly rejected the 1992 Consensus; she appears to understand that any refutation of the one-China principle will not be tolerated by Beijing. Breaking Out Of the ‘KMT-CCP Framework’ Tellingly, at a recent speech in Washington, Tsai spoke of the importance of securing the “accumulated outcomes of more than twenty years of negotiations and exchanges” [which apparently includes the 1992 Consensus], in which “these accumulated outcomes will serve as the firm basis of [her] efforts to further the peaceful and stable development of cross-strait relations”. Admittedly, these could be clever rhetoric meant to reassure international audiences. There is considerable political incentive for the DPP to pursue a more conciliatory position towards China since it would be in its interest to demonstrate to the Taiwanese people that, like the KMT, it too can pursue dialogue with Beijing without compromising the island’s de facto independence. Indeed, Tsai has spoken of changing the perception that the KMT is the only party capable of managing relations with Beijing, and talked about breaking out from the “KMT-CCP framework” in China-Taiwan relations. Significantly, she has not ruled out the possibility of meeting Xi Jinping once she becomes Taiwan’s president. China: Distrust and Pragmatism towards the DPP For China, it remains deeply suspicious of the DPP and Tsai’s longer-term intentions. Mainland observers point out that the DPP has yet to rescind the party’s 2007 Normal Nation Resolution or the 1999 Resolution on Taiwan’s future, which are premised on the notion of Taiwan as a sovereign entity separate from China. They have also not forgotten Tsai’s role in the crafting of the controversial “Two States Theory”, or her earlier time as the head of Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council from 2000-2004 – a period when cross-strait ties were particularly fraught. But despite these misgivings, the reality is that Beijing has limited policy options vis-à-vis Taipei. Closer economic ties have not translated into Taiwanese political goodwill towards China, while the Chinese political solution of “one country, two systems” has become even more unappealing in democratic Taiwan in the wake of political unrest in Hong Kong. Only if Taiwan declares formal independence would Xi turn to a military solution. Even then it is a battle he cannot be sure of winning, while a cross-strait war would be sure to jeopardise the gains of three decades of reform and opening-up in China. Moreover, Xi’s overwhelming priority in the next two years before the 19th Party Congress will be to stabilize the Chinese economy and he would not want to be distracted by renewed trouble in the Taiwan Strait, alongside China’s continuing problems in the South China Sea. This limited policy space means that Beijing can ill-afford not to consider a more open attitude towards the DPP, especially given the latter will dominate Taiwanese politics in the foreseeable future. Interestingly, in the past few years, there have been signs that Beijing is starting to adjust its traditional attitude towards the DPP, quietly allowing some limited or indirect CCP-DPP interactions. Notable DPP figures, such as former premier Frank Hsieh and Tainan city mayor William Lai, have made low-key visits to China. So as long as a Taiwanese leader steers clear of overtly pushing for Taiwanese independence, there will be some room for negotiation with Beijing. Whither Cross-Strait Relations? Thus far, Tsai appears to be likely to persist with existing institutional mechanisms to pursue cross-strait relations with China, although the frequency or pace of exchanges may well decline. While the Tsai government will resist moving Taipei closer to Beijing, it will not repeat the previous DPP-led government’s mistake of pursuing Taiwanese independence; it would have too much to lose. Analogously thus, Tsai will resemble a cold Ma Ying-jeou in overall tenor of the orientation towards China. This situation will not fully satisfy Beijing, but it at least satisfies the bottom-line in Chinese policy to avert Taiwan’s formal independence. We are therefore likely to see calm but colder waters in the Taiwan Strait.

#### Even if they’re right in the short-term, concessions won’t change China’s long-term behavior.

Jackson 15 — Van Jackson, Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, International Affairs Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, Visiting Scholar and Adjunct Assistant Professor with the Asian Studies Program in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, former Strategist and Policy Adviser focused on the Asia-Pacific at the Office of the Secretary of Defense, holds a Ph.D. in World Politics from The Catholic University of America, 2015 (“The Myth of a US-China Grand Bargain,” *The Diplomat*, August 6th, Available Online at <http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/the-myth-of-a-us-china-grand-bargain/>, Accessed 06-28-2016)

But grand bargains rarely work. There’s a dangerous naivete in abandoning U.S. commitments on the hope that China will then be more willing to resolve its other disputes. And policies of accommodation will not suspend military competition because that involves more than present day concerns with surveillance overflight missions, territorial disputes, and current political commitments. Regardless of the policy and crisis management decisions we make today, military competition plays out over years and decades; it relates to force structure investment and doctrinal decisions that can’t be sacrificed for political promises.

#### The bargain is easily reversible by China — but once the U.S. gives up Taiwan, there’s no going back.

Roy 15 — Denny Roy, Senior Fellow and Supervisor of the POSCO Fellowship Program at the East-West Center—a U.S.-based institution for public diplomacy in the Asia Pacific region, former Professor at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu, former Faculty Member in the National Security Affairs Department at the Naval Postgraduate School, former Research Fellow with the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University in Canberra, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Chicago, 2015 (“The Impossible Price of a U.S.-China Grand Bargain: Dumping Taiwan,” *The National Interest*, June 24th, Available Online at <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-impossible-price-us-china-grand-bargain-dumping-taiwan-13177?page=show>, Accessed 06-28-2016)

Glaser recognizes that Chinese leaders may intend to push out their U.S. rival. He argues his proposal would answer the question of whether this is Beijing’s plan. If Beijing accepts the proposal, it would indicate that China has limited aims and can tolerate continued U.S. regional hegemony. If not, China intends to usurp that role from the United States. If we now recognize that expelling U.S. strategic leadership may be Beijing’s intention, unilaterally assisting the Chinese by abandoning Taiwan is not the most sensible policy if the US hopes to retain its accustomed role. The timing of Glaser’s proposal is particularly bad given that Xi Jinping’s government seems to represent a shift toward a more assertive Chinese foreign policy that has grown impatient with waiting for the United States to decline on its own.

Even if the current regime in Beijing does not plan to dismantle U.S. regional leadership, the United States cannot be sure the leaders of a future, stronger China will think the same way. China could renege on Glaser’s proposed deal more easily than the US could. China is a local power with relatively short supply lines to the East and South China Seas. In the case of the South China Sea, China enjoys a huge and growing military force projection disparity in its favor relative to the other claimants. But to cancel its part of the deal, the United States would have to cross the Pacific Ocean to invade and capture a Taiwan defended by ensconced PLA forces only 100 miles from China’s mainland.

#### The grand bargain isn’t binding on China — they’ll still challenge U.S. hegemony.

Lingwall 15 — Noah Lingwall, Student at the Schreyer Honors College and Paterno Fellow majoring in History and Global & International Studies at the Pennsylvania State University, Intern at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, 2015 (“The Taiwan Problem: If It Ain't Broke, Don't Fix It,” *The Diplomat*, August 8th, Available Online at <http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/the-taiwan-problem-if-it-aint-broke-dont-fix-it/>, Accessed 06-30-2016)

Even if China is willing to accept (in its view) an “invasive” U.S. military presence in the Asia-Pacific in the present, there is no mechanism to ensure that China does not default on agreements in the future. China’s military power projection capabilities are growing, and Chinese leaders may see fit to act in a fashion commensurate with their nation’s growing abilities. Therefore, the U.S. cannot expect a credible Chinese commitment to accept U.S. regional hegemony in exchange for control of Taiwan.

## Solvency

### EXT- Can’t know intentions

#### Group 1NC 2-4- you can’t know a states’ intentions

#### Too optimistic- domestic characteristics and behavior cannot determine policy and grand strategy, Rosato is comparative and says the most it can get you is slight reduction in uncertainty

#### Things change- even if you can make predictions- it’s only about Xi in the context of the 19th party congress- not larger Chinese intentions

#### Actions don’t determine intentions- Plans change really quickly in foreign policy decisions and are often meant to mislead nations.

#### States *intentionally* mislead other states about their intentions.

Rosato 15 — Sebastian Rosato, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame, former Fellow at the Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame and the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies and the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Chicago, 2014/2015 (“The Inscrutable Intentions of Great Powers,” *International Security*, Volume 39, Number 3, Winter, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Project Muse)

This uncertainty is exacerbated by the significant incentives great powers have to conceal or misrepresent their intentions.166 States planning aggression may seek to hide this or appear peaceful to lull potential adversaries into a false sense of security. Similarly, states with peaceful intentions may hide their designs or appear aggressive to deter aspiring predators. In other words, whether they are aggressive or peaceful, states work to keep their plans to themselves. Because all states know this, their uncertainty about one another’s intentions is heightened even further.

#### Context of the plan-

#### The bargain is easily reversible by China — but once the U.S. gives up Taiwan, there’s no going back.

Roy 15 — Denny Roy, Senior Fellow and Supervisor of the POSCO Fellowship Program at the East-West Center—a U.S.-based institution for public diplomacy in the Asia Pacific region, former Professor at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu, former Faculty Member in the National Security Affairs Department at the Naval Postgraduate School, former Research Fellow with the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University in Canberra, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Chicago, 2015 (“The Impossible Price of a U.S.-China Grand Bargain: Dumping Taiwan,” *The National Interest*, June 24th, Available Online at <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-impossible-price-us-china-grand-bargain-dumping-taiwan-13177?page=show>, Accessed 06-28-2016)

Glaser recognizes that Chinese leaders may intend to push out their U.S. rival. He argues his proposal would answer the question of whether this is Beijing’s plan. If Beijing accepts the proposal, it would indicate that China has limited aims and can tolerate continued U.S. regional hegemony. If not, China intends to usurp that role from the United States. If we now recognize that expelling U.S. strategic leadership may be Beijing’s intention, unilaterally assisting the Chinese by abandoning Taiwan is not the most sensible policy if the US hopes to retain its accustomed role. The timing of Glaser’s proposal is particularly bad given that Xi Jinping’s government seems to represent a shift toward a more assertive Chinese foreign policy that has grown impatient with waiting for the United States to decline on its own.

Even if the current regime in Beijing does not plan to dismantle U.S. regional leadership, the United States cannot be sure the leaders of a future, stronger China will think the same way. China could renege on Glaser’s proposed deal more easily than the US could. China is a local power with relatively short supply lines to the East and South China Seas. In the case of the South China Sea, China enjoys a huge and growing military force projection disparity in its favor relative to the other claimants. But to cancel its part of the deal, the United States would have to cross the Pacific Ocean to invade and capture a Taiwan defended by ensconced PLA forces only 100 miles from China’s mainland.

#### The grand bargain isn’t binding on China — they’ll still challenge U.S. hegemony.

Lingwall 15 — Noah Lingwall, Student at the Schreyer Honors College and Paterno Fellow majoring in History and Global & International Studies at the Pennsylvania State University, Intern at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, 2015 (“The Taiwan Problem: If It Ain't Broke, Don't Fix It,” *The Diplomat*, August 8th, Available Online at <http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/the-taiwan-problem-if-it-aint-broke-dont-fix-it/>, Accessed 06-30-2016)

Even if China is willing to accept (in its view) an “invasive” U.S. military presence in the Asia-Pacific in the present, there is no mechanism to ensure that China does not default on agreements in the future. China’s military power projection capabilities are growing, and Chinese leaders may see fit to act in a fashion commensurate with their nation’s growing abilities. Therefore, the U.S. cannot expect a credible Chinese commitment to accept U.S. regional hegemony in exchange for control of Taiwan.

### EXT- No Political Will

#### No political will- congress literally never does anything- it will be impossible to change foreign policy in time to prevent miscalculation.

#### If they say yes- it is unlikely that security hawks will be willing to take more soft-line approaches towards China, especially if they have Taiwan.

#### If they say no, and we conclude that China is expansionist- the status quo solves because we already have a hardline strategy- Obama and Hillary both plan to strengthen the pivot