# A2 Afro-Pess

**FW - Debate is a competitive activity that centers around a policy question within the resolution – our interpretation is that the debate should be focused on the plan.**

**1. Testing desirability of the plan is predictable stable advocacy that allows fair competition between Aff and the Neg. Competitive equity dictates that the Negative negates the plan.**

**Two impacts.**

**A. Without this the plan is never tested and subjected to scrutiny. Leads to bad politics because we never debate over why our policies are white supremacist and what we can do to fix it.**

**B. The Neg’s advocacy is never tested by the full front of the Aff’s offense, there is no victory to beating an opponent who is not at their best. Only with clash can the Negative become competent advocates who can refine their arguments to persuade the USFG**

**Although fiat isn’t “real” our discussion of the state as a heuristic allows students to gain skills that help them understand the complexity of politics**

**Zanotti 14** (Dr. Laura Zanotti is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Virginia Tech. Her research and teaching include critical political theory as well as international organizations, UN peacekeeping, democratization and the role of NGOs in post-conflict governance.“Governmentality, Ontology, Methodology: Re-thinking Political Agency in the Global World” – Alternatives: Global, Local, Political – vol 38(4):p. 288-304)

While there are important variations in the way international relations scholars use governmentality theory, for the purpose of my argument I identify two broad trajectories. 2 One body of scholarship uses governmentality as a heuristic tool to explore modalities of local and international government and to assess their effects **in** the **contexts** where they are deployed; the other adopts this notion as a descriptive tool to theorize the globally **oppressive features** of international liberalism. Scholars who use governmentality as a heuristic tool tend to conduct **inquiries** based upon analyses of practices of **government** and **resistance**. These scholars rely on ethnographic inquiries, emphasizes the multifarious ways government works in practice (to include its oppressive trajectories) and the ways uneven interactions of governmental strategies and resistance are contingently enacted. As examples, Didier Bigo, building upon Pierre Bourdieu, has encouraged a research methodology that privileges a relational approach and focuses on practice; 3 William Walters has advocated considering governmentality as a research program rather than as a ‘‘depiction of discrete systems of power;’’ 4 and Michael Merlingen has criticized the downplaying of resistance and the use of ‘‘governmentality’’ as interchangeable with liberalism. 5 Many other scholars have engaged in contextualized analyses of governmental tactics and resistance. Oded Lowenheim has shown how ‘‘responsibilization’’ has become an instrument for governing individual travelers through ‘‘travel warnings’’ as well as for ‘‘developing states’’ through performance indicators; 6 Wendy Larner and William Walters have questioned accounts of globalization as an ontological dimension of the present and advocated less substantialized accounts that focus on studying the discourses, processes and practices through which globalization is made as a space and a political economy; 7 Ronnie D. Lipschutz and James K. Rowe have looked at how localized practices of resistance may engage and transform power relations; 8 and in my own work, I have studied the deployment of disciplinary and governmental tools for reforming governments in peacekeeping operations and how these practices were hijacked and resisted and by their targets. 9 Scholars who use governmentality as a descriptive tool focus instead on one particular trajectory of global liberalism, that is on the convergence of knowledge and scrutiny of life processes (or biopolitics) and violence and theorize global liberalism as an extremely effective formation, a coherent and powerful Leviathan, where biopolitical tools and violence come together to serve dominant classes or states’ political agendas. As I will show, Giorgio Agamben, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, and Sergei Prozorov tend to embrace this position. 10 The distinction between governmentality as a heuristic and governmentality as a descriptive tool is **central for debating political agency**. I argue that, notwithstanding their critique of liberalism, scholars who use governmentality as a descriptive tool rely on the **same ontological assumptions as the liberal order** they criticize and do move away from Foucault’s focus on historical practices in order to privilege abstract theorizations. By using governmentality as a description of ‘‘liberalism’’ or ‘‘capitalism’’ instead of as a methodology of inquiry on power’s contingent modalities and technologies, these scholars tend to reify a substantialist ontology that ultimately reinforces **a liberal conceptualization of subjects and power** as standing in a relation of externality and stifles the possibility of **reimagining political agency on different grounds**. ‘‘Descriptive governmentality’’ constructs a critique of the liberal international order based upon an ontological framework that presupposes that power and subjects are entities possessing qualities that preexist relations. Power is imagined as a ‘‘mighty totality,’’ and subjects as monads endowed with potentia. As a result, the problematique of political agency is portrayed as a quest for the ‘‘liberation’’ of a subject ontologically gifted with a freedom that power inevitably oppresses. In this way, the conceptualization of political agency remains confined within the liberal struggle of ‘‘freedom’’ and ‘‘oppression.’’ Even researchers who adopt a Foucauldian vocabulary end up falling into what Bigo has identified as ‘‘traps’’ of political science and international relations theorizing, specifically essentialization and ahistoricism. 11 I argue here that in order to reimagine political agency an ontological and epistemological turn is necessary, one that relies upon a relational ontology. Relational ontological positions question adopting abstract stable entities, such as ‘‘structures,’’ ‘‘power,’’ or ‘‘subjects,’’ as explanations for what happens. Instead, they explore how these pillar concepts of the Western political thought came to being, what kind of practices they facilitate, consolidate and result from, what ambiguities and aporias they contain, and how they are transformed. 12 Relational ontologies nurture ‘‘modest’’ conceptualizations of political agency and also question the **overwhelming stability** of ‘‘mighty totalities,’’ such as for instance the international liberal order or the state. In this framework, political action has more to do with playing with the cards that are dealt to us to produce **practical effects in specific contexts** than with building **idealized ‘‘new totalities’’** where perfect conditions might exist. The political ethics that results from non-substantialist ontological positions is one that privileges ‘‘modest’’ engagements and weights political choices with regard to the consequences and distributive effects they may produce in the context where they are made rather than based upon their universal normative aspirations. 13

Perm do the plan and all non mutually exclusive parts of the alt: **Their insistence on negativity and a particular starting point is problematic—only the perm’s inclusive approach can create movements and tangible change**

**Brand-Jacobsen 05** (Kai Frithjof Brand-Jacobsen, is founder and Director of the Peace Action, Training and Research Institute of Romania (PATRIR) and Co-Director of TRANSCEND, and is on the Executive Board of the TRANSCEND Peace University (TPU) where he is Course Director for the courses Peacebuilding and Empowerment and War to Peace Transitions. He has worked in Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, Nepal, Russia, South Eastern Europe, North America, Colombia, Somalia, Cambodia, Aceh-Indonesia and the Middle East at the invitation of governments, inter-governmental organisations, UN agencies, and local organisations and communities. He has written and published widely, and is author of The Struggle Continues: The Political Economy of Globalisation and People's Struggles for Peace (Pluto, forthcoming), co-author, together with Johan Galtung and Carl Jacobsen, of Searching for Peace: The Road to TRANSCEND (Pluto, 2000 & 2002) and Editor of the TRANSCEND book series published together with Pluto Press, Constructive Peace Studies: Peace by Peaceful Means. He is a member of the Executive Board of the Journal of Peace and Development and the Executive Board of the Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution. In 1999 he was founder and Director of the Coalition for Global Solidarity and Social Development, and in 2000, together with Johan Galtung, he was founder of the Nordic Institute for Peace Research (NIFF). Since 1996 he has provided more than 250 training programmes in peacebuilding, development, and constructive conflict transformation to more than 4000 participants in 30 countries. 2005) <http://www.globalsolidarity.org/articles/peace_means_kai.html>/CH

Peace by Peaceful Means Dear Friends, The discussions which have taken place over e-mail over the past few days have been extremely interesting. I have just returned from Oslo where the 100th anniversary of the Nobel Peace Prize was being celebrated. The obvious contrast between the rather elite 'suit' dominated celebrations in Oslo and the realities of what is occurring in the world today was stark. Questions of strategy, tactics and visions for how we work to bring about change, to transform all forms of violent conflict -- direct, structural, and cultural -- and to empower, mobilise, and involve people in a mass, broad-based movement for peace and to build the alternatives we are looking for, are vital. In Norway alone, to take one example, perhaps 80% of people think what is happening now in and over Afghanistan is wrong, either completely or at least in part, and yet all they hear from the media, academics and politicians is constant support and acclaim for the 'justness' of this war (or indeed, any war in which it is 'we' against 'them'). Small groups of people and 'NGOs', in Norway as in every single country, are trying to bring forward alternatives, to raise their voices, and to protest/oppose what they think is wrong. While these organisations are in every case much smaller than our governments and militaries going to war, they often represent the social majority. A major challenge they face, however, is how to reach out to people, how to involve people, and how to develop alternatives which make sense to people tired of war and violence (whether of the kind we are seeing in Afghanistan, or of a global economic system killing 100,000 a day). Negative slogans and opposition to what is wrong is not enough however. It is not enough, but it is necessary. 'Basta!', 'Enough!' was perhaps the most 'revolutionary' cry of the last decade, and still is in many parts of the world. The simple, courageous act, of standing up when we see that something is wrong, and stating that it is wrong, not cooperating with it, can be a powerful and evocative symbol. When we are having our conferences, discussions and meetings in whichever city, town or village of the world we may be found, we should always remember that the vast majority of people in our own city, town or village, as well as the entire rest of the world, have no idea that we are there, meeting. The vision, hope and ideas which bring people to these conferences are, in the vast majority of cases, kept marginalised, on the periphery. Yet that is also part of our own responsibility, technique and methods. Basta! became a cry to inspire millions, because those who said it lived it, refusing to cooperate any longer with what they know to be wrong. While Basta! may be the most revolutionary cry or word today, transforming all forms of direct, structural, and cultural violence is the greatest challenge. The two are inclusive and complementary, not exclusive. We need to state clearly our opposition to violence, war, injustice and exploitation (the 'peace movement' has often been willing to do the first two, not always as willing on the last two), and we need also to build a constructive, positive programme. It is not only a question of what we are against, but what we are for. When we criticize what we think is wrong, people will also want to know what we think could be done instead. In these cases, our answers must seem real and viable to people. The 'anti-globalisation' movement is therefore also a social justice movement; 'non-governmental organisations' should also be people's organisations or people's movements; and one of our challenges today will be to build upon the growing 'anti-war' movement, transforming it also into a peace movement. A step further, as many social and peace activists have recognised, will be to link the peace and social justice movements. Slogans and messages are important, as are practice and vision. It will not be possible today to unite broad numbers of people around issues which they feel are too abstract and divorced from them. The 'abolish the debt' campaign/movement was successful because people were able to see the clear linkages between debt and the effective colonisation and enslavement of countries and people across the south, as well as the incredible suffering and destruction it brought. The Jubilee 2000 'campaign' however, unlike the Jubilee South movement which continues today, did not reach its objective of having the debt cancelled. Instead, while many people around the world believe the problem has been solved, the debt-system and the burden it places upon countries has become even more extreme. Going from 'campaigns' to movements will also be important, though even here it is not a question of 'either/or' but 'both/and' with individual campaigns extremely useful and effective at times for involving people, raising awareness and mobilising around specific issues, strengthening further the broader movements of which they may be a part. Today, a movement for demos kratos is necessary, and vital for any movement or work towards peace. To speak about the United States or any government in the world today as a 'democracy' is a ridiculous farce. They are highly elite dominated systems built upon massive structures and cultures of violence, and willing to use overwhelming (Powel Doctrine) violence when necessary to enforce their needs and/or interests. At best they may be demagogia's, where elites maintain power by promising the people what they will do for them (we call this 'elections'), but they are not system's or societies built upon people's power, demos kratos. Decisions to go to war are made by tiny numbers of people. Our economic and political policies are constructed for us, often to the detriment of the social majorities who are told to 'leave well enough alone' and trust in the experts. This is sometimes as true of politicians as it is of non-governmental organisations who themselves frequently prefer the conference halls and well-funded projects to actually working democratically with people as part of the people themselves. An alternative today, what Johan Galtung has called for, with 10,000 dialogues, meetings, discussions at every level, focussing not only on what is wrong, but also on what we want therapy, ideas, alternatives. In one form or another many of these dialogues are taking place. In a way they are therapy for the massive amounts of violence we are all being exposed to today, in our cultures, in our world, on our television sets or in the speeches of our 'democratically elected' rulers (the question, for those who do not support their policies, should not be 'who put them in power' -- though this is also important -- but why haven't we removed them from power yet\_). They are also empowering, if we take the step beyond saying what is wrong to what could be done\_, what should be done\_, and then go further to discussing what I/we can do about it. Mobilising people for peace today is not simply about a slogan (though coming up with clearly expressed messages in a few words will of course help us to link people together and raise awareness). What is necessary, beyond any single issue or top-level strategy for how to change the world, is the process. The way is the goal. Perhaps the greatest achievement of the social justice/anti-globalisation movement is that it has mobilised, involved, and empowered millions of people around the world in discussing, thinking about, and acting upon the realities around them. On the streets of Seattle, Praha, Okinawa, Melbourne, Gotheburg, Washington, Quebec, Genoa, Ottawa, people, many of whom refuse to vote, have been discussing foreign policy, domestic politics, people to people movements, and all the issues which politicians and well-established NGOs are not able and often not willing to discuss with people. We have our 'manifestos', our policies and plans which we wish to put forward in the name of people, often addressing them to 'politicians' and 'elites' believing, in a fundamentally undemocratic way, that they will be the ones to bring about and implement change for us. This is not to say that that is not an important level which we also need to work at. The broader vision here is both/and, not either or, in terms of strategy as well often of vision. We also need, however, to be willing to take part in the much slower, more timely, and more empowering process, of tens of thousands of dialogues together with people, communities, and organisations at every level. Solidarity today is being built upon and carried further into alliances not just supporting people in their struggles for social justice, peace and freedom, but carrying forward those struggles ourselves in our own communities, our own towns, cities and villages. If we wish to change the injustices taking place in the world today we must of course work on a global level, but we must also work, just as importantly, within our communities. Again, both/and rather than either or. We should also be wary when we say 'we must begin here', or 'this must be done first!', even when the message is very positive and constructive. 'We must begin with the individual!'. 'We must begin by changing society!'. 'We must begin with a culture of peace!'. 'We must begin by ending the debt!'. All of these, and the many others put forward, are extremely important issues. They are also all linked together. Again, both/and. Exclusive and elitist visions will only serve to further fragment our efforts, creating division and separation where what is needed is dialogue, solidarity, cooperation and alliances between movements/organisations which often take diverse strategies and approaches to addressing deeply interlinking injustices and structures and cultures of violence. Conscientisation (raising awareness, often political awareness -- but also social, cultural, economic), organisation (we can do more together than we can apart, and it is necessary to organise -- though in many different ways -- to be able to bring about changes, both against what we think is wrong and for what we think is right), mobilisation (bringing in more and more people, involving people in dialogues, discussion, action, and work for change/transformation), and empowerment (I/we can, rather than 'I/we can't'; also important recognising the power we have to bring about change, rather than simply accepting existing, often extremely violent, power structures and believing that change can/should/must be implemented by those 'in power', whether slave owners, men, politicians, or fuhrers) are all necessary.

**Focus on methodology allows atrocity in the name of ethical purity – ethical policymaking requires calculation of feasibility and time-sensitive consequences**

**Gvosdev 5** – executive editor of The National Interest (Nikolas, The Value(s) of Realism, SAIS Review 25.1, pmuse)

As the name implies, realists focus on promoting policies that are achievable and sustainable. In turn, the morality of a foreign policy action is judged by its results, not by the intentions of its framers. A foreign policymaker must weigh the consequences of any course of action and assess the resources at hand to carry out the proposed task. As Lippmann warned, Without the controlling principle that the nation must maintain its objectives and its power in equilibrium, its purposes within its means and its means equal to its purposes, its commitments related to its resources and its resources adequate to its commitments, it is impossible to think at all about foreign affairs.8 Commenting on this maxim, Owen Harries, founding editor of The National Interest, noted, "This is a truth of which Americans—more apt to focus on ends rather than means when it comes to dealing with the rest of the world—need always to be reminded."9 In fact, Morgenthau noted that "there can be no political morality without prudence."10 This virtue of prudence—which Morgenthau identified as the cornerstone of realism—should not be confused with expediency. Rather, it takes as its starting point that it is more moral to fulfill one's commitments than to make "empty" promises, and to seek solutions that minimize harm and produce sustainable results. Morgenthau concluded: [End Page 18] Political realism does not require, nor does it condone, indifference to political ideals and moral principles, but it requires indeed a sharp distinction between the desirable and the possible, between what is desirable everywhere and at all times and what is possible under the concrete circumstances of time and place.11 This is why, prior to the outbreak of fighting in the former Yugoslavia, U.S. and European realists urged that Bosnia be decentralized and partitioned into ethnically based cantons as a way to head off a destructive civil war. Realists felt this would be the best course of action, especially after the country's first free and fair elections had brought nationalist candidates to power at the expense of those calling for inter-ethnic cooperation. They had concluded—correctly, as it turned out—that the United States and Western Europe would be unwilling to invest the blood and treasure that would be required to craft a unitary Bosnian state and give it the wherewithal to function. Indeed, at a diplomatic conference in Lisbon in March 1992, the various factions in Bosnia had, reluctantly, endorsed the broad outlines of such a settlement. For the purveyors of moralpolitik, this was unacceptable. After all, for this plan to work, populations on the "wrong side" of the line would have to be transferred and resettled. Such a plan struck directly at the heart of the concept of multi-ethnicity—that different ethnic and religious groups could find a common political identity and work in common institutions. When the United States signaled it would not accept such a settlement, the fragile consensus collapsed. The United States, of course, cannot be held responsible for the war; this lies squarely on the shoulders of Bosnia's political leaders. Yet Washington fell victim to what Jonathan Clarke called "faux Wilsonianism," the belief that "high-flown words matter more than rational calculation" in formulating effective policy, which led U.S. policymakers to dispense with the equation of "balancing commitments and resources."12 Indeed, as he notes, the Clinton administration had criticized peace plans calling for decentralized partition in Bosnia "with lofty rhetoric without proposing a practical alternative." The subsequent war led to the deaths of tens of thousands and left more than a million people homeless. After three years of war, the Dayton Accords—hailed as a triumph of American diplomacy—created a complicated arrangement by which the federal union of two ethnic units, the Muslim-Croat Federation, was itself federated to a Bosnian Serb republic. Today, Bosnia requires thousands of foreign troops to patrol its internal borders and billions of dollars in foreign aid to keep its government and economy functioning. Was the aim of U.S. policymakers, academics and journalists—creating a multi-ethnic democracy in Bosnia—not worth pursuing? No, not at all, and this is not what the argument suggests. But aspirations were not matched with capabilities. As a result of holding out for the "most moral" outcome and encouraging the Muslim-led government in Sarajevo to pursue maximalist aims rather than finding a workable compromise that could have avoided bloodshed and produced more stable conditions, the peoples of Bosnia suffered greatly. In the end, the final settlement was very close [End Page 19] to the one that realists had initially proposed—and the one that had also been roundly condemned on moral grounds.

Turn – their refusal to engage is the state reifies neoliberalism

**Barbrook, 97 –** professor at the Hypermedia Research Centre at the University of Westminster (Richard, <http://www.nettime.org/Lists-Archives/nettime-l-9706/msg00034.html>)

I thought that this position is clear from my remarks about the ultra-left posturing of the 'zero-work' demand. In Europe, we have **real** social **problems** of deprivation and poverty which, in part, can **only** be solved by state action. This does not make me a statist, but **rather an anti-anti-statist**. By opposing such intervention because they are carried out by the state, anarchists are tacitly **lining up with the neo-liberals**. Even worse, refusing even to vote for the left, they acquiese to rule by neo-liberal parties. I deeply admire direct action movements. I was a radio pirate and we provide server space for anti-roads and environmental movements. However, this doesn't mean that I support political abstentionism or, even worse, the mystical nonsense produced by Hakim Bey. It is great for artists and others to adopt a marginality as a life style choice, but most of the people **who are** economically and socially **marginalised were never given any choice**. They are excluded from society **as a result of** deliberate **policies** of deregulation, privatisation and welfare cutbacks carried out by neo-liberal governments. During the '70s, I was a pro-situ punk rocker until Thatcher got elected. Then we learnt the hard way that voting did change things and lots of people suffered

**Starting politics from the premise of social death accepts the colonial mindset as neutral and inevitable---it confines blackness forever into incapacity---an ethical process of encountering the alterity of slave resistance is necessary to break from the Eurocentric reading of history**

Tracey **Walker 12**, Birkbeck University Masters in Psychosocial Studies, “The Future of Slavery: From Cultural Trauma to Ethical Remembrance”, Graduate Journal of Social Science, 9.2, July, JSTOR/CH

To argue that there is more to the popular conception of slaves as vic­tims who experienced social death within the abusive regime of transat­lantic slavery is not to say that these subjectivities did not exist. When considering the institution of slavery we can quite confidently rely on the assumption that it did indeed de­stroy the self-hood and the lives of millions of Africans. Scholar Vincent Brown (2009) however, has criticised Orlando Patterson’s (1982) seminal book Slavery and Social Death for positioning **the slave** as a subject without agency and maintains that those who managed to dislocate from the nightmare of plantation life ‘**were not** in fact **the living dead’, but ‘the mothers of gasping new societ­ies’** (Brown 2009, 1241). **The Jamaican Maroons** were one such disparate group of Africans who **managed to** band together and **flee** the Jamaican **plantations** in or­der **to create a new mode of living** under their own rule. These ‘run­aways’ were in fact ‘ferocious fight­ers and master strategists’, building towns and military bases which en­abled them to fight and successfully win the war against the British army after 200 years of battle (Gotlieb 2000,16). In addition, the story of the Windward Jamaican Maroons disrupts the phallocentricism in­herent within the story of the slave ‘hero’ by the very revelation that their leader, ‘Queen Nanny’ was a woman (Gotlieb 2000). As a lead­er, she was often ignored by early white historians who dismissed her as an ‘old hagg’ or ‘obeah’ woman (possessor of evil magic powers) (Gotlieb 2000, xvi). Yet, despite these negative descriptors, Nanny presents an interesting image of an African woman in the time of slavery who cultivated an exceptional army and used psychological as well as military force against the English despite not owning sophisticated weapons (Gotlieb 2000). As an oral tale, her story speaks to post-slavery generations through its representa­tion of a figure whose gender defy­ing acts challenged the patriarchal fantasies of the Eurocentric imagi­nary and as such ‘the study of her experiences might change the lives of people living under paternalistic, racist, classist and gender based oppression’ (Gotlieb 2000, 84). **The label of ‘social death’ is** re­jected here on the grounds that it is **a narrative which is positioned from the vantage point of a European** hegemonic **ideology**. Against the social symbolic and its gaze, black slaves were indeed regarded as non-humans since their lives were stunted, diminished and deemed less valuable in comparison to the Europeans. However, Fanon’s (1967) assertion that ‘not only must the black man be black; he must be black in relation to the white man’ (Fanon 1967, 110) helps us to un­derstand that **this classification can only have meaning relative to the symbolic which represents the aliveness of whiteness against the back­drop of the dead** black **slave** (Dyer 1997). Butler (2005) makes it clear that the ‘death’ one suffers relative to the social symbolic is imbued with the fantasy that having constructed the Other and interpellated her into ‘life’, one now holds the sovereignty of determining the subject’s right to live or die: this death, if it is a death, is only the death of a certain kind of sub­ject, one that was never possible to begin with, the death of the fan­tasy of impossible mastery, and so a loss of what one never had, in other words it is a necessary grief (Butler 2005, 65). The point to make here is that al­though **the concept of social death** has proved useful for theorists to de­scribe the metaphysical experience of those who live antagonistically in relation to the social symbolic, it **is** nevertheless **a colonial narrative within which the slaves are confined to a one dimensional story of ter­ror.** In keeping with Gilroy’s (1993b) argument that the memory of slav­ery must be constructed from the slaves’ point of view, we might in­stead concentrate, not on the way in which the slaves are figured within the European social imaginary, but on how **they negotiated their own ideas about self and identity. We** might therefore **find** some **value in studying** a group like the **Maroons who not only managed to create an autonomous world outside of the hegemonic discourse which ne­gated them, but also**, due to their unique circumstances, were forced **to create new modes of communi­cation which would include a myriad of** African cultures, **languages** and creeds (Gottlieb 2000). **This** cre­ative and resistive **energy of** slave **subjectivity not only disrupts the colonial paradigm of socially dead slaves, but also implies the ethical tropes of creation, renewal and mu­tual recognition**. In contrast, the passive slave proved to feature heavily in the 2007 bicentenary commemorations causing journalist Toyin Agbetu to interrupt the official speeches and exclaim that it had turned into a discourse of freedom engineered mostly by whites with stories of black agency excluded 8. Young’s argu­ment that ‘one of the damaging side effects of the focus on white peo­ple’s role in abolition is that Africans are represented as being passive in the face of oppression’, appears to echo the behaviour in the UK today given that a recent research poll re­veals that the black vote turnout is significantly lower than for the white majority electorate and that forty percent of second generation ‘immi­grants’ believe that voting ‘doesn’t matter’.9 Yet, Gilroy (1993a) argues that this political passivity may not simply be a self fulfilling prophecy, but might allude to the ‘lived contra­diction’ of being black and English which affects one’s confidence about whether opinions will be validated in a society that, at its core, still holds on to the fantasy of European supe­riority (Gilroy 1993a). **Without con­sidering the slaves’ capacity for sur­vival and their fundamental role in overthrowing** the **European** regime of **slavery, we limit the use**–value **of the memory and risk becoming overly attached to singular slave subjectivities seeped in death and passivity**. The Maroons story how­ever, enables slave consciousness to rise above the mire of slavery’s abject victims and establishes an ethical relation with our ancestors who lived and survived in the time of slavery.

**5. Anti-blackness is not an ontological antagonism---conflict is inevitable in politics, but does not have to be demarcated around whiteness and blackness**

Peter **Hudson 13**, Political Studies Department, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg , South Africa, has been on the editorial board of the Africa Perspective: The South African Journal of Sociology and Theoria: A Journal of Political and Social Theory and Transformation, and is a member of the Johannesburg Workshop in Theory and Criticism, The state and the colonial unconscious, Social Dynamics: A journal of African studies, 2013/CH

Thus the self-same/other distinction is necessary for the possibility of identity itself. There always has to exist an outside, which is also inside, to the extent it is designated as the impossibility from which the possibility of the existence of the subject derives its rule (Badiou 2009, 220). But although the excluded place which isn’t excluded insofar as it is necessary for the very possibility of inclusion and identity may be universal (may be considered “ontological”), its content (what fills it) – as well as the mode of this filling and its reproduction – are contingent. In other words, the meaning of the signifier of exclusion is not determined once and for all: the place of the place of exclusion, of death is itself over-determined, i.e. the very framework for deciding the other and the same, **exclusion and inclusion, is nowhere engraved in ontological stone but is political and never** terminally **settled.** Put differently, the “curvature of intersubjective space” (Critchley 2007, 61) and thus, the specific **modes of** the “othering” of **“otherness” are nowhere decided in advance (as** a certain **ontological fatalism might have it**) (see Wilderson 2008). **The social does not have to be divided into white and black**, and the meaning of these signifiers is never necessary – because **they are signifiers**. To be sure, **colonialism** institutes an ontological **division**, in that whites exist in a way barred to blacks – who are not. But this ontological relation **is** really on the side of the **ontic** – that is, of all **contingently constructed identities, rather than** the ontology of the social which refers to the **ultimate unfixity**, the indeterminacy or lack of the social. In this sense, then, the white man doesn’t exist, the black man doesn’t exist (Fanon 1968, 165); and neither does the colonial symbolic itself, including its most intimate structuring relations – division is constitutive of the social, not the colonial division**. “Whiteness” may** well **be** very **deeply sediment** in modernity itself, but respect for the “ontological difference” (see Heidegger 1962, 26; Watts 2011, 279) shows up its ontological status as ontic. It may be so deeply sedimented that it becomes difficult even to identify the very possibility of the separation of whiteness from the very possibility of order, **but from this it does not follow that the “void” of “black being” functions as the ultimate substance,** the transcendental signified **on which all possible forms of sociality** are said to **rest.** What gets lost here, then, is the specificity of colonialism, of its constitutive axis, its “ontological” differential. A crucial feature of the colonial symbolic is that the real is not screened off by the imaginary in the way it is under capitalism. At the place of the colonised, the symbolic and the imaginary give way because non-identity (the real of the social) is immediately inscribed in the “lived experience” (vécu) of the colonised subject. The colonised is “traversing the fantasy” (Zizek 2006a, 40–60) all the time; the void of the verb “to be” is the very content of his interpellation. The colonised is, in other words, the subject of anxiety for whom the symbolic and the imaginary never work, who is left stranded by his very interpellation.4 “Fixed” into “non-fixity,” he is eternally suspended between “element” and “moment”5 – he is where the colonial symbolic falters in the production of meaning and is thus the point of entry of the real into the texture itself of colonialism. Be this as it may, **whiteness and blackness are (sustained by**) determinate and **contingent practices** of signification; the “structuring relation” of colonialism thus itself comprises a knot of significations **which**, no matter how tight, **can always be undone.** Anti-colonial – i.e., **anti-“white” –** modes of **struggle** are not (just) “psychic” 6 but **involve** the “**reactivation**” (or “de-sedimentation”)7 **of colonial objectivity** itself. No matter how sedimented (or global), colonial objectivity is not ontologically immune to antagonism. Differentiality, as Zizek insists (see Zizek 2012, chapter 11, 771 n48), immanently entails antagonism in that differentiality both makes possible the existence of any identity whatsoever and at the same time – because it is the presence of one object in another – undermines any identity ever being (fully) itself. Each element in a differential relation is the condition of possibility and the condition of impossibility of each other. It is this dimension of antagonism that the Master Signifier covers over transforming its outside (Other) into an element of itself, reducing it to a condition of its possibility.8 All symbolisation produces an ineradicable excess over itself, something it can’t totalise or make sense of, where its production of meaning falters. This is its internal limit point, its real:9 an errant “object” that has no place of its own, isn’t recognised in the categories of the system but is produced by it – its “part of no part” or “object small a.”10 Correlative to this object “a” is the subject “stricto sensu” – i.e., as the empty subject of the signifier without an identity that pins it down.11 That is the subject of antagonism in confrontation with the real of the social, as distinct from “subject” position based on a determinate identity.

**6. Fatalism DA**

**A. Their alt fails- reject the negative’s totalizing, all or nothing approach to politics---it locks in the status quo through an apocalyptic fatalism regarding the prospects for tangible change**

Jonathan **Smucker 14**, spent most of the past two decades organizing within grassroots social justice movements and organizations in the United States, PhD candidate at the Department of Sociology at University of California, Berkeley, “The danger of fetishizing revolution,” wagingnonviolence.org/feature/danger-fetishizing-revolution/CH

What do contact with extraterrestrials, the return of Jesus Christ, apocalypse, and revolution all have in common? In a sense, they are all imagined redemptions — epic reset buttons for humanity. Onto these we can pin our heartbreaks and frustrations with the world as it is, with all its suffering, mire and messy details. Any of these redemptive apocalypses can serve as the X that solves the daunting problem of our sense of impotency. This messianic X — this unknown and imaginary seismic intervention — might help us to hold onto a kind of hope despite overwhelming evidence of a hopeless reality. Somehow, someday, something will occur that stops the madness, and we will be able to begin anew.¶ **We need hope** — in life and also **in political mobilization**. Hope is an essential ingredient in scaling up collective action beyond the limited pool of martyrs, saints and counter-cultural usual suspects. Organizing large-scale collective power requires something of an art of raising popular hopes and expectations. A long-term vision of a radically transformed world can be an important grounding for such hope. And isn’t such radical transformation precisely the idea of social and political revolution? Isn’t it a bit unfair to include revolution as an item on the same list as the Biblical end of days?¶ Perhaps it is a bit unfair. It depends on whether we mean revolution as horizon or revolution as apocalypse. **Do we imagine a revolutionary restructuring of power relations** in society **as an all-or-nothing totalizing moment or** as an **aspirational horizon**, something to always be moving towards? If the former, then what incentive do we have to study the details of the terrain where we are presently situated? **Why would we** bother to **strategize about overcoming** the **particular** **obstacles** that block our way today, if we believe that the accumulation of all obstacles will ultimately add up to a grand crisis that will somehow magically usher in a new era? Believing that things will “have to get worse before they get better,” **we** may **become disinterested in** — perhaps even sabotaging of — **efforts to improve real**-life **conditions** in the here and now. **After all, why put a band-aid on a gaping wound?** Why prolong the life of an oppressive system? **With such logic we can excuse ourselves from the trouble of getting to know our political terrain**. It is, after all, the very mess we hope to avoid.¶ **If, on the other hand, we imagine revolutionary change as a horizon toward which we orient ourselves, such a vision may be of use, so long as it grounds us in a political struggle** in the here and **now.**¶ Still, let us further interrogate our attachment to the word revolution — even as a horizon. Many of my friends like to think of themselves and their efforts as revolutionary. I am tempted to fancy myself a revolutionary too — it sounds sexy enough — but what does this label really mean today? In the present context in the United States, the words revolution and revolutionary have been mostly emptied of their contents. Their meanings are more than slightly ambiguous. Proponents of revolution range from radical Leftists to libertarians and members of the Tea Party. What does advocating for revolution mean then? Is it not merely a more extreme and totalizing way of advocating for “change”? The question begs itself: What kind of change? And revolution for what?¶ Answering these questions will provide us with our political content. Revolution is not itself the content, but (among) the means we might possibly use to deliver the content. If we are to articulate a horizon to guide our day-to-day political struggle, shouldn’t that horizon be the content of a social vision, rather than scenes from the battles we must fight along the way?¶ Even as a means, revolution is vague and less than instructive. Today in the context of the U.S. Left, **the label revolutionary serves** largely as a reference to inspirational historical moments — and contemporary moments in other countries — and **as a signifier of belonging**, or “getting it,” **within radical subcultures, more than it suggests an instructive** path or **framework for** social, economic and **political change** in our context. When we say “revolution” today — if we mean something beyond an empty signifier of subcultural belonging — we are mostly, vaguely, referring to the overthrow of governments in specific historical circumstances. Social justice-directed revolutions have overthrown monarchies, feudal systems and colonial governments, but the “revolutionary” forces that have overthrown democratic elected governmentsin the past century — however much we may critique how democratic they actually are — have by and large been right-wing reactionary forces, usually through military coups.¶ On the other hand, one could tweak the definition of revolution to make it fit the context of advanced capitalist democracies; one could argue that revolution is about overthrowing the current order. Presently, we are subject to an oppressive capitalist order, and we are working to overthrow that regime. I am fine with the signifying label revolutionary being attributed to me if it is with this intended meaning. But still, what is the point of the label? What is the value added? What does it do for us, besides earning us cool pointsin our little “revolutionary” social clubs? What does it accomplish politically?¶ What am I getting at here? Why does this matter? It matters because, as an ambiguous signifier of belonging within political groups, the word revolutionary can privilege certain tactics and approaches over others. As a signifying label, revolutionary is meant to distinguish a change agent within a broader field of change agents — to marginally differentiate oneself and one’s group within a broader alignment of groups working for social justice-directed change — perhaps even more than it is meant to distinguish us from all-out defenders of the status quo. As such, the posed opposite of revolutionary is less the status quo or an elite power than it is a reform approach to change. In extreme form, this tendency lumps “reformists” together with the status quo and its defenders into one big impenetrable monolith that we “revolutionaries” are unequivocally against. It sets up a false dichotomy of revolution versus reform — a framework that may sometimes hold merit or useful warnings, but that can be paralyzing without further contextualization, clarification and nuance.¶ Where revolution serves as an ambiguous signifier of belonging to radical subcultures, group members may be inclined to do things, to say things, even to wear things that seem “revolutionary,” and to distance themselves from whatever reeks of “reformism,” often including the efforts and organizations of key social blocs that any serious “revolutionary” project must ultimately include in its political alignment. It is true that, in today’s landscape, such efforts and organizations tend to have limited goals and to win compromised victories, if they win at all. **Dismissing** such **reform** efforts as a general principle, **however, does not somehow make one a revolutionary. It is,** rather, **a sign of** purism, **fatalism** and apocalyptic thinking — and often of an abstract “politics” that emerges from a disconnected social position of relative privilege. This amounts to revolution as apocalypse; what is needed is a cataclysmic, nevermind catastrophic, reset. **Any improvement in the situations of real people is dismissed**, perhaps even denounced, **as prolonging** the life of “**the system.”**¶ Of course, not everyone who uses the word revolution is guilty of all or any of the above. After all, it is mostly an empty signifier. Advertisers love to brand the shit they’re selling as “revolutionary” too. The point here is that there can be harm in framing our social, economic and political change efforts in the United States today in a term whose applicability is historically contingent — at least if we lack an analysis of this contingency. The word revolution conjures the idea of overthrowing a government, and as such is descriptive of a particular model and moment of transformation that mostly applies to the radical overhaul of particular kinds of governments in particular historical contexts, namely feudalism, monarchies, dictatorships and colonial governments. As such, our attachment to the abstract idea of revolution might be something like holding a hammer and perceiving every problem one encounters as a nail.¶ Moreover, even in historical revolutionary contexts, revolution has never been a panacea. Problems and injustices still have to be struggled against. “The revolution” is a moment, certainly an important one, but in an ongoing political struggle with no end point. Most of the moments in that struggle are far less spectacular than the moment of dramatic upheaval. In The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism, sociologist Daniel Bell describes how “the real problems arise the ‘day after the revolution,’ when the mundane world again intrudes upon consciousness.” Bell argues that “Our fascination with the apocalypse blinds us to the mundane: the relations of exchange, economic and social; the character of work and occupations; the nature of family life; and the traditional modes of conduct which regulate everyday life.” Social change is “much slower, and the processes more complex than the dramaturgic mode of the apocalyptic vision, religious or revolutionary, would have us believe.”¶ **If we project a totalizing imaginary**-future moment onto our own situation, we may also fixate on present-day moments that seem to carry the essence of our ideas about such an imagined “revolution.” **We may elevate ritualistic signifiers of revolutionary zeal above winning real**-world **victories and above the patient construction of** social **bases of collective power that could win** bigger, more **systemic** — we might even say revolutionary — **changes.**¶ Revolution as apocalypse or as a totalizing moment is highly related to utopianism. The practical implications of the two concepts are equivalent. With both orientations a post-revolutionary, utopian vision of the future can become the distorted lens through which to view the messy present. **Nothing** in present society, including stepping-stone victories, **can measure up to utopian standards**. It is as if the revolutionary or utopian “dreamer” is afraid of contaminating the purity of his or her vision with the grit of real life. In reality, the seeds of society’s “redemption” — the fits and starts of social justice struggles — are always manifest in the fabric of what already exists in society. The job of effective change agents is to identify and encourage these fits and starts; to awaken and empower the “better angels” that we find in our histories and our contemporary cultures; to claim and contest both history and culture, rather than try to build from scratch in the ashes of an imaginary-future apocalypse.¶ This is not at all to suggest that we give up on big structural changes — even including ultimately ending capitalism. To the extent that “revolutionary” means “big structural changes” I am all for being revolutionary. The problem here is not the radicalness of our end goal; the problem is all-or-nothing apocalyptic thinking about political change in the meantime. If the structures of society were to collapse tomorrow, why would society reconstruct itself in a way that substantially differs from its present structure? A revolutionary social justice movement will not magically ascend in the wake of catastrophe.¶ **A movement gains** strength by organizing over time, by showing more and more people that it can succeed. **By winning small victories**, it begins to overcome popular resignation, awakening hope in people that it is possible to fight for something and win — that collective action “gets the goods.” If a movement is incapable of winning even small things, why should anyone believe it capable of winning a revolution — of accelerating “from zero to sixty” in a mere moment? Most people are not going to join our movement because they want to ride with us into the apocalypse; they join when they have enough reason to believe that the movement can act effectively as a vehicle to bring about changes that matter to them. It’s on us to show that this is indeed possible.

**b) Their argument isn’t afro-pessimism, but absolutist despair—their facile antihumanism doesn’t chart us a path towards the end of the world, but instead limits us to total resignation**

**Marriott 12** (David Marriott, “Black Cultural Studies”, Years Work Crit Cult Theory (2012) 20 (1): 37-66) CH

In the concluding pages of Darker Than Blue, Gilroy restates why he finds the ongoing attachment to the idea of race in the US so very unsatisfactory in comparison, say, to the anti-racism of Frantz Fanon: [Fanon’s] ‘audacious commitment to an alternative conception of humanity reconstituted outside ‘‘race’’ [...] is something that does not endear Fanon’s work to today’s practitioners of the facile antihumanism and ethnic absolutism so characteristic of life on US college campuses, where class-based homogeneity combines smoothly with deference to racial and ethic particularity and with resignation to the world as it appears. Fanon disappoints that scholastic constituency by refusing to see culture as an insurmountable obstacle between groups, even if they have been racialized. He does not accept the ‘‘strategic’’ award of an essential innocence to the oppressed and the wretched of the earth. Their past and present sufferings confer no special nobility upon them and are not invested with redemptive insights. Suffering is just suffering, and Fanon has no patience with those who would invoke the armour of incorrigibility around national liberation struggles or minority cultures’. (pp. 157–8, my emphasis) Whatever one might think of the cogency of these remarks (if only because the notion of a non-racial life is predicated on the idea that the human can somehow reside ‘outside’ of race, a humanism that would always then be constitutively compromised by the racism at its frontier), the question of whether US culture can ever escape racial antagonism is the primary focus of Frank B. Wilderson III’s powerful Red, White, and Black: Cinema and the Structure of US Antagonisms, as part of a more general reading of US film culture. And indeed Fanon’s anti-philosophical philosophical critique of racial ontology (historically blacks were seen as part of existence but not, as yet, part of human being, a not-yet that forces Fanon to rethink the teleological form of the human as already and essentially violent in its separation from the state of nature from which it has come) forms a major part of Wilderson’s conception of anti-blackness as the major structural antagonism of US history and culture. It is against the conception that racism could ever be simply contingent to black experience that Wilderson protests, reflecting on the fact that racial slavery has no parallel to other forms of suffering, and perhaps most strikingly social death is the constitutive essence of black existence in the US. In brief, slavery remains so originary, in the sense of what he calls its ‘accumulation and fungibility’ (terms borrowed from Saidiya Hartman), it not only has no ‘analogy’ to other forms of antagonism— Wilderson’s examples are the Holocaust and Native American genocide— there is simply no process of getting over it, of recovering from the loss (as wound, or trauma): as such, slavery remains the ultimate structure of antagonism in the US. Whether at a personal level or at the level of historical process, if ‘black slavery is foundational to modern Humanism’, then any teleological appeal to a humanism beyond racism is doomed from the start (p. 22). The problem with Wilderson’s argument, however, is that it remains of a piece with the manichean imperatives that beset it, and which by definition are structurally uppermost, which means that he can only confirm those imperatives as absolutes rather than chart a dialectical path beyond them, insofar as, structurally speaking, there is no ‘outside’ to black social death and alienation, or no outside to this outside, and all that thought can do is mirror its own enslavement by race. This is not so much ‘afro-pessimism’— a term coined by Wilderson—as thought wedded to its own despair.

**The Afro-Pessimism Critique**

**Notes**

This file was cut and produced by the Michigan Debate Institutes 2016 Kritik Lab, specifically by the house that Frank, Hortense, Saidiya, and Jared built; led by Marquis Ard.

**1NCs**

**General**

**State action and institutional ethics makes anti-blackness worse - erases the exploitation of the black body**

**Wilderson**, award-winning author of Incognegro: A Memoir of Exile and Apartheid. He is one of two Americans to hold elected office in the African National Congress and is a former insurgent in the ANC’s armed wing, **2010** (Frank B. III “Introduction: Unspeakable Ethics” *Red, White, & Black: Cinema and the Strucure of U.S.* Antagonisms, Pg 15-16)/MR

Regarding the Black position, some might ask why, after claims successfully made on the state by the Civil Rights Movement, do I insist on positing an operational analyticfor cinema, film studies, and political theory that appears to be a dichotomous and essentialist pairing of Masters and Slaves? In other words, why should we think of today’s Blacks in the US as Slaves and everyone else (with the exception of Indians) as Masters? One could answer these questions by demonstrating how nothing remotely approaching claims successfully made on the State has come to pass. In other words, **the election of a Black President aside, police brutality, mass incarceration, segregated and substandard schools and housing, astronomical rates of HIV infection, and the threat of being turned away en masse at the polls still constitute the lived experience of Black life**. But **such empirically based rejoinders would lead us in the wrong direction**; we would find ourselves on “solid” ground, which would only mystify, rather than clarify, the question. We would be forced to appeal to “facts,” the “historical record,” and empirical markers of stasis and change, all of which could be turned on their head with more of the same. Underlying such a downward spiral into sociology, political science, history, and/or public policy debates would be the very rubric that I am calling into question: **the grammar of suffering known as exploitation and alienation, the assumptive logic whereby subjective dispossession is arrived at in the calculations between those who sell labor power and those who acquire it.** The Black qua the worker. Orlando Patterson has already dispelled this faulty ontological grammar in Slavery and Social Death, where he demonstrates how and why work, or forced labor, is not a constituent element of slavery. Once the “solid” plank of “work” is removed from slavery, then the conceptually coherent notion of “claims against the state”—**the proposition that the state and civil society are elastic enough to even contemplate the possibility of an emancipatory project for the Black position—disintegrates into thin air**. The imaginary of the state and civil society is parasitic on the Middle Passage. Put another way: no slave, no world. And, in addition, as Patterson argues, no slave is in the world. If, as an ontological position, that is, as a grammar of suffering, **the Slave is not a laborer but an anti-Human, a positionality against which Humanity establishes, maintains, and renews it coherence, its corporeal integrity; if the Slave is**, to borrow from Patterson, **generally dishonored**, perpetually open to gratuitous violence, and void of kinship structure, that is, having no relations that need be recognized, a being outside of relationality, **then our analysis cannot be approached through the rubric of gains or reversals in struggles with the state and civil society.**

**The world writ large and civil society are preconditioned on the destruction of those in the black positionality**

**Wilderson 03** [Frank, Professor at UC Irvine, “The Prison Slave as Hegemony’s (Silent) Scandal”, P. 22]//MHELLIE

**There is something organic to black positionality that makes it essential to the destruction of civil society**. There is nothing willful or speculative in this statement, for one could just as well state the claim the other way around: **There is something organic to civil society that makes it essential to the destruction of the Black body.** Blackness is a positionality of "absolute dereliction" (Fanon), abandonment, in the face of civil society, and therefore cannot establish itself, or be established

**The only possible demand is one that calls for the end of the world itself—the affirmative represents a conflict within the paradigm of America but refuses to challenge the foundational antagonism that produces the violence that undergirds the same paradigm**

**Wilderson ’10** {Frank; Associate Professor of African-American Studies at UC Irvine and has a Ph.D. from UC Berkeley; “Red, White & Black: Cinema and the Structure of U.S. Antagonisms,” p. }/MR

Leaving aside for the moment their state of mind, it would seem that **the structure**, that is to say the rebar, or better still the grammar **of their demands**—and, by extension, the grammar of their suffering—was indeed an ethical grammar. Perhaps **their grammars are the only ethical grammars available to** modern politics and **modernity** writ large, for **they draw** our **attention not to the way in which space and time are used and abused by** enfranchised and violently **powerful interests, but to the violence that underwrites the modern world’s capacity to think, act, and exist spatially and temporally**. The violence that robbed her of her body and him of his land provided the stage upon which other violent and consensual dramas could be enacted. Thus, they would have to be crazy, crazy enough to **call not merely the actions of the world to account but to call the world itself to account**, and to account for them no less! **The womyn** at Columbia **was not demanding to be a participant in an unethical network of distribution: she was not demanding a place within capital, a piece of the pie** (the demand for her sofa notwithstanding). Rather, she was articulating a triangulation between, on the one hand, the loss of her body, the very dereliction of her corporeal integrity, what Hortense Spillers charts as the transition from being a being to becoming a “being for the captor” (206), the drama of value (the stage upon which surplus value is extracted from labor power through commodity production and sale); and on the other, the corporeal integrity that, once ripped from her body, fortified and extended the corporeal integrity of everyone else on the street. She gave birth to the commodity and to the Human, yet she had neither subjectivity nor a sofa to show for it. In her eyes**, the world**—and **not its myriad discriminatory practices, but the world itself—was unethical**. And yet, the world passes by her without the slightest inclination to stop and disabuse her of her claim. Instead, it calls her “crazy.” And to what does the world attribute the Native American man’s insanity? “He’s crazy if he thinks he’s getting any money out of us”? Surely, that doesn’t make him crazy. Rather it is simply an indication that **he does not have a big enough gun.** What are we to make of a world that **responds to the most lucid enunciation of ethics with violence**? What are the foundational questions of the ethico-political? Why are these questions so scandalous that they are rarely posed politically, intellectually, and cinematically—unless they are posed obliquely and unconsciously, as if by accident? Return Turtle Island to the “Savage.” **Repair the demolished subjectivity of the Slave.** Two simple sentences, thirteen simple words, and **the structure of U.S. (and** perhaps **global) antagonisms would be dismantled. An “ethical modernity” would no longer sound like an oxymoron. From there we could busy ourselves with important conflicts that have been promoted to the level of antagonisms: class struggle, gender conflict, immigrants rights.** When pared down to thirteen words and two sentences, one cannot but wonder why **questions that go to the heart of the ethico-political, questions of political ontology, are so unspeakable in intellectual meditations, political broadsides**, and even socially and politically engaged feature films. Clearly they can be spoken, even a child could speak those lines, so they would pose no problem for a scholar, an activist, or a filmmaker. And yet, what is also clear—if the filmographies of socially and politically engaged directors, the **archive of progressive scholars**, and the plethora of Left-wing broadsides are anything to go by—**is that what can so easily be spoken is now** (five hundred years and two hundred fifty million Settlers/Masters on) so ubiquitously unspoken that these two simple sentences, these thirteen words not only render their speaker “crazy” but become themselves **impossible to imagine**. Soon it will be forty years since radical politics, Left-leaning scholarship, and socially engaged feature films began to speak the unspeakable. In the 1960s and early 1970s **the questions asked by radical politics and scholarship were not “Should the U.S. be overthrown?**” or even “Would it be overthrown?” **but rather when and how**—and, for some, what—would come in its wake. Those steadfast in their conviction that **there remained a discernable quantum of ethics** in the U.S. writ large (and here I am speaking of everyone from Martin Luther King, Jr., prior to his 1968 shift, to the Tom Hayden wing of SDS, to the Julian Bond and Marion Barry faction of SNCC, to Bobbie Kennedy Democrats) **were accountable**, in their rhetorical machinations, **to the paradigmatic zeitgeist of the Black Panthers, the American Indian Movement, and the Weather Underground**. Radicals and **progressives could deride**, reject, or chastise **armed struggle mercilessly** and cavalierly with respect to tactics and the possibility of “success,” but **they could not dismiss revolution-as-ethic because they could not make a convincing case**—by way of a paradigmatic analysis—**that the U.S. was** an **ethical** formation and still hope to maintain credibility as radicals and progressives. Even Bobby Kennedy (a U.S. attorney general and presidential candidate) mused that the law and its enforcers had no ethical standing in the presence of Blacks. One could (and many did) acknowledge America’s strength and power. This seldom, however, rose to the level of an ethical assessment, but rather remained an assessment of the so-called “balance of forces.” The political discourse of Blacks, and to a lesser extent Indians, circulated too widely to credibly wed the U.S. and ethics. The raw force of COINTELPRO put an end to this trajectory toward a possible hegemony of ethical accountability. Consequently, **the power of Blackness** and Redness **to pose the question**—and the power to pose the question is the greatest power of all—**retreated as did White radicals and progressives who “retired” from struggle.** **The question’s echo lies buried in the graves of young Black Panthers, AIM Warriors, and Black Liberation Army soldiers**, or in prison cells **where so many of them have been** rotting (some in solitary confinement) for ten, twenty, thirty years, **and at the gates of the academy where the “crazies” shout at passers-by. Gone are** not only **the** young and vibrant **voices that affected a seismic shift on the political landscape**, but also the intellectual protocols of inquiry, and with them a spate of feature films that became authorized, if not by an unabashed revolutionary polemic, then certainly by a **revolutionary zeitgeist**. Is it still possible for a dream of unfettered ethics, **a dream of the Settlement and the Slave estate’s destruction**, to manifest itself at the ethical core of cinematic discourse, when this dream is no longer a constituent element of political discourse in the streets nor of intellectual discourse in the academy? The answer is “no” in the sense that, as history has shown, what cannot be articulated as political discourse in the streets is doubly foreclosed upon in screenplays and in scholarly prose; but “yes” in the sense that in even the most taciturn historical moments such as ours, the grammar of Black and Red suffering breaks in on this foreclosure, albeit like the somatic compliance of hysterical symptoms—it registers in both cinema and scholarship as symptoms of awareness of the structural antagonisms. Between 1967 and 1980, we could think cinematically and intellectually of Blackness and Redness as having the coherence of full-blown discourses. But from 1980 to the present, Blackness and Redness manifests only in the rebar of cinematic and intellectual (political) discourse, that is, as unspoken grammars. This grammar can be discerned in the cinematic strategies (lighting, camera angles, image composition, and acoustic strategies/design), even **when the script labors for the spectator to imagine social turmoil through the rubric of conflict** (that is, **a rubric of problems that can be posed and conceptually solved) as opposed to the rubric of antagonism (an irreconcilable struggle between entities**, or positionalities, **the resolution of which is not dialectical but entails the obliteration of one of the positions)**. In other words, even when films narrate a story in which Blacks or Indians are beleaguered with problems that the script insists are conceptually coherent (usually having to do with poverty or the absence of “family values”), the non-narrative, or cinematic, strategies of the film often disrupt this coherence by posing the irreconcilable questions of Red and Black political ontology—or non-ontology. **The grammar of antagonism breaks in on the mendacity of conflict**. Semiotics and linguistics teach us that when we speak, our grammar goes unspoken. Our grammar is assumed. It is the structure through which the labor of speech is possible. Likewise, the grammar of political ethics—the grammar of assumptions regarding the ontology of suffering—which underwrite Film Theory and political discourse (in this book, discourse elaborated in direct relation to radical action), and which underwrite cinematic speech (in this book, Red, White, and Black films from the mid-1960s to the present) is also unspoken. This notwithstanding, film theory, political discourse, and cinema assume an ontological grammar, a structure of suffering. And **the structure of suffering** which film theory, political discourse, and cinema assume **crowds out other structures of suffering, regardless of the sentiment of the film or the spirit of unity mobilized by the political discourse in question**. To put a finer point on it, structures of ontological suffering stand in antagonistic, rather then conflictual, relation to one another (despite the fact that antagonists themselves may not be aware of the ontological positionality from which they speak). Though this is perhaps the most controversial and out-of-step claim of this book, it is, nonetheless, the foundation of the close reading of feature films and political theory that follows.

**Vote neg – freedom is an illusion created by the shackles of civil society, we must burn the 1AC to the ground  
Farley 5 –** Boston College (Anthony, “Perfecting Slavery”, <http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1028&context=lsfp)> \*edited for gendered languageWhat is to be done? Two hundred years ago, when the slaves in Haiti rose up, they, of necessity, burned everything: They burned San Domingo flat so that at the end of the war it was a charred desert. Why do you burn everything? asked a French officer of a prisoner. We have a right to burn what we cultivate because a[person] ~~man~~ has a right to dispose of his own labour, was the reply of this unknown anarchist. 48 The slaves burned everything because everything was against them. Everything was against the slaves, the entire order that it was their lot to follow, the entire order in which they were positioned as worse than senseless things, every plantation, everything. 49 “Leave nothing white behind you,” said Toussaint to those dedicated to the end of white-overblack. 50 “God gave Noah the rainbow sign. No more water, the fire next time.” 51 The slaves burned everything, yes, but, unfortunately, they only burned everything in Haiti. 52 Theirs was the greatest and most successful revolution in the history of the world but the failure of their fire to cross the waters was the great tragedy of the nineteenth century. 53 At the dawn of the twentieth century, W.E.B. Du Bois wrote, “The colorline belts the world.” 54 Du Bois said that the problem of the twentieth century was the problem of the colorline. 55 The problem, now, at the dawn of the twenty-first century is the problem of the colorline. The colorline continues to belt the world. Indeed, the slave power that is the United States now threatens an entire world with the death that it has become and so the slaves of yesterday, today, and tomorrow, those with nothing but their chains to lose, must, if they would be free, if they would escape slavery, win the entire world. We begin as children. We are called and we become our response to the call. Slaves are not called. What becomes of them? What becomes of the broken-hearted? The slaves are divided souls, they are brokenhearted, the slaves are split asunder by what they are called upon to become. The slaves are called upon to become objects but objecthood is not a calling. The slave, then, during its loneliest loneliness, is divided from itself. This is schizophrenia. The slaves are not called, or, rather, the slaves are called to not be. The slaves are called unfree but this the living can never be and so the slaves burst apart and die. The slaves begin as death, not as children, and death is not a beginning but an end. There is no progress and no exit from the undiscovered country of the slave, or so it seems. We are trained to think through a progress narrative, a grand narrative, the grandest narrative, that takes us up from slavery. There is no up from slavery. The progress from slavery to the end of history is the progress from white-over-black to white-over-black to white-overblack. The progress of slavery runs in the opposite direction of the pastpresent-future timeline. The slave only becomes the perfect slave at the end of the timeline, only under conditions of total juridical freedom. It is only under conditions of freedom, of bourgeois legality, that the slave can perfect itself as a slave by freely choosing to bow down before its master. The slave perfects itself as a slave by offering a prayer for equal rights. The system of marks is a plantation. The system of property is a plantation. The system of law is a plantation. These plantations, all part of the same system, hierarchy, produce white-overblack, white-over-black only, and that continually. The slave perfects itself as a slave through its prayers for equal rights. The plantation system will not commit suicide and the slave, as stated above, has knowing non-knowledge of this fact. The slave finds its way back from the undiscovered country only by burning down every plantation. When the slave prays for equal rights it makes the free choice to be dead, and it makes the free choice to not be. Education is the call. We are called to be and then we become something. We become that which we make of ourselves. We follow the call, we pursue a calling. Freedom is the only calling—it alone contains all possible directions, all of the choices that may later blossom into the fullness of our lives. We can only be free. Slavery is death. How do slaves die? Slaves are not born, they are made. The slave must be trained to be that which the living cannot be. The only thing that the living are not free to be is dead. The slave must be trained to follow the call that is not a call. The slave must be trained to pursue the calling that is not a calling. The slave must be trained to objecthood. The slave must become death. Slavery is white-over-black. White-over-black is death. White-over-black, death, then, is what the slave must become to pursue its calling that is not a calling.

**Economic Engagement**

**State action and institutional ethics makes anti-blackness worse - erases the exploitation of the black body**

**Wilderson**, award-winning author of Incognegro: A Memoir of Exile and Apartheid. He is one of two Americans to hold elected office in the African National Congress and is a former insurgent in the ANC’s armed wing, **2010** (Frank B. III “Introduction: Unspeakable Ethics” *Red, White, & Black: Cinema and the Strucure of U.S.* Antagonisms, Pg 15-16)/MR

Regarding the Black position, some might ask why, after claims successfully made on the state by the Civil Rights Movement, do I insist on positing an operational analyticfor cinema, film studies, and political theory that appears to be a dichotomous and essentialist pairing of Masters and Slaves? In other words, why should we think of today’s Blacks in the US as Slaves and everyone else (with the exception of Indians) as Masters? One could answer these questions by demonstrating how nothing remotely approaching claims successfully made on the State has come to pass. In other words, **the election of a Black President aside, police brutality, mass incarceration, segregated and substandard schools and housing, astronomical rates of HIV infection, and the threat of being turned away en masse at the polls still constitute the lived experience of Black life**. But **such empirically based rejoinders would lead us in the wrong direction**; we would find ourselves on “solid” ground, which would only mystify, rather than clarify, the question. We would be forced to appeal to “facts,” the “historical record,” and empirical markers of stasis and change, all of which could be turned on their head with more of the same. Underlying such a downward spiral into sociology, political science, history, and/or public policy debates would be the very rubric that I am calling into question: **the grammar of suffering known as exploitation and alienation, the assumptive logic whereby subjective dispossession is arrived at in the calculations between those who sell labor power and those who acquire it.** The Black qua the worker. Orlando Patterson has already dispelled this faulty ontological grammar in Slavery and Social Death, where he demonstrates how and why work, or forced labor, is not a constituent element of slavery. Once the “solid” plank of “work” is removed from slavery, then the conceptually coherent notion of “claims against the state”—**the proposition that the state and civil society are elastic enough to even contemplate the possibility of an emancipatory project for the Black position—disintegrates into thin air**. The imaginary of the state and civil society is parasitic on the Middle Passage. Put another way: no slave, no world. And, in addition, as Patterson argues, no slave is in the world. If, as an ontological position, that is, as a grammar of suffering, **the Slave is not a laborer but an anti-Human, a positionality against which Humanity establishes, maintains, and renews it coherence, its corporeal integrity; if the Slave is**, to borrow from Patterson, **generally dishonored**, perpetually open to gratuitous violence, and void of kinship structure, that is, having no relations that need be recognized, a being outside of relationality, **then our analysis cannot be approached through the rubric of gains or reversals in struggles with the state and civil society.**

**The world writ large and civil society are preconditioned on the destruction of those in the black positionality**

**Wilderson 03,** [Frank, Professor at UC Irvine, “The Prison Slave as Hegemony’s (Silent) Scandal”, P. 22]//MHELLIE

**There is something organic to black positionality that makes it essential to the destruction of civil society**. There is nothing willful or speculative in this statement, for one could just as well state the claim the other way around: **There is something organic to civil society that makes it essential to the destruction of the Black body.** Blackness is a positionality of "absolute dereliction" (Fanon), abandonment, in the face of civil society, and therefore cannot establish itself, or be established

**Chattel Slavery and the slave ship in particular are foundational to modern systems of domination and neoliberalism.**

**Dillon 13**, [Stephen, “Fugitive Life: race, gender, and the rise of the neoliberal-carceral state”, P. 69-71]//MHELLIE

Chattel slavery is central to the contemporary politics of the market in addition to the politics of life and death in general. Indeed, terror’s constitutive relationship to the production and management of race began on the “floating dungeon” of the slave ship. As a paradigmatic technology of modernity, the slave ship—a machine that was simultaneously a prison, a factory, a market, and an instrument of warfare—and its social relations inaugurated the economic, discursive, and institutional life of transnational capitalism.136 The carceral, the imperial, and the industrial were intertwined in the biopolitical regulation of black life, the expansion of capital, and the production of blackness, whiteness, and white supremacy. **The slave trade produced methods for controlling populations; disciplining, torturing, and immobilizing the body; regulating health and hygiene; and extending the market beyond the economic**. Additionally, it produced regimes of race and racism wherein blackness was subjected to “open and absolute vulnerability,” making white life dependent upon black (living) death.137 In short, the slave trade inaugurated methods for ranking life and measuring value that have yet to be undone.138 We can position slavery and its various technologies of domination (ship, plantation, sexual violence, management of birth) as preceding Giorgio Agamben’s argument that the concentration camp is the paradigmatic figure of modernity.139 In Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, Agamben argues that the juridico-political structure of the camp is a “hidden matrix of the politics in which we are still living.”140 For Agamben, the camp is the “new biopolitical nomos of our planet,” and our future resides in our ability to recognize the ways that the camp inhabits and drives the architecture of cities, airports, and the distribution of life and death across the globe. The camp is not a historical anomaly but a temporal and spatial structure that is continually brought back to life. That is, it may change name and shape but its function remains the same. As with Agamben’s call to see space, time, and power in a new way in order to make visible the camp’s possession of our everyday, I am arguing that we must learn to see the spirit of slavery in spectacles of racialized violence and death. In addition, we must also learn to recognize it in the operations that go by the names freedom, humanity, and democracy. Such a project requires an understanding that the biopolitics and necropolitics of slavery are not relegated to an amputated past, nor do they reside in a time progress will soon leave behind. Rather, the slave trade’s logics and technologies have intensified, expanded, and become more insidious. The past does more than repeat: it envelops, seduces, and multiplies.141

**The only possible demand is one that calls for the end of the world itself—the affirmative represents a conflict within the paradigm of America but refuses to challenge the foundational antagonism that produces the violence that undergirds the same paradigm**

**Wilderson ’10** {Frank; Associate Professor of African-American Studies at UC Irvine and has a Ph.D. from UC Berkeley; “Red, White & Black: Cinema and the Structure of U.S. Antagonisms,” p. }/MR

Leaving aside for the moment their state of mind, it would seem that **the structure**, that is to say the rebar, or better still the grammar **of their demands**—and, by extension, the grammar of their suffering—was indeed an ethical grammar. Perhaps **their grammars are the only ethical grammars available to** modern politics and **modernity** writ large, for **they draw** our **attention not to the way in which space and time are used and abused by** enfranchised and violently **powerful interests, but to the violence that underwrites the modern world’s capacity to think, act, and exist spatially and temporally**. The violence that robbed her of her body and him of his land provided the stage upon which other violent and consensual dramas could be enacted. Thus, they would have to be crazy, crazy enough to **call not merely the actions of the world to account but to call the world itself to account**, and to account for them no less! **The womyn** at Columbia **was not demanding to be a participant in an unethical network of distribution: she was not demanding a place within capital, a piece of the pie** (the demand for her sofa notwithstanding). Rather, she was articulating a triangulation between, on the one hand, the loss of her body, the very dereliction of her corporeal integrity, what Hortense Spillers charts as the transition from being a being to becoming a “being for the captor” (206), the drama of value (the stage upon which surplus value is extracted from labor power through commodity production and sale); and on the other, the corporeal integrity that, once ripped from her body, fortified and extended the corporeal integrity of everyone else on the street. She gave birth to the commodity and to the Human, yet she had neither subjectivity nor a sofa to show for it. In her eyes**, the world**—and **not its myriad discriminatory practices, but the world itself—was unethical**. And yet, the world passes by her without the slightest inclination to stop and disabuse her of her claim. Instead, it calls her “crazy.” And to what does the world attribute the Native American man’s insanity? “He’s crazy if he thinks he’s getting any money out of us”? Surely, that doesn’t make him crazy. Rather it is simply an indication that **he does not have a big enough gun.** What are we to make of a world that **responds to the most lucid enunciation of ethics with violence**? What are the foundational questions of the ethico-political? Why are these questions so scandalous that they are rarely posed politically, intellectually, and cinematically—unless they are posed obliquely and unconsciously, as if by accident? Return Turtle Island to the “Savage.” **Repair the demolished subjectivity of the Slave.** Two simple sentences, thirteen simple words, and **the structure of U.S. (and** perhaps **global) antagonisms would be dismantled. An “ethical modernity” would no longer sound like an oxymoron. From there we could busy ourselves with important conflicts that have been promoted to the level of antagonisms: class struggle, gender conflict, immigrants rights.** When pared down to thirteen words and two sentences, one cannot but wonder why **questions that go to the heart of the ethico-political, questions of political ontology, are so unspeakable in intellectual meditations, political broadsides**, and even socially and politically engaged feature films. Clearly they can be spoken, even a child could speak those lines, so they would pose no problem for a scholar, an activist, or a filmmaker. And yet, what is also clear—if the filmographies of socially and politically engaged directors, the **archive of progressive scholars**, and the plethora of Left-wing broadsides are anything to go by—**is that what can so easily be spoken is now** (five hundred years and two hundred fifty million Settlers/Masters on) so ubiquitously unspoken that these two simple sentences, these thirteen words not only render their speaker “crazy” but become themselves **impossible to imagine**. Soon it will be forty years since radical politics, Left-leaning scholarship, and socially engaged feature films began to speak the unspeakable. In the 1960s and early 1970s **the questions asked by radical politics and scholarship were not “Should the U.S. be overthrown?**” or even “Would it be overthrown?” **but rather when and how**—and, for some, what—would come in its wake. Those steadfast in their conviction that **there remained a discernable quantum of ethics** in the U.S. writ large (and here I am speaking of everyone from Martin Luther King, Jr., prior to his 1968 shift, to the Tom Hayden wing of SDS, to the Julian Bond and Marion Barry faction of SNCC, to Bobbie Kennedy Democrats) **were accountable**, in their rhetorical machinations, **to the paradigmatic zeitgeist of the Black Panthers, the American Indian Movement, and the Weather Underground**. Radicals and **progressives could deride**, reject, or chastise **armed struggle mercilessly** and cavalierly with respect to tactics and the possibility of “success,” but **they could not dismiss revolution-as-ethic because they could not make a convincing case**—by way of a paradigmatic analysis—**that the U.S. was** an **ethical** formation and still hope to maintain credibility as radicals and progressives. Even Bobby Kennedy (a U.S. attorney general and presidential candidate) mused that the law and its enforcers had no ethical standing in the presence of Blacks. One could (and many did) acknowledge America’s strength and power. This seldom, however, rose to the level of an ethical assessment, but rather remained an assessment of the so-called “balance of forces.” The political discourse of Blacks, and to a lesser extent Indians, circulated too widely to credibly wed the U.S. and ethics. The raw force of COINTELPRO put an end to this trajectory toward a possible hegemony of ethical accountability. Consequently, **the power of Blackness** and Redness **to pose the question**—and the power to pose the question is the greatest power of all—**retreated as did White radicals and progressives who “retired” from struggle.** **The question’s echo lies buried in the graves of young Black Panthers, AIM Warriors, and Black Liberation Army soldiers**, or in prison cells **where so many of them have been** rotting (some in solitary confinement) for ten, twenty, thirty years, **and at the gates of the academy where the “crazies” shout at passers-by. Gone are** not only **the** young and vibrant **voices that affected a seismic shift on the political landscape**, but also the intellectual protocols of inquiry, and with them a spate of feature films that became authorized, if not by an unabashed revolutionary polemic, then certainly by a **revolutionary zeitgeist**. Is it still possible for a dream of unfettered ethics, **a dream of the Settlement and the Slave estate’s destruction**, to manifest itself at the ethical core of cinematic discourse, when this dream is no longer a constituent element of political discourse in the streets nor of intellectual discourse in the academy? The answer is “no” in the sense that, as history has shown, what cannot be articulated as political discourse in the streets is doubly foreclosed upon in screenplays and in scholarly prose; but “yes” in the sense that in even the most taciturn historical moments such as ours, the grammar of Black and Red suffering breaks in on this foreclosure, albeit like the somatic compliance of hysterical symptoms—it registers in both cinema and scholarship as symptoms of awareness of the structural antagonisms. Between 1967 and 1980, we could think cinematically and intellectually of Blackness and Redness as having the coherence of full-blown discourses. But from 1980 to the present, Blackness and Redness manifests only in the rebar of cinematic and intellectual (political) discourse, that is, as unspoken grammars. This grammar can be discerned in the cinematic strategies (lighting, camera angles, image composition, and acoustic strategies/design), even **when the script labors for the spectator to imagine social turmoil through the rubric of conflict** (that is, **a rubric of problems that can be posed and conceptually solved) as opposed to the rubric of antagonism (an irreconcilable struggle between entities**, or positionalities, **the resolution of which is not dialectical but entails the obliteration of one of the positions)**. In other words, even when films narrate a story in which Blacks or Indians are beleaguered with problems that the script insists are conceptually coherent (usually having to do with poverty or the absence of “family values”), the non-narrative, or cinematic, strategies of the film often disrupt this coherence by posing the irreconcilable questions of Red and Black political ontology—or non-ontology. **The grammar of antagonism breaks in on the mendacity of conflict**. Semiotics and linguistics teach us that when we speak, our grammar goes unspoken. Our grammar is assumed. It is the structure through which the labor of speech is possible. Likewise, the grammar of political ethics—the grammar of assumptions regarding the ontology of suffering—which underwrite Film Theory and political discourse (in this book, discourse elaborated in direct relation to radical action), and which underwrite cinematic speech (in this book, Red, White, and Black films from the mid-1960s to the present) is also unspoken. This notwithstanding, film theory, political discourse, and cinema assume an ontological grammar, a structure of suffering. And **the structure of suffering** which film theory, political discourse, and cinema assume **crowds out other structures of suffering, regardless of the sentiment of the film or the spirit of unity mobilized by the political discourse in question**. To put a finer point on it, structures of ontological suffering stand in antagonistic, rather then conflictual, relation to one another (despite the fact that antagonists themselves may not be aware of the ontological positionality from which they speak). Though this is perhaps the most controversial and out-of-step claim of this book, it is, nonetheless, the foundation of the close reading of feature films and political theory that follows.

**The technologies of the slave ship have proliferated globally. The duplicitous nature of neoliberal freedom constructs subjection as liberation by revolutionizing new technologies of subjugation. Furthermore, state regulation of economic activity uniquely limits political freedom through the will to dominate. The logic of the market necessitates the construction and subsequent exclusion of those deemed “other” to maintain profit and productivity.**

**Dillon 13**, [Stephen, “Fugitive Life: race, gender, and the rise of the neoliberal-carceral state”, P. 146-151]//MHELLIE

The power of Friedman’s text lies in its ability to produce new forms of subjection through an argument concerning the expansion of freedom. In his attempt to construct a theory of freedom, Friedman reinstalls what he understands to be domination and subjugation within the very practice he names liberty. Freedom, in the text, operates through a type of “melancholic logic,” where freedom becomes its opposite.323 **Neoliberal freedom resurrects the forms of discipline, regulation, and domination it attempts to abolish—it is haunted by (and becomes) what it repudiates**. In other words, neoliberal freedom is possessed by and reproduces the forms of unfreedom it attempts to resign to the past. The power of the language of neoliberal freedom stems from this process—neoliberal thought made subjection look like liberation by allowing new methods of control and regulation to emerge in an era marked by what appeared to be the rise of new forms of liberty. The underground and the fugitive were two formations that emerged to name and challenge this new system of knowledge and governmentality. Throughout Capitalism and Freedom, Friedman argues that political freedom, “the absence of coercion by other men,” requires economic freedom, “the voluntary cooperation of individuals.”324 For Friedman, freedom is destroyed by the concentration of state power. Each chapter of the text describes how state regulation occurs, and why it should not, in the realms of education, trade, finance, discrimination law, licensing, and welfare. For example, someone who is “not free to follow the occupation of his choosing” unless they get a license for it is deprived of “an essential part of his freedom.”325 Or someone who appeases the “taste of the community” by only hiring white workers is denied the freedom to run their business as they wish by the state tyranny of fair hiring laws. **Thus, state regulation of economic activity prevents political freedom.** In this case, as with most examples in the text, political freedom means the right for someone to do what they want, when they want, as long as the action exists within a system of free exchange between private individuals. The basic rules for the governance of the free market are: “Co-operation is strictly individual and voluntary provided: (a) the enterprises are private, so that the ultimate contracting parties are individuals and (b) that individuals are effectively free to enter or not enter into any particular exchange, so that every transaction is strictly voluntary.”326 For Friedman, African American workers could simply choose to work for a different business that does not discriminate. Under the free market, the consumer and worker are protected from harm by the presence of other businesses and employers.327 In this way, “the technique of the marketplace” produces freedom in the form of the “voluntary co-operation of individuals.”328 Political freedom follows where economic freedom flourishes, or as Friedman puts it, “exchange can...bring about co-ordination with out coercion.”329 The imagined absence of coercion and force in the economic realm means freedom will proliferate. **In short, freedom advances when power disappears**.330 And power is a possession held by the state, while freedom is a localizable space that is more absence than form. The ghosts of neoliberal freedom rise and take form when Friedman describes the role of the state: “Its major function must be to protect our freedom from the enemies outside our gates and from our fellow-citizens: to preserve law and order, to enforce private contracts, to foster competitive markets.”331 Within this formulation, the free market is not actually free; the state, according to Friedman, must regulate the freedom of the market. As Nikolas Rose has observed, constructing a free market seems to necessitate innumerable interventions by “accountants, management consultants, lawyers and industrial relations specialists and marketing experts in order to establish the conditions under which the ‘laws of supply and demand’ can make themselves real.”332 **The free market is not to be left to its own devices; its freedom must be fostered by the soft regulations of the state.** The market’s freedom must be regulated and disciplined in order to provide governance to a social world “dismembered by liberal individualism.”333 In essence, Friedman’s notion of economic freedom inaugurates the unfreedom it seeks to escape—economic freedom must be fostered and enforced. While the state, in Friedman’s theory, should be weak enough to free the economic from any and all constraint, it must also have the force necessary to eliminate “domestic and foreign enemies.” Throughout the text Friedman emphasizes that the state must maintain “law and order to prevent physical coercion of one individual by another and to enforce the contracts voluntarily entered into, thus giving substance to the ‘private.’”334 Law and order is the precondition for “voluntary exchange.”335 It is what gives shape to the private sphere. The market’s freedom needed protecting—freedom required containment and control. The brilliance of Friedman’s use of the phrase “law and order” was that it could name blackness as a threat to the market without ever mentioning race. As a racial liberal, Friedman could deploy the race-neutral language of law and order while still invoking a racialized other—the “domestic and foreign enemies” who threatened the free market and freedom itself. In fact, Friedman was very clear about what must be done to the others of neoliberal freedom: “Freedom is a tenable objective only for responsible individuals. We do not believe in freedom for madmen or for children. The necessity of drawing a line between responsible individuals and others is inescapable, yet it means that there is an essential ambiguity to our ultimate objective of freedom. Paternalism is inescapable for those whom we designate as not responsible.”336 The compromise for the liberal is to accept that “paternalism” is necessary in some aspects of life, for some people. The fictional coercion-free exchange that occurs between two individuals is made possible by the racial violence of the law and the police. Life and freedom as Friedman conceptualized them are the products of what he calls “paternalism” and what a number of scholars call social death. Friedman made clear the mutually constitutive relationship between the prison and the free market: paternalism and law and order meant the policing powers of the state must be expansive and robust. **By naming certain populations “not responsible” enough to be free, neoliberal thought fabricates populations that must be policed and imprisoned.** Loïc Wacquant describes this when he writes, “Thus the ‘invisible hand’ of the unskilled labor market...finds its ideological extension and institutional complement in the ‘iron fist’ of the penal state, which grows and redeploys in to order to stem the disorder generated by social insecurity...”337 **The free market and the prison require one another: the carceral controls the waste of the market, while the market produces surplus populations that will be immobilized within the prison**. The fabrication of freedom within the governing realm of the market necessitates the racialized and gendered unfreedom of the prison. The “burden of conscience” constitutive of the liberal individual facilitated self-discipline but also produced resentment toward (and justified the punishment of) those who could not prove themselves worthy of freedom.338 The subject deemed not responsible was caught between the failures of self-reliance, the criminalization of poverty, and the premature death produced by low-wage labor. And as Wacquant makes clear, as the freedom of the market expands, so do systems of incapacitation. While the free market spreads the insecurity of abandonment, the prison offers the illusion of security to those not captured and caged. This relationship between the market and the prison was made even more explicit by followers of Friedman.

**Vote neg – freedom is an illusion created by the shackles of civil society, we must burn the 1AC to the ground  
Farley 5 – Boston College (Anthony, “Perfecting Slavery”,**[**http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1028&context=lsfp)**](http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1028&context=lsfp)) **\*edited for gendered language**What is to be done? Two hundred years ago, when the slaves in Haiti rose up, they, of necessity, burned everything: They burned San Domingo flat so that at the end of the war it was a charred desert. Why do you burn everything? asked a French officer of a prisoner. We have a right to burn what we cultivate because a ~~man~~ has a right to dispose of his own labour, was the reply of this unknown anarchist. 48 The slaves burned everything because everything was against them. Everything was against the slaves, the entire order that it was their lot to follow, the entire order in which they were positioned as worse than senseless things, every plantation, everything. 49 “Leave nothing white behind you,” said Toussaint to those dedicated to the end of white-overblack. 50 “God gave Noah the rainbow sign. No more water, the fire next time.” 51 The slaves burned everything, yes, but, unfortunately, they only burned everything in Haiti. 52 Theirs was the greatest and most successful revolution in the history of the world but the failure of their fire to cross the waters was the great tragedy of the nineteenth century. 53 At the dawn of the twentieth century, W.E.B. Du Bois wrote, “The colorline belts the world.” 54 Du Bois said that the problem of the twentieth century was the problem of the colorline. 55 The problem, now, at the dawn of the twenty-first century is the problem of the colorline. The colorline continues to belt the world. Indeed, the slave power that is the United States now threatens an entire world with the death that it has become and so the slaves of yesterday, today, and tomorrow, those with nothing but their chains to lose, must, if they would be free, if they would escape slavery, win the entire world. We begin as children. We are called and we become our response to the call. Slaves are not called. What becomes of them? What becomes of the broken-hearted? The slaves are divided souls, they are brokenhearted, the slaves are split asunder by what they are called upon to become. The slaves are called upon to become objects but objecthood is not a calling. The slave, then, during its loneliest loneliness, is divided from itself. This is schizophrenia. The slaves are not called, or, rather, the slaves are called to not be. The slaves are called unfree but this the living can never be and so the slaves burst apart and die. The slaves begin as death, not as children, and death is not a beginning but an end. There is no progress and no exit from the undiscovered country of the slave, or so it seems. We are trained to think through a progress narrative, a grand narrative, the grandest narrative, that takes us up from slavery. There is no up from slavery. The progress from slavery to the end of history is the progress from white-over-black to white-over-black to white-overblack. The progress of slavery runs in the opposite direction of the pastpresent-future timeline. The slave only becomes the perfect slave at the end of the timeline, only under conditions of total juridical freedom. It is only under conditions of freedom, of bourgeois legality, that the slave can perfect itself as a slave by freely choosing to bow down before its master. The slave perfects itself as a slave by offering a prayer for equal rights. The system of marks is a plantation. The system of property is a plantation. The system of law is a plantation. These plantations, all part of the same system, hierarchy, produce white-overblack, white-over-black only, and that continually. The slave perfects itself as a slave through its prayers for equal rights. The plantation system will not commit suicide and the slave, as stated above, has knowing non-knowledge of this fact. The slave finds its way back from the undiscovered country only by burning down every plantation. When the slave prays for equal rights it makes the free choice to be dead, and it makes the free choice to not be. Education is the call. We are called to be and then we become something. We become that which we make of ourselves. We follow the call, we pursue a calling. Freedom is the only calling—it alone contains all possible directions, all of the choices that may later blossom into the fullness of our lives. We can only be free. Slavery is death. How do slaves die? Slaves are not born, they are made. The slave must be trained to be that which the living cannot be. The only thing that the living are not free to be is dead. The slave must be trained to follow the call that is not a call. The slave must be trained to pursue the calling that is not a calling. The slave must be trained to objecthood. The slave must become death. Slavery is white-over-black. White-over-black is death. White-over-black, death, then, is what the slave must become to pursue its calling that is not a calling.

**Supplement cards**

**Anti-black violence is what gives the world its coherence, creating positions such as “human”and most what is to be eliminated violently from categories of the human. This means that blackness is the only position from which analysis can begin.**

**Sexton 10** (Jared, Associate Professor, African American Studies School of Humanities, “People-of-Color-Blindness” Social Text 103 • Vol. 28, No. 2, PG 36-37)

**Not all free persons are white (nor are they equal or equally free),¶ but slaves are paradigmatically black. And because blackness serves as¶ the basis of enslavement in the logic of a transnational political and** legal¶ **culture**, **it permanently destabilizes the position of any nominally free black¶ population.** Stuart Hall might call this the articulation of elements of a¶ discourse, the production of a “non-necessary correspondence” between¶ the signifiers of racial blackness and slavery.27 But **it is the historical materialization¶ of the logic of a transnational political and legal culture such that¶ the contingency of its articulation is generally lost to the infrastructure of¶ the Atlantic world that provides** Frank **Wilderson** **a basis for the concept**¶ **of a “political ontology of race.”28** The United States provides the point of¶ focus here, but the dynamics under examination are not restricted to its¶ bounds. **Political ontology is** not a metaphysical notion, because it is **the explicit outcome of a politics and thereby available to historic challenge¶ through collective struggle**. **But it is not simply a description of a political¶ status either, even an oppressed political status, because it functions as if¶ it were a metaphysical property across the longue durée of the premodern,¶ modern, and now postmodern eras. That is to say, the application of the¶ law of racial slavery is pervasive, regardless of variance or permutation in¶ its operation across the better part of a millennium**.29¶ **In Wilderson’s terms, the libidinal economy of antiblackness is pervasive,¶ regardless of variance or permutation in its political economy. In¶ fact, the application of slave law among the free (that is, the disposition¶ that “with respect to the African shows no internal recognition of the¶ libidinal costs of turning human bodies into sentient flesh”) has outlived¶ in the postemancipation world a certain form of its prior operation—the¶ property relations specific to the institution of chattel and the plantationbased¶ agrarian economy in which it was sustained.** Hartman describes this¶ in her 2007 memoir, Lose Your Mother, as the afterlife of slavery: “a measure¶ of ~~man~~ and a ranking of life and worth that has yet to be undone . . . a¶ **racial calculus and a political arithmetic that were entrenched centuries¶ ago.”30 On that note, it is not inappropriate to say that the continuing¶ application of slave law facilitated the reconfiguration of its operation with¶ the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, rather¶ than its abolition** (in the conventional reading) **or even its circumscription¶ “as punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly¶ convicted” (on the progressive reading of contemporary critics of the¶ prison-industrial complex). It is the paramount value of Loïc Wacquant’s¶ historical sociology, especially in Wilderson’s hands, that it provides a¶ schema for tracking such reconfigurations of anti-blackness “from slavery¶ to mass imprisonment” without losing track of its structural dimensions,¶ its political ontology.**

**Blackness exists as the underbelly to civil society’s conception of “humanity”.**

**Wilderson 03 cut from (The position of unthought)** A. B. Dartmouth College (Government/Philosophy); MFA Columbia University (Fiction Writing); Ph.D. University of California, Berkeley (Rhetoric/Film Studies). His work explores cinema’s formal and narrative “awareness” of political ontology by bringing two disparate modes of representation into conversation with one another: (1) the cinema of Red, White, and Black directors and (2) three traditions of epistemological reflection: Humanism (feminism, Marxism, psychoanalysis); Indigenism (meditations on sovereignty and genocide); and Social Death (meditations on the accumulation and fungibility of Black bodies). University of Nebraska press

we have to ask why. In my own work, obviously I'm not saying that in this space of negation, which is blackness, there is no life. We have tremendous life. But this life is not analogous to those touchstones of cohesion that hold civil society together. In fact, the trajectory of our life (within our terrain of civil death) is bound up in claiming - sometimes individually, sometimes collectively - the violence which Fanon writes about in The Wretched of the Earth, that trajectory which, as he says, is "a splinter to the heart of the world"9 and "puts the settler out of the picture."10 So, it doesn't help us politically or psychologically to try to find ways in which how we live is analogous to how white positionality lives, because, as I think your book suggests, whites gain their coherence by knowing what they are not. There is tremendous diversity on the side of whiteness and tremendous conflict between white men and white women, between Jews and gentiles, and between classes, but that conflict, even in its articulation, has a certain solidarity. And I think that solidarity comes from a near or far relation to the black body or bodies. We give the nation its coherence because we're its underbelly.

**Blackness inhabits the position of the unthought. This is what allows for gratuitous and quotidian violence to be done to black bodies. Civil society is engaged in a continuous process of collective forgetting that allows them to not have to confront the atrocity of their actions.**

**Wilderson ’10** {Frank; Associate Professor of African-American Studies at UC Irvine and has a Ph.D. from UC Berkeley; “Red, White & Black: Cinema and the Structure of U.S. Antagonisms,”}/MR

Spillers and Eltis remind us that **the archive of African slavery shows no internal recognition of the libidinal costs of turning human bodies into sentient flesh**. From Marx’s reports on proposed vagabond-into-slave legislation, it becomes clear that the libidinal economy of such European legislation is far too unconsciously invested in “saving” the symbolic value of the very vagabonds such laws consciously seek to enslave. In other words**, the law would rather shoot itself in the foot** (i.e., sacrifice the economic development of the New World) **than step into a subjective void where idlers and vagabonds might find themselves without contemporaries, with no relational status to save. In this way, White-on-White violence is put in check (a) before it becomes gratuitous, or structural, before it can shred the fabric of civil society beyond mending; and (b) before conscious, predictable, and sometimes costly challenges are mounted against the legislation despite its dissembling lack of resolve. This is accomplished by the imposition of the numerous on condition that and supposing that clauses bound up in the word if and also by claims bound up in the language around the enslavement of European children: a White child may be enslaved on condition that she or he is the child of a vagabond, and then, only until the age of twenty or twenty four.** Spillers searched the archives for a similar kind of stop-gap language with respect to the African—some indication of the African’s human value in the libidinal economy of Little Baby Civil Society. She came up empty-handed: “Expecting to find direct and amplified reference to African women during the opening years of the Trade, the observer is disappointed time and again that this cultural subject is concealed beneath the overwhelming debris of the itemized account, between the lines of the massive logs of commercial enterprise [e.g., a ship’s cargo record] that overrun the sense of clarity we believed we had gained concerning this collective humiliation.”25 It would be reassuring to say that Europeans rigorously debated the ethical implications of forcing the social death of slavery on Africans before they went ahead with it; but, as Marx, Eltis, and Spillers make abundantly clear**, it would be more accurate simply to say that African slavery did not present an ethical dilemma for global civil society. The ethical dilemmas were unthought.**

**Blackness is that which is always already void of relationality. The distinction between the experience of slavery and the ontology of slavery is one that demarcates blackness from whiteness.**

**Wilderson ’10** {Frank; Associate Professor of African-American Studies at UC Irvine and has a Ph.D. from UC Berkeley; “Red, White & Black: Cinema and the Structure of U.S. Antagonisms,”}/MR

During the emergence of new ontological relations in the modern world, from the late Middle Ages through the 1500s, many different kinds of people experienced slavery. In other words, there have been times when natal alienation, general dishonor, and gratuitous violence have turned individuals of myriad ethnicities and races into beings who are socially dead. But *African,* or more precisely **Blackness, refers to an individual who is by definition always already void of relationality. Thus modernity marks the emergence of a new ontology because it is an era in which an entire race appears, people who**, a priori, that is prior to the contingency of the “transgressive act” (such as losing a war or being convicted of a crime**), stand as socially dead in relation to the rest of the world. This, I will argue, is as true for those who were herded onto the slave ships as it is for those who had no knowledge whatsoever of the coffles**. In this period, **chattel slavery, as a condition of ontology and not just as an event of experience, stuck to the African like Velcro**. To the extent that we can think the essence of Whiteness and the essence of Blackness, we must think their essences through the structure of the Master/Slave relation. It should be clear by now that I am not only drawing a distinction between what is commonly thought of as the Master/Slave relation and the constituent elements of the Master/Slave relation,26 but I am also drawing **a distinction between the experience of slavery (which anyone can be subjected to) and the ontology of slavery, which in modernity (the years 1 00 to the present) becomes the singular purview of the Blac**k. In this period, slavery is *cathedralized***. It “advances” from a word which describes a condition that anyone can be subjected to, to a word which reconfigures the African body into Black flesh**. Far from being merely the experience of the African**, slavery is now the African’s access to (or, more correctly, banishment from) ontology.**

**Framework**

**Interpretation**

**Counter interpretation: The judge should be a critical intellectual tasked with evaluating the best outcome for modernity**

**Modern day intellectual practices stress inclusion and unity without confronting the structural antagonism that shapes the world. This conceals anti-black violence by relegating it to the positon of the unthought.**

**Wilderson ’10** {Frank; Associate Professor of African-American Studies at UC Irvine and has a Ph.D. from UC Berkeley; “Red, White & Black: Cinema and the Structure of U.S. Antagonisms,”}/MR

The difficulty of writing a book which seeks to uncover Red, Black, and White socially engaged feature films as aesthetic accompaniments to grammars of suffering, predicated on the subject positions of the “Savage” and the Slave, is that **today’s intellectual protocols are not informed by Fanon’s insistence that “ontology**—once it is finally admitted as leaving existence by the wayside—**does not permit us to understand the being of the black man**.”6 In sharp contrast to the late 1960s and early 1970s, **we now live in a political, academic, and cinematic milieu which stresses “diversity,” “unity,” “civic participation,” “hybridity,” “access,” and “contribution.” The radical fringe of political discourse amounts to little more than a passionate dream of civic reform and social stability.** The distance between the protester and the police has narrowed considerably. **The effect of this on the academy is that intellectual protocols tend to privilege two of the three domains of subjectivity, namely preconscious interests** (as evidenced in the work of social science around “political unity,” “social attitudes,” “civic participation,” and “diversity,”) **and unconscious identification** (as evidenced in the humanities’ postmodern regimes of “diversity,” “hybridity,” and “relative [rather than “master”] narratives”). Since the 1980s**, intellectual protocols aligned with structural positionality** (except in the work of die-hard Marxists) **have been kicked to the curb**. That is to say, it is hardly fashionable anymore to think the vagaries of power through the generic positions within a structure of power relations —such as man/woman, worker/boss. Instead, **the academy’s ensembles of questions are fixated on specific and “unique” experiences of the myriad identities that make up those structural positions. This would be fine if the work led us back to a critique of the paradigm; but most of it does not**. Again, the upshot of this is that **the intellectual protocols now in play**, and the composite effect of cinematic and political discourse since the 1980s, **tend to hide rather than make explicit the grammar of suffering which underwrites the United States and its foundational antagonisms. This state of affairs exacerbates—or, more precisely, mystifies and veils—the ontological death of the Slave and the “Savage” because** (as in the 1950s) **the cinematic, political, and intellectual discourse of the current milieu resists being sanctioned and authorized by the irreconcilable demands of Indigenism and Blackness—academic enquiry is thus no more effective in pursuing a revolutionary critique than the legislative antics of the loyal opposition. This is how left-leaning scholars help civil society recuperate and maintain stability. But this stability is a state of emergency for Indians and Blacks.**

**Framing issue. Their refusal to engage in discussions of the way that anti-blackness shapes the world will lose them this debate**

-Afro-pessimism is fore fronting discussions, and it’s crucial that these debates happen

-Pessimism is a political position. Don’t defer to other people’s definition of it

**Sexton 16** [Jared Sexton, Ph.D. in Ethnic Studies at UC Berkeley, associate professor of African American Studies and Film and Media Studies at UC Irvine, “Afro-Pessimism: The Unclear Word,” Rhizomes issue 19,sections 1-8]

[1] Afro-Pessimism is a contemporary phenomenon, some may even scoff that it is trendy, but its political and intellectual evolution is considerably longer and its ethical bearings much broader than one might expect, and there is work yet to be done regarding a genealogy of its orientation and sensibility. No individual or collective effort, of course, springs forth whole cloth and yet the controversy that has accompanied the emergence of this discourse over the better part of the past decade has suffered greatly from a refusal—on the part of most critics and too many proponents as well—to follow the old Jamesonian edict to historicize the theoretical aim and object (Herman 2003). I only note the problem here, as the development of proper context would require far more space than available at present. The vacuum-packed controversy has been surprisingly pointed as a result, and it is easy to miss the true significance thereof between the epiphanic tone of recent acquaintance and the acrimony of recurrent denunciation. [2] Some part of the pace and extent of debate about Afro-Pessimism to date is no doubt due to the proliferation of social media platforms in the same moment when the professoriate groans under the intensified administrative command to turn research into output with eventual market value (including the market value of "civic engagement"); the subsequent migration of much previously refereed scholarly commentary to these less (or differently) regulated forums in search of greater and faster measurable impact and, for better or worse, readership beyond the ken of advanced higher education; and the increased if uneven porosity of deliberations among activists, artists, educators, journalists, non-profit workers, researchers, etc. afforded by the digitization of print culture and the growing access to recordings of conference panels, public lectures, radio interviews, and the like. It is no exaggeration to say that, as a result of this convergence of global economic restructuring and technological development, there are thousands of online conversations underway across Africa, the Americas, Asia, and Europe, especially among students and young scholars, adjudicating the relative merits of Afro-Pessimism. [3] But this much could be said about any number of topical discussions featured anywhere from chat rooms and microblogs to virtual meetings and TED talks. What accounts for the particular critical purchase and affective resonance of what I called elsewhere "a highly technical dispute in a small corner of the American academy" has more likely to do with a growing understanding of the common (which is not to say shared, much less identical) political conditions of diverse black life-worlds with respect to claims and practices of freedom. That common sense of things is bound to a terrible and terrifying acknowledgement of not only the tragic material and symbolic continuities everywhere revealed by the history of post-emancipation societies throughout the Diaspora, but also, more fundamentally, the uncontainable categorical sprawl of the epochal transformation that names the emergence of racial slavery as such. In this, the postulate of a free black - whether non-slave or former-slave - would appear as oxymoron. None of which should stop anyone from believing its true, that being the crux. If Afro-Pessimism has captured the imagination of certain black radical formations and suggested a critical idiom, provoking a basic rethinking among more than a few of their non-black counterparts by the way, it has also, and maybe for the same reasons, struck a nerve among others, all along the color line, who fear that open-minded engagement involves forsaking some of the most hard-earned lessons of the last generation. [4] The reticence expressed about the force and signification of Afro-Pessimism, which in some quarters has bloomed into open if largely uninformed resistance, has taken on the logic of preemptive strike. Though we have little engagement in print thus far, due in part to the recentness of the published literature, certain discussions are nonetheless afoot on the left "devoted to blaming pessimism for whatever crisis is thought to occupy us at the moment." Afro-Pessimism, in this case and on this count, is thought to be, in no particular order: a negative appraisal of the capabilities of black peoples, associating blackness with lack rather than tracing the machinations through which the association is drawn and enforced, even in the black psyche, across the longue durée; a myopic denial of overlapping and ongoing histories of struggle and a fatal misunderstanding of the operational dynamics of power, its general economy or micro-physics, reifying what should be historicized en route to analysis; a retrograde and isolationist nationalism, a masculinist and heteronormative enterprise, a destructive and sectarian ultra-leftism, and a chauvinist American exceptionalism; a reductive and morbid fixation on the depredations of slavery that superimposes the figure of the slave as an anachronism onto ostensibly post-slavery societies, and so on. [5] The last assertion, which actually links together all of the others, evades the nagging burden of proof of abolition and, moreover, fails to acknowledge that one can account for historically varying instances of anti-blackness while maintaining the claim that slavery is here and now. Most telling though is the leitmotif of offense, and the felt need among critics to defend themselves, their work, their principles and their politics against the perceived threat. In place of thoughtful commentary, we have distancing and disavowal. The grand pronouncement is offered, generally, without the impediment of sustained reading or attempted dialogue, let alone careful study of the relevant literature. The entire undertaking, the movement of thought it pursues, is apprehended instead as its lowest common denominator, indicted by proxy, and tried in absentia as caricature.[1] [6] Astonishingly, all of this refuses to countenance the rhetorical dimensions of the discourse of Afro-Pessimism (despite the minor detail that its principal author is a noted creative writer and its first major statement is found in an award-winning literary work of memoir) and the productive theoretical effects of the fiction it creates, namely, a meditation on a poetics and politics of abjection wherein racial blackness operates as an asymptotic approximation of that which disturbs every claim or formation of identity and difference as such.[2] Afro-Pessimism is thus not against the politics of coalition simply because coalitions tend systematically to render supposed common interests as the concealed particular interests of the most powerful and privileged elements of the alliance. Foremost, Afro-Pessimism it seeks, in Wilderson's parlance, "to shit on the inspiration of the personal pronoun we" (143) because coalitions require a logic of identity and difference, of collective selves modeled on the construct of the modern individual, an entity whose coherence is purchased at the expense of whatever is cast off by definition. The subject of politics is essentially dividual and there is in effect always another intervention to be made on behalf of some aspect of the group excluded in the name of the proper.[3] The ever-expansive inclusionary gesture must thus be displaced by another more radical approach: an ethics of the real, a politics of the imperative, engaged in its interminably downward movement. This daunting task entails making necessity out of virtue, as it were, willing the need for the black radical imagination and not just its revisable demand**. If certain scholars whose work has been instructive or inspirational for Afro-Pessimism miss this point too, it may have something to do with the search for a method of gaining agency that, while rightly suspending the assumption of an a priori agent, nonetheless rushes past the hidden structure of violence that underwrites so many violent acts,** whether spectacular or mundane. [7] Such may provide reassurance for those informed by the basic assumptions and animated by the esprit de corps of the theoretical orientations and conceptual frames in question, but it cannot be mistaken for an adequate defense of a disposition. We would do well, on this score, to heed Joshua Dienstag's rather germane suggestion in Pessimism: Philosophy, Ethic, Spirit that "some thought should be given to why this word functions so well as a gesture of dismissal" and, likewise, to "the routine use of 'pessimist' and its cognates as a casual intellectual put-down" (Dienstag 2006: x). For present purposes, Afro-Pessimism as epithet would be the obverse of the unasked question: Why has this discourse found its articulation now? Rather than simply motivating speculation about the psychological states and political commitments of theorists, commentators, students, advocates or adherents; the intervention and implications of Afro-Pessimism, however they are adjudged, "need to be addressed at the theoretical level at which they arose" (Dienstag 2001: 924). Dienstag writes further: Critics have often mistaken a depiction of the world for a choice about our future, as if [scholars] had rejoiced at the decline or decay they described. [...] Yet, despite the abuse they attract pessimists keep appearing—and this should not be surprising since the world keeps delivering bad news. Instead of blaming pessimism, perhaps, we can learn from it. Rather than hiding from the ugliness of the world, perhaps we can discover how best to withstand it (Dienstag 2006: x).[4] [8] **As if they rejoiced about the wrong things and, by contrast, failed to rejoice about the right ones**. Why not turn this (moralistic) accusation into (political-intellectual) opportunity? Indeed, the moniker "Afro-Pessimism" emerges at a certain inaugural moment as the embrace of a critical outlook deemed, upon review, to be disappointing or discouraging to an ostensibly progressive, even modernist anti-racism (Hartman 2003). Détournement. Resignification. A simple enough term for withstanding the ugliness of the world—and learning from it—might be suffering and Afro-Pessimism is, among other things, an attempt to formulate an account of such suffering, to establish the rules of its grammar, "to think again about the position of the ex-slave," as Bryan Wagner puts it in his Disturbing the Peace, "without recourse to the consolation of transcendence" (Wagner 2009: 2). The difficulty has to do with the special force that the consolation of transcendence—be it cultural, economic, geographical, historical, political, psychological, sexual, social or symbolic—brings to bear on the activity of thinking, no less of speaking and writing, about those whose transcendence is foreclosed in and for the modern world.

**Framing – Racism a-priori**

**Challenging racism is a prior ethical question that is a prerequisite for the formation of any moral agent—**

Albert **Memmi 2k**, Professor Emeritus of Sociology @ U of Paris, Naiteire, Racism, Translated by Steve Martinot, p. 163-165 \*edited for gendered language

The struggle against racism will be long, difficult, without intermission, without remission, probably never achieved. Yet, **for this very reason,** **it is a struggle to be undertaken without surcease and without concessions.** One cannot be indulgent toward racism; one must not even let the monster in the house, especially not in a mask. To give it merely a foothold means to **augment the bestial part in us** and in other people, which is to diminish what is human. To accept the racist universe to the slightest degree is to endorse fear, injustice, and violence. It is to accept the persistence of the dark history in which we still largely live. **it is to agree that the outsider will always be a possible victim** (and which [person] ~~man~~ is not [themselves] ~~himself~~ an outsider relative to someone else?. Racism illustrates, in sum, the inevitable negativity of the condition of the dominated that is, it illuminates in a certain sense the entire human condition. The anti-racist struggle, difficult though it is, and always in question, is nevertheless **one of the prologues to the ultimate passage from animosity to humanity**. In that sense, we cannot fail to rise to the racist challenge. However, it remains true that one’s moral conduct **only emerges from a choice**: one has to want it. It is **a choice among other choices**, and **always debatable** in its foundations and its consequences. Let us say, broadly speaking, that **the choice to conduct oneself morally is the condition for the establishment of a human order, for which racism is the very negation**. This is almost a redundancy. One cannot found a moral order, let alone a legislative order, on racism, because racism signifies the exclusion of the other, and his or her subjection to violence and domination. From an ethical point of view, if one can deploy a little religious language, racism is ‘the truly capital sin. It is not an accident that almost all of humanity’s spiritual traditions counsels respect for the weak, for orphans, widows, or strangers. It is not just a question of theoretical morality and disinterested commandments. Such unanimity in the safeguarding of the other suggests the real utility of such sentiments. All things considered, we have an interest in banishing injustice, because **injustice engenders violence and death**. Of course, this is debatable. There are those who think that if one is strong enough, the assault on and oppression of others is permissible. Bur no one is ever sure of remaining the strongest. One day, perhaps, the roles will be reversed. All unjust society contains **within itself the seeds of its own death.** It is probably smarter to treat others with respect so that they treat you with respect. “Recall.” says the Bible, “that you were once a stranger in Egypt,” which means both that you ought to respect the stranger because you were a stranger yourself and that you risk becoming one again someday. It is an ethical and a practical appeal—indeed, it is a contract, however implicit it might be. In short, the refusal of racism is the condition for all theoretical and practical morality because, in the end, the ethical choice commands the political choice, a just society must be a society accepted by all. If this contractual principle is not accepted, then only conflict, violence, and destruction will be our lot. If it is accepted, we can hope someday to live in peace. True, it is a wager, but the stakes are irresistible.

**Impacts**

**Collective Forgetting**

**Normative policy framework does nothing but produce a deceptive network of collective forgetting. It immures us to atrocities in world by neutralizing terms such as torture, terrorism, genocide, and nuclear war. This stance is inherently linked to modern practices of power.**

**Reid-Brinkley 2008** [Dr. Shanara Reid-Brinkley, “The Harsh Realities of “Acting Black”: How African-American Policy Debaters Negotiate Representation Through Racial Performance and Style”, P. 15]//MHELLIE

Genre Violation Four: Policymaker as Impersonal and the Rhetoric of Personal Experience. Debate is a competitive game.112 It requires that its participants take on the positions of state actors (at least when they are affirming the resolution). Debate resolutions normally call for federal action in some area of domestic or foreign policy. Affirmative teams must support the resolution, while the negative negates it. The debate then becomes a “laboratory” within which debaters may test policies.113 Argumentation scholar Gordon Mitchell notes that “Although they 117 may research and track public argument as it unfolds outside the confines of the laboratory for research purposes, in this approach students witness argumentation beyond the walls of the academy as spectators, with little or no apparent recourse to directly participate or alter the course of events.”114 Although debaters spend a great deal of time discussing and researching government action and articulating arguments relevant to such action, what happens in debate rounds has limited or no real impact on contemporary governmental policy making. And participation does not result in the majority of the debate community engaging in activism around the issues they research. Mitchell observes that the stance of the policymaker in debate comes with a “sense of detachment associated with the spectator posture.”115 In other words, its participants are able to engage in debates where they are able to distance themselves from the events that are the subjects of debates. Debaters can throw around terms like torture, terrorism, genocide and nuclear war without blinking. Debate simulations can only serve to distance the debaters from real world participation in the political contexts they debate about. As William Shanahan remarks: …the topic established a relationship through interpellation that inhered irrespective of what the particular political affinities of the debaters were. The relationship was both political and ethical, and needed to be debated as such. When we blithely call for United States Federal Government policymaking, we are not immune to the colonialist legacy that establishes our place on this continent. We cannot wish away the horrific atrocities perpetrated everyday in our name simply by refusing to acknowledge these implications” (emphasis in original).116 118 The “objective” stance of the policymaker is an impersonal or imperialist persona. The policymaker relies upon “acceptable” forms of evidence, engaging in logical discussion, producing rational thoughts. As Shanahan, and the Louisville debaters’ note, such a stance is integrally linked to the normative, historical and contemporary practices of power that produce and maintain varying networks of oppression. In other words, the discursive practices of policyoriented debate are developed within, through and from systems of power and privilege. Thus, these practices are critically implicated in the maintenance of hegemony. So, rather than seeing themselves as government or state actors, Jones and Green choose to perform themselves in debate, violating the more “objective” stance of the “policymaker” and require their opponents to do the same.

**Permutation**

**Cards**

**The perm is nothing more than white supremacist multiculturalism. It is an attempt to take the alien body/presence and integrate it into the localities of whiteness-this inclusion of the “other” is simply another way in which white hegemony makes minorities take on white identity even if it is the so called enemy population-this multiculturalist white supremacy is crucial to the project of white supremacist globality and produces a form of double-consciousness.**Dylan **Rodriguez 2009**, University of California, Riverside, “The Terms of Engagement: Warfare, White Locality, and Abolition” Critical Sociology, Vol. 36 Issue 1

It thus is within the confines of Homeland Security as white supremacist territoriality – a structure of feeling that organizes the cohesion of racial and spatial entitlement – that ‘multiculturalism’ is recognized as a fact of life, an empirical feature of the world that is inescapable and unavoidable, something to be tolerated, policed, and patriotically valorized at once and in turn. On the one hand, white locality is a site of existential identification that generates (and therefore corresponds to) a white supremacist materiality. As subjects (including ostensibly ‘non-white’ subjects) identify with this sentimental structure – a process that is not cleanly agential or altogether voluntary – they enter a relation of discomforting intimacy with embodied threats to their sense of the ‘local’. Those alien bodies and subjects, whose movement suggests the possibility of disruption and disarticulation, become objects of a discrete discursive labor as well as material/military endeavors. Most importantly, they become specified and particularized sites for white locality’s punitive performances: racialized punishment, capture, and discipline are entwined in the historical fabric of white supremacist social formations from conquest and chattel enslavement onward, and the emergence of white locality’s hypermobility has necessitated new technologies commensurate with the hyperpresence – actual and virtual – of white subjectivities. As white bodies and subjects exert the capacity to manifest authority and presence in places they both do and do not physically occupy (call the latter ‘absentee’ white supremacy for shorthand), the old relations of classical white supremacist apartheid are necessarily and persistently reinvented: racial subjection becomes a technology of inclusion that crucially accompanies – and is radically enhanced by – ongoing proliferations of racist state and state-sanctioned violence. Further, this logic of multiculturalist white supremacist inclusion does not exclusively rely on strategies of coercion or punishment to assimilate others – such as in the paradigmatic examples of bodily subjection that formed the institutional machinery of Native American boarding and mission schools (Adams 1995; Smith 2005), but instead builds upon the more plastic and sustainable platforms of consensus and collective identity formation. I do not mean to suggest that either consensus building or identity formation are benign projects of autonomous racial self-invention, somehow operating independently of the structuring relations of dominance that characterize a given social formation. Rather, I am arguing that the social technologies of white supremacy are, in this historical moment, not reducible to discrete arrangements of institutionalized (and state legitimated) violence or strategies of social exclusion (Da Silva 2007) but are significantly altered and innovated through the crises of bodily proximity that white locality bears to its alien (and even enemy) populations. It is in these moments of discomfort, when white locality is internally populated by alien others who have neither immigrated nor invaded the space, but have in multiple ways become occupied by the praxis of white locality construction, that logics of incorporation and inclusion become crucial to the historical project of white supremacist globalization.

**The permutation fails because it includes the destructive policing of blackness as an afterthought or part of an exasperated laundry list catalog of equivalents. This fails to center anti-black, white supremacist policing as the constitutive condition of the entire structural network of violent domination and thereby misunderstands the truth of the social order. This failure to center discussion around antiblackness dooms the affirmative’s politics to the anti-blackness of white civil society, and leads to the inevitable amplification of state power and white supremacist violence.** Jared **Sexton 2010**, Associate Professor of African American Studies and Associate Professor of Film and Media Studies and one third of the Trifecta of Tough, “People-of-Color-Blindness: Notes on the Afterlife of Slavery”, Social Text, Vol. 28 No. 2   
The upshot of this predicament is that obscuring the structural position of the category of blackness will inevitably undermine multiracial coalition building as a politics of radical opposition and, to that extent, force the question of black liberation back to the center of discussion. Every analysis that attempts to understand the complexities of racial rule and the machinations of the racial state without accounting for black existence **within its framework**—which does not mean simply listing it among a chain of equivalents or returning to it as an afterthought—**is doomed to miss** what is essential about the situation. Black existence does not represent the total reality of the racial formation—it is not the beginning and the end of the story—but it does relate to the totality; it indicates the (repressed) truth of the political and economic system. That is to say, the whole range of positions within the racial formation is most fully understood from this vantage point, not unlike the way in which the range of gender and sexual variance under patriarchal and heteronormative regimes is most fully understood through lenses that are feminist and queer. 75 What is lost for the study of black existence in the proposal for a decentered, “postblack” paradigm is a proper analysis of the true scale and nature of black suffering and of the struggles—political, aesthetic, intellectual, and so on—that have sought to transform and undo it. What is lost for the study of nonblack nonwhite existence is a proper analysis of the true scale and nature of its material and symbolic power relative to the category of blackness. 76 This is why every attempt to defend the rights and liberties of the latest victims of state repression will fail to make substantial gains insofar as it forfeits or sidelines the fate of blacks, the prototypical targets of the panoply of police practices and the juridical infrastructure built up around them. Without blacks on board, the only viable political option and the only effective defense against the intensifying cross fire will involve greater alliance with an antiblack civil society and further capitulation to the magnification of state power. At the apex of the midcentury social movements, Kwame Ture and Charles Hamilton wrote in their 1968 classic, Black Power: The Politics of Liberation, that black freedom entails “the necessarily total revamping of the society.” 77 For Har t man, t hinking of t he entanglements of the African diaspora in this context, the necessarily total revamping of the society is more appropriately envisioned as the creation of an entirely new world: I k new t hat no mat ter how far from home I t raveled, I wou ld never be able to leave my past behind. I would never be able to imagine being the kind of person who had not been made and marked by slavery. I was black and a history of terror had produced that identity. Terror was “captivity without the possibility of flight,” inescapable violence, precarious life. There was no going back to a time or place before slavery, and going beyond it no doubt would entail nothing less momentous than yet another revolution. 7

**AT: Multiracialism perm/coalition perm**

**Coalitions are anti-black in that they obscure the position of the category of blackness and remove it from the center of discussion.**

**Sexton 10** (Jared Sexton, Associate professor of African American studies and film and media studies at the University of California, Irvine, 2010, “People-of-Color-Blindness; Notes on the Afterlife of Slavery,” Pages 47-49)

If the oppression of nonblack people of color in, and perhaps beyond, the United States seems conditional to the historic instance and functions at a more restricted empirical scope, antiblackness seems invariant and limitless (which does not mean that the former is somehow negligible and short-lived or that the latter is exhaustive and unchanging). If pursued with some consistency, the sort of comparative analysis outlined above would likely impact the formulation of political strategy and modify the demeanor of our political culture. In fact, it might denature the comparative instinct altogether in favor of a relational analysis more adequate to the task. Yet all of this is obviated by the silencing mechanism par excellence in Left political and intellectual circles today: “Don’t play Oppression Olympics!” The Oppression Olympics dogma levels a charge amounting to little more than a leftist version of “playing the race card.” To fuss with details of comparative (or relational) analysis is to play into the hands of divide-and-conquer tactics and to promote a callous immorality. 72 However, as in its conservative complement, one notes in this catchphrase the unwarranted translation of an inquiring position of comparison into an insidious posture of competition, the translation of ethical critique into unethical attack. This point allows us to understand better the intimate relationship between the censure of black inquiry and the recurrent analogizing to black suffering mentioned above: they bear a common refusal to admit to significant dif ferences of structural position born of discrepant histories between blacks and their political allies, actual or potential. We might, finally, name this refusal people-of-color-blindness, a form of colorblindness inherent to the concept of “people of color” to the precise extent that it misunderstands the specificity of antiblackness and presumes or insists upon the monolithic character of victimization under white supremacy 73 —thinking (the afterlife of) slavery as a form of exploitation or colonization or a species of racial oppression among others. The upshot of this predicament is that **obscuring the structural position of the category of blackness will inevitably undermine multiracial coalition building as a politics of radical opposition** and, to that extent, force the question of black liberation back to the center of discussion. Every analysis that attempts to understand the complexities of racial rule and the machinations of the racial state without accounting for black existence within its framework — which does not mean simply listing it among a chain of equivalents or returning to it as an afterthought — **is doomed to miss what is- essential about the situation**. Black existence does not represent the total reality of the racial formation — it is not the beginning and the end of the story — **but it does relate to the totality**; it indicates the (repressed) truth of the political and economic system. That is to say, the whole range of positions within the racial formation is **most fully understood from this vantage point**, not unlike the way in which the range of gender and sexual variance under patriarchal and heteronormative regimes is most fully understood through lenses that are feminist and queer. 75 What is lost for the study of black existence in the proposal for a decentered, “postblack” paradigm is a proper analysis of the true scale and nature of black suffering and of the struggles — political, aesthetic, intellectual, and so on — that have sought to transform and undo it. What is lost for the study of nonblack nonwhite existence is a proper analysis of the true scale and nature of its material and symbolic power relative to the category of blackness. 76 This is why every attempt to defend the rights and liberties of the latest victims of state repression will fail to make substantial gains inso - far as it forfeits or sidelines the fate of blacks, the prototypical targets of the panoply of police practices and the juridical infrastructure built up around them. **Without blacks on board**, **the only viable political option** and the only effective defense against the intensifying cross fire **will involve greater alliance with an antiblack civil society** and further capitulation to the magnification of state power. At the apex of the midcentury social movements, Kwame Ture and Charles Hamilton wrote in their 1968 clas - sic, Black Power: The Politics of Liberation , that black freedom entails “**the necessarily total revamping of the society.**” 77 For Hartman, thinking of the entanglements of the African diaspora in this context, the necessarily total revamping of the society is more appropriately envisioned as the **creation of an entirely new world**: I knew that no matter how far from home I traveled, I would never be able to leave my past behind. I would never be able to imagine being the kind of person who had not been made and marked by slavery. I was black and a history of terror had produced that identity. Terror was “captivity without the possibility of flight,” inescapable violence, precarious life. **There was no going back to a time or place before slavery**, and going beyond it no doubt would entail nothing less momentous than yet **another revolution.**

**Theory**

**Severance Perms Bad**

**Reciprocal – the neg gets to kick args that aren’t straight turned and in a world of conditionality, can kick everything, we should get to kick part of the aff as long as we prove they haven’t straight turned it.**

**Its what you do, not what you justify – all their reasons why severance is bad assume extreme examples, out example is reasonable though**

**Neg flex – neg needs to be able to change positions and rethink their strategies throughout the debate, we force that which leads to better debates**

**Intrinsic Perms Bad**

**Intrinsicness is bad and a voting issue:**

**Kills neg ground- allows the affirmative to get out of every disad or counterplan with the intrinsic permutation**

**Moving target- the permutation advocates the plan and other action that the 1AC does not endorse. Stable plans are key to predictable ground and strategy.**

**The perms allow for extra topical plans – creates aff advantages out of nonresolutional ground to beat our disads**

**It's a voter for fairness and education.**

**Multiple Perms Bad**

**Justifies infinite worlds- they could literally make thousands of perms- these take time to answer- skewing the negative- negative flexibility is key to debates.**

**Aff conditionality- The aff is allowed to advocate any or all of these perms in the 2AR- we can’t predict what they will do- the existence of multiple perms kills our ability to prepare and respond- making the aff a moving target.**

**Counter-Interpretation- 1 perm checks all abuse, they still get to test competition- but don’t spend the debate out while only being given the right to shift in one way.**

**It’s not reciprocal- the neg can advocate either the status quo or a counter plan, and the aff gets the plan and the prem. Allowing multiple perms unbalances it towards the affirmative and makes the debate unfair.**

**It makes them a moving target- if we beat one perm they can shift their advocacy to a different one so we end up playing hide and go seek with the aff advocacy and lose all our ground.**

**Links**

**Allies**

**There cannot be any allies of the black body. There can only be the subject and the object. Renouncing white privilege does nothing but further the slave/master dialect by centering the discussion around you.**

**Wilderson 03 cut from (The position of unthought)** A. B. Dartmouth College (Government/Philosophy); MFA Columbia University (Fiction Writing); Ph.D. University of California, Berkeley (Rhetoric/Film Studies). His work explores cinema’s formal and narrative “awareness” of political ontology by bringing two disparate modes of representation into conversation with one another: (1) the cinema of Red, White, and Black directors and (2) three traditions of epistemological reflection: Humanism (feminism, Marxism, psychoanalysis); Indigenism (meditations on sovereignty and genocide); and Social Death (meditations on the accumulation and fungibility of Black bodies). University of Nebraska press

You've just thrown something into crisis, which is very much on the table today: the notion of allies. What you've said (and I'm so happy that someone has come along to say it!) is that the ally is not a stable category. There's a structural prohibition (rather than merely a willful refusal) against whites being the allies of blacks, due to this - to borrow from Fanon's The Wretched of the Earth again - "species" division between what it means to be a subject and what it means to be an object: a structural antagonism. But everything in the academy on race works off of the question, "How do we help white allies?" Black academics assume that there is enough of a structural commonality between the black and the white (working class) position - their mantra being: "We are both exploited subjects" - for one to embark upon a political pedagogy that will somehow help whites become aware of this "common morality." White writers posit the presence of something they call "white skin privilege," and the possibility of "giving that up," as their gesture of being in solidarity with blacks. But what both gestures disavow is that subjects just can't make common cause with objects. They can only become objects, say in the case of John Brown or Marilyn Buck, or further instantiate their subjectivity through modalities of violence (lynching and the prison industrial complex), or through modalities of empathy. In other words, the essential essence of the white/black relation is that of the master/slave - regardless of its historical or geographic specificity. And masters and slaves, even today, are never allies.

**Apocalyptic Rhetoric**

**The future exists solely as a virtual field created by white fear of the other. This means that the true danger emerges from the fact that their discussion of the future shapes the present. Their tropes of apocalypse create a state of emergency for black folks in the name of security.**

**Baldwin 12**, [Andrew, Professor at Durham University, “Whiteness and Futurity: Towards a Research Agenda, Progress in Human Geography”, P. 172-187]//MHELLIE

This paper argues that research on whiteness and geography is oriented almost exclusively around some notion of the past. While this is perhaps to be expected given that whiteness studies builds off two past-oriented bodies of scholarship – US labour studies (Roediger, 1991) and postcolonial theory (Said, 1994) – the argument is that privileging the past when researching geographies of whiteness risks overlooking the ways in which whiteness and hence various forms of racism are configured in relation to a different temporal horizon: the future. In pressing this claim, the argument is not to suggest that history is irrelevant for understanding the politics of whiteness. Analysing the past remains indispensable for understanding the numerous forms whiteness can take. Instead, the argument is that analysing discourses of ‘the future’ can reveal important insights about the ways in which white geographies are configured that might otherwise be foreclosed if the past is privileged as the exclusive time-space through which such geographies are produced and maintained. As such, any politics seeking to challenge whitenesses and their hold on racist social imaginaries may benefit by analysing **how the future is invoked in articulations of white** identity and how such future-oriented articulations shape geographies of all kinds. Why the future? By future I refer to an imagined time that is yet-to-come. The future can be understood to follow sequentially from a past-present trajectory, or it can be understood as a form of absent presence. From tropes of uncertainty, Utopia, **apocalypse, prophesy, hope, fear**, possibility and potentiality, **the future shapes the present** in all manner of ways. For instance, in politics, rights are often suspended **to safeguard against future events of** **insurrection,** **catastrophe and terror**. In religion, moral judgements in the present are shaped by a concern for one’s safe passage into a future afterlife, and, in finance, the pricing of securities necessarily entails some calculation of future risk. Given the ubiquity of the future in the present, it is perhaps no surprise that the future is an important object of inquiry in contemporary thought (see, for example, Adams and Groves, 2007; Anderson, 2010b; Jameson, 2005; Luhmann, 1993). Ben Anderson (2010a) provides a useful sketch of this research in a recent article in this journal. His point is that the future is rendered knowable through specific practices (i.e. calculation, imagination and performance) and, in turn, intervenes on the present through three anticipatory logics (i.e. pre-caution, pre-emption and preparedness). So, too, others have made the case that **pre-empting the future** is now a common feature of contemporary political life (Braun, 2007; Cooper, 2006). Futurity is also an important feature of **the affective dimensions of daily life.** Take, for instance, fear (Pain, 2009) and hope (Anderson, 2006; Anderson and Holden, 2008). Both are simultaneously embodied experiences and atmospheric qualities animated by imagined futures: one fears the yet-to-come and the other hopes for better things to come. In both, the here-and-now of the psyche or of collective mood is shaped by the yet-to-come. Or, as Brian Massumi (2002) argues, affect occurs precisely in **the overlap between the actual and the virtual**, which I take to mean an overlap between that which is and a very specific form of the virtual – the yet-to-come. By virtual I refer to things that are real but not actual (Shields, 2003); in this way, **the future is exemplary of the virtual**. It can be known and hence real, as Anderson suggests, but because it can never be fully actualized as the future, **the future remains a permanent virtuality**. Thus, analysing atmospheres of fear and hope, for instance, may tell us something about the way politics takes shape through the conjugation of the actual and the virtual, or at the threshold of the future event. But the future as an object or orientation of inquiry is not limited to the affective, and nor is it confined to an actual-virtual binary. Hegel, for instance, paid considerable attention to transactions of the actual and the possible. For Hegel, the dialectic is made possible by the actual-possible relation where the dialectical movement of the actual is the possible.1 So, too, Heidegger argued that the future is indispensable to meaning. For instance, the significance that attaches to certain kinds of information would vanish were it not for the anticipated (i.e. future) consequences that lay dormant in information. Currency exchange rates would matter little, for instance, were it not for the anticipated consequences of exchange rate volatility. Although radically different, the Hegelian and Heideggerian traditions share in common the idea not simply that politics take shape through the collision of social forces that gathered pace in the past, but that political contests are shaped by the future as well. This essay argues for a research agenda that situates the future at the centre of analyses of white geographies. It shows how the geographic literature on whiteness is past-oriented and suggests how this literature might benefit by attending to the ways in which white geographies are infused by notions of futurity. I develop this argument more fully below. For now let me offer a few preliminary thoughts about geographies of whiteness. By whiteness I refer to a racialized subject position that is remarkable for its seeming invisibility (Dwyer and Jones, 2000; Dyer, 1997). In this sense, whiteness is only partially about skin. More important, whiteness plays a foundational role in racist epistemology by serving as the norm against which others come to be viewed as different (Dwyer and Jones, 2000; Kobayashi and Peake, 2000). As such, whiteness does not name a set of stereotypes, so much as a set of ‘narrative structural positions, rhetorical tropes and habits of perception’ (Dyer, 1997: 12) that stand in for the normal. This makes defining whiteness almost impossible but then, as Richard Dyer (1997) argues, the power of whiteness lies in its capacity for almost infinite variability (see also Kobayashi, 2003; Vanderbeck, 2006). For myself, the power of racisms rest in their capacity to normalize their corresponding whitenesses (Kobayashi and Peake, 2000). What, then, are geographies of whiteness? For my purposes here, they refer to geographies – spaces, places, landscapes, natures, mobilities, bodies, etc. – that are assumed to be white or are in some way structured, though often implicitly, by some notion of whiteness (Bonnett, 1997; McCarthy and Hague, 2004; Vanderbeck, 2006). The argument put forward in this paper is that research on geographies of whiteness is almost invariably past-oriented (Bonnett, 1997, 2000; Hoelscher, 2003; Pulido, 2000). By ‘past-oriented’ I mean that whiteness, whether understood as a past or present phenomenon, tends to be explained, accounted for and examined as an expression of social relations that took shape in the past (Satzewich, 2007). In the paper, I aim to show how this work is dominated by an orientation that looks to the past as the temporal horizon through which research and learning about past or present white racial identity occurs. By and large, this work assumes that in order to challenge or reconfigure whitenesses and their corresponding racisms whiteness must be diagnosed using some form of past-oriented analysis (Bonnett, 1997). The racist past is, thus, used to explain the racist present. A brief example makes the point. In an essay that many (Baldwin, 2009a; Dwyer and Jones, 2000; Jackson, 1998; McCarthy and Hague, 2004) suggest is a main point of reference for debate about whiteness in geography, Alastair Bonnett (1997) argues that whiteness ought to be understood as a function of historical geography.2 As such, Bonnett privileges a methodological approach that reaches into the past for answers about contemporary race and racism. Elsewhere, Audrey Kobayashi and Linda Peake (2000) make a similar claim that whiteness is a historically constructed position: to understand whiteness requires understanding its multiple genealogies. I do wonder, though, whether a past-oriented approach to the study of white geographies reproduces the teleological assumption that white racism can be modernized away. Such an assumption privileges an ontology of linear causality in which the past is thought to act on the present and the present is said to be an effect of whatever came before. Consequently, efforts to understand racism are thought to proceed from, or be enhanced by, some correct historical analysis of whiteness. According to this kind of temporality, the future is the terrain upon or through which white racism will get resolved. It cleaves the future from the present and, thus, gives the future discrete ontological form. Yet, in so doing, this kind of temporality disregards the ways in which the future is very often already present in the present not as a discrete ontological time-space, but as an absent or virtual presence that constitutes the very meaning of the present (Anderson, 2010a; Massumi, 2007). This is a rather significant oversight when attempting to account for geographies of whiteness because it means that such geographies are not simply a function of the past but of the future as well. So, then, what about the future? To what extent are geographies of whiteness a function not just of the past but of the future? How are white geographies maintained in relation to the future? In what ways is the future already present in various forms of whiteness? It seems that the geographic literature on whiteness is silent on these questions. In pointing this out, I do not mean to indict or discredit the historicist approach that has come to dominate understandings of whiteness. Again, past-oriented analyses of various kinds have been and continue to be critical for understanding whitenesses and the various racisms to which they give rise. I simply wish to acknowledge that by foregrounding the past in the present the geographic study of whiteness risks overlooking how whitenesses are made and maintained in relation to futures both distant and immanent. Here, the task for a future-oriented geographic research on whiteness might be to understand how both contemporary and past forms of whiteness relate to the future (Anderson, 2010a), or how specific geographic expressions of whiteness are contingent on the future. For instance, the task might be to understand how **discourses of futurity shape various forms of white supremacy** from **right-wing xenophobias to left-nationalisms to practices of liberal humanitarianism**, and how these shape, for instance, geographies of place, nature, space, mobility, bodies and so on. A worthwhile starting point for this work might be to analyse how discourses of **white crisis**, such as those found in Great Britain in the early 1900s (Bonnett, 2004) or throughout the West during processes of post-Second World War decolonization (Thobani, 2007), relate to and are shaped by notions of futurity. They do relate to the future. The question is: how and to what effect? Acknowledging how the future is made present in white geographies is important for at least three reasons. First, as many now argue (Grusin, 2010; Massumi, 2007), the future is an important site **through which individuals and societies are governed** (Anderson, 2010a). A focus on whiteness and futurity provides scope for thinking about the way in which governing through the future might **inaugurate new or reconfigure old forms of whiteness**. Eugenic science is a useful example here. Eugenics was underwritten by an imagined future eradicated of human imperfections. Thus we might seek to understand how white geographies are reproduced through new future-oriented technologies, like genetic screening and nanotechnology (Rose, 2007). Second, understanding how white geographies articulate with discourses of futurity opens up new terrains for conceptualizing and challenging racism. If white supremacy is, in part, reproduced through shared practices of futurity, what then are these practices? What kinds of futures do such practices seek to expunge or produce, and how can they be resisted? The case of genetic medicine is again illustrative. For instance, individual gene mapping allows ‘genetic citizens’ to witness their ‘future’ health by assessing their genetic predisposition for disease (Rose, 2007). Genetic citizenship is, in turn, shaped by new practices of bodily purification aimed at foreclosing certain ‘unhealthy’ futures. We might ask whether and how these practices are white. Third, a focus on whiteness and futurity points to the idea that **affect shapes white racial formation** (Hook, 2005). For the future can never exist except as a form of **virtual present**, and affect can be understood, in part, as a generalized attitude towards the presencing of particular futures. (Important, however, is that affect can also be understood as a generalized attitude towards presencings of the past. Think, for example, affects of nostalgia and loss.) Thus, we might ask: **what futures infuse the affective logics of whiteness?** How does this future presencing occur? And how, if at all, are these futures constitutive of specific white spatio-temporalities? These reasons together provide a rationale for a research agenda concerned with understanding how the future works as a resource in the geographic expression of whitenesses.

**Assemblages**

**Blackness exists as antagonistically related to whiteness. They are dialectically opposed counterparts that give coherence to the notion of the subject based on its degree of deviance from whiteness. Their conception of assemblages as consisting of a collection of multiplicities effaces the singularity of blackness.**

**Douglass and Wilderson 13** [Patrice, PhD candidate at UC Irvine; Frank, professor at UC Irvine, “The Violence of Presence: Metaphysics in a Blackened World; The Black Scholar, Vol. 43, No. 4, Special Issue: Role of Black Philosophy”, P. 117-123]//MHELLIE

A focus on violence should be at the center of this project because violence not only makes thought possible, but it **makes black metaphysical being and black relationality impossible**, while simultaneously giving rise to the philosophical contemplation of metaphysics and the thick description of human relations. **Without violence, critical theory and pure philosophy would be impossible.** Marx and others have intimated as much. But what is often left unexamined is that this violence is peculiar in that, whereas some groups of people might be the recipients of violence, after they have been constituted as people, violence is a structural necessity to the constitution of blacks. Ideally, philosophers (studying metaphysics) and critical theorists (studying the relational status of the subject) should not be able to labor without contemplating the violence that enables black (non)being; but, in fact, **the evasion of blackness-qua-violence is what gives these disciplines their presumed coherence.** This unthought dynamic is a bestcase scenario, as will be seen below with a critique of Elaine Scarry’s The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World.3 A worst-case scenario ensues when the critical theorist deploys anti-black violence in her/ his critique—and restricting of subjectivities and genres, as will be seen with a critique of Jasbir K. Puar’s Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times.4 **Jasbir Puar frames Terrorist Assemblages** by taking further the underwriting assumptive logics of critical theory and cultural criticisms, the fields the text both draws on and contributes to. The text foregrounds theories of subject resistance in relation to violence by atomizing the logic of analysis down to the level of genre distinctions.5 This framework posits a critical interrogation of how subject categories are incorporated by the state. The terrorist assemblage is a theoretic that resists subsumption into the war machine of the homonationalist nation-state formation, **by contesting, refusing, morphing, and acting against** classifications in a manner that suggests an incomprehensibility rather than legibility. This increases the possibility to apprehend the ontological and affective possibilities that resonate in queer futurity. By situating two genres of subjectivity, race and sexuality, in tension with one another, Terrorist Assemblages maneuvers to mark an investment in upholding the underlying structures upon which these terms are constituted. Puar argues, It is precisely within the interstices of life and death that we find the differences between queer subjects who are being folded (back) into life and the racialized queerness that emerges through the naming of populations, thus fueling the oscillation between the disciplining of subjects and the control of populations. . . . We can complicate, for instance, the centrality of biopolitical reproductive biologism by expanding the terrain of who reproduces and what is reproduced . . . rather than being predominately understood as implicitly or explicitly targeted for death.6 While this argument unhinges many protocols for thinking subjectivity in the humanities, it does not contest the grounds upon which genres, as subcategories of the subject, are produced and enacted. That is to say, the gesture to think outside of the constrictors and binds of race and sexuality as distinctive orientations by assessing the mergers, overlaps, and divergences of their competing and coalescing concerns, does not interrogate the parameters that suture race and sexuality as categories, and life and death as legible modes of existing and suffering within those categories. Instead it demands a more suitable relationship to genre and while the forms of relationality may at times be unnamable for Puar, this assessment still maintains that existing in the world is in fact a possibility. Also what is apparent in the formation of the terrorist assemblage as an inhabitance of resistance is the assumption of the state as the predominating force of violence and it furthermore asserts that all violence has the potential to be definitively recognized as such, violence. Metaphysics, in this context, is wholly unattended to, yet present in its absent consideration. **Violence is assumed as the constitution of a singular, refracted, and namable predominating force, the state and its extension, and is blind to considerations of violence located at the constitution of being itself** and present prior to the arrival of the state. In Scenes of Subjection: Terror, Slavery, and Self-Making in Nineteenth-Century America, Saidiya Hartman provides a critical collapsing of the analysis put forth by Puar by placing the legibility of resistance in question when explicitly considering the status of the female slave. What is brought to bear in Hartman’s analysis of the case, Missouri v. Celia (the slave), and countless other legal (non)accounts of sexual violence involving both female and male gendered slaves, is **a mediation on metaphysical violence that asks first under what conditions of existence can injury become legible.** In the case of slave women, the law’s circumscribed recognition of consent and will occurred only in order to intensify and secure the subordination of the enslaved, repress the crime, and deny injury, for it asserted that the captive female was both will-less and always willing. Moreover, the utter negation of the captive’s will required to secure absolute submission was identified as willful submission to the master in the topsy-turvy scenario of onerous passions. Within this scenario, the constraints of sentiments were no less severe than those of violence. Critical theory’s questions are silenced in the face of the evidence presented by Hartman. While Puar places concern on the formation of the terrorist assemblage as “a queer praxis of assemblage [which] allows for a scrambling of sides that is illegible to state practices of surveillance, control, banishment, and extermination,”9 Hartman places in peril the assumption that such a choice alignment of being is in fact a sustaining resistance to violence for all. **The anxious intent to sidestep blackness**, which is wholly apparent in Terrorist Assemblages, **cannot underwrite the reality of an existence for which space and time do not shift.** Through an intentional mediation on black existence, Scenes of Subjection brings to bear a witnessing that cannot be witnessed in the precarious existence of a being that is simultaneously injured and injurious, harmed and harmful, resistant and complicit, willful and unwilling, at the level of its constitution. That is to say, blackness is not deformed by slavery but quite the contrary. Slavery as an ancient political system finds itself disfigured by blackness, as its structural components proliferate the constraints and definitive power of the master’s gaze beyond the reach of actual physical property status and proximity. Black philosophical inquiries push introspections to shift concerns beyond thinking direct relations of violence as a tractable force by instead engaging the infinite refractions of violence **at the level of being and existence within the world**. What Hartman uncovers in her world-shifting theoretical engagement with slavery is the question of exactly whose agency and suffering is revealed through an engagement with a blackened existence. Is it the suffering of the black, or is the status of something else altogether revealed? of advertising: calling for site-specific improvisation—**deterritorializing lines of flight—seems merely a call to "make it new."**

**Transcendence, becoming, and the vacuous project of non-dialectical assemblage theory forgets how racial assemblages are formed in the first place. As a result, much of their theory prioritize racial hybridity, or degrees of deviance. This operates through etching forces of power onto human physiology and flesh, creating the appearance of a sociopolitical status based upon that organization of what the flesh expresses: the hieroglyphics of the flesh. Deleuze and Guattari in their theoretical abstraction leave this open for naturalization. Their project in no way addresses the naturalization of antiblackness enacted through the flesh.**

--- Willful abandonment of the subject is an avoidance. Your theory and theorists still vote neg.

**Weheliye 14** [Alexander G. Weheliye, professor of African American studies at Northwestern University, *Habeas Viscus*, P. 33-35] \*edited for gendered language

We should remain cautious, as Barbara Christian, Stuart Hall, and Gayatri Spivak urge us to do, about the complete disavowal of subjectivity in theoretical discourse, because within the context of the Anglo-American academy more often than not **an insistence on transcending limited notions of the subject or identity leads to the neglect of race as a critical category**, as we have seen in scholars such as Judith Butler, and as I show shortly in my discussion of Foucault and Agamben.5 In this context, Spivak's remarks concerning Deleuze and Guattari's refusal to contemplate the interactions between “desire, power and subjectivity” remain acutely relevant, because it “renders them incapable of articulating a theory of interests,” and Foucault's emphasis on “ ‘genealogical’ speculation...has created an unfortunate resistance...to ‘mere’ ideological critique.”6 The opposition to ideology as a metaterritorializing category on the part of Foucault and Deleuze and Guattari is understandable within the context of post-1960s French thought given the then-au courant disenchantment with Marxism and grand narratives. Nevertheless, notions such as power, ideology, gender, coloniality, identity, and race jinglingly dawdle in the margins of Deleuze and Guattari's putatively asubjective and disinterested universes, since otherwise, as Stuart Hall remarks, “there is no reason why anything is or isn't potentially articulable with anything,” while the “critique of reductionism has apparently resulted in the notion of society as a totally open discursive field.”- It should be noted that Hall and Spivak, two of the most significant contemporary Anglo-American theorists of cultural studies and deconstruction, are not simply rejecting post-structuralist tenets for their arbitrariness or relativism but are asking about the stakes of evacuating seemingly retrograde concepts such as identity, especially within the context of “societies structured in dominance.” Stuart Hall's elaboration of the Marxian notion of articulation, which Marx referred to as soziale Gliederung, represents “the necessity of thinking unity and difference; difference in complex unity, without this becoming a hostage to the privileging of difference as such.”9 Hall's outline of articulation here emphasizes relational connectivity in much the same way as the Deleuzo-Guattarian notion of assemblages while still retaining some of the political traction called for by Spivak and Hall. Hall is also careful to acknowledge the existence of “tendential combinations,” which are “not prescribed in the fully determinist sense” but are nevertheless the “ ‘preferred’ combinations, sedimented and solidified by real historical development over time.”10 Preferred articulations insert historically sedimented power imbalances and ideological interests, which are crucial to understanding mobile structures of dominance such as race or gender, into the modus operandi of assemblages. Accordingly, a robust fusion of articulation and assemblage accents the productive ingredients of social formations while not silencing questions of power, reinstituting an innocent version of the subject, or neglecting the deterritorializing capabilities of power, ideology, and so on. Articulated assemblages such as racialization materialize as sets of complex relations of articulations that constitute an open articulating principle—territorializing and deterritorializing, interested and asubjective—structured in political, economic, social, racial, and heteropatriarchal dominance. In one of the few passages in which Deleuze and Guattari explicitly address racial difference, they contend the “race-tribe exists only at the level of an oppressed race, and in the name of the oppression it suffers: there is no race but inferior, minoritarian; there is no dominant race,” which intimates the rudiments of a political theory of racialization in its honing in on race as an assemblage of hierarchy and the deracination of the majoritarian. In the end, however, this theory flounders on Deleuze and Guattari's celebration of racial impurity: “A race is defined not by its purity but rather by the impurity conferred upon it by a system of domination. Bastard and mixed-blood are the true names of race” (Plateaus, 3-9). By asking neither how racialized impurity is articulated within a given sociohistorical totality (or what counts as racial hybridity and what does not) nor whose interests are served by the adjudication of racial categories, **Deleuze and Guattari foreclose the conceptual reflection of the ways racialization and different axes of domination cooperate in founding racializing assemblages**.11 The one-drop rule, the Nuremberg laws, or the blood quantum laws have exposed how the juridico-political territorialization of racial hybridity frequently serves to solidify the ordering of humans along racial lines rather than heralding the suspension of racializing assemblages. The idea of racial admixture assumes the reality of distinctive races that are sublated in Deleuze and Guattari's deterritorialized “mixed-race bastard.” For, in contrast to Glissant's notion of relation, which I discussed earlier and which takes as its point of departure the constitutive relatedness of the world, **Deleuze and Guattari's exhalation of impurity must inevitably presuppose an erstwhile racial pureness, which territorializes the very notion of racial difference**. Besides underscoring the necessity for ideology and articulation to be introduced into a theory of assemblages, t**he privileging of racial hybridity points to the limits of the Deleuzo-Guattarian model.** If not, then Deleuze and Guattari's supposition of the actuality of races and their failure to explore how and why the impure represents the real faciality of race would go unchecked. As a result, **Deleuze and Guattari conjure a “self-proximate, if not self-identical, subject of the oppressed**,” only in this context the racially subjugated subject emerges as pristine via its hybridity. With regard to the category of race, **racializing assemblages ascribe “incorporeal transformations...to bodies,” etching abstract forces of power onto human physiology and flesh in order to create the appearance of a naturally expressive relationship between phenotype and sociopolitical status: the hieroglyphics of the flesh** (Plateaus, 98). Or, in Colin Dayan's words: “Slavery...rendered material the conceptual, giving a body to what had been abstraction.. An idea of lineage thus evolved and turned the rule of descent into the transfer of pigmentation, which fleshed out in law the terms necessary to maintain the curse of color.”14 As a result, the legal and extralegal fictions of skin color and other visual markers obscure, and therefore facilitate, the continued existence and intergenerational transmission of the hieroglyphics of the flesh. Spillers adds to and recasts the concept of bare life by forcefully showing how, within the context of racial slavery, it gives birth to a cluster of classifying assemblages that stands at the center of modernity. Deleuze and Guattari point to the productive components of assemblages in which “the material or machinic aspect of an assemblage relates not to the production of goods but rather to a precise state of intermingling of bodies in a society, including all the attractions and repulsions, sympathies and antipathies, alterations, amalgamations, penetrations, and expansions that affect bodies of all kinds in their relations to one another” (Plateaus, 90). Racializing assemblages articulate relational intensities between human physiology and flesh, producing racial categories, which are subsequently coded as natural substances, whether pure or impure, rather than as the territorializing articulations of these assemblages. **By not thinking through race in any sustained or critical manner, Deleuze and Guattari leave the door open for the naturalization of this category**. Race, however, should be viewed not as ideology or the erroneous ascription of social meaning to existent biological classifications, as Deleuze and Guattari do by giving preference to the hybrid, but, in the words of Dorothy Roberts, as “a political system that governs people by sorting them into social groupings based on invented biological demarcations.. Race is not a biological category that is politically charged**.** It is a political category that has been disguised as a biological one.”15 The flesh, although not synonymous with racialization in toto, represents one such racializing assemblage within the world of [people] ~~Man~~, and, consequently, it represents both a subject and an object of knowledge within black studies's intellectual topographies.

**Baudrillard**

**Baudrillard’s discourse is rooted in a fear of the other.**

Aaron **Schwabach** (20**03**) Kosovo, Law & Literature, 15:1, 1-21,Aaron Schwabach Professor of Law J.D., University of California, Berkeley (Boalt Hall); B.A., Antioch College

The word “Oriental” in this context has an odd ring to American ears. To Americans “Oriental” is an outmoded term once used to refer to the countries, cultures, inhabitants, and artifacts of East Asia. To Europeans in general, however, and to the French in particular, the term refers to what Americans generally still refer to as the Middle East. And to academics everywhere the word inevitably suggests the work of Edward Said.34 Orientalism was at one time the term used in European universities for the study of the countries of the Middle East and, to a lesser extent, South and East Asia. The European “Orientalists”—writers and academics—created an image of the “Orient” in the European popular consciousness bearing only occasional resemblance to the original: a perfect Baudrillardian simulacrum except for the fact that it was largely constructed before the days of television, relying almost exclusively on the medium of print. Said uses the term “Orientalism” to refer not only to the academic discipline but also to the simulacral Orient created by it: a textual Orient.35 He describes the creations of the Orientalists as “highly stylized simulacra, elaborately wrought imitations of what a live Orient might be thought to look like. To an American, perhaps, it may seem especially bizarre that a resident of France would repeatedly insist on the Otherness of Arabs and Islam. 37 France, after all, is a diverse and pluralistic democracy with nearly two million Muslims among its fifty-nine million inhabitants.38 In 1992, 1.72 million Muslims lived in France, making Muslims more than twice as numerous there as Protestants;39 this number included 614,207 Algerians and 572,652 Moroccans.40 Many of these persons, of course, are French citizens. Perhaps it is these he is thinking of when he says, “The Arabs: there where they should not be (immigrants) . . .” To a resident of a country where even conservative standardbearers extol the benefits of immigration41 it may be difficult to understand the assumption that immigrants “should not be” there.42 On the other hand, my bafflement and, indeed, disgust at the racism contained in this assumption may only prove Baudrillard’s point that “[T]he Americans . . . cannot imagine the Other, nor therefore personally make war upon it.”43 In this thought Baudrillard echoes the earlier words of Said: “Unlike the Americans, the French and the British . . . have had a long tradition of what I shall be calling Orientalism, a way of coming to terms with the Orient that is based on the Orient’s special place in European Western experience.”44 The Orient, Said concludes, is the source of one of Europe ’s “deepest and most recurring images of the Other.”45 It does not hold a similar place in the American worldview. Baudrillard, however, is unable to free himself from the Orientalism his culture has inculcated in him, and therefore is insistent on the Otherness of Arabs and Islam. He conflates the two terms, and draws no distinction between largely Arab Iraq and non-Arab Iran. The goal of the West is to meet “the challenge of Islam, with its irreducible and dangerous alterity.”46 The “refractory forces on the planet” include “Islam in its entirety.”47 Of course, Baudrillard apparently disapproves of these aims, and of those who would see Islam as the Other. But the mere fact that he imputes this belief to others suggests that he sees Islam in this way—as Other in its entirety—and tells us more about the author than about those he addresses. From an American perspective, at least, this insistence is bizarre. Baudrillard’s “uncontrollable elements” include, among others, the 1.72 million Muslims of France, many of whom must be Mr. Baudrillard’s neighbors, colleagues and, at one time, students. Many, born in France, are every bit as French as Mr. Baudrillard himself.48 Throughout this work, as indeed in all his work, Baudrillard affects an air of cynical detachment, as if prepared to sneer at any reader foolish enough to take him seriously or to believe that he actually means the outrageous things that he says. But racism, even affected racism, causes real damage. Baudrillard, despite his rejection of everything up to and including reality, is evidently a product of his time and his culture: As Said points out, France has played a greater role than any country (with the possible exception of the United Kingdom) in the development of Orientalism.49 But Islam and its adherents are not the only Others here. The Americans, those “missionar[ies] bearing electroshocks”50 serve equally as signifiers or at least exemplars of everything that is un-French. Seen in this way, the book becomes nothing more than the curmudgeonly and xenophobic rant of a cranky old French person dismayed to find his country embroiled in a conflict between two equally despised sets of foreigners. Baudrillard’s unquestioning acceptance of a Eurocentric and even racist value system is not all that surprising in light of the obvious consequences of his thinking. An obvious extension of the argument that the Gulf War did not take place, or did not take place in any meaningful way, is that the Holocaust did not take place, nor did the genocides in Cambodia, Rwanda or the Balkans. The latter two had not occurred at the time of Baudrillard’s writing, of course. The former, though, was an outgrowth of the same intellectual tradition as Baudrillard’s self-conscious bourgeois nihilism; Pol Pot (then Saloth Sar) and Sary Ieng (then Kim Trang) acquired much of their ideology, including Andre Malraux’s doctrine of necessary violence, at the Sorbonne.51 It would be unkind to conclude from this that the principal export of French universities is bad ideas. It might be even less kind to expand upon this idea, taking colonialism, communism, fascism, Orientalism and various other isms into account, and conclude that the principal export of Europe is bad ideas. It thus comes as something of a relief to find that some of Baudrillard’s numerous critics consider that he has nothing of value to contribute: In fact, his thought does not develop at all. He is simply an aphorist who seized upon half a dozen borrowed concepts twenty-odd years ago and has rung changes on them ever since. Thus it is both frustrating and deceptive to seek progressive modulations between one text and another. They are all basically one book, and any fifty consecutive pages of Baudrillard are essentially the whole of Baudrillard.52 More recently, the United States has found itself involved in a postmodern conflict of another sort: One in which there is no clearly defined “enemy.” For most of us, the war is defined by simulacra: the videos, endlessly repeated, of the hijacked airliner crashing into the south tower of the World Trade Center, and the videos of the towers collapsing. We have seen these images so many times, woven into so many different commentaries (each a creative work in itself ) in so many media, that the original event may be difficult to distinguish from the precessing simulacra. But it is not impossible to distinguish. To dismiss the underlying reality (and horror) of the event, as Baudrillard does with the Gulf War, is facile, meaningless, and morally empty. Real people died; real people continue to suffer as a result. The concept of simulacrum is useful for understanding the relationship between events and experience, but simulacra, even those generated by a single event, are not necessarily symmetrical. Simulacral or not, the experience of war by TV viewers is not the same as the experience of war by its participants and victims. While the war may not have taken place for Jean Baudrillard, and even less so for me, for example (I didn’t even watch it on television), it definitely took place for the Iraqis, Kuwaitis, Palestinians, Saudi Arabians, Israelis, Americans, Europeans and others involved.

**Seduction and reversibility are conspiracies of power which operate through logics of willed submission and mutual benevolence between dominated and domineer. This euphemizes the antagonistic fissures inflicted within master-slave relations.**

**Hartman 1997** (Saidiya Hartman – professor of English and comparative literature at Columbia University | *Scenes of Subjection: Terror, Slavery, and Self-making in nineteenth-century America,* Oxford University Press, 1997 – ERW)

-Reversibility and seduction operates through mystified conception of power – claiming it is alterable through the subaltern destabilizing the domineer.

-Parasitic upon antagonistic fissures – equivalent to saying black women should let themselves get raped because that is an instance of “seducing” or tinkering with power – if they aren’t free, they aren’t trying hard enough. Assumes that master-slave relations can be contingently morphed.

-Distancing DA – Baudrilard crafts theories which fall benign in the face of violence.

The construction of black subjectivity as **will-less, abject, insatiate and pained**, and the instrumental deployment of sexuality in the reproduction of property, subordina- tion, and racial difference usurped the category of rape. Sexuality formed the nexus in which black, female, and chattel were **inextricably bound**, and acted to intensify the constraints of chattel status by subjecting the body to another order of violations and whims.23 The despotic ravages of power made violence indistinguishable from the full enjoyment of the thing. The tensions generated by the law's dual invocation of property and person, or by "full enjoyment" and limited protection to life and limb, were masked by the phantasmal ensnaring agency of the lascivious black.24 **Rape disappeared through the intervention of seduction-the assertion of the slave wom- an's complicity and willful submission.** Seduction was central to the very constitution and imagination of the antebellum South, for it provided a way of **masking the antagonistic fissures of the social by pathologizing the black body** and licensing barbarous forms of white enjoyment. The discourse of seduction enabled those like Mary Boykin Chestnut, who were disgusted and enraged by the sexual arrangements of slavery, to target slave women as the agents of their husbands' downfall. The **complicity of slave women displaced the act of sexual violence.** According to Chestnut, decent white women were forced to live with husbands degraded by the lowliness of their enslaved "mistresses": "Under slavery, we lived surrounded by prostitutes, yet an abandoned woman is sent out of any decent house. Who thinks any worse of a Negro or mulatto woman for being a thing we can't name?" (Chestnut 21). The sexual exploitation of the enslaved female, incredulously, **served as evidence of her collusion with the master class** and as evidence of her power, the power both to render the master weak and, implicitly, to **be the mistress of her own subjection. The slave woman** not only suffered the responsibility for her sexual (ab)use, but **was blameworthy because of her purported ability to render the powerful weak.** Even those like Fanny Kemble, who eloquently described the "simple horror and misery" that slave women regularly experienced, were able to callously exclaim, when confronted with the inescapable normativity of rape and the "string of detest- able details" that comprised the life of the enslaved woman, as yet another woman, Sophy, shared her experience of violation: "Ah! but don't you know-did nobody ever teach any of you that it is a sin to live with men who are not your husbands?!" (Kemble 270).25 Sophy, appropriately and vehemently responded: "Oh, yes, missis, we know-we know all about dat well enough; but we do anything to get our poor flesh some rest from the whip; when he made me follow him into de bush, what use me tell him no? he have strength to make me" (Kemble 270). The equivocations which surround issues of consensual sexual relations under domination, the eliding of sexual violence by the imputation of the slave woman's ensnaring sexual agency or lack of virtue, and the presumption of consent as conse- quence of the utter powerlessness of her "no" (the "no means yes" philosophy) are important constituents of the discourse of seduction. In a more expansive or generic sense, seduction denotes a theory of power that demands the absolute and "perfect" submission of the enslaved as the guiding principle of slave relations, and yet seeks to mitigate the avowedly necessary brutality of slave relations through the shared affections of owner and captive. The doctrine of "perfect submission" reconciled violence and the claims of **mutual benevolence between master and slave as necessary in maintaining the harmony of the institution.** The presumed mutuality of feelings in maintaining domination enchanted the brutal and direct violence of master-slave relations. The term **seduction is** employed here to designate this displacement and **euphemization of violence**, for seduction epitomizes the discursive alchemy which shrouds direct forms of violence beneath the "veil of enchanted relations," that is, the reciprocal and mutual relations of master and slave (Bourdieu). This mining of the discourse of seduction attempts to illuminate the violence obscured by the veil through an interrogation of the language of power and feelings, specifically the manipulations of the weak and the kind-heartedness and moral instruction of the powerful. The benign representation of the paternal institution in slave law constituted the master-slave relationship as typified by the bonds of affection, and thereby trans- formed relations of violence and **domination into those of affinity**. This benignity depended upon a construction of the enslaved black as one easily inclined to submis- sion, a skilled maneuverer wielding weakness masterfully, and as a potentially threatening insubordinate who could only be disciplined through violence. If what is at stake in **social fantasy is the construction of a non-antagonistic, organic, and complementary society**, then the ability of the South to imagine slavery as a paternal and benign institution and master-slave relations as bound by feelings depended on the specter of the obsequious and threatening slave,26 for this manichean construction undergirded both the necessary violence and the bonds of affection set forth in slave law. As well, this fantasy enabled a vision of whiteness defined primarily by its complementary relation to blackness and by the desire to incorporate and regulate black excess. Seduction thus provided a holistic vision of social order, **not divided by antagonisms**, and precariously balancing barbarism and civilization, violence and protection, mutual benevolence and absolute submission, and brutality and senti- ment. This harmonious vision of community was made possible by the exercise of violence, the bonds of affection, and the consonance of the weak and the powerful. How does seduction uphold perfect submission and, at the same time, assert the alluring, if not endangering, agency of the dominated? By forwarding the strength of weakness. As a theory of power, **seduction contends that there is an ostensible equality between the dominant and the dominated.** The dominated acquire power based upon the identification of force and feeling. As Baudrillard writes, "seduction play(s) triumphantly with weakness" (83). The artifice of weakness not only provides seduction with its power, but defines its essential character, for the enactment of weakness and the "impenetrable obscurity" of femininity and blackness harbor a conspiracy of power (Baudrillard 83). The dominated catalyze reversals of power, not by challenges presented to the system but by succumbing to the system's logic. Thus power comes to be defined not by domination but by the manipulations of the dominated. The reversibility of power and the play of the dominated discredit the force of violence through the assertion of reciprocal and contubernal relations. In this regard, the recognition of the agency of the dominated and the power of the weak secure the fetters of subjection, while proclaiming the power and influence of those shackled and tethered. The pro-slavery ideologue George Fitzhugh, like Baudrillard, also celebrated the reversibility of power enacted through surrender. In Cannibals All! or, Slaves Without Masters, Fitzhugh argued that the strength of weakness disrupts the hierarchy of power within the family, as well as the master-slave relationship. Appearances conspire to contrary purposes, thus the seemingly weak slave, like the infant or (white) woman, exercises capricious dominion: "The dependent exercise, because of their dependence, as much control over their superiors, in most things, as those superiors exercise over them. Thus and thus only, can conditions be equalized" (Fitzhugh 204-5). Seduction appears to be a necessary labor, one required to extend and reproduce the claims of power, though advanced in the guise of the subaltern's control and disruptions: "The humble and obedient slave exercises more or less control over the most brutal and hard-hearted master. It is an invariable law of nature, that weakness and dependence are elements of strength, and generally sufficiently limit that universal despotism, observable throughout human and animal nature" (Fitzhugh 205). If, as Fitzhugh insists, the greatest slave is the master of the household, and the enslaved rule by virtue of the "strength of weakness," then, in effect, **the slave is made the master of her subjection.** As Fitzhugh envisioned, kindness and affection undergirded the relations of subordination and dependency. As a model of social order, the patriarchal family depended upon duty, status, and protection, rather than consent, equality, and civil freedom. Subjection was not only naturalized but consonant with the sentimental equality of reciprocity, inasmuch as the power of affection licensed the strength of weakness. Essentially, "the strength of weakness" prevailed due to the goodness of the father, "the armor of affection and benevolence." The generosity of the father enabled the victory claimed by the slave, the tyrannical child, and the brooding wife. The bonds of affection within the slaveholding family circle permitted the tyranny of weakness, and supplanted the stranglehold of the ruling father. Ironically, the family circle remained intact as much by the bonds of affection as by the tyranny of the weak. Literally, theforces of affection bound the interests of the master and slave in a delicate state of equilibrium, as one form of strength modified the other. Thus, we are to believe that the exercise of control by the weak softens universal despotism, subdues the power of the father by commanding his care, and guarantees the harmony of slave relations. Seduction erects a family romance, in this case, the elaboration of a racial and sexual fantasy in which domination is transposed into the bonds of mutual affection, subjection idealized as the pathway to equality, and perfect subordination declared the means of ensuring great happiness and harmony. The patriarchal model of social order erected by Fitzhugh marries equality and despotism through an explicit critique of consent, possessive individualism, and contractual relations. Feelings rather than contract are the necessary corrective to universal despotism, therefore duty and reciprocity rather than consent provide the basis for equality. The despotic and sovereign power celebrated by Fitzhugh could only be abated by the bonds of affection, a phrase which resonates with the ambivalence attendant to the attach- ments and constraints which characterize the relation of owner and object. If **a conspiracy of power resides within seduction**, then questions arise as to the exact nature of this conspiracy: Who seduces whom? Does the slave become en- trapped in the enchanted web of the owner's dominion, lured by promises of protection and care? Does the guile and subterfuge of the dependent mitigate the effects of power? Are the manipulations and transgressions of the dominated fated to reproduce the very order presumably challenged by such actions? Or do such enactments on the part of the owner and the enslaved, the feigned concessions of power and the stylized performance of naivete, effect any shifts or disruptions of force, or compulsively restage power and powerlessness?

**Baudrillard’s analyses assume a homogenized and orientalist perception of the Arab world and Asia**

**Almond**, I. (20**07**). New Orientalists, The : Postmodern Representations of Islam from Foucault to Baudrillard (1). London, US: I.B.Tauris. Retrieved from <http://www.ebrary.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu> Ian Almond is a literary scholar and writer. He is Professor of World Literature at Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar. Educated in the UK, Almond received his PhD in Literature at Edinburgh University. TE

This exclusive concern with surface, these impromptu and uninformed evaluations, an instinct for controversial imagery, the mocking imitation-cum-sincere replication of Orientalist stereotypes and the tacit, unquestioning conviction of his own enlightened Western identity will all be features of Baudrillard’s general approach to the Islamic East. Unlike Derrida, whose Jewish Algerian background protects him from any basic charge of ignorance about Islamic culture, or Foucault, who at least made an effort to read Corbin before his trip to Iran, Baudrillard appears to be relatively unburdened by any deeper knowledge of Islam or its socio-political history. In a universe where the flow of events ‘bear no relation to any reality whatsoever’, where the various manifestations of signs form their ‘own pure simulacrum’, 7 the superficiality of Baudrillard’s knowledge of Islam, far from constituting any kind of handicap, becomes a means of obtaining a clearer and purely imagistic perspective on the issue at hand, unclouded by the mendacious illusions of depth, research and ‘background knowledge’. The paucity of Baudrillard’s knowledge of the Middle East is revealed in the eagerness with which he embraces the Oriental, whether it is the ‘Oriental logic’ of Saddam Hussein, 8 or the use of The Thousand and One Nights to justify extempore observations on the Iraqi leader’s concept of time. 9 In ‘Hypotheses sur le terrorisme’ we even see a fable from the Turkish sage Nasreddin Hoja employed to introduce Baudrillard’s own hypothesis on the ‘meaning’ – or more accurately, non-meaning – of September 11. Occasionally Baudrillard confounds Arabs together with Indians and Chinese in order to make a particularly non-Western point, as we see towards the end of Fatal Strategies in his remarks on the Peking Opera. The passage is one in which Baudrillard praises the harmonious objectification of the Chinese Theatre – how ‘everything is arranged: felinity, avoidance, advance, retreat, confrontation’, p. 176); 10 the scope of the observations quickly broaden, however, to an explicit commendation of how the Oriental sees combat as ‘never [being] confrontational … but stratagems’, of how the Oriental mind has a truer understanding ‘of the world as play and ceremony’, in contrast to its Western counterpart, which is forever involved in a futile struggle with the other ‘to annex the empty heart of truth’ (p. 177). Like Foucault’s Confucians, Baudrillard’s Chinese dancers have perfectly submitted their jarring individualities to the order of the ceremony. The staging of their perfectly rehearsed movements encourages this conviction of the Oriental as having better understood – in a less combatative, more holistic way – the flux of simulacra than the truth-obsessed, agonistic Occidental. This superior grasp of how ‘everything is linked and connected, but never with a connection of meaning’ (p. 176) is quickly extended to the Moroccan or Egyptian moving in their bazaar: The difference can be felt even in the movements of crowds and masses: while in the Western space of the subway, the city, the market, people bump against each other, fighting for space, or at best, avoiding each other’s trajectories, in an aggressive promiscuity, the crowds in the Orient, or in an Arab casbah, know how to move differently, glide with presentiment (or consideration), care, even in a tight space, the interstitial spaces the meat-cutter of the Chuang-Tzu was talking about, through which his blade passes effortlessly. (p. 177) Perhaps it would be unfair to ask if the Oriental’s inhumanity played a part in rendering him more amenable to this superior harmony. Only a belief-system that sees an Oriental closer to an unthinking object than a free-thinking subject would praise the former for a wise, knowing acquiescence to ceremony and ritual, instead of the ignorant, quibbling, Occidental insistence on freedom and the will to act. This becomes clarified in Fatal Strategies: What people have always wanted to conserve is control over them and over their rule: that of birth and death, but also of the eclipse of stars, the rapture of passion, and the revolving of the natural cycle. It is only our modern culture that has capitulated to this form of obligation and entrusted everything to that informed and formless form of freedom called chance. (p. 174) Following Nietzsche and Foucault, Baudrillard maintains this linking of the Oriental (Chinese, Arab, Indian) with a more authentic, pre-modern understanding of power. However, the formula is slightly different: if Nietzsche saw Orientals as not being ashamed of using power, Foucault reiterated the idea from the other end of the equation, believing Orientals to be more accommodating to holistic collectivities than their Western counterparts. Baudrillard, for all his desire to oublier Foucault, seems to be suggesting the same conclusion in his remarks on Chinese theatre: the Oriental on the high street and the Arab in his bazaar are both creatures who lend themselves easily to the rituals and ceremonies around them, not possessing the Western desire to ‘occupy the blind spot around which the battle is arrayed’ (p. 177). In other words, as Arabs don’t have wills of their own – not having undergone, presumably, the Cartesian/Kantian discoveries of their selves – the selflessness and complete commitment required of them by hierarchies and collectivities provide no frustration, no dilemma. Any critique of what Baudrillard calls ‘our modern culture’ and its obsession with freedom and choice – that ‘formless form of freedom called chance’ – will naturally enlist the Arab and the Oriental as alternatives to the Western illusion of freedom. As Baudrillard’s Arabs appear to have no problem with being playthings in the order of something larger than themselves, they become inevitable examples in the text of Fatal Strategies, examples to be cited in the endeavour to ‘pass over to the side of the object’ (p. 205). 11

**Baudrillard’s colonial biases are ever present in his work which plays off of racist perceptions of Arabs.**

**Almond**, I. (20**07**). New Orientalists, The : Postmodern Representations of Islam from Foucault to Baudrillard (1). London, US: I.B.Tauris. Retrieved from <http://www.ebrary.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu> Ian Almond is a literary scholar and writer. He is Professor of World Literature at Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar. Educated in the UK, Almond received his PhD in Literature at Edinburgh University. TE \*edited for ablest language

Nevertheless, our concern is not so much with the political/ sociological feasibility of Baudrillard’s theory, but how it translates itself into an Arab context. Probably the first thing to be said about the above selection of quotations is that Baudrillard appears untroubled by the unmistakably colonial implications a term such as ‘the Arab masses’ may have. The phrase ‘Arab masses’ itself is an expression no French thinker can use, not even ironically, without re-evoking a long succession of French colonial observations on the non-individuality and tribal, clannish inclinations of the Arab mind, its inherent resistance to democracy and critical thinking, and so on. With all their echoes of Renan’s ‘Semitic’ and D’Herbelot’s racial categorizations of the Arab, Baudrillard’s remarks on the easily led nature of the ‘Arab masses’ cannot escape their colonial genealogy. Moreover, in contrast to everything he had written about the Western masses five years earlier, Baudrillard appears to be using the phrase ‘masses’ in its more conventional sense, rather than any ironic, secretly subversive meaning. The Western masses, we will recall, are ‘deeply aware that they do not have to make a decision about themselves and the world’ (p. 215); in other words, their passivity is an authentic one, a conscious choice, a decision not to take decisions. No trace of this ironic de-volition, of what Baudrillard calls a strategic ‘expulsion of the obligation of being responsible’ (ibid.), seems to be found in Baudrillard’s ‘Arab masses’. Forever the victim of Saddam their ‘hero’, forever deluded by his Saladin-like ‘aura’, forever manipulated and controlled by their despot, the ‘Arab masses’ do not appear to have any of the depth and sophistication of their Western counterparts. At no point in the text of The Gulf War do we receive the impression that the ‘Arab masses’ are aware of the game that is being played, that there is anything even remotely symbiotic about their relationship to Saddam, or that their willingness to perform the role of abject masses has even the slightest degree of self-irony about it. The subtlety and connivance of Baudrillard’s theory of the masses, it seems, is applicable only to the West. That Baudrillard should attribute unironic docility to the Arabs is confusing, as, elsewhere in the text of The Gulf War Did Not Take Place, Arabs – in particular their leaders – appear to enjoy a superior grasp of the flexibility of truth than their more naïve Western counterparts. At times this superiority is seen in terms of a cannier understanding of the nature of symbolic exchange (p. 55); as always, Baudrillard does not hesitate to employ Oriental clichés as metaphors, in this case that of Saddam Hussein the carpet-seller, ‘more gifted for the scam’: … whereas Saddam Hussein, for his part, bargains his war by overbidding in order to fall back, attempting to force the hand by pressure and blackmail, like a hustler trying to sell his goods. The Americans understand nothing in this whole psychodrama of bargaining, they are had every time until, with the wounded pride of the Westerner, they stiffen and impose their conditions. (p. 54) How quickly we are back to the wily Arab, cunning and sly, cheating the fat, rich, slightly ~~stupid~~ American tourist with his overpriced carpets. What appears to limit the Americans in this contest is, somewhat predictably, their honesty – unlike the sly Arab, the goodnatured American plays fair, has no understanding of the usefulness of mendacity, of the advantageous pliability of truth: ‘If the other wants to play, to trick and to challenge, they will virtuously employ their force’ (ibid.). In this respect, at least, the Arab emerges as a more intelligent, if more dishonest player, an intelligence and superior bargaining-ability that Baudrillard is keen to attribute not simply to the inherent mendacity and slyness of the Arab (though doubtless this is the determining factor) but also to a wider, non-economic grasp of what lies in the concept of exchange – not simply the price, but also the time of the exchange, the honour, the language of the procedure. ‘The Americans’, Baudrillard tells us, ‘take no account of these primitive subtleties’ (p. 55). The remark is, in one sense, quite generous for all its ordinary unoriginality: it is modernity that, blinded by its worship of the number, the price, has been rendered ~~stupid~~ and inflexible when faced with the ‘primitive’ sophistication of the Arab. At other times, however, Baudrillard seems to suggest another reason for the ease with which the Arab deals in untruth: ~~Seeing~~ how Saddam uses his cameras on the hostages, the caressed children, the (fake) strategic targets, on his own smiling face, on the ruins of the milk factory, one cannot help thinking that in the West we still have a hypocritical vision of television and information, to the extent that, despite all the evidence, we hope for their proper use. Saddam, for his part, knows what the media and information are: he makes a radical, unconditional, perfectly cynical and therefore perfectly instrumental use of them. … these cynics alone are right about information when they employ it as an unconditional simulacrum. We believe that they are immorally perverted images. Not so. They alone are conscious of the profound immorality of images. (p. 46) The passage is remarkable for a number of points. First of all, we in the West are hampered by truth. Here Baudrillard, bringing in both Nietzsche and Derrida, seems to link the history of mimesis, of truth and representation, in the West with a certain naïveté. This naïveté, it seems, is ultimately logocentric – the delusion of correspondence theory, still nurtured by modernity, that an image must necessarily correspond to ‘something’ on the other side of it. Arabs (and, oddly enough, Romanians – not for the first time does the Islamic East and the Soviet/Orthodox East become united in common opposition to Protestant capitalism) possess a cynicism which enables them to ~~see~~ truth as purely functional, rather than representational. Of course, the unpleasant implication of the passage is that lies are second-nature to the Arab mind – unhampered by the burden of sincerity, enlightened as to the real nature of ‘unconditional simulacra’, the irrelevance of the signifier to the signified, the Arab ~~sees~~ no distinction between truth and lies, between fact and fiction, between the genuine and the fake. Although this idea is reminiscent of a common Western conviction of nihilism in the Oriental mind – the secret maxim of Nietzsche’s Assassins (‘Nothing is true. Everything is Allowed’) – Baudrillard provides a surprisingly original justification for this cliché by an appeal to the iconoclast/Islamic prohibition of the image, a historical reference he has already made use of elsewhere (~~see~~ Baudrillard’s belief that the Iconoclast’s ‘rage to destroy images arose precisely because they sensed this omnipotence of simulacra’). 14 Because Muslims and iconoclasts already believe images to be haram or unclean, they have no moral reservations about misusing them in order to obtain what they desire. Hence the West’s naïveté which rises from its idolatry of the image, its over-sanctification of a non-existent truth, its deluded belief in the image’s divine referent. Baudrillard’s Arabs, the passage suggests, manipulate images with greater dexterity than their Western counterparts because they know them to be nothing more than idols, false gods, empty signs.

**Baudrillard reproduces Martin Luther’s islamophobic rhetoric of Muslims as the bringers of the end times.**

**Almond**, I. (20**07**). New Orientalists, The : Postmodern Representations of Islam from Foucault to Baudrillard (1). London, US: I.B.Tauris. Retrieved from <http://www.ebrary.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu> Ian Almond is a literary scholar and writer. He is Professor of World Literature at Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar. Educated in the UK, Almond received his PhD in Literature at Edinburgh University. TE \*edited for ablest language

In concluding, two final points need to be made concerning Baudrillard’s use of Islam as a final bastion of resistance against an increasingly unilateral world order – the first concerns the place of Islam in the end of the West, the second concerns Islam and Baudrillard’s theories of ecstasy and excess. At the end of Chapter 4, we saw how the apocalyptic overtones associated with Islam in Borges’ story drew on a long medieval tradition, one that interpreted the coming of the Moors as a precursor to the Day of Judgment. The Turks were unconvertible, Luther wrote in 1542, they were a sign of the end of the Age. 16 Equally, Arabs are also described as ‘unconvertible’ in Baudrillard’s book (p. 37); like Luther’s Turks, they are hopelessly beyond redemption, utterly incapable of being reintegrated into the Protestant capitalist world order. Part of the attraction of the Islamist for Baudrillard throughout The Gulf War Did Not Take Place is this ideological obstinacy of the Muslim, the dialogue-proof impenetrability of their dogma. That their advent signifies in some way the imminent self-destruction of the West is a point that Baudrillard goes on to make ten years later, in an essay on the events of September 11, ‘Hypothèses sur le terrorisme’. In this piece Baudrillard quotes the remarkable letter of Philippe Muray, ‘Dear Jihadists’, in which the writer reinscribes the terrorism of Islamic extremists within a darker, Occidental destiny as a symptom of Western decay (‘We made you, you jihadists and terrorists, and you will end up prisoners of our resemblance … You cannot kill us, because we are already dead’). 17 The mood of Islam as a pseudodivine judgment upon the morally/intellectually bankrupt West is already introduced; what Baudrillard goes on to suggest is not simply that Islamism is a symptom of the decline of the West, but also that its manifestation has become a tool of Occidental suicide: When Western culture ~~sees~~ all its values extinguished one by one, it spins inwardly towards the worst. For us, our death is an extinction, an annihilation, it is not a symbolic exchange – that is our misfortune … The singularity, in killing itself, suicides the other with the same blow – one could say that acts of terrorism have literally ‘suicided’ the West. 18 For Luther, ultimately, the Turks had no value in themselves, no intrinsic worth, no potential for salvation. Their principal significance was semiotic – the value of a signpost, warning of the end ahead. Baudrillard’s ‘unconvertible’ Arabs and ‘irreducible’ Islamists, one can’t help feeling, perform a similar ontological function. Their disruption, extremism, radical incompatibility are all symptoms of the end of what Fanon called ‘the European game’; their utter alterity announces, perhaps not apocalyptically, the philosophical (if not economic or military) collapse of Western hegemony. Nevertheless, for all Baudrillard’s lip-service to the ‘irreducible’ otherness of Islam, the supposedly uncontrollable alterity of its followers does become reinscribed into the destiny of the West; by redescribing the extremities of Islam as the ‘suicide’ of the West, Baudrillard repeats Luther’s gesture in a much deeper sense – not simply by linking Islam with some form of end-of-millennium eschatology, but also by turning Islam into a peripheral consequence of the West, a side-effect of the Occident, an a posteriori hiccup of modernity. Zygmunt Bauman has described Baudrillard as a philosopher who ‘patches up the identity of his world out of absences alone’. 19 What is most surprising about the use Baudrillard makes of Islam in his inimitable critique of modernity is how radically empty Islam becomes – how, in a sense, the semantic emptiness of Islam comes to reflect the much graver moral and ontological emptiness of the West. We are reminded of Baudrillard’s own thoughts on the ecstatic excess of the object, how the qualities of entities gyrate ever faster until they lose all meaning: ‘Reality itself founders in hyperrealism … it becomes reality for its own sake, the fetishism of the lost object: no longer the object of representation, but the ecstasy of denial and of its own ritual extermination: the hyperreal.’ 20 In witnessing the gradual progression of representations of Islam and Arabs in Baudrillard’s work – feudal Orientals, cunning Arabs, empty wars, endlessly energetic Islamists, culminating in an Islam which is nothing more than an incompatibility to the West, a photographic negative of the Occident – one wonders whether Islam itself has not undergone a kind of ecstasy (literally ex-stasis), an ecstatic self-emptying of identity, a vertiginous transformation into hyper-Islam, just as Baudrillard’s reality has spun itself dizzily into the hyperreal. For all the positive advantages that Baudrillard’s encounter with Islam may offer to the Muslim critic – a decentring and cultural re-finitizing of modernity’s truth claims, an awareness of the equally fierce fundamentalisms of the secular Enlightenment, not to mention a classic exposition of the media’s transformation of war into pure semiotica – this semantic hollowing-out of Islam may well be the inevitable consequence of any sustained meeting between Islam and the postmodern.

**Baudrillard’s reversibility of death is a useless heuristic - it valorizes death for the living but excludes the black body in constant social death. Death is not cultural but rather it is political: this frames the rest of the debate because civil society decides who lives and who dies.**

**Noys 2005** [Benjamin, critical theorist @ University of Chichester, “The Culture of Death”, Berg Publishing, ISBN-13 978 184520 069 5, 26-27] \*edited for ablest language

The problem with his model is that it offers no real explanation for why death comes to invade our whole culture. His idea of a radical reversal, when what is excluded returns in a more virulent form, is extremely hard to pin down concretely. This leaves his argument ungrounded and it is no surprise that it has been greeted with scepticism. In comparison, whatever criticisms we might want to make of it, Agamben’s analysis of our exposure to death is more concretely grounded. The increasing exposure to death in modern culture is understood as the result of the act of sovereign power that creates bare life, a life exposed to death. In modern culture this production of bare life has spread because bare life has become the ground of our political identity. Agamben does not regard death as some point of resistance that somehow lies outside our culture. In treating death as a point of resistance Baudrillard is in danger of turning death into some sort of authentic experience where we can ﬁnd, or recover, our true values. In fact, the exposure to death in modern culture seems to be, as we shall ~~see~~ later in this book, a far more banal and everyday process. Baudrillard’s model does explore our exposure to death in modern culture but it seems to offer no adequate explanation for that exposure. Instead it offers something like a magical or metaphysical thinking where what is excluded can only ever return in a more extreme form. Agamben provides an analysis which is more precise but which is also not beyond criticism. If Baudrillard’s thesis has proven controversial and been treated with scepticism then so have Agamben’s claims. In particular, his history of bare life has faced ﬁve major criticisms. The ﬁrst is that Agamben’s theory concerning bare life is not well supported by the historical evidence and that he is selective in the evidence he draws on. Secondly, that Agamben’s history of bare life is too straightforward, too linear, and so doesn’t really deal with the complex nature of the social history of death. Thirdly, that in only studying Western culture Agamben is ethnocentric, and that he excludes evidence from other cultures and tends to treat Western culture as a monolithic whole. Fourthly, that Agamben’s model of biopolitics tends to erase the important distinctions between different political systems, especially between democracies and totalitarian states. And, ﬁnally, that he does not consider in enough depth the different experiences of exposure to death, or the fact that this exposure to death is unevenly distributed.

**Baudrillard’s politics appropriate the suffering of the militarized penal colony of the United States. Their privileged ivory tower understanding of violence sanitizes scenes of terror from epiphenomenal context and displaces trauma onto the wretched of the earth. Prioritizing their disembodied theory is itself a strategy to contain blackness. Only a grammar of suffering that begins with the black matrix can create the conditions of possibility for liberation.**

**James** 200**7** (Joy, *Warfare in the American Homeland: Policing and Prison in a Penal Democracy*, p.6-10)

**It is fairly easy to begin as an ally “liberator” and slide into role playing as ally “appropriator.”** For instance, “white antiracists" or “people of color (poc)” are amorphous groupings that mask the ethnic chauvinism and anti-black racism that lie within. Such formations can provide a rainbow prism of hatreds and envy solidified by a refusal to “bow down” to blacks and their demands for recognition based on “exceptionalism.” The quandary, though, for those who never sought genuflection is what is the value of recognition for the “uniqueness” of black bodies for whom white supremacist cultures and state policing practices in the United States have reserved an exceptional place: that of targets for excessive force and the penal site. What does it mean when “people of color” or antiracist whites wear the black body to exercise their grievances and outrage at white supremacy but maintain their distance (and disdain?) for the antithesis of whiteness. Women, black women, even those intimately aware of trauma, can also violate and appropriate others, particularly if they are housed in the most repressive sites of the archipelago, its domestic (and foreign) prisons. For example, Asha Bandele's memoir, The Prisoners Wife, offers an illustration of facile moves that glorify the mundane resistor by mapping over the narrative of the imperiled insurgent. Such moves extinguish the political risk and vulnerability that differentiate the “free” person, albeit one regulated to the household by racialsexual stigma and practices, and the unfree person, locked in prison. Cloaking the middle-class author in the dress of the prison revolutionary George Jackson, the Readers' Club Guide for The Prisoners Wife poses two queries that struck me as masking and violating gestures: The Prisoners Wife features allusions to Soledad Brother, George Jackson's seminal portrait of the struggles, politics, and intricacies of prison life. How has Jackson's book—the work of a brave and embattled man— influenced our culture's perceptions of political imprisonment, racism, and the United States justice system? In what ways can we view The Prisoners Wife—the work of an equally brave and similarly embattled black woman—as a useful, even indispensable, counterpoint (and complement) to the messages in Jackson's Soledad Brother?” It is noted that the Readers' Club recognizes a black revolutionary. Yet, **mimetic performance, even one that must cover Jackson's ideology as a militarist in order to appropriate and wear his iconic persona, is an equal-opportunity affair.** Still, one must note that drag is not worn with equal risk—that is, those already designated part of the privatized realm for subordination, for example, black women such as Bandele, when performing insurrectionist, are likely to pay a heavier price for their theater than those designated part of the public realm of rulers and authoritative intellectuals and politicians such as white neoliberal or neoradical male intellectuals. **Some valued and mimed for their presentations of radicalism may never pay the price of the ticket (to use James Baldwin here) in the academic landscape, a surrogate for and derivative of the American penalscape.** Useful registers—reliable in strategies to survive warfare—rather than globalizing genealogies offer precision. Remember the color codes of Homeland Security, red, orange, yellow flags as precautions against erasing or glossing over subjugated and insurgent knowledge. Back to the foil. Consider Foucault's interview at New York's Attica prison.” Attica was the site of the state's killing of over thirty men, mostly African American and Latino, who protested the slave-like conditions of subjugation. For Foucault in the Attica interview, crime is a “coup d'état from below.” Yellow. The United States and its economic and political and social structures were and are founded on theft of (indigenous) land and (African) labor. Hence, the most significant criminals, and the least interested in battling the state, come from “above"—in property theft (white-collar crime), drug trafficking (money laundering is the most profitable; growers and street dealers garner only a fraction of the trade), and organized violence and murder rationalized as warfare— Vietnam, Kissinger's Cambodia. (Surely, state violence, Reagan's contrasin Latin America and Southern Africa, the School of the America's training of death squads, the occupation of Iraq, and the theft of national and global resources and lives must register somewhere.) When the coup d'état from below meets the coup d'état from above, the reinforcement of the penalscape follows." What constitutes critical theory that can analyze this troubled symbiotic relationship? Within the interview—which here serves as an illustration or contrast for my larger argument that **the technologies of containment encompass “radical" academic discourse**—coupled with the vanishing of state criminality in his narrative are Foucault's comments about Attica's architecture that refer to “Disneyland” (Baudrillard?) and the “cleanliness” of the prison halls (which he equates with nineteenth-century French parochial schools). Orange. Those who fear the physical terror of imprisonment may dissociate Attica from the “Magic Kingdom.” Rather than foster a lack of imagination or theoretical verve, closer proximity to state captivity and violation shape even the gallows humor of the dead zones of the household and the penalscape. Those policed in virulent, violent fashions may have different cognitive skills that produce different, deeper meanings. Foucault's comments about the physical structure of Attica disconcerted me but not some of the academic colleagues and students with whom I raised the issue. If they were disturbed, most did not acknowledge it to me. In fact, Foucault was usually vigorously defended against my ignorance of Foucault (although I imagine that the “discredited knowledge” that Toni Morrison notes as the affliction of all blacks must shape perceptions of ignorance and allow many to ignore the query, “Where are the people—my people?”)." My animated or quiescent questions were met with silence. Perhaps I had committed some form of infraction? Here's a violation that I–and any chorus member who marks the demise of (black/brown) renegades seeking freedom—will remember: In his interview, **Foucault does not once mention the men who rebelled in Attica and who were massacred there** (to use the terminology of Tom Wicker, the white, liberal New York Times writer). Not one man, not once, does he name. Red. **To say nothing of the victims when one enters a mass graveyard is a breach of trust** if one enters not as a national guardsman, or as Governor Nelson Rockefeller, or as an idle spectator or consumer, but as an ally. **Erasing a genealogy mapped by the "wretched of the earth" allows the nonwretched to print over their (our?) texts, to use insurgent narratives as recyclables. This is a practice of the police machinery and its technologies of warfare.** Professed allies, **“radical” theorists, are selective because they have that right and privilege**. In one narrative, Foucault disappears all impoverished and imprisoned black/brown bodies, yet in another he presents, in painstaking delineation, the corpse of the revolutionary icon and prison rebel George Jackson; that killing in a California prison thirty years ago sparked the Attica rebellion and additional killings in a prison on the other side of the continent. As did Jackson, the Attica captives and insurgents fashioned reformist and revolutionary moves and were murdered for those acts. Who witnesses this? Who supplants them? Who performs their guerrilla theater? Who loves what they represented and the families of their origins as they fashion new survival and liberation from war? Who understands that they were both violators and violated? **And who comprehends that the most civil and surgical of violations, those that leave no mark on the physical body, would be erasure or dismemberment through mimetic performance that discredits the legacies of the “household"—their resistance.** Hence, the mesh of “revolutionary” desire and anxiety concerning the academic, elite cartographer and genealogist that I bring as editor to this work. A new “progressive radical” order can continue to elide the “household” that I am “forced” to occupy and, in complicity, reproduce. When the “household” of the disappeared—poor communities, prisoners, queers, red/black/brown peoples, women, children—reappears and dictates its own narrative, in its own voice, with its own unmitigated desires, surely that is, this is war. Like many others, I am weary of warfare. Yet there are distinctions that I maintain between wars of survival and liberation and wars of conquest and annihilation. Like most, I fear violence and the realization that noncombatants largely are the victims of carnage or the designated targets. In contemporary warfare, since World War II in the foreign theater, the casualties have been in the majority women and children (giving perverse meaning to the chivalric chant, “Women and children first!"). In the domestic theater, women and children have always dominated the landscape of broken and scarred bodies and minds and disoriented souls. Still, exhaustion and terror cannot prevent movement; one must travel or become buried under the penal landscape. Those who don't resist violation don't survive. **Some who enact survival and liberation possibilities do**. Transport requires mapping. Warfare in the American Homeland: Policing and Prison in a Penal Democracy, I hope, assists in locating race and gender “blackholes” in authoritative texts; the undertheorizing of the “household"; and the resurgence of a (new) resistance to authoritative voices. It documents those who struggle and who stay present long enough to endure a battle or bear witness while attempting not to disappear the meaning of what they record. Some witness the raced-gendered-queered imprisoned body in order to investigate, interview, and be interrogated by those assigned to captivity—the poor, women, children, slaves, prisoners, laborers of the household, and those who resist. Captives and rebels are not saints merely because they (or we) are exploited or abused. Some relegated to confinements seek rewards and approval for loyalties that “reproduce” the national(ist) “family” and its “coherence.” According to the official, conventional narratives, it is safer to harbor and shelter within a penal democracy, despite its abusive excess. Some measure of safety is promised in exchange for obedience and conformity to and within the household. Is it not better to be a black woman in the Southern United States than a black woman in South Africa or Sudan?” In Sudan, Arab Muslim militia men (embraced by the terms of “people of color” and “Third World people"), in their ethnic cleansing and genocidal warfare, rape and mutilate African Muslim, Christian, and animist women, girls, and boys, cursing them with the Sudanese epithets of “black,” branding survivors on their hands to ensure that private trauma enters public record. The archipelago is global, and so not always “American.” There are multiple predations confronted and little adequate shelter—for some prey."

**Baudrillard’s theory of hyper-reality deconstructs the real, ignoring that colonial violence has extended itself through the real.**

**McCarthy 6** [Bridie, Ph.D. in Philosophy from Deakin University, “At the Limits: Postcolonial and Hyperreal Translations of Australian Poetry”, August 2006]

As Forbes’ poetry arguably embraces, the most iconic feature of Baudrillard’s work—and a useful theoretical tool for postcolonial studies—is simulation. As the chief mechanism with which he reveals the fictitiousness of “reality”, simulation represents a form of (un)mapping in Baudrillard’s philosophy, a metaphysical and semiotic deconstruction of materialism. Hence, as Nick Perry outlines: what has now disappeared is the very notion that maps and territories, representation and reality, might be ontologically discrete. Both have been displaced by simulacra (69). Where colonial discourses assume the control of material geographies (arguably for symbolic as much as material reasons), this hyperreal deconstruction allows for a critique of colonialism based on its reliance on the “reality contract”. If we accept the new hegemony of simulacra (as Perry suggests), along with the impossibility of access to the “real”, it follows that the necessary power of Empire is destabilised. As much as hyperreality can discursively and ideologically combat colonial discourses, however, its scope is of course limited in that postcolonial subjects cannot simply redress all forms of subjugation or oppression by hyperreal means. However, in its applicability to new forms of imperialism (such as contemporary U.S. imperialism) which often rely on representational politics and virtualised modes of domination, Baudrillard’s work on simulation and hyperreality provides a workable vocabulary for the critique of the New World Order. As Chapters 1, 2 and 3 demonstrate, Australian poets engage with hyperreal simulation in their depictions and analyses of the representational politics that inform mythologies of national and global identity. For example, Kevin Hart’s work reveals the simulatory basis of Australian identity in its denial of incarceration as an Australian problematic, and the subsequent mythologies of liberty and security that obfuscate this denial. In Chapter 3, Maiden’s analysis of the Gulf War and the War on Terror presents an astute reading of the simulatory basis of New World Order logic, as it manifests in U.S imperialism. As a boundary to postcolonial politics and discourses, therefore, hyperreal simulation is both restricted and productive in navigating contemporary engagements with the “real”. Hence, as Rex Butler argues, simulation is not just a decorative description of a mode of representation, but an extension and deconstruction of realist logic: The aim of simulation is not to do away with reality, but on the contrary to realise it, make it real. Simulation in this sense is not a form of illusion, but opposed to illusion, a way of getting rid of the fundamental illusionality [sic] of the world (24). This sense in which Baudrillard’s deconstructive critique of reality operates simultaneously as a desire for reality—an obvious but vital inconsistency in his work—is also apparent in his recent formulation of “Integral Reality” as the excessive internalisation of the reality principle at the level of the social. In Baudrillard’s analysis of the “real”, it is possible to perceive a theoretical trajectory from “objective reality”, to “virtual reality”, to this most recent Integral Reality as the constituent elements of his “hyperreality” (Intelligence 45). Characterised by the impossibility of a realist or historicist imaginary, Baudrillard’s Integral Reality plots the social at “zero degrees”—at an axis where the hyperreal hypothesis has reached its final ideological completion: Let us be clear about this: when we say reality has disappeared, the point is not that it has disappeared physically, but that it has disappeared metaphysically. Reality continues to exist; it is its principle that is dead (Intelligence 18). As an antagonistic counterpoint to postcolonial theory, Integral Reality is engaged with in this dissertation in relation to the reliance on the history principle implicit in postcolonial studies. The absence of an historical imaginary under an Australian Integral Reality is thus tested against the poetry of Sykes and Birch in Chapter 3. This investigation seeks to establish how the dictates of linear progress (as a modernist inheritance) are central to colonialism and to much contemporary postcolonialism, just as this linearity influences notions of “official” History.

**Baudrillard’s postmodern and ahistorical scholarship creates epistemic violence through its hegemonic representations—his reliance on western notions of subjectivity and modernity are inherently Eurocentric**

**Kaplan 1996** (Caren, “Questions of Travel: Postmodern Discourses of Displacement”, 69-70, 8-21-1996)//RM

In America, Jean Baudrillard produces a **postmodern discourse** of displacement that relies upon a host of Euro-American modernist tropes: exile, solitude, distances, emptiness, nostalgia, and loss. Following the parameters of Euro-American modernist articulations of displacement, Baudrillard romanticizes travel and, through a deeply mystical metaphysics, constructs essentialist entities that function in binary opposition to one another. Eschewing tourism, Baudrillard espouses a “pure travel” in which a “trip without object” speeds up the evaporation of meaning”. Thus the wide open space of the desert offers the theorist/traveler only a surface rather than a deep structure.. “I went in search of astral America,” he writes, “not social or cultural America, but the America of the empty, absolute freedom of the freeways, not the deep America of mores and mentalities but the America of desert speed, of motels and mineral surfaces”/ Yet despite Baudrillard’s quest for “deliverance from the social,” American can never be read in a vacuum. Refusing any history, culture, context or meaning, Baudrillard proposes value laden assertions with no possibility of critique. As J.Hoberman points out in his review of America, Everything in the United States is simulation except the point of view of Baudrillard himself: “Baudrillard is the last nonsimulacrum in America.” There is no vacation from modernity when the terms of travel are modernist. Thus, although Baudrillard’s America insists upon a radical deterritorialization from culture, politics and the social, its reliance upon a version of modernist exile poetics produces a text that is laced with **Eurocentric stereotypes and other hegemonic representational practices**. I am not suggesting that there is a true or purer “picture” of America to be substituted for a flaw representation. Rather, I am arguing that continuum of Euro-American representational and episteme violence reproduces itself in the practice of some versions of postmodern poststructuralism. America’s Discourses of displacement stress **ahistorical** and mythic figures of exile and travel that deploy **Euro-American Modernist notions of subjectivity**, legitimating and authorizing “theory.

**Braidotti**

**Braidotti has a problematic reading of Glissant. Becoming, inventing a new subjectivity, is not a magical formula that can be applied to everyone. The weight of accumulating time as an ontological project of antiblackness cannot be overcome, for Braidotti’s project itself requires time, which in the political present requires a colonized non-subject without time.**

**Yountae 14** [An Yountae, assistant professor of religion at the Lebanon Valley College, “Beginning in the Middle: Deleuze, Glissant, and Colonial,” Difference, Culture, Theory and Critique. The trap of Eurocentrism-the coloniality of being] \*edited for ablest language

It would be fair to clarify one point before delving into Braidotti’s argument in further detail**. Braidotti makes it clear from the very beginning that her text mainly targets Euro-American readers**. She acknowledges that she is speaking as a first-world, European subject and that her argument is foremost an inner critique of the white European identity. It is within this context that she urges her readers to mobilise a new form of identity. Unavoidably, claims Braidotti, the process of detachment from the familiar and comfortable forms of identity creates negative emotions such as fear, anxiety, and nostalgia (2006: 83). Certainly, the enriching and positive experience of constructing a new identity entails pain and a sense of loss. Migrants and diasporic subjects are at the center of reference here as they are the ones who most bear the burden of the sense of loss and woundedness. The point for Braidotti is that one should not sink into the mournful landscape of nostalgic yearning, but move further. Deconstruction plays a critically important role in this process, but it should not be the ultimate goal. Rather, one needs to transform such loss into the new material for constructing the ground for multiple belongings or ‘multilocality’ (84). She makes reference to Glissant as the great example who transformed ‘the pain of loss into the active production of multiple forms of belonging and complex allegiances’ (84). Braidotti’s radical reconfiguration of subjectivity is a very important project that addresses the multiple issues related to globalisation and identity of our time. Equally important is the need to translate the negative affects into the ground for transformation and reconstruction of a new identity. However, I argue that **she fails to escape from the trap of Eurocentrism by not taking seriously the unfathomable dimensions of pain and suffering caused by the colonial trauma**. Despite the innovative nature and the radical political aim of her argument, and despite her acknowledgement of the conditions of postcoloniality, I am in disagreement with the direction she takes in order to advance the key principles of her philosophical nomadism. For many racialised/colonised subjects who have experienced slavery, displacement, and diasporisation, the pain of loss is neither a mere set of negative feelings nor a historical memory that needs to be overcome or transcended. Rather, such feelings point to a much deeper sense of coloniality inscribed at the core of their edifice of being**: an ontological trauma**. Likewise, the vision for the beginning of a new world, **a new people in Glissant’s reflections is born out of the ‘abyss’** which parallels the multiply displaced reality of the Caribbean people. Braidotti might be right in remarking that Glissant transformed the pain of loss into the active production of new and multiple forms of identity. However, I argue that **her reference to Glissant is problematic as the simple description of ‘overcoming the sense of loss and fragmentation’ does not adequately describe Glissant’s agenda**. For Glissant, the very womb that gives rise to the beginning of a new world is the abyss which, as its etymological root of ‘bottomlessness’ indicates, represents the sense of ‘groundlessness’ shaping the fabric of the colonised reality. **Loss haunts the horizon of life** just as in Glissant’s parlance, the ocean is marked with balls and chains that were weighing down the slaves thrown into the water, which now have gone green (Glissant 1997: 6). This is why memory occupies a central place in Glissant. Throughout his writings in general, memory and loss are ceaselessly named and honored to the extent that his work can be labeled, as John Drabinski put it, a ‘memory project’ (Drabinski 2011: 6) Perhaps, for Braidotti’s European readers, loss might be perceived to a certain degree as a negative and transitional feeling. However, for Glissant, loss involves a different level of magnitude and intensity that derives from the ‘weight’ of the colonial history and the devastated socio-economic reality created by it. Braidotti fails to do justice to Glissant by omitting these complex layers that constitute the ‘groundless horizon’ out of which Glissant’s decolonial poetics emerges. Another facet of Braidotti’s argument that I find problematic is that she evokes ethics by urging her European readers to move beyond the pain of loss produced in the process of identity reconstruction, but nowhere does she evoke the ethics of accounting for the pain and loss that Western colonialism has caused to the innumerable others of history. She calls ‘the move across and beyond pain, loss, and negative passions’ an act of freedom, ‘the defining moment for the process of becoming-ethical’ (Braidotti 2006: 84). I argue that one of the main problems of Braidotti’s philosophical nomadism is that what lies at its core is the self’s ‘endless becoming’, rather than the place of the other. Braidotti’s Deleuzianism privileges ‘freedom’ as the ultimate liberating state of the subject. She views freedom as the ‘capacity to express and explore the subject’s ability to affect and be affected’ (2006: 148). Freedom transcends all boundaries of the classic notion of subjectivity and creates connections, thus facilitating the joyful ‘lines of flight’ of the nomadic subject who is able to embody multiple identities and inhabit multiple locations at the same time. I ask, should not the call for accountability and mourning for the loss and suffering of others precede the joyful celebration of freedom and nomadic ontology? Should not the question of the other be at the center of ethics rather than the preoccupation for one’s endless becoming? The ethical unaccountability of Braidotti’s philosophical vision has been a constant target of criticism especially within the inner circle of feminist philosophy. Of particular problem have been notions of mobility since Braidotti fails to concretise it, as Julie Wuthnow has remarked, in its historic and contextual picture of colonialisation (Wuthnow 2002: 187). In other words, Braidotti’s affirmation of movement and her model of the all-transcending-and-unlocatable-subject raises questions of accountability as to the socio-historic location of the subject as Braidotti’s erasure of her own site of subject position, argues Wuthnow, means ignoring ‘her potential complicity in colonialist discourse’ (2002: 190). Echoing Irene Gedalof, who problematises Braidotti’s omission of ‘location’ in her discussion of identity construction (Gedalof 1996: 192), Wuthnow concludes that Braidotti’s gesture results in solidifying a model of universal subjectivity inscribed with ‘important features of the unmarked western subject’ (Wuthnow 2002: 181). This way, **Braidotti’s model represents the ideal of the privileged Western subject who enjoys the freedom to ‘travel’ and ‘transgress’ borders without being marked by class or race.** Given the global context of forced displacement and exile, the blind celebration of movement and transgression is a naı¨ve romanticisation of ‘rootlessness’ for those who cannot afford the privilege of such mobility. As Gedalof has remarked, without a critical examination of its own social location, the nomadic model is ‘really only available to white western feminists, and only under conditions where our whiteness and our westernness continue to function as the invisible, unmarked norms that do not seem to fix our identity at all’ (Gedalof 2000: 343). Against Braidotti’s nomadic model, which fails to catch the unfathomable dimension of trauma and loss ingrained in the fabric of colonialism, I borrow critical insights from Nelson Maldonado-Torres, whose Fanonian reading of Heidegger will help me deepen my decolonial reading of Braidotti’s nomadic ethics. This will also lead my argument to the next point where I will point out Braidotti’s misreading of Glissant more concretely, and eventually rethink the notion of the middle from Glissant’s decolonial vision. Coloniality of being In his provocative essay ‘On the Coloniality of Being’, Maldonado-Torres takes on the notion of the ‘coloniality of being’, which was first developed by Enrique Dussel and Walter Mignolo, in order to read Heidegger critically. While the concept in its initial appearance in the academic circle was to make reference to the implications of the coloniality of power in different realms of social existence, in particular the general understanding of being under the rubric of coloniality, Maldonado-Torres’ contribution expands the concept in dialogue with Fanon’s existential expression of coloniality. At the core of Maldonado-Torres’ argument lies the colonial difference between Heidegger’s European ontology and Fanon’s black ontology. If what conditions the authenticity of existence, of what Heidegger calls Dasein is the inescapability and singularity of one’s own death, for the racialised subject, death has a different impact as death is not an individualised feature of their reality. Rather, claims Maldonado-Torres, death is always already beside them (Maldonado-Torres 2007: 151). The decolonial struggle emerges ‘not through an encounter with one’s own immortality, but from a desire to evade death, one’s own but even more fundamentally that of others’ (2007: 151). In the same way, if the existential affirmation of Da-sein as being-there is the very ground of European ontology, for Fanon, it is the non-beingness of the damne´, the condemned of the earth, that expresses the existential condition of the black man. Maldonado-Torres adds, While Dasein is lost in the They and achieves authenticity when it anticipates its own death, the damne´ confronts the reality of its own finitude as a day to day adventure. This is why Fanon writes in Black Skin, White Masks that the black lacks the opportunity to descend into hell. As Lewis Gordon puts it, the reason is because the black already lives in hell. The extraordinary event of confronting mortality turns into an ordinary affair. (255) The notion of coloniality of being helps us to ~~see~~ that death, for many racialised subjects in the world today, is not an event that is behind us, as Braidotti claims against Heidegger (Braidotti 2006: 210). Rather, in Fanon’s critical reflection, the threat of death lies everywhere in the experience of the colonised, presented in different forms such as ‘endemic famine, unemployment, high death rate, an inferiority complex and the absence of any hope for the future’ (Fanon 1995: 128). Braidotti’s Eurocentric view is revealed in her inability to fully capture the abyssal and totalitarian character of coloniality imprinted in the cry of the damne´, who, in Fanon’s words, ‘perceives life not as a flowering or a development of an essential productiveness, but as a permanent struggle against an omnipresent death’ (1965: 128). It is this inability which causes Braidotti to propose the productive character of zoe against what she calls the metaphysics of finitude (Braidotti 2006: 210). This is also why her reading of Glissant is misleading too. While I agree with her initial approach that views Glissant’s middle as the site for the refusal of the Western ontology of sameness, I dispute her further reading of Glissant. She fails to capture the fact that what Glissant was refusing at the same time was an ontology that presupposes the coloniality of Being. Admittedly, Braidotti makes visible efforts to take into account the historical experience of slavery and colonialism out of which Glissant’s Poetics of Relation emerges. Nevertheless, her efforts fall short as her reading of Glissant leaves out the complex layer of coloniality that gives birth to the constructive dimension of Glissant’s work. Braidotti believes that the effects and the power of ‘transposition’ lie in turning what is lost into ‘an increased desire to belong’ (2006: 84). She makes it clear that such gesture is not ‘the avoidance of pain, but rather about transcending the resignation and passivity that ensue from being hurt, lost, and dispossessed’ (2006: 84). While this is a valid point and a legitimate reading of Glissant’s project, my sense of uneasiness grows as Braidotti appropriates Glissant in order to advance her ‘politics of location’, which presupposes a universalised vision of a freely moving, non-unitary subject. Following Wuthnow’s and Gedalof’s voices of warning against Braidotti’s overcelebration of movement, I object to the unmarked facileness embedded in Braidotti’s account of ‘transposing the loss’ and of constructing a nonunitary subject. Especially, reflecting from Glissant’s context, a social fabric characterised by the omnipresence of loss, discontinuity, and socio-ontological trauma, remembering the past is a crucial move that enables people to come to terms with the present, even before any form of subject position takes place. Braidotti’s ‘nomadic middle’ is not only a privileged space, but it also implies a privileged sense of time. Her politics of location is built upon a seamless sense of time whereby she can ‘affirm’ and even ‘transgress’ the present in order to transform it into an open-ended future. Nevertheless, time does not hold the same meaning for the colonised and dislocated people. For the colonised, time is something that has never belonged to them. Rather, as Glissant remarked, the colonised had to fight time ‘in order to reconstitute the past’, even when this time was ‘transported in fields of oblivion where we must, with difficulty and pain, put it all back together if we wish to make contact with ourselves and express ourselves’ (Glissant 1989: 145). In her discussion of the shattering dimension of trauma and the difficulty of recollecting one’s memory and identity amidst of it, **it is striking to ~~see~~ how Braidotti turns to Glissant in order to stress the ‘effects’ of generative power produced by memory** (Braidotti 2006: 167–168) **without scrutinising the crucial significance of memory in Glissant.** A careful reading of Glissant makes it not too difficult to ~~see~~ that his poetic vision of relation and the possibility of a Caribbean identity emerges out of the shared memory (knowledge) of suffering and the impossibility of articulating the abyssal experience of coloniality. In the same way, ‘Relation’, the key constructive notion of Glissant’s decolonial poetics, is not an empty signifier devoid of any material root. Relation does not emerge from nothing. In Glissant’s own words, Relation is ‘not made up of things that are foreign but of shared knowledge’ (Glissant 1997: 6). The generative power behind the poetics of Relation is not merely a memory spelled in past tense, but the memory of the abyss depicted in his poetic imageries of the slave boat, which carries the unbearable weight of the innumerable suffering bodies of African slaves. Imagine two hundred human beings crammed into a space barely capable of containing a third of them. Imagine vomit, naked flesh, swarming lice, the dead slumped, the dying crouched. Imagine, if you can, the swirling red of mounting to the deck, the ramp they climbed, the black sun on the horizon, vertigo, this dizzying sky plastered to the waves. Over the course of more than two centuries, twenty, thirty million people deported. Worn down, in a debasement more eternal than apocalypse. (1997: 5–6) It is in this crack of the ontological edifice, the overwhelming abyss of suffering, and the terrifying time of the unknown where the enigmatic trope of Relation opens up, for, utters Glissant, ‘although you are alone in this suffering, you share in the unknown with others whom you have yet to know’ (1997: 6). The blurry past filled with fractured memories of shock and loss is also at the same time the very terrain whereby the mystery of Relation and the indomitable desire to build a ground out of groundlessness is born. This is why Glissant calls the abyss, the depth of the painful history, a ‘womb’, a ‘womb abyss’ (6). The collective memory of suffering is not a mere set of negative emotions that needs to be overcome and transposed. Rather, the silence of the dead and the cry of the suffering people never cease to haunt the freeing knowledge of Relation. Without this panoramic understanding of Glissant’s work, it would be misleading to use him as an example of what Braidotti herself calls a productive ethics, which consists of reworking the unbearable events ‘in the direction of positive relations’ (Braidotti 2006: 208). I argue that it is erroneous to claim, immediately following her reference to Glissant that ‘the moment of the actualization is also the moment of its neutralization’ (208). This is because, she goes on to say, ‘every event contains within it the potential for being overcome and overtaken – its negative charge can be transposed’ (208). Against Braidotti’s reading, I argue that ‘transposing’ is not the best term to describe Glissant’s project properly. Transposing conveys a sense of reversing and altering the position/form. It implies an active deployment of agency to transform the undermined ground into a fertile horizon of becoming. While it is true that the thoughts of Glissant are gesturing toward the future, such future is always an elusive notion, for time, confesses Glissant, always ‘keeps slipping away’ (Glissant 1989: 245). To reiterate, for the colonised people of the Caribbean islands, time is an elusive notion that has never belonged to them. Rather, time has always belonged to the realm of the impossible; time is a rupture that has privileged the West and left the colonised with non-history. Consequently, time itself is an abyss, as Glissant writes: ‘for history is not only absence for us, it is vertigo. This time that was never ours, we must now possess’ (1989: 161). Rather than being a presupposed ‘ground’ or matrix that facilitates the transgressive movement of free subjects, time, for the colonised, bears the intensity or the weight of the traumatic past, which goes beyond one’s control and imagination. The shock of the violent encounter leaves one silenced, without the language to describe it. The root of Glissant’s poetics is thus marked with a sense of mourning as mourning happens, according to Judith Butler, because the effect of transformation followed by loss cannot be known in advance. One is stupefied and reminded of the precariousness of one’s existence. Before the wave of loss, adds Butler, one becomes inscrutable to oneself and fallen as one realises that an enigmatic ‘something is bigger than one’s own deliberate plan, one’s own project, one’s own knowing and choosing’ (Butler 2004: 21). The jovial stroke of transposition espoused by philosophical nomadism erases or underrates the overwhelming intensity that history bears in the colonised world. Alternatively, I suggest that John Drabinski’s reading of Glissant proposes a more suitable account of Glissant’s project that does justice to the complexity embedded in the soil of the Caribbean history. In order to describe Glissant’s poetics, Drabinski employs the figurative image of ‘standing at the Caribbean shoreline and speaking the impossible’, that is, affirming at one and the same time the tragic sadness and the beauty that the Caribbean landscape embodies (Drabinski 2011: 6). Before the devastating experience of the colonial reality, which is overwhelming and paralysing, Glissant shows us, in Drabinski’s parlance, ‘how to say yes to ghosts and hauntings, and so how to welcome the memory of terror because it is the constant, if often mute or muted, companion to the excessiveness and profundity of creolized life’ (6). Before the sweeping hail of loss, the means of transformation are not sought in assured terms as if one possesses power and control over the reality. Rather, with Glissant, we ~~see~~ a humble, yet unyielding gesture to name and welcome the weight of the past in order to rise up and begin again. Glissant begins from the ruins. It is not, however, a glamorous beginning, but as Michael Dash said, beginnings for Glissant are ‘lowly, paradoxical, and unspectacular’ (Glissant 1989: xii). Beginning is not always the romantic and blithe experience that philosophical nomadism envisions. Without the privileged milieu (middle) of time and ‘without the help of those plateaus in time from which the West has benefited’ (1989: 63–64), yet, which remain unacknowledged in the Western mode of universal subjectivity, Glissant begins from the groundless middle in order to build a ground that is a ‘groundless ground’. The middle, therefore, is a groundless alluvium for becoming haunted by the unspeakable past and the unknown future, the ‘painful notion of time and its full projection forward into the future’ (64).

**The middle, where their politics takes place, is not a sight of creative acceleration as Deleuze describes it. Glissant reminds us that the middle is the middle passage. It is a sight of all-pervading ontological groundlessness, the abyss that afropessimism talks about. The question of becoming should be read as a question of the middle passage.**

**Yountae 14** [An Yountae, assistant professor of religion at the Lebanon Valley College, “Beginning in the Middle: Deleuze, Glissant, and Colonial,” Difference, Culture, Theory and Critique. Reading Deleuze with Glissant: the decolonial middle-conclusion]

As already discussed, for Deleuze, the middle is the critical site for his philosophy of multiplicity and becoming, just as the plateau, ‘is always in the middle, not at the beginning or the end’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 24). The importance of the middle for Deleuze lies in the fact that the middle never ceases to open new doors to an occasion for an ever-new becoming. This means that the ‘event’ does not consist of a teleological end or a final result of the becoming, but the singular act of becoming. In other words, it is the act of becoming itself that is privileged by the Deleuzean middle, rather than the result of becoming. In this way, the middle always signals the point of a new beginning at the moment where the previous process of becoming seems to have concluded. This is why, for Deleuze, the middle is not an average, but a site in which intensities are negotiated and accumulated. It is not a localisable point. Rather, it is a ‘perpendicular direction, a transversal movement that sweeps one and the other away, a stream without beginning or end that undermines its banks and picks up speed in the middle’ (1987: 28). This powerful image of the middle illustrated by Deleuze, finds, in my reading, a striking parallel, and with an even more striking twist, in Glissant’s imagery of the middle passage, which might help us to bracket and refuse the deep-seated ontological privileges presupposed in Eurocentric forms of universalised subjectivity. Glissant opens the first chapter of his Poetics of Relation with the metaphor of the slave boat in order to evoke the collective memory of the spectral past haunting the present quandary of the Martinican situation. The murky vision of the slave boat is filled with the horrifying images of vomit, naked flesh, and death**; the voyage is characterised by the abyss of the unknown.** The gape of the abyss opens as the bodies of people are thrown into the boat, and as the boat is dragged into the ocean, into the middle of its depths. The middle, in Glissant’s poetic vision, is another name for the ‘petrifying face of the abyss [which] lies far ahead of the slave ship’s bow’ (Glissant 1997: 6). In the abyssal middle, the future does not come in the name of the new. Rather, it comes in the name of the unknown: ‘a pale murmur; you do not know if it is a storm cloud, rain or drizzle, or smoke from a comforting fire’. As the boat keeps sailing into the ocean, murmurs Glissant, ‘the banks of the river have vanished on both sides of the boat. What kind of river, then, has no middle?’ (1997: 6–7) This stunning line strikes the readers of Deleuzean philosophy with its remarkably disparate view on the middle. If for Deleuze, the middle is where the creative flow of the stream picks up its speed, thus finally undermining its banks, for Glissant, the middle is the terrifying abyss of the unknown from which all you can do is to watch the landscape of the familiar land, the banks of the river, vanish. When read from Glissant’s middle passage, Deleuze’s nomadic vision of the middle can be seen as constructed upon a solid ontological ground that accommodates a certain sense of political subjectivity. Doubtlessly, Deleuze is against such a notion of a ‘solid’ ground underlying the movement of transgressive diversion or ‘the lines of flight’. Nevertheless, through Glissant’s decolonial poetics, we gain a contrasting, and perhaps a wider perspective by which we can unveil the ‘colonial difference’ shaping the socio-political fabric of the ‘others’ of history. To be clear, Glissant openly admits Deleuze’s impact on his own thinking and he shows this through many of the notions he develops through his writings such as Relation/rhizome, the baroque, errantry, chaos/chaos-monde, and so on. The difference between Deleuze and Glissant’s Deleuzianism is therefore extremely subtle and implicit. However, I insist that **even at moments when Glissant faithfully follows Deleuze at his best, his thinking spills out a different texture of political implications and weight of history, thus begging a different type of reading practice and political imagination from when reading Deleuze**. When such differences are unacknowledged, as is the case with Braidotti, what we ~~see~~ is the advancement of a logic that carries the label of ‘radical thinking’ and yet resembles the ideals of Western political liberalism or the ever-expanding force of the globalised capital. The abyss of the middle, which Glissant is speaking about, has a much wider meaning than the traditionally understood conception of the abyss that carries a strong mythical and metaphysical connotation: It involves an all-pervading ontological groundlessness that involves an insurmountable material and political devastation; while it hints at the site of a creative potential and a new beginning, it is at the same time a symptom of the loss of historical and politico-economic ground within the (colonial) context of oppression. In Braidotti’s nomadic philosophy, ground or ‘place’ is construed as a depersonalised, non-attached element of individual identity in a way that the nomadic subject is always in movement, trespassing, and ‘only passing through’ (Braidotti 1994: 33). Gedalof has already remarked that the overemphasis on movement can be problematic as it fails to ‘offer a means of rethinking women’s place in specific community identities’ (Gedalof 2000: 343). As Gedalof has rightly pointed out, for Deleuze, it is false to ‘define the nomad by movement’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 381). Deleuze clearly describes nomad’s relation with space/place. It is not the case that the nomadic subject is always on the go without creating any responsible relationship with the space he/she passes through. Rather, affirms Deleuze, ‘the nomad distributes himself in a smooth space’, which means, that ‘he occupies, inhabits, holds that space’ (1987: 381). The socio-political topography of the global reality today is incongruent with the perception of the smooth space in which one can slide back and forth without bumping into the rugged surface. What makes the smooth space a smooth space, then, is ‘that it does not have a dimension higher than that which moves through it or is inscribed in it’ (1987: 488). Deleuze therefore calls it a ‘flat multiplicity’: a mode of being that materialises both here and there, both moving and staying at one and the same time. Glissant embodies this nomadic multiplicity magnificently. If, in any sense, Glissant materialises the Deleuzian nomadic vision, it is not because he freely moves across borders and transposes the negative into a positive material. Rather, he can be seen as an example of Deleuzian nomadism because he materialises flat multiplicity, a multiplicity that is fully immanent to the historical and material reality of the globalised world. Glissant begins from the ruins, yet without the ambition of a vertical transcendence or avoiding the painful space of the middle. Instead of denying or pretending that he can fully fill the crack in the middle, he embraces it by facing, affirming, and moving with(in) it. It is therefore ‘nomadic’ in the Deleuzian sense since Glissant does not resort to any other dimension higher than the very shattered-self moving painfully within the surface of history. His tenacious effort to stare at the void of time or the abyssal middle and affirm it as the womb for the birth of a new identity is neither a refusal to move on nor a hopeful guarantee of a new future. Rather, it signals the flat multiplicity of being here and there, moving and staying, at one same instance since the movement of ‘errantry’ and Relation breaks the boundary between mobility and immobility, subject and object or being and becoming. While Braidotti acknowledges the historical legacy of colonialism and violence, the middle, in her reading of Glissant, still remains a privileged ground for a politics of becoming (Braidotti 2006: 68). For both Deleuze and Glissant, the middle is the space in which intensities and creative potential are being channeled. As it has been discussed so far, for Glissant, the intensities in the middle enfold the roiling water of darkness. It is important to note that while it is not often acknowledged by many critics, for Deleuze too, the middle includes the substratum of dark negativity just as he claims that in the Baroque, harmony always ‘goes through a crisis that leads to a broadened chromatic scale, to an emancipation of dissonance or of unresolved accords, accords not brought back to tonality’ (Deleuze 1993: 93). Even chaos, adds Deleuze, the matrix out of which the world is made and which contains all colors, emerges out of the uscum subnigrum (the dark background of the soul in Leibniz), the depthless shadow of darkness (1993: 93). Contrary to Braidotti’s nomadic middle, for both Deleuze and Glissant, the middle is the space of becoming in which the darkness of the depth gives rise to an ever new act of beginning. Braidotti’s nomadic ethics shows how a radical thinking falls easily into the trap of Eurocentrism when it fails to take into account the colonial difference and the bottomless dimension of the historical trauma, which cracks open the ontological ground of the colonial subject who drifts ‘between the first innumerable long-ago and the second all too easily enumerated present’ (Britton 1999: 41). On the other hand, while Deleuze might still hold accountable to the postcolonial context, I argue that Deleuze’s depersonalised and decontextualised language is hardly capable of capturing the full depth of the colonial trauma or colonial difference that constitute the ontological edifice of the colonised subject. It follows that when such philosophical ideas are translated into a political language and applied universally to different political contexts, it results in a disregard of the weight of history and the need of a different kind of political imagination. Concluding remarks Glissant’s decolonial imagination is shaped by this irremediable gap that splits the colonial subject. The middle, for Glissant, is an unde(te)rmined ground or groundlessness (abyss), for the Martinican reality is trapped between the unending collective memory of suffering and the still absurd present. The notion of freedom as arduously advocated by philosophical nomadism is based on an ontological privilege, which enables the subject to name the present in relation to a past and a future that is conceivable. Glissant’s decolonial poetics stands as the refusal of such privileged time and space constituting the ontological ground of the Western-nomadic subject. Nevertheless, this is not a project constrained to the past or a refusal to accept the present. Rather, it points to the present of people whose reality is breached with the coloniality of Being: people for whom the denied past has not yet been materialised; people whose present socio-reality is in an immediate continuity with the absurd past. The ‘solid ground’ underlying Braidotti’s nomadic thought refers to the middle as an ‘eventive space’ inhabited by the creative affirmations of the life of free subjects. On the other hand, the ground, in Glissant’s decolonial poetics, is another name for the precarious groundlessness of being, which can only be glimpsed in the collective work of taking upon oneself the weight of the unbearable past and naming the unspeakable present. A critical contribution that Glissant made for thinking the meaning of the middle in relation to the past and trauma is that he urges us to turn to ‘Relation’ amidst suffering. In his endeavor to make sense of the fragmented sense of (collective) identity after catastrophe, Glissant elaborates the trope of Relation. The key to envisioning the future, which is a seemingly impossible project when looked at from the colonial abyss, lies in the liberating power of Relation as the abyss, the abyss of suffering in particular, makes one ~~see~~ the ‘freeing knowledge of Relation within the Whole’ (Glissant 1997: 8). This is another reason why the tragically sad landscape of the Caribbean islands and the history that accompanies it is, at the same time, beautiful. The horrifying abyss of time is, paradoxically, the very womb in which the shared experience of suffering gives rise to a vision of future, relationality, and a collective sense of identity. Rhizomatic multiplicity arises out of this topographical matrix composed of relations: a bottomless middle where finitude and vulnerability bear the soil for new relations and new beginnings. As Marija Cetinic remarked in her reflection on the thoughts of Jean-Luc Nancy in their relation to trauma and community, even when the particularity of each traumatic event can not be shared, ‘what trauma nonetheless forces us to share is the experience of a limit, the limit as shared, or the finite sharing of finitude’ (Cetinic 2010: 292). The underdeveloped trope of relation in Deleuze and Braidotti becomes, in Glissant, the very material through which he transposes the void of loss, the painful middle of the fragmented history. Immanent multiplicity and nomadic subjectivity certainly expose their limits when confined to the obsessive terms of self-affirmation, movement, and endless becoming. It is then Glissant who epitomises an alternative set of terms for embodying multiplicity and immanence differently. The embrace of finitude needs not be a denial of the present, a regression to the past or a refusal to (re)construct the future. Rather, Glissant shows us that the humble submission to finitude signifies the middle space in which the unified, sovereign self is dissolved and the liberating power of relation propels the self forward to the opaque future. The freeing power of becoming and multiplicity is glimpsed perhaps in this groundless middle, which as Glissant remarks, will allow each person, each creolised self ‘to be there and elsewhere, rooted and open, lost in the mountains and free beneath the sea, in harmony and in errantry’ (Glissant 1997: 34).

**Capitalism**

**Modern Capitalism finds it origins in the violence that was done to the African continent. The black body in particular has been the primary target of gratuitous violence which is indicative of larger schemas of racialization due to the fact that it would have been more profitable to take slaves from Europe.**

**Wilderson 03** [Frank, Professor at UC Irvine, “The Prison Slave as Hegemony’s (Silent) Scandal”, P. 22]//MHELLIE

Capital was kick-started by the rape of the African continent, a phenomenon that is central to neither Gramsci nor Marx. According to Barrett (2002), some-thing about the Black body in and of itself made it the repository of the violence that was the slave trade. It would have been far easier and far more profitable to take the white underclass from along the riverbanks of England and Western Europe than to travel all the way to Africa for Slaves. The theoretical importance of emphasizing this in the early 21st century is twofold. First, capital was kick-started by approaching a particular body (a black body) with direct relations of force, not by approaching a white body with variable capital. Thus, one could say that slavery is closer to capital's primal desire than is exploitation. It is a relation of terror as opposed to a relation of hegemony. Second, **today, late capital is imposing a renaissance of this original desire, the direct relation of force, the despotism of the unwaged relation.** This renaissance of slavery, i.e., the reconfiguration of the prison-industrial complex has, once again, as its structuring metaphor and primary target the Black body. The value of reintroducing the unthought category of the slave, by way of noting the absence of the Black subject, lies in the Black subject's potential for extending the demand placed on state/capital formations because its reintroduction into the discourse expands the intensity of the antagonism. In other words, the positionality of the slave makes a demand that is in excess of the demand made by the positionality of the worker. The worker demands that productivity be fair and democratic (Gramsci's new hegemony, Lenin's dictatorship of the proletariat, in a word, socialism). In contrast, the slave demands that production stop, without recourse to its ultimate democratization. Work is not an organic principle for the slave. The absence of Black subjectivity from the crux of radical discourse is symptomatic of the text's inability to cope with the possibility that the generative subject of capitalism, the Black body of the 15th and 16th centuries, and the generative subject that resolves late capital's over-accumulation crisis, the Black (incarcerated) body of the 20th and 21 st centuries, do not reify the basic categories that structure conflict within civil society: the categories of work and exploitation.

**The reduction of blackness to mere commodity as per the middle passage indoctrinated a new form of global capitalism that exists to this very day.**

**Heitzeg 15** [Nancy, professor of Sociology & Critical Studies of Race and Ethnicity, “On The Occasion Of The 50th Anniversary Of The Civil Rights Act Of 1964: Persistent White Supremacy, Relentless Anti-Blackness, And The Limits Of The Law”, P. 57-59]//MHELLIE

While all communities of color suffer from racism in general and its manifestation in criminal justice in particular, “Black” has been the literal and figurative counterpart of “white”. Anti-black racism is arguably at the very foundation of white supremacy; the two constitute the foundational book-ends for the legal, political and every day constructions of race in the United States.12 For this reason, in combination with the excessive over-representation of African Americans in the criminal justice system and the prison industrial complex, this analysis will largely focus on the ways in which the law has been a tool for the oppression of African Americans via the furtherance of white supremacy and antiblackness in both law and practice. While race has never reflected any biological reality, it is indeed a powerful social and political construct. In the U.S. and elsewhere, it has served to delineate “whiteness” as the “unraced” norm – the “unmarked marker” – while hierarchically devaluing “other” racial/ethnic categories with Blackness always as the antithesis.13 The socio-political construction of race coincides with the age of exploration, the rise of “scientific” classification schemes, and perhaps **most significantly capitalism**. In the United States, the solidification of racial hierarchies cannot be disentangled from the capitalist demands for “unfree” labor and expanded private property. By the late 1600s, race had been a marker for either free citizens or slave property, and colonial laws had reified this decades before the Revolutionary War.14 The question of slavery was at the center of debates in the creation of the United States and is referenced no less than ten times.15 By the time of the Constitutional Convention of 1787, the racial lines defining slave and free had already been rigidly drawn – white was “free” and black was “slave” – and the result according to Douglass was this: “assume the Constitution to be what we have briefly attempted to prove it to be, radically and essentially pro-slavery”. 16 The Three-Fifths Clause, the restriction on future bans of the slave trade and limits on the possibility of emancipation through escape were all clear indications of the significance of slavery to the Founders. The legal enouncement of slavery in the Constitution is one of the first of many “racial sacrifice covenants” to come, where the interests of Blacks were sacrificed for the nation. 17 The social and constitutional construction of white as free and Black as slave has on-going **political and economic ramifications**. According to Harris, whiteness not only allows access to property, may be conceived of per se as “whiteness as property”. 18 These property rights produce both tangible and intangible value to those who possess it; whiteness as property includes the right to profit and to exclude, even the perceived right to kill in defense of the borders of whiteness.19 As Harris notes: The concept of whiteness was premised on white supremacy rather than mere difference. “White” was defined and constructed in ways that increased its value by reinforcing its exclusivity. Indeed, just as whiteness as property embraced the right to exclude, whiteness as a theoretical construct evolved for the very purpose of racial exclusion. Thus, the concept of whiteness is built on both exclusion and racial subjugation. This fact was particularly evident during the period of the most rigid racial exclusion, as whiteness signified racial privilege and took the form of status property

**There can be no discussion of capitalism without first discussing the Zong massacre. A slave vessel, the Zong becomes lost on the high seas. On board, supplies are running low and the physical quality of the bodies of the slaves is getting even lower as their bodies decay in holds with ceilings only 18 inches high. The captain of the ship, Luke Collingwood arrives at the conclusion that the only way for him and his company to make money would be to claim the insurance on “lost cargo”. Over the next three days, 132 black men, women, and children were handcuffed and thrown overboard into the sea to be lost forever. Capital was produced as each body hit the water. The affirmative participates in the very same system of capital that would rather throw black bodies overboard to drown that to potentially lose money. This is indicative of the way in which slavery shaped modern capitalism.**

**Baucom 01,** [Ian, “Specters of the Atlantic; The South Atlantic Quarterly, Volume 100, Number 1”, P. 62-3]//MHELLIE

The sea is slavery. . . . Sea receives a body as if that body has come to rest on a cushion, one that gives way to the body’s weight and folds round it like an envelope. Over three days 131 such bodies, no, 132, are flung at this sea. Each lands with a sound that the sea absorbs and silences. . . . Those bodies have their lives written on salt water. The sea current turns pages of memory. One hundred and thirty one souls roam the Atlantic with countless others. When the wind is heard it is their breath, their speech. The sea is therefore home. The Zong is on the high seas. Men, women and chil- dren are thrown overboard by the Captain and his crew. There is no fear or shame in this piece of in- formation. There is only the fact of the Zong and its unending voyage and those deaths that cannot be un- done. Where death has begun but remains unfinished because it recurs. Where there is only the record of the sea. . . . Those spirits feed on the story of themselves. The past is laid to rest when it is told. —Fred D’Aguiar, Feeding the Ghosts So begins and ends the Guyanese writer Fred D’Aguiar’s Feeding the Ghosts, a novelistic ac- count of the 1781 massacre by drowning of 132 slaves aboard the slave ship Zong, a murder ordered by the ship’s captain, Luke Collingwood, when he became aware that he had steered his ship off course, that his supplies of water and food were running out, that his ‘‘cargo’’ would perish before he could steer it to port, and that the only way for him to guarantee a profit to himself and the vessel’s Liverpool owners was to jettison all those sickly slaves who, by continuing to consume water, were ‘‘threatening’’ the welfare of their fellows and then to claim compensation for these jettisoned ‘‘goods’’ under the ‘‘salvage’’ clause of the Zong’s marine insurance policy. Collingwood ordered the murders, and on his return to London, when the insurers would not pay, he and the ship’s owners sued. A bizarre series of court cases followed. Collingwood died before the suit could reach court, but the owners pursued the case, whose successful outcome, from their point of view, depended on their need to prove that the slaves had indeed existed, that their agent had had them murdered, and that such a massacre was not only ‘‘necessary’’ but, under the operating laws of property, had conferred on each of the slave’s bodies a measurable and recoverable quantity of value—that, indeed, the only question of justice pertinent to this case was the question of the insurance company’s obligation to compensate the shipowners for their loss.1 On which point, let me pause for just a moment, for it is precisely with regard to questions of justice and value that the case of the Zong has a bearing upon that contemporary discourse of memory that I want to discuss, a discourse in which the theory of value upon which a politics of diasporic remembrance founds itself originates in a refusal to identify either value or justice with that law of exchange which was the true law governing the outcome of the Zong trials. For if it was a commercial triumph of the ex- change principle that permitted the courts to find, as they did, that Collingwood had produced something of value in each of those moments in which a slave’s body hit the surface of the sea, that each such miniapocalypse was not only an apocalypse of death but an apocalypse of money, an apocalypse in which, through the metaphoric imagination of capital, death and the money form name one another as literal equivalents, then it was also a conceptualization of justice as exchange, the triumph of a classical thinking of jus- tice codified for Enlightenment modernity in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, that permitted what were to become a series of court inquiries into the eighteenth-century laws of marine insurance to confirm those fundamental and complementary laws of capital which dictate that justice is done and value produced when one thing is exchanged for another. By such thinking, justice is little more than a means of measuring the fungibility of all things, a way, in Hegel’s terms, of discovering, even ‘‘in cases where the damage done amounts to destruction and is irreparable,’’ that damage is, in- deed, reversible, that something can be substituted for the lost thing, some- thing that will ‘‘take the place of its specific qualitative character,’’ some- thing, in this case, called money.2 If such conceptions of justice, value, and insurance emerge from the Zong trials as capital’s contribution to the his- tory of mourning, then the notions of justice and value that emerge from a contemporary politics of black Atlantic remembrance, a politics in which the case of the Zong has once more become a central event, articulate a far more complex understanding of what it means to exchange one thing for another: an understanding that is at once recognizably melancholic and countermelancholic, equally devoted to the singular and to the notion of ex- change but devoted, in that case, to a reconceptualization of the protocols of exchange fundamentally consonant with that implied by a hauntological rethinking of justice.

**Our analysis of capital can only begin with the captive female body, which “locates precisely a moment of converging political and social vectors that mark the flesh as a prime commodity of exchange.” The pregnancy of slave women was critical to the production of capital for profit. In this way, slavery became as dependent upon female reproductive capacities as anything else. The abjection of the humanity of both the pregnant woman and the soon-to-be child was exacerbated by the desire for wealth.**

**Hartman 16**, [Saidiya, Professor at Columbia University, “The Belly of the World: A Note on Black Women’s Labors”, P. 165-9]//MHELLIE

The slave ship is a womb/abyss. The plantation is the belly of the world. Partus sequitur ventrem—the child follows the belly. The master dreams of future increase. The modern world follows the belly. **Gestational language has been key to describing the world-making and world-breaking capacities of racial slavery.** What it created and what it destroyed has been explicated by way of gendered figures of conception, birth, parturition, and severed or negated maternity. To be a slave is to be “excluded from the prerogatives of birth.” The mother’s only claim—to transfer her disposses- sion to the child. The material relations of sexuality and reproduction defined black women’s historical experiences as laborers and shaped the character of their refusal of and resistance to slavery.1 The theft, regulation and destruction of black women’s sexual and reproductive capacities would also define the afterlife of slavery. Most often when the productive labor of the slave comes into view, it is as a cate- gory absent gender and sexual differentiation. In two of the greatest works of the black radical tradition, W.E.B. Du Bois’s Black Reconstruction and C.L.R. James’s Black Jacobins, the agency of the enslaved becomes legible as politics, rather than crime or destruction, at the moment slaves are transformed into black workers and revolutionary masses fashioned along the lines of the insurgent proletariat. However, representing the slave through the figure of the worker (albeit unwaged and unfree), obscures as much as it reveals, making it difficult to distinguish the constitutive elements of slavery as a mode of power, violence, dispossession and accumulation or to attend to the forms of gendered and sexual violence that enable these processes. In Black Reconstruction, women’s sexual and reproductive labor is critical in accounting for the violence and degradation of slavery, yet this labor falls outside of the heroic account of the black worker and the general strike. Black women, too, refused the conditions of work on the plantation, and Du Bois notes their presence among the “army of fugitives” rushing away from the fields. Yet, in the shift from the fugitive to the striking worker, the female slave becomes a minor figure. Neither “the potentialities for the future” represented by the fugitive nor the text engendered by flight and refusal and furnished for abolition idealists embraced her labors.2 Marriage and protection rather than sexual freedom and reproductive justice were the only ways conceived to redress her wrongs, or remedy the “wound dealt to [her] reputation as a human being.” The sexual violence and reproduction characteristic of enslaved women’s experience fails to produce a radical politics of liberation or a philosophy of freedom. Black women’s labors have not been easy to reckon with conceptually. Feminist thinkers, following the path cleared by Angela Davis’s groundbreaking essay “Reflec- tions of the Black Woman’s Role in the Community of Slaves,” have considered the significance of gender, sexuality and reproduction in defining the constitutive relations of slavery and the modes of its violence.3 It has proven difficult, if not impossible, to assimilate black women’s domestic labors and reproductive capacities within narratives of the black worker, slave rebellion, maroonage, or black radical- ism, **even as this labor was critical to the creation of value, the realization of profit and the accumulation of capital.** It has been no less complicated to imagine the future produced by such labors as anything other than monstrous. Certainly we know that enslaved women fled the plantation, albeit not in as great numbers as men; poisoned slaveholders; plotted resistance; dreamed of destroying the master and his house; utilized abortifacients rather than reproduce slaves; practiced infanticide rather than sentence their children to social death, the auction block, and the master’s bed; exercised autonomy in suicidal acts; gave birth to children as testament to an abiding knowledge of freedom contrary to every empirical index of the plantation; and yearned for radically different ways of being in the world. So where exactly does the sex drudge, recalcitrant domestic, broken mother, or sullen wet-nurse fit into the scheme of the general strike? If the general strike is a placeholder for political aspirations that Du Bois struggles to name, how does the character of the slave female’s refusal augment the text of black radicalism? Is it at all possible to imagine her as the paradigmatic slave or as the representative black worker? **Reproductive labor, as the scholars Hortense Spillers, Jennifer Morgan, Dorothy Roberts, Alyss Weinbaum, and Neferti Tadiar note, is central to thinking about the gendered afterlife of slavery and global capitalism**.4 Yet attending to the status of black women’s labors has confounded our conceptual categories and thrown our critical lexicon into crisis. On the slave ship, captive women were accounted for as quantities of greater and lesser mass, and the language of units and complete cargo eclipsed that of the subject, the person or individual. The “anomalous intimacy of cargo,” according to Stephanie Smallwood, represented a new social formation. Those African persons in Middle Passage, writes Spillers, were “literally suspended in the oceanic.” They were “culturally unmade.” “Under these conditions one is neither female, nor male, as both subjects are taken into account as quantities.”5 For Spillers, the categories of flesh and body are deployed to describe the mutilation, dismemberment, and exile of captivity and enslavement. Flesh provides the primary narrative rather than gendered subject positions. The flesh is produced by the violence of racial slavery and yet it brings into view a new mode of relation. On the plantation, black women were required to toil as hard as men, and in this way “ungendered,” according to Spillers, by which she means that “female and male adhere to no symbolic integrity.” Partus sequitur ventrem negated kinship and denied it any “legal or social efficacy.” The condition of the mother marked her offspring and was “forever entailed on her remotest posterity.” **We carry the mother’s mark and it continues to define our condition and our present.** The role of gender and sexual differentiation in the constitution of labor are especially complex in the context of slavery. On one hand, the category of labor insuf- ficiently accounts for slavery as a mode of power, domination and production. **The fungibility of the slave, the wanton uses of the black body for producing value or plea- sure, and the shared vulnerabilities of the commodity, whether male or female, trouble dominant accounts of gender.** Depending on the angle of vision or critical lexicon, the harnessing of the body as an instrument for social and physical reproduction unmakes the slave as gendered subject or reveals the primacy of gender and sexual differentiation in the making of the slave. Natal alienation is one of the central attributes of the social death of the slave and gendered and sexual violence are central to the processes that render the black child as by-product of the relations of production.6 At the same time, the lines of division between the market and the household which distinguished the public and the domestic and divided productive and reproductive labor for propertied whites does not hold when describing the enslaved and the carceral landscape of plantation. **Reproduction is tethered to the making of human commodities and in service of the marketplace. For the enslaved, reproduction does not ensure any future other than that of dispossession nor guarantee anything other than the replication of racialized and disposable persons or “human increase” (expanded property-holdings) for the master.** The future of the enslaved was a form of speculative value for slaveholders. Even the unborn were conscripted and condemned to slavery. “Kinship loses meaning,” according to Spillers, “since at any moment it can be invaded at any given and arbitrary moment by property relations.” Extending and revising this line of argument, Morgan notes the importance of maternity and reproduction in the evolution of the legal codification of slavery. “Women’s bodies became the definitional sites of racial slavery.” In North America, the future of slavery depended upon black women’s reproductive capacity as it did on the slave market. **The reproduction of human property and the social relations of racial slavery were predicated upon the belly.** Plainly put, subjection was anchored in black women’s reproductive capacities. The captive female body, according to Spillers, “locates precisely a moment of converging political and social vectors that mark the flesh as a prime commodity of exchange.”7 Forced to labor for the “satisfaction of the immediate needs” of their owners and overseers, however, those needs were defined, the captive female body was subjected to innumerable uses. It could be converted into cash, speculated and traded as commodity, worked to death, taken, tortured, seeded, and propagated like any other crop, or murdered. The value produced by and extracted from enslaved women included productive labor—their labors as farm workers, cotton pickers, tobacco hands, and rice cultivators—and their reproductive capacities created “future increase” for farms and plantations and human commodities for markets, yoking the prospect of racial slavery to their bodies**. Even the unborn figured into the reproductive calculus of the institution.** The work of sex and procreation was the chief motor for reproducing the material, social, and symbolic relations of slavery. The value accrued through reproductive labor was brutally apparent to the enslaved who protested bitterly against being bred like cattle and oxen. This reproductive labor not only guaranteed slavery as an institutional process and secured the status of the enslaved, but it inaugurated a regime of racialized sexuality that continues to place black bodies at risk for sexual exploitation and abuse, gratuitous violence, incarceration, poverty, premature death, and state-sanctioned murder. **The sexuality and reproductive capacities of enslaved women were central to understanding the expanding legal conception of slavery and its inheritability**. Slavery conscripted the womb, deciding the fate of the unborn and reproducing slave property by making the mark of the mother a death sentence for her child. The negation or disfigurement of maternity, writes Christina Sharpe, **“turns the womb into a factory reproducing blackness as abjection and turning the birth canal into another domestic middle passage.”**8 Partus sequitur ventrem—replicates the fate of the slave across generations. The belly is made a factory of production incommensurate with notions of the maternal, the conjugal or the domestic. In short, the slave exists out of the world and outside the house.

**China Rise**

**Their motives to legalistically manage Chinese economic development within statist frameworks obfuscates that the foundational logics for their rise in the international market are inseparable from the gratuitous consumption of Africa.**

**Ayers** **13** (Alison J. Ayers, Simon Fraser University (SFU), Political Science, Sociology & Anthropology. “Beyond Myths, Lies and Stereotypes: The Political Economy of a ‘New Scramble for Africa,’” New Political Economy, 18:2, 227-257 -ERW)

Commentators across the political spectrum have increasingly drawn attention to a ‘new scramble for Africa’. This ‘new scramble’ marks the latest chapter of imperialist engagement, with not only Western states and corporations but also those of ‘emerging economies’ (such as China, Russia, Brazil, India and Malaysia) seeking to consolidate their access to African resources and markets. The ‘new scramble for Africa’ involves therefore significant politico-economic transformations related to shifts in global politico-economic power. Accordingly, a burgeoning literature has emerged to make sense of the current historical conjuncture. Indeed, as Roger Southall and Henning Melber argue, ‘something big is happening’ in contemporary Africa and ‘there is an urgent need for us as analysts to seek to understand it’ (2009: xxiv). However, as this article elaborates, much of the burgeoning literature on the ‘new scramble for Africa’ is premised upon problematic **substantive, theoretical and ontological claims and debates**. In particular, the article seeks to challenge two commonplace and related narratives. Firstly, the highly questionable representations of the **scale** and **perceived threat** of emerging powers’ (particularly China’s) involvement in Africa, in contrast to the **silences, hypocrisy and paternalistic representation** of the historical role of the West. As such, the West’s relations with Africa are construed as essentially beneficent, in contrast to the putatively opportunistic, exploitative and deleterious role of the emerging powers, thereby **obfuscating the West’s ongoing neocolonial** relationship with Africa. Second, and relatedly, debate and analysis are **framed predominantly within an ahistoric statist framework** of analysis, particularly that of **inter-state rivalry** between China and other ‘emerging’ states vs. Western powers. Absent or neglected in such accounts are profound changes in the global political economy within which the ‘new scramble for Africa’ is to be more adequately located. Without contextualising the rise of China (and other emerging states) in the neoliberal capitalist global order, ‘it is too easy to single out the country without addressing the **structural and institutional forces** that are driving not only China, but also other emerging powers, to look with covetous eyes at Africa’s natural resources and markets’ (Luk 2008: 13). This article interjects in such debates through critique of these two commonplace but highly problematic narratives. In so doing, it seeks to contribute to a more adequate analysis of politico-economic transformations in the twenty-first world order, and Africa’s place within it. Yellow peril, dark continent, white man’s burden Much of the discussion and debate around the ‘new scramble for Africa’ focuses on China’s engagement with Africa. Such accounts are characteristic of a wider discourse on the rise of China internationally and the so-called ‘China threat’ evident in policy-making, social science and mass public discourse (Gertz 2000; Yee and Storey 2002; Bernstein and Munro 1997; Mosher 2000; Mearsheimer 2006; Naı´m 2007; Curtis 2008). Such representations give ‘the impression that the African continent, and much of the rest of the world, is in the process of being “devoured” by China’, with descriptors such as ‘voracious’, ‘ravenous’ and ‘insatiable appetite for natural resources’ used to characterise China’s new role (Guerrero and Manji 2008: 1; Mohan and Power 2008). Within the academic literature Robert Rotberg argues, for example, that China is ‘opportunistic’, ‘extractive and exploitive.’ ‘China’s very rapaciousness – its seeming insatiable demand for liquid forms of energy, and for the raw materials that feed its widening industrial maw – responds to sub-Saharan Africa’s relatively abundant supplies of unprocessed metals, diamonds, and gold’ (Rotberg 2008: viii– ix). Similarly, Peter Navarro, in The Coming China Wars, illuminates the so-called dark sides of China’s leap into ‘globalisation’, including China’s ‘amoral’ involvement in Africa, arguing that ‘China’s tentacles reach throughout Africa’ in its quest to access oil and other natural resources. China’s Africa strategy, he concludes ‘is a threat that will colonise and economically enslave the vast majority of the continent’s population that lives outside the elite circles. It is an imperialist marriage manufactured in China and made in hell’ (Navarro 2007: 100). Similar concerns are echoed in Western foreign policy positions, particularly within the United States. The Council on Foreign Relations Report, More Than Humanitarianism: A Strategic US Approach Toward Africa, for example, highlights the threat of China on the continent (CFR 2006). Similarly, US Congress officials have voiced concerns ‘that the Chinese intend to aid and abet African dictators, gain a stronghold on precious African natural resources, and undo much of the progress that has been made on democracy and governance in the last 15 years in African nations’ (Rep. Christopher Smith, quoted in Naidu and Davies 2006: 69). Meanwhile, sensationalistic and Sinophobic accounts in the Western media routinely invoke the specter of Chinese expansion, including Chinese rapacity in Africa (Brown and Sriram 2008). Reviewing the UK print media, Emma Mawdsley reveals that such accounts consistently depict China as ‘ruthless’, ‘unscrupulous’, ‘amoral, greedy and coldly indifferent’ (Mawdsley 2008: 517, 523). While French journalists Serge Michel and Michel Beuret in China Safari: On the Trail of Beijing’s Expansion in Africa, liken Beijing’s role to that of the Godfather: ‘Borrow from the Chinese and you are drawn into the bosom of its – highly profitable – family. Beijing is the Godfather, engaged in everything from textiles to infrastructure to uranium and oil. His bids are all interlinked and his motivation is constant’ (Michel and Beuret 2009: 108). By contrast, the operations of Western capital with the same ends are notably absent from such accounts (Mawdsley 2008; Melber 2009), or are ‘described with anodyne phrases such as “development”, “investment”, “employment generation”’ (Guerrero and Manji 2008: 1). As such, commonplace accounts claim that Western powers have developed a new ‘vision of foreign partnership with Africa’ based on ‘a shared agenda for change’ with the West undertaking ‘ameliorative initiatives’ across Africa (Alden 2007: 93–94; Rotberg 2008: 18). Both the silences on the role of the West, together with the ahistoric distortions and flawed understanding of the West’s ongoing neocolonial relationship with Africa characteristic of such approaches, are highly problematic. Not least, as Kwesi Kwaa Prah (2007) has argued, it is hypocritical of Western states to raise concerns about China’s role in Africa, given their long history of exploitative relations with Africa, which continue to the present day. Yet Western powers continue to arrogate to themselves the project of ‘spreading “enlightenment” and culture to barbarous natives ... [whilst] seeking to convince us about how bad and evil rapacious Chinese “mercantilists” are for Africa’, all the while ‘continuing to rampage through Africa in search of markets to conquer and “mad mullahs” to vanquish’ (Adebajo 2008: 227). As such, it is necessary to shatter the ‘Orientalist’ myth that often describes China’s role as that of a ‘yellow peril’ seeking to monopolise markets, coddle caudillos and condone human rights’ abuses on the continent; while Western powers ... are portrayed in contrast almost as knights in shining armour, seeking to assist Africa’s economic recovery, spread democracy and contribute to conflict-management efforts (Adebajo 2008: 227) The engagement of China and that of other so-called ‘emerging states’ with Africa has undoubtedly undergone significant changes, particularly over the last decade, with notable consequences within and beyond Africa. However, a fuller and more nuanced understanding is required if we are to understand contemporary shifts in the centres of politico-economic power within the twenty-first-century worldorder, and Africa’s place within it. This necessarily includes analysis of the contemporary history of Western imperialism on the continent and the continuing dominance of Western capital, albeit recognising that a significant spatial reorganisation of global capitalism is occurring with the rise of the BRICs and other ‘emerging’ states. This spatial reorganisation of global capitalism and its implications for and beyond Africa are addressed in the subsequent section. This section interrogates commonplace Western claims regarding the scale and threat of China and other emerging powers in Africa, and, relatedly, subjects the ongoing role of the West in Africa to critical scrutiny.

**Deleuze**

**Read Deleuze not as the prophet of affirmation, but as a stoic. The non-thought is necessary to sustain philosophy at every moment of its so-called becoming. The power of the superstructure of social death precedes grammatical ground, and their theory doesn’t resolve gratuitous violence, it only renders it immanent. The stoic position concerning vacuoles of non-communication is the only possible approach to social death that doesn’t actively recreate it.**

**Barber 16** [Daniel Colucciello Barber, PHD in religious studies from Duke University, Fellow at ICI Berlin, “The Creation of Non-Being,” Rhizomes issue 29, section 1-8]

[1] Anti-blackness operates axiomatically. This is the case, at least, insofar as we speak of what Frank B. Wilderson, III, has called "the world" (Wilderson 2003: 234).[1] The aim of this essay is to address the consequences of this axiomatic operation for some rather classical terms of reference within continental philosophy, such as being, analogy,[2] communication, possibility, and knowledge. Such terms are the means by which the world claims to grant itself coherence; they form the grammatical ground, the structuring condition, of the world. If the "gratuitous violence" of anti-blackness extends into the very "grammar" of the world (Wilderson 2010: 38, 131),[3] then the aforementioned terms—far from providing retreat into a "metaphysical" domain unaffected by the historical and material—serve as points for the articulation of antagonism toward anti-blackness. In fact, the gratuity of such violence—its irreducibility to purposive meaning—entails a refusal of the coherent ground that these very terms claim to supply. This is to say that **being**—or the possibility thereof—**grounds itself not through its own coherence, but through an enactment of power that is staged by anti-black violence**. **Power precedes grammatical ground**. [2] Maurizio Lazzarato's analysis of contemporary capitalism approaches the anti-blackness analyzed by Wilderson. Lazzarato argues that capitalism is not grounded in any coherent science of economy, but is an enactment of the power to make indebted beings. It is by way of this emphasis on power that he links a purportedly secular capitalism to the theological structure of Christianity—that is, to a being that acts gratuitously, or without ground. Yet Lazzarato, I argue, ultimately wards off an encounter with anti-blackness through reliance on a coherence implicit in "the indebted man" (Lazzarato 2012: 8). I elaborate this argument by drawing on Gilles Deleuze's concept of "difference in itself" (Deleuze 1994: 36-89). This concept, on my reading, ungrounds the purported coherence of being by way of a logically prior differentiality, which is expressed as non-being. Essential to this argument is the task of articulating such non-being without conversion to an affirmation of the world. [3] Deleuze's philosophy has come to be associated with habits of affirmation, where "habits" indicate the practices or operations by which reality is experientially and experimentally enacted.[4] This association could be attributed to Deleuze's invocation of concepts such as the rhizome, which appears to advocate teeming, emergent, multiplicitous movement in excess of all boundaries. In such a landscape of fluidity and flux, Deleuze's notion of creation then becomes associated with the affirmation of alternative possibilities. This association may also be attributed to Deleuze's rigorous refusal of the being of negativity. He contends that negative being plays no role in the determination of reality, that it is in fact an illusion that conceals the force of differential immanence. Given the centrality of this contention, **any association of Deleuze's thought with habits of affirmation would have to depend on the following claim: the refusal of negative being entails the refusal of habits of negativity, in favor of habits of affirmation**.[5] [4] Yet it is fundamentally mistaken to conflate the refusal of negative being with the refusal of negative habits. The call for habits of affirmation is theoretically illegitimate: if all habits are real, and if reality has no negative being, then all habits—precisely because they are real—do not involve negative being; the reality that is habituated—regardless of whether this habituation is characterized as affirmative or negative—has no negative being. If the call for habits of affirmation is therefore not entailed by Deleuze's refusal of negative being, then from where does this call arise? If habits of affirmation are imperative, then from where does this imperativity draw its mandate? **To begin to answer these questions, one must address the ways in which habits of affirmation are logically consistent—and ultimately politically complicit—with the contemporary conjuncture of capitalism.** [5] This conjuncture, which has been variously described in terms of "late capitalism," "postfordism," or "communicative capitalism," is marked by an affirmation of mobility, innovation, fluidity, possibility, and creativity. Deleuze analyzed this conjuncture in terms of control societies, which he distinguished from disciplinary societies. Control establishes domination not by setting up in advance strict boundaries, but rather by a kind of unending encouragement, or motivated permissiveness: control establishes and expands itself by establishing and expanding possibilities of communication. Domination "no longer operate[s] by confining people but through continuous control and instant communication" (Deleuze 1997: 174). Whereas discipline names the prohibition of excessive mobility and innovation, control names the "modulation" of the possibilities implied in such mobility and innovation (Deleuze 1997: 179).[6] [6] With control, domination remains not despite, nor in opposition to, but precisely as possibility, which is modulated through a communicability that is ever more fluid and receptive in its listening in order to be ever more innovative in its surveilling.[7] Following Deleuze's analysis of control**, habits of affirmation—of multiplicitous possibilities, or of the possibility of being-otherwise—are not resistant to, but actually constitutive of, control's modulation**. Control is marked by "endless postponement" (Deleuze 1997: 179), meaning that the future—as that which breaks with the present—never takes place**. The present is extended into the future, and so the future becomes a modulation of the present; an essential incommensurability between present and future remains unthinkable**.[8] Given Deleuze's analysis, it is not by accident that he increasingly experimented with habits of negativity. In his last book, What is Philosophy? – co-written with Félix Guattari, and published one year after his analysis of control—one can observe, for instance, his attentiveness to "shame" (Deleuze and Guattari 1996: 107), which was motivated by his reading of Primo Levi, or his indication of agreement with the negative dialectic of Theodor Adorno.[9] [7] One finds, in the same book, a polemic against communication and a concomitant positioning of creation as distinct from and incommensurable with the communicative.[10] Simply put, Deleuze's increased attention to control, or communication, directly corresponds to his increased attention to the negative—not as being but as experience and experiment, as habit. Thus it is not only that Deleuze's refusal of negative being cannot be conflated with habits of affirmation, it is also that Deleuze, when attending to control, attempts to articulate habits of negativity. What is Philosophy? concludes with an articulation of the No of chaos, the non of thought that enables creation: philosophy must attain "an essential relationship with the No that concerns it"; philosophy does "not need the No as beginning, or as the end in which [it] would be called upon to disappear by being realized, but at every moment of [its] becoming or [its] development" (Deleuze and Guattari 1996: 218). [8] The creation named by Deleuze's philosophy is thus in immanence with the No, and it is this No-creation immanence that begins to articulate antagonism toward communication: "Creating has always been something different from communicating" (Deleuze 1997: 175). This divergence between communication and the No of creation is utter, essential, and irredeemable. **There is no possibility of emancipating communication, nor is there any affirmative basis for creation—for the base is communication. There is nothing to affirm, and so creation is immanent with the negativity of the non: "The key thing may be to create vacuoles of noncommunication**" (Deleuze 1997: 175).

**The ground upon which their advocacy is enacted is already governed by prescriptions of difference as non-being. There is no synthesis between blackness and whiteness, this is exactly where the phenomena of double consciousness and unspeakable ethics comes from. Instead, think non-being according to blackness as an unflinching analysis for how historical material power is enacted.**

**Barber 16** [Daniel Colucciello Barber, PHD in religious studies from Duke University, Fellow at ICI Berlin, “The Creation of Non-Being,” Rhizomes issue 29, sections 9-16]

[9] **My argument, drawing on Deleuze, is that the logic of possibility actually serves to modulatively reproduce the anti-black grammar of the world. Creation, defined as a break with the presently given world, is not a possibility. It is rather immanent with an axiomatic No to such possibility, with habits of negativity**. [10] This thesis concerns a key problematic that stems from the Afro-Pessimist analysis of anti-blackness: if blackness stands both within the habitus of modernity, as an organizing principle, and without this habitus, as a perpetually banished subjectivity, then the very articulation of blackness would seem to depend on and reproduce such a habitus. In other words, both being-within and being-without are possibilities governed by modernity's dominative positioning of blackness. The articulation of blackness is in fact bound by this problematic insofar as one remains within the ambit of habits of affirmation. In other words, the presumption of affirmation is co-extensive with the reproduction of the habitus of modernity: **that which is presently available for affirmation is already governed by modernity and its articulation of blackness**, and so **habits of affirmation inevitably participate in and reproduce the double-bind in which modernity positions blackness**. [11**] Against such reproduction, it is essential to insist on habits of negativity.** Such insistence is total: since it is affirmation as such that entails participation in the being here indexed by modernity, even a modicum of affirmation mitigates the force enacted by negativity. **The power of creation therefore resides entirely and essentially on the side of negativity—and not at all on the side of affirmation.** Concomitantly, to invoke such power actually entails an unmitigated refusal of habits of affirmation; affirmation does not name or support, but on the contrary denies, the power of creation. Given the double-bind in which modernity positions blackness, this is to say that the negativity of the non, in virtue of its immanence with a force of creation, indexes blackness as a power of non-being, as that which is without need of—and in fact opposed to—reliance on the affirmative. [12] It remains necessary to outline the articulation of this immanence of creation and non-being—that is, to theoretically express how an unmitigated insistence on habits of negativity can be both a refusal of affirmation and an enactment of power. This warrants a return to Deleuze's thought by way of some questions: How can habits of negativity, articulated via Deleuze's insistence on the non, gain theoretical consistency with his conceptual refusal of negative being? If negative being is refused, then in what sense can there be insistence on the non? [13] Deleuze argues that "being is difference itself. Being is also non-being, but non-being is not the being of the negative . . . non-being is Difference" (Deleuze 1994: 76-77). This makes clear that negative being is refused in virtue of difference; what is essential is difference in itself. Hence difference is articulated not as the affirmation of affirmative being, nor even as the affirmation of being as such. On the contrary, difference is articulated as "non-being": negative being is refused, but it is refused in favor of non-being. Difference antecedes both positive being and negative being, thereby displacing their dialectical or conflictual relation. In other words, difference is not between opposed beings but in itself, autonomous from and antecedent to every being or thing; difference is real, but precisely as a matter of non-being. Its reality is not the being of a thing, it is no-thing. [14] Such theorization enables the delinking of creation (as force of non-being, or no-thing) from affirmation (as possibility of being). Difference, or non-being, marks a real force of creation that is without, and incommensurable with, being. In virtue of this unanalogizability of non-being with being, creation is articulated as a force stemming from negativity, and not at all from affirmation: affirmation is said of being and its possibilization, whereas creation is said of non-being. Habits of negativity, which antagonize every (positively or negatively described) being, or being as such, are thus coeval with an insistence on the real force of non-being. [15] This argument can be used to negotiate a tension between the Afro-Pessimist emphasis on irresolvable negativity and the concern of Black Optimism to emphasize a power named by blackness: while the former's emphasis on negativity extends to habits of affirmation as such, this negativity immanently involves—and thus does not abandon—an insistence on the power of creation. Consequently, the Black Op concern to speak of the power of blackness may be satisfied entirely within the space of negativity, or social death, on which Afro-Pessimism insists. Such satisfaction does not then require recourse to qualifications that would mitigate the negativity of this space, On the contrary, power is immanent to a redoubled negativity, or a negativity toward both being and the affirmation of the possibility of being-otherwise. [16] Yet even as Deleuze's philosophical efforts may be deployed by and for the articulation of Afro-Pessimist claims, these claims vertiginously intensify Deleuze's theorization of non-being: Deleuze theorizes non-being in terms of a "vertigo" of immanence (Deleuze and Guattari 1996: 48), yet blackness is the historical, material experience of such vertigo. Drawing on a distinction made by Wilderson, this is to say that for Deleuze non-being is a "subjective vertigo," or a vertigo into which Deleuze's thought makes an entrance, while blackness is experienced as "objective vertigo," meaning that vertigo is—historically or materially—always already there (Wilderson 2011: 3). Immanence, or the vertigo of non-being, remains an object for the thought of Deleuze; blackness is historically or materially the objective reality of non-being—the very reality of the vertigo of immanence. Consequently, to think non-being according to blackness entails the reading of Deleuze's theoretical articulation in terms of the operations by which historical, material power is enacted.

**The threshold for weighing their theory boils down to the question of its relationship to material violence. What is it that gives one the potential to become? It is precisely the logic of inheritance that sustains being. What this entails is that the theoretical grounds for enacting instances of their metaphysics holds antiblackness as a necessity.**

-This supplement’s Wilderson’s argument that time is accumulating. This gets articulated in this article as the process of whiteness as a credit/debit system.

**Barber 16** [Daniel Colucciello Barber, PHD in religious studies from Duke University, Fellow at ICI Berlin, “The Creation of Non-Being,” Rhizomes issue 29, Sections 17-49] \*edited for gendered language

[17] A central feature of control is debt. As Deleuze remarks, "A ~~man~~ is no longer a ~~man~~ confined but a ~~man~~ in debt" (Deleuze 1997: 179). The experience of the indebted ~~man~~ is one of endless postponement, for the creditor-debtor relation sets the terms, in the present, for the future of this relation. Otherwise put, the relation between present and future is circumscribed within the relation between creditor and debtor: to have credit is to have the future as a present creditor; to have debt is to have the future as a present debtor**.** The future is given credit by the present, or the future is what one is given to pay off the debt of the present. In such a relation, **the future is endlessly postponed while the present remains, endures, as credit and debt**. Any negativity toward the present is foreclosed, and so the future is never created. [18] Yet Deleuze's analysis of control, and thereby of debt, is inchoate. For this reason, it will be useful to turn to the arguments set forth in Lazzarato's recent text, The Making of the Indebted ~~Man~~, which offers a thoroughgoing development of the insights of Deleuze's analysis. The usefulness of this text arises, additionally, from the fact that Lazzarato—unlike many who work in a Deleuzian vein—tends to avoid dependence on an ineliminable excess of being that is presumed to overcome the limits of the present. Rather than treat Deleuze's thought as the index of an indefatigable, constitutive power of being that guarantees political possibility, Lazzarato attends to the ways in which control has foreclosed such possibility. As such, Lazzarato is perhaps the best available candidate for exemplifying Deleuzian thought without the presumption of affirmation. [19] Lazzarato presents the indebted ~~man~~ as the subjective terrain of communicative capitalism's apparatus of control, and in doing so develops some of Deleuze's central claims. For instance, he observes how debt "preempts non-chronological time, each person's future as well as the future of society as a whole," and contends that debt is the "principal explanation for the strange sensation of living in a society without time, without possibility, without foreseeable rupture" (Lazzarato 2012: 46-47). Furthermore, he confirms that debt marks the appearance of capitalism's capacity to make being as such, and thus to make the future: "The power of capitalism, like the world it aims to appropriate and control, is always in the process of being made" (Lazzarato 2012: 107). [20] Lazzarato offers a key advance on Deleuze with his emphasis on the aforementioned being-making capacity of capitalism. Specifically, he insists that debt is not a scientific necessity—something that stems from autonomous economic laws—but rather a product of power. Debt belongs to the exercise of power, and as such it is a making of beings that are logically prior to—and thus do not gain their coherence through—any science of economy. "Measure, evaluation, and appraisal"—the means by which debt expresses and constructs itself—"all arise from the question of power, before there is any question of economics" (Lazzarato 2012: 80). It is in virtue of the centrality of power within his analysis that Lazzarato offers an additional advance: the claim that attention to the debt-relation is inseparable from attention to the Christian relation. The power at issue, Lazzarato argues, is one in which the "origin of valuation and measure is both religious and political" (Lazzarato 2012: 81). [21] Lazzarato's theorization of capitalism as a power to make the debt-relation—and not as a secular science regulating this relation—leads him to introduce and emphasize the Christian valence of "debt obligations" (Lazzarato 2012: 40-41). He argues that what makes the debt-relation hold (as its necessary, if not sufficient, condition) is obligation, and that the theorization of this obligation requires attending to the Christian character of debt. Being is made through the establishment of a creditor-debtor relation, yet essential to this relation is the establishment of obligation, and obligation, Lazzarato argues, is established by Christianity (from which capitalism inherits it). Simply put, the making of beings through debt is made through obligation, which is made through Christianity. It is along these lines that he claims we are now "indebted to the 'god' Capital" (Lazzarato 2012: 32). Lazzarato's analysis of the debt-relation thereby demonstrates that the power by which capitalism makes being is bound up with a power named by Christianity. Capitalist power must then be analyzed in its undividedness from Christian power, and in a way that attends to the negativity of non-being against being. Asymmetry as Analogy [22] One way of addressing this task is to think debt as inheritance—that is, to think the inheritance of Christian debt by capitalism, and in doing so to think how a capacity of being is inherited by capitalism from Christianity. We inherit debt, and debt requires that our future be inherited—ahead of time—as the debt enacted in the present. But it is not just that debt is inherited, it is also that debt constitutes its inheritors as something, as beings analogically belonging to a "we." Note, for instance, the collective first-person of Lazzarato's claim: "We are no longer the inheritors of original sin but rather of the debt of preceding generations" (Lazzarato 2012: 32). Who is "we"? [23] It is by way of this question that one begins to encounter a limit of Lazzarato's analysis, which I will address in a logical register before returning to the explicitly historical marks of the inheritance that he tracks. This limit, logically speaking, is Lazzarato's focus on asymmetry. He clearly observes the injustice of the debt-relation by articulating the deep asymmetry between creditor and debtor.[11] While this observation is not incorrect, the approach to which it belongs ignores the ways in which asymmetry remains within being. In order for one thing to be communicated as asymmetrical with or disproportionate to another thing, these things must be analogical to one another, possessing a minimal degree of likeness or commonality. Therefore creditor and debtor, despite the extremity of their asymmetry, remain analogous to each other as beings. [24] This is to say that the debt-relation operates as a domain of analogous being, and that Lazzarato—by presupposing and leaving in place this domain—fails to encounter the negativity of non-being.[12] Whereas asymmetry presupposes the commonality and analogical relation of beings, non-being names that which is without being, and thus without analogical relation to being(s): something and nothing are not asymmetrical but incommensurable. Lazzarato's critique of debt, by focusing on asymmetry, ignores this absence of analogy between being (whether positive or negative, creditor or debtor) and non-being, and so it can only amount to a modulation of being—that is, a modulation of we. [25] Returning to Lazzarato's history of Christian-capitalist inheritance, I contend that this modulation is evident as an apparent transmutation within the "we": we were once the inheritors of original sin, whereas we are now the inheritors of debt. Yet a deeper continuity remains, for while we are different, it is we who have undergone—and survived—discontinuity: we are still we. Previously we inherited original sin, whereas now we inherit debt, but we are still those who inherit—and, in virtue of this being-inherited or inheriting-being, we are something. We are we, and we remain we, across any apparent discontinuity of Christianity and capitalism, because what remains, what is constant, is the capacity to inherit. Such inheritance is not so happy, of course, for to inherit sin, or to inherit debt, is to be exploited by God or capital. Yet this structure of exploitation maintains an analogy between exploiter and exploited: we are exploited, but precisely through this exploitation, this inheritance of debt, we still know ourselves as we. [26] In this sense, "we" names the inherited capacity to be-something, or the capacity to inherit being. What is ultimately inherited is not debt so much as this capacity: the debt that exploits is the debt that gives being, that gives the capacity to be in analogy with other beings, and thus to participate in or communicate as we. To frame the inheritance of debt primarily in terms of its asymmetry or exploitation is thus to obscure the fact that inheritability, or the ability to inherit, is the common or communicable being underlying all asymmetry. This is to say that Lazzarato focuses his analysis on the conflictual relation between beings of the anti-black world and thereby fails to address the more essential antagonism between blackness and the world. Lazzarato remains within the being of inheritance, or within the we that underlies and guarantees the "coherence"[13] (Hartman and Wilderson 2003: 187) of asymmetrical relation, whereas any break with the present must be articulated according to blackness, which is without relation. [27] The break, then, must be articulated according to the uninheritability of blackness. For Lazzarato, however, blackness remains in "the position of the unthought" (Hartman and Wilderson 2003: 185), and this is precisely because he adheres to the universalizable horizon of the we. "Everyone is a 'debtor,' accountable to and guilty before. Capital has become the Great Creditor, the Universal Creditor" (Lazzarato 2012: 11).[14] Yet it is clear that there are those who do not participate in the we of the indebted man.[15] **Logically prior to the domination articulated via asymmetrical relations of we (inheritance of debt), there is domination articulated as non-being: "the damned of the earth"[16] do not inherit**. The Anti-Blackness of the Indebted ~~Man~~ [28] This is to name the essential limit of Lazzarato's account as the failure to analyze the ways in which the domination of capitalism is constituted by the domination of anti-blackness. In making this claim, I am following Wilderson's argument that "the privileged subject of Marxist discourse is a subaltern who is approached by variable capital—a wage. In other words, Marxism assumes a subaltern structured by capital, not by white supremacy" (Wilderson 2003: 225). **The essential limit of Marxism, he argues, is its theorization of capitalism in terms of "exploitation (rather than accumulation and death)"** (Wilderson 2003: 234). Marxism thus begins from and stays within the being of whiteness, a being whose coherence is premised on the denial of the fact that capital "was kick-started by approaching a particular body (a Black body) with direct relations of force, not by approaching a White body with variable capital" (Wilderson 2003: 230). [29] The position of the worker, in virtue of its raced difference from the position of the slave, asserts a capacity for analogical relation—even amidst exploitation—with the exploiter. The exploited and the exploiter, despite their asymmetry, share a being that is made through the denial of blackness, which is positioned as the slave; the worker possesses an analogical relation to the owner that the slave does not. To presume that the slave position can be analogized with the worker position is thus to attribute the latter's analogical capacity to the former, which is without analogy. It is to presume an analogy between what is capable of being analogous with what is not: "the ruse of analogy" (Wilderson 2010: 37). [30] This means, as well, that there can be no question of an intersection between separate but equal spheres of class and anti-black racism, much less of an account that takes up anti-blackness as a means of proceeding toward a supposedly essential antagonism of class. Against such accounts, Wilderson remarks that, within them, "racism is read off the base, as it were, as being derivative of political economy" (Wilderson 2003: 225). On the contrary, what is essential is anti-black racism, or the incommensurability between non-being and being: class division concerns relations between analogizable terms (owner and worker) that, however conflictual or exploitative, presume a common being, a being whose making—and being made coherent—is premised on (the denial of) the real non-being of the slave. [31] All this is to say that anti-black racial ontology is the condition of possibility for the Marxist demand—central to Lazzarato's own version of autonomist Marxism—for being free from exploitation. As Christina Sharpe remarks: "The legal captivity of Africans and their descendants was central to the codification of rights and freedoms for those legally constituted as white and their legally white descendants. That is, freedoms for those people constituted as white were and are produced through an other's body legally and otherwise being made to wear unfreedom and to serve as a placeholder for access to the freedoms that are denied the black subject" (Sharpe 2010: 15). The being of freedom, or the articulation of a free being – that is, the very link between being and freedom—is premised upon a denial of blackness, or non-being**. This is the case even (or especially) when freedom is expressed as a possibility, for such possibility—pertaining only to that which has already emerged as being—cannot articulate that which this emergence denies**. As Saidiya V. Hartman remarks, the "language of freedom no longer becomes that which rescues the slave from his or her former condition, but the site of the re-elaboration of that condition" (Hartman and Wilderson 2003: 185). [32] Freedom names the modulative, mutational possibilities of being(s). Marxist discourse, however innovative, addresses free beings, or the being of freedom. It leaves unthought non-being, the reality of which is logically prior to all being, and thus to all possibilities of being. It is for this reason that Lazzarato's account of capitalism in terms of debt, while an extremely innovative form of contemporary Marxism, still fails to articulate the essential antagonism of non-being.[17] When Lazzarato speaks of the indebted ~~man~~, of the "we" of debt inheritance, he is speaking of the position that Marxism ascribes to the worker—instead of a capital-work relation we have, in Lazzarato, a credit-debt relation.[18] Debt innovatively re-defines the meaning of work, but it does not change the positionality of the worker, which remains as the position of the debtor.[19] His critique proceeds in virtue of a link—foreclosed by debt—between being and freedom, without ever articulating that the very possibility of this link is premised on the denial of non-being, on the making of blackness as that which is without the possibility of being free. Lazzarato thereby fails to address how the being of the worker, now the indebted ~~man~~, is rendered visible by standing out against the background of (black) flesh.[20] Accumulation, Time, and Relative Negativity [33] The encounter between Lazzarato and Wilderson is of interest because it shows that even an innovated and deeply critical Marxism, responsive to the contemporary foreclosure of the future (or to the relative negativity therein), remains complicit in anti-blackness. This may be further elaborated by attending to the ways in which Lazzarato, by conceiving capitalism as a matter of power rather than of scientific economy, actually seems to require attention to the anti-blackness that he nonetheless evades. In other words, to give power's violence analytic priority over economy's rationality, as Lazzarato does, is to begin to theorize capitalism's constitutive violence—that is, the gratuitous violence that Wilderson locates in slavery (Wilderson 2010: 38). [34] This dynamic is particularly evident in the apparent convergence between Lazzarato's analysis of primitive (or "original") accumulation and Wilderson's argument that the slave position perdures in contemporary capitalism. For Lazzarato, the power that is enacted in the creditor-debtor relation—even if it is now peculiarly manifest—is not merely contemporary. On the contrary, he argues that capitalism has always been a matter of a power irreducible to economic structure, from its beginning to its unending present, and that this is because accumulation is never simply primitive. What gets cast as primitive accumulation is actually something that never ceases: "The original accumulation of capital is always contemporaneous with its expansion; accumulation is not an historical stage, but an ever-renewed actuality" (Lazzarato 2012: 43).[21] In other words, capitalism is the power to accumulate, and must be treated as such, without any developmental distinction between primitive and contemporary accumulations. [35] Lazzarato's refusal to abide by such a developmental distinction is connected to what I have called relative negativity. The present, defined by control, appears to foreclose rather than develop possibilities of the future. Faced with such foreclosure, a developmentally oriented Marxism, with its tendency toward mediatic or hegemonic advance, is put under severe stress. Its emphasis on affirmation, which underwrites historically progressive development, is called into question by the present foreclosure of the future. In contrast to this approach, Lazzarato takes up a relative negativity: he refuses the distinction (between primitive and contemporary accumulation) on which the affirmation of progress rests. In doing so, he permits theorization of the foreclosure of possibility: if the affirmative basis (on which progress depends) is refused, then the foreclosure of progress into the future ceases to be inexplicable. [36] An instance of the sort of affirmative basis that Lazzarato refuses is provided by Antonio Negri's ontological redescription of labor power. For Negri, the possibility of the future can never be entirely foreclosed because the priority of labor to capital is ontological. Labor-power, no matter how exploited, belongs to a "constitutent" power of being and thereby rests upon an inextinguishably affirmative basis.[22] Along these lines, Lazzarato's emphasis on debt, as opposed to labor, may be understood as an attempt to articulate a subjectivity without affirmative basis, a subjectivity that cannot access the guarantees provided to labor by its supposed ontological priority. [37] Nonetheless, Lazzarato's negativity remains merely relative; it does not accede to the negativity of non-being.[23] Once again, this is peculiarly striking insofar as his refusal to narrate a development from primitive to contemporary accumulation should force him to **encounter the anti-blackness in which capitalism was always already subsumed**—long before the more recent development of real subsumption. In other words, if capital's accumulation is just as much primitive as it is contemporary, then the conditions marking the former—namely the slave basis of capitalism—remain essential to the establishment of the present. Lazzarato's articulation of the contemporaneity of capitalism's "original accumulation" thus entails the contemporaneity of anti-blackness. [38] Yet he keeps distance from the essence of capitalism—that is, from the non-being marked by anti-blackness (social death of the slave). Simply put, Lazzarato's own analysis of the temporality of capitalist accumulation should lead him, for instance, to Hartman's articulation of the "time of slavery": temporality that "negates the common-sense intuition of time as continuity or progression," and that does so in virtue of an insistence that "then and now coexist; we are coeval with the dead" (Hartman 2002: 759; emphases mine). Seeking to escape this negativity, Lazzarato affirms a different "we"—not a "we" "coeval with the dead," with non-being, but rather an indebted "we" that continues to presume the capacity to be. The Logic of Inheritance [39] This capacitation of being is structured by a logic of inheritance. Lazzarato, despite his ultimate collusion with such capacitation, already espied this logic when he observed a certain undividedness of Christian power and capitalist power. Nonetheless, his analysis of inheritance (in terms of debt) evades encounter with the essence of the power that inheritance enacts: the power to damn non-being. This logic of inheritance is the logic of the contemporary world;[24] the contemporary, or the presently given, is given precisely as inheritance. Such a claim refuses the understanding of the contemporary world as secular—that is, as divided from, in supersession of, an historically prior period of Christianity.[25] In doing so, it serves to emphasize the constitutive violence of the secular.[26] [40] Essential to the secular is the disavowal of its own violence, which it accomplishes by referring such violence to a domain of religion that is cast into the past. The gratuitous violence of secular anti-blackness exceeds the self-definition of the secular, but this excess is warded off, denied contemporary appearance, insofar as the secular treats violence as a matter of religion, which it claims to supersede in principle and to inevitably progress beyond in practice. To insist on the inheritance of Christianity by secular capitalism, then, is to refuse any operation whereby the violence of the secular—indexed, via Christianity, as (a) being that gratuitously damns—is disavowed. It is to insist that damnation perdures within a purportedly distinct secular frame. [41] The logic of inheritance thus refuses any narrative according to which the secular divides from and thereby progresses beyond the Christian. Yet to refuse this division is not to reduce capitalist power to Christian power—as if capitalism were simply Christianity in disguise. Nor is it to understand the anti-blackness of secular capitalism as reducible to—and thus as a ruse for—the mode of domination set forth by Christianity. On the contrary, there is—amidst the undividedness of inheritance—a qualitative intensification of violence. [42] In other words, just as the logic of inheritance tracks the secular "backward" into the Christian, so it tracks the Christian "forward" into the secular. This last is partially indicated by Lewis R. Gordon's claim that Christian being was inherited by or passed on as anti-black being: "Th[e] problematic of blackness is symbiotically linked to the world in which Christendom was transformed into Europe, where Germanic and Mediterranean Christians were transformed into whites ... blackness is fundamental to the formation of European modernity as it is one that imagines itself legitimate and pure through the expurgation of blackness" (Gordon 2013: 728-9). The qualitative intensification at issue in this passage from Christian to secular may be articulated by way of the passage from the (Christian) positioning of Jews and Muslims to the (secular) positioning of blackness. [43] Christianity subjected Jews and Muslims, who had "wrong religion," to the choice between conversion and death. Importantly, having-wrong-religion was simultaneously racialized: Christian religion named the properly human, and so having-wrong-religion also meant being on the wrong side of the human race. Not only does the secular world inherit the Christian religio-racial discourse, it also intensifies this discourse as anti-blackness: Jews and Muslims, due to their possession of religion, were positioned as being capable (in theory) of converting to the full humanity named by Christianity and thereby retained a minimum of humanity;[27] blacks, however, were denied the possibility of humanity. In other words, when Jews and Muslims were damned by Christianity, they were damned as possible humans—humans who lacked the actualization of full humanity (Christian being), but humans nevertheless. In secular capitalism, on the other hand, the form of actualization is no longer Christian being but a more generalized human being—one that is denied to blackness, to the position of the slave, as such. The damnation of Christian power is thus inherited, and qualitatively intensified, through the positioning of blackness by secular power as that which is denied even the possibility of human being. [44] This passage "forward," while a qualitative intensification, did not have the effect of leaving Christianity behind. On the contrary, secular anti-black racialization was able to be "retroactively" applied by Christianity to the subjects of its domination. This is evident, for instance, in the case of the Moriscos (Muslims baptized as part of their forced conversion to Christianity). As Ramón Grosfoguel observes, "Despite the Christian church prohibition to enslave Christians and people baptized as Christian," after the historical establishment of anti-blackness "Moriscos were massively enslaved in Granada" (Grosfoguel 2013: 85). In other words, a position that Christianity had prohibited or saved from enslavement was, in view of a consequent anti-blackness, subjected to the violence of such anti-blackness. [45] The argument that I am advancing must be made precise. It is not that the violence of anti-blackness was already articulated by Christianity, such that the position of blackness was the mere extension of a position here exemplified by the Moriscos. This cannot be the case, since Christianity had already positioned Moriscos so as to be saved from enslavement. Nor is the point that the position of Moriscos, after enslavement, became analogous to the position of blackness—unlike blacks, Moriscos have the capacity to narrate enslavement as the loss of a prior being-saved from enslavement. The point is simply that once anti-blackness is articulated, Christianity does not mitigate—much less refuse—such violence. On the contrary, it renders such violence operable within its own logic. In this sense, Christian damnation recognizes the anti-blackness operative under secular capitalism as its own heir, as a violence whose qualitative intensification remains something that Christianity is able to recognize and claim as its own. [46] Christianity's readiness to recognize and claim this violence as its own demonstrates its ultimate commensurability with the anti-black violence of secular capitalism. To attend to this commensurability is to understand that the limits of any Christian humanitarianism—when posed as a possible ally in combating anti-blackness—stem from (intrinsic) logical operation rather than from (extrinsic) historical conjuncture. This is to say, for instance, that an abolitionist claim motivated by Christian humanitarianism is contradictory at essence. In fact, even to grant such contradictions of intention is already too generous: if Christianity is ultimately commensurable with anti-blackness, then such a call for abolition is the capture of antagonism toward anti-blackness by means of the (redemptive) possibility of human being or freedom. It reproductively modulates the anti-black world through the possibility of emancipation—a possibility that is already narratively inscribed within Christian salvation as the redemption from sin, or debt. And debt remains a matter of inheritance. [47] The logic of inheritance is meant to emphasize not only the undividedness of Christian power and secular power, of Christian being and secular being, but also the means by which this world makes (and continuously remakes) the division between being and non-being: kinship. This is to follow Hortense J. Spillers' argument concerning the central role played by (the denial of) kinship in anti-blackness. She remarks, for instance, that this establishment is one in which kinship, in terms of blackness, "loses meaning, since it can be invaded at any given and arbitrary moment by property relations" (Spillers 1987: 74). Blackness is subjected to a violence, enacted in slavery, from which kinship saves. Hence it is not just blackness, but also the possibility of kinship within or for blackness, that is subjected to expurgation: "under conditions of captivity, the offspring of the female does not 'belong' to the mother, nor is s/he 'related' to the 'owner,' though the latter 'possesses' it, and in the African-American instance, often fathered it, and, as often, without whatever benefit of patrimony" (Spillers 1987: 74). The gratuitous violence to which blackness becomes subject, then, is both brought about by and reproduced as the denial of kinship. [48] It is this violence, this uninheritability, that remains unthought in Lazzarato and thereby marks the commensurability of his analysis of debt with the anti-black world. As I have argued, his focus on the asymmetry of the creditor-debtor relation remains within the domain of being, and thus his account of the capitalist inheritance of Christianity fails to address the damnation marked by non-being. This means that even as he rightly articulates capitalism as the power to make being, he evades the central means of this making: not the power of debt that forecloses the freedom of being, but the power of kinship that denies blackness.[28] [49] Blackness is denied the capacity to inherit, whereas whiteness, no matter how exploited, still possesses this capacity—in fact, to be white is to inherit capacity as such. Making the same point, but from another angle, this is to say that blackness is subject to and imaginable in terms of enslavement precisely because kinship—the capacity for or inheritance of which defines one as something, and particularly as something that cannot simply be treated in terms of non-being—is already defined in terms of whiteness. It is not only that the experience of slavery deprives blackness of kinship, it is also that blackness is subjected to this experience of slavery precisely because kinship, as that which precludes such subjection, is already articulated as whiteness.[29]

**George Jackson votes neg. It’s not becoming, it’s a confrontation with non-being. In fact, so is Deleuze. This card is amazing.**

**Barber 16** [Daniel Colucciello Barber, PHD in religious studies from Duke University, Fellow at ICI Berlin, “The Creation of Non-Being,” Rhizomes issue 29, sections 50-59] \*edited for gendered language

[50] Given this adumbration of the logic of inheritance, non-being may be recapitulated—in a sense irreducible to Deleuze's strictly conceptual articulation, and in accordance with Afro-Pessimism's analysis of the forceful negativity of blackness—as that which is without the kinship of being or the being of kinship.[30] One consequence of this approach is the reformulation of control societies in terms of George Jackson's analysis of "captive society" (Jackson 1994: 4), the elaboration of which draws upon the indications of Michelle Koerner's "Line of Escape."[31] Conceiving control according to captivity has the analytic advantage of foregrounding anti-blackness in a way that control does not: a slave society is also a captive society, and so to speak of control according to captivity is to speak of the perdurance of anti-blackness in the contemporaneity of control. Whereas control may be reduced to debt, and thus to the supposed universality of the indebted ~~man~~, the insistence on captivity breaks this universality through a position bound not to debt—the we of anti-black social life—but to gratuitous violence. [51] If contemporary social life is constituted through what Jackson calls "neo-slavery,"[32] then any public space for mediating conflicts, much less any state as a space for mediating the representation of (conflictual) people, is inadequate to social antagonism. As Koerner puts it, "Jackson asserts that, despite the theatrics of representational democracy, the function of the state in 'captive society' is not exactly a political function but a policing one. The state here emerges not as the site of political power but as a weapon" (Koerner 2011: 167). Police violence, as the weapon constitutive of captive society, thus indicates a violence logically prior to any public. The gratuity of such violence can be analyzed only insofar as it is connected to the violence of a slavery that – contrary to the progressive aspirations of a public—has not ended. [52] To observe this point is to redouble the refusal of any secular frame that purports to be distinct from Christian theological violence.[33] This is because the inadequacy of the public sphere or the state is fundamentally an inadequacy of the secular. After all, both the public sphere and the state are imagined by or as the secular, which presents itself as a space of neutrality (at least in principle) for the mediation of conflicts. The secular claims this capacity for mediation insofar as it defines itself as fundamentally distinct from religion, which in turn is defined as the cause of the violence that sabotages the neutrality of secular space. As I have argued, however, secular capitalism should be understood as undivided from Christianity. This means that the secular, while correct in its claim that religion—specified as Christian damnation—is an index of violence, uses this very claim to disavow its own perpetuation and qualitative intensification of such gratuitous violence via anti-blackness. [53] Against the world's gratuitous violence, there is no means of mediation, no space of reasons. As Koerner remarks, "Power, in the terms of Jackson's analysis, is essentially predatory. And it is for this reason that Jackson conceptualizes the forces of resistance in 'captive society' in terms of escape and, above all, running" (Koerner 2011: 168). She observes that **one of Deleuze's central concepts, the "line of flight," is essentially a gloss on Jackson's writing.** "Jackson's name – always accompanied by the refrain, 'I may run, but all the while that I am, I'll be looking for a stick'—appears" in three of Deleuze's texts, and, "In each instance, Jackson's line announces the idea that 'escape is revolutionary'" (Koerner 2011: 160**). Escape, however, cannot be separated from antagonism:** "a line of flight composes itself as a search for a weapon" (Koerner 2011: 161). I contend that the connection between escape and weaponization, which remains indeterminate in Deleuze, should be addressed via the distinction between control and captivity: under conditions of control, flight may remain an imaginable possibility; under conditions of captivity, the stakes of such flight involve the end of the possibility of this world. Knowledge Never Inherited [54] The question of escape, or Deleuze's "line of flight," thus becomes a different matter when under the pressure of the Afro-Pessimist analysis, elaborated here in terms of inheritance. Captivity is not a space within the world, but the world itself; as the world is the very inheritance of being, the line of flight is less a matter of escape than a matter of knowing – without inheritance—to antagonize being as such. Escape, then, is not the (ultimately inextinguishable) appearance of a freedom of being. It is instead the (intrinsic) vertigineity of non-being.[34] The operations of the force immanent to this vertiginous non-being are indexed at an epistemic (rather than ontological) register: non-being's absence, its incommensurability with any being, entails its essential enactment as a knowledge that is antagonistic toward conversion. [55] **Conversion, in its specifically Christian formulation, was marked by a turn toward the salvific, transcendent being of Christ**. The term may be defined, within the logic of inheritance, as the act of turning toward any being that claims to save (and thus indebt), and that in doing so claims, more basically and by sovereign presumption, the power to damn. To be damned can be understood at the level of names, or in terms of what Louis Althusser famously conceived as "interpellation." In his account, he named interpellation—literally—in terms of conversion. Koerner cites the key passage, in which Althusser says of "the hailed individual"that "By this mere one-hundred-and-eighty degree physical conversion, he becomes a subject" (Althusser 2001: 118; Koerner 2011: 171). [56] Koerner cites this passage because it is the police who do such hailing, and whose doing so provides an Althusserian script for the occasion of Jackson's flight. Yet in contrast to Althusser's emphasis on naming as ideological, Jackson's being-named puts him under the gun, subject to a violence that exceeds any analogy between himself and that from which he runs—gratuity is, by definition, without the measure of analogy.[35] In other words, the conversion to which Jackson is subjected is not a scene whereby he is confronted with and constituted by an ideological name; it is a scene in which he is bound to an intensified modality of violence that is inseparable from his namability as non-being.[36] [57] Jackson does not turn around or convert: he knows that he is being named, or damned—in this instance, unlike a purely "ideological" subject, it amounts to the same thing—by captive society's police; he knows that on the basis of this conversion, this "mere one-hundred-and-eighty degree" turn, he is subject to gratuitous predation. **Jackson's communicability is Jackson's capture.** His antagonism has no name on which to base itself, for the only name it has is already damned. To not convert—to not turn around, to not have a name, to not communicate—is non-being. Yet \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ knows this. And this knowledge, while baseless rather than a basis, while negative rather than affirmative—an enactment of non-being rather than a conversion toward being-something—is real. [58] Such immanence of non-being and knowledge, or "gnosis," is incommensurable with the inheritance of being.[37] The inheritance of being is imposed, whether through Christ or the police, by external means. Yet gnosis is knowledge without inheritance, knowledge that is not acquired or possessed but rather baselessly enacted.[38] In this sense, gnosis is not a matter of what Sharpe critically describes as a narrative "in which readable progress is proximity to whiteness, and where both come to signify as a gift, as (positive) inheritance" (Sharpe 2010: 13). Gnosis is without need of any gift of being, any grace of inheritance. [59] Jackson's knowledge enacts itself as knowledge of uninheritability.[39] Such knowledge has nothing to do with being transcendent or prior to genealogy. It immanently enacts non-being as negativity toward the given inheritance of slaveness. As Jackson remarks: "When I revolt slavery dies with me. I refuse to pass it down" (Jackson 1994: 250; Koerner 2011: 157). When he "refuse[s] to pass it down," Jackson refuses every alternative possibility, every being-something or being-otherwise, of inheritance: non-being against the being of kinship and the kinship of being

**Deleuze can be misread**

**DnG’s project hasn’t been neutral. The Israeli military state reads Deleuze and Guattari, and use the tactics that they criticize. This proves that no reading of any text is neutral. Theory and practice connect in all sorts of unpredictable ways, which often turn violent. This is one more reason why the ballot needs to directly concern itself with its orientation to structures of black suffering**

**Dean 16** [Jodi Dean, professor of Political Science at Hobart and William Smith Colleges NY, “Why the Israeli Army Loves Deleuze,” http://jdeanicite.typepad.com/i\_cite/2006/09/why\_the\_israeli.html, 9/26/06]

Fascinating link from a former student. Excerpts here, but read the whole thing: frieze. Naveh, a retired Brigadier-General, directs the Operational Theory Research Institute, which trains staff officers from the IDF and other militaries in ‘operational theory’ – defined in military jargon as somewhere between strategy and tactics. He summed up the mission of his institute, which was founded in 1996: ‘We are like the Jesuit Order. We attempt to teach and train soldiers to think. […] We read Christopher Alexander, can you imagine?; we read John Forester, and other architects. We are reading Gregory Bateson; we are reading Clifford Geertz. Not myself, but our soldiers, our generals are reflecting on these kinds of materials. We have established a school and developed a curriculum that trains “operational architects”.’4 In a lecture Naveh showed a diagram resembling a ‘square of opposition’ that plots a set of logical relationships between certain propositions referring to military and guerrilla operations. Labelled with phrases such as ‘Difference and Repetition – The Dialectics of Structuring and Structure’, ‘Formless Rival Entities’, ‘Fractal Manoeuvre’, ‘Velocity vs. Rhythms’, ‘The Wahabi War Machine’, ‘Postmodern Anarchists’ and ‘Nomadic Terrorists’, they often reference the work of Deleuze and Guattari. War machines, according to the philosophers, are polymorphous; diffuse organizations characterized by their capacity for metamorphosis, made up of small groups that split up or merge with one another, depending on contingency and circumstances. (Deleuze and Guattari were aware that the state can willingly transform itself into a war machine. Similarly, in their discussion of ‘smooth space’ it is implied that this conception may lead to domination.) I asked Naveh why Deleuze and Guattari were so popular with the Israeli military. He replied that ‘several of the concepts in A Thousand Plateaux became instrumental for us […] allowing us to explain contemporary situations in a way that we could not have otherwise. It problematized our own paradigms. Most important was the distinction they have pointed out between the concepts of “smooth” and “striated” space [which accordingly reflect] the organizational concepts of the “war machine” and the “state apparatus”. In the IDF we now often use the term “to smooth out space” when we want to refer to operation in a space as if it had no borders. […] Palestinian areas could indeed be thought of as “striated” in the sense that they are enclosed by fences, walls, ditches, roads blocks and so on.’5 When I asked him if moving through walls was part of it, he explained that, ‘In Nablus the IDF understood urban fighting as a spatial problem. [...] Travelling through walls is a simple mechanical solution that connects theory and practice.’6 To understand the IDF’s tactics for moving through Palestinian urban spaces, it is necessary to understand how they interpret the by now familiar principle of ‘swarming’ – a term that has been a buzzword in military theory since the start of the US post cold War doctrine known as the Revolution in Military Affairs. The swarm manoeuvre was in fact adapted, from the Artificial Intelligence principle of swarm intelligence, which assumes that problem-solving capacities are found in the interaction and communication of relatively unsophisticated agents (ants, birds, bees, soldiers) with little or no centralized control. The swarm exemplifies the principle of non-linearity apparent in spatial, organizational and temporal terms. The traditional manoeuvre paradigm, characterized by the simplified geometry of Euclidean order, is transformed, according to the military, into a complex fractal-like geometry. The narrative of the battle plan is replaced by what the military, using a Foucaultian term, calls the ‘toolbox approach’, according to which units receive the tools they need to deal with several given situations and scenarios but cannot predict the order in which these events would actually occur.7 Naveh: **‘**Operative and tactical commanders depend on one another and learn the problems through constructing the battle narrative; **[…] action becomes knowledge, and knowledge becomes action.** […] Without a decisive result possible, the main benefit of operation is the very improvement of the system as a system.’8 This may explain the fascination of the military with the spatial and organizational models and modes of operation advanced by theorists such as Deleuze and Guattari. Indeed, as far as the military is concerned, urban warfare is the ultimate Postmodern form of conflict. Belief in a logically structured and single-track battle-plan is lost in the face of the complexity and ambiguity of the urban reality. Civilians become combatants, and combatants become civilians. Identity can be changed as quickly as gender can be feigned: the transformation of women into fighting men can occur at the speed that it takes an undercover ‘Arabized’ Israeli soldier or a camouflaged Palestinian fighter to pull a machine-gun out from under a dress. For a Palestinian fighter caught up in this battle, Israelis seem ‘to be everywhere: behind, on the sides, on the right and on the left. How can you fight that way?’9 ... In addition to these theoretical positions, Naveh references such canonical elements of urban theory as the Situationist practices of dérive (a method of drifting through a city based on what the Situationists referred to as ‘psycho-geography’) and détournement (the adaptation of abandoned buildings for purposes other than those they were designed to perform). These ideas were, of course, conceived by Guy Debord and other members of the Situationist International to challenge the built hierarchy of the capitalist city and break down distinctions between private and public, inside and outside, use and function, replacing private space with a ‘borderless’ public surface. References to the work of Georges Bataille, either directly or as cited in the writings of Tschumi, also speak of a desire to attack architecture and to dismantle the rigid rationalism of a postwar order, to escape ‘the architectural strait-jacket’ and to liberate repressed human desires. In no uncertain terms, education in the humanities – often believed to be the most powerful weapon against imperialism – is being appropriated as a powerful vehicle for imperialism. The military’s use of theory is, of course, nothing new – a long line extends all the way from Marcus Aurelius to General Patton.

**Their message may appear sincere, but we can’t know that they aren’t secretly the Israeli War Machine. This is the plight of becoming in an age of supposed transparency.**

**Stohl, Stohl and Leonardi 16** (Cynthia Stohl, Professor in the Communication department at the University of California Santa Barbara, Michael Stohl, Dean of communication at UCSB, and Paul M. Leonardi, Professor of technology management at UCSB, “Managing Opacity: Information Visibility and the Paradox of Transparency in the Digital Age,” International Journal of Communicationvol. 10 pg. 123-137) \*edited for ablest language

To argue, theoretically, that information visibility is tantamount to transparency, as many observers do, is to hold, empirically, that information is available, is approved for dissemination, and is easily accessible to third parties. On its face, such an argument makes good sense. If just one of those attributes of visibility is missing, or exists at low levels, third parties cannot ~~see~~ information, and, consequently, they will be unable to reconstruct the decision path that an organization followed or the outcomes of past decisions. In short, **there will be no transparency**. This traditionally proposed relationship between visibility and transparency is illustrated in Figure 1, in which varying levels of visibility are placed on the x axis and varying degrees of transparency are placed on the y axis. As the figure illustrates, the traditional view of the relationship between visibility and transparency is linear: More visibility results in greater transparency. Visibility Figure 1. Theorizing the relationship between visibility and transparency. It is also possible, however, that the relationship between visibility and transparency can be curvilinear, such that **the more visibility** **you have, the less transparency—more opacity—is achieved.** This effect is illustrated in Figure 1 by the “proposed relationship” line. In other words, what we propose is a **transparency paradox**. Increasing the **availability**, **approval**, and **accessibility of information**, which makes it **more visible**, can have the **paradoxical effect** of making **decision-making** paths in **organizations** more **opaque** rather than more **transparent**. In his 1934 play, The Rock, T. S. Eliot presciently asked, “**Where is the knowledge we have lost in information?**” Whether we use the predigital lens of Eliot or the high-definition lenses of today, his question raises the specter of the transparency paradox. Visibility may produce a flood of information, drowning us in a sea of unstructured and boundless data that overwhelms our cognitive and interpretive capabilities, and hence renders information meaningless or confusing and opaque. Considering the practical as well as theoretical implications of decoupling visibility from transparency, we suggest two possible paths by which greater levels of availability, approval, and accessibility of information may lead to less rather than more transparency: inadvertent and strategic opacity. Inadvertent Opacity: Information Hides in Plain Sight The first path by which high levels of visibility and transparency become decoupled is when increasing the attributes of visibility produces such great quantities of information that important pieces of information become inadvertently hidden in the detritus of information made visible—that is, the information hides in plain sight. This unintended or inadvertent opacity results from the lack of informational, temporal, or structural boundaries that typically have been in place to manage the flow of information. In these cases, the necessary information is available, approved, and accessible, but it is **rendered meaningless** because of recipients’ cognitive limitations—or what has traditionally been labeled **information overload** (Toffler, 1970) or interpretive blinders (~~see~~ Bazerman & Chugh, 2006 for a discussion of why people may not ~~see~~ what is put before them). Of course, it may not only be the limited capacities of receivers that render information opaque. Opacity may result from the interpretative propensities of message receivers who **may reshape and adapt information** in ways quite distinct from the intended meaning. Moreover, organizations certainly cannot control what a message means for recipients (Christensen & Cornelissen, 2011). The porous boundaries and affordances of **digital media** have widely expanded the possibilities for making **huge amounts of information** available, approved, and accessible for mass audiences and inadvertently **hidden or opaque.** The abilities afforded by the digital environment to access, process, and transmit information to mass audiences with little extra effort (or cost) through e-mail blasts, repetitive retweets, or other types of social media distribution—what we label macrotargeting—also means that many messages that would have been withheld, targeted to a select group of recipients, or sent only once because of the cost of production and transmission are now digitally disseminated to very large numbers of people and often repeated in multiple waves of messages. Whether the information indexes intentions, actions, and/or decisions, recipients may or may not be interested in this information, they may be unfamiliar with the source of the message or focused on other things, and/or they may represent an irrelevant or inappropriate audience for the information. Thus, the message is ignored. Furthermore, individuals who do not perceive the source or the message(s) to be relevant or interesting enough to access initially or open and process the information once may very well treat the unexpected information as junk mail or spam and immediately delete or ignore it. Furthermore, recipients of the messages may experience information fatigue, so that they ignore almost all messages regardless of their relevance or importance. As several scholars have noted, when exposure to too much information and technologies begins to predominate the communication landscape, individuals tend to shut down and cease processing both relevant and irrelevant, high-priority as well as low-priority messages (~~see~~ Edmunds & Morris, 2000). Strategic Opacity: Hiding Information in Plain Sight Strategic opacity is at the core of the second path of decoupling visibility and transparency. Actors who wish to keep certain information hidden from view but who are bound by transparency regulations or norms can **produce opacity** by strategically increasing the availability, approval, and accessibility of information. In these cases, so much information is visible that unimportant pieces of information will take so much time and effort to sift through that **receivers will be distracted from the central information** the actor wishes to conceal. By strategically producing opacity, an actor can hide information in plain sight such that they are still appearing to comply with expectations for transparency. And this is not necessarily problematic. As Eisenberg notes in his seminal work on strategic ambiguity (1984), conforming to transparency expectations also may alienate constituencies and prevent meaningful dialogue. Opacity, vagueness, and even misdirection can foster cohesion and identity among organizational stakeholders. Strategic opacity through the manipulation of the attributes of visibility is not dependent upon digital technologies, although their development has certainly enhanced possibilities. In digital terms, strategic opacity is steganography cover writing, or what the IT community calls stego—the art of hiding information inside of information so that the recipient does not detect the presence of other messages present (Porter, 2013). As discussed earlier, the affordances of digital media enable organizations to send a very large set of messages to mass audiences cheaply and quickly (macrotargeting). These same capabilities also enable easy and cheap audience segmentation and provide the opportunity for what we label microtargeting—strategic and sequential data presentation that makes information available, approved for access, and accessible while enabling greater opacity in the guise of visibility. For example, digital media provides the opportunity to craft special briefings of information and strategically chosen frames prior to collective macro-announcements in ways that were not possible before. Similar to the temporal effect found in information cascades (Chierichetti, Kleinberg, & Panconesim, 2014), **these** messages help shape how future information will be encoded, stored, retrieved, and acted upon, and **they** provide opportunities to increase the opacity of seemingly transparent messages. When the macro-announcement with its much fuller information set and more neutral framing arrives, the previously targeted **audiences are less likely to fully investigate**/interrogate the material, because they already “know” what is being presented. Thus, organizations have the capacity to not only tailor messages in a strategic way (message processes) but introduce the information in various **strategically chosen frames that help shape how future information will be encoded**, stored, retrieved, and processed, providing the opportunity to increase the opacity of seemingly transparent messages. Conclusion Digital transformations have made possible rapidly expanding sources and dissemination of information and ever greater capabilities for storage, retrieval, and processing of that information. We have argued that it is the combination of the availability of information, the approval to disseminate, and the accessibility of the information in the context of organizational settings and purpose that illustrates the complex relationship between visibility and transparency and their effects on understanding and utilizing the information. We have explored the individual and interactive importance of each of these three attributes and how understanding these mechanisms enables disentangling visibility from transparency. Finally, we have uncovered the transparency paradox, explaining how **opacity can result even when all three attributes of visibility operate at high levels**. The transparency paradox goes beyond the idea that when there is an abundance of information available, it is often difficult to obtain useful, relevant information. The transparency paradox indicates that availability, accessibility, and approval of information need to be managed to produce not only visibility but effective use of that information. **The** **transparency paradox raises important questions for scholars and practitioners interested in open decision making and deliberative democracy.** There are many other mechanisms and dynamics of inadvertent and strategic opacity beyond macro- and microtargeting that need to be explored. Understanding these mechanisms will increase our ability to unpack the relationship between and management of visibility and transparency. For example, what are the information minimums and maximums for (a) effective decision making, (b) effective monitoring of organizational conduct, or even (c) being well informed about the issues and choices? What are the unintended consequences of greater availability, approval, and accessibility? Further investigation of the trade-offs among the three attributes of visibility is required both to produce more effective and visible organizational processes and decisions and to understand how organizations may manipulate their presentation of information in the information age as regulations, norms, and capacities continue to change.

**A discussion of race should acknowledge the real, that which cannot be represented in language. This inexpressible history should be interrogated through a paradigmatic analysis. Otherwise, becoming is just democratic hedonism.**

**Spillers 96** [Hortense J. Spillers is the Gertrude Conaway Vanderbilt Professor of English at Vanderbilt University, "All the Things You Could Be by Now If Sigmund Freud's Wife Was Your Mother": Psychoanalysis and Race, Critical Inquiry, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Summer, 1996), pp. 713-14, Published by: The University of Chicago Press]

A break toward the potentiality of becoming, or the formation of substitutive identities, consists in going beyond what is given; it is also the exceeding of necessity. While this gesture toward a theory of the tran- scendent is deeply implicated in the passage and itinerary of modern philosophy and the Cartesian subject, it is not so alien to the narratives and teachings of overcoming long associated not only with native tradi- tions of philosophy in the lifeworld (via the teachings of **the Christian church**) but **entirely consonant with the democratic principles on which the U.S. was founded** (though immensely simplified in the discourses of liberal democracy). But the resonance that I would rely on here is less dependent on a narrative genealogy, whose plot line culminates in an epiphany of triumph, than on a different relation to the "Real," where I would situate the politics and the reality of"race." Even though it is fairly clear that "race" can be inflected (and should be) through the Lacanian dimensions, its face as an aspect of the "Real" brings to light its most persistent perversity. In Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen's reading of Lacan's "lin- guisteries," the "real" is said to be "'pure and simple,' 'undifferentiated,' . . . 'without fissure,"' and "'always in the same place"' (L, p. 192). As these Lacanian assertions seem to match precisely the mythical behavior of "race," or of any "myth today,"3 they pointedly refer to the situation of the subject of enunciation his or her own most "Real," or the status quo. In the classical narratives of psychoanalytic theory, the status quo, the standing pat, does not by error open onto death's corridor, inasmuch as it freezes and fixes subjectivity in a status permanently achieved. The outcome breezes by us in the very notion of status, with its play on statue, sto, stant, and so on. In this sense, overcoming is the cancellation of what is given. Borch-Jacobsen offers this explanation: "Thus language, the manifestation of the negativity of the subject who posits himself by negat- ing (himself as) the Real, works the miracle of manifesting what is not; the tearing apart, the ek-sistence, and the perpetual self-overtaking that 'is' the subject who speaks himself in everything by negating everything" (L, p. 193). "Speaking" here is both process and paradigm to the extent that signifying enables the presence of an absence and registers the ab- sence of a presence, but it is also a superior mark of the transformative, insofar as it makes something by cutting th-rough the "pure and simple" of the "undifferentiated" in the gaps and spacings of signifiers. **If potenti- ality, then, can be said to be the site of the human, rather than the nonhu- man, fixedness**; more precisely, **if it is the "place" of the subjectivity, the condition of being/becoming subject, then its mission is to un- fold through "words, words, words**" (L, p. 193), yes, but"words, words, words" as they lead us out to the re-presentational where the subject **com- mences its journey in the looking glass of the symbolic**. Thus, to represent a self through masks of self-negation is to take on the work of discovering where one "is at" the subject led back to his signifying dependence. Freud had thought a different idea bringing unconsciousness under the domination of the preconscious while La- can, Freud's post-Saussurean poet, revised the idea as the "mapped" "network of signifiers" brought into existence at the place where the sub- ject was, has always been: "'Wo es war, soll Ich werden."'4 We could speak of this process as the subject making its mark through the transitivity of reobjectivations, the silent traces of desire on which the object of the sub- ject hinges. This movement across an interior space demarcates the disci- pline of self-reflection, or the content of a self-interrogation that "race" always covers over as an already-answered. But for oneself another ques- tion is posed: What might I become, insofar as . . . ? To the extent that "I" "signs" itself"elsewhere," represents itselfbeyond the given, the onus of becoming boomerangs 5 Ralph Ellison's word as it rebounds on the one putting the question. But what impedes the function of the question?

**Democracy**

**Democracy is not benign, but rather an extension of civil society that is used to legitimize anti-black violence**

**Sexton and Lee 06** [Jared Sexton, African American Studies Program, University of California, Irvine, CA, USA, Elizabeth Lee, Department of Geography, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada, “Figuring the Prison: Prerequisites of Torture at Abu Ghraib”, Editorial Board of Antipode, page 1013-1014]//MHELLIE

The rituals of torture exposed at Abu Ghraib—staged events both reckless and deliberate, a whole theatrics of humiliation, terror, sexual degradation—provide, not contradiction or hypocrisy, but the necessary counterpart to the “American” principles of democracy, dignity, and freedom; what Zizek calls “the obscene underside of U.S. popular culture ... the disavowed beliefs, suppositions and obscene practices we pretend not to know about, even though they form the background of our public values” (Zizek 2004).11 In this sense, what the notorious images of frivolous brutality circulating throughout the global media environment evoke, however obliquely, is the ambient combat, and the attendant culture of authoritarianism, that operates without direct announcement and acknowledgment within the United States as an affirmation of its birthright in and as a slave society.12 This ancient internal warfare is foundational and constitutive; the primary division of humanity it enables launches the syntax of western modernity, the state(s) of democratic citizenship, the promise and compromise of civil society—not the division between the exploiters and the exploited or the rich and the poor, but rather the free and the enslaved, subject and object, person and property (Barrett 2006). The obscene underside of the popular culture, the “repression, torture, and sexual coercion that constitute the underbelly of a particular version of democracy, which has achieved dominance in the world” (Davis 2004:45), and the myriad peculiar institutions of social incarceration it has engendered, is the most intimate possession of black existence in the US—from the political and libidinal economies of chattel slavery (still determinate in current affairs despite wishful thinking from all quarters) to the official endorsements of institutionalized lynching (practices commandeered in recent generations by the proper authorities) and the codification of Jim Crow segregation (whose revival cancels apace the detours thrown up by the modern Civil Rights Movement) to the formation of the urban ghetto (which retains its powers of quarantine even in the aftermath of the “long hot summers” and the short flight of a fragile black lumpen bourgeoisie) to the rise of the modern day prison (whose ghastly presence supplies the hallmark of the so-called post-civil rights era) (Nast 2000).

**The idea you need a democratic telos to sustain life is fundamentally wrong as the violence of power relations is unchecked. Yet society is still able to continue.**

**Wilderson ’10** {Frank; Associate Professor of African-American Studies at UC Irvine and has a Ph.D. from UC Berkeley; “Red, White & Black: Cinema and the Structure of U.S. Antagonisms,”}/MR

The sentence of death is selfreferential, for it need not specify who ordered and adjudged it—the state, or “the people” of Georgia? —and it is under no obligation to name either the defendant, the manner of death, the crime and its character, the authorities, or the date and time of death. It is as though these specifications are not only as extradiegetic and asynchronic to the death walk as the voice over itself, but appear to be also timeless, generic, and ubiquitous, placing them beyond the limits of civil society, that is, **beyond the populist and democratic interventions of both its minions and its representatives, locked, as they are, in the wit ness room of the death chamber. The voice over alerts us to the immanence of the state’s command and control. The disembodied voice and the circuitous logic of the sentence mark yet another symptom of the postindustrial withering away of civil society. “The democratic and/or disciplinary institutions of civil society, the channels of social mediation, as a particular form of the organization of social labor, have declined and been displaced from the center of the scene. Not the State** [the prison, the death chamber, the violence], **but civil societ**y [the home, the commons, the machinations of hegemony and its attendant institutionality] **has withered away**. . . . **The social conditions necessary for civil society no longer exist.” “The society we are living in today is more properly understood as a postcivil society**.”12 **The voice over’s self-referential justification for violence, and the cavalier way in which the formal strategies of the execution sequence, and so much of the film, imagine no need for the state to display itself ethically for the idea of “justice” to emanate from the image track** (be it the robed spectacle of a judge, or the common, civil, spectacle of a jury) mark cinema’s late twentieth - and e**arly twenty first century embrace of postcivil society’s ethical dilemmas and its articulation of certain ontological touchstones of cohesion, namely, political economy’s crisis of space and temporality, a crisis of the comm**ons. But Monster’s Ball pushes the envelope of this proletarian crisis more deliberately than do metacommentaries on the proletarian themselves. The film’s formal cinematic strategies—here the disembodied voice over—suggest that **state power, which is to say state violence, exists in excess even to the embodied authority of the prison guards and their uniforms**. Lawrence Musgrove is about to be executed, but it is Sonny’s and Hank’s death walk to which the film’s formal strategies cathect us most. It is the horrific trauma of civil society, not simply the trauma of its withering away, as Hardt and Negri would have it, but of Hardt’s and Negri’s nightmare in full bloom, that interpellates our anxiety. We are engrossed in the drama that positions White men at the site of a double lack.13 We are not engrossed in or inter - pellated by the anxiety of Lawrence Musgrove, who is not only suffering via the grammar of postcivil society but is also about to stop breathing. His dilemmas seem reasonable, banal, and unremarkable. The double lack, then, is coded White: the voice over not only lords its disembodied violence and authority over Sonny and Hank but, by way of intellectual montage, the cross cut to the witness room, over a diverse ensemble of civil society’s institutional representatives. In this the montage cuts between one death walk and another: from Sonny and Hank to the press, the clergy, the elected representative, those place holders of the “intellectual function” formerly emblematic—in a Gramscian milieu of civil society—of a vibrant commons and a contested institutionality that stood in cartographic distinction (and sometimes revolutionary opposi tion) to the violent command and control modalities of the state which Gramsci called “political society” (police, prison, army).14 Here, in the cross cutting montage from an omnipotent state “voice,” the organizers of hegemony are herded into the death chamber’s witness room by the same disembodied authority to which they now, in Negri’s and Hardt’s postcivil dispensation, have as little access to and as little agency in the face of, as Hank and Sonny Grotowski, two lowly proletarians. Capital has incarcerated workers together with their organizers of, and capacity for, hegemonic struggle, those “processes [or that institutionality] . . . variously conceived as education, training, or discipline.” It has incarcerated them in the command and control cartography of its selfreferential violence and curtailed the possibility of “active engagement with social forces . . . within the context of institutions. What has come to an end . . . in postcivil society . . . [are the] functions of mediation or education and the institutions that gave them form.” “The State today has moved beyond Hegel and his dialectic, not limiting but perfecting state rule.”15 **If the private and quotidian of civil society has been deterritorialized by the force of violence** (the home subsumed by the prison), **so too has the publicly acknowledged of civil society, the commons, been deterritorialized. Incarcerated in the witness room behind the glass of the execution chamber, without the capacity for speech, the symbolic representatives of civil society**, assembled to observe Lawrence Musgrove’s death, are literally in no position to act as either a check on, or balance against, the extradiegetic voice over which we hear while watching Musgrove and company on his death walk. **The voice over’s circuitous (il)logic signifies a virtual thumbing of the nose at the authority of civil society’s symbolic representatives and, therefore, at any socially transformative optimism which had, in eras gone by, accrued to those representatives and their in stitutions within civil society**.16 That optimism can be traced historically from Gramsci’s writings on a hegemonic war of position in The Prison Notebooks, to wartime labor solidarity in the United States and across the globe, to the euphoria of postcolonial struggles in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, and up through New Left demands (in Paris, London, and the United States) in the 1960s and 1970s for civil society’s expansion and the intensification of its promise of access. When one considers socially engaged White cinema of the 1960s and 1970s, especially the spate of fiction films produced in the wake of the Democratic Convention in Chicago (1968), the Weathermen’s Days of Rage (1969), and the post– Kent State national student strike (1970), one ~~sees~~ how cinema of that period would lose all meaning without its faith in the power of a public voice as the linchpin of social transformation.17 **But there exists today no such optimism, no such socially transformative public voice, and no grand illusions regarding social transformation** that a film like Monster’s Ball, which engages a phenomenon as vast and social as the prison industrial complex, might embrace. Civil society as a public play and display of struggle and discontent, so alive in the sea of people surrounding Mario Savio at the University of California, Berkeley, in the public discourse surrounding the Pentagon Papers, in the rage after Kent State, and in the public indignation over Watergate, is lost on Monster’s Ball in general and on Hank Grotowski in particular. My point is this: socially engaged White cinema can no longer articulate civil society’s vast and collective ethical dilemmas. Hank Grotowski’s ethical dilemmas seem to have fallen from the status of public agent to that of the prisoner. His prototypical dilemmas, once animated by the question Where are we going? (in films like Medium Cool [1970] and Coming Home [1978]), have been crowded out by a more urgent hydraulics of questions like How do we break out? For cinema, the power to pose the questions is withering away because, as Negri and Hardt have made so clear, **civil society is withering away**. Despite this nadir of articulation and articu lateness, Monster’s Ball “knows” something more than do director Marc Forster, White feminism and film theory, and Negri and Hardt. What Monster’s Ball “knows,” in spite of directorial intentionality and in spite of Negri’s and Hardt’s textual repression and disavowal, is that this de bacle (civil society withering down past the scale of domesticity) can be neither imagined, nor thought, nor staged; that is to say, **it cannot be made coherent without the Black. The coherence of a White grammar of suffering, even the spatial and temporal deracination of a heretofore robust civil cartography** (whether the scene of a domestic commons or the scene of a public commons), cannot narrate its own devastation with out calling on the Family Thanatos, that is, without devouring the flesh of Leticia, Lawrence, and Tyrell. This is true even as the film ratchets the ethical dilemmas of civil society down a notch below domesticity, to the scale of the body. Again, throughout Monster’s Ball, civil society’s autonomous cartography, its liberated zone, is much smaller, more private and quotidian than it has ever been in the history of socially engaged White cinema. In fact, the map has been reduced to the oral zone of the mouth, through which Hank is only “free” to suck chocolate ice cream with a white plastic spoon, or, interchangeably, to suck Leticia’s vagina under white cotton sheets. The map has been reduced to the ocular zone of the eyes, through which Hank gazes as he meticulously paints the letters “L e t i c i a” on what he tells her is “our” sign above “our” gas station. **Civil society**, if it can be found at all in what Negri and Hardt call a postindustrial world, **no lon ger flourishes and assembles in the public spaces which hegemony had once territorialized as discursive** (i.e., the street, the stump, the union hall, the square, the home) **but rather finds itself under permanent lock down, deterritorialized by command, coercion, and force** (as though lost somewhere in Guantánamo, awaiting trial). **Such is the fate of civil soci ety’s organizers of hegemony, locked as they are inside the prison, in the witness room of the death chamber. The only temporal capacity left to the worker is to be found** not in a living heritage of wildcat strikes, public speeches in the square, consciousness raising meetings, and the like, but **in the simple memory of last night’s pleasures**: the taste of chocolate ice cream, the vision of a coffee colored woman’s body, the gaze on the large black font that spells her name, the touch (and taste) of cunnilingus, and the memory of penetration between her legs. **That which can still be mapped with civil society’s cartographic integrity and remembered in its historiographic integrity no longer exists** (has no guaranteed coherence) **at the scale of domesticity but rather has been reduced to the scale of corporeal integrity**. In point of fact, the scenario is even bleaker, for in Negri’s and Hardt’s postindustrial world, the body, in its reified form as “gender” and “race,” can no longer be thought of as a liberated zone, though it is still a contested zone.18 In a socius that has withered away and become a prison, the last coordinate of spatial and temporal capacity, the last sanctuary of civil society— in that it re mains (or can still be imagined as) a coherent vector of “civil” space and time—is the body. And this is something Monster’s Ball is well aware of. Hank Grotowski’s job site and his home are those spaces of work and domesticity where contingent violence is no longer guaranteed; so com plete is their postindustrial deracination that they have become vulner able to gratuitous violence. His body, however, is another matter alto - gether. Here coherence and optimism can be maintained. The body, then, of Hank Grotowski gives both radical feminism and film theory (Butler, Seshadri Crooks, Silverman, Doane, et al.) and iconoclastic Marxism (Negri and Hardt) a terrain where their assumptive logic can still resonate. The resonance, however, does not bring about an ideological, method ological, or aesthetic (or, for that matter, a conscious) suture between them. It is a rhetorical resonance (symptomatic of a structural kinship) through which all of these discourses know that even in the crisis of a postindustrial world they still have something coherent to hold on to. How, exactly, do they know what they know given the disparate nature of their discourses? How does one know that though the commons may no longer exist, there are still bodies in the world? I maintain that this knowledge of bodies, however peripheral and unconscious, is sustained through the presence of flesh.

**Economic Engagement**

**We begin our discussion of economic engagement not with <insert plan> but rather with the economic engagement that helped to shape America, the middle passage. What the affirmative has ignored is that economic engagement does not manifest itself from a desire for economic prosperity, but rather is engrained in a libidinal desire for black flesh.**

**Wilderson 10**, [Frank, Professor at UC Irvine, “Red, White, and Black: Cinema and Structure of US Antagonisms”, P. 22-8]//MHELLIE

David Eltis is emphatic in his assertion that European civil society’s decision not to hunt for slaves along the banks of the Thames or other rivers in the lands of White people or in prisons or poor houses was a bad business decision that slowed the pace of economic development in both Europe and the “New World.” Eltis writes: No Western European power after the Middle Ages crosses the basic divide separating European workers from full chattel slavery. And while serfdom fell and rose in different parts of early modern Europe and shared characteristics with slavery, serfs were not outsiders either before or after enserfment. The phrase “long distance serf trade” is an oxymoron. (1404) He goes on to show how population growth patterns in Europe during the 1300s, 1400s, and 1500s far outpaced population growth patterns in Africa. He makes this point not only to demonstrate how devastating the effect of chattel slavery was on African population growth patterns—in other words, to highlight its genocidal impact—but also **to make an equally profound but commonly overlooked point. Europe was so heavily populated that had the Europeans been more invested in the economic value of chattel slavery than they were in the symbolic value of Black slavery and hence had instituted “a properly exploited system drawing on convicts, prisoners and vagrants...[they] could easily have provided 50,000 [White slaves] a year [to the New World] without serious disruption to either international peace or the existing social institutions that generated and supervised these potential European victims**” (1407). I raise Eltis’s counterposing of the symbolic value of slavery to the economic value of slavery in order to debunk two gross misunderstandings: One is that work—or alienation and exploitation—is a constituent element of slavery. Slavery, writes Orlando Patterson, “is the permanent, violent domination of natally alienated and generally dishonored persons.”ix Patterson goes to great lengths to delink his three “constituent elements of slavery” from the labor that one is typically forced to perform when one is enslaved. The forced labor is not constitutive of enslavement because whereas it explains a common practice, it does not define the structure of the power relation between those who are slaves and those who are not. In pursuit of his “constituent elements” of slavery, a line of inquiry that helps us separate experience (events) from ontology (the capacities of power—or lack thereof—lodged within distinct and irreconcilable subject positions, e.g., Humans and Slaves), Patterson helps us denaturalize the link between force and labor, and theorize the former as a phenomena that positions a body, ontologically (paradigmatically), and the latter as a possible but not inevitable experience of someone who is socially dead.x The other misunderstanding I am attempting to correct is the notion that the profit motive is the consideration within the slaveocracy that trumps all others. David Marriott, Saidiya Hartman, Ronald Judy, Hortense Spillers, Orlando Patterson, and Achille Mbembe have gone to considerable lengths to show that, in point of fact, slavery is and connotes an ontological status for Blackness; and that the constituent elements of slavery are not exploitation and alienation but accumulation and fungibility (Hartman): the condition of being owned and traded. As these Black writers have debunked conventional wisdom pertaining to the grammar of slave suffering, so too has David Eltis provided a major corrective on the commonsense wisdom that profit was the primary motive driving the African slave trade. Eltis meticulously explains how the costs of enslavement would have been driven exponentially down had White slaves been taken en masse from European countries. Shipping costs from Europe to America were considerably lower than shipping costs from Europe to Africa and then on to America. He notes that “shipping costs...comprised by far the greater part of the price of any form of imported bonded labor in the Americas. If we take into account the time spent collecting a slave cargo on the African coast as well, then the case for sailing directly from Europe with a cargo of [Whites] appears stronger again” (1405). Eltis sums up his data by concluding that if European merchants, planters, and statesmen imposed chattel slavery on some members of their own society— say, only 50,000 White slaves per year—then not only would European civil society have been able to absorb the social consequences of these losses, in other words class warfare would have been unlikely even at this rate of enslavement, but civil society “would [also] have enjoyed lower labor costs, a faster development of the Americas, and higher exports and income levels on both sides of the Atlantic” (1422). But what Whites would have gained in economic value, they would have lost in symbolic value; and it is the latter which structures the libidinal economy of civil society. White chattel slavery would have meant that the aura of the social contract had been completely stripped from the body of the convict, vagrant, beggar, indentured servant, or child. This is a subtle point but one vital to our understanding of the relationship between the world of Blacks and the world of Humans. Even under the most extreme forms of coercion in the late Middle Ages and in the early modern period—for example, the provisional and selective enslavement of English vagrants from the early to mid-1500s to the mid-1700s—“the power of the state over [convicts in the Old World] and the power of the master over [convicts in the New World] was more circumscribed than that of the slave owner over the slave” (Eltis 1410). Marx himself takes note of the preconscious political—and, by implication, unconscious libidinal—costs to civil society, had European elites been willing to enslave Whites (Capital Vol. 1, 896-905). In fact, though widespread anti-vagabond laws of King Edward VI (1547), Queen Elizabeth (1572), King James I, and France’s Louis XVI (1777) all passed ordinances similar to Edward VI’s which proclaimed that: [I]f anyone refuses to work, he shall be condemned as a slave to the person who has denounced him as an idler. The master shall feed his slave on bread and water, weak broth and such refuse meat as he thinks fit. He has the right to force him to do any work, no matter how disgusting, with whip and chains. If the slave is absent for a fortnight, he is condemned to slavery for life and is to be branded on the forehead or back with the letter S...The master can sell him, bequeath him, let him out on hire as a slave, just as he can any other personal chattel or cattle...All persons have the right to take away the children of the vagabonds and keep them as apprentices, the young men until they are 24, the girls until they are 20. (897) These laws were so controversial, even among elites, that they could never take hold as widespread social and economic phenomena. But I am more interested in the symbolic value of Whiteness (and the absence of Blackness’s value), gleaned from a close reading of the laws themselves, than I am in a historical account of the lived experience of the White poor’s resistance to, or the White elite’s ambivalence toward, such ordinances. The actual ordinance(s) manifests the symptoms of its own internal resistance long before either parliament or the poor themselves mount external challenges to it. Symptomatic of civil society’s libidinal safety net is the above ordinance’s repeated use of the word “if.” If anyone refuses to work...if the slave is absent for a fortnight... The violence of slavery is repeatedly checked, subdued into becoming a contingent violence for that entity which is beginning to call itself “White;” at the very same moment that it is being ratcheted up to a gratuitous violence for that entity which is being called (by Whites) “Black.” All the ordinances of the 16th, 17th, and 18th centuries which Marx either quotes at length or discusses are ordinances which seem, on their face, to debunk my claim that slavery for Whites was/is experiential and that for Blacks it was/is ontological. And yet all of these ordinances are riddled with contingencies, of which frequent and unfettered deployment of the conjunction “if” is emblematic. Both Spillers and Eltis remind us that **the archive of African slavery shows no internal recognition of the libidinal costs of turning human bodies into sentient flesh. From Marx’s reports on proposed vagabond-into-slave legislation, it becomes clear that the libidinal economy of such European legislation is far too unconsciously invested in “saving” the symbolic value of the very vagabonds such laws consciously seek to enslave.** In other words, the law would rather shoot itself (that is, sacrifice the economic development of the New World) in the foot than step into a subjective void where idlers and vagabonds might find themselves without contemporaries, with no relational status to save. In this way, White-on-White violence is put in check (a) before it becomes gratuitous, or structural, before it can shred the fabric of civil society beyond mending; and (b) before conscious, predictable, and sometimes costly challenges are mounted against the legislation despite its dissembling lack of resolve. This is accomplished by the imposition of the numerous “on condition that...” and “supposing that...” clauses bound up in the word “if” and also by claims bound up in the language around the enslavement of European children: a White child may be enslaved on condition that s/he is the child of a vagabond, and then, only until the age of 20 or 24. Hortense Spillers searched the archives for a similar kind of stop-gap language with respect to the African—some indication of the African’s human value in the libidinal economy of Little Baby Civil Society. She came up as empty handed: Expecting to find direct and amplified reference to African women during the opening years of the Trade, the observer is disappointed time and again that this cultural subject is concealed beneath the overwhelming debris of the itemized account, between the lines of the massive logs of commercial enterprise [e.g., a ship’s cargo record] that overrun the sense of clarity we believed we had gained concerning this collective humiliation. (Spillers 210) It would be reassuring to say that Europeans rigorously debated the ethical implications of forcing the social death of slavery upon Africans before they went ahead with it; but, as Marx, Eltis, and Spillers make abundantly clear, it would be more accurate simply to say that African slavery did not present an ethical dilemma for global civil society. The ethical dilemmas were unthought.

**Economic Rationality**

**The notion of economic rationality is detrimental for black folks because it justifies the reduction of black bodies to a standing reserve to be exploited for profit in the name of “efficiency”.**

**Dillon 13**, [Stephen, “Fugitive Life: race, gender, and the rise of the neoliberal-carceral state”, P. 65-9]//MHELLIE

**For the slave, economic rationality possessed every moment of life’s terror and death’s release.** Liberal distinctions between the public and private, and the economic, political, and social were fabrications for the slave, illusions that depended on their erasure from the realm of the human. This erasure made possible the alchemy of the market so that with its social, economic, and discursive mechanisms, the market could transform a human being into an object and test the limits of that object’s biological life.126 In Dessa Rose, Nathan, a slave who aided in the coffle uprising, narrates the ways value, gender, race, and terror were intertwined when he describes Dessa’s punishment after she attacks her Master (captor) for murdering her lover. I seen her when she come out that sweatbox they put her in. Know what that is, Mis'es? It's a closed box they put willful darkies in, built so's you can't lie down in it or sit or stand in it. It do got a few holes in it so you can breathe, but plenty people done suffocated in em. They whipped her, put her in that, let her sweat out in the sun....They lashed her about the hips and legs, branded along the inside of her thighs...They'd just about whipped that dress off her and what hadn't been cut off her--dress, drawers, shift--was hanging around her in tatters or else stuck in them wounds. **Just from the waist down, you see, cause they didn't wanna 'impair her value**...I don't know how long they had her in that box. Her face was swolled; she was bloody and dirty, cramped from laying up in there. I didn't think she could stand up; but she did...She stood up. (my emphasis) 127 Nathan’s description apprehends the ways slavery tested the boundary between life and death, torturing the body, murdering the soul, but preserving biological life. The merger of white supremacy and the market animated the power of the sweatbox. The market and the carceral are indistinguishable in the disciplining of Dessa. Wilson’s goal in torturing Dessa was not death, “he didn’t believe in damaging goods,” rather “what he done then was mostly for show, impress the mistress with how slaves ought to be handled...He wasn’t trying to kill her.”128 Dessa’s incarceration in the sweatbox was the performative and pedagogical merging of race, terror, and the market. An assemblage that produced social and living death as it flirted with biological death. Yet, death was not the goal because the market set limits on how far white desire for pain could go. Wilson’s production of black suffering for his wife, other slaves, and himself had to be balanced with his longing for the accumulation of capital. The violence of chattel-slavery was not just driven by the need for capital; the pleasures of terror were also central to the maintenance and reproduction of the social order. But the pleasures brought on by black pain had to be balanced with the production of value. The value of the unnamed pregnant rebel’s child trumped the desire for her death; “I had been spared death till I could birth a baby the white folks wanted to keep slaved.”129 By speaking the unspeakable and remembering the forgotten, this passage shows us is that **the market was central to slavery’s carceral technologies.** The market possessed the body with a logic of accumulation, fungibility, death and determined what form punishment and discipline would take. By indexing a genealogy of the market’s relationship to the body of the slave, the work of Davis and Williams can help us understand neoliberal biopolitics in a new capacity. As capital changed from a Fordist- Keysian regime to a neoliberal regime of “flexible accumulation” in the 1970s, a number of scholars have argued that we witnessed the transition from the formal to the real subsumption of life and labor under capital.130 The 70s mark the moment when capital enveloped “life itself.” Yet, as evident in the writing of black feminists in the 70s, this process goes back to the plantation, and is informed, animated, and possessed by this past. While the economics of slavery possessed bodies and populations with its logic of accumulation and disposability, the market fatally haunted black life, tracking and managing it everywhere captives could find a moment of respite. Under chattel-slavery, the market possessed the body but also restricted, controlled, and incarcerated it. The market under slavery was a prison itself. For Dessa, freedom did not lie outside the sweatbox, off the coffle, or beyond the plantation. The carceral nature of white supremacy and the market made it so that Dessa could literally not imagine freedom; “You could scape from a master, run away, but that didn’t mean you’d scaped from slavery. I knew for myself how hard it was to find some place to go.”131 There was no place to go because everyplace was a marketplace. Smallwood writes: Those who managed [to escape] found that, here again, the most powerful force opposing their desperate efforts to return to a place of social belonging was not the physical constraint of prison walls and iron shackles, but rather the market itself.132 Smallwood, like Shakur and Williams, understands the market as a powerful extension of various technologies of capture: chains, shackles, bars, prisons, and ships. Although penal technologies were central to detaining and immobilizing captive Africans, white supremacy and the market made them slaves. Whether they burrowed under prison walls, killed a crew and overtook a ship, or quietly swam away, fugitive flesh was easily recognized as a commodity on the run. An expansive grid of captivity engendered by race and commodification meant that there was no outside to the prison of slavery.133 As Smallwood notes, “The market was everywhere, always shining a light on the captive’s ‘exchangability.”134 The market fused chattel and blackness together at the level of discourse, skin, and ontology, ensuring the mark of commodification held stronger than iron and steel. The market produced a regime of surveillance wherein black flesh became ontologically inseparable from slavery’s chattel logic. Thus, the terror of social and living death would follow captives into what was ostensibly the free world. Blackness meant slave, and the market would follow wherever commodified flesh could hide. This fabrication of blackness as ontological, as more than political, as more than the profound uneven distribution of death and dying, meant that the necropolitics of race would live on well past the “non-event of emancipation” weaving slavery and subjection into the very texture of freedom.135 Race and white supremacy carried slavery’s chattel logic into the future. Accordingly, traces of slavery’s necropolitics live on in discourse, institutionality, and ontology.

**Economic Freedom Rhetoric**

**Beware of the liberal rhetoric of neoliberal freedom. It is complicit in a systematized process of collective forgetting and erasure that allows for the creation of societies of control.**

**Dillon 13**, [Stephen, “Fugitive Life: race, gender, and the rise of the neoliberal-carceral state”, P. 153-5]//MHELLIE  
\*Edited for ablest language

**The language of neoliberal freedom does not just provide an ideological screen that obscures the unfreedom necessary to the free market**. While it produces a fantasy, its goal is not to hide a deeper truth, but rather, to create new capacities for control. Freedom, in other words, is not only ideological, but also biopolitical. The language of neoliberal freedom produces the forms of knowledge and subjectivity required for freedom to operate as a system of regulation and discipline. Freedom becomes a way of administering populations, not through the deception of a myth, but by making freedom a system of governance and management. 345 For example, Rose writes that neoliberal freedom implants “ways of calculating and managing that will make economic actors think, reckon, and behave as competitive, profit-seeking agents,” turns workers into motivated employees who will “freely strive to give their best in the work place,” and transforms “people into consumers who can choose between products.”346 In short, neoliberal freedom transforms materiality through the power of language.347 It alters desires, feelings, attitudes, and values.348 It creates subjects who manage themselves through responsibility and individuality. **Freedom is more than a discourse; it is a mechanism of biopolitical governance actualized by the power of language**. As Rose emphasizes, people and markets cannot be set free, “They have to be made free.”349 **Freedom is discipline**, a notion Friedman’s mentor Friedrich Hayek evinced when he wrote, “Man has not developed in freedom...Freedom is an artifact of civilization...Freedom was made possible by the gradual evolution of the discipline of civilization which is at the same time the discipline of freedom.”350 Hayek argues that freedom must be controlled, regulated, and managed. Regimes of power do not distort freedom and falsify subjectivity.351 Instead, **freedom and individuality are modes of subjection that look like liberation**. And as Friedman and Posner made clear, for those subjects not responsible enough to be guided by the discipline that is liberty, law and order would capture those who escaped freedom’s grasp. While I have been arguing that the language of neoliberal freedom transforms epistemology, subjectivity, and materiality, I want to extend this by arguing that the power of Friedman’s language rests within what it says, but also in the silences that act as its condition of possibility. If knowledge shapes vision, then what is forgotten shapes what we ~~see~~ as much as what we know and remember. That is, the forms of violence rendered invisible by neoliberal freedom alter materiality, and forgetting is a form of incorporeal transformation. For Deleuze and Guattari, language captures what it describes, but silence and forgetting shape what is present as well. The discourses of personal responsibility, individuality, and choice produced by Friedman necessitated the erasure of history—they effaced the enormity of the ravages and affiliations of the past and placed the weight of freedom on the actions of the individual. A new form of subjectivity and state power rested upon the forgotten and the erased. The theory of neoliberal freedom cannot exist without a willful erasure of the possessive power of the past. This is most evident in Friedman’s discussion of racial discrimination.

**Extinction**

**Their extinction impacts are terminally non-unique: the world ended for people of color in 1492 when the slave trade began with the new world. Their utilitarian impact calculus does not consider the way in which African culture was obliterated in the middle passage, or the ways in which the effects of nuclear fallout such as water pollution and a lack of resources plague impoverished communities daily.**

**Omolade 84**, [Barbara, Historian of black women at City College Center in New York, “Women of Color and the Nuclear Holocause; Women’s Studies Quarterly, Vol. 12, No. 2”, P. 12]//MHELLIE  
\*edited for ablest language

In April, 1979, the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency released a report on the effects of nuclear war that concludes that, in a general nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union, 25 to 100 million people would be killed. This is approximately the same number of African people who died between 1492 and 1890 as a result of the African slave trade to the New World. The same federal report also comments on the destruction of urban housing that would cause massive shortages after a nuclear war, as well as on the crops that would be lost, causing massive food shortages. Of course, for people of color the world over, starvation is already a common problem, when, for example, a nation’s crops are grown for export rather than to feed its own people. And the housing of people of color throughout the world’s urban areas is already blighted and inhumane: families live in shacks, shanty towns, or on the streets; even in the urban areas of North America, the poor may live without heat or running water. **For people of color, the world as we knew it ended centuries ago**. Our world, with its own languages, customs and ways, ended. And we are only now beginning to ~~see~~ with increasing clarity that our task is to reclaim that world, struggle for it, and rebuild it in our own image. The “death culture” we live in has convinced many to be more concerned with death than with life, more willing to demonstrate for “survival at any cost” than to struggle for liberty and peace with dignity. Nuclear disarmament becomes a safe issue when it is not linked to the daily and historic issues of racism, to the ways in which people of color continue to be murdered. **Acts of war, nuclear holocausts, and genocide have already been declared on our jobs, our housing, our schools, our families, and our lands.** As women of color, we are warriors, not pacifists. We must fight as a people on all fronts, or we will continue to die as a people. We have fought in people’s wars in China, in Cuba, in Guinea-Bissau, and in such struggles as the civil rights movement, the women’s movement, and in countless daily encounters with landlords, welfare departments, and schools. These struggles are not abstractions, but the only means by which we have gained the ability to eat and to provide for the future of our people. We wonder who will lead the battle for nuclear disarmament with the vigor and clarity that women of color have learned from participating in other struggles. Who will make the political links among racism, sexism, imperialism, cultural integrity, and nuclear arsenals and housing? Who will stand up?

**Their singular focus on an abrupt, explosive end of the world necessarily effaces the way in which a holocaust has been waged upon communities of color for centuries.**

**Omolade 89**, [Barbara, Historian of black women at City College Center in New York “We Speak for the Planet”, P. 172-6]//MHELLIE

Recent efforts by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and President Ronald Reagan to limit nuclear testing, stockpiling, and weaponry, while still protecting their own arsenals and selling arms to countries and factions around the world, vividly demonstrate how "peace" can become an abstract concept within a culture of war. Many peace activists are similarly blind to the constant wars and threats of war being waged against people of color and the planet by those who march for "peace" and by those they march against. These pacifists, like Gorbachev and Reagan, **frequently want people of color to fear what they fear and define peace as they define it. They are unmindful that our lands and peoples have already been and are being destroyed as part of the "final solution" of the "color line**." It is difficult to persuade the remnants of Native American tribes, the starving of African deserts, and the victims of the Cambodian "killing fields" that nuclear war is the major danger to human life on the planet and that only a nuclear "winter" embodies fear and futurelessness for humanity. The peace movement suffers greatly from its lack of a historical and holistic perspective, practice, and vision that include the voices and experiences of people of color; the movement's goals and messages have therefore been easily coopted and expropriated by world leaders who share the same culture of racial dominance and arrogance. The peace movement's racist blinders have divorced peace from freedom, from feminism, from education reform, from legal rights, from human rights, from international alliances and friendships, from national liberation, from the particular (for example, black female, Native American male) and the general (human being). Nevertheless, social movements such as the civil rights-black power movement in the United States have always demanded peace with justice, with liberation, and with social and economic reconstruction and cultural freedom at home and abroad. The integration of our past and our present holocausts and our struggle to define our own lives and have our basic needs met are at the core of the inseparable struggles for world peace and social betterment. The Achilles heel of the organized peace movement in this country has always been its whiteness. In this multi-racial and racist society, no allwhite movement can have the strength to bring about basic changes. It is axiomatic that basic changes do not occur in any society unless the people who are oppressed move to make them occur. In our society it is people of color who are the most oppressed. Indeed our entire history teaches us that when people of color have organized and struggled-most especially, because of their particular history, Black people-have moved in a more humane direction as a society, toward a better life for all people.1 Western man's whiteness, imagination, enlightened science, and movements toward peace have developed from a culture and history mobilized against women of color. The political advancements of white men have grown directly from the devastation and holocaust of people of color and our lands. This technological and material progress has been in direct proportion to the undevelopment of women of color. Yet the dayto- day survival, political struggles, and rising up of women of color, especially black women in the United States, reveal both complex resistance to holocaust and undevelopment and often conflicted responses to the military and war. The Holocausts Women of color are survivors of and remain casualties of holocausts, and we are direct victims of war-that is, of open armed conflict between countries or between factions within the same country. But women of color were not soldiers, nor did we trade animal pelts or slaves to the white man for guns, nor did we sell or lease our lands to the white man for wealth. Most men and women of color resisted and fought back, were slaughtered, enslaved, and force marched into plantation labor camps to serve the white masters of war and to build their empires and war machines. **People of color were and are victims of holocausts-that is, of great and widespread destruction, usually by fire. The world as we knew and created it was destroyed in a continual scorched earth policy of the white man.** The experience of Jews and other Europeans under the Nazis can teach us the value of understanding the totality of destructive intent, the extensiveness of torture, and the demonical apparatus of war aimed at the human spirit. A Jewish father pushed his daughter from the lines of certain death at Auschwitz and said, "You will be a remembrance-You tell the story. You survive." She lived. He died. Many have criticized the Jews for forcing non-Jews to remember the 6 million Jews who died under the Nazis and for etching the names Auschwitz and Buchenwald, Terezin and Warsaw in our minds. Yet as women of color, we, too, are "remembrances" of all the holocausts against the people of the world. We must remember the names of concentration camps such as Jesus, Justice, Brotherhood, and Integrity, ships that carried millions of African men, women, and children chained and brutalized across the ocean to the "New World." We must remember the Arawaks, the Taino, the Chickasaw, the Choctaw, the Narragansett, the Montauk, the Delaware, and the other Native American names of thousands of U.S. towns that stand for tribes of people who are no more. **We must remember the holocausts visited against the Hawaiians, the aboriginal peoples of Australia, the Pacific Island peoples, and the women and children of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. We must remember the slaughter of men and women at Sharpeville, the children of Soweto, and the men of Attica. We must never, ever, forget the children disfigured, the men maimed, and the women broken in our holocausts**-we must remember the names, the numbers, the faces, and the stories and teach them to our children and our children's children so the world can never forget our suffering and our courage. Whereas the particularity of the Jewish holocaust under the Nazis is over, our holocausts continue. We are the madres locos (crazy mothers) in the Argentinian square silently demanding news of our missing kin from the fascists who rule. We are the children of El Salvador who see our mothers and fathers shot in front of our eyes. We are the Palestinian and Lebanese women and children overrun by Israeli, Lebanese, and U.S. soldiers. We are the women and children of the bantustans and refugee camps and the prisoners of Robbin Island. We are the starving in the Sahel, the poor in Brazil, the sterilized in Puerto Rico. We are the brothers and sisters of Grenada who carry the seeds of the New Jewel Movement in our hearts, not daring to speak of it with our lipsyet. Our holocaust is South Africa ruled by men who loved Adolf Hitler, who have developed the Nazi techniques of terror to more sophisticated levels. Passes replace the Nazi badges and stars. Skin color is the ultimate badge of persecution. Forced removals of women, children, and the elderly-the "useless appendages of South Africa"-into barren, arid bantustans without resources for survival have replaced the need for concentration camps. Black sex-segregated barracks and cells attached to work sites achieve two objectives: The work camps destroy black family and community life, a presumed source of resistance, and attempt to create human automatons whose purpose is to serve the South African state's drive toward wealth and hegemony. Like other fascist regimes, South Africa disallows any democratic rights to black people; they are denied the right to vote, to dissent, to peaceful assembly, to free speech, and to political representation. The regime has all the typical Nazi-like political apparatus: house arrests of dissenters such as Winnie Mandela; prison murder of protestors such as Stephen Biko; penal colonies such as Robbin Island. Black people, especially children, are routinely arrested without cause, detained without limits, and confronted with the economic and social disparities of a nation built around racial separation. Legally and economically, South African apartheid is structural and institutionalized racial war. The Organization of African Unity's regional intergovernmental meeting in 1984 in Tanzania was called to review and appraise the achievements of the United Nations Decade for Women. The meeting considered South Africa's racist apartheid regime a peace issue. The "regime is an affront to the dignity of all Africans on the continent and a stark reminder of the absence of equality and peace, representing the worst form of institutionalized oppression and strife." Pacifists such as Martin Luther King, Jr. and Mahatma Gandhi who have used nonviolent resistance charged that those who used violence to obtain justice were just as evil as their oppressors. Yet all successful revolutionary movements have used organized violence. This is especially true of national liberation movements that have obtained state power and reorganized the institutions of their nations for the benefit of the people. **If men and women in South Africa do not use organized violence, they could remain in the permanent violent state of the slave.** Could it be that pacifism and nonviolence cannot become a way of life for the oppressed? Are they only tactics with specific and limited use for protecting people from further violence? For most people in the developing communities and the developing world consistent nonviolence is a luxury; it presumes that those who have and use nonviolent weapons will refrain from using them long enough for nonviolent resisters to win political battles. To survive, peoples in developing countries must use a varied repertoire of issues, tactics, and approaches. Sometimes arms are needed to defeat apartheid and defend freedom in South Africa; sometimes nonviolent demonstrations for justice are the appropriate strategy for protesting the shooting of black teenagers by a white man, such as happened in New York City. **Peace is not merely an absence of 'conflict that enables white middleclass comfort, nor is it simply resistance to nuclear war and war machinery. The litany of "you will be blown up, too" directed by a white man to a black woman obscures the permanency and institutionalization of war**, the violence and holocaust that people of color face daily. Unfortunately, the holocaust does not only refer to the mass murder of Jews, Christians, and atheists during the Nazi regime; it also refers to the permanent institutionalization of war that is part of every fascist and racist regime. The holocaust lives. It is a threat to world peace as pervasive and thorough as nuclear war.

**Faciality**

**The politics of facialiality is ALWAYS a question of degrees of deviance from the face of whiteness. DnG use the term “Jesus Christ Superstar” jokingly. You should be aware that blackness cannot be measured in terms of degrees of deviance, it is categorically outside of this theory of the face and subjectivity from this perspective. This is why the face of blackness is always being effaced by the technologies of slavery.**

**Kr0ll 15** [Joe Kroll, graduate student in comparative literature at the UC Irvine, “Facing the Light: Deleuze and the Critique of Faciality,” <https://uci.academia.edu/JoeKrall> 3/13/15]   
\*edited for ablest language

I will begin with a brief note on method: In this paper I would like to present a response to Deleuze and Guattari’s description of the abstract machine of faciality in the seventh chapter of A Thousand Plateaus, which offers up a description of the process of facial determination as localized around the figure of the white face, personified in Jesus Christ. I argue that **this description fails to account for the manner in which this white face’s construction is dependent on a prior violence against the figure of the black face, a figure implicit in, but continually repressed by the Deleuzean schemata**. In order to do this I will situate the faciality chapter against a counter construction of the face that I read in the visual apparatus of Minneapolis hip-hop artist I Self Devine’s music video for the song Exist to Remain. Following Frank Wilderson’s work in Red, White & Black, I present this video not as an analogy for the metaphysical principles under discussion—this would make the mistake of thinking the grammar of anti-black violence as placed within the metaphysical thought-world of Deleuzean philosophy rather than as its enabling condition. Instead I present the video as a demonstration—and I mean this term in the mathematical sense—of a certain narrative and representational logic, the logic of anti-blackness. Or, to put a finer point on the matter, as a demonstration of metaphysics’ a priori reliance on a certain performance of anti-black violence. As Deleuze and Guittari develop their critique through the model of a “black hole/white wall system,” before we can directly address “Year Zero”, it is worth grounding our discussion with a few points from Deleuze’s earlier, ontological work, Difference and Repetition (“Year Zero” 179). Deleuze opens the first chapter of the work, “Difference in Itself”, with a description of the way that thoughts of blackness and whiteness structure indifference: Indifference has two aspects: the undifferentiated abyss, the black nothingness, the indeterminate animal in which everything is dissolved—but also the white nothingness, the once more calm surface upon which float unconnected determinations like scattered members: a head without a neck, an arm without a shoulder, eyes without brows. The indeterminate is completely indifferent, but such floating determinations are no less indifferent to each other (Difference and Repetition 28). Blackness, here, operates by bearing the mark nothingness in the ontological field, where it serves to disarticulate the possibility of Being—“everything is dissolved.” Deleuze characterizes this movement as an animalistic (perhaps not an entirely pejorative term for Deleuze) violence; indifference is produced in this instance through the dissolution of the structures of perception as the coordinates of determination become disjoint and an absolute indeterminacy takes hold. Whiteness, by contrast, renders the field indifferent by fracturing the relations between determinations. Rather than produce the non-Being of indeterminacy, whiteness affirms positive Being by providing a “calm surface” for the appearance of determination. “Head…arm…[and] eyes” come into Being dissociated from the “neck…shoulder…[and] brows” which would provide geographic coordination for their appearance through association, yet still they appear. What the previous description provides for us, then, is a description of different forms of indifference. By bringing these indifferences into contact, rendering them finite in a co-presence or a relationality, rather than their former infinite solitudes (for certainly the comparative description does exactly the work of constructing a relation between the two formerly infinite fields), we construct difference itself, an operation that Deleuze calls “thought.” “[T]hought is that moment in which determination makes itself one, by virtue of maintaining a unilateral and precise relation to the indeterminate. Thought ‘makes’ difference” (Difference and Repetition 29). Yet here we ~~see~~ something troubling. The white field of indifference supports determinations by providing a surface for them to dissociatively slide across, yet determination “makes itself” only through a relation to the indeterminate, or the ontologically black. Indeed, for Deleuze “[d]ifference is the state in which one can speak of determination as such” (Difference and Repetition 28). The white field thus depends on maintaining a relation to black, yet the indeterminate black nothingness is characterized by no such dependency. The Deleuzean model is thus capable of thinking blackness as such and in itself, yet the construction of a pure whiteness, or an infinite field of white indifference, is possible only by eliminating or (to use the phenomenological term) reducing blackness. Whiteness is thus parasitically or “unilaterally” related to blackness. This relation, which we call “difference or determination as such is also cruelty” (Difference and Repetition 28). What remains most troubling here, is the way in which this recognition of determination as cruelty follows the prior description of the nature of the ontological markers. Whiteness attains its characteristic of calmness in this reduction, which is to say that its calmness, the peace which renders determinations stable within the field, is ontologically grounded in the repression or the forgetting of a prior cruelty. Blackness, by contrast, attains its violent function of dissolution only in the active recognition of its overtaking determination. That is to say that blackness is violent not in itself, or in its essential and ontological character, but rather in its undoing of a determination which it makes possible a priori. The opening description thus functions to invert the scales and relations of violence. Whiteness is parasitically dependent on the violent eradication of blackness, yet it appears as peaceful tranquility. Blackness is self-stabilizing and prior, yet it appears destructive and posterior. The face then, as it appears in the later work, “Year Zero”, emerges through the function of “an abstract machine of faciality” that unites these ontological fields through their co-delimitation within the horizon of a “surface-holes, holey surface, system” (“Year Zero” 168; 170). This system brings together “black hole[s]” and “white wall[s],” representational objects that bear the markers of the two poles of indifference discussed in the earlier work (“Year Zero” 177). Again this combination generates the possibility of determination, which is here elaborated along two lines: the face “delimit[s] a field that neutralizes in advance any expressions or connections unamenable to the appropriate significations” and “form[s] a loci of resonance that select[s] the sensed or mental reality and make[s] it conform in advance to a dominant reality” (“Year Zero” 168). The structure of determination presented here is that of a violent reduction of the field of indeterminate possibility to the singularity of an overdetermined, univocal expression: the face as collapse. And yet, for Deleuze and Guattari, this power is not bound up in any face at all, in the generality of this-or-that face, but rather in the “entirely specific idea” of “Christ… your average ordinary White Man” (“Year Zero 176;178). Here the power of determination is linked with the divine power of the Christ figure and distributed along the lines of white raciality, in a move that configures racism away from a model of interiority and exteriority to an operation “by the determination of degrees of deviance in relation to the White-Man face” (“Year Zero” 178**). Racism’s “cruelty [in this system] is equaled only by its incompetence and naïveté” and understanding which subsumes all bodies under the heading of a more or less deviant whiteness** (“Year Zero” 178). To elaborate the functioning of this schema, Deleuze and Guatarri turn to a series of examples drawn from artistic mediation. The most illuminating of these examples is their description of the film screen as analogue for the facial function. Here, the white wall of the face is transformed into the reflective surface of a film screen off which significations bounce. The black holes which mar this surface interrupt the purity of this reflective behavior, generating determination through the relativity of the topographic distribution. The affirmation of the bounce is reduced by the negativity the holes’ nonbounce and a differential field is thereby generated. What Deleuze and Guatarri neglect in this construction is the way in which the facial machine, conceived here as the film screen, gains its power only within the horizon of a more significant and prior machine: the projector itself. The face-as-screen gains its power and even its function only within the beam of a projected light. What else, after all, could bounce from the screen? What mediates the bounce? ~~Seen~~ in this wider frame, the distribution of the light authorizes the screen as screen, the hole as hole. The screen is that part of the field which, allying itself with the light, bounces, multiplying the light in an unlimited escalation of intensity. The hole is that part of the field that sets itself against the light, swallowing the light and halting its propagation. Against Deleuze and Guatarri I ask us instead to think of the framing of the face they offer as a white face overdetermined by the light**. Its sanctity and its power derive from the alliance between the light and the white, whiteness’s position in the Deleuzean framework as that which intensifies the light. We might ask then, what the face does outside of this overdetermination.** Might we introduce instead a different principle with which to over(or under)determine the face**? I suggest** that I Self Devine’s video does exactly this work, demonstrating through the logic of its construction a different critique of the face**, a critique which recognizes the politics of the black/white antagonism**. The video opens for us with the domestic scene of black life, showing the artist engaged in the patterns of familial exchange, and accoutered with the adornments of contemporary domestic life: the French press, house keys, waffles. I read this scene as an invocation of the life-world, the establishment of a horizon within which the business of the domestic scene may take place. Against this the video offers us a second scene in which we find I Self Devine standing alone in a darkened space adjacent from a television. This second scene serves to demonstrate a space outside of the overdetermination of the light. This is signaled by the strobic effect of the light, which burts into the space in momentary illuminations only to recede again, unable to assert itself as the dominant mode of signification. Like Deleuze and Guatarri, I Self Devine metaphorizes facial construction through a media object, in this case the television screen in the dark space. Yet, unlike D&G, I Self Devine’s metaphorization recognizes the alliance between screen and light through their unified embodiment. Here is not a screen which bounces the light, but rather a screen which produces it in harsh flashes. The high contrast nature of the filming shows renders these flashes as violent impositions on the darkened space. They fix the face in stills that haunt the space in the light’s disappearance, violently imposing a fixed determination on the structure of a face that experiences flux and movement only between these punctuations. In view of this conflict, I Self Devine’s choice to wear sun glasses functions as a moment of self-preservation, the donning of an armor against the light and its anti-black operation. Moving back to the domestic scene, we find the explication of a narrative wherein I Self Devine leaves his home and makes his way to a bus station. Here, he and others watch transfixed as a dispute erupts between a white man and a black man. The conflict, which begins with a muttered phrase by the white man, quickly escalates past words as both men draw knives. As they fight a second white man enters the scene. Non-witness to the originary insult, this third man finds the conflict mid-fight, yet siding immediately with the fighting white man, this new arrival draws a gun and executes the black man, ending the conflict. Yet is this resolution unexpected? The arrival of this second man on the scene has been given special significance by a particular use of the camera. His face, shot at an upward angle, is illuminated by some source outside the frame to such an extent that the light appears to emanate from his skin itself. How are we to read this image if not as an allusion to the traditional iconography of Christ, who is frequently (if not always) depicted as the source or conduit of a divine light. This white man is here anointed Christ in order to deliver a violent death to the black man. Following the shot, we ~~see~~ the white spectators flee the scene while the present black spectators stand transfixed, unable to escape the violence of the scene. As the music winds down and the final moments play out, we watch as a pool of black blood pushes its way into the light, asserting the reality of anti-black violence over and against the illusionary whiteness produced by lighting of the scene. This recognition, which Deleuze represses, sets the film to running backwards, disarticulating the narrative and nullifying the prior fantasy of black domestic life.

**Their method of destroying the faciality machine does not consider the specificity of blackness which always already problematizes contemporary practices of recognition. The estrangement of blackness from contemporary forms of humanity makes visual perception obsolete. Their solvency mechanism cannot resolve any of the problems caused by the proliferation of invisible differences.**

**Sexton 8,** [Jared, Professor at UC Irvine, “Amalgamation Schemes: Antiblackness and the Critique of Multiracialism”, P. 231-4]//MHELLIE

At the turn of the twenty-first century, Fredric Jameson (1998b) announced that “the state of things the word globalization attempts to designate will be with us for a long time to come; and . . . its theorization . . . will constitute the horizon of all theory in the years ahead” (xvi). It would thus seem that any intellectual project accompanying the historical movement of black liberation—whose intervention sustains the current position of enunciation—must take as central the series of questions posed by the term. We might posit the reverse as well: anyone thinking seriously about globalization, particularly those hoping to organize political resistance to it, cannot afford to elide the question of black liberation without missing something essential to its unfolding. It is my suspicion that this vital consideration, made only more pointed by the ambivalent rendering of race mixture, forces an uncanny encounter with the black body—its capacities, its energies, its appearance as well as its structured installation in the nexus of sexuality and violence. In each case noted previously (the white supremacist movement, the global sex industries, the discourse of multiracialism), **it is the image of the black body that throws the apparatus of representation into unmitigated crisis.** “The history of racism is a narrative in which the congruency of micro- and macrocosm has been disrupted at the point of their analogical intersection: the human body” (Gilroy 1997, 192). This prescient point, offered by Paul Gilroy in his essay “Scales and Eyes,” bears significantly on the present effort. **The body presents a problem, a point of disruption**, for the historical narrative of racism. It has failed to lend itself, once and for all, to a stable designation. As Gilroy asks, “Has anyone ever been able to say exactly how many ‘races’ there are, let alone how skin shade should correspond to them” (195)? Of course, the answer is no, but we have ~~seen~~ that the indeterminacy of race in “the order of active differentiation” (192) has not proved insurmountable, even if it is inescapable. Quite the contrary, this perennial difficulty has given rise to a frenetic succession of methods designed for specifying human difference that characterize the protean nature of modernity’s “most pernicious signature” (192). In the current moment, we confront a novel question: “What does that trope ‘race’ mean in the age of molecular biology” (192)? For Gilroy, we now inhabit “a space beyond comparative anatomy” where “the body and its obvious, functional components no longer delimit the scale upon which assessments of the unity and variation of the species are to be made” (194). Our collective estrangement from anatomical scale has rendered the eye inadequate, if it ever was, “to the tasks of evaluation and description demanded” by racial segregation. Thus, the ascendancy of what he terms “nanopolitics” “**departs from** the scalar assumptions asso-ciated with **anatomical difference** and accelerates a vertiginous, inward movement towards the explanatory power of ever-smaller scopic regimes” (193). Indeed, this one-way movement, “downwards and inwards,” **locks the racializing project into a perpetual search for the zero degree of difference.** However, if racial difference “cannot be readily correlated with genetic variation” (194), the most basic level of differentiation known to date, at what level can it be asserted, maintained, legitimated? Or is it destined simply to remain anxious and uncertain, forever suspicious? Gilroy is less than sanguine about these developments. Although skepticism about “the status of visible differences” is welcomed for the trouble it causes to the paradigm of comparative anatomy, there is no indication that the calibration of “human sameness” and “human diversity” will diminish in political importance. The frustration of this procedure at one scale does not prevent its seeking refuge by burrowing deeper into the flesh, the viscera, the blood, the DNA. Gilroy asks, “Can a different sense of scale and scaling form a counterweight to the appeal of absolute particularity celebrated under the sign of ‘race’?” “Can it answer the seductions of self and kind projected onto the surface of the body?” Scarcely: the repudiation of surface-level sameness by “the proliferation of invisible differences” remains an object of aggravated fascination insofar as such differences are understood to “produce catastrophic consequences where people are not what they seem to be” (192). We are familiar with the vast literature regarding the thematic of **racial passing** in and beyond the United States, which often sensationally features the scandal of seeming to be white when one is, “in truth,” something else (Ginsberg 1996; Sanchez and Schlossberg 2001). Today, the fear of **invisible blackness commingles with the global traffic in hypervisible blackness**, the premier consumer product. Across the globe, **one can play at blackness, selectively appropriating “everything but the burden,”** to borrow Greg Tate’s (2003) apt phrase. Yet, Gilroy’s remarks on the crisis of visible difference invoke another catastrophic consequence not unrelated to an unsuspected or invisible blackness. Visible differences, he notes, not only prove unreliable in determinations of race, they also “do not . . . tell us everything we need to know about the health- status of the people we want to have sex with” (192). They really never did, of course, but Gilroy’s comment here makes reference to another “catastrophic consequence” associated with the age of molecular biology: AIDS. He concludes his essay as follows: With the body figured an epiphenomenon of coded information, this aesthetics of racial difference is now residual. **The skin may no longer be privileged as the threshold of identity.** There are good reasons to suppose that the line between inside and outside now falls elsewhere. (196) This other threshold of identity, this newly privileged “elsewhere” that now houses the persistent dividing line, is located within the body, tracking an invisible presence that demotes and denotes the significance of the bodily surface. It is, in effect, **a displacement of the skin as the preeminent sign of race**. Here we note a convergence with the project of multiracialism discussed at the outset: for different reasons, both developments portend the obstruction or unraveling of racialization in the field of vision— one betting on the increasing difficulty of making clear discriminations on the surface, the other devaluing the surface altogether. However, nothing in Gilroy’s account **alludes to the wholesale replacement of the surface by the interior, wherein the latter simply supplants the former**. More likely, we have an augmentation of racial difference, an alloy of the inner and outer, **by way of the discourses of biotechnology and genetic science**. Similarly, **the blurring of the color line prophesied by multiracialism provides the occasion, within the imagination of white supremacy and antiblackness, for a redoubled effort to police it. In this respect, the surface becomes a more intense object of observation precisely because it has become more unreliable as a sign of race**

**Destroying the notion of a “white” face in favor of a vibrant notion of becoming is impossible for the black-body that exists in a state of nonbeing and is already constructed through the social**

**Gordon 5** [Lewis R. Gordon, Yale University Ph.D with Distinction in philosophy, “Through the Zone of Nonbeing A Reading of Black Skin, White Masks in Celebration of Fanon's Eightieth Birthday”, Clr James Journal 11 (1):1-43, <https://globalstudies.trinity.duke.edu/wp-content/themes/cgsh/materials/WKO/v1d3_LGordon.pdf>] l.gong  
\*edited for ablest language

The convergence of the “black problem” with desire (“want”) already marks a distinction in Fanon’s analysis. When Du Bois considered the black problem half a century earlier, he argued against the question itself; it confuses, he argued, blacks with their problems. Blacks themselves are not the problem. The problem is the tendency to construct blacks as the problem, and that construction often emerged from white communities. By adding the dimension of what blacks want, Fanon raises the question of the subjective life of blacks, of black consciousness, that parallels the Freudian question of women—what do women want? This question of want, of desire, is not as simple as it may at first seem, for the life of desire is pre-reflective and reflective. What one claims to want is not always what one actually wants. And what one actually wants could become discarded upon reflection. That Fanon has raised the subjective life raises, as well, the split between livedreality and structure. An individual black’s desire may not comport with the structural notions of black desire. As Fanon cautions the reader, “Many Negroes will not find themselves in what follows. This is equally true of many whites. But the fact that I feel a foreigner in the worlds of the schizophrenic or the sexual cripple in no way diminishes their reality” (Pn 9 /BS 12). He affirms this focus later on: “I am speaking here, on the one hand, of alienated (mystified) blacks, and, on the other, of no less alienated (mystifying and mystified) whites”(Pn 23 /BS 29). Fanon raises this schism between individual and structure through making an important distinction. That the study of the black as a form of human study requires understanding what he calls ontogenic and phylogenic approaches. Ontogenic approaches address the individual organism. Phylogenic approaches address the species. The distinction pertains to the individual and structure. Fanon adds that such distinctions often miss a third factor—the sociogenic. The sociogenic pertains to what emerges from the social world, the intersubjective world of culture, history, language, economics. In that world, he reminds us, it is the human being who brings such forces into existence. What does recognition of such a factor offer our understanding of the black problem and what blacks want? The black is marked by the dehumanizing bridge between individual and structure posed by antiblack racism; the black is, in the end, “anonymous,” which enables “the black” to collapse into “blacks.” Whereas “blacks” is not a proper name, antiblack racism makes it function as such, as a name of familiarity that closes off the need for further knowledge. Each black is, thus, ironically nameless by virtue of being named “black.” So blacks find themselves, Fanon announces at the outset, not structurally regarded as human beings. They are problematic beings, beings locked in what he calls “a zone of nonbeing.” What blacks want is not to be problematic beings, to escape from that zone. They want to be human in the face of a structure that denies their humanity. In effect, this “zone” can be read in two ways. It could be limbo, which would place blacks below whites but above creatures whose lots are worse; or it could simply mean the point of total absence, the place most far from the light that, in a theistic system, radiates reality, which would be hell. His claim that “In the majority of cases, the black lacks the benefit of being able to accomplish this descent into a real hell (Enfers)” (Pn / BS 8) suggests the first read, but Fanon has much in store for the reader. For even if the “majority” of blacks lack such ability, it does not follow that in this case— namely, Fanon’s unfolding narrative—the descent into Enfers cannot be made. Such thoughts suggest that although the text has an epigraph from Aimé Césaire’s Discours sur le colonialisme, the suffering of which he speaks gains its poetic flavor from the mythopoetics of hell that have governed many writers in the western world—namely, Dante Alighieri’s Inferno.4 That Fanon’s formal education was exclusively western, and that the Martinique of his childhood was (and continues to be) predominantly Roman Catholic means that the grammar of normative life would take the form of the Church’s founding imagery in spite of Fanon’s existential atheism. The connection with Dante’s mythopoetic vision of church doctrine raises the question, however, of Fanon’s role in the text. Is Fanon Dante the seeker threatened by sin (the “fire” he brought to truth) or Virgil the (“cooled”) guide from Limbo? Or is he both? The social world is such that it is not simply a formal mediation of phylogeny and ontogeny. It also offers the content, the aesthetics, the “lived” dimensions of mediation. Fanon our guide, then, plans to take us through the layers of mediation offered to the black. As such, he functions as Virgil guiding us through a world that many of us, being “imbeciles,” need but often refuse to ~~see~~. So, utilizing Fanon’s observation of sociogenic dimensions of this structural denial, the argument takes the following turn. Constructivity and the semiotic folly of the dialectics of recognition There is a white construction called “the black.” This construction is told that if he or she really is human, then he or she can go beyond the boundaries of race. The black can “really” “choose” to live otherwise as a form of social being that is not black and is not any racial formation. Racial constructions are leaches on all manifestations of human ways of living: language, sex, labor (material and aesthetic), socializing (reciprocal recognition), consciousness, the “soul.” Chapters 1 through 7 thus become portraits of an anonymous black hero’s efforts to shake off these leaches and live an adult human existence. Each chapter represents options offered the black by modern Western thought. In good faith, then, the black hero attempts to live through each of these options simply as a human being. But the black soon discovers that to do so calls for living simply as a white. Antiblack racism presents whiteness as the “normal” mode of “humanness.” So, the black reasons, if blackness and whiteness are constructed, perhaps the black could then live the white construction, which would reinforce the theme of constructivity. Each portrait, however, is a tale of how exercising this option leads to failure. And in fact, “failure” takes on a peculiar role in the work; it is the specialized sense in which Fanon is using the term “psychoanalysis”: “If there can be no discussion on a philosophical level—that is, the plane of the basic needs of human reality—I am willing to work on the psychoanalytical level—in other words, the level of the ‘failures,’ in the sense in which one speaks of engine failures”(Pn 18 /BS 23). We should bear in mind that he says “willing to” work so, for, as we will ~~see~~, Fanon raises, as well, the question of whether the approach of working on the level of failure is, too, a form of failure, which raises the question of whether such a psychoanalytical approach is exemplified or transcended.

**Fiat**

**Normative policy practices do nothing but produce a deceptive network of collective forgetting, consigning blackness to the position of the unthought. It immures us to atrocities in world by neutralizing terms such as torture, terrorism, genocide, and nuclear war. This stance is inherently linked to modern practices of power.**

**Reid-Brinkley 2008** [Dr. Shanara Reid-Brinkley, “The Harsh Realities of “Acting Black”: How African-American Policy Debaters Negotiate Representation Through Racial Performance and Style”, P. 15]//MHELLIE

Genre Violation Four: Policymaker as Impersonal and the Rhetoric of Personal Experience. Debate is a competitive game.112 It requires that its participants take on the positions of state actors (at least when they are affirming the resolution). Debate resolutions normally call for federal action in some area of domestic or foreign policy. Affirmative teams must support the resolution, while the negative negates it. The debate then becomes a “laboratory” within which debaters may test policies.113 Argumentation scholar Gordon Mitchell notes that “Although they 117 may research and track public argument as it unfolds outside the confines of the laboratory for research purposes, in this approach students witness argumentation beyond the walls of the academy as spectators, with little or no apparent recourse to directly participate or alter the course of events.”114 Although debaters spend a great deal of time discussing and researching government action and articulating arguments relevant to such action, what happens in debate rounds has limited or no real impact on contemporary governmental policy making. And participation does not result in the majority of the debate community engaging in activism around the issues they research. Mitchell observes that the stance of the policymaker in debate comes with a “sense of detachment associated with the spectator posture.”115 In other words, its participants are able to engage in debates where they are able to distance themselves from the events that are the subjects of debates. Debaters can throw around terms like torture, terrorism, genocide and nuclear war without blinking. Debate simulations can only serve to distance the debaters from real world participation in the political contexts they debate about. As William Shanahan remarks: …the topic established a relationship through interpellation that inhered irrespective of what the particular political affinities of the debaters were. The relationship was both political and ethical, and needed to be debated as such. When we blithely call for United States Federal Government policymaking, we are not immune to the colonialist legacy that establishes our place on this continent. We cannot wish away the horrific atrocities perpetrated everyday in our name simply by refusing to acknowledge these implications” (emphasis in original).116 118 The “objective” stance of the policymaker is an impersonal or imperialist persona. The policymaker relies upon “acceptable” forms of evidence, engaging in logical discussion, producing rational thoughts. As Shanahan, and the Louisville debaters’ note, such a stance is integrally linked to the normative, historical and contemporary practices of power that produce and maintain varying networks of oppression. In other words, the discursive practices of policyoriented debate are developed within, through and from systems of power and privilege. Thus, these practices are critically implicated in the maintenance of hegemony. So, rather than seeing themselves as government or state actors, Jones and Green choose to perform themselves in debate, violating the more “objective” stance of the “policymaker” and require their opponents to do the same.

**Foreign Policy**

**Their singular focus on foreign policy and foreign wars obfuscates the war on blackness that occurs everyday.**

**Martinot & Sexton 2003** [Steve & Jared, Steve, a lecturer at San Francisco State University in the Center for Interdisciplinary Programs, Jared, Associate Professor at UC Irvine Ph.D, “The Avant-Garde of White Supremacy, Social Identities, Volume 9, Number 2, 2003”, P. 171-2]//MHELLIE   
\*edited for ablest language

They prowl, categorising and profiling, often turning those profiles into murderous violence without (serious) fear of being called to account, all the while claiming impunity. What jars the imagination is not the fact of impunity itself, but the realisation that they are simply people working a job, a job they secured by making an application at the personnel office. In events such as the shooting of Amadou Diallo, the true excessiveness is not in the massiveness of the shooting, but in the fact that these cops were there on the street looking for this event in the first place, as a matter of routine business. This spectacular evil is encased in a more inarticulable evil of banality, namely, that the state assigns certain individuals to (well-paying) jobs as hunters of human beings, a furtive protocol for which this shooting is simply the effect. But they do more than prowl. They make problematic the whole notion of social responsibility such that we no longer know if the police are responsible to the judiciary and local administration or if the city is actually responsible to them, duty bound by impunity itself. To the extent to which the police are a law unto themselves, the latter would have to be the case. This unaccountable vector of inverted social responsibility would resonate in the operating procedures in upper levels of civil administration as well. That is, civil governmental structures would act in accordance with the paradigm of policing— wanton violence legitimised by strict conformity to procedural regulations. For instance, consider the recent case of a 12-year-old African-American boy sentenced to prison for life without parole for having killed a 6-year-old African-American girl while acting out the moves he had seen in professional wrestling matches on TV. In demanding this sentence, the prosecutor argued that the boy was a permanent menace to society and had killed the girl out of extreme malice and consciousness of what he was doing. A 12-year-old child, yet Lionel Tate was given life without parole. In the name of social sanctity, the judicial system successfully terrorised yet another human being, his friends, and relatives by carrying its proceduralism to the limit. The corporate media did the rest; several ‘commentators’ ridiculed Tate’s claim to have imitated wrestling moves, rewriting his statement as a disreputable excuse: ‘pro wrestling made me do it’ (San Francisco Chronicle, 25 March 2001). Thus, they transformed his naive awareness of bodies into intentional weaponry and cunning. One could surmise, with greater justification than surmising the malice of the child, that the prosecutor made a significant career step by getting this high-profile conviction. Beyond the promotion he would secure for a job well done, beyond the mechanical performance of official outrage and the cynicism exhibited in playing the role, what animus drove the prosecutor to demand such a sentence? In the face of the prosecution’s sanctimonious excess, those who bear witness to Tate’s suffering have only inarticulate outrage to offer as consolation. With recourse only to the usual rhetorical expletives about racism, the procedural ritualism of this white supremacist operation has confronted them with the absence of a real means of discerning the judiciary’s dissimulated machinations. The prosecutor was the banal functionary of a civil structure, a paradigmatic exercise of wanton violence that parades as moral rectitude but whose source is the paradigm of policing. All attempts to explain the malicious standard operating procedure of US white supremacy find themselves hamstrung by conceptual inadequacy; it remains describable, but not comprehensible. The story can be told, as the 41 bullets fired to slaughter Diallo can be counted, but the ethical meaning remains beyond the discursive resources of civil society, outside the framework for thinkable thought. It is, of course, possible to speak out against such white supremacist violence as immoral, as illegal, even unconstitutional. But the impossibility of thinking through to the ethical dimension has a hidden structural effect. For those who are not racially profiled or tortured when arrested, who are not tried and sentenced with the presumption of guilt, who are not shot reaching for their identification, all of this is imminently ignorable. Between the inability to ~~see~~ and the refusal to acknowledge, a mode of social organisation is being cultivated for which the paradigm of policing is the cutting edge. We shall have to look beyond racialised police violence to ~~see~~ its logic. The impunity of racist police violence is the first implication of its ignorability to white civil society. The ignorability of police impunity is what renders it inarticulable outside of that hegemonic formation. If ethics is possible for white civil society within its social discourses, it is rendered irrelevant to the systematic violence deployed against the outside precisely because it is ignorable. Indeed, that ignorability becomes the condition of possibility for the ethical coherence of the inside. The dichotomy between a white ethical dimension and its irrelevance to the violence of police profiling is the very structure of racialisation today. It is a twin structure, a regime of violence that operates in two registers, terror and the seduction into the fraudulent ethics of social order; a double economy of terror, structured by a ritual of incessant performance. And into the gap between them, common sense, which cannot account for the double register or twin structure of this ritual, disappears into incomprehensibility. The language of common sense, through which we bespeak our social world in the most common way, leaves us speechless before the enormity of the usual, of the business of civil procedures.

**IR discourse epitomizes whiteness – it relies on Eurocentric concepts of civility and conceals colonial history**

-- IR is a product of whiteness – it ignores history, lacks specificity or context and acts only to preserve state sovereignty

**Krishna 9** Sankaran, teaches international relations and comparative politics as the University of Hawaii at Manoa in Honolulu, HI. His most recent book is "Globalization and Postcolonialism: hegemony and resistance in the 21st century". (Rowman and Littlefield, 2009). PWoods.

Yet, after two world wars, the rising tide of anti-colonial nationalism across three continents (Asia, Africa and Latin America), and the growing refusal of those who were the objects of its inquiry to recognize themselves in its descriptions, a decolonized Anthropology could no longer be delayed, even as significant numbers of scholars resisted such an effort. One could chart a similar trajectory – with varying degree of success - in disciplines such as History, Sociology, Political Science, Economics and others as the 20th century unfolded. The realization that power and knowledge were inextricably intertwined, and that ‘western’ descriptions of the non-west were never innocent of their own political, economic and other interests in those spaces, gradually worked their way towards a still incomplete and ongoing process of decolonization of these disciplines. For a variety of reasons, the discipline of International Relations (IR) has been extraordinarily resistant to a decolonizing impulse. Firstly, IR emerged within the United States, a society that is ferociously amnesiac about its own (domestic) history as a settler-colony and an (external) history as a colonizer in Latin America, the Pacific Islands, the Far East, etc. The US has instead emphasized its post-colonial status in that it broke away from Britain in the late 18th century and (intermittently) supported the decolonization efforts of third world countries seeking independence from England, France or Japan. This assiduous forgetting of the genocide (of Native Americans) and slavery (of Africans exported to the New World) central to the founding of the United States has carried over into the quintessentially American discipline of IR which often talks of the relations between nations as if they were ahistorical entities which suddenly emerged – all identical and sovereign - sometime in the middle of the 20th century. Second, emerging as it did in the interregnum between two horrific world wars, IR has always focused on explaining the conditions that lead to war and ways to prevent it. This has produced an obsession with issues of national security, and especially of the need to avoid ‘irresponsible’ policy or idealism that could lower one’s guard and create the conditions for war. ‘Historical’ issues such as colonialism were deemed less relevant and priority accorded to a ‘presentism’ that continuously focused on threats to national security and opportunities to enhance national interests. In other words, IR discourse is predominantly a prose of counter-insurgency: it is governed by a methodological nationalism that it is designed at every turn to avert all threats to statist sovereignty. And thirdly, IR has sought to construct itself in the image of a scientific discipline, one that aims to uncover the invariant laws that govern relations between nations. This emphasis on achieving a universal science applicable in all situations has meant that IR has a strong preference for abstract theory at the expense of historical contexts and specificity.

**Their grammar of geopolitics misunderstands global power – the absolute dereliction produced by the gratuitous sexual violence of slavery constituted an entire global colonial order, acting as the crucial lever for American empire – rather than understanding Africa, the Middle East, and Asia as separate continents with distinct “nation-states,” you should treat them as nodes in a vast, inextricable network of intimate everyday trauma and sexual degradation**

**Lowe 15** (Lisa Lowe, Professor of English and American Studies at Tufts University, and a member of the consortium of Studies in Race, Colonialism, and Diaspora, [**The Intimacies of Four Continents**, pgs. 167-171](https://books.google.com/books?id=UMMECgAAQBAJ&lpg=PT143&vq=Du%20Bois%20argued%20that&dq=The%20Intimacies%20of%20Four%20Continents&pg=PT143#v=onepage&q&f=false))

Du Bois argued that slavery was the fundamental contradiction of U.S. history and was frank and forthright that the social, political, and economic practices that issued from slavery damaged American democratic premises, distorted its institutions, and disrupted its social life. “The true significance of slavery in the United States to the whole social development of America lay in the ultimate relation of slaves to democracy.” 86 Not only did the revelation of slavery belie the promises of democracy; the force of potential slave revolt and the threat of slave rebellion lay beneath all of the nation’s political processes. 87 He was very specific about the brutality of slavery as a regime for extracting surplus value and stressed that the ownership of human persons subjected those men and women to violence, indignity, rape, and forcible separations from their kin and community. While he discussed “deliberate commercial breeding and sale of human labor for profit and toward the intermingling of black and white blood” as a cornerstone of slavery’s violence, the consideration of Black women’s emancipation fell beyond his scope, and Black feminist historians and theorists have pursued further the analysis of slavery and its aftermath, in terms of the conditions within which slave women were systematically subjected to rape, and their forced reproductive labor and offspring appropriated. 88 In Du Bois’s history, slavery was not an aberration of liberal democracy in the United States but its central contradiction; he argued that slavery was and continued to be systemic and constitutive of U.S. democracy, and of the extension of American power around the world. Slavery, which had violently brought Black workers into the modern world system, was at the heart of modern liberal democracy. He told the story of half a million Black workers who were “the founding stone of a new economic system in the nineteenth century and for the modern world, who brought the Civil War” (67), and who, by their mass exodus from the southern slave plantations, seized the opportunity to create a General Strike to stop the plantation system that brought the Confederacy to its knees: “This slow, stubborn mutiny of the Negro slaves was not merely a matter of 200,000 black soldiers and perhaps 300,000 other black laborers. Back of this half million stood 3 1⁄2 million more. Without their labor the South would starve. With arms in their hands, Negroes would form a fighting force which could replace every single Northern white soldier fighting listlessly and against his will with a black man fighting for freedom.” 89 In Du Bois’s epic history, the subject of the history of emancipation was neither the abolitionist nor the political leader; it was the mass movement of fugitive slaves who won the Civil War, who compelled the North to make the abolition of slavery its issue, and who made the slaveholders face their surrender to the North. In emphasizing the historical subjectivity of the Black laborers in the Great Strike, Du Bois situated them as central actors in the unfolding of the U.S. Civil War. Furthermore, his account also explains the retrenchment and refortification of white racial capital during Reconstruction in terms of their recognition of the enormous collective power of the Black freedom struggle. Both the white industrialists and white planters recognized the significance of the former slaves to transform the social and economic system, and sought to vanquish the slaves’ attainment of freedom. Black Reconstruction told a history of the consolidation of northern industrial finance capitalism and southern planters, and of ruling-class whites aggressively recruiting poor southern whites as their allies, dividing the black and white workers to prevent their joining in common struggle. “The masters fear their former slaves.… They forestalled the danger of a united Southern labor movement by appealing to the fear and hate of white labor.” 90 The historical convergence of the interests of the black slaves and the white peasants had made the victory of the North possible; but the state, and both northern and southern white interests, were all threatened by the possible longevity of cross-racial worker solidarity. Black Reconstruction details the collaboration between the state, northern white industrial capital, and southern white planter oligarchy, to divide white labor from what could have been their common cause with the Black proletariat. The possible union of four million ex-slaves and five million white peasant laborers represented a potential revolutionary force. It was against this possible convergence, Du Bois argued, that the interests of capital and the southern white ruling class organized, so that it might enact the “new capitalism and a new enslavement of labor.” 91 Finally, in Du Bois’s historical analysis, the post-Reconstruction “new capitalism and new enslavement of labor” described a shift in capitalist economy that was not restricted to Black slavery in the United States; it precisely set in motion the mid-century globalization of capitalism. In 1935, Du Bois captured the way in which the liberal promises of humanitarian “abolition” and “emancipation” did not end slavery, but enabled the triumph of U.S. capitalist industry that inaugurated instead the expansion of capitalism globally, permitting the “re-enslavement” of labor linking Africa, Asia, and the Americas: “Within the very echo of that philanthropy which had abolished the slave trade, was beginning a new industrial slavery of black and brown and yellow workers in Africa and Asia.” The new northern industrialists led this consolidation of global capitalism: “fired by a vision of concentrated economic power and profit greater than the world had envisioned” that linked with capitalist classes elsewhere “to unite in the exploitation of white, yellow, brown and black labor, in lesser lands and ‘breeds without laws.’”92 This “new” capitalist imperialism was built on the assets and surplus value extracted from slavery, and it required the “counter-revolution of property” to suppress the cross-racial alliance of workers in the United States, and across the globe. As Moon-Ho Jung has explained, “If enslaved black labor had laid the foundation of U.S. and European empires, its re-enslavement through an agreement between big business and the white south heralded the age of what Du Bois called ‘international and commercial imperialism,’ which would lead directly to the Great War and the Great Depression.” 93 In this sense, inasmuch as Black Reconstruction has been canonized as a history of the “unfinished revolution” of the Black working class in the United States, it was also an analysis of the centrality of Black slave labor to the formation of a racialized global capitalism that was built on colonialism in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Moreover, if Du Bois’s history featured the reproduction of racial difference at the center of the consolidation of U.S. capitalism, it also framed the importance of the alliances among differently racialized laboring peoples across the world in the ongoing struggle against the expanding U.S. empire. In Black Reconstruction, Du Bois viewed slavery in the United States as an integral part of capitalist imperialism as a global phenomenon, and understood the General Strike of Black slaves as one part of the struggle of a necessarily international working class of color: “The emancipation of man is the emancipation of labor and the emancipation of labor is the freeing of that basic majority of workers who are yellow, brown, and black.” 94 He was concerned not only with the history of Black slave labor but with “that dark and vast sea of human labor in China and India, the South Seas and all Africa; in the West Indies and Central America and in the United States.” 95 His history connected the forms of labor extraction employed in U.S. slavery with the exploitation of laborers in Asia, Africa, and Latin America in the consolidation of “a new capitalism” that extended globally. The development of American industrial capitalism, which depended on slave labor, was deeply connected with the exploitation of agrarian laborers on plantations in Asia and the Pacific Islands, in India and islands in the Indian Ocean, in Africa, and in Latin America, where plantation systems had also been established to profit from imported and indigenous colonized workers. Across the world, peasant workers had been and were becoming the communities of rebellion against capitalist imperialism; under the “new capitalism,” these laborers immigrated to the industrialized countries, where they were recruited as a new labor force in manufacturing and production. In Black Reconstruction, Du Bois situated the African American freedom struggle within a world historical struggle of laborers of color and implied that the struggle of Black labor did not depend on recognition by white Americans or the U.S. state, but on recognition by other laborers of color in the colonized world. In this way, his narrative of Black slaves in the Civil War and Reconstruction not only revised Marx’s subject of history, but it framed a history of slavery within the emergence of a world system of capitalism and imperial sovereignty. Du Bois did not tell the history of African American struggle as if it were exclusively a national struggle, bounded by the history of the United States. Rather the Black American struggle was situated as central to the apotheosis of Anglo-American empire, and within the broader struggle of laborers from China, India, Mexico, and elsewhere. Du Bois was not satisfied with Black American enfranchisement as the endpoint of the antislavery struggle; he was concerned with international social justice. In Eric Porter’s analysis, “Du Bois understood that the persistence and revision of slavery’s and colonialism’s racist legacies, and the faith that they were being overcome, produced emergent forms of racism in his present.” 96 In other words, Du Bois’s Black Reconstruction was deeply concerned that the “counter-revolution of property” that had defeated Reconstruction, had also advanced U.S. exploitation of the decolonizing world. Du Bois cautioned that the pursuit of political enfranchisement for a single group within an imperial United States could contribute to the subordination of others, both inside and outside of the American capitalist empire.

**Their focus on international conflicts only ignores the living apocalypse for people of color under the domestic warfare of white supremacy**

-- Their focus on foreign wars trades off with a focus on the wars on our streets

**Rodriguez, ’08** [2008, Dylan Rodriguez is an Assistant Professor at University of California Riverside, Abolition Now! p.93-100]

We are collectively witnessing, surviving, and working in a time of unprecedented state-organized human capture and state-produced physical/social/ psychic alienation, from the 2.5 million imprisoned by the domestic and global US prison industrial complex to the profound forms of informal apartheid and proto- apartheid that are being instantiated in cities, suburbs, and rural areas all over the country. This condition presents a profound crisis—and political possibility—for people struggling against the white supremacist state, which continues to institutionalize the social liquidation and physical evisceration of Black, brown, and aboriginal peoples nearby and far away. If we are to approach racism, neoliberalism, militarism/militarization, and US state hegemony and domination in a legitimately "global" way, it is nothing short of unconscionable to expend significant political energy protesting American wars elsewhere (e.g. Iraq, Afghanistan etc.) when there are overlapping, and no less profoundly oppressive, declarations of and mobilizations for war in our very own, most intimate and nearby geographies of "home." This time of crisis and emergency necessitates a critical examination of the political and institutional logics that structure so much of the US progressive left, and particularly the "establishment" left that is tethered (for better and worse) to the non-profit industrial complex (NPIC). I have defined the NPIC elsewhere as the set of symbiotic relationships that link political and financial technologies of state and owning class social control with surveillance over public political discourse, including and especially emergent progressive and leftist social movements. This definition is most focused on the industrialized incorporation, accelerated since the 1970s, of pro-state liberal and progressive campaigns and movements into a spectrum of government-proctored non-profit organizations. It is in the context of the formation of the NPIC as a political power structure that I wish to address, with a less-than-subtle sense of alarm, a peculiar and disturbing politics of assumption that often structures, disciplines, and actively shapes the work of even the most progressive movements and organizations within the US establishment left (of which I too am a part, for better and worse): that is, the left's willingness to fundamentally tolerate—and accompanying unwillingness to abolish—the institutionalized dehumanization of the contemporary policing and imprisonment apparatus in its most localized, unremarkable, and hence "normal" manifestations within the domestic "homeland" of the Homeland Security state. Behind the din of progressive and liberal reformist struggles over public policy, civil liberties, and law, and beneath the infrequent mobilizations of activity to defend against the next onslaught of racist, classist, ageist, and misogynist crirninalization, there is an unspoken politics of assumption that takes for granted the mystified permanence of domestic warfare as a constant production of targeted and massive suffering, guided by the logic of Black, brown, and indigenous subjection to the expediencies and essential violence of the American (global) nation-building project. To put it differently: despite the unprecedented forms of imprisonment, social and political repression, and violent policing that compose the mosaic of our historical time, the establishment left (within and perhaps beyond the US) does not care to envision, much less politically prioritize, the abolition of US domestic warfare and its structuring white supremacist social logic as its most urgent task of the present and future. Our non-profit left, in particular, seems content to engage in desperate (and usually well-intentioned) attempts to manage the casualties of domestic warfare, foregoing the urgency of an abolitionist praxis that openly, critically, and radically addresses the moral, cultural, and political premises of these wars. Not long from now, generations will emerge from the organic accumulation of rage, suffering, social alienation, and (we hope) politically principled rebellion against this living apocalypse and pose to us some rudimentary questions of radical accountability: How were we able to accommodate, and even culturally and politically normalize the strategic, explicit, and openly racist technologies of state violence that effectively socially neutralized and frequently liquidated entire nearby populations of our people, given that ours are the very same populations that have historically struggled to survive and overthrow such "classical" structures of dominance as colonialism, frontier conquest, racial slavery, and other genocides? In a somewhat more intimate sense, how could we live with ourselves in this domestic state of emergency, and why did we seem to generally forfeit the creative possibilities of radically challenging, dislodging, and transforming the ideological and institutional premises of this condition of domestic warfare in favor of short-term, "winnable" policy reforms? (For example, why did we choose to formulate and tolerate a "progressive" political language that reinforced dominant racist notions of "criminality" in the process of trying to discredit the legal basis of "Three Strikes" laws?) What were the fundamental concerns of our progressive organizations and movements during this time, and were they willing to comprehend and galvanize an effective, or even viable opposition to the white supremacist state's terms of engagement (that is, warfare)? 'this radical accountability reflects a variation on anti- colonial liberation theorist Frantz Fanon's memorable statement to his own peers, comrades, and nemeses: Each generation must discover its mission, fulfill it or betray it, in relative opacity. In the underdeveloped countries preceding generations have simultaneously resisted the insidious agenda of colonialism and paved the way for the emergence of the current struggles. Now that we are in the heat of combat, we must shed the habit of decrying the efforts of our forefathers or feigning incomprehension at their silence or passiveness. Our historical moment suggests the need for a principled political rupturing of existing techniques and strategies that fetishize and fixate on the negotiation, massaging, and management of the worst outcomes of domestic warfare. One political move long overdue is toward grassroots pedagogies of radical dis-identification with the state, in the trajectory of an anti-nationalism or anti-patriotism, that reorients a progressive identification with the creative possibilities of insurgency (this is to consider “insurgency” as a politics that pushes beyond the defensive maneuvering of “resistance”). Reading a few lines down from our first invoking of Fanon’s call to collective, liberatory action is clarifying here: “For us who are determined to break the back of colonialism, our historic mission is to authorize every revolt, every desperate act, and every attack aborted or drowned in blood.”

**Foreign Policy Util**

**Furthermore, their maintenance of distance produces a political subject that is a voyeur to oppression that comes to fixate upon large death counts and nuclear war rather than actually address the war that takes place on the streets**

**El Kilombo Intergalactico 2007** [Collective in Durham NC that interviewed Subcomandante Insurgente Marcos, Beyond Resistance: Everything p. 1-2]

In our efforts to forge a new path, we found that an old friend—the Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (Zapatista Army of National Liberation, EZLN)—was already taking enormous strides to move toward a politics adequate to our time, and that it was thus necessary to attempt an evaluation of Zapatismo that would in turn be adequate to the real ‘event’ of their appearance. That is, despite the fresh air that the Zapatista uprising had blown into the US political scene since 1994, we began to feel that even the inspiration of Zapatismo had been quickly contained through its insertion into a well-worn and untenable narrative: Zapatismo was another of many faceless and indifferent “third world” movements that demanded and deserved solidarity from leftists in the “global north.” From our position as an organization composed in large part by people of color in the United States, we viewed this focus on “solidarity” as the foreign policy equivalent of “white guilt,” quite distinct from any authentic impulse toward, or recognition of, the necessity for radical social change. The notion of “solidarity” that still pervades much of the Left in the U.S. has continually served an intensely conservative political agenda that dresses itself in the radical rhetoric of the latest rebellion in the “darker nations” while carefully maintaining political action at a distance from our own daily lives, thus producing a political subject (the solidarity provider) that more closely resembles a spectator or voyeur (to the suffering of others) than a participant or active agent, while simultaneously working to reduce the solidarity recipient to a mere object (of our pity and mismatched socks). At both ends of this relationship, the process of solidarity ensures that subjects and political action never meet; in this way it serves to make change an a priori impossibility. In other words, this practice of solidarity urges us to participate in its perverse logic by accepting the narrative that power tells us about itself: that those who could make change don’t need it and that those who need change can’t make it. To the extent that human solidarity has a future, this logic and practice do not! For us, Zapatismo was (and continues to be) unique exactly because it has provided us with the elements to shatter this tired schema. It has inspired in us the ability, and impressed upon us the necessity, of always viewing ourselves as digniﬁed political subjects with desires, needs, and projects worthy of struggle. With the publication of The 2 Sixth Declaration of the Lacandón Jungle in June of 2005, the Zapatistas have made it even clearer that we must move beyond appeals to this stunted form of solidarity, and they present us with a far more difﬁcult challenge: that wherever in the world we may be located, we must become “companer@s” (neither followers nor leaders) in a truly global struggle to change the world. As a direct response to this call, this analysis is our attempt to read Zapatismo as providing us with the rough draft of a manual for contemporary political action that eventually must be written by us all.

**Uniqueness**

**The US and China cooperating against terror**

**Wee and Fernandez 15** (Sui-Lee and Clarence, Reuters Editorial, 12-15-2015, "China urges U.S. cooperation to battle terrorism financing," Reuters, <http://www.reuters.com/article/uk-china-usa-terrorism-idUSKBN0TY1GT20151215> //SC)

A senior Chinese official urged the United States to work with China to combat terrorism financing, China's central bank said on Tuesday, as the world's two largest economies step up efforts against a global security threat. During two days of talks in New York last week, China and the United States discussed combating terrorist financing, national risk assessments for money laundering and a Sino-U.S. anti-money laundering pact, the People's Bank of China said in a statement on its website. The meeting is the latest sign that China and the United States are improving bilateral cooperation to fight terrorism, despite major disagreements on a host of other issues. Shared concern about Islamic State offers a rare convergence of security interests for Beijing and Washington, and a break from their more typical enmity on sensitive geopolitical issues, notably in the South China Sea and matters such as cyber spying. "The two sides should, on the basis of mutual trust and mutual benefit, strengthen communication and coordination," the statement quoted deputy central bank governor Guo Qingping as saying in his speech in New York. Other aspects of cooperation he urged were safeguarding the interests of both countries' financial institutions and actively promoting efforts against money laundering and terrorism financing, it added. China says some Uighurs, a mainly Muslim people from its violence-prone far western region of Xinjiang, have travelled to Syria and Iraq to fight with militant groups there. Last month, Islamic State said it had killed a Chinese hostage, prompting outrage in Beijing. In September, the foreign ministry said China and the United States would improve cooperation on fighting militancy, including intelligence exchanges, and work together to bring peace to Afghanistan.

**China is engaging the US against perceived terror threats**

**Martina Blanchard and Macfie 15** (Michael, Ben and Nick Reuters Editorial, 8-5-2015, "China appeals for U.S. help to fight Xinjiang militants," Reuters, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-usa-security-idUSKCN0QA07O20150805> //SC)

China has appealed for U.S. support in fighting Islamist militants in the far western Chinese region of Xinjiang, saying they are also a threat to the United States. Chinese officials say the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) recruits Uighurs, a largely Muslim ethnic minority from Xinjiang, and trains them with extremists in Syria and Iraq, with the intent of returning to China to wage holy war. Many foreign experts, however, have questioned whether ETIM exists as the coherent group China claims it is. The threat of terror grows "more complicated and severe by the day", China's Foreign Ministry said late on Tuesday, following a meeting between Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Cheng Guoping and Tina Kaidanow, Ambassador-At-Large for the U.S. State Department's Bureau of Counterterrorism. "China stressed the serious threat of ETIM and other East Turkestan terror organizations to China, the United States and the international community, and requested that the United States vigorously support and coordinate with China in combating the efforts of East Turkestan terrorism forces," the ministry said. Both sides agreed to combat cyber terrorism and violent extremism and strengthen anti-terrorism intelligence, it added. Hundreds, perhaps thousands, of Uighurs, have illegally crossed the Chinese border in recent years, traveling to Turkey via Southeast Asia. Rights groups say such migrants are fleeing ethnic violence in Xinjiang and Chinese controls on their religion and culture, allegations Beijing denies. Hundreds of people have died in unrest in Xinjiang in the last three years, blamed by Beijing on Islamist militants. But Chinese officials have offered little evidence that the violence is linked to ETIM, which Washington deemed a terror group after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks. Some officials in the U.S. government have privately questioned the extent of the organization's influence in Xinjiang, though experts note that U.S. rhetoric on the group may be swinging back in favor of Beijing. China has ramped up counter-terrorism efforts following deadly attacks in recent years, including a mass stabbing in March 2014 at a train station in the southwestern city of Kunming in which 31 people were killed. The government is on heightened alert ahead of an international athletics event in Beijing this month and a parade also in Beijing next month to mark 70 years since the end of World War Two. "The bottom line is anti-terrorism work must be implemented well to ensure terrorist plots are foiled before they can be carried out," Xinhua news agency quoted deputy public security minister Huang Ming as saying. (Reporting by Michael Martina and Ben Blanchard; Editing by Nick Macfie)

**Freedom**

**Freedom and neoliberalism are intimately linked, for those who are rendered inhuman, the promise of freedom is a lie. The spirit of slavery lives on, guiding bullets and shaping contemporary formations of power.**

**Dillon 13**, [Stephen, “Fugitive Life: race, gender, and the rise of the neoliberal-carceral state”, P. 35-6]//MHELLIE  
\*Edited for ablest language

What is most crucial for my project on the relationship between the afterlife of slavery and neoliberalism is that as freedom navigated the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, it was not innocent and it did not come alone. Something from the past held on to freedom as it maneuvered time and space. Freedom was possessed by its opposite, a ghost wished away by liberal thought that did not so easily disappear. In the 1970s, when the market produced the freedom of capital mobility, individuality, and choice, and the prison manufactured the freedom of safety and security, the spirit of slavery dictated the movements and meanings of that freedom. Indeed, the spirit of slavery lives on in more ways than one can imagine: in the shade of tree-lined suburban streets, in definitions and measures of value, in the prosperity and health of some, and in the hail of the police as one walks down the street. It guides bullets and bombs, makes visible what we ~~see~~, and vanishes what is right in front of us. It is laced in the cement and steel of the prison, solidified in dreams of liberation, and embedded in psychic life. Although it is sometimes recognizable, it also lives on in what we do not know and cannot remember— in the lives erased, expunged, ended or that were simply never recorded to begin with. Whether it comes as spectacle or something one cannot ~~see~~ or feel, it is always there. **The spirit of slavery does more then meddle in the present; rather, it has intensified, seduced, enveloped, and animated contemporary formations of power.** Possession names the ways that the operations of corporate, state, individual, and institutional bodies are sometimes beyond the self-possessed will of the living. Something else is also in control, something that may feel like nothing even as it compels movement, motivates ideology, and drives the organization of life and death. In this way, **slavery is not a ghost lingering in the corner of the room—rather, its spirit animates the architecture of the house as a whole**. The past does not merely haunt the present; it composes the present. As Toni Morrison writes, “All of it is now, it is always now.”62

**Blackness can’t access freedom**

**Wilderson ’10** {Frank; Associate Professor of African-American Studies at UC Irvine and has a Ph.D. from UC Berkeley; “Red, White & Black: Cinema and the Structure of U.S. Antagonisms,”}/MR

The most salient feature of Dorsey’s findings is not his understanding of the way **Blackness, as a crucial and fungible conceptual possession of civil society, impacts and destabilizes previously accepted categories of intra-White thought**. Most important, instead, is his contribution to the evidence that, **even when Blackness is deployed to stretch the elasticity of civil society to the point of civil war, that expansion is never elastic enough to embrace the very Black who catalyzed the expansion**. In fact, Dorsey, building on Bradley’s historical research, asserts that just the opposite is true. **The more the political imagination of civil society is enabled by the fungibility of the slave metaphor, the less legible the condition of the slave becomes**: “Focusing primarily on colonial newspapers . . . Bradley finds that the slavery metaphor ‘served to distance the patriot agenda from the antislavery movement.’ If anything, Bradley states, widespread use of the metaphor ‘gave first evidence that the issue of real slavery was not to have a part in the revolutionary messages.’”35 And Eltis believes that this philosophical incongruity between the image of the Slave and freedom for the Slave begins in Europe and predates the American Revolution by at least one hundred years: “The [European] countries least likely to enslave their own had the harshest and most sophisticated system of exploiting enslaved non-Europeans. Overall, the English and Dutch conception of the role of the individual in metropolitan society ensured the accelerated development of African chattel slavery in the Americas . . . because their own subjects could not become chattel slaves or even convicts for life.”36 Furthermore, **the circulation of Blackness as metaphor and image at the most politically volatile and progressive moments in history (e.g., the French, English, and American revolutions) produces dreams of liberation which are more inessential to and more parasitic on the Black, and more emphatic in their guarantee of Black suffering, than any dream of human liberation in any era heretofore. Black slavery is foundational to modern Humanism’s ontics because “freedom” is the hub of Humanism’s infinite conceptual trajectories. But these trajectories only appear to be infinite. They are finite in the sense that they are predicated on the idea of freedom from some contingency that can be named, or at least conceptualized**. The contingent rider could be freedom from patriarchy, freedom from economic exploitation, freedom from political tyranny (e.g., taxation without representation), freedom from heteronormativity, and so on. What I am suggesting is that **first political discourse recognizes freedom as a structuring ontologic and then it works to disavow this recognition by imagining freedom not through political ontology—where it rightfully began—but through political experience (and practice); whereupon it immediately loses its ontological foundations**. Why would anyone do this? Why would anyone start off with, quite literally, an earth-shattering ontologic and, in the process of meditating on it and acting through it, reduce it to an earthreforming experience? Why do Humans take such pride in selfadjustment, in diminishing, rather than intensifying, the project of liberation (how did we get from 1968 to the present)? Because, I contend, **in allowing the notion of freedom to attain the ethical purity of its ontological status, one would have to lose one’s Human coordinates and become Black. Which is to say one would have to die. For the Black, freedom is an ontological, rather than experiential, question. There is no philosophically credible way to attach an experiential, a contingent, rider onto the notion of freedom when one considers the Black—such as freedom from gender or economic oppression, the kind of contingent riders rightfully placed on the non-Black when thinking freedom**. Rather, the riders that one could place on Black freedom would be hyperbolic—though no less true—and ultimately untenable: freedom from the world, freedom from Humanity, freedom from everyone (including one’s Black self). Given the reigning episteme, what are the chances of elaborating a comprehensive, much less translatable and communicable, political project out of the necessity of freedom as an absolute? **Gratuitous freedom has never been a trajectory of Humanist thought, which is why the infinite trajectories of freedom that emanate from Humanism’s hub are anything but infinite—for they have no line of flight leading to the Slave.**

**The Slave is conditioned to know not any freedoms, but to only understand the slave master relationship**

**Wilderson 03 cut from (The position of unthought)** A. B. Dartmouth College (Government/Philosophy); MFA Columbia University (Fiction Writing); Ph.D. University of California, Berkeley (Rhetoric/Film Studies). His work explores cinema’s formal and narrative “awareness” of political ontology by bringing two disparate modes of representation into conversation with one another: (1) the cinema of Red, White, and Black directors and (2) three traditions of epistemological reflection: Humanism (feminism, Marxism, psychoanalysis); Indigenism (meditations on sovereignty and genocide); and Social Death (meditations on the accumulation and fungibility of Black bodies). University of Nebraska Press

the good conduct encouraged by such counsels eased the transition from slavery to freedom by imploring the freed to continue in old forms of subservience, which primarily entailed remaining on the plantation as faith full, hardworking, and obedient laborers, but also included manners, styles of comportment in work relations, objects of consumption, leisure, and domestic relations. In their emphasis on proper conduct, these schoolbooks resuscitated the social roles of slavery, not unlike the regulation of behavior in labor contracts or the criminalization of impudence in the Black Codes. The pedagogical injunctions to obedience and servility cast the freed in a world starkly similar to the one in which they had suffered under slavery. On the one hand, these texts heralded the natural rights of all men; and on the other, they advised blacks to refrain from enjoying this newly conferred equality. Despite proclamations about the whip's demise, emergent forms of involuntary servitude, the coercive control of black labor, the repressive instrumentality of the law, and the social intercourse of everyday life revealed the entanglements of slavery and freedom. (S, 151)

**Emancipatory discourse merely reveals the truth of the fungibility of the slave. What may seem like a benign gesture in reality is just the actualization of the fancies of white people. Notions of humanism that justify acts of liberalism were created by the void left by the exclusion of blackness from humanity.**

**Wilderson ’10** {Frank; Associate Professor of African-American Studies at UC Irvine and has a Ph.D. from UC Berkeley; “Red, White & Black: Cinema and the Structure of U.S. Antagonisms,”}/MR

Again, what is important for us to glean from these historians is that the pre-Columbian period, the late Middle Ages, reveals no archive of debate on these three questions as they might be related to that massive group of black-skinned people south of the Sahara. Eltis suggests that there was indeed massive debate which ultimately led to Britain taking the lead in the abolition of slavery, but he reminds us that that debate did not have its roots in the late Middle Ages, the post-Columbian period of the 1500s or the Virginia colony period of the 1600s. It was, he asserts, an outgrowth of the mid- to late eighteenth-century emancipatory thrust— intra-Human disputes such as the French and American revolutions— that swept through Europe. But Eltis does not take his analysis further than this. Therefore, i**t is important that we not be swayed by his optimism about the Enlightenment and its subsequent abolitionist discourses. It is highly conceivable that the discourse that elaborates the justification for freeing the slave is not the product of the Human being having suddenly and miraculously recognized the slave**. Rather, as Saidiya Hartman argues**, emancipatory discourses present themselves to us as further evidence of the Slave’s fungibility: “The figurative capacities of blackness enable white flights of fancy while increasing the likelihood of the captive’s disappearance**.”27 First, **the questions of Humanism were elaborated in contradistinction to the human void**, to the African qua chattel (the 1 00s to the end of the 1600s). Second, **as the presence of Black chattel in the midst of exploited and unexploited Humans (workers and bosses, respectively) became a fact of the world, exploited Humans** (in the throes of class conflict with unexploited Humans) **seized the image of the Slave as an enabling vehicle that animated the evolving discourses of their own emancipation, just as unexploited Humans had seized the flesh of the Slave to increase their profits. Without this gratuitous violence, a violence that marks everyone experientially until the late Middle Ages when it starts to mark the Black ontologically, the so-called great emancipatory discourses of modernity— Marxism, feminism, postcolonialism, sexual liberation, and the ecology movement—political discourses predicated on grammars of suffering and whose constituent elements are exploitation and alienation, might not have developed.**28 **Chattel slavery did not simply reterritorialize the ontology of the African. It also created the Human out of culturally disparate entities from Europe to the East. I am not suggesting that across the globe Humanism developed in the same way regardless of region or culture; what I am saying is that the late Middle Ages gave rise to an ontological category—an ensemble of common existential concerns—which made and continues to make possible both war and peace, conflict and resolution, between the disparate members of the human race, East and West.** Senator Thomas Hart Benton intuited this notion of the existential commons when he wrote that though the “Yellow race” and its culture had been “torpid and stationary for thousands of years . . . [Whites and Asians] must talk together, and trade together, and marry together. Commerce is a great civilizer—social intercourse as great—and marriage greater.”29 Eltis points out that as late as the seventeenth century, “prisoners taken in the course of European military action . . . could expect death if they were leaders, or banishment if they were deemed followers, but never enslavement. . . . Detention followed by prisoner exchanges or ransoming was common.” “By the seventeenth century, enslavement of fellow Europeans was beyond the limits” of Humanism’s existential commons, even in times of war.30 Slave status “was reserved for non-Christians. Even the latter group however . . . had some prospect of release in exchange for Christians held by rulers of Algiers, Tunis, and other Mediterranean Muslim powers.”31 But though the practice of enslaving the vanquished was beyond the limit of wars among Western peoples and only practiced provisionally in East-West conflicts, the baseness of the option was not debated when it came to the African. The race of Humanism (White, Asian, South Asian, and Arab) could not have produced itself without the simultaneous production of that walking destruction which became known as the Black. Put another way, **through chattel slavery the world gave birth and coherence to both its joys of domesticity and to its struggles of political discontent; and with these joys and struggles the Human was born, but not before it murdered the Black, forging a symbiosis between the political ontology of Humanity and the social death of Blacks**.

**Their political discourse about freedom is paradoxically self-negating, by defining freedom as a structuring ontologic but then basing discussions of freedom on physical experiences, they have ignored the way in which blackness cannot have freedom in the world due to its ontological position.**

**Wilderson 10** (Frank, Red, Red, White, & Black: Cinema and the Structure of U.S. Antagonisms pg 35-36)/MR

Black slavery is foundational to modern Humanism’s ontics because “freedom” is the hub of Humanism’s infinite conceptual trajectories. But these trajectories only appear to be infinite. They are finite in the sense that they are predicated on the idea of freedom from... some contingency that can be named, or at least conceptualized. The contingent rider could be freedom from patriarchy, freedom from economic exploitation, freedom from political tyranny (for example, taxation without representation), freedom from heteronormativity, and so on. What I am suggesting is that first, **political discourse recognizes freedom as a structuring ontologic and then it works to disavow this recognition by imagining freedom not through political ontology—where it rightfully began—but through political experience (and practice); whereupon it immediately loses its ontological foundations. Why would anyone do this? Why would anyone start off with, quite literally, an earth-shattering ontologic and, in the process of meditating on it and acting through it, reduce it to an earth reforming experience? Why do Humans take such pride in self-adjustment, in diminishing, rather than intensifying, the project of liberation (how did we get from ’68 to the present)? Because, I contend, in allowing the notion of freedom to attain the ethical purity of its ontological status, one would have to lose one’s Human coordinates and become Black. Which is to say one would have to die. For the Black, freedom is an ontological, rather than experiential, question. There is no philosophically credible way to attach an experiential, a contingent, rider onto the notion of freedom when one considers the Black—such as freedom from gender or economic oppression, the kind of contingent riders rightfully placed on the non-Black when thinking freedom.** Rather, the riders that one could place on Black freedom would be hyperbolic—though no less true—and ultimately untenable: i.e., freedom from the world, freedom from humanity, freedom from everyone (including one’s Black self). Given the reigning episteme, what are the chances of elaborating a comprehensive, much less translatable and communicable, political project out of the necessity of freedom as an absolute? Gratuitous freedom has never been a trajectory of Humanist thought, which is why the infinite trajectories of freedom that emanate from Humanism’s hub are anything but infinite—for they have no line of flight leading to the Slave.

**Gender**

**Gender contestations operate much in the same way as civil societies various ethical dilemmas in that they are predicated off of the corporeal dissolution of blacks. The ability to own and contest in an agential capacity one’s body for the sake of gender and sexual liberation depends upon one’s immunity to the genital and fleshy mutilation that structurally positions blackness as a captive object as opposed to a willful subject.**

**Wilderson ’10** (FRANK B. WILDERSON 2010 - Professor of African America Studies and Drama at UC Irvine, Red White and Black - ERW) \*edited for racialized language

**I want to locate Bukhari-Alston's state-induced hemorrhaging and the subsequent destruction of her womb outside of and prior to the prison walls, spatially at the symbolic plentitude of the White woman's womb**, and temporally **at White femininity's moment of possibility.** This rich semantic field of **White female sexuality**, which spreads its tendrils through the conceits of civil society, **depends**, even for its discontents, **on a repetition of the always already mutilation and destruction of Black female sexuality**. For White women to embrace patriarchy as its celebrated dupe or to rail against it, for them to celebrate the confinement of domesticity or agitate for access to the workplace, for them to acquiesce to church doctrines of sexuality or proclaim "Our bodies, ourselves"—for all such conflicts to have coherence, find semiotic correspondence, cash in on symbolic value, and cultivate a semantic field, there must occur, in the first instance of ontological time, **the reification and destruction of Bukhari-Alston's womb.** White thought, even at its most radical outposts, is not possible without the unmooring of Black femininity. And this accumulated and destroyed sexuality (to recall the 1914 dissertation of H. M. Henry) is every White persons business to patrol, not only through the spectacular violence of a prison hospital, but also through White struggles over ethical dilemmas in civil society: the selection of topics, the distribution of concerns, emphasis, the bounding of debate within acceptable limits, and the propensity for the affective intensity of no more than everyday life27—so that Whites may be saddened by the spectacle of ghetto life in their own backyards yet find no joy at the thought of four dead cops. Everyday life, which is the backdrop, the hum, the private, and the quotidian of civil society, can only cohere by way of the imaginative labor which genocided and banished the object it constructed as "Savage" to the reservations of White ethics and by way of a simultaneous imaginative labor that keeps the gratuity of Black genital accumulation and destruction from occurring between White legs. **"Motherhood as female birthright," Spillers recalls, "is outraged, is denied [Black women] at the very same time that it becomes the founding term for [White women's] human and social enactment."** Spillers reinforces this point when she says that for the Black woman "mother' and enslavement' are indistinct categories," synonymous elements which define "a cultural situation that is father-lacking." Fortunati understands the sexual rubric differently, writing, "Within reproduction, the exchange [of labor power] takes place on three different levels. It, too, is an exchange of nonequivalents between unequals, but it does not appear even formally as an exchange that is organized in a capitalist way. Rather, it is an exchange that appears to take place between male workers and women, but in reality takes place between capital and women with male workers acting as the intermediaries."31 For Fortunati, capital has the female subject ensconced within a symbolic illusion in which it appears that the reproductive subject (mother/wife) confronts the productive subject (father/husband) when in fact they are both productive subjects confronted by capital. And the sooner they both realize it, the sooner they can get on with the workers' revolution. The same counterhegemonic, antiillusionary tactics that animate social movement theory and alternative cinema are implied in Fortunati's analysis. However, **gratuitous violence relegates the Slave to the taxonomy, the list of things. That is, it reduces the Slave to an object.** Motherhood, fatherhood, and gender differentiations can only be sustained in the taxonomy of subjects. A reading of Italian feminist thought through Spillers reminds us that the foundation of all **White feminist thought maintains its coherence not primarily through a conscious understanding of how the White female body is exploited, but through the unconscious libidinal understanding that**, no matter how bad exploitation becomes, **the White body can never fall prey to accumulation and fungibility: "Simple enough one has only not to be a ~~nigger~~."**32 In this way, the most radical White politics function as the patrols did during slavery. Like the grand emancipatory rhetoric of the American Revolution, **White feminism is inessential to and parasitic on the grammar of Bush Mama's suffering.** It polices and crowds out Dorothy's and Bukhari-Alston's ethical dilemmas because its emancipatory imperative is predicated on a refusal to relinquish its body to the ripped-apartness of Bush Mama's Black flesh. For Black people, the structure of essential antagonisms cannot be attributed, as Fortunati attributes it, to the illusory nature of the reproductive sphere (laws like STEP incarcerate "Black home" with scare quotes) where the woman's subordination to patriarchal capital is brought on by the illusory mystification of her mother-to-child, wife-to-husband relations (mystified and illusory because, as Fortunati would have it, the objective conditions of the woman's oppression stem from the fact that her waged relation to capital is hidden by capital). On the contrary, the ontological core of Black suffering is not lost in a labyrinth of production posing as a reproduction posing as natural motherhood. Nor, at the core of Black suffering, is the Black woman's (or man's) ontology erroneously gendered by patriarchal castration fears and masculine desire as in an Oedipal drama. For the production of Black suffering, as Spillers notes, no such hall of mirrors is necessary: "Gender, or sex-role assignation or the clear differentiation of sexual stuff, sustained elsewhere in the culture [i.e., available to White and non-Black women], does not emerge for the African-American female in this historic instance [an "instance" which Spiller reminds us spans from the Middle Passage to the Moynihan Report to the present] except indirectly, except as a way to reinforce through the process of birthing 'the reproduction of the relations of production.'" Spillers goes on to acknowledge the symmetry between the Black woman and Fortunati's working-class mother/wife, in that the birthing process is indeed one of the first steps in the reproduction of the relations of production. In other words, like White mothers, Black mothers, if they can be called mothers, can also help Black babies reproduce both themselves and the values and behavior patterns necessary to maintain civil society's system of hierarchy. But Spillers steadfastly insists that although Black CINEMATIC UNREST 137 "mothers" indeed experience the same "naturalized" attachments to their children (and to their partners) as mothers of the working class, **the Black woman cannot "claim her child."33 Black children do not belong to Black mothers (or fathers), just as Black men and women don't belong to, and thus cannot claim, each other: flesh is always already claimed by direct relations of force. As** a result, the conflicts that arise between the disparate ideological elements within civil society (i.e., the White Left and the White Right) ultimately strengthen White solidarity within the libidinal economy. The greater the intensity of the conflict, the more intense the unconscious reminder of what they can all agree on: that bodily reification and mutilation is not one of their dilemmas. It's a Black thing. And when this unconscious agreement is made available to speech and therefore becomes conscious, it is displaced onto a myriad of investments—one may call it environmentalism, multiculturalism, pacifism, or feminism, but I call it anti-Black policing.

**Their discussions of gender are rendered incoherent in how blackness functions in civil society and blackness disrupts their normative discussions of blackness which ignores how black bodies are inherently queered**

**Sharpe 14** (Christina, Ph.D., Cornell University MA, Cornell University BA, University of Pennsylvania, Associate Professor at Tufts University Department of English; Black Studies: In the Wake; Paradigm Publishers //SC)

\*edited for ablest language

In Scenes of Subjection: Terror, Slavery, and Self-Making in Nineteenth Century America, Saidiya Hartman writes that “nineteenth-century observers” of a coffle of enslaved people described that coffle (in its formation and its movement/passage) as “a domestic middle passage.”20 In “Mama’s Baby, Papa’s Maybe: An American Grammar Book,” Hortense Spillers writes that slavery transformed the black woman, she “became the principal point of passage between the human and the non-human world,” and that **Africans packed into the slave hold of the ship were marked according to EuroWestern definitions not as male and female but as differently sized and weighted property.** “Under these conditions,” she writes, “**we lose at least gender difference in the outcome and the female body and the male body become a territory of cultural and political maneuver not at all gender-related, gender-specific**” (Spillers 206). Reading together the middle passage, the coffle, and, I argue, the birth canal, we ~~see~~ how each has functioned separately and collectively over time to disfigure black maternity, **to turn the womb into a factory (producing blackness as abjection much like the slave ship’s hold and the prison**), and turning the birth canal into another domestic middle passage with black mothers, after the end of legal hypodescent, still ushering their children into her condition; her non-status, her non-being-ness. By way of confirming this, we need look no farther than our Twitter time lines, the news, or to the series of anti-abortion websites and billboard ads by groups like “Life Always” (the now defunct thatsabortion.com) that feature images of pregnant black women or black children and text that reads, “The most dangerous place for an African American is in the womb.”21 Despite an alarming lack of access to prenatal care,22 the most dangerous place for an African American (for US blacks and blacks in the United States) is not in the womb. The many dangers faced by black people, children or not, increase exponentially once one emerges from that passage, once one is birthed by and from a black woman. Womb to tomb all over again.

**Hegemony**

**Hegemony is a global racial formation that spreads the American doctrine of anti-blackness across different cultures.**

**Rodriguez 07,** [Dylan, PhD in Ethnic Studies Program of the University of California Berkeley and Associate Professor of Ethnic Studies at University of California Riverside, “American Globality And the US Prison regime: State Violence And White Supremacy from Abu Ghraib to Stockton to bagong diwa”]//MHELLIE

In fact, the notion of American globality I have begun discussing here already exceeds negri and Hardt’s formulation to the extent that it is a global racial formation, and more pointedly a global mobilization of a white supremacist social formation (read: a united States of America formed by the social-economic geographies of racial chattel slavery and their recodification through the post-13th Amendment innovation of other technologies of criminalization and imprisonment). The US prison regime’s production of human immobilization and death composes some of the fundamental modalities of American national coherence. It inscribes two forms of domination that tend to slip from the attention of political theorists, including Negri and Hardt: first, the prison regime strategically institutionalizes the biopolitical structures of white racial/nationalist ascendancy—it quite concretely provides a definition for white American personhood, citizenship, freedom, and racialized patriotism. Second, the prison regime reflects the moral, spiritual, and cultural inscription of Manifest Destiny (and its descendant material cultural and state-building articulations of racist and white supremacist conquest, genocide, and population control) across different historical moments. to invoke and critically rearticulate negri and Hardt’s formulation, the focal question becomes: How does the right of the uS-as-global police to kill, detain, obliterate become voiced, juridically coded, and culturally recoded? the structure of presumption—and therefore relative political silence—enmeshing the prison’s centrality to the logic of American globality is precisely evidence of the fundamental power of the uS prison regime within the larger schema of American hegemony. In this sense the uS prison regime is ultimately really not an “institution.” rather it is a formulation of world order (hence, a dynamic and perpetual labor of institutionalization rather than a definitive modernist institution) in which massively scaled, endlessly strategized technologies of human immobilization address (while never fully resolving) the socio-political crises of globalization. The US prison regime defines a global logic of social organization that constitutes, mobilizes, and prototypes across various localities. What would it mean, then, to consider state-crafted, white supremacist modalities of imprisonment as the perpetual end rather than the self-contained means of American globality? I am suggesting a conception of the prison regime that focuses on what cultural and political theorist Allen Feldman calls a “formation of violence,” which anchors the contemporary articulation of white supremacy as a global technology of coercion and hegemony. Feldman writes, the growing autonomy of violence as a self-legitimating sphere of social discourse and transaction points to the inability of any sphere of social practice to totalize society. Violence itself both reflects and accelerates the experience of society as an incomplete project, as something to be made. As a formation of violence that self-perpetuates a peculiar social project through the discursive structures of warfare, the US prison regime composes an acute formation of racial and white supremacist violence, and thus houses the capacity for mobilization of an epochal (and peculiar) white supremacist global logic. This contention should not be confused with the sometimes parochial (if not politically chauvinistic) proposition that American state and state-sanctioned regimes of bodily violence and human immobilization are somehow self-contained “domestic” productions that are exceptional to the united States of America, and that other “global” sites simply “import,” imitate, or reenact these institutionalizations of power. In fact, I am suggesting the opposite: the US prison regime exceeds as it enmeshes the ensemble of social relations that cohere uS civil society, and is fundamental to the geographic transformations, institutional vicissitudes, and militarized/economic mobilizations of “globalization” generally. to assert this, however, is to also argue that the constituting violence of the US prison regime has remained somewhat undertheorized and objectified in the overlapping realms of public discourse, activist mobilization, and (grassroots as well as professional) scholarly praxis. Here I am arguing that it is not possible to conceptualize and critically address the emergence and global proliferation of the (uS/global) prison industrial complex outside a fundamental understanding of what are literally its technical and technological premises: namely, its complex organization and creative production of racist and white supremacist bodily violence. It is only in this context, I would say, that we can examine the problem of how “the Prison” is a modality (and not just a reified product or outcome) of American statecraft in the current political moment. It is only a theoretical foregrounding of the white supremacist state and social formation of the united States that will allow us to understand the uS prison regime as an American globality that materializes as it prototypes state violence and for that matter, “state power” itself through a specific institutional site.

**Human Rights**

**The rhetoric of human rights in reality is the rhetoric of the “savior”. Western civilizations feel the need to save those who they consider to be “savages”.**

**Mutua 2K,** [Makaij, Professor of Law at State university of New York at Buffalo, “Villanova Law Review, 45 Vill. L. Rev. 841”]//MHELLIE

Even **the international law of human rights**, arguably the most benign of all the areas of international law, **seeks the universalization of Eurocentrism**. The human rights corpus is driven by what I have called the savage-victim-savior metaphor, in which human rights is a grand narrative of an epochal contest that pits savages against victims and saviors. n32 **In this script of human rights, democracy and western liberalism are internationalized to save savage non-Western cultures from themselves and to "alleviate" |"\*8511 the suffering of victims,** who are generally non-Western and non-European. n33 In the human rights idiom, the European West becomes the savior of hapless victims whose salvation lies only in the transformation of their savage cultures through the imposition of human rights. Attempts to craft a truly universal regime of rights, one that reflects the complexity and the diversity of all cultures, have generally been viewed with indifference or hostility by the official guardians of human rights.

**Humanism**

**The logic of humanism can never think of blackness as an ontology, but rather as a contingency. Humanism has no way to theorize the position of the slave because it requires a subject that does not exist as dialectically opposed to society.**

**Wilderson 10** (Frank Wilderson, 2010, Frank B. Wilderson is an Associate Professor of African-American Studies at UC Irvine and has a Ph.D. from UC Berkeley, “Red, White & Black: Cinema and the Structure of U.S. Antagonisms,” ; published in 2010; p 74-75)

In the Introduction and the preceding chapter, we have seen how **the aporia between Black being and political ontology has existed since Arab and European enslavement of Africans,** **and** **how** **the need** to craft an ensemble of questions through which **to arrive at an unflinching paradigmatic analysis of political ontology is repeatedly thwarted in its attempts to find a language that can express the violence of slave-making, a violence that is both structural and performative.** Humanist discourse, the discourse whose epistemological machinations provide our conceptual frameworks for thinking political ontology, is diverse and contrary. But for all its diversity and contrariness it is sutured by an implicit rhetorical consensus that violence accrues to the Human body as a result of transgressions, whether real or imagined, within the Symbolic Order. That is to say, **Humanist discourse can only think a subject’s relation to violence as a contingency and not as a matrix that positions the subject**. **Put another way, Humanism has no theory of the slave because it imagines a subject who has been either alienated in language (Lacan) and/or alienated from his/her cartographic and temporal capacities (Marx). It cannot imagine an object who has been positioned by gratuitous violence and who has no cartographic and temporal capacities to lose**—a sentient being for whom recognition and incorporation is impossible. In short, **political ontology, as imagined through Humanism, can only produce discourse that has as its foundation alienation and exploitation as a grammar of suffering, when what is needed (for the Black, who is always already a slave) is an ensemble of ontological questions that has as its foundation accumulation and fungibility as a grammar of suffering (Hartman).** The violence of the Middle Passage and the slave estate (Spillers), technologies of accumulation and fungibility, recompose and reenact their horrors upon each succeeding generation of Blacks. **This violence is** both **gratuitous, that is, it is not contingent upon transgressions against the hegemony of civil society; and structural, in that it positions Blacks ontologically outside of humanity and civil society.** Simultaneously, it renders the ontological status of humanity (life itself) wholly dependent on civil society’s repetition compulsion: the frenzied and fragmented machinations **through which civil society reenacts gratuitous violence upon the Black**—that civil society might know itself as the domain of humans—generation after generation. Again, we need a new language of abstraction to explain this horror. **The explanatory power of Humanist discourse is bankrupt in the face of the Black. It is inadequate and inessential to, as well as parasitic on, the ensemble of questions which the dead but sentient thing, the Black, struggles to articulate in a world of living subjects**. My work on film, cultural theory, and political ontology marks my attempt to contribute to this often fragmented and constantly assaulted quest to forge a language of abstraction with explanatory powers emphatic enough to embrace the Black, an accumulated and fungible object, in a human world of exploited and alienated subjects. The imposition of Humanism’s assumptive logic has encumbered Black film studies to the extent that it is underwritten by the assumptive logic of White or non-Black film studies.

**International Relations**

**Discussions of international relations focus solely on macro-political superstructures while ignoring the macro-metaphysical superstructure that coheres civil society.**

**Persaud et al 01** [Randolph B, associate Professor School of International Service, R.B.J, “Apertura: Race in International Relations”, https://www.questia.com/library/journal/1G1-82517371/apertura-race-in-international-relations]//MHELLIE

The theory of international relations has shown a famous aversion to complex and multiply contested concepts**. It has been especially silent about race**, as about **many other practices that cannot be quickly reduced to claims about the necessities of states in a modern states-system**. Like culture, economy, or gender, it does not fit into the prevailing division of the world into "levels" above (the international) and below (the individual) the state. Unlike culture, economy, and gender, **there has been very little attempt to insist that claims about race do indeed deserve serious discussion in the context of a changing international or global order**. From time to time, of course, the discipline does open up to problems hitherto deemed outside its epistemological boundaries. "Opening up" has historically resulted from sustained wars of position between the forces that represent a broadening of the proper subjects of the discipline and those who insist that international relations (IR) is about "war and peace" among states. It may be time for one more apertura; namely, for race to be systematically incorporated into the analysis of global politics. Consider the following: The first global attempt to speak of equality focused upon race. The first human rights provisions in the United Nations Charter were placed there because of race. The first international challenge to a country's claim of domestic jurisdiction and exclusive treatment of its own citizens centered upon race. The international convention with the greatest number of signatories is that on race. Within the United Nations, more resolutions deal with race than any other subject. And certainly one of the most long-standing and frustrating problems in the United Nations is that of race. Nearly one hundred eighty governments, for example, recently went as far as to conclude that racial discrimination and racism still represent the most serious problems for the world today. (1) Extensive as it is, the above synopsis provided by Paul G. Lauren must be viewed as very limited indeed. The significance of race goes much beyond various multilateral and other diplomatic achievements. Race has been a fundamental force in the very making of the modern world system and in the representations and explanations of how that system emerged and how it works. This can only be understood, however, if we look at race as an interrelated set of material, ideological, and epistemological practices. The articulation of these latter into full-fledged racialized discourses have produced, over time, social formations and even world orders that were macrostructural systems of inclusion and exclusion.

**Law**

**Reliance on legality as a metric of progress fuels a violent temporal narrative that materializes the permanency of whiteness – Western common law demands a series of affective attachments to the law, which ensures bodies come to desire the structure that produces violence– do you find yourself trapped within the auspices of hope, or do you desire to craft yourself otherwise, affirming the imperceptible politics of refusal.**

**Warren**, Assistant Professor of American Studies, **2015** (Calvin, research fellow at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee in Africology, "Black Nihilism and the Politics of Hope", CR: The New Centennial Review, 15.1, accessed on 9/26/15 – hhs ew)

Throughout this essay, I have argued that the Politics of hope preserve metaphysical structures that sustain black suffering. This preservation amounts to an exploitation of hope—when the Political colonizes the spiritual principle of hope and puts it in the service of extending the “will to power” of an anti-black organization of existence. **The Politics of hope**, then, **is bound up with metaphysical violence, and this violence masquerades as a “solution” to the problem of anti-blackness. Temporal linearity, perfection, betterment, struggle, work, and utopian futurity are conceptual instruments of the Political that will never obviate black suffering or anti-black violence**; these concepts only serve to reproduce the conditions that render existence unbearablefor blacks. Political theologians and black optimists avoid the immediacy of black suffering, the horror of anti-black pulverization, and place relief in a “not-yet-but-is (maybe)-to-come-social order” that, itself, can do little more but admonish blacks to survive to keep struggling. **Political hope becomes a vicious and abusive cycle of struggle**—it mirrors the Lacanian drive, and we encircle an object (black freedom, justice, relief, redress, equality, etc.) that is inaccessible because it doesn’t really exist. **The** political theologian and **black optimis**t, then, **propose a collective Jouissance as an answer to black suffering**—finding the joy in struggle, the victory in toil, and the satisfaction in inefficacious action. **We continue to “struggle” and “work” as black youth are slaughtered daily, black bodies are incarcerated as forms of capital, black infant mortality rates are soaring, and hunger is disabling the bodies, minds, and spirits of desperate black youth**. In short, these conditions are deep metaphysical problems—the sadistic pleasure of metaphysical domination— and “work” and “struggle” avoid the terrifying fact that the world depends on Black Death to sustain itself. Black nihilism attempts to break this “drive”—to stop it in its tracks, as it were—and to end the cycle of insanity that political hope perpetuates. The question that remains is a question often put to the black nihilist: what is the point? This compulsory geometrical structuring of thought—all knowledge must submit to, and is reducible to, a point—it is an epistemic flicker of certainty, determination, and, to put it bluntly, life. **“The point” exists for life**; it enlivens, enables, and sustains knowledge. Thought outside of this mandatory point is illegible and useless. To write outside of the “episteme of life” and its grammar will require a position outside of this point, a position somewhere in the infinite horizon of thought (perhaps this is what Heidegger wanted to do with his reconfiguration of thought). Writing in this way is inherently subversive and refuses the geometry of thought. Nevertheless, the nihilist is forced to enunciate his/her [their] refusal through a “point,” a point that is contradictory and paradoxical all at once. To say that the point of this essay is that “the point” is fraudulent—its promise of clarity and life are inadequate— will not satisfy the hunger of disciplining the nihilist and insisting that one undermine the very ground upon which one stands. Black nihilistic hermeneutics resists “the point” but is subjected to it to have one’s voice heard within the marketplace of ideas. **The “point” of this essay is that political hope is pointless. Black suffering is an essential part of the world, and placing hope in the very structure that sustains metaphysical violence, the Political, will never resolve anything.** This is why the black nihilist speaks of “exploited hope,” and the black nihilist attempts to wrest hope from the clutches of the Political. Can we think of hope outside the Political? Must “salvation” translate into a political grammar or a political program? The nihilist, then, hopes for the end of political hope and its metaphysical violence. Nihilism is not antithetical to hope; it does not extinguish hope but reconfigures it. Hope is the foundation of the black nihilistic hermeneutic. In “Blackness and Nothingness,” Fred Moten (2013) conceptualizes blackness as a “pathogen” to metaphysics, something that has the ability to unravel, to disable, and to destroy anti-blackness. If we read Vattimo through Moten’s brilliant analysis, we can suggest that blackness is the limit that Heidegger and Nietzsche were really after. It is a “blackened” world that will ultimately end metaphysics, but putting an end to metaphysics will also put an end to the world itself—this is the nihilism that the black nihilist must theorize through. This is a far cry from what we call “anarchy,” however. The black nihilist has as little faith in the metaphysical reorganization of society through anarchy than he/she does [they do] in traditional forms of political existence. The black nihilist offers political apostasy as the spiritual practice of denouncing metaphysical violence, black suffering, and the idol of antiblackness. The act of renouncing will not change political structures or offer a political program; instead, it is the act of retrieving the spiritual concept of hope from the captivity of the Political. Ultimately, **it is impossible to end metaphysics without ending blackness, and the black nihilist will never be able to withdraw from the Political completely without a certain death-drive or being-toward-death. This is the essence of black suffering: the lack of reprieve from metaphysics, the tormenting complicity in the reproduction of violence, and the lack of a coherent grammar to articulate these dilemmas.** After contemplating these issues for some time in my office, I decided to take a train home. As I awaited my train in the station, an older black woman asked me about the train schedule and when I would expect the next train headed toward Dupont Circle. When I told her the trains were running slowly, she began to talk about the government shutdown. “They don’t care anything about us, you know,” she said. “We elect these people into office, we vote for them, and they watch black people suffer and have no intentions of doing anything about it.” I shook my head in agreement and listened intently. “I’m going to stop voting, and supporting this process; why should I keep doing this and our people continue to suffer,” she said. I looked at her and said, “I don’t know ma’am; I just don’t understand it myself.” She then laughed and thanked me for listening to her—as if our conversation were somewhat cathartic. “You know, people think you’re crazy when you say things like this,” she said giving me a wink. “Yes they do,” I said. “But I am a free woman,” she emphasized “and I won’t go back.” Shocked, I smiled at her, and she winked at me; at that moment I realized that her wisdom and courage penetrated my mind and demanded answers. I’ve thought about this conversation for some time, and it is for this reason I had to write this essay. To the brave woman at the train station, I must say you are not crazy at all but thinking outside of metaphysical time, space, and violence. Ultimately, we must hope for the end of political hope.

**Marx**

**Any discussion of liberation must first begin with the structural position of blackness. The privelged subject of Marxist discourse is the subect that is structured by capital, not anti-blackness. This inhibits the ability of Marx to think of white supremacy as the foundation of modern antagonisms.**

**Wilderson 03**, [Frank B., Professor at UC Irvine, “Gramsci’s Black Marx: Whither the Slave in Civil Society?”, P. 225-6]//MHELLIE

**Any serious consideration of the question of antagonistic identity formation — a formation, the mass mobilisation of which can precipitate a crisis in the institutions and assumptive logic which undergird the United States of Amer- ica — must come to grips with the limitations of marxist discourse in the face of the black subject**. This is because the United States is constructed at the intersection of both a capitalist and white supremacist matrix. And the privi- leged subject of marxist discourse is a subaltern who is approached by variable capital — a wage. In other words, marxism assumes a subaltern structured by capital, not by white supremacy. In this scenario, racism is read off the base, as it were, as being derivative of political economy. This is not an adequate subalternity from which to think the elaboration of antagonistic identity formation; not if we are truly committed to elaborating a theory of crisis — crisis at the crux of America’s institutional and discursive strategies. The scandal with which the black subject position threatens Gramscian discourse is manifest in the subject’s ontological disarticulation of Gramscian categories: work, progress, production, exploitation, hegemony, and historical self-awareness. By examining the strategy and structure of the black subject’s absence in Antonio Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks and by contemplating the black subject’s incommensurability with the key categories of Gramscian theory, we come face to face with three unsettling consequences. Firstly, the black American subject imposes a radical incoherence upon the assumptive logic of Gramscian discourse. In other words, s/he implies a scandal. Secondly, the black subject reveals marxism’s inability to think white supremacy as the base and, in so doing, calls into question marxism’s claim to elaborate a comprehensive, or in the words of Antonio Gramsci, ‘decisive’ antagonism. Stated another way: Gramscian marxism is able to imagine the subject which transforms her/himself into a mass of antagonistic identity formations, formations which can precipitate a crisis in wage slavery, exploi- tation, and/or hegemony, but it is asleep at the wheel when asked to provide enabling antagonisms toward unwaged slavery, despotism, and/or terror. Finally, we begin to see how marxism suffers from a kind of conceptual anxiety: a desire for socialism on the other side of crisis — a society which does away not with the category of worker, but with the imposition workers suffer under the approach of variable capital: in other words, the mark of its conceptual anxiety is in its desire to democratise work and thus help keep in place, ensure the coherence of, the Reformation and Enlightenment ‘founda- tional’ values of productivity and progress. This is a crowding-out scenario for other post-revolutionary possibilities, i.e. idleness. Why interrogate Gramsci with the political predicament and desire of the black(ened) subject position in the Western Hemisphere? Because the Prison Notebooks’ intentionality, and general reception, lay claim to universal appli- cability. Neither Gramsci nor his spiritual progenitors in the form of scholars or activists say that the Gramscian project sows the seeds of freedom for whites only. Instead, they claim that deep within the organicity of the organic intellectual is the organic black intellectual, the organic Chinese intellectual, the organic South American intellectual and so on; that though there are historical and cultural variances, there is a structural consistency which elaborates all organic intellectuals and undergirds all resistance. Through what strategies does the black subject destabilise — emerge as the unthought, and thus the scandal of — historical materialism? How does the black subject distort and expand marxist categories in ways that create, in the words of Hortense Spillers, ‘a distended organisational calculus’? (Spillers 1996, p. 82). We could put the question another way: How does the black subject function within the American desiring machine differently than the quintessential Gramscian subaltern, the worker? Before going more deeply into how the black subject position destabilises or disarticulates the categories foundational to the assumptive logic of marixsm, it’s important to allow ourselves a digression that attempts to schematise the Gramscian project on its own terms.

**Marx’s conception of revolution does not does entail a destruction of civil society, but rather a restructing of its power hierarchy. In this way, the affs revolutionary strategy can only take place in the arena of civil society. As such, all the alternative results in is an expansion of civil society, giving it the impression of ethicality, which only further exacerbates the way that blackness is relegated to the position of the unthought.**

**Wilderson 03**, [Frank B., Professor at UC Irvine, “Gramsci’s Black Marx: Whither the Slave in Civil Society?”, P. 226-9]//MHELLIE

The Gramscian Dream Students of struggle return, doggedly, to the Prison Notebooks for insights regarding how to bring about a revolution in a society in which state/capital formations are in some way protected by the ‘trenches’ of civil society. It is this outer perimeter, this discursive ‘trench’, constructed by an ensemble of private initiatives, activities, and an ensemble of pose-able questions (hegemony), which must be reconfigured before a revolution can take the form of a frontal assault. But this trench called civil society is not, for Gramsci, in and of itself the bane of the working class. Instead it represents a terrain to be occupied, assumed, and appropriated in a pedagogic project of transforming ‘common sense’ into ‘good sense’. This notion of ‘destruction-construction’ is a War of Position which involves agitating within civil society in a ‘revolutionary move- ment’ that builds ‘qualitatively new social relationships’ (Sassoon, 1987, p. 15): [A War of Position] is a struggle that engages on a wide range of fronts in which the state as normally defined ... is only one aspect. [For Gramsci a War of Position is the most ‘decisive’ form of engagement] because it is the form in which bourgeois power is exercised [and victory on] these fronts makes possible or conclusive a frontal attack or War of Movement. (Sassoon, 1987, pp. 15–17) In other words, for revolution to be feasible the proletariat must be ‘hailed’, in the Althusserian sense of the word, to a revolutionary position. And, for Gramsci, it is within this ‘trench’ between the economic structure and the state (with its legislation and its coercion), within civil society, that this hailing must take place. Again, for that to happen the trench, civil society, must be trans- formed. A War of Position can be summed up as a process by which workers struggling against capital and the state forge organs of working class civil society which in turn elaborate organic intellectuals capable of assimilating certain traditional intellectuals, and throughout the whole process all the struggle’s personnel, if you will, fashion a discourse on all of civil society’s fronts through which they eventually become hegemonic. In this way the ‘common sense’, the ‘spontaneous’ consent of the ruled toward the ideology of the rulers, finds its ‘good sense’, fragments of antagonistic sentiment trans- formed into an ensemble of questions which, prior to this process, could not be posed (i.e., What is to be done?). Common sense, by way of contrast, is an effect of ‘the prevailing forma mentis’. It involves the notion that the social order can be perfected through ‘fair and open’ competition ... [and it] seeks to remedy problems and injustices through reforms fought for and negotiated among competing groups within the existing overall structure ... thus leaving the juridical-administrative apparatus of the state more or less intact ... It ... makes the revolution- ary idea of eliminating competitiveness (i.e., greed) as the primary motivating force in society seem unreasonable, unrealistic, or even dangerous. (Buttigieg. 1995, p. 13) The pedagogical implications are self-evident. For Gramsci this is a process through which various strata of the class struggling for dominance achieve ‘historical self-awareness’ (Gramsci, 1971, pp. 333–35). And for this reason civil society itself is not the bane of workers because its constituent elements (as opposed to the way those elements are combined) are not anti-worker.1 Therefore: [**Gramsci’s] purpose is not to repress civil society or to restrict its space but rather to develop a revolutionary strategy (a ‘war of position’) that would be employed precisely in the arena of civil society, with the aim of disabling the coercive apparatus of the state, gaining access to political power, and creating the conditions that could give rise to a consensual society wherein no individual or group is reduced to a subaltern**. (Buttigieg, 1995, p. 7) At this moment (the end of subalternity by way of the destruction of the ruling class) the State becomes ‘ethical’. Gramsci writes: Every State is ethical in as much as one of its most important functions is to raise the great mass of the population to a particular cultural and moral level, a level (or type) which corresponds to the needs of the productive forces for development, and hence to the interests of the ruling classes. (1971, p. 258) He suggests that schools and courts perform this function for the State, before describing the ‘so-called private initiatives and activities’ which form the hegemonic apparatuses of the ruling class. But these private initiatives (i.e., newspapers, cinema, guild associations) are not ‘ethical’ precisely because of their ability to exist in tandem with the State and/or due to their function as its outright handmaidens (i.e., lobbyists, PACs). [Therefore] only the social group [his code word for ‘class’, in an attempt to secure the Notebooks’ safe passage past Mussolini’s prison censors] that poses the end of the State and its own end as the target to be achieved can create an ethical State — i.e. one which tends to put an end to the internal divisions of the ruled ... and to create a technically and morally unitary social organism. (p. 259) In other words, ‘civil society can only be the site of universal freedom when it extends to the point of becoming the state, that is, when the need for political society is obviated’ (Buttigieg, 1995, p. 30). ‘[T]he phenomenon of ‘subordination’ ... occurs without coercion; it is an instance of power that is exercised and extended in civil society, resulting in the hegemony of one class over others who, for their part, acquiesce to it willingly or, as Gramsci puts it, ‘spontaneously’. (Buttigieg, 1995, p. 22) What appears to be spontaneous is a product of consent manufactured by intellectuals of the ruling class. Again, not only is consent manufactured but it is backed up by coercion-in-reserve, what Gramsci calls political society: the courts, the army, the police, and, for the past 57 years, the atomic bomb. It is true that Gramsci acknowledges no organic division between political society and civil society. He makes the division for methodological purposes. There is one organism, ‘the modern bourgeois-liberal state’ (Buttigieg, 1995, p. 28), but there are two qualitatively different kinds of apparatuses: on the one hand, the ensemble of so-called private associations and ideological invitations to participate in a wide and varied play of consensus-making strategies (civil society), and on the other hand, a set of enforcement structures which kick in when that ensemble is regressive or can no longer lead (political society). But Gramsci would have us believe not that white positionality emerges and is elaborated on the terrain of civil society and encounters coercion when civil society is not expansive enough to embrace the idea of freedom for all, but that all positionalities emerge and are elaborated on the terrain of civil society. Gramsci does not racialise this birth, elaboration, and stunting, or re-emerg- ence, of human subjectivity — because civil society, supposedly, elaborates all subjectivity and so there is no need for such specificity. Anglo-American Gramscians, like Buttigieg and Sassoon, and US activists in the anti-globalisation movement whose unspoken grammar is predicated on Gramsci’s assumptive logic, continue this tradition of unraced positionality which allows them to posit the valency of Wars of Position for blacks and whites alike. They assume that all subjects are positioned in such a way as to have their consent solicited and to be able to extend their consent ‘sponta- neously’. This is profoundly problematic if only — leaving revolution aside for the moment — at the level of analysis; for it assumes that hegemony with its three constituent elements (influence, leadership, consent) is the modality which must be either inculcated or breached, if one is to either avoid or incur, respectively, the violence of the state. However, one of the primary claims of this essay is that, whereas the consent of black people may seem to be called upon, its withdrawal does not precipitate a ‘crisis in authority’. Put another way, the transformation of black people’s acquiescent ‘common sense’ into revolutionary ‘good sense’ is an extenuating circumstance, but not the catalyst, of State violence against black people. **State violence against the black body, as Martinot and Sexton suggest in their introduction, is not contingent, it is structural and, above all, gratuitous. Therefore, Gramscian wisdom cannot imagine the emergence, elaboration, and stunting of a subject by way, not of the contingency of violence resulting in a ‘crisis of authority’, but by way of direct relations of force.** This is remarkable, and unfortunate, given the fact that the emergence of the slave, the subject- effect of an ensemble of direct relations of force, marks the emergence of capitalism itself. Let us put a finer point on it: violence towards the black body is the precondition for the existence of Gramsci’s single entity ‘the modern bourgeois-state’ with its divided apparatus, political society and civil society. This is to say **violence against black people is ontological and gratuitous as opposed to merely ideological and contingent.**2 Furthermore, no magical mo- ment (i.e., 1865) transformed paradigmatically the black body’s relation to this entity.3 In this regard, the hegemonic advances within civil society by the Left hold out no more possibility for black life than the coercive backlash of political society. What many political theorists have either missed or ignored is that a crisis of authority that might take place by way of a Left expansion of civil society, further instantiates, rather than dismantles, the authority of whiteness. **Black death is the modern bourgeois-state’s recreational pastime, but the hunting season is not confined to the time (and place) of political society; blacks are fair game as a result of a progressively expanding civil society as well.**

**Marx’s analysis does not account for the way that capital was kick started by the violence done to the African continent. This means that Marx’s analysis is predicated off of the notion of hegemony as a way to understand the relationship between worker and bourgeoisie. However, this modality of thought is incapable of understanding the antagonistic relationship between blackness and civil society, the particular grammar of suffering of blackness. In other words, the worker represents a demand that can be actuated by shifting structural positions whereas the slave represents a demand that can only be achieved by ending the world itself.**

**Wilderson 03**, [Frank B., Professor at UC Irvine, “Gramsci’s Black Marx: Whither the Slave in Civil Society?”, P. 229-232]//MHELLIE

Civil Death in Civil Society **Capital was kick-started by the rape of the African continent. This phenomenon is central to neither Gramsci nor Marx.** The theoretical importance of emphasis- ing this in the early twenty-first century is two-fold: first, ‘the socio-political order of the New World’ (Spillers, 1987, p. 67) was kick-started by approaching a particular body (a black body) with direct relations of force, not by approach- ing a white body with variable capital. Thus, one could say that slavery — the ‘accumulation’ of black bodies regardless of their utility as labourers (Hartman; Johnson) through an idiom of despotic power (Patterson) — is closer to capital’s primal desire than is waged oppression — the ‘exploitation’ of unraced bodies (Marx, Lenin, Gramsci) that labour through an idiom of rational/symbolic (the wage) power: A relation of terror as opposed to a relation of hegemony.4 Secondly, today, late capital is imposing a renaissance of this original desire, direct relations of force (the prison industrial complex), the despotism of the unwaged relation: and this Renaissance of slavery has, once again, as its structuring image in libidinal economy, and its primary target in political economy, the black body. The value of reintroducing the unthought category of the slave, by way of noting the absence of the black subject, lies in the black subject’s potential for extending the demand placed on state/capital formations because its re-intro- duction into the discourse expands the intensity of the antagonism. In other words, **the slave makes a demand, which is in excess of the demand made by the worker**. The worker demands that productivity be fair and democratic (Gramsci’s new hegemony, Lenin’s dictatorship of the proletariat), the slave, on the other hand, demands that production stop; stop without recourse to its ultimate democratisation. Work is not an organic principle for the slave. **The absence of black subjectivity from the crux of marxist discourse is symptomatic of the discourse’s inability to cope with the possibility that the generative subject of capitalism, the black body of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, and the generative subject that resolves late-capital’s over-accumulation crisis, the black (incarcerated) body of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, do not reify the basic categories which structure marxist conflict: the categories of work, production, exploitation, historical self-awareness and, above all, hege- mony.** If, by way of the black subject, we consider the underlying grammar of the question ‘What does it mean to be free?’ that grammar being the question ‘What does it mean to suffer?’ then we come up against a grammar of suffering not only in excess of any semiotics of exploitation, but a grammar of suffering beyond signification itself, a suffering that cannot be spoken because the gratuitous terror of white supremacy is as much contingent upon the irrational- ity of white fantasies and shared pleasures as it is upon a logic — the logic of capital. It extends beyond texualisation. When talking about this terror, Cornel West uses the term ‘black invisibility and namelessness’ to designate, at the level of ontology, what we are calling a scandal at the level of discourse. He writes: [America’s] unrelenting assault on black humanity produced the funda- mental condition of black culture — that of black invisibility and namelessness. On the crucial existential level relating to black invisibility and namelessness, the first difficult challenge and demanding discipline is to ward off madness and discredit suicide as a desirable option. A central preoccupation of black culture is that of confronting candidly the ontological wounds, psychic scars, and existential bruises of black peo- ple while fending off insanity and self-annihilation. This is why the ‘ur-text’ of black culture is neither a word nor a book, not an architec- tural monument or a legal brief. Instead, it is a guttural cry and a wrenching moan — a cry not so much for help as for home, a moan less out of complaint than for recognition. (1996, pp. 80–81). **Thus, the black subject position in America is an antagonism, a demand that can not be satisfied through a transfer of ownership/organisation of existing rubrics; whereas the Gramscian subject, the worker, represents a demand that can indeed be satisfied by way of a successful War of Position, which brings about the end of exploitation**. The worker calls into question the legitimacy of productive practices, the slave calls into question the legitimacy of productivity itself. From the positionality of the worker the question, ‘What does it mean to be free?’ is raised. But the question hides the process by which the discourse assumes a hidden grammar which has already posed and answered the question, ‘What does it mean to suffer?’ And that grammar is organised around the categories of exploitation (unfair labour relations or wage slavery). Thus, exploitation (wage slavery) is the only category of oppression which concerns Gramsci: society, Western society, thrives on the exploitation of the Gramscian subject. Full stop. Again, this is inadequate, because it would call white supremacy ‘racism’ and articulate it as a derivative phenomenon of the capitalist matrix, rather than incorporating white supremacy as a matrix constituent to the base, if not the base itself. What I am saying is that **the insatiability of the slave demand upon existing structures means that it cannot find its articulation within the modality of hegemony** (influence, leadership, consent) — the black body cannot give its consent because ‘generalised trust’, the precondition for the solicitation of consent, ‘equals racialised whiteness’ (Barrett). Furthermore, as Patterson points out, slavery is natal alienation by way of social death, which is to say that a slave has no symbolic currency or material labour power to exchange: a slave does not enter into a transaction of value (however asymmetrical) but is subsumed by direct relations of force, which is to say that **a slave is an articulation of a despotic irrationality whereas the worker is an articulation of a symbolic rationality.** White supremacy’s despotic irrationality is as founda- tional to American institutionality as capitalism’s symbolic rationality because, as West writes, it dictates the limits of the operation of American democracy — with black folk the indispensable sacrificial lamb vital to its sustenance. Hence black subordination constitutes the necessary condition for the flourishing of American democracy, the tragic prerequisite for America itself. This is, in part, what Richard Wright meant when he noted, ‘The Negro is America’s metaphor’. (1996, p. 72) And it is well known that a metaphor comes into being through a violence that kills, rather than merely exploits, the object so that the concept might live. West’s interventions help us see how **marxism can only come to grips with America’s structuring rationality — what it calls capitalism, or political econ- omy; but cannot come to grips with America’s structuring irrationality: the libidinal economy of white supremacy, and its hyper-discursive violence that** kills the black subject so that the concept, civil society, may live. In other words, from the incoherence of black death, America generates the coherence of white life. This is important when considering the Gramscian paradigm (and its progenitors in the world of US social movements today) which is so dependent on the empirical status of hegemony and civil society: struggles over hegemony are seldom, if ever, asignifying — at some point they require coherence, they require categories for the record — which means they contain the seeds of anti-blackness.

**Marx’s revolution is not reverse causal – there is no indication that once the system of worker exploitation has been ended, it will do anything for the slave. This reveals a fundamental distinction between worker and slave, once the worker accumulates enough capital, they can purchase a slave. In the same way that if the workers are being exploited in a slaughter-house, and the workers revolt, it will not change the position of the cattle that is being slaughtered.**

**Wilderson 03**, [Frank B., Professor at UC Irvine, “Gramsci’s Black Marx: Whither the Slave in Civil Society?”, P. 233-4]//MHELLIE

For the sake our scenario — the impact of a successful War of Position on our hypothetical meat packing plant — let us not refer to the question as ‘the negro question’. Instead, let us call it the ‘cow question’. Let us suppose that the superstructure has finally ‘flowered’, and that throughout the various fronts where the power to pose the question held by the private initiatives and associations elaborated by the industrialists, hegemony has now been called into question and a war of position has been transposed into a war of manoeuver. The scandal with which the black subject position threatens Gramscian discourse is manifest in the subject’s ontological disarticulation of Gramscian categories: work, progress, production, exploitation, hegemony, and historical self-awareness. Gramsci’s notes on ‘Americanism and Fordism’ dem- onstrate his acumen in expressing how the drama of value is played out in civil society (i.e. the family) away from the slaughter house, while being imbricated and foundational to the class exploitation which workers experience within the slaughter house. But still we must ask, what about the cows? The cows are not being exploited, they are being accumulated and, if need be, killed. The desiring machine of capital and white supremacy manifest in society two dreams, imbricated but, I would argue, distinct: the dream of worker exploitation and the dream of black accumulation and death. **Nowhere in Gramsci can one find sufficient reassurance that, once the dream of worker exploitation has been smashed — once the superstructure, civil society, has ‘flowered’ and the question of hegemony has been posed — the dream of black accumulation and death will be thrown into crisis as well**. I submit that death of the black body is (a) foundational to the life of American civil society (just as foundational as it is to the drama of value — wage slavery), and (b) foundational to the fantasy space of desires which underwrite the industrialist’s hegemony and which underwrite the worker’s potential for, and realisation of, what Gramsci calls ‘good sense’. Thus, a whole set of new and difficult, perhaps un-Gramscian, questions emerge at the site of our meat packing plant in the throes of its War of Manoeuver. First, how would the cows fare under a dictatorship of the proletariat? Would cows experience freedom at the mere knowledge that they’re no longer being slaughtered in an economy of exchange predicated on exploitation? In other words, would it feel more like freedom to be slaughtered by a workers’ collective where there was no exploitation, where the working day was not a minute longer than the time it took to reproduce workers’ needs and pleasures, as opposed to being slaughtered in the exploitative context of that dreary old nine to five? Secondly, in the river of common sense does the flotsam of good sense have a message in a bottle that reads ‘Workers of the World Become Vegetarians!’? Finally, is it enough to just stop eating meat? In other words, can the Gramscian worker simply give the cows their freedom, grant them emanci- pation, and have it be meaningful to the cows? The cows need some answers before they raise a hoof for the ‘flowering of the superstructure’. The cows bring us face to face with the limitations of a Gramscian formulation of the question, what does it mean to be free? by revealing the limitations of the ways in which it formulates the question, what does it mean to suffer? **Because exploitation (rather than accumulation and death) is at the heart of the Gramscian question, what does it mean to suffer? — and thus crowds out analysis of civil society’s foundation of despotic terror and white pleasure by way of the accumulation of black bodies — the Gramscian question also functions as a crowding out scenario of the black subject herself/himself, and is indexical of a latent anti-blackness which black folks experience in the most ‘sincere’ of social movements.** So, when Buttigieg tells us that: The struggle against the domination of the few over the many, if it is be successful, must be rooted in a careful formulation of a counterhege- monic conception of the social order, in the dissemination of such a conception, and in the formation of counterhegemonic institutions — which can only take place in civil society and actually require an expansion of civil society. [emphasis mine] (1995, p. 31) ...a chill runs down our spine. For this required expansion requires the intensification and proliferation of civil society’s constituent element: black accumulation and death.

**Slavery positions blackness in excess of the fundamental categories of Marx’s analysis because they assume a subject with a grammar of suffering that has an analog. The black subject however renders Marx’s analysis incoherent, blackness is positioned outside of normative conceptions of hegemony and domination. That is, black suffering has no analog. In this way, blackness is murdered over and over in order for whiteness to gain coherence.**

**Wilderson 03**, [Frank B., Professor at UC Irvine, “Gramsci’s Black Marx: Whither the Slave in Civil Society?”, P. 236-9]//MHELLIE

The gratuitous violence begun in slavery, hand in hand with the absence of data for the New World Historical Axis (Rights/Entitlement, Sovereignty, Immi- gration) as a result of slavery, position black subjects in excess of Gramsci’s fundamental categories, i.e. labour, exploitation, historical self-awareness; for these processes of subjectification are assumed by those with a semiotics of analogy already in hand — the currency of exchange through which ‘a dimension ... of relatedness between one human personality and another, between human personality and cultural institutions’ can be established. Thus, the black subject imposes a radical incoherence upon the assumptive logic of Gramscian discourse. S/he implies a scandal: ‘total objectification’ in contradis- tinction to human possibility, however slim, as in the case of working class hegemony, that human possibility appears. It is this scandal which places black subjectivity in a structurally impossible position, outside of the ‘natural’ articulations of hegemony; but it also places hegemony in a structurally impossible position because our presence works back upon the grammar of hegemony and threatens it with incoherence. If every subject — even the most massacred subjects, Indians — are required to have analogues within the nation’s structuring narrative, and one very large significant subject, the subject upon which the nation’s drama of value is built, is a subject whose experience is without analogue then, by that subject’s very presence all other analogues are destabilised. Lest we think of the black body as captive only until the mid-nineteenth century, Spillers reminds us that the marking and branding, the total objectification are as much a part of the present as they were of the past. Even though the captive flesh/body has been ‘liberated’, and no one need pretend that even the quotation marks do not matter, dominant symbolic activity, the ruling episteme that releases the dynamics of naming and valuation, remains grounded in the originating metaphors of captivity and mutilation so that it is as if neither time nor history, nor historiography and its topics, shows movement, as the human subject is ‘murdered’ over and over again by the passions of a bloodless and anonymous archaism, showing itself in endless disguise. (1987, p. 68) Herein, the concept of civil war takes on a comprehensive and structural, as opposed to merely eventful, connotation. Conclusion Civil society is the terrain where hegemony is produced, contested, mapped. And the invitation to participate in hegemony’s gestures of influence, leader- ship, and consent is not extended to the black subject. We live in the world, but exist outside of civil society. This structurally impossible position is a paradox because **the black subject, the slave, is vital to civil society’s political economy: s/he kick-starts capital at its genesis and rescues it from its over-accumulation crisis at its end — black death is its condition of possibility. Civil society’s subaltern, the worker, is coded as waged, and wages are white. But marxism has no account of this phenomenal birth and life-saving role played by the black subject: in Gramsci we have consistent silence.** The black body in the US is that constant reminder that not only can work not be reformed but it cannot be transformed to accommodate all subjects: work is a white category. The fact that millions upon millions of black people work misses the point. The point is **we were never meant to be workers; in other words, capital/white supremacy’s dream did not envision us as being incorporated or incorporative. From the very beginning, we were meant to be accumulated and die**. Work (i.e. the French shipbuilding industry and bour- geois civil society which finally extended its progressive hegemony to workers and peasants to topple the aristocracy) was what grew up all around us — 20 to 60 million seeds planted at the bottom of the Atlantic, 5 million seeds planted in Dixie. Work sometimes registers as a historical component of blackness, but where whiteness is concerned, work registers as a constituent element. And **the black body must be processed through a kind of civil death for this constituent element of whiteness to gain coherence.** Today, at the end of the twentieth century, we are still not meant to be workers. We are meant to be warehoused and die. The U.S. carceral network kills ... more blacks than any other ethnic group ... [and] constitute[s] an ‘outside’ in U.S. political life. In fact, our society displays waves of concentric outside circles with increasing distances from bourgeois self-policing. The state routinely polices the unassimilable in the hell of lockdown, deprivation tanks, control units, and holes for political prisoners. (James, 1996, p. 34) Work (i.e. jobs for guards in the prison industrial complex and the shot in the arm it gives to faltering white communities — its positive reterritorialisation of White Space and its simultaneous deterritorialisation of Black Space) is what grows up around our dead bodies once again. The chief difference today, compared to several hundred years ago, is that today our bodies are desired, accumulated, and warehoused — like the cows. Again, the chief constant to the dream is that, whereas desire for black labour power is often a historical component to the institutionality of white supremacy, it is not a constituent element. This paradox is not to be found at the crux of Gramsci’s intellectual pessimism or his optimistic will. His concern is with subjects in a white(ned) enough subject position that they are confronted by, or threatened with the removal of, a wage, be it monetary or social. But black subjectivity itself disarticulates the Gramscian dream as a ubiquitous emancipatory strategy, because Gramsci (like most US social movements) has no theory of, or solidarity with, the slave. Whereas the positionality of the worker enables the reconfiguration of civil society, the positionality of the slave exists as a destabilising force within civil society because civil society gains its coherence, the very tabula raza upon which workers and industrialists struggle for hegemony, through the violence of black erasure. From the coherence of civil society the black subject beckons with the incoherence of civil war. Civil war, then, becomes that unthought but never forgotten spectre waiting in the wings — the understudy of Gramsci’s hegemony.

**Moten**

**Moten is behind on the question of ontology, and a historical understanding of Fanon. Moten’s ideas about phenomenology still boil down to a question of unspeakable ethics, and Moten’s ideas about Fanon place him in the company of Daniel Patrick Moynihan. Moten’s pointing out of paradoxes within trying to derive black pathology links back and defeats its own logic, where its teleological project has contradicting social prescriptions and psychological theories.**

**Mariott 16** [David Marriott, Professor of literature at the University of California in Santa Cruz, “(A Reading That Is Too Black) Judging Fanon,” Rhizomes issue 29, 1. Socially Dead]

[3] How to read Fanon and/or his blackness? Let us distinguish two types of reading. The first makes Fanon the addressee of a certain demand that has everything to do with how he reads blackness (or, more accurately, with how he positions blackness as an object always traversed, or ruined by, the abusive truths of whiteness). In "The Case of Blackness", first published in 2008, Fred Moten memorably and powerfully argues that Fanon's work is linked to a peremptory assertion (which is itself disavowed) of blackness as a kind of death-driven nonbeing, or pathologically impure object; it's a view that, in Moten's terms, positions blackness as the referent of an objectifying encounter—with racism—and blackness as the thing that racism represents.[[2]](http://www.rhizomes.net/issue29/marriott.html#footnote-2) Fanon's famous analysis of le vecu noiris, then, judged to have relegated, via 'a complex disavowing claim', black lived experience to the status of an object whose meaning is always prescribed.[[3]](http://www.rhizomes.net/issue29/marriott.html#footnote-3) Accordingly, this would mean that any reading of Fanon has to answer the following (pessimistic) prescriptions: that there is no such thing as black social life, and/or blackness is a 'pathology' in 'close proximity to the criminal'.[[4]](http://www.rhizomes.net/issue29/marriott.html#footnote-4) Hence, the form of black social life is essentially one of fugitivity: blackness is insofar as it is not, for it can never be(whiteness). Whence the belief (which Moten also wants to ground as an ontic-ontological difference between human and racialized being), that blackness can only be invoked, always regulatively, as a movement between 'an original impurity' and a normative social logic or frame that it necessarily can never coincide with nor escape.[[5]](http://www.rhizomes.net/issue29/marriott.html#footnote-5) The suggestion is that blackness, in Fanon's work, is nothing more than the impure element of a social frame or pathological code, and that the validity of this code, in the normative tasks of law or ontology, can only project blackness as a state of decay always calculable and confined as such, except now in the fugitive form of a social incompleteness that is neither a form of life nor a form of death. Blackness is thus ejected from the social life of things, which means that it can only be known pessimistically in the exclusion that includes it. The problem, however, is not to know if blackness is a form of social death, but if, when confronting that death, another order can present itself whose relation to law and ontology 'is reducible neither to simple interdiction nor bare transgression'.[[6]](http://www.rhizomes.net/issue29/marriott.html#footnote-6) The Fanonian message to the black subject can therefore be defined as one of capacious ruination, in which the role of blackness in the world is essentially one of abnormality or fall, in whose aberrant movement blackness (as thing or chose) is reduced to an object (objet) of racism. However, what if blackness were to be defined otherwise, as the figure for an 'absence or excess' withheld from 'the horrific honorific of "object"?'[[7]](http://www.rhizomes.net/issue29/marriott.html#footnote-7) What if black culture and language were to be seen not merely as a discursive effect, born out of subjugation, but as the very thing that calls into question the illusory privilege of whiteness and of race? For Moten, such escape 'would be the cause for black optimism' as well as a more optimistic reading of Fanon; we could then say that when the emphasis falls on what blackness is (as a mode of fugitive sublimity) rather than on what it fails to be (as flaw or impurity), another message becomes possible.[[8]](http://www.rhizomes.net/issue29/marriott.html#footnote-8) [4] Crucially, Moten presents his argument not as a 'refusal' of Fanon, but as a 'demand that we read' his texts as if 'for the first time'.[[9]](http://www.rhizomes.net/issue29/marriott.html#footnote-9) This would mean that any reading of Fanon must begin naively (etymologically speaking), without prejudice or prescription: it's a demand that recalls phenomenology's approach to things/sachen (an approach in which reading is both a bracketing and a reduction). This scene is immediately complicated, however, in that naïve reading, which in this hypothesis or story is to begin without judgment, reappears in the prescription that we read naively. Indeed, if naivety is demanded what would it mean to prescribe Fanon's texts as the addressee of that naivety? And if one accepted, with Moten, that such naïve reading constitutes neither a refusal nor judgment of Fanon, and if it were decided that such reading could also be named a refusal of refusal (of Fanon's disavowing claim), then the complication only spreads. That demand for naivety, which describes itself as black optimism, is in turn derived from a certain reading of Heidegger. It is from the latter that Moten rapidly determines what it means to give the 'case' of blackness a hearing, to register the optimism of its outpouring despite the 'horror of its making', or the horror from which it was made.[[10]](http://www.rhizomes.net/issue29/marriott.html#footnote-10) The word 'case' must be understood as both a tribunal and its hearing, but 'case' too in the sense of psychopathology: here Moten does not explain why, nominally speaking, the case of blackness should take the form of a juridical dispute between Fanon and Heidegger, nor why that dispute should be settled by the latter's account of 'representational thinking'.[[11]](http://www.rhizomes.net/issue29/marriott.html#footnote-11) In terms of the law applicable to this case, Fanon's crime, then, would be his failure to think beyond law or pathology, or to imagine a new set of possibilities as defined by Heidegger's ontological naivety—but also that the latter's claim to return representation to its ontological ground (as too in Moten's constant implicit claim to give blackness a hearing) merely means that Fanon's own critique of ontology is inevitably reduced to a litigious politics of representation. [5] We know that the case of blackness (and its juridical rhetoric) includes at least two questions: what is this thing called blackness and how is it to be represented? The junction at which these two questions meet in Peau noire, masques blancs is that of a flaw: this flaw is born very specifically from an experience of ruination 'that interdicts any ontological explanation'.[[12]](http://www.rhizomes.net/issue29/marriott.html#footnote-12) In the colony, the phenomenological form of social power is never immediate, that is to say, a relation of representation, but a confrontation that designifies, and, at the same time, resignifies social relations once they are racially determined, a confrontation in which both being and law acquire new significations born out of disavowal (what Fanon defines as the lactifying desire for substitution or separation of the black from the négre, and of the white from its other) and of amplification (the recoding of the social and symbolic order by racial signifiers of precarity and threat, fear and impoverishment). Saying that there is a question whether blackness is disavowed in Fanon, a disavowal whose meaning is in dispute, does not, however, explain why Moten continues to use the language of ontology and of law to explain Fanon's writing on blackness as a phenomenology. The etymology of the word 'case' also includes that of contingency and of fall (lapsus); that is to say, the meaning of blackness is not prescribed, and has no prior signification before it is raced. This contingency or fall (the lapsus or trauma of racialization) denotes not a prescribed imperfection but refers to the time, paradoxically enough, in which the black comes face to face with its own contaminating filiation with the négre, a confrontation that is never simply in the order of an object, but is that of an exposure that is also the work of a certain concealment; it is a moment in which any simple history (of escape or confinement, mimicry or identification) is necessarily the impure avowal of an imaginary longing for a colorless presence, meaning, or proximity. If one accepts, along with Moten, that blackness always escapes its positioning in either law or representation, and if it were to be shown that neither that law (or its history) nor that representation (or its history) can capture 'the case blackness makes for itself in spite of and by way of every interdiction', according to which this case names both a specific pathology and object, then why hold onto this juridical rhetoric (with respect to the case) to present that which apparently always escapes law and representation?[[13]](http://www.rhizomes.net/issue29/marriott.html#footnote-13) [6] **By writing blackness as ceaseless fugitivity, Moten has moved towards a position in which blackness is only black when it exceeds its racist disavowal.** Or, the blackness of blackness can only be recognized as black in so far as it escapes the racism of its history: but what allows us to ~~see~~ this escape is not blackness, but its racist disavowal. Or, in order to reconcile blackness with that which blackness supposedly is, Moten has to rely on the narrative of its constraint or pathology, which he cannot do without: this pathology enables Moten to avoid the disavowing naiveties of Fanon but only in so far as he too reads naively, or optimistically. A third possibility would make this disavowing claim, that Moten wants to make deliver up its secrets, a sign of how Moten himself disavows how racist disavowal complicates his reading of what he describes as Fanon's phenomenology, in which impurity inevitably generates a pathological meaning. Or again: if Fanon hears what Moten does not hear (in terms of his reading of the case**), this is because Moten can only affirm blackness as affirmation**, not because it escapes pathology, **but because blackness is experienced only as the activity of escape, but one which never escapes the ontology of such production**. It follows that **blackness cannot escape its own fugitivity**; its constitutive moment is traversal (or, what constitutes it is its force of subversion with regard to the pathological classifications of blackness). If Fanon fails 'to investigate more adequately the change from object to thing', one could also suggest this failure fails to address, or forecloses, that other scene in Fanon; in short, how the very distinction between object and thing refuses to engage with the Fanonian unconscious (in which the object is neither simply represented nor simply fugitive to the languages of law, ontology, or difference).[[14]](http://www.rhizomes.net/issue29/marriott.html#footnote-14) The form of this problem seems to be linked to what can appear to be a persistent equivocation in Moten's reading of Fanon between apparently ontological claims and the use of the aesthetic-political to somehow escape ontology. This situation, which would demand new formulations of the relationship between ontology and the aesthetic-political, is perhaps programmed by the logic of a presentation which needs to ~~see~~ a radical break between them, a necessity whose prescription is also thus disavowed. [7] This scenario is not an easy one to follow, and might therefore be described as itself Fanonian. Moten defines as black a situation in which the obligation to steal away goes along with a 'movement of escape' that is not criminal and cannot be 'enframed' as such. Moten states this movement as follows: blackness is 'an ensemble always operating in excess of that ancient juridical formulation of the thing', it is 'a stolen, transplanted organ always eliciting rejection', and, 'the lived experience of blackness is, among other things, a constant demand for an ontology of disorder, an ontology of dehiscence' and so on.[[15]](http://www.rhizomes.net/issue29/marriott.html#footnote-15) Aside from noting the logical instability of this 'always': namely**, if x is always escaping then it cannot be said to ever entirely escape**, it is clear that, according to Moten's own logic, **these descriptions leave it completely undecidable whether blackness is fugitive because it never quite escapes (its enslavement, its impurity), or whether it always thereby escapes how it is rendered black, or not, precisely because it is not an object**. Moten refers to this situation as the 'special ontic-ontological fugitivity of/in the slave' which he says is 'necessarily unaccounted for in Fanon'.[[16]](http://www.rhizomes.net/issue29/marriott.html#footnote-16) I am not going to provide any detailed commentary on this word 'necessarily', although it would not be difficult to construct an argument showing that Fanon, in so far as he insists on the necessary mis-recognition of blackness as black, is in fact in some senses the most radical discourse of why blackness remains unaccounted for. Nor would it be difficult to argue that Fanon escapes the hold of the pathological/normative opposition. I shall also try to resist the temptation of denouncing a very general tendency to present the operation of disavowal as a 'critique' of what Fanon himself says about racist disavowal, of assuming that when Fanon says that black lived experience names both a specific discourse of misrecognition and the symptom of that misrecognition, that attempts to name misrecognition, such as Moten's, which attempt to position Fanonism as a misrecognition of what blackness is, would themselves not generate further cases of misrecogniton, or escape the naivety of such optimism. Instead, I shall narrow down the scenario still further and consider something like the logic of escape in Moten's engagement with phenomenology, especially with respect to his own representations of the aesthetic-political. This restriction will seem only the more excessive in that I shall appeal to only a very small part of Moten's case history, ignoring notably all of what he says about art here, and concentrating on what he says about theft, in the sense of stolen from or dispossession. [8] After citing Heidegger's famous reading of the jug in the essay, "Das Ding", Moten argues that Fanon confuses the black's 'becoming-object' for the thing that blackness is, which exceeds the jurisdiction of racist discourse and its formulation of an 'impure, degraded, manufactured (in)human who moves only in response to inclination, whose reflexes lose the name of action'.[[17]](http://www.rhizomes.net/issue29/marriott.html#footnote-17) So that in contradistinction to Fanon, Moten wants to present 'the inadequacy of any ontology to blackness' as the inadequacy of 'calculation to being in general' and then show how blackness as lived is 'a constant demand for an ontology of disorder, an ontology of dehiscence'.[[18]](http://www.rhizomes.net/issue29/marriott.html#footnote-18) The problem with this approach is its particular determination of history as filiation: Moten's commitment to black social life, to its vitality, leads him to provide, in section one, an anything-but-Fanonian history of racist philosophy (in which blackness is always the sign of negation). This is the context in which Fanon sets out his reading of blackness as interdiction or flaw. Because he fails to read this context, Moten is obliged to read the figure of impurity as part of a history of philosophy rather than as one of Fanon's essential points critiquing philosophical historicity, which queries how the being of the black has been understood in both the history of philosophy and the philosophical history of the concept of 'race'. Consequently, Fanonism is viewed as an aberrational consequence of that history, rather than one of its sharpest critiques. [9] **This leads Moten to present a history of Fanonism that puts Fanon in the same company as that of Daniel Patrick Moynihan** (!)—suffice it to say I think that it's a horrible philosophical travesty of Fanon to present his work as the antecedent of this anti-black moralist from the US. Moten knows all this too. Whence the effect of decontextualisation: the price paid for the naivety of his reading never essentially goes beyond a restricted set of prescriptions that, even when they take the form of endless questioning, are necessarily disavowed. One consequence of this is that Moten's own placing of Fanon in a tradition dominated by the representation of black pathology is also dominated by the need to present Fanonism as, paradoxically, a pathological object. Lastly, let us recall that Moten's philosophical reading of Fanon wants to question what he ~~sees~~ as a particular, pessimistic inflection, which is marked by the absence of black social life. It's a reading in whose exposition the discontinuity of black social life is determined as a kind of pious optimism, or in Moten's terms a paraontological form of resistance. The case of blackness, in Moten's transcription of Heidegger, has no code of law or body of jurisprudence or rule of representation to determine its ontology for 'its relation to law is reducible neither to simple interdiction nor bare transgression.'. The law for the case of blackness must be found, invented. But if the black judge or critic has no law at hand, it would seem that the possibility of judging is given in the name of an aesthetic-political optimism: our task here (that of 'judging Fanon') puts us in the situation of having to judge the case which thus prescribes judgment – of blackness as pathology—without grounding its being in or as pathology: Moten therefore repeats the pathological presupposition of a judgment (of black pathology) in the attempt to judge it non-pathologically. The phrase 'Fanon is too pessimistically black' names an example (which cannot just be an example) of this situation. Fanon is too black (or not black enough) because he can only ~~see~~ blackness as instituted out of violence and pathology, out of the lived experience of racism, and this violence returns to question the institution of black social life even as it constitutes it. In a brilliant article called "The Social Life of Social Death", Jared Sexton, wondering what happens when blackness determines itself as essentially 'pathological' (Moten's word), suggests that Fanon (as opposed to his blackness) names the limits of this very situation.[[19]](http://www.rhizomes.net/issue29/marriott.html#footnote-19) The question of the pathologization of blackness is then, says Sexton, 'a reinscription of (black) pathology that reassigns its cause and relocates its source without ever getting inside it'; 'another way of putting this might be to say that **they [the thinkers of blackness as pathology] are caught in a performative contradiction enabled by disavowal'.**[[20]](http://www.rhizomes.net/issue29/marriott.html#footnote-20) If, for Sexton, Moten is a repetition of that 'black' disavowal, then Fanon is another, displaced, repetition of Moten's repetition. [10] In Sexton's reading, which is my second powerful example of how to read Fanon, the oddness of this disavowal is that it must take into account the necessity of black social life as lived fugitivity (in the form of the case, the aesthetic-political): he goes on to elaborate this question in terms of an essential 'affirmation' inhabiting blackness in its constitutively pathological drive to be the case, the movement of escape, which cannot be lived as such. Blackness has an essential relation to social death even when read optimistically, and this consecution is neither to be simply celebrated nor simply deplored. And, more crucially, at some point blackness must attempt to take itself as a case without naively compromising its defense or execution, stating the law of blackness as law (as case), but knowing that this 'law' is caused in the first instance by the kinds of social death at work in black social life. In the case of Moten, blackness's relation to law cannot act as a case, in that it precedes or is not reducible to a 'simple interdiction nor bare transgression' of law: whether this be figured in terms of pathology or not, it is clearly a situation of theft, if only in that it is stolen from the law as the very possibility of its jurisdiction. In the paradoxical terms which Moten finds in any attempt to derive or legitimate black pathology (~~see~~ section 1), his disavowal can only, as Sexton suggests, **produce simultaneously a denial or a refusal of the very institution of blackness (as socially dead), which allows that disavowal to be made**. To do so he has to absolve the violence which presides over the anti-black world, and in so doing do violence to the freedom made possible by that violence: this is Moten's command to avow the social life of blackness and its aesthetic affirmation. This violent secondary attempt to erase primary anti-black violence can be presumably repeated indefinitely as anti-blackness continues to rule the world. (As such, writes Sexton, this is a theft 'that creates the crime and its alibi at once'[[21]](http://www.rhizomes.net/issue29/marriott.html#footnote-21)). [11] This crime, this alibi (which would have to be read with Fanon's notion of the tabula rasa, and its implication of a writing that abolishes all forms of inheritance) is clearly complex, to say the least.[[22]](http://www.rhizomes.net/issue29/marriott.html#footnote-22) In the essay, 'Medicine and Colonialism', Fanon suggests that "the colonized, like all the people in underdeveloped countries and all the dispossessed everywhere, do not ~~see~~ life as blossoming and fruition but as a permanent struggle against atmospheric death": this omnipresent death, this mort à bout touchant, "tends to make of life an incomplete death", in which small and large acts of resistance are not so much a "refusal of life" but an all-too-human response to this "close and contagious death" (DC, 128). Thus, a resistance to colonialism is both instituted and marked by this incomplete life-death. By refusing western medicine, by making western therapy into a clandestine struggle over life anddeath, the colonized know that it is through the promise of the cure that the law of colonialism reaffirms itself. Thus the patient vanishes or releases himself, writes Fanon, from the passive objectivity of colonial pathology; and while this confirms the western view of the colonized as feckless, for Fanon these acts are the site of a coalescence of a struggle in which life and death are openly or implicitly in conflict: i.e., by shutting himself up alone with his disease, fastened to it, coiled up in its fascination and pain, its emptiness and voluptuousness, the colonized produces social death as the symptom of an overwhelmed body, in whose dispossessed life and incomplete death the rottenness of western pathology is revealed as a discourse of cure without ultimate justification or legitimation, a cure within which the rule of law and propriety is sustained by force and violence. There is then something rotten in this encounter between medical efficacy and the racialized body that infuses the cure with an element of violence and compulsion. [12] It is therefore surprising to read that this situation is one in which Fanon shows his 'ongoing ambivalence toward the supposedly pathological'.[[23]](http://www.rhizomes.net/issue29/marriott.html#footnote-23) Moten's mildly parodic sketch of this version as a story in which anticolonial resistance is both symptom and cure could well be read as a refusal to read what Fanon himself says about the contagion of social death in the colony. There has been a great deal of discussion, and long before the advent of Afro-pessimism, of the different points of view that Fanon adopts to affirm the lived social death of the colonized. A way of connecting this death to his psychotherapeutics, or more broadly to his analysis of the colonial body, would be to consider what he says about that body's contraction and/or mortification; in other words, to ~~see~~ the truth of that body in its subsequent alienation, or rigidity, to make this body reveal itself as a form of resistance (not even necessarily a conscious one) to the signifieds of colonialism. The atmosphere of certain-uncertainty defining this body affords an example: the sheer material facticity of that atmosphere is secreted in the body (both clandestinely and literally) which is subsequently blown apart, distended, reassembled; this body becomes virtually multiple insofar as it is injured and irreal, obsessed and petrified, a body that would assume its affirmation insofar as its injury becomes an unspeakable piece of the real, simultaneously performing delirious disorder and a conserving desire as it undergoes torture, petrification, and the seeming infinitude of total war. It is therefore not easy to ~~see~~ why Moten should describe this multiply injured body as a dialectical reversal (of political consciousness and cure), rather than what Fanon describes as its structural vocation: that is, not to decode (the case), but to overcode or overwrite both law and criminality, resistance and complicity with the advent—whether perverse, or paranoiac, imaginary, or neurotic—of decolonial war. In Moten's account this structure is read (very quickly) as a political prescription (to resist) that is also positioned as a natural will to resistance. **It's a reading that is at once psychological and normative,** scorning what remains indescribable, inassimilable: the shock or accentuation of the revolutionary moment that is both destructive and reinventing. So Fanonism now becomes a text whose political prescriptions are contradicted by its psychotherapeutic demands, in so far as the liberatory narrative of revolution inevitably forecloses the now normative notion of the cure. The problem with this reading is that the notion of resistance is projected as a telos rather than grasped as an event that exceeds all such narratives. This is too limited a reading: unless we conceive of the incomplete death that seizes—this life, this body—as the very thing which refuses to be exhausted by categories of resistance or pathology, we will fail to read, in short, what Fanon means by the permanent hemorrhaging of this black body which ultimately no art or politics can stem, precisely because in the movement of its history there are few categories that wish to touch it without being made dirty or hysterical.

**Don’t go along with Moten’s reading of Fanon, which posits it merely as a Hegelian struggle that needs to be transcended. This alternative mode of thinking does not produce the optimist “becoming” they speak of but instead renders the colonized disarticulate, written outside of the dialectic they don’t really challenge. Instead, recognize that under their framework blackness can’t put blackness to work without relegating itself to an ontic state of being which is profoundly depoliticizing. Your ballot should center on the limit of the fictions of blackness in the undercommons. In other words, recognize where black art movements come from as a prerequisite to recruiting them into Moten’s alt.**

**Mariott 16** [David Marriott, Professor of literature at the University of California in Santa Cruz, “(A Reading That Is Too Black) Judging Fanon,” Rhizomes issue 29, 2. The Antinomy]

[24] This new conjunction of wretchedness and non-sovereignty, which I have just mentioned, might provisionally be called, for lack of a better name, an antinomy, since it implies that there is a form of death in life whose everyday struggle expresses a décalage or cleavage between sovereign life and black being. Now, this death in life that is n'est pas cannot be identified with humanism, even in a new form, or in any case, humanism is far from exhausting it. It involves a perspective of an altogether different scope, whose object cannot be constituted as a simple accident of form, but by the very relation between blackness and politics. This perspective does not imply a lack of interest in humanity, but, on the contrary, a continual return to the racial 'truths', however archaic, in which whiteness is the only proper form of human being. Certain of these truths still have a power of provocation, in respect to a certain idea of language and culture, and for this reason, we must not fail to consider them. [25] 1. One of the common misreadings of Fanon's theory of violence is to read it as an Hegelian struggle, or that, at least, the struggle between colonizer and colonized is a version of the fight for prestige between master and slave: violence therefore has a progressive purpose in making the colonized the subject of a recognition rather than the thing (chose) that is not recognized.[[37]](http://www.rhizomes.net/issue29/marriott.html#footnote-37) Hence, violence is humanized as a fundamental category of human being. I am not saying that this reading is wrong, and certain aspects of it could be read into Peau noire, masque blancs; but in Les damnés de la terre **decolonial violence is far from its Hegelian origin, and refers to a struggle that is not to the death, but to a struggle with and from death, a struggle that seeks to go beyond the death in life that, however dialectical, no philosophical anthropology has yet grasped, and that reveals a certain aporia within the language of sovereignty**. [26] Decolonial violence, which I have just said is not a dialectics, is engaged in a detoxification that is radically reinventive, since it implies that decolonialism cannot be identified with a politics, even in a progressive form, but with a language yet to be written. It leads to a tabula rasa bringing a judgment into play but one without jurisdiction. This violence receives extremely various contours and expressions, but one thing seems certain: the moment of invention is an event without sense or content; consequently, its appearance always exceeds the representational forms of the political. As a tabula rasa, violence has nothing to do with either right nor justice: in a sense it only takes place as a case, but this is a case that falls without order or meaning, through which the colonized is only able express itself disarticulately. As such, it marks the absence of person and of law, and is an advent without jurisdiction. If this is criminality, at least in its decision and pathos, it concerns itself with the blackness that falls, in principle, always outside of law. Or, more precisely, decolonial violence plunges the subject into an abyss whose meaning (Fanon uses the word 'measure') is always unprecedented. [27] 2. A second principle, especially important with regard to how we read Fanon's sexual politics, is that blackness cannot be considered an unambivalent form of pleasure. In his reading of how nativism inures itself against colonial repression, where every cultural value is the product of a collective punishment, pleasure (religious, pagan, aesthetic) comes to have the following resonance: there is something frenetic, ghostly, hysterical about it. Fanon writes: 'This magical superstructure which permeates native society fulfills certain well-defined functions in the dynamism of the libido', and, 'we perceive that all is settled by a permanent confrontation on the phantasmic plane.' (WE, 43) Here, law itself becomes magical, in whose erotic jurisdiction the subject is not so much presented as inhibited, and precisely by the ecstasies that terrify and at the same reassure it, and which remedies the 'pure force' of colonialism by an erotism that delimits itself within the limiting force of colonialism (WE, 43). As such, the real violence of the colony becomes indiscernible from the magical superstructure of nativism (its foundation as libido, as terrifying figuration), which it claims as a more archaic form of its own jurisdiction. Defined as law, pleasure—which might be called an eros of subjugation to be distinguished from that of masochism – signifies the institution of an 'avoidance' that is itself disavowed, and represents a dissociation that is essentially turned in upon itself. [28] 3. Moreover, from a methodological point of view, Fanon's writing on black art accustoms us to a form of libidinal economy that, at the level of psyche and culture, both 'protects and permits' (WE, 44). The economy hitherto that sees art as sublimation, which must immediately be seen as a work (of translation), is here deciphered as an 'open book' and at the same time as a de facto abandonment to a world of dangerous and dogmatic fictions (WE, 44). Fanon's analyses suggest, on the one hand, that we distinguish levels of dislocation and describe the distinctive elements by which black art is able to establish a completely new form beyond judicial reason; and on the other, he asks us to recognize that, unlike nativist and colonialist practices, these forms make possible something else, as 'the imagination is let loose outside the bounds of the colonial order' (WE, 53). As Sexton has observed, it is the discovery of this passage which gives Fanon's reflections on 'life and death, pessimism and optimism, subject and object, thing and case, blacks and blackness, and so on' the tone of an affirmation written, it seems to me, from a position that is both within and without, within as without the political life of blackness.[[38]](http://www.rhizomes.net/issue29/marriott.html#footnote-38) [29] 4. There remains to be discussed one last Fanonian notion that may illuminate the figure of blackness at its very center, since it concerns the motif of slavery. In the chapter on 'recognition', inPeau noire, masques blancs, Fanon refers to a governing system of 'fictions' that prevents the black from encountering the object: the subject that seeks to know itself through its history, whether in the aspects of master or of slave, must confront the object so as to lose it and so gain its personhood, not so much in the objectivity of the given, but as ethical social life. Hence, it is possible to see in Fanon's commentaries on Adler and Hegel a blackness which is itself a fiction, that exists only through and as fiction, whose fictioning conforms to different levels of alienated life: political, economic, and ontological. This unity of the fictitious and the repressed authorizes Fanon's rereading of phenomenology and psychopathology: blackness can only in sum recognize itself as a fiction, which is why it turns away from the Other and from any dialectical resolution of itself as a labor that produces and sublates. It is in terms of this impasse that blackness figures the very being of the case that bars it from having both form and content. The black cannot put blackness to work—at least in the way that slavery is thought in metaphysics—for its 'governing fiction' involves the resolution of figures, that is metaphors, or signs, that are absolutely self-referential and contained to the exclusion of anything else, figures and fictions whose action can increasingly be defined as a refusal of a black logic of the subject (BS, 212). It is in this perspective that blackness is only ever going to be the subject of a limitation that is the limit of its own fictioning, and first of all insofar as the mirror whose whiteness it masks befalls it as a n'est pas.

**Multilateralism**

**Engagement with multilateral institutions requires a process of racialized socialization which psychologically numbs “experts” to ongoing anti-black genocides. This form of unconscious altruism renders racial violence incalcuble within liberal discussions.**

**Shields 95** (David L. L. Shields – retired United States ambassador and teaches in the Peace and Conflict Studies Program at the University of California at Berkeley, “The Color of Hunger: Race and Hunger in National and International Perspective” – ERW)

-Psychological and empirical indict to both scholarship and the skills the Aff creates. They create policymakers, but those policymakers are only benign in the face of violence.

I believe there is considerable racism in most international institutions, but it is a **racism of neglect rather than of intent.** It is subtle, it is underlying, and it is difficult to detect with conventional lenses. If we define **racism as exclusion from a position, privilege, or organization based on skin color**, then we would have to conclude that most international public organizations are remarkably nonracist. But if we judge these organizations in terms of the impact of their work, we would have to see that, too Often, **people of color have borne the harshest part of economic and political changes,** including those orchestrated by international aid agencies. In other words, despite a presumed lack of such intent, an uncanny racial bias exists in the consequences of many actions and policy decisions of multilateral institutions. This, of course, is a generalization, and, thankfully, one also finds exceptions to this. As an illustration, let us consider the World Bank, by any standard a powerful designer of economic change in many poor I've had two different occasions to work at the World Bank, and each time I was impressed by its firepower and financial I was also impressed by how little overt racism existed there. The first time, I worked for a Kenyan, Who reported to an American, who reported to a Pakistani. Another time, reported to an Israeli, who reported to an Australian, who to a gentleman from Ghana. The Bank has developed the remarkable ability to overcome at least the more obvious forms of racism. In light of the apparent multiculturalism in the Bank's chain of command, some observations incongruent. One stood out with particular poignancy. Given the of staff from the Third World, I expected the entire organization to be infused with a sense of urgency and personal commitment to end poverty and injustice. Afterall, **hunger is torturously killing of color at such a rate that an outside observer** (perhaps a newcomer from Mars) **could plausibly conclude that the dominant North was engaged in a worldwide policy of "ethnic cleansing" by its inatten- tion.** But, sonwhow, it seemed that despite the representation of races, nations, and peoples, there was something even more powerful that made most employees conform to a rather uninspired state of being. During the mid-1980s when I worked at the Bank, I found little sense of the urgency or impatience that our situation warranted. Most of us intellectu- ally realized that we were losing the battle against poverty, but this realization unsure of our personal commitments and **psychologically distanced from the realities of poverty in our home countries.** I remember feeling that **many of us had lost our idealism and had become just cogs in an international bureaucra- cy** that viewed development as its job but not its passion and dream. To understand the genesis of this reality, I think we need to examine the socializa- tion process that occurs within most such agencies. Most international agencies maintain that their best employees give up their national loyalties to become professional international civil servants. There is much to be said for eschewing national chauvinism and becoming global in one's orientation. But this particular of socialization has a shadow side, as well. In the process of assimilating into this faceless interna- tional bureaucracy (with its own notions of careers, promotions, professional- ism, and perks), **many of us lose sense of why we got into this line of work in the first place.** This confusion is further exacerbated by the jargon and convoluted rhetoric that are the daily currency of many agencies. process of conforming can **become a process of deforming.** I suspwt that this rootless Of Sorne imple (such as many of those inhabiting transnational agencies) is in part responsible for the insensitivity and maladroitness of many policies. A number of months before the United Nations took action in Somalia, a most-senior African official Of the United Nations appeared on "Nightline" and his organization's lethargic response to the crisis of Somalia. The kinds of procedural, bureaucratic, and excuses that he presented could have come out of a Franz novel. **While people were being slaughtered and starved on an unfathomable scale**, he was passing the buck from one agency to another. His attitude would have made even Max Weber, the master of modern bureaucracy, cringe in disbelief. Just imagine what a difference a timely intervention by the United Nations mi\*lt have made. As countries such as Somalia and Rwanda (among many others) lurch into ever-deepening crises, the leaders and officialdom of the United Nations **seem ever so paralyzed, unclear about their own objectives and caught in the crossfire** and politicking of member-states. Becau\* the values and principles of the United Nations are rhetorically recitd but inadequately internalized, the organization repeatedly finds itself following the path of least resistance. Nowhere is the implicit racism of international aid buraucracies more evident than in the ways in which we support a veritable army of foreign experts in developing countries. Where technical skills combind with common sene, compassion, and a spirit of appreciative inquiry is neæssary, we bring in high-paid, Elf-promoting "experts" who tell "them" at what they already know, but in a that is no longer By creating this new caste of development experts**, have confused rather than eased the path to social progress.** As a consultant myself, I have a healthy regard for the value of inde•ixn- dent and expertiæ. But I also know that too often the provided by outside experts on development is not worth the pa\*r it is presented on—and certainly not worth the bill that comes with it. Further- more, I subrnit to you that **too large a portion of the intemational assistance is driven by a sense of white superiority** (however subtle) **and donor nationalism, rather than the actual needs of development.** Those of you who have worked in the development field know only too well the phenomenon of itinerant, Westem consultants who spend the first half of their extended visits learning from thox on the ground and the second half of their tenure pontifi- cating to those from whom they have just learned. Right now, there are about 80,000 foreign (read Western) experts in Africa, and it costs a minimum Of $150,000 a year per person to keep thern there. I ask you, how many of these so-called experts know more about Africa than their African counterparts? The European Development Fund, which was set up as Europe's conscientious response to the crises in their old colonies, has foreign expatriates running about 90 percent of its projects in Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific. Throughout the Third World, we a staggering $15 to $22 billion a year—a third to a half of all bilateral and multilateral foreign aid money—to support Westem exr\*rts, who live like nobility and speak nobly of the poor. By overpaying expatriates and a sekct group of privileged nationals, we are practicing a kind of foreign aid apart- heid, ail the while preaching the good words of self-determination, self- reliance, and progress at the gra«oots. Is this really the best way to engender indiænous capabilities? Foreign expertise can be helpful and well worth its price tag, but only if such experti\* is focuæd on critical needs and rapidly Just as in Manifest Destiny, or Christopher Columbus's "discovery" of the Arnericas, or the British "civilizing" India, all modern development para- digms, capitalist as well as socialist, start with a model of an ideal world that is defined in materialist terms. It assumes that all of the world are on the same path, with the white West leading the way and the nonwhite Third World following. -rhe dominant paradigrn is by W. W. Rostow's book, TheStages of Economic Growth. Although Rostow himælfwas far more cautious and understood subtleties, tho\* who took his rnantle basically reducd the countries Of the world and their wonomic history into stages of economic "growing First you have infancy, the stage that a number of countries are said still to in. Then you develop infrastructure to facilitate private capitalism and a concrntration Of productive As you continue to develop, you move in a straight line until, finally, you're ready to "take æonomically. I don't quite know where, but at Sonw point, a country reaches the nirvana Of development. This is the basic formula, admittedly simplified and that all so-called Third World countries are to follow. Have you ever what this "development nirvana" wouki look like? How many McDonald's should it have? How many Nintendo ganrs household? How many cable channels and tanning salons? I know I am facetious, but less so than you think. The fact remains that the current developrnent rvadigrn simply tries to mimic (but not challenge) the wonomic, cultural, and transformations that the Euro-bagd industrial societies went through, presumably toward similar ends. Developrnent assistance, as currently is to help people do the they within rigid constraints. It is designa\* to help Imple play the modem economic game, and to play it more efficiently; **it is not to reinvent the game or alter the balance of power.** I want to emphasize that the problern is not one of a lack of good inten- tion or good will. The sarxr kind of arrogance and the same kind of uncon- sciously racist assumptions come from people whose individual moral charac- ter is t\*yond reproach. Letme illustrate. Consider Larry Summer, the fomEr chiefæonomist of the World Bank and now the Under Særetary of the U S. Treasury. A distinguished academician, Sumnrr recognized that the West had a Evere pollution problem and a high Cost for health care. Following a logic inherent in a economic worldview, Summer came up with a quite rational yet ethically alternative: the West could export its toxic wastes to poor countries, where both life and land Were cheap. In summary, **multinational development organizations exhibit a cultural affinity toward a Western,** primarily Eurol\*an, **view of development.** of color in ther organizations are largely from affluent clasrs who have Ezen educated **in Western or We-stem-influenced institutions.** Many of them have become psychologically distanced from the histories and conditions of the popular struggles in their countries of origin. They have gone through a process of socialization that has dulled their and tempered their sense of urgency.

**Necropolitics**

**Necropolitics are informed and enabled by the historical conditions of the African diaspora**

**Sexton 2010** ~Jared, Associate Professor of African American Studies and Associate Professor of Film and Media Studies and one third of The Trifecta of Tough, "People-of-Color-Blindness: Notes on the Afterlife of Slavery," Social Text, Vol. 28, No. 2~ p.32-33 /MR

However, if for Agamben the camp is “the new biopolitical nomos of the planet,” its novelty does not escape a certain conceptual belatedness with respect to those “repressed topographies of cruelty” that Achille Mbembe has identified in the formulation of “necropolitics.”6 On my reading, the formulation of necropolitics is enabled by attending to the political and economic conditions of the African diaspora in the historic instance—both acknowledging the form and function of racial slavery for “any historical account of the rise of modern terror” and addressing the ways that “the political economy of statehood [particularly in Africa] has dramatically changed over the last quarter of the twentieth century” in connection with “the wars of the globalization era.”7 Necropolitics is important for the historicist project of provincializing Agamben’s paradig- matic analysis, especially as it articulates the logic of race as something far more global than a conflict internal to Europe (or even Eurasia). Indeed, Mbembe initially describes racial slavery in the Atlantic world as “one of the first instances of biopolitical experimentation” and goes on to discuss it, following the work of Saidiya Hartman, as an exemplary manifestation of the state of exception in “the very structure of the plantation system and its aftermath.”8Mbembe abandons too quickly this meditation on the peculiar insti- tution in pursuit of the proper focus of his theoretical project: the formation of colonial sovereignty. In the process, he loses track of the fact, set forth in the opening pages of Hartman’s study, that the crucial aspects of “the peculiar terror formation” that Mbembe attributes to the emergence of colonial rule are already institutionalized, perhaps more fundamentally, in and as the political-juridical structure of slavery.9 More specifically, it is the legal and political status of the captive female that is paradigmatic for the “(re)production of enslavement,” in which “the normativity of sexual violence [i.e., the virtual absence of prohibitions or limitations in the determination of socially tolerable and necessary violence] establishes an inextricable link between racial formation and sexual subjection.”10 This is why for Hartman resistance is figured through the black female’s sexual self-defense, as exemplified by the 1855 circuit court case State of Missouri v. Celia, a Slave, in which the defendant was sentenced to death by hanging on the charge of murder for responding with deadly force to the sexual assault and attempted rape by a white male slaveholder.

**Neoliberalism**

**The modern neoliberal state is not only intimately linked to the modern carceral state and chattel slavery but also specifically targets black women**

**Dillon 13**, [Stephen, “Fugitive Life: race, gender, and the rise of the neoliberal-carceral state”, P. 20-1]//MHELLIE

Although Shakur’s essay does not name neoliberalism explicitly, we can read it as a black feminist theorization of neoliberalism at the very moment of its emergence. Indeed, it is a narration of the drastic racialized and gendered restructurings of social and economic life in the 1970s United States from the perspective of someone detained for resisting those changes. Written by a captured member of the underground black liberation movement, the text names the discourses and (state) violence neoliberalism requires yet erases. Neoliberalism is most certainly an economic doctrine that prioritizes the mobility and expansion of capital at all costs, but its mechanisms exceed the liberation of the market from the repression of the state. As Shakur indicates, one of the conditions of possibility for the emergence of the neoliberal state is the kinship shared between the free world and the prison—an affinity structured and produced by an anti- blackness inaugurated under chattel-slavery. More over, as Shakur argues throughout the essay, the technologies of immobilization utilized by the neoliberal state specifically target black women, a process connected to the emergence of the black feminist movement in the late 1960s and early 1970s. By reading black feminist texts from the 1970s as implicit theories of neoliberalism, we can come to understand the formation and implementation of neoliberalism in a new light. Shakur not only connects an emergent neoliberalism to a rapidly expanding prison regime, she also links the contemporary prison to chattel slavery—an institutional, affective, and discursive connection apprehended by Angela Davis’s phrase, “From the prison of slavery to the slavery of prison.”28

**The market is designed as a mechanism to keep the western man in power. It is only through the will to forget that civil society can construct the market as a technology of freedom. The relegation of black folks to the position of the unthought is indicative of the ways in which the market is driven by a fear to lose the privilege of whiteness.**

**Dillon 13**, [Stephen, “Fugitive Life: race, gender, and the rise of the neoliberal-carceral state”, P. 35-6]//MHELLIE

In addition, the “Statement of Principles” is structured by an anxiety about losing the freedom of whiteness. It argues that **the market is the technology that must be mobilized to protect and secure the sanctity of white life**. As I discuss more fully later in the chapter, the authors of the statement understand that the market is a racialized mechanism that protects Western Man. **The powers of the market collude with the powers of race, relegating some to spaces of prosperity, safety, and security, and others to spaces of disposability, death, and dying**. Without the dispersed powers of the market, the freedom that Friedman et al. seek to preserve—a freedom that has always been produced by racialized and gendered subjection and terror—will disappear. The statement implicitly argues that the racial subjection produced by the market must continue if freedom is to live on. Unspoken (but necessary) in this process is that the Others to Western Man will be relegated to spaces of unfreedom and death. In this way, the “Statement of Principles” rests upon a willful forgetting of the forms of racial terror and subjection that make freedom possible, most critically chattel-slavery. It is through a willful forgetting of slavery and racial terror that the market can be theorized as a technology of freedom. When proponents of neoliberalism pushed for the freedom of the market, they also expanded the market’s powers of racial subjection. Yet they acknowledge this fact when they argue that the market will free Western Man and presumably, leave others unfree. Thus, the freeing of the market gave new life to white supremacy in the era of the post-Civil Rights revival of the racial state. **If the market frees Western Man while leaving others unfree, then there is another genealogy of the market that leads us not to freedom, but to the slave ship, plantation, coffle, and auction black—a genealogy that undoes the neoliberal narrative of freedom and progress.** Proponents of neoliberalism are not alone in the forced forgetting of slavery and racial subjection. This body of knowledge shares an epistemological kinship with the movements and theories that seek its destruction. Slavery’s status as an unthinkable history of the present is also evident in critical scholarship on neoliberalism. More specifically, slavery as the unthought structures the ways that critical theories of neoliberalism understand the relationship between the economic, the social, the population, and the body. For instance, in his germinal book Neoliberalism: A Short History, David Harvey argues that neoliberalism produces the “financialization of everything” by intensifying the market’s hold over daily life.111 For Harvey and many scholars, neoliberalism is understood through a historical teleology in which capitalism is regressing to a point never before witnessed. For instance, Harvey writes, “Neoliberalization has unquestionably rolled back the bounds of commodification and greatly extended the reach of legal contracts.”112 Neoliberalism is understood to have broken the liberal division between the social, economic, and political so that the economic reaches beyond its supposed isolated domain. As Aihwa Ong argues, under “neoliberal governmentality,” market-driven truths and calculations infiltrate the domain of politics.113 Within this narrative, the 1970s signal a change in the relationship between the market and life.

**The market transformed black bodies into a commodity only existing to be exploited for their use value. For black folks, the market has never been a zone of freedom, but one of social death all in the name of economic efficiency.**

**Dillon 13**, [Stephen, “Fugitive Life: race, gender, and the rise of the neoliberal-carceral state”, P. 62-5]//MHELLIE

In the passage that inspired Williams to write Dessa Rose, Davis captures the relationship between race, gender, punishment, and the market that was central to slavery: During the same year [as the dissection and execution of a black woman charged with starting a fire], a group of slaves, being led from Maryland to be sold in the South, had apparently planned to kill the traders and make their way to freedom. One of the traders was successfully done away with, but eventually a posse captured all the slaves. Of the six leaders sentenced to death, one was a woman. She was first permitted, for reasons of economy, to give birth to her child. Afterwards, she was publicity hanged (my emphasis).119 For Davis, **enslaved black women were subjected to particular forms of racial terror, torture, and discipline. These forms of punishment, and the accompanying racial logics concerning the management of black life, were animated by the rationality of the market.** The unnamed pregnant rebel's death was prolonged, not to preserve the life of an unborn child, but rather to extract the capital growing in her body. In this way, slavery did not commodify labor, it commodified life itself—producing what Hartman calls "the subject of accumulation."120 As Davis shows, **slavery's disciplinary and biopolitical regulation of black life was animated by the dictates of the market. Profit, punishment, race, gender, and death, were inextricably intertwined. The market helped drive the punishment of the insurgent black body while also taking hold of it with demands for value and profit.** Skin, iron, and capital were linked as race and death were produced for profit. White supremacy wedded the market to flesh and bone, a process that is central to the Achille Mbembe's concept of necropolitics. He writes: Any historical account of the rise of modern terror needs to address slavery, which could be considered one of the first instances of biopolitical experimentation...This power over the life of another takes the form of commerce: a person's humanity is dissolved to the point where it becomes possible to say that the slave's life is possessed by the master. Because the slave's life is like a 'thing," possessed by another person, the slave's existence appears as a perfect figure of a shadow.121 Under the logic of the Atlantic slave trade, the market’s arithmetic of accumulation was sutured to the flesh, inhabiting the bodies and lives it stripped down to the sum of their biological parts for sale within the freedom of the market. This process marked the violent nexus between the market, discipline, and the production of life. **The market was not a zone of freedom, but a zone of death and terror.** The historian Stephanie Smallwood writes: The violence exercised in the service of human commodification relied on scientific empiricism always seeking to find the limits of human capacity for suffering, that point where material and social poverty threatened to consume entirely the lives it was meant to garner for sale in the Americas. In this regard, the economic enterprise of human trafficking marked a watershed in what would become an enduring project in the modern world: probing the limits up to which it is possible to discipline the body without extinguishing the life within.122 **The aim of this early biopolitical project was not to punish and torture, but rather, to slow the depletion of life in the name of economic efficiency**. White supremacy and the market produced the shadow life of the slave within space between life and death. Violence and death were the mechanisms mobilized, and required, to turn human beings into things. While torture and terror were the outcomes for captives, their pain, panic, dread, and horror were unintelligible the rational calculations and concerns of the market. The market decided how many rocks a body could ingest, how many bodies a ship could swallow, and where the line between life and death would reside. Out of social, living, and biological death, the human commodity would live, so that bodies, value, and a racial order would circulate the globe. Through this circulation, the market more than dictated the slave’s living death, more than determined how the most value could be extracted from the frailty of a dying child or the rage of women close to insurrection—it transformed people into money and in some cases, a form of credit. According to Ian Baucom: They were not just selling slaves on the far side of the Atlantic, they were lending money across the Atlantic. And, as significantly, they were lending money they did not yet possess or only possessed in the form of slaves. The slaves were thus treated not only as a type of commodity but as a type of interest-bearing money. They functioned in this system simultaneously as commodities for sale and as reserve deposits of a loosely organized, decentered, but vast trans-Atlantic banking system....123 This is the unimaginable power of the market. The market was mobilized to manage every aspect of life and to transform it so that black flesh was fully fungible with other captive bodies, gold, rum, or animals.124 Yet, the slave was not just equivalent to other commodities, as Baucom argues, she became money. The body and soul of the slave were socially and biologically killed and brought back to life through a possession of the racial powers of the market.125

**Neoliberal Freedom**

**The technologies of the slave ship have proliferated globally. The duplicitous nature of neoliberal freedom constructs subjection as liberation by revolutionizing new technologies of subjugation. Furthermore, state regulation of economic activity uniquely limits political freedom through the will to dominate. The logic of the market necessitates the construction and subsequent exclusion of the other to maintain profit and productivity.**

**Dillon 13**, [Stephen, “Fugitive Life: race, gender, and the rise of the neoliberal-carceral state”, P. 146-151]//MHELLIE

The power of Friedman’s text lies in its ability to produce new forms of subjection through an argument concerning the expansion of freedom. In his attempt to construct a theory of freedom, Friedman reinstalls what he understands to be domination and subjugation within the very practice he names liberty. Freedom, in the text, operates through a type of “melancholic logic,” where freedom becomes its opposite.323 **Neoliberal freedom resurrects the forms of discipline, regulation, and domination it attempts to abolish—it is haunted by (and becomes) what it repudiates**. In other words, neoliberal freedom is possessed by and reproduces the forms of unfreedom it attempts to resign to the past. The power of the language of neoliberal freedom stems from this process—neoliberal thought made subjection look like liberation by allowing new methods of control and regulation to emerge in an era marked by what appeared to be the rise of new forms of liberty. The underground and the fugitive were two formations that emerged to name and challenge this new system of knowledge and governmentality. Throughout Capitalism and Freedom, Friedman argues that political freedom, “the absence of coercion by other men,” requires economic freedom, “the voluntary cooperation of individuals.”324 For Friedman, freedom is destroyed by the concentration of state power. Each chapter of the text describes how state regulation occurs, and why it should not, in the realms of education, trade, finance, discrimination law, licensing, and welfare. For example, someone who is “not free to follow the occupation of his choosing” unless they get a license for it is deprived of “an essential part of his freedom.”325 Or someone who appeases the “taste of the community” by only hiring white workers is denied the freedom to run their business as they wish by the state tyranny of fair hiring laws. **Thus, state regulation of economic activity prevents political freedom.** In this case, as with most examples in the text, political freedom means the right for someone to do what they want, when they want, as long as the action exists within a system of free exchange between private individuals. The basic rules for the governance of the free market are: “Co-operation is strictly individual and voluntary provided: (a) the enterprises are private, so that the ultimate contracting parties are individuals and (b) that individuals are effectively free to enter or not enter into any particular exchange, so that every transaction is strictly voluntary.”326 For Friedman, African American workers could simply choose to work for a different business that does not discriminate. Under the free market, the consumer and worker are protected from harm by the presence of other businesses and employers.327 In this way, “the technique of the marketplace” produces freedom in the form of the “voluntary co-operation of individuals.”328 Political freedom follows where economic freedom flourishes, or as Friedman puts it, “exchange can...bring about co-ordination with out coercion.”329 The imagined absence of coercion and force in the economic realm means freedom will proliferate. **In short, freedom advances when power disappears**.330 And power is a possession held by the state, while freedom is a localizable space that is more absence than form. The ghosts of neoliberal freedom rise and take form when Friedman describes the role of the state: “Its major function must be to protect our freedom from the enemies outside our gates and from our fellow-citizens: to preserve law and order, to enforce private contracts, to foster competitive markets.”331 Within this formulation, the free market is not actually free; the state, according to Friedman, must regulate the freedom of the market. As Nikolas Rose has observed, constructing a free market seems to necessitate innumerable interventions by “accountants, management consultants, lawyers and industrial relations specialists and marketing experts in order to establish the conditions under which the ‘laws of supply and demand’ can make themselves real.”332 **The free market is not to be left to its own devices; its freedom must be fostered by the soft regulations of the state.** The market’s freedom must be regulated and disciplined in order to provide governance to a social world “dismembered by liberal individualism.”333 In essence, Friedman’s notion of economic freedom inaugurates the unfreedom it seeks to escape—economic freedom must be fostered and enforced. While the state, in Friedman’s theory, should be weak enough to free the economic from any and all constraint, it must also have the force necessary to eliminate “domestic and foreign enemies.” Throughout the text Friedman emphasizes that the state must maintain “law and order to prevent physical coercion of one individual by another and to enforce the contracts voluntarily entered into, thus giving substance to the ‘private.’”334 Law and order is the precondition for “voluntary exchange.”335 It is what gives shape to the private sphere. The market’s freedom needed protecting—freedom required containment and control. The brilliance of Friedman’s use of the phrase “law and order” was that it could name blackness as a threat to the market without ever mentioning race. As a racial liberal, Friedman could deploy the race-neutral language of law and order while still invoking a racialized other—the “domestic and foreign enemies” who threatened the free market and freedom itself. In fact, Friedman was very clear about what must be done to the others of neoliberal freedom: “Freedom is a tenable objective only for responsible individuals. We do not believe in freedom for madmen or for children. The necessity of drawing a line between responsible individuals and others is inescapable, yet it means that there is an essential ambiguity to our ultimate objective of freedom. Paternalism is inescapable for those whom we designate as not responsible.”336 The compromise for the liberal is to accept that “paternalism” is necessary in some aspects of life, for some people. The fictional coercion-free exchange that occurs between two individuals is made possible by the racial violence of the law and the police. Life and freedom as Friedman conceptualized them are the products of what he calls “paternalism” and what a number of scholars call social death. Friedman made clear the mutually constitutive relationship between the prison and the free market: paternalism and law and order meant the policing powers of the state must be expansive and robust. **By naming certain populations “not responsible” enough to be free, neoliberal thought fabricates populations that must be policed and imprisoned.** Loïc Wacquant describes this when he writes, “Thus the ‘invisible hand’ of the unskilled labor market...finds its ideological extension and institutional complement in the ‘iron fist’ of the penal state, which grows and redeploys in to order to stem the disorder generated by social insecurity...”337 **The free market and the prison require one another: the carceral controls the waste of the market, while the market produces surplus populations that will be immobilized within the prison**. The fabrication of freedom within the governing realm of the market necessitates the racialized and gendered unfreedom of the prison. The “burden of conscience” constitutive of the liberal individual facilitated self-discipline but also produced resentment toward (and justified the punishment of) those who could not prove themselves worthy of freedom.338 The subject deemed not responsible was caught between the failures of self-reliance, the criminalization of poverty, and the premature death produced by low-wage labor. And as Wacquant makes clear, as the freedom of the market expands, so do systems of incapacitation. While the free market spreads the insecurity of abandonment, the prison offers the illusion of security to those not captured and caged. This relationship between the market and the prison was made even more explicit by followers of Friedman.

**Nomad**

**The radical, unpredictable subject of Deleuze and Guattari’s project on capitalist society is not the racial other, but rather the precarious subject, the far-right libertarian cowboy who is against everything to do with the scholarship of the 1NC. This is because the post-workerist society Deleuze and Guattari speak of requires a subject that can both create and destroy capital. If we understand capitalism not as some ontological project that came out of nowhere, but an investment of power in the creation of indebted beings, then the theory of the nomad doesn’t account for blackness. They thought production accumulated in stasis, but under the rubric of social death time itself accumulates. There are categorical distinctions between conflict and antagonism which require specificity. We have a better account for the repression of capitalism, and the very grammar of suffering regarding black people is different from what your authors are speaking of.**

**Barchiesi 12** [Franco Barchiesi, professor of African American studies at Ohio State University, “Precarity as Capture: A Conceptual Reconstruction and Critique of the Worker-Slave Analogy,” Capture of a Special Kind: The Body of the Slave and the Spinozian Encounter] \*edited for racialized language

A foundational aspect in the theoretical and political project that I have here defined as Spinozian is its insistence on a meaning of production that is conducive to the self-realization of the multitude as an essentially human, intrinsically social form of life. It is indeed significant that ‘autonomist’ Marxism gestures toward a terrain of liberation that surpasses political economy and its critique, but then resurrects so powerfully the category, ‘production’, which, even when not confined to the ‘working class’, more than any other defines controversies in political economy. But does liberation reside in redeeming production from capital’s control and signification? Do competing understandings of what it means to work and produce exhaust the possibilities of radical critique? Do indeed notions of ‘the human’ and its precarity fully encompass the objects of domination and violence in a capitalist order? Frank Wilderson has provided – in his intellectual conversation with Frantz Fanon, Hortense Spillers, Saidiya Hartman, Jared Sexton, and others he refers to as ‘afro-pessimists’ – an important inquiry into the limits of political economy and capital-labor relations as sources of emancipatory imagination.40 Wilderson starts with what I would define a notion of ‘capture’ that problematizes the ‘autonomist’ one, while possibly maintaining some resonance with it. That is the capture by white/settler civil society, constituting itself as a world system under capital, of African subjects to be turned into ‘socially dead’, á-la Orlando Patterson, Black slaves as objects of gratuitous violence and natal alienation. But once inserted as a constitutive modality of white modernity, blackness as condition marked by slavery and structural violence survives the historical circumstances, chiefly legally defined personal subjection, which originated it as such violence is reenacted in colonial exploitation, Jim Crow segregation, apartheid, or the US prisonindustrial complex.41 Jared Sexton thus defines ‘afropessimism’, summarizing the interventions of Hartman and Wilderson, as an ethical and intellectual project that challenges [us] to question the prevailing understanding of a post-emancipation society and to revisit the most basic questions about the structural conditions of antiblackness in the modern world. To ask, in other words, what it means to speak of ‘the tragic continuity between slavery and freedom’ …, indeed to **speak about a type of living that survives after a type of death [and] a political ontology dividing the Slave from the world of the Human in a constitutive way. Wilderson’s approach to capture is therefore ontological and not merely historical. He defines blackness-as-slavery not as a condition of exploitation and alienation, which enable the worker as subject, but as the position of ‘accumulation and fungibility’ that places ‘dead but sentient’ objects in a state of ‘absolute dereliction’ and the deprivation of capacity and relationality. The Settler’s establishment of blackness also constitutes the Black body as the non-human boundary that validates the self-definition of White civil society as a realm of human possibility, affects, and moral reflection, including White meditations on what is good for the Black itself**. Such meditations articulated, for example, Blackness as a target of productive discipline and wage labor imperatives in post-emancipation and colonial orders, where the White/Settler element reclaimed for itself the prerogative of defining the meanings and boundaries of others’ ‘freedom’. **But even if the Black body ended up being exploited as a worker, and experienced a degree of precarity that David Roediger’s ‘wages of whiteness’ alleviated for the Settler working class, it did not enter such dehumanizing modalities primarily as a worker. The ontological significance of blackness as a condition of existence predicated upon the denial of capacity, relationality, and agency is rather to allow whiteness as such, as a cross-class, cross-gender construct, to define itself as ‘human’ precisely on account of possessing such attributes or of partaking of their plenitude. The body of the Slave marks the limit of narratives of modernity as a progressive political project in which concepts like precarity reveal crises, conflicts, and subjects as Koselleck’s idea of historical time suggests. The temporality of the ‘Black qua slave’ is incommensurable with that of workers, even precarious workers, because it is a temporality marked by the event of a loss – of identity, community, culture, descent – that cannot be named. It is, therefore, a temporality that cannot be narrativized because it is constitutively defined by the lack of eventfulness and historicity, a temporality defining, as Wilderson puts it, ‘the time of paradigms, as opposed to time in a paradigm’**. Neilson and Rossiter ground, as I noticed above, their view of precarity as a political subjectivity in the conjunction of ‘ontological experience and socioeconomic condition’. But Black slavery displaces and disarticulates these polarities. More appropriate would be to talk of blackness in terms of socioeconomic experiences, which may well be akin to that of exploited workers, and an ontological condition that is, however, drastically incomparable. Precarity retains in fact the capacity of a narrative trajectory enabled by the event of a loss – of decent work, welfarist compacts, the productive powers of the multitude – that underwrites the imaginative labor of progressive resolutions. **But Blackness exists as a condition that makes loss unnamable, thereby making its subjective narrativization impossible**. In the material experience of workers, black and white alike, extreme precarity can resemble what for Africans was the moment preceding social death, before, that is, being turned into Blacks. Cornel West has suggested that much by referring to the unfolding ‘~~niggerization~~ of America’ as ‘a people, not just black people’, by which he meant that ‘when you’re ~~niggerized~~ you’re unsafe, unprotected, subject to random violence, hated for who you are. You become so scared that you defer to the powers that be, and you’re willing to consent to your own domination. And that’s the history of black people in America’. What is peculiar about that history, however, is that the moment before social death, the moment of extreme precarity, was the last event enslaved Blacks ever experienced, the end of historicity and the beginning of Blackness**. For non-Blacks precarity, exploitation, even slavery remain within the realm of historical experience, but when referred to Blackness they ontologically characterize a state ‘stripped of capacity to transform aimless time into meaningful events, events that can be recognized and incorporated in the “family” of events**. The Black slave is not the embodiment of lost or stolen time; s/he embodies the absence of time’. Blackness as an ontological condition is the insurmountable limit of analogy between the precarity of the Slave and that of the Worker as it marks those entities’ disparate relation to time and to the possibility of narratives validating claims, rights, and recognition. To argue, as Marcel van der Linden does, that slavery and waged work are just ‘two extremes along the spectrum of labor relations’ necessitates the insulation, as the work ethics of plantation economies did, of the Slaves’ productive functions to obscure and normalize the subjectivity-erasing violence that brings them to the world. As the comfort of analogy eludes white progressivism, or comes at the cost of jarring ethical omissions, the threat Blackness poses to the civil society organized by liberal capitalism and policed by Whiteness **can hardly be comprehended in terms of social movement projects**. One should not fall, to be sure, into the erroneous conclusion that Black struggles, including Black workers’ mobilizations, are unimportant. Their achievements in opposing institutional racism and colonialism are indeed as numerous as they are decisive; but are not essential to the afropessimist contention that, no matter their triumphs, black struggles as historical experiences cannot undo Blackness as a constantly reenacted ontological positionality. Christina Sharpe has brilliantly captured the tension between the ‘desire to be human’ underpinning Black quest for agency in an age of legal ‘freedom’ and the routinization of antiblack violence, which constitutes ‘the everyday mundane horrors that aren’t acknowledged to be horrors’ due to the place Blackness occupies in white civil society’s ordinary significations of the ‘monstrous’. Similarly, Hortense Spillers reflects on how for black women the articulation of productive and reproductive roles, an issue white and middle-class feminism emphasizes as central to strategies of ‘intersectional’ visibility vis-à-vis institutionality, is instead a recipe for invisibility to the extent civil society configures black (male and female) sexuality as a pathology and thus turns the black female body into ‘the principal point of passage between the human and the nonhuman world’. The threat of falling into the non-human then acts for conflicts categorized in terms of ‘gender struggles’ as an inducement to both repel the black (male and female) body and align their claims within the more reassuring confines of liberal legalism. It would take too long for the purpose of this paper to delve deeper into debates on afropessimism. What I am interested in here is the light they shed on elaborations of precarity as a condition of political agency. As a violation of living human labor, the socioeconomic violence of precarity is not analogous to the ontological violence of white antiblackness, which defines the socially dead and non-human as a productive force. Not only does the elision of social death, which as we saw was a crucial preoccupation in Mezzadra’s reading of Marx, avoid a radical appraisal of capital’s constitutive, and not merely contingent, violence. It also reconfigures violence into a problem resolvable within the confines of employment relations, civil society mobilizations, and progressive politics. Turning structural violence into a problem of production defines it, in Wilderson’s words, as a ‘conflict’, or ‘a rubric of problems that can be posed and conceptually solved’ as a progressive recomposition without the obliteration of one of the contending entities. **It therefore mystifies the ontological opposition of Black/death and White/life, which is not a conflict but rather an ‘antagonism’, which Wilderson defines as ‘an irreconcilable struggle between entities, or positions, the resolution of which is not dialectical but entails the obliteration of one of the positions’**. The analytical distinction between conflict and antagonism, which the left – including many ‘autonomist’ Marxist endorsements of social movement politics – tend to see as coincidental, allows an approach to my initial issue of precarity as a political subject under an innovative perspective. Can the objectified targets of capital’s ontological violence, echoing what Wilderson calls Black ‘dead but sentient bodies’, participate in the Spinozian encounter? Is Spinoza’s look at the conatus as a property of ‘lines, planes, and solids’ adequate to restoring capacity to the objectified and disposable actors in a precarious world of production? Or is that approach uneasily reflective of the fact that, exactly at the time the Ethics was written, human bodies were being turned into objects, to which the sturdy facticity of ‘lines, planes, and solids’ is better suited than feelings, affects, and desire? But if this latter is the case, to what extent are the ghosts of the ontological deaths that simultaneously originated capitalism and White liberal civil society still haunt, unable to find a political resolution, ‘new social movements’ that keep grounding their optimistic sense of agency in the celebration of life and its limitless productive potentials? Attempts have been made to reconcile Fanon’s body of the Negro – an image that is central to afropessimist commentaries on antiblackness – with Deleuze and Guattari’s desiredriven ‘body without organs’ (BwO), as both refer to a critique of the Oedipus complex. In conclusion to one of such attempts, Amber Jamilla Musser writes: **The painful particularity of the colonized black man offers a reminder that the BwO’s radical possibilities must be thought in conjunction with specificity and also that it comes at the risk of foreclosing the agency of others**. It is a salutary warning, but one nonetheless that is still bound by reverence for Fanon as a theorist of ‘freedom and possibility’ embodied by ‘brothers banded together’ in the anticolonial struggle. It misses how this vision is articulated, as Wilderson powerfully shows in his discussion of Steve Biko’s Fanonianism, with Fanon’s reading of the Black body as the recipient of ontological death, which destabilizes the entire horizon of ‘freedom and possibilities’ as explicating themselves through social movements and civil societies**. The analogy between the Black body and the body without organs can hold, in other words, only if the former means the body of the colonized, which, similarly to Wilderson’s native Americans as genocided but not enslaved subjects, can still espouse within civil society a ‘register of sovereignty’ , or a way of naming the loss of a culture, a community, a regime of landholding, a wholeness of self as an imaginative condition for their restoration through a politics of precariousness**. But Musser’s analogy is no longer applicable – at least in civil society and social movements geared to recognition and rights-claiming – when the Black is the Slave – organs without body rather than the reverse – or what Fanon saw as an ontological position predicated upon antiblackness as absolute dereliction in which the obliteration of Black desire is civil society’s condition of existence. The assertion of that desire, or making the Black body a body without organs, cannot thus be addressed by theoretical analogy and multicultural encounters within social movements, but only through the abolition of civil society. The final section will elaborate on some possible implications of Blackness for precarity as a political subject, which will summarize and review this paper’s initial questions.

**Spaces are de-territorialized just as quick as they are re-territorialized. Blackness is ontological, and so is the nomad. Make no mistake, this is still a debate of the accumulation of time, NOT the passage of it that their authors assume. Graffiti builds upon itself as an ontological project despite how they may theorize about time’s passage.**

**Jones 16** [Dalton Anthony Jones, Ph.D in African-American and American Studies from Yale, associate professor at Bowling Green State university, “Northern Hieroglyphics: Nomadic Blackness and Spatial Literacy,” Rhizomes issue 29, sections 16-18]

[16] The easy slide into complicity happens with the snap of the fingers, when you are paying attention to something else, something like safety or protecting your dignity by staying calm. But speed cannot hide the fact that this was, and, of course still rightfully is by any measure of justice, indigenous land that I am violating and I have approached it once again under the escort and under the guise of the colonial-settler. A part of it yet so, so far removed that it is hard to feel remorse. But I tilled and seeded this soiled earth. I cracked and ate the stolen corn. I cut and carried the tortured timber and drove the fence posts into the earth. And even if I did the Gandy Dance to pass the time, it was I who hammered the rail spikes into the tracks that cut red blood paths across the country, sealing our fates together forever. If I killed their buffalo and helped set the prairies ablaze, what can I tell them today? My hands were tied. There is no bureau of African American Affairs, no territorial sovereignty for me to fight for. I have no casinos to bet my future on and there is certainly no reservation about my place in relation to the order of things as they presently stand. [17] "[T]he nomad has no points, paths or land," writes Deleuze or Guattari, we are never quite sure who is who and which is which, "even though he does by all appearances[.]" A perfect description of my blackness I would say. No wonder there is such a dearth of accomplices for me to turn to, including among my kin. If the nomad can be called the Deterritorialized par excellence, it is precisely because there is no reterritorialization afterwards as with the migrant, or upon something else as with the sedentary (the sedentary's relation with the earth is mediatized by something else, a property regime, a State apparatus...). With the nomad, on the contrary, it is deterritorialization that constitutes the relation to the earth, to such a degree **that the nomad reterritorializes on deterritorialization itself**.[[5]](http://www.rhizomes.net/issue29/jones/index.html#footnote-5) [18] It is a painful pill to swallow, a hard and lonely way to be a revolutionary in this world. For nomadic blackness, the violently deracinated subject, the constant mobility of deterritorialization is a haunting spectre, an unstill quest, an exercise in solipsism, not a respite from the troubled failures and ugly defeats of the soil. An accurate description, no doubt, but to reterritorialize deterritorialization is, for the black subject, to resubmit to the wound of captivity in an endless cycle of assent, a nightmare of re-flagellation. Deterritorialization is not a space of liberation, at least not when it is coerced; it is a space already inhabited by the captor, colonized by the colonizer, capitalized by the capitalist. Such contradictions produce violent antagonisms in terms of the black subject's right to, first, try to maintain its center of gravity in and through the world by affirming the right to self-determination and autonomous community building, and, second, and more to the point, produce a grievance by articulating an "ethics of the real" when this ambition is dislodged. It is the right to protest and adequately defend oneself against the state of Objective Vertigo articulated by Frank Wilderson, "the sensation that one is not simply spinning in an otherwise stable environment, [but] that one's environment is perpetually unhinged stem[ing] from a relationship to violence that cannot be analogized."[[6]](http://www.rhizomes.net/issue29/jones/index.html#footnote-6) The domesticated subject of Domestication. The oppressed subject of Oppression. The violated subject of Violation. These are heady claims, but a fair review of history demonstrates that blackness is the original (in terms of modernity at least) governed subject of all these things, all these processes. In this regard, and this regard only, can we say that "[t]he black body," as Dionne Brand has put it, ought to be understood as "a domesticated space as much as it is a wild space." To occupy this body, she tells us, is to live a life that is spoken, "in the blunt language of brutality," to be ordered by a vocabulary where "even beauty is brutal."[[7]](http://www.rhizomes.net/issue29/jones/index.html#footnote-7) The reterritorialization of Nomadic blackness is a result of the gravitational pull of a discursive and territorial black hole whose center is vacated: and nature, or at least we are taught, abhors a vacuum. As a vagabond—albeit a rather privileged one as the ancient legacy of vagrant wandering goes—I have learned to listen closely to the ways that Humans mark and measure the boundaries of the spaces they inhabit. The uneasy history of nomadic blackness under the wide-open skies of North America, that curious symbol of global emancipation, has prepared me well for this task. First as émigré, then as captive, then as a fugitive regarding with prudence every step it takes along the lines of flight to the four cardinal points of the world and beyond, the black subject, never grounded, always on the run, is accustomed to navigating the enigmatic line between text and subtext, between the terrain and the subterranean. Moving across this tarnished landscape, evidence of the full enclosure of the commons is everywhere and everywhere it conspires to make me understand, with the barbaric reflexivity of commonsense, that I am subordinated to the effect of a cause that long preceded me. Outside my window a portrait of a land born in violence, nurtured in violence, and sustained in violence passes before my eyes. There is no sign of sovereign space for me to call my home, no autonomous zone left for me to suture myself on to, no under-the-commons to use as an escape hatch and no over-the-commons to float away on into the future in a phantasmagorical quest for "we." To believe this is to misapprehend the depth of a wound that has been inflicted on a world struggling to preserve its air, its water, the fertility of its land, the food it eats. My body stands in austere relief against the outlines of a merciless ecosystem. I am a hieroglyphic, illuminating with my presence an entire ecology of suffering and paranoia, exposing with my mobility the stuttering cruelty of an unfulfilled mission that lies dormant here, active there, hiding in the nomenclature of our culture like a felon crouching in fear of being found, of being talked about too closely, of being driven to the surface of things with words. Like the wilting world on fire, I, not it, am the mark of difference and the figure of repetition: the persistent (disa)vowel that gives the multitude of consonants around me their signification, a body that makes complete a transcript with far too many rogues for one story to contain. [6] Running from the sun only to reach it in time for tomorrow, we navigate our way around a string of black holes with gravitational fields that are far more conductive than my one black body, a concentration of holes like me that deform time and space, warping the narrative of the American dream, drawing it into a vacuum that transforms it into a delirious hallucination that is as devoid of light as an abandoned Detroit street at night. One moment, we are a stone's throw from a city so hard and volatile it is named after a rock that makes fire, a city poisoning its children by the tens of thousands out of boredom and bureaucratic necessity, quenching their tiny thirst with a neurotoxic element known to create permanent brain damage in vertebrates since the Shang Dynasty of 1,500 BC. The next moment we barrel past the refugee camps of Toledo and Cleveland, following the outlines of a lake so eerie it blossoms with thick-green algae every summer as the result of a phosphorous runoff that produces a liquid scum so noxious you cannot drink or even bath in it: cutting off the water supply to half a million people being just another of the "negative externalities" of factory farming and genetic modification. We see towns overshadowed by nuclear power plants, steaming concrete cylinders drawn tightly at the waist like Victorian women bound in corsets coughing, trying to breath, looming twin towers leaking a steady stream of tritium waste into the nature sanctuaries and public swimming holes that surround it. The magnetic pull into blackness along this drive is more harrowing than any narrative of nation or state can possibly fend off, too irrational to contain or sustain. I see a withering geography that is, as Katherine McKittrick describes it so well, as much demonic ground as fecund soil or safe haven for life.[[2]](http://www.rhizomes.net/issue29/jones/index.html#footnote-2) [7] Precarity in the face of a predator as exotic and insufferable as Man forces one to hear with the eyes and see with the ears; to touch with the mouth and taste through the very pores of the skin**. Evolution demands sensitivity to detail**. More than a theoretical meditation on the "symbolism of architectural forms" or even an aesthetic rumination on the organic relationship between a structure and its social function, spatial literacy is a survival mechanism, an act of self-preservation more urgent for the endangered species than for those living at the top of the food chain. In the hands of cartography, the science of land and measurement, of record keeping and permanence, of engineering, of bridges and dams, of prisons and zoos and confinement, of surveillance and cameras and drones, spatial awareness is a weapon of social control: A tool of domination. Form and function are necessary correlates nowhere more so than in the face of extinction, l'art pour l'art being as useless as the wings of the Dodo Bird. Even the illicit "production of space," **the discursive reclamation of the walls that confine us, is rendered fleeting, restricted and abstract under the conditions of late capital and global governance we encounter; under the morphing and intensifying expressions of modernity we are forced to navigate.** We are fatally intimate with these highways and fences after all. We know what they are meant for and how they came to be. We know their wages and we know without being told that the backroads and shortcuts are no longer a viable option. So I listen carefully to what the surface of things has to say and I heed the advice I receive accordingly. We are always in proximity to danger and the land I am moving through is closing in around us like a noose drawing tighter and tighter with each passing day.

**The position of blackness, its social life in social death, solves for your vacuous project in the present on a level of specificity that (your abstract author) doesn’t engage with. (Narrative about traversing the highway, looking at graffiti) Also it’s terminally non-unique, their alt is being enacted by blackness on the level of ontology.**

**Jones 16** [Dalton Anthony Jones, Ph.D in African-American and American Studies from Yale, associate professor at Bowling Green State university, “Northern Hieroglyphics: Nomadic Blackness and Spatial Literacy,” Rhizomes issue 29, sections 8-13]

[8] Words and signs are a dwelling, a zone of domesticity, an instrument of coherence. Words and signs are a tool of domination, a menace. Words and signs are a technology of salvation and deliverance**.** But above all, whether nuisance, threat, or sanctuary, words and signs are a navigational device. **Words and signs are unstable, shifting in meaning only because they are how we move, and when it comes to articulation we are scavengers far more concerned with subsistence than high philosophy**. The law of natural selection holds as true for the plasticity of language and the decorum of grammar as it does for the negotiation of space. Territorial animals, humans make their presence known even in their absence and this artery through the heart of the nation is no exception to the rule. Along the sound barriers, against the sides of abandoned railroad sheds, clinging to the billboards and overpasses, we are followed and preceded by illicit lines. An elaborate semaphore stretches out before us, guiding our way just as surely as Daniel Boone's vulgar hatchet once marked the trees, steering modernity with its voracious appetite and relentless insistence on "I" across the hills and hollers of Ohio and Appalachia in the first place. **The voices of those with a synthetic attachment to this land mingle with the wayfarers like myself who are just trying to keep low as they make their way forward to someplace else.** Our conversation is inscribed on the surroundings with chaotic precision. Letters without words, words without sentences; a montage of characters suspended without clear-cut frames of reference. E-L-K....S-T-P....R-K-Sha....D-V-S, and the tag that emerges above the others with dogged regularity, M-U-L. [9**] I recognize something of myself in the liminal highway literature I pass.** Graffiti, wall writing, tags, the errant lines that twist and bend the precision of the surveyor's chainage, are a scripture that belongs in the hands of the displaced and the h(a)unted. **Like jazz, a black sound emerging from the contradictions and barbarities of a slave democracy, our-selves, our identities, our desires and aspirations, our wounds and our scars, walk across the plane of language with an improvised disregard for the rules of conduct**. As the universal "disappearing subject" of discourse, I am the inability to locate textual authority. I am the measure and value of goods on the market: a black hole on the white face of modernity, my body is the demystification of the mystification of value. If the struggle to establish a coherent position within a constantly shifting system of signs is one of the great political struggles of our age, we are, thanks in no small part to the lessons learned from the discursive interventions of the black vernacular and its body, becoming quite effective at performing this radical maneuver. Letter-by-letter, syllable-by-syllable, word-by-word, image-by-image, a new language, embryonic and inchoate, is defacing the value accumulated in the creaky edifice that is crumbling around us even as it continues to churn out and police its signifiers. **The art of spatial literacy**— the ability to read one's environs in order to decode and disrupt the center of discourse—**is the lingua franca of blackness**. The disintegration of language, the transcendence of its limitations and the acknowledgement of its betrayals, has led to a fluency with the "multiplication of modes of writing" that fill this littered, lettered landscape. [10] If all of this sounds somewhat familiar, it is. Strategic illiteracy has been at the core of any modernist literary ambition with integrity ever since its genesis in the slave trade's brutal disarticulations of the black subject-in-space and the clearing of the frontier of its indigenous savages. The effacement of colonized space is more than just the revenge of the speech act upon the imposed codification of the written word: it is, at its core, an in-human act and, defiling such a subject position, necessarily a revolutionary one. [11] Roland Barthes spent the last three decades of his life trying to divine the revolution and its saboteurs in boxes of detergent, string-net bags of pasta and Japanese travel guides. Ironically, if Afro-pessimism affirms the right to assert the living presence of the past, a past it has not just been robbed of but a form of social death it has been refused to mourn and encouraged to forget**, escaping the "burden" of the past has been one of the exemplary missions of European high philosophy.** For Barthes, the father of semiotics and a guiding force in the move away from the stability of order and into the magical land of poststructuralism, history in its entirety stood before us unified in language. All of the dramas of value and exchange were bound and tied by the grammatical inheritance of the word. To be free of the constraints of an authoritarian past meant to be free not only of its narrative, the ideology and bureaucratic tongue that legally and ethically sanctioned the form and order of hierarchy, but to demolish the very structure of its articulation. For him, the purview of "degree zero" therefore meant pushing the linguistic inheritance of old France beyond the materiality of the written word and into a new event horizon, creating a new grammar that spilled over into the abstraction of visuality. Barthes sought his escape by turning to a set of visual codes, elaborating a system that, he argued, was capable of operating beyond the creative constraints of a stale, oppressive, European formalism. He believed passionately that the protocols of literacy imposed a limited psychic frontier for the free sovereign European subject, a nightmare ontology that could only be surpassed (or suppressed) through the creation of a non-compliant, unbound mode of articulation. [12] But this is where Barthes veered astray and missed the mark. He failed to recognize, or was unable to read the signs of the times he was living in well enough to know that literacy is more than a symbolic act; it is a full out contact activity with dire consequences. Literacy demands full embodiment. **The war in Algeria was more than a media spectacle**: it was, as he averred but evidently could not grasp, a lethal encounter between men with bullets over territory. In a version of hear no evil, see no evil while one hears and sees evil, Barthes advocated for an "insurrectionary literature" lifted from the convention of the page, without the enforced boundary of authorial intent, a renunciation that was configured as an act of rebellion, an uprising against structure whose modus operandi was respite from the burden of Francophone sterility, hierarchy, and, yes, guilt**.** A "neutral" writing Barthes tells us, one premised on the democracy of articulation, would emerge from the quest to realize "a mode of writing which might at last achieve innocence."[[4]](http://www.rhizomes.net/issue29/jones/index.html#footnote-4) [13] The democracy of articulation...the burden of the past...a neutral writing...the attainment of innocence. Although a perverse fulfillment of Barthes' dream**, the broken dialect spoken along this corridor might just represent the last stand of the Enlightenment project for which France is at least partly to blame**. It is a grammar of dispossession that poses an insolent challenge to the letter of the law and the ethical cohesion spelled out by liberal Humanism's covenant between power and those it purports to govern. **One thing is for sure, the authors of this nomadic literature are not waiting for the sanction of high theory to speak**. They do not need to be reminded that the structure of grammar is the pawn of authority or that their voices are locked within a prison-house of language. These negro highway scribes in spirit, speaking in a language that blackness speaks fluently, are trying to liberate the sign from the clutches of the written word, reveling in the act of defacement and recreation, and although it may be a futile task they are, at the very least, demolishing any pretense of a formal line between signifier and signified, about what the past means and what the present is. But blackness is a dark place, full of holey ghosts, and few choose to risk that journey of their own accord.

**Do you engage with authors with a grammar of obscure French high theory, or with the dilemma of a lack of articulation towards the technologies of slavery that pervade civil society? This debate is about the wound that still festers, before becoming.**

**Jones 16** [Dalton Anthony Jones, Ph.D in African-American and American Studies from Yale, associate professor at Bowling Green State university, “Northern Hieroglyphics: Nomadic Blackness and Spatial Literacy,” Rhizomes issue 29, sections 19-23]

[19] How, then, does one develop a working genealogy of a conundrum such as Afro-pessimism? Where does one begin? How is it possible to chart the history of something as polymorphous, as generative of and yet so abjectly banished from the life of Western modernity as the phenomenon of blackness-as-negation and negation-as-blackness? How does one narrate a story whose most poignant expressions have never been made with the written word or debated forthrightly in the public transcripts of civil society? **How does one develop a functional vocabulary of silence?** How does one paint a portrait of the unseen? And, most gravely perhaps, how does one do this crucial work while remaining sane in the face of a million commonplace and pitiless deferrals? [20] The first challenge one confronts when trying to develop a theory and practice of black study is the problem of scale. That is, accepting the daunting task of conveying the sheer magnitude, the confounding depth and breadth of the topic at hand. Elaborating the slave's capture and subordination, establishing the relationship between the violence entailed by this process and the most essential and seemingly inessential formations of the modern (on the one hand, the nation, the state, civil society, the regime of value and its accumulated surplus and so forth; on the other, the minute protocols that organize our affiliations and disaffiliations with these meta-dispositifs of power), is itself enough to test the most stable psychology and blackness, we must remember, is born just a little bit crazy. **But elaborate them we must, for without this effort all subsequent theorizations of blackness fail.** Lindon Barrett's posthumous and tragically incomplete masterpiece, Racial Blackness and the (Dis)continuities of Western Modernity, serves as a case-point for the almost maniacal lengths a brilliant mind such as his must go through in order to demonstrate with precision (for anything less than precision will be dismissed outright on a technicality) the emergent circumstances of racial blackness, to show the centrality of trans-Atlantic plantation slavery to this formation, to catalogue the means by which slavery was a constituent element in the development of capitalism and is thus a constituent element of the contemporary global distribution of wealth and European territorial hegemony, of tracing the historical transition away from European feudal and monarchical forms of consolidated power to the more elusive, flexible forms of capitalist authority we live under today, to call attention to the consequent unstable formation of the human as a normative subject, to assemble an encyclopedic catalogue of the philosophers, historians, psychoanalysts, revolutionary anti-colonialists and social scientists of the more tame type who buttress these truths in order to show how and why we can and must see the extraction, consolidation, and distribution of resources in the creation of the Atlantic economies as not just foundational to but an ongoing process in the formation of the modern world, to emphasize, finally, the relation between the materiality of power and the "discursive grammar" by which subjects are composed and imagined, and all of this as prelude to say something else, something as simple as "I am" and "I am here." Reading Barrett's exhaustive résumé one can feel the frenetic energy expended upon the project and the almost perceptible slide into madness as he attempts to elaborate the elaborated, to prove the proven, to speak what has already been spoken, to be heard in a world where blackness lives in and is defined as vacuum: A living black hole pockmarking the face of modernity.[8] [21] Capitalism and Schizophrenia, Civilization and Its Discontents, Madness and Civilization: all of the classic exegeses on mental illness and modernity express the dementia of blackness in its stable form. To be black, is to be mad. To be sane in a world of repetitive violence against one's body and soul is to be mad. Blackness is an unstable delirium that sucks the very light out of Enlightenment.[9] If Afro-pessimist thought forces us to make an accounting of the past, its imperative, its impetus for being, the persistence of its assertion as a destabilizing injunction, is driven by decidedly contemporary concerns. It is the effort to make an honest accounting of the question, "where does my body stand in relation to my flesh and how can they both, one without sacrificing the other, find a stable place to stand in this world or, in the meantime, how can I at least find a way to speak the contradiction and violence of that displacement**?" It assumes the task of answering this question by delving into the past not for the sake of melancholy, the right to sing the blues or wallow in self-pity, but in order to elaborate the mechanics of a wound that still festers**. It is an exhaustive project that demands willpower and invites sanction at every step. It entails not cutting a truce between the past and the present, not accepting a plea-bargain that leaves our accumulated grievances and the perpetual expendability of our lives off of the negotiating table in exchange for the dubious right to join the legions of alienated and exploited citizens struggling to find coherence in an insane and abusive new world order that has evolved, seamlessly and coercively, from the old. To hazard the consequences of not raising the white flag is an act of courage. But one look out of the window at the America I am traversing across tells me that I do not want to join the rank and file I see. And with that decision, for better or worse, **begins a struggle that cannot rely on the power of affirmation alone**. It demands that one produce a string of negations as persistent and unrelenting as the steady repetition of deportations that promote one's exile, and it requires one to challenge, ruthlessly, the unethical stability and indefensible centrism that has been the operational status quo of modernity since its inception. [22] For this reason, Jared Sexton, who provides a concise overview of the objections mounted against Afro-pessimism, asserts, following Wilderson, that Afro-pessimism is as much a structural position as a school of thought or collection of ideological dogmas. (Sexton, Afro-Pessimism: The Unclear Word, 9) Rather, it is a (dis)position of embodiment that is deployed and asserted at key junctures. While the encounter may not always be willful, it inevitably emerges of its own accord with a predictable yet spontaneous regularity. It disrupts the flow of social discourse, particularly at those moments of convergence between the black body and its "institutional inscription."[10] More than a unified polemic, although it can be this too, Afro-pessimism is an extended meditation upon a set of accumulated negations growing out of the contradictions of Western thought and practice. Sometimes these can be moments of catharsis, appearing as a productive intervention, creating levity and release in unexpected places at unexpected times, but their (re)appearance and (re)iteration occur with such frequency, and always in a mode that replicates the grievance of blackness, that even such affective solidarities become a structural disposition bound by a relation of violence and a posture of negation. [23] **Afro-pessimism is, in other words, first and foremost a political imperative.**

**Prefer Afropessimism to French Postmodernism/Poststructuralism. If post-structuralism is true, and discourse does shape reality, then endgaging with the reality of gratuitous violence is a prerequisite to a discussion of what next for blackness.**

**Jones 16** [Dalton Anthony Jones, Ph.D in African-American and American Studies from Yale, associate professor at Bowling Green State university, “Northern Hieroglyphics: Nomadic Blackness and Spatial Literacy,” Rhizomes issue 29, sections 24-27]

[24] If black thought and black being take exception to the authority of the sign, it is for very different reasons than those articulated by Barthes and the main body of poststructuralism. For Afro-pessimism it is that the structure of language, the fluidity and potential creativity of the word, is bound by a systemic shock whose ground zero is not monarchy, feudalism, labor exploitation or the multiple forms of alienation they produce, but the awe and occurrence of a structural violence rooted in captivity and the imposition of social death, the black body as removable, kidnapable, killable, fuckable, and, in an endless variety of ways, unaccounted for in civil society. **This is the only way to fully understand the gesture of madness** (not just anger, but actual insanity), that appears, say, when Sandra Bland slams her phone on the hood of her car after being stopped for the civil offense of not using a blinker to change lanes or the routine nature of her subsequent death by hanging in a Waller County, Texas jail cell. Every one gets tickets they feel they don't deserve or has a bad day, but here we see how the structure and authority of the word encounters the structure and authority of civil society**: how the legacy of social death in one realm**, the instability of linguistic structure that Barthes (and Foucault) would call **the "death of the author," colludes with the grammar of violence that organizes the state around the black body**: Encinia: I don't know, you seem very really irritated. Bland: I am. I really am. I feel like it's crap what I'm getting a ticket for. I was getting out of your way. You were speeding up, tailing me, so I move over and you stop me. So yeah, I am a little irritated, but that doesn't stop you from giving me a ticket, so [inaudible] ticket. Encinia: Are you done? Bland: You asked me what was wrong, now I told you. Encinia: Step out of the car. Bland: You do not have the right. You do not have the right to do this. Encinia: I do have the right, now step out or I will remove you. Bland: I refuse to talk to you other than to identify myself. [crosstalk] I am getting removed for a failure to signal? Encinia: Step out or I will remove you. I'm giving you a lawful order. Get out of the car now or I'm going to remove you. Bland: And I'm calling my lawyer. Encinia: I'm going to yank you out of here. (Reaches inside the car.)[11] [25] The poststructuralist attempt to exploit the instability of the word in order to dodge the authority of structure was meant to free the purported "sovereign individual" from the clutches of a hierarchy rooted in conquest and capital, a heritage that was, by the 1950s, being challenged as morally and militarily indefensible. **If we are "franc" about it, we will note that the critique of French national and colonial heritage lodged by Barthes, Foucault, Derrida, Baudrillard, and, yes, although always marching to the beat of his own rhythm, Gilles Deleuze, was due in no small measure to the revolutionary demands of colonized black and brown people for self-determination and, short of this, citizenship and administrative equality: the battle of Dien Bien Phu of 1954, the Algerian war of independence from 1954—1962, and the advent of the civil rights movement in the United States, being just a few examples of the anti-colonial resistance that ran concurrently with the most productive and innovative work of European philosophy**. [26] Barthes and his cadre of colonial intellectuals may have even recognized in their aspiration that they were inviting the dispossession of an authoritative voice of whiteness that they could not escape any more than the black subject could bypass her exclusion from the discursive center. But I am fairly sure they did not recognize what the consequences of their disavowal of displacement might be. We might categorize Fred Moten's In the Break: The Aesthetics of the Black Radical Tradition, one of the most groundbreaking texts in the canon of black thought from the past decade and a half, as a work whose two-fold objective is, first, to deconstruct deconstruction, critiquing the deft maneuvers of European theory to salvage a privileged center and, second, to offer an alternative analysis of poststructuralist and postmodernist theory from the purview of the black voice, in particular its ability to exploit the interstices and breaks of articulation, the in-between spaces made famous by Homi Bhabha whose argument Moten extends, to its radical advantage. Deep into this project, Moten, in a rather brief but dazzling exposition of Barthes, deconstructs the semiotician's effort to construct a new theory of the visual sign by illustrating how his maneuvers ultimately amounted to the conceit of an "egocentric particularity" in which "a critique of the suppression of the determining weight of history is left behind for a stance that is nothing if not ahistorical."[12] It is on Moten's second thesis, the possibility of a zone of radical black transformation within the structural (linguistic, symbolic and empirical) grammar of the empire of signs (and bodies) that he and the Afro-pessimists have engaged in what is arguably one of the most eloquent, comprehensive, magical, rational, civil, contentious, and rigorous dialogues that Western theory has ever produced. David Marriott, one of the key participants in this generative exchange, extends this debate within Afro-pessimism with his contribution to this special issue. Offering a reading of Moten's request that we approach Frantz Fanon as if "for the first time" in order to salvage an optimistic reading of the revolutionary Martiniquais, Algerian philosopher/psychologist's writing, Marriott pinpoints the anxieties of nomadic blackness and its repetition and deferral: if Fanon hears what Moten does not hear (in terms of his reading of the case), this is because Moten can only affirm blackness as affirmation, not because it escapes pathology, but because blackness is experienced only as the activity of escape, but one which never escapes the ontology of such production. It follows that blackness cannot escape its own fugitivity; its constitutive moment is traversal (or, what constitutes it is its force of subversion with regard to the pathological classifications of blackness). (Marriott, Judging Fanon, 3) [27] Afro-pessimism begins with the general recognition of the organizing capacity of violence. It traces the contemporary conundrum of blackness back to its deployment as a mechanism of African captivity and slave incarceration and the centrality of this instance to the creation of the so-called New World. What is at stake, then, is the question of continuity. That is to say, following the groundbreaking work of Hortense Spillers, that if my body does not (yet) bare the scars of the trans-Atlantic and plantation slave experiences—the whip-marks across my back, the blisters on my feet and fingers from toiling, the rope burns around my elongated neck—these wounds live on in the legacy of my flesh.[13] It is Spillers who, emerging out of the radical context of the black women's rights movement, has shown us with the most lucid clarity how the ensemble of violent structures that arranged the body of the black slave comprises a continuum of trauma, a "human sequence written in blood, [that] represents for its African and indigenous peoples a scene of actual mutilation, dismemberment, and exile."[14] For Spillers, the distinction between body and flesh is an expression of the continuity of a suffering that goes hand-in-hand with the will to live, to survive with integrity, with what she, offering a direct challenge or corrective to the ambitions of modernist discourses that long for and believe in a degree zero of articulation, calls "that zero degree of social conceptualization that does not escape concealment under the brush of discourse or the reflexes of iconography."[15]

**Their theory of movement needs serious recontextualization from the alt; the nomad doesn’t ‘choose’ to become, this ballot isn’t a choice. Instead, the nomad is propelled in a state up chaos based upon artistry and need. An understanding of the black nomad in the wake of the middle passage as such is needed to work through an archive of suffering in any meaningful way.**

**Hantel 12** [Max Hantel, Post-Doctoral fellow at the gender research institute at Dartmouth, “Errant Notes on a Caribbean Rhizome,” Rhizomes issue 24, sections 15-20]

[15] Glissant problematizes this nomadism as lacking rhizomatic roots: [Circular nomadism's] function is to ensure the survival of the group by means of circularity...Contrast this with invading nomadism, that of the Huns, for example, or the Conquistadors, whose goal was to conquer lands by exterminating their occupants...an arrow-like nomadism...Neither in arrowlike nomadism nor in circular nomadism are roots valid. (Glissant: 12) [[3]](http://www.rhizomes.net/issue24/hantel.html" \l "_ftn3" \o ") In other words, the agency of the nomad risks becoming as univocal as the state apparatus in its pursuit of smooth space, which is precisely a non-movement. "The nomad is one who does not depart, does not want to depart, who clings to the smooth space left by the receding forest" (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 381). [16] For the purposes of enriching the conversation between Deleuze and Glissant, then, the itinerant smith is much more interesting because Glissant's oeuvre is so defined by a concern with the relationship between movement, memory, and traumatic but generative roots. He sums up this relation with the term errantry. The complex agency of the itinerant smith illuminates this possible connection, an agency encapsulated by Deleuze and Guattari's claim that they work "not by nature but by artistry and need" (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 413). The tense coupling of artistry and need introduces a mode of agency beyond, on the one hand, passivity in the face of contingent conditions or violence, and on the other hand, active (and often heroic) resistance or unimpeded self-styling. From the perspective of post-colonial critics, a central concern then is to foreground the normative scenes of violence experienced by people outside the global North (or those caught in the underside of the global North) while simultaneously bringing into relief creative survival tactics that precede systematization by theory. [17] Take, for example, slum dwellers caught in what Lauren Berlant calls, writing in a different context, the temporality of "crisis ordinariness" (Berlant: 761): they become bricoleurs, finding, assembling, reusing, recontextualizing, rebuilding constantly, in geometries still without vocabularies, with the cast aside waste and detritus of neoliberal capitalism. The slums grow and breathe – through the rogue taking of spaces or the recycling of materials to build livable space – according to the often violently creative balancing act between a population's needs and the available resources in the area. From one day to the next, any number of additions might be added to a slum residence such that any centralized 'structure' becomes unrecognizable and the building or house at hand is different from day to day**.****[[4]](http://www.rhizomes.net/issue24/hantel.html" \l "_ftn4" \o ") Beyond the academic forms of Deleuzean architecture that rarely result in actual built-space, perhaps the slum architect can be thought as a practitioner of holey space, propelled by artistry and need**. [18] To return to the grounding question of this paper, the rhizome, what does it mean to say holey space becomes rhizomatic? In a case like slum architecture, for instance, a multiplicity relates to and redirects (without necessarily controlling) matter-flows in order to frustrate the state apparatus. In this case, Deleuze and Guattari argue that holey space is "a kind of rhizome with its gaps, detours, subterranean passages, stems, opening, traits, holes etc" (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 415). [19] It is this particular subset of the rhizome, holey space as rhizome, which interests me. Glissant's interlocutors tend to focus exclusively on the linguistic aspect of the rhizome in his work (or in Deleuzean terms, the rhizome as a form of expression) with little attention to the specificity of content as materiality. Keith Alan Sprouse, for instance, argues that the rhizome for Glissant is the insistence of difference against totalitarian sameness, in the privileged terms of linguistic expression. "Diversity is the realm of cross-cultural connection; the heterogeneous and the rhizomatic; it is the acceptance of difference; and of orality" (Sprouse: 83). And later he adds, in an odd formulation that reduces the rhizome to a flattened regime of signs, "The poetics of relating is a rhizomatic poetics, to the extent that it emphasizes connectivity and decentered identity, ...For in a rhizome, all connections are signifying and equally valued" (Sprouse: 85). The holey space-rhizome expands this narrowing down of Glissant's poetics to include flows of matter and energy as a vital part of the insistence on difference. It also, in turn, answers objections from critics like Peter Hallward, who see Glissant's relationship to Deleuze as a back-door univocity that erases the specificity of the Caribbean – a specificity Hallward sees as necessary for effective post-colonial critique (see Hallward 2001: Chapter 2). Taking seriously the two series that make up matter-flow – the conveyance of physical properties and traits of expression – suggests a way of reading the rhizome as itinerant movement through holey space thatincorporates the incorporeal aspects of Glissant's poetics into the materiality of place. [20] The rhizome as it is rendered here is precisely the movement in the space between these two series, then, and not reducible to either form of content or form of expression alone. Attentive readers of Deleuze will certainly note that these two series never converge, to be exact, but in fact actualize embodiment precisely in their intermediary disjuncture. Between the visible and the articulable a gap or disjunction opens up, but this disjunction of forms is the place – or 'non-place,' as Foucault puts it – where the informal diagram is swallowed or becomes embodied instead in two different directions that are necessarily divergent and irredicuble. The concrete assemblages are therefore opened up by a crack that determines how the abstract machine performs. (Deleuze: 38) **The idea of non-place here is precisely the milieu of the rhizome, which is always intermezzo and so well represented by the idea of a contingent eruption in the crack between content and expression**. The remainder of this paper will examine the rhizome as it emerges in this "non-place" – and so turning to Foucault along with Deleuze – considering the figure of the slave ship in Glissant's Poetics of Relation as the point of embodiment where the folding of content and expression produce a post-colonial subject.

**Free-floating movement is an over-simplification of the material phenomena occurring in the wake of the middle passage. The errantry of nomadic movement in its relation to the slave ship, its claustrophobia, is the only way to account for the clamoring of the ship, how it births grammars outside of Western humanity. Accumulating knowledge in this sense itself becomes an act of violence against the forgetting machine of anti-blackness**

**Hantel 12** [Max Hantel, Post-Doctoral fellow at the gender research institute at Dartmouth, “Errant Notes on a Caribbean Rhizome,” Rhizomes issue 24, sections 33-39]

[33] My concern is with the first instantiation of the abyss: "[I]n your poetic vision, a boat has no belly a boat does not swallow up, does not devour; a boat is steered by open skies. Yet, the belly of this boat dissolves you, precipitates you into a nonworld from which you cry out. This boat is a womb, a womb abyss. It generates the clamor of your protests; it also produces all the coming unanimity. Although you are alone in this suffering, you share in the unknown with others whom you have yet to know. This boat is your womb, a matrix, and yet it expels you. This boat: pregnant with as many dead as living under sentence of death" (Glissant 1997: 6). Glissant's apt and paradoxical description of the slave ship as a womb abyss, pregnant with death, brings into relief many of the characteristics of the ship as heterotopia described by Foucault. Glissant calls them nonworlds, similar to Foucault's use of nonplaces, because these slave ships exist in the seams of Western civilization, outside of the carefully crafted narrative of Enlightenment rationality or humanist religion that supposedly girds the various trans-Atlantic empires, and yet constitutive of that narrative's condition of possibility. [34] Glissant also seems to invoke, then problematize, the open and veritably romantic vision of the ship which Foucault attaches in his take on heterotopias. Foucault says, "the boat...has been...the greatest reserve of the imagination.... In civilizations without boats, dreams dry up" (Foucault: Online). Glissant concedes the figuring of the boat in the imagination as part of the larger adventure of the boundless sea and the infinite possibility of transformative travel, but insists that **the slave ship inverts this potentiality in the darkness and claustrophobia of its hold.** **The imaginary figure of the ship makes all the more stark the terrifying reality of the middle passage**. [35] With this death and suffering, however, there is the language of pregnancy and generation. Victims of the slave trade are not only "dissolved" into the hold of the ship, but precipitated in a yet-unknown form; the ship "generates the clamor of [their] protests," producing, in other words, new modes of resistance and political grammars; initially solitary, new relationships and communities form in the crucible of shared suffering. Glissant walks a fine line here in his rendering of those subjected to slavery: he does not want to romanticize their suffering, on the one hand, but he also refuses a view of them as passive or inert victims waiting to die. His concept of the slave ship is in tension, then, with Foucault's notion of heterotopia, which sentimentalizes the ship's infinite possibility and so erases the complex forms of agency that arise for those subjected to the coercion of slavery and its haunted legacy. [36] Glissant proposes the term "errantry," briefly mentioned earlier, to think through these conditions of forced diaspora. From the French errance, errantry literally means roving movement. Glissant does not intend the term, however, to simply mean a free-floating movement through undefined space or a solipsistic peripateticism. And here we return to the rhizome. Glissant reminds his readers that the rhizome is still a root-system and so, while characterized by horizontal movement and decentered growth, it is still a generative network that anchors, perhaps only temporarily, a specific localization of matter and energy. [37] Errantry is rooted movement but still a "desire to go against the root," where "the root" refers to the imposition of a univocal (or monolingual) meaning on the self and the world. The history of the West is a history of fixing movement in terms of the static model of the nation-state, a model adopted by decolonizing countries: "Most of the nations that gained freedom from colonization have tended to form around an idea of power – the totalitarian drive of the single, unique root" (Glissant 1997: 14). Against this totalitarian root, Glissant proposes the root as multiplicity embodied in the relationship with the Other – not the drive to know the Other in a fully rational sense, but instead, in Deleuzo-Guattarian terms, an openness to affect and be affected by others. Like his tiptoeing act in the description of the slave ship, Glissant's idea of errantry lies between a notion of fixed identity, rooted in an ancestral past (the movement back to Africa) and a purely fluid subjectivity that precludes communities of affinity and shared horizons of meaning. [38] So when Glissant refers to rhizomatic thinking as a relation in which "each and every identity is extended through a relationship with the Other," it becomes clear that both the meaning of identity and the meaning of Other have shifted for him. First, identity is a particular demarcation in matter-flow, a provisional embodiment of extensive and intensive qualities. Glissant is concerned particularly with the latter category of incorporeal traits of expression that come from a legacy of forced diaspora; in other words, how subjects negotiate the haunting force of slavery and colonization as a memory formation that is not always materially present. It is understandable why even his most astute readers focus in on the politics of language, then, because Glissant's most important locus of expression is the creolization of thought through a polyvocal poetics. [39] As for the Other, Glissant aligns himself with Deleuze in the rejection of some central chamber of subjectivity that can be rationally known if only discovered. He uses the word "opacity" to describe the status of the Other in our confrontation with them. One has the choice to embrace the conditions of opacity as the basis for an ethical relationship, or to work tirelessly to overcome opacity through knowing the other, whether through violence or the accumulation of knowledge (or both) (Glissant 1997: 62). In setting out a research agenda for Caribbean philosophy that takes its cues from Glissant, the notion of opacity is instructive. Reworking Deleuzo-Guattarian concepts, Glissant provides a mode of engagement with past trauma that neither disavows totally the meaning of the historical fact of suffering nor identifies completely with the facticity of memory and an inability to move beyond the reality of that suffering. The rhizomatic embrace of errantry and opacity articulates new modes of subjectivization and collectivity both grounded and open, escaping the false choice between the totalitarian root and rootlessness.

**Nuclear War**

**Representations of future nuclear conflict rest on racist fears of irrational non-whites—the bomb is the epitome of the destructive capacity of Whiteness, naturalizing structural violence through the projection of a spectacular extinction.**

**Williams ‘11** (Paul, lecturer in English at the University of Exeter, “Race, Ethnicity, and Nuclear War”, Liverpool Science Fiction Texts and Studies, 2011, p.1-3- SG)

In this study, nuclear representations are defined as depictions of the following subjects: (1) the invention and use of the first atomic bombs; (2) nuclear weapons testing stockpiling of the Cold War superpowers; and (3) nuclear war (often referred to as World War Three) and life after such a cataclysm. Nuclear technology has been the subject of narratives of racial and national belonging and exclusion undoubtedly because its emergence (and deployment against Japan) was read by some commentators as an act of genocidal racist violence, and by some as the apex of Western civilization’s scientific achievement. These opposing perspectives are interpretative poles that have been central to nuclear representations. By posing white moral and technological superiority against the destructive technology it supposedly invented, cultural producers have cited nuclear weapons as evidence against white Anglo-Saxon supremacism. From this point of view, the scientific achievement of splitting the atom does not reveal white superiority; instead, the enormity of nuclear weapons reminds one that the technology first created by the white world imperils the whole Earth. Through a range of media, from novels to poetry, short stories to film, comics to oratory, the terms that modern European imperialism depended upon – ‘civilization, ‘race’, and ‘nation’, in particular – often recur in nuclear representations. Some of these representations, emerging when Europe’s empires were relinquishing direct control of their colonies, share the uncertainty that beset the colonial powers following the uneven and often violent decolonizing process. The historical congruence of nuclear representations and decolonization intimates the importance of this context to future visions of World war Three: tropes of genocide, technological and and scientific modernity, and the (re)population of the planet are relevant to this apocalyptic subgenre of SF as well as being recurrent elements in colonial history. Several of the nuclear representations discussed reproduce the justifications of the modern imperial project. But an alternative tradition makes these justifications visible and demonstrates their corrosive, lingering presence in contemporary culture through the depiction of nuclear technology and its possible consequences. Significantly, the idea that nuclear weapons are used to buttress a racial order that privileges whiteness – an idea that prohibits non-white peoples from accessing such technology – remains a potent current running from 1945 until the present day. Having raised this point to emphasize the importance of the themes in this study, I am mindful to repeat that my focus is literary, cultural and filmic texts. I am not seeking to explain how race and ethnicity have structured Cold War history. If I may be excused a brief aside, I do think such moments have occurred. Civil rights and Cold War historians have long understood that US foreign policy had to negotiate the American government’s response to domestic systems of racial discrimination, and vice versa. Recently decolonized nations whose populations had been excluded along similar lines by European imperialism followed the narrrative of American desegregation closely, and the allegiances of these nations played and important role in the Cold War. When the black student James Meredith was not permitted to join the University of Mississippi in 1962, President Kennedy ordered federal marshals to force his registration through. This took place on 1 October 1962, after a night of fighting between demonstrators and troops. While not universally praised, Kennedy’s actions were widely perceived in the international press as evidence to resolve to oppose racial discrimination. When the Cuban Missile Crisis took place three weeks later, the presidents of Guinea and Ghaa denied refuelling facilities to Soviet planes flying to the Caribbean. Kennedy aside Arthur Schlesinger directly attributed the African presidents’ actions to the intervention in Mississippi. The subject of this book is not the mechanisms of history. The subject of this book is the way that representations of nuclear weapons and the world after nuclear war postulate meanings that are not only fully activated when considered through a lens of race, ethnicity, nationhood and civilization. In many of the texts discussed, a primary consideration is whether the vestigial master narrative of white supremacy, the narrative of racial superiority that underpinned modern European colonization, is being resuscitated. I have in mind Fredric Jameson’s expression, ‘if interpretation in terms of […] allegorical master narratives remains a constant temptation, this is because such master narratives have inscribed themselves in the texts as well as in our thinking about them. For Jameson the interpretative act runs the risk of being an act of hermeneutic bad faith – the risk that the critic finds what they are looking for all along because they gathered up a series of texts whose selection is far from arbitrary, and consequently the reading of said texts confirms the ubiquity of the historical essence with which they were initially ascribed. Yet, as Jameson writes, one should not be too cynical about the act of interpretation. If the critical analysis of a text finds evidence of the historical trends it set out to discover the success of the interpretation is not in itself a reason to reject the idea that texts allow one to think closely and critically about historical attitudes. The act of interpretation can sometimes be the imposition of a preconvieved set of ideas onto a series of texts chosen precisely because they corroborate the hypothesis being tested, but it can also be credible because texts are inscribed by history and by master naratives. As a way of referring to an explanation of the movement of history and its future direction, Jameson’s sense of master narratives is worth retaining. My usage here designates the explanation itself, specifically the master narrative of white supremacism that proved so useful to European colonialism and the settlement of North America. How do texts come to be inscribed by master narratives? What justification do I have in reading the master narrative o white supremacism and related narratives of settlement through the literary, cultural and filmic texts analysed here?

**Omission**

**The affirmatives exclusion of the discussion of how neoliberalism negatively affects black bodies is not benign but rather indicative of the relegation of blackness to the position of the unthought. This is uniquely true in the context of neoliberalism and freedom because the effects of anti-black neoliberalism to not register as “harm” because the structural violence that civil society necessitates that black folks endure does not constitute physical violence under neoliberalism.**

**Dillon 13**, [Stephen, “Fugitive Life: race, gender, and the rise of the neoliberal-carceral state”, P. 156-8]//MHELLIE

Friedman dedicates an entire chapter (although a very short one) of Capitalism and Freedom to questions concerning capitalism and discrimination, but not once does he name the effects of racist hiring practices for black workers. While the chapter argues that the market could abolish racism, Friedman could not comprehend the effects of white supremacy on black life. He is unable to name the forms of systemic and institutionalized racial violence that collude with and enable the actions of the individual racist, even at a time before the civil rights laws of the mid- to late 1960s.356 Racism, for Friedman, was an individual preference isolated from state and economic power. Under the neoliberal theory of freedom, blackness is unthinkable even when it is thought. Friedman invokes blackness only to eradicate it. In fact, in a remarkable moment when he almost considers how a racist white business might harm the black workers it refused to hire, he quickly redefines “harm” so as to exclude racial discrimination. According to Friedman, there are two types of harm: positive harm, which is caused by physical force, and negative harm, which is indirect (for example, the effects of pollution downstream, or in this case, the black worker denied employment).357 Physical force, or coercion, violates the voluntary cooperation of individuals, and thus, must be outlawed.358 However, negative harm results from a mutual agreement over a voluntary contract. And since voluntary cooperation between individuals is the essence of freedom, outlawing “negative harm” would reduce freedom and “limit voluntary cooperation.”359 **The effects of a racist economic system do not register as “harm” within the neoliberal theory of freedom.** Black people are not harmed by white supremacy since harm only looks like physical force. In his attempt to address concerns about the free market’s relationship to race, Friedman further subjugated black people to a discourse and an economic system he argued could abolish racism. **The price of neoliberal freedom entailed silencing the very conditions of poverty, degradation, and subjection produced by white supremacy— processes neoliberal freedom claimed it could abolish. Liberalism’s anti-racism was the mark of white supremacy’s continuation.** Perhaps Friedman could not think black life because black freedom is an epistemological impossibility within neoliberal thought. Blackness cannot be free since freedom, as conceptualized by Friedman, requires the subjection of blackness. As we saw with law and order politicians and now with Friedman, blackness is the unnamed presence that must be restrained and contained by law and order so that the market can be free.360 Indeed, the subjection of blackness is how (white) freedom comes into being.361 If racist hiring practices do not constitute harm under the theory of neoliberal freedom, then neoliberal thought cannot name the forms of subjection and unfreedom that must end for black freedom to be realized. In this way, Friedman’s theory that the market can end white supremacy works to police the demands of the period’s liberation movements. Yet it accomplishes this through what it forgets, through the forms of racial violence it cannot name or comprehend.

**Opium Wars/Coolie Trade**

**The opium wars are the result of the technologies of the slave ship gone global.**

**Chinweizu 07**, [Chinweizu, “Partners in crime, Index on Censorship”, P. 12-13]//MHELLIE

In the passive sense of the dead hand of the past, a motion sustained entirely by inertia, racism is certainly not a ‘residual legacy’ of slavery. It is, rather, a constitutive and sustaining element of the system of white supremacy established by European power during the centuries of transatlantic enslavement of Black Africans, hence its extreme resistance to eradication. Even today, new forms of ‘slave trade’ and slavery, as well as new structures of racism are still being elaborated and justified, as they have been, whenever needed, since the sixteenth century. For example, on 11 November 2006, in Philadelphia, at a Wharton Business School conference on business in Africa, World Trade Organization representa- tive Hanniford Schmidt announced the creation of a WTO initiative for ‘full private stewardry of labour’ for the parts of Africa that have been hardest hit by the 500 years of Africa’s free trade with the West. ‘Full, untrammelled stewardry is the best available solution to African poverty, and the inevitable result of free- market theory,’ Schmidt told an audience of more than 150. He acknowledged that the stewardry programme – which will require Western companies doing business in some parts of Africa to own their workers outright – was similar in many ways to slavery, but explained that just as ‘compassionate conservatism’ has polished the rough edges on labor relations in industrialised countries, full stewardry, or ‘compassionate slavery’, could be a similar boon to developing ones. In short, racism is not a crime committed and completed long ago by moral Neanderthals in the bad old days of chattel slavery, a crime whose ‘unfortunate consequences’ are still, inexplicably, lingering on. Rather, the crime is still re-enacted, day by day and unrepentantly, by the heirs and agents of a system driven by the same enduring mania for the cheap labour and profits that created chattel slavery. Contrary to prevailing confusions, racism is a system of domination, of one race by another, which combines the superstition of racial hierarchy with a racialised structure of socio-economic domination and exploitation, and which is instituted and maintained by the violent practices of conquest and suppression, including torture, terrorism and mass murder. The colourarchy, or colour-hierarchy, is a sorting principle by which, even if all else could be made equal, a person’s position, expectations, opportunities, rewards and punishments are determined by skin colour, with white skin privi- leged at the top, black skin dis-privileged at the bottom and other colours – brown, yellow – in between. Discrimination is merely the act of applying or enforcing the colourarchy. **The so-called Slave Trade and its so-called abolition were not what they are purported to be. ‘Abolition’ did not, in any way, abolish or dismantle the racially stratified socio-economic system established by Europeans during the centuries of transatlantic chattel enslavement of Black Africans.** Furthermore, the celebrated British abolition of the Slave Trade in 1807 was promptly followed by the inauguration, by the same British, of what, had it endured, might have come to be called the ‘coolie trade’, from India and China. The first shipment of ‘indentured labour’ from India, to replace slave labour on plantations in America and elsewhere, followed immediately on the formal abolition of slavery in British territories. Following the Opium War (1840–42), the British began to traffic in indentured labour from the treaty ports of China. This trafficking was a replica of the early days of the ‘trade’ in African captives. British and other white gangsters used deception and intimidation to seize or kidnap Chinese labours – coolies – and shipped them to the Americas, South Africa and other British territories for heavy labour. The ships in which the coolies were transported were reminiscent of the slave ships of the Transatlantic Middle Passage and were described by the Chinese as ‘floating hells’. British moral self-preening for ending the transatlantic ‘slave trade’ is dishonest and pharisaic. It is like a man who boasts: ‘Look I am a paragon of virtue. I’ve stopped beating my black wife’, and who, even as he preens himself about that, proceeds to beat his new yellow wife, using the same club! The abolition of slavery – and all subsequent reforms – have never altered, let alone abolished, the essential sorting principle of the Eurocentric socio-economic system, namely the colourarchy. Moreover, after the abolition of slavery, the ‘freed’ slaves were craftily ushered into a peonage system that, by design, preserved the essentials of the old system. In Jamaica, after a slave revolt in 1834, the abolition of slavery was conducted in such a way that, as Noam Chomsky says, ‘the plantation system would be maintained without essential change’.

**Peaceful Imperialism**

**The outcome of the plan will just be exporting western norms and subjectivity globally – their shift from physical presence to cooperation is imperial peace: a unified global order based in neoliberalism and white supremacy.**

**Ohenewah 15** [Christine, Department of International Relations at the University of Chicago, “Liberalism: An Obstacle to Black Unification”, Tapestries: Interwoven voices of local and global identities: Volume 4, Issue 1 Threats to the American Dream, Article 21]

International discourse has long rendered liberalism as an ideology of optimism, aiming to attain specific objectives: the proliferation of **democracy**, support for human rights, capitalist expansion, **international cooperation**, and **pacifism**. **Liberal ideology affirms** that **the establishment of ‘correct’ political systems** and domestic groups is likely **to encourage** states to engage in **international cooperation**. Although seemingly benign in its efforts to **reinforce international harmony**, I contend that liberalism augments **cultural hegemony and homogenization**. As a mode of **Western imperialism**, it assumes the **guise of world peace** to ensure self-interests and ‘ideal’ paradigms, while increasing the global jurisdiction of dominant nation-states. Scholar Patrick Morgan asserts, “It is not that international politics must eventually embrace and inculcate these particular norms, but that, as an elaborate social activity, international politics needs elements of community including a structure of norms. Liberalists are busy pushing their preferred norms with this in mind.” Said another way, states **must seek cooperation** rather than sovereignty and autonomy and be flexible towards embracing **normalized values**. We must however question the ‘acceptance of norms’ as a feature of liberalism. In analyzing the mission to spread liberalism to other non-democratic countries, we must interrogate which actors are promoting preferred norms and practices for the international community and at whose expense these norms are being enforced. My chapter responds to the following questions: How is mid-20th century liberalism in tandem with White citizenry? Does liberalism embody a global manifestation of White citizenship? In what ways does liberalism impede the progress of Black unification? Finally, how does liberalism bear resemblance to colonialism? In chapter one we recall that **White citizenry predicates itself on norms based in Whiteness**, (i.e. hard work, education, high socioeconomic status). Similarly, liberalism comprises of democratic, capitalist, and human rights values. Both systems determine the acceptance of a minority group or nation-state, given that they follow the aforementioned paradigms. Using Ghana as a case study to delve into Kwame Nkrumah’s Pan-African leadership, I argue that **liberalism is an ideology rooted in colonialism and serves as a global index of White citizenship**. Its disruption of transatlantic Black unification efforts further relies on three elements: primitivism, patronization, and the manipulation of power. In the course of this chapter, I first trace the damaging outcomes colonialism induced within Ghana’s infrastructure. I subsequently discuss the role that late Ghanaian leader Kwame Nkrumah played in buttressing the Pan-African Movement and how Pan-African efforts were curbed by liberal agendas within international politics. Finally, I explain the similarities that modern liberal ideology shares with White citizenry and recapitulates colonial iniquities. If we consider that liberalism resembles colonialism, which ignited calamities within Ghana’s infrastructure, it would then hold that liberal ideology is non-ideal for all nation-states and operates to homogenize the rest of the international community according to Western tradition. Pan-Africanism’s Black unification agenda would thus stand in opposition to an empire of Western governance that has been solidified by colonial conquest. Remembering that antiBlackness works to sustain White supremacy by degrading Black culture, **we must** then **recognize that anti-Blackness and White citizenry function globally through liberalism**. We must further recognize that liberalism is an ideology fueled with self-interests that enhance the authority of the West at the expense of nations who refuse Western paradigms. Ghana’s Pan-African Movement, which represented historic collaboration between Africans and African Americans, challenged such paradigms and thus became a target for the West. Attached to various meanings and agendas, liberalism on the one hand is perceived as a progressively humanitarian endeavor whose mission is to bestow peace and democracy unto states in extreme turmoil. On the other hand, liberalism is viewed as a homogenizing scheme, seeking to maintain the global power and selfinterests of Western entities. The subsequent sections serve to outline these two opposing views and provide a comprehensive understanding of the way liberal ideology is situated within international discourse. Proponents of liberalism argue that liberalism is fundamentally optimistic, calling for positive interaction among international actors and chances for a peaceful world (Morgan, 2013). In a liberal framework, international politics is an evolving atmosphere characterized by interdependence, cooperation, peace, and security. Under acceptable models of liberal political systems and domestic groups, states are viewed as being more capable of achieving international cooperation. Proponents also view capitalism as an additional benefit of liberalism, due to its perceived ability to cultivate wealth and higher living standards. The production and accumulation of wealth are thus more rapid and efficient if private actors run economic activities in accordance with the “dictates” of markets (Morgan 2013). **Promoting a capitalist** or ‘free trade’ **society** further **circumvents the possibility of war, thereby reducing the influence of elites who have historically been devoted to military conquests** and national glory (Solingen 1998). Proponents also defend that liberalism is marked by a strong support for democracy, which is crucial to the legitimacy of governmental systems. Western nations have historically upheld this belief by advocating democracy as a means to restore peace within a region. In this vein, scholars contend that sovereignty is not simply a right to national autonomy; it is the responsibility of a government to treat its society with decency. Failure to do so may result in international intervention. Said another way, liberalism refuses to endorse violence as a coercive method unless the political order in question denies all opportunity for peaceful, democratic transition (Martin 1948). Proponents of liberalism finally observe that liberal ideology supports rights and opportunities for women, religious freedoms, and civil rights, among many others. They argue that within liberal ideology, the preservation of human rights is one of its most salient characteristics, as it is derived from states’ long-held concerns about how their prominent religious and ethnic groups are treated by neighboring states. Diplomatic pressures, military interventions, and peace agreements further agitate such concerns (Krasner 1999). Where human rights are involved, liberalism further encourages self-determination, or the acceptance of the present world order’s norms and values, over separatism, claiming that states should deemphasize sovereignty and autonomy. Because most countries are multiethnic, endorsing separatism would invite chaotic dissolutions by fracturing the unity of international states. In examining the arguments in favor of liberalism, it is clear that proponents view this ideology as a means of fostering international cohesion. States are generally non-strict about their autonomy and center sovereignty on their government’s obligation to treat its society with decency. A nation’s inability to do this, however, may result in international intervention. Liberalism further commits itself to propagating capitalist and democratic values on a global scale, and in addition to defending human rights, the notion of selfdetermination is also one of its essential components. The above claims portray liberalism as a wholly optimistic approach that holds the interests of states at heart and offers a resolution for enhancing world peace. I however contend that liberalism’s attempts to reduce state autonomy, expand capitalism and democracy, and augment international cooperation convey a fundamental hypocrisy. Proponents of liberalism fail to deeply examine whom the values of capitalism and democracy are modeled after, who benefits from promoting such norms, and which entities bear their repercussions. **This nod towards world homogenization reveals a colonial remnant within modern-day liberalism that reinforces global White supremacy.** In contrast to its proponents, opponents of liberalism defend that the ideology reflects Western dominance. In its more forceful version, liberalism is an **updated expression of Western imperialism**; a rationalization of hegemonic efforts to spread Western values so that the global environment remains **palatable for the West**. As Ayers (2009) asserts, “In particular, the regime of ‘democratisation’ and the curtailing of democratic freedom constitute a principal means through which imperial rule is articulated.” This means that Western governments are consistently eager to see the overturn of numerous political systems along with a drastic alteration of their social and economic structures. Ayers further refutes the notion of self-determination that liberalism’s proponents support. For Ayers, self-determination is a concept based in non-autonomy and signifies the freedom to “embrace rules, norms, and principles of the emerging liberal global order.” Opponents of liberalism further observe that Western ideas of democracy do not well align with other cultural milieus (Faust 2013). In this vein, liberalism possesses an inherent favoritism towards the Western colonial state. Baudrillard (1975) argues that the emphasis on capitalism, for instance, acts as a Western lens through which peripheral societies are perceived, therefore obstructing the cycles of symbolic exchange that mark other “Third-World” states. Robinson and Tormey (2009) likewise posit that when liberalism assumes a mission of ‘global justice,’ aiming to instill Western cultural norms and values, it imposes a ‘global-local’ conception that reproduces colonial epistemology. This enables a Western reasoning that demonizes non-liberal societies as failed states that are corrupt, lacking, and insufficiently stable. In summary, opponents of liberalism contend that the ideology reflects Western hegemonic modes of influence. For opponents, the notion of self-determination is based in the freedom to accept rules, norms, and values that align with those of Western global powers. Liberalism as a mission of global justice further alienates states by ‘otherizing’ them and thereby emulating colonial epistemologies and practices. While opponents of liberalism thoroughly unearth liberalism’s Western origins and name the violence it launches on other states, they do not adequately locate the factors that continue to sustain liberal longevity. The two aforementioned positions on liberalism provide a helpful overview on the strengths as well as pitfalls of liberal ideology. I however believe that scholars who take a more critical standpoint on liberalism effectively consider its negative reverberations, which contradict aims of world peace and international cooperation. While it is arguable that liberalism, like any ideology, may contain fallacies, there is a marked distinction between “international cooperation” and “international cooperation with Western nation-states.” Thus, I concur with opponents who suggest that liberalism promotes colonial epistemologies and practices that distort the functions of perceived “weaker” entities rather than honoring their self-governance and interests. To expand this body of thought further, I identify the particular elements on which liberalism thrives: primitivism, patronization, and the manipulation of power. Identifying these elements will help contextualize the way liberalism, like White citizenry, has served to dislodge Black unification efforts and will further sustain my claim that liberalism is rooted in a colonial enterprise that maintains global White supremacy. In the sections below, I provide a timeline for the demise of the Pan-African Movement by first discussing the detriments of British colonization on Ghanaian infrastructure.

**Performance**

**Performative agency can only ever render the slave law’s violence *inapplicable* to the particular space of the affirmative, but not *inoperable,* which is key**

**Sexton 10** (Jared Sexton, Director of African American Studies at UC Irvine, 2010, “People-of-Color-Blindness: Notes on the Afterlife of Slavery”, pages 34-37)

In pursuit of her thesis, Hartman challenges the prevailing modes of historical writing about slavery, including the sort of folkloric ethnography for which Abrahams gained an international scholarly reputation. Hartman extends the work of Hayden White (in his Metahistory and Tropics of Discourse) in reading the text of Abrahams’s 1992 Singing the Master as typical of the pastoral genre that emplots history as comic romance. “When history is emplotted in the comic mode,” she suggests, “its mode of historical explanation tends to be organicist and its ideological implications conservative.”18 Abrahams celebrates the capacities of the slave to subvert the regime through her signifying beyond the master’s awareness and comprehension, but Hartman demonstrates how **this celebration relies upon an erasure of the structural violence, the hardly discernible terror, of compelled performance**. Mbembe thus defends Abrahams’s American pastoral against Hartman’s criticism when he mobilizes the former as support for the idea that in spite of the terror and the symbolic sealing off of the slave, he or she maintains alternative perspectives toward time, work, and self. **This is the second paradoxical element of the plantation** world as a manifestation of the state of exception. Treated as if he or she no longer existed except as a mere tool and instrument of production, the slave nevertheless is able to draw almost any object, instrument, language, or gesture into a performance and then stylize it. Breaking with uprootedness and the pure world of things of which he or she is but a fragment, the slave is able to demonstrate the protean capabilities of the human bond through music and the very body that was supposedly possessed by another.19 Mbembe’s conjectural phrasing—**asserting a supposed possession of the body rather than a political-juridical order that enforces its actuality**—**has the effect of diminishing the violence of slave law in the very scenes of subjection that Hartman shows to be central to** “the construction of racial difference and **the absolute distinctions of status between free white persons and black captives.**”20 It also seeks to discredit the scholarship that operates according to such assumptions. Put slightly differently, **it seeks to resurrect the same problematic attributions of “humanity,” “agency,” and “personhood” that Hartman identifies as key components of the racial domination of blacks in “the tragic continuities between slavery and freedom**.” Uncritical, and ultimately romantic, ethnographic claims, like those Mbembe draws upon, about the slave’s capacity and capability for “stylization” are theoretically untenable since the publication of Scenes of Subjection over a decade ago. **I am talking broadly here about the sort of claims about slavery that rely on phrases like “In spite of the terror” and** “ . . . **nevertheless**. . . .”21 This is not likely evidence of oversight or lack of rigor, but rather misrecognition of the theoretical level at which Hartman’s critique is posed. Hortense Spillers limns something like this critical distinction in her landmark 1996 essay on psychoanalysis and race, “ ‘All the Things You Could Be by Now, If Sigmund Freud’s Wife Was Your Mother.’ ”22 Midway through that study, Spillers quotes Jürgen Habermas from his 1968 Knowledge and Human Interests: “**A critically mediated knowledge of laws cannot through reflection alone render the law itself inoperative, but it can render it inapplicable**.” Her point will not be to endorse straightaway “Habermas’s self-reflection, in which case the laws are operative but do not apply,” both because it “appears to be predicated on the agency of self-knowing” that the Du Boisian figure of double consciousness significantly complicates and because, pace Marx (and, in his own social-democratic way, Habermas too), it is not enough simply “to see with greater clarity what the problem is.”23 Yet **Spillers finds useful the conceptual discrimination between the domain of the operation of the law** (in which it is historically determinate of social, political, and economic existence) **and the domain of the application of the law** (in which it solicits the consent of the governed or, in another parlance, the identification of the dominated position). A law may be or may become inapplicable, enabling an array of subversion and resistance at the level of infrapolitics **or**, better, **providing preconditions for effective opposition, but that does not thereby make it inoperative—maybe not even a little bit.** Ultimately, it is a question of evaluative criteria: **are we judging the significance of a practice based on whether or to what extent it renders a law inapplicable or inoperative**? One would think that **the inevitably political dimension of analysis holds the latter firmly in place as its horizon**.24 But even the inapplicability of the law cannot be safely assumed, given not only the complications of double consciousness for the slave but also the obscure versatility of slave law’s functioning. Again, Hartman is instructive: **what appears in the first instance to be evidence of an agency** that indexes the law’s inapplicability for the slave **may upon closer scrutiny reveal a convoluted form of consent**. There are questions of the operation and application of slave law for the free as well. Regarding the former, we note the fact that “**the absolute submission mandated by law was not simply that of slave to his or her owner, but the submission of the enslaved before all whites.**”25 The latter group is better termed all nonblacks (or, less economically, the unequally arrayed category of nonblackness), because it is racial blackness as a necessary condition for enslavement that matters most, rather than whiteness as a sufficient condition for freedom. The structural position of the Indian slaveholder—or, for that matter, the smattering of free black slaveholders in the United States or the slaveholding mulatto elite in the Caribbean—is a case in point.26 Freedom from the rule of slave law requires only that one be considered nonblack, whether that nonblack racial designation be “white” or “Indian” or, in the rare case, “Oriental”—this despite the fact that each of these groups has at one point or another labored in conditions similar to or contiguous with enslaved African-derived groups. In other words, it is not labor relations, but property relations that are constitutive of slavery.

**Postmodernism**

**The affirmative represents the view from nowhere – white, postmodern philosophy seeks universalist answers to problems that affect different bodies in different ways – the personal cannot be divorced from the theory and their attempt to distance themselves from their subject position is a tactic of white privilege**

**Yancy 5, George Yancy is a Professor of Philosophy, works primarily in the areas of critical philosophy of race, critical whiteness studies, and philosophy of the Black experience. “Whiteness and the Return of the Black Body,”** <http://www.westga.edu/~mmcfar/George%20Yancy.htm> \*edited for racialized language

**I write out of a personal existential context. This context is a profound source of knowledge connected to my "raced" body**. Hence, **I write from a place of lived embodied experience, a site of exposure. In philosophy, the only thing that we are taught to "expose" is a weak argument, a fallacy, or someone's "inferior" reasoning power**. **The embodied self is bracketed and deemed irrelevant to theory, superfluous and cumbersome in one's search for truth. It is best, or so we are told, to reason from nowher**e. Hence, **the white philosopher/author presumes to speak for all of "us" without the slightest mention of his or her "raced" identity**. Self-consciously writing as a white male philosopher, Crispin Sartwell observes:∂ Left to my own devices, I disappear as an author. That is the "whiteness" of my authorship. This whiteness of authorship is, for us, a form of authority; to speak (apparently) from nowhere, for everyone, is empowering, though one wields power here only by becoming lost to oneself. But such an authorship and authority is also pleasurable: it yields the pleasure of self-forgetting or [End Page 215] apparent transcendence of the mundane and the particular, and the pleasure of power expressed in the "comprehension" of a range of materials.∂ (1998, 6)∂ To theorize the Black body one must "turn to the [Black] body as the radix for interpreting racial experience" (Johnson [1993, 600]).1 It is important to note that this particular strategy also functions as a lens through which to theorize and critique whiteness; for the Black body's "racial" experience is fundamentally linked to the oppressive modalities of the "raced" white body. However, there is no denying that my own "racial" experiences or the social performances of whiteness can become objects of critical reflection. In this paper, my objective is to describe and theorize situations where the Black body's subjectivity, its lived reality, is reduced to instantiations of the white imaginary, resulting in what I refer to as "the phenomenological return of the Black body."2 These instantiations are embedded within and evolve out of the complex social and historical interstices of whites' efforts at self-construction through complex acts of erasure vis-à-vis Black people. These acts of self-construction, however, are myths/ideological constructions predicated upon maintaining white power. As James Snead has noted, "Mythification is the replacement of history with a surrogate ideology of [white] elevation or [Black] demotion along a scale of human value" (Snead 1994, 4).∂ How I understand and theorize the body relates to the fact that the body—in this case, the Black body—is capable of undergoing a sociohistorical process of "phenomenological return" vis-à-vis white embodiment. The body's meaning—whether phenotypically white or black—its ontology, its modalities of aesthetic performance, its comportment, its "raciated" reproduction, is in constant contestation. The hermeneutics of the body, how it is understood, how it is "seen," its "truth," is partly the result of a profound historical, ideological construction. "The body" is positioned by historical practices and discourses. The body is codified as this or that in terms of meanings that are sanctioned, scripted, and constituted through processes of negotiation that are embedded within and serve various ideological interests that are grounded within further power-laden social processes. The historical plasticity of the body, the fact that it is a site of contested meanings, speaks to the historicity of its "being" as lived and meant within the interstices of social semiotics. Hence: a) the body is less of a thing/being than a shifting/changing historical meaning that is subject to cultural configuration/reconfiguration. The point here is to interrogate the "Black body" as a "fixed and material truth" that preexists "its relations with the world and with others"3 ; b) the body's meaning is fundamentally symbolic (McDowell 2001, 301), and its meaning is congealed through symbolic repetition and iteration that emits certain signs and presupposes certain norms; and, c) the body is a battlefield, one that is fought over again and again across particular historical moments and within particular social spaces. "In other words, the concept of the body provides only the illusion of self-evidence, facticity, 'thereness' for something [End Page 216] fundamentally ephemeral, imaginary, something made in the image of particular social groups" (301). On this score, it is not only the "Black body" that defies the ontic fixity projected upon it through the white gaze, and, hence, through the episteme of whiteness, but the white body is also fundamentally symbolic, requiring demystification of its status as norm, the paragon of beauty, order, innocence, purity, restraint, and nobility. In other words, given the three suppositions above, both the "Black body" and the "white body" lend themselves to processes of interpretive fracture and to strategies of interrogating and removing the veneer of their alleged objectivity.∂ To have one's dark body invaded by the white gaze and then to have that body returned as distorted is a powerful experience of violation. The experience presupposes an anti-Black lived context, a context within which whiteness gets reproduced and the white body as norm is reinscribed.The late writer, actor, and activist Ossie Davis recalls that at the age of six or seven two white police officers told him to get into their car. They took him down to the precinct. They kept him there for an hour, laughing at him and eventually pouring cane syrup over his head. This only created the opportunity for more laughter, as they looked upon the "silly" little Black boy. If he was able to articulate his feelings at that moment, think of how the young Davis was returned to himself: "I am an object of white laughter, a buffoon." The young Davis no doubt appeared to the white police officers in ways that they had approved. They set the stage, created a site of Black buffoonery, and enjoyed their sadistic pleasure without blinking an eye. Sartwell notes that "the [white] oppressor seeks to constrain the oppressed [Blacks] to certain approved modes of visibility (those set out in the template of stereotype) and then gazes obsessively on the spectacle he has created" (1998, 11). Davis notes that he "went along with the game of black emasculation, it seemed to come naturally" (Marable 2000, 9). After that, "the ritual was complete" (9). He was then sent home with some peanut brittle to eat. Davis knew at that early age, even without the words to articulate what he felt, that he had been violated. He refers to the entire ritual as the process of "~~niggerization~~." He notes:∂ The culture had already told me what this was and what my reaction to this should be: not to be surprised; to expect it; to accommodate it; to live with it. I didn't know how deeply I was scarred or affected by that, but it was a part of who I was.∂ (9)∂ Davis, in other words, was made to feel that he had to accept who he was, that "~~niggerized~~" little Black boy, an insignificant plaything within a system of ontological racial differences. This, however, is the trick of white ideology; it is to give the appearance of fixity, where the "look of the white subject interpellates the black subject as inferior, which, in turn, bars the black subject from seeing him/herself without the internalization of the white gaze" (Weheliye 2005, 42). On this score, it is white bodies that are deemed agential. They configure "passive" [End Page 217] Black bodies according to their will. But it is no mystery; for "the Negro is interpreted in the terms of the white man. White-man psychology is applied and it is no wonder that the result often shows the Negro in a ludicrous light" (Braithwaite 1992, 36). While walking across the street, I have endured the sounds of car doors locking as whites secure themselves from the "outside world," a trope rendering my Black body ostracized, different, unbelonging. This outside world constitutes a space, a field, where certain Black bodies are relegated. They are rejected, because they are deemed suspicious, vile infestations of the (white) social body. The locks on the doors resound: Click. Click. Click. Click. Click. Click. ClickClickClickClickClickClickClick! Of course, the clicking sounds are always already accompanied by nervous gestures, and eyes that want to look, but are hesitant to do so. The cumulative impact of the sounds is deafening, maddening in their distorted repetition. The clicks begin to function as coded sounds, reminding me that I am dangerous; the sounds create boundaries, separating the white civilized from the dark savage, even as I comport myself to the contrary. The clicking sounds mark me, they inscribe me, they materialize my presence in ways that belie my intentions. Unable to stop the clicking, unable to establish a form of recognition that creates a space of trust and liminality, there are times when one wants to become their fantasy, to become their Black monster, their bogeyman, to pull open the car door: "Surprise. You've just been carjacked by a ghost, a fantasy of your own creation. Now, get the fuck out of the car." I have endured white women clutching their purses or walking across the street as they catch a glimpse of my approaching Black body. It is during such moments that my body is given back to me in a ludicrous light, where I live the meaning of my body as confiscated. Davis too had the meaning of his young Black body stolen. The surpluses being gained by the whites in each case are not economic. Rather, it is through existential exploitation that the surpluses extracted can be said to be ontological—"semblances of determined presence, of full positivity, to provide a sense of secure being" (Henry 1997, 33).∂ When I was about seventeen or eighteen, my white math teacher initiated such an invasion, pulling it off with complete calm and presumably self-transparency. Given the historical construction of whiteness as the norm, his own "raced" subject position was rendered invisible. After all, he lived in the real world, the world of the serious ~~man~~, where values are believed anterior to their existential founding. As I recall, we were discussing my plans for the future. I told ~~him~~ that I wanted to be a pilot. I was earnest about this choice, spending a great deal of time reading about the requirements involved in becoming a pilot, how one would have to accumulate a certain number of flying hours. I also read about the dynamics of lift and drag that affect a plane in flight. After no doubt taking note of my firm commitment, he looked at me and implied that I should be realistic (a code word for realize that I am Black) about my goals. He said that I should become a carpenter or a bricklayer. I was exposing myself, telling a trusted teacher what I wanted to be, and he returned me to myself as something [End Page 218] that I did not recognize. I had no intentions of being a carpenter or a bricklayer (or a janitor or elevator operator for that matter).

**Their use of European philosophy is a project of re-colonization – their arguments illustrate their inability to understand philosophy outside a Eurocentric framework – only a philosophical praxis grounded in the concrete material experiences can avoid reproducing the anti-blackness of the university system**

**Dotson & Lewis 15**

(Kristie Dotson, a Black feminist professional philosopher. She is an Associate Professor in the Department of Philosophy at Michigan State University. She earned a M.A. and Ph.D. in Philosophy from the University of Memphis, as well as an M.A. in Literature from the University of Illinois at Chicago and a B.A. in African American Studies, Business Administration and English Literature from Coe College, Heidi R. Lewis, Feminist Wire, “Feminists We Love: Dr. Kristie Dotson,” January 9, 2015, <http://thefeministwire.com/2015/01/kristie-dotson/>)

HRL: Two years ago, you published “How is this Paper Philosophy?” in Comparative Philosophy, and discussed your reservations about your sister becoming a philosopher, because, as an advisor told her, **it’s a “white man’s game.”** Because of the white male paradigm that dominates philosophy as a discipline, you wrote that you are “often made to feel a sense of incongruence.” Can you talk a bit more about why you think philosophy has been so hostile to Black women? Additionally, I’m hoping that you can share some of the strategies you’ve developed over the years for navigating these struggles.¶ **Academic philosophy** in the U.S. is hard on most Black women. Heck, it is hard on a lot of people of color. Personally, and I really am only speaking for myself here (I don’t want to step on any toes…there’s a lot of disagreement over the “problems of the profession of academic philosophy”), I started with a fairly traditional set of questions about knowledge, i.e. “What is knowledge? Why do people think they have knowledge?” etc. and got incredibly lucky. These questions made my work fairly “mainstream,” at least more so than a great deal of projects you will find Black women engaged in currently in academic philosophy. The random convergence between my interests and more “mainstream” versions of epistemology made the possibility of my work’s uptake in academic philosophy more likely than other kinds of important projects. This unearned privilege insulated me from a great deal of craziness in my field, though not all of it. So when I wrote, “How is this Paper Philosophy?” I was in the process of thinking through the things I’d seen that made routine engagement with one’s philosophy colleagues particularly onerous. Part of the problem was the cartoon “question mark,” as Crenshaw explains it, over one’s head when one talks about or presents one’s work. That question mark, which can take any number of forms, boils down to a question about the legitimacy of one’s projects and/or one’s existence in a given profession.¶ It was the question mark that I felt through graduate school and early on in my professional engagement that shapes my opinion of the field of philosophy at large. In many ways, “How is this Paper Philosophy?” was a statement about my distaste for the profession of philosophy and the question marks it makes some of us bear.¶ And if those question marks exist for me, and they did (and do), as a fairly “mainstream-able” Black feminist professional philosopher, what must it be for folks whose projects don’t hit the barn-side-wall of current disciplinary standards for respectability? In other words, if someone like me who can often slip under the radar of disciplinary respectability without changing my interests and focus can feel the impact of cartoon “question marks,” what about everyone else?¶ The success of “How is this Paper Philosophy?” is a surprise to me. In that paper, I wrote what I wanted to read, what I’d hoped I could have read as a graduate student (and maybe before). That anyone else wants to read it still surprises me.¶ So when you ask me what strategies I have, I have to be honest: none that are particularly useful. My most significant strategy was to write a paper about the profession of academic philosophy and fight to get it published (an almost five year journey) so that I could return to it to encourage myself, but also to highlight the cartoon “question mark” resting over my head.¶ Publishing, “How is this Paper Philosophy?” even without its current reception, was watershed for me. The essential message of that paper is that anyone who thinks that questioning the justification for a given philosophical project is a legitimate question without clarifying one’s own conception of philosophy and philosophical engagement is acting like an asshole.¶ I didn’t need a soul to read that paper for its publication to be a life-giving moment for me. For someone who works on silencing, the attempt to speak can make all the difference in the world.¶ Now, this is not particularly good advice, depending on your perspective. I lived my Assistant Professor years like I was not going to get tenure. That is to say, I was not afraid to lose my job. I strove for tenure, publishing and giving papers and such, but I did not bother to do all the microagressive, professional cultural things people tell you to do in order to attain it. So, publishing a paper saying that one’s profession is full of unpleasant folks, as an assistant professor, is probably not the best strategy. But it worked for me. [Laughs.] HRL: You conclude “How is this Paper Philosophy?” by suggesting “a culture of praxis within professional philosophy would present a great deal more livable options than it does currently.” I’m hoping that you can define philosophical praxis here and discuss here how your own work is advancing the discipline in this way.¶ Tough question. First, let me say that philosophical engagement is a basic human activity. Everyone does it. Most people don’t think of themselves as “philosophizing” when they ask broad questions about the state of things, but they are. Anyone who has ever scratched their head and asked, “What is this world all about?” or “Why are things set up the way they are?” has already begun philosophizing. Philosophical questions can get broader and more particular, but there are very few people who have never taken a step back and asked, “What is really going on?” and then attempted to imagine answers.¶ As a professional, Black feminist philosopher, i.e. a person who draws her living from my knowledge about philosophy and specializes in investigating the conditions of oppression and liberation for Black women-kind, I try to answer the question, “What is really going on with respect to cis- and trans\* Black women and girls, particularly in a U.S. context?” The answers I come up with, I hope, contribute to bodies of work also seeking answers to this question so that we can think and pursue justice in the 21st century. In this way, what I do is engaged in a particular community.¶ **Philosophical praxis**, for me, **is an “engaged” pursuit of answers to broad questions**. The emphasis on “engaged” highlights philosophy that is done in and for communities, where those communities are not considered monolithic. For example, as a member of the #WhyWeCantWait core team, which challenged the gender-exclusive nature of President Obama’s initiative, My Brother’s Keeper (MBK), I took part in a range of actions aimed at moving a so-called, racial justice measure to include all youth of color in targeted communities. Flawed though MBK is, and it is flawed all the way down to its neo-liberal focus on individual achievement instead of structural remedies, advocating for girls of color taught me something that merely producing theory never could. I was able to witness specific ways “knowledge” works in the world.¶ Books and theories, wonderful and illuminating though they may be, could not teach me some of the things that putting my epistemological training to work taught me. It was **the community of engagement**, a group of Black feminists from various walks of life, and the attempt to wrestle with existing institutions that transformed my understanding of my work and what my work can do to help under racial racial justice in the 21st century.¶ Engagement, for me, means working towards some goal with a range of people interested in similar issues, especially where consensus is not a given. **Philosophical praxis**, on my account, is the result of pursuing answers to broad questions in communities; this requires the realization that even in the most abstract philosophical work is done via engagement with a community of folks thinking about the same kinds of things. These communities are not mutually exclusive, but neither are they synonymous with one another. Inquiries often drive their formation, not disciplinary standards.¶ HRL: During the 2011 Conference for Pre-Tenure Women at Purdue University, Caroline S. Turner said, “Women get mad and leave. Men get mad and stay.” That crosses my mind when I think about the decisions marginalized intellectuals make regarding when to walk away and when to stay at particular institutions in the academy. For instance, you left your first tenure-track job after just one year to take a position in the Department of Philosophy at Michigan State University. I don’t presume to know all of the complex reasons for your decision, but I am hoping that you can share some advice about how to effectively make such an important decision. I’m also wondering if you would be willing to provide some commentary on Dr. Turner’s theory.¶ My experience has shown me that the statement, “Women get mad and leave. Men get mad and stay,” speaks a misleading half-truth, if not contextualized. It can often be explained by privilege and structure of supremacy in a given institutional context.¶ For women of color in the academy, one must be very careful. First, one needs to consider **how quickly women of color academics die**. Yes, I said, die, as in death, especially if you are a feminist academic. I went to a women of color event on Michigan State University’s campus, and Terrion L. Williamson appropriately started with a tribute to women of color academics and artists who died before the age of 60. There are simply too many of us, especially when you consider our relatively small numbers.¶ It simply may be that women of color can and do die of excessive negative emotional onslaughts caused, in large part, by the circumstances of our lives. So one needs to be very careful with respect to negative emotion. Seriously. Getting mad all the time is not an ideal circumstance for personal well-being.¶ And the privilege of academic life can sometimes afford a mobility that makes a “stay and fight” mentality just plain silly. There are other fights, especially if you are a Black feminist academic. Some of us will choose to stay and fight and others of us will choose different battles entirely. I, personally, chose a different battle entirely.¶ None of this is to say that one can avoid anger in one’s workplace. Black women in every profession can call “lie” to that idea. And the reality is, some anger is productive. However, it is important to judge one’s environment to see whether one’s anger is getting genuine uptake.¶ What I found at my first institution, and this has probably changed, was a lip service acknowledgement of the situations that invoked my anger. It slowly became clear to me that I would run the gauntlet for tenure and come out the other end needing to sue that institution for it, whether or not I’d earned tenure (and I would have).¶ Now though I did not live for tenure as a junior professor, my mama didn’t raise no fool. I don’t fight losing battles for no good reason. There are other fronts on which to fight.¶ Too many women of color who get mad and stay under similar conditions are forced out with failed tenure bids. You see my point? They are forced to leave anyway.¶ So one could interpret the “women get mad and leave” observation as: many women read the writing on the wall and get ghost.¶ One could also say that “men” stay and fight because institutional landscapes are primed for recognizing their claims for workplace justice as reasonable.¶ White male supremacy helps white men along with this. Male supremacy helps many men of color along with this (I say “many,” because I think that race can be a serious mitigating factor for one’s grievances gaining uptake, along with sexuality, nationality, ability, and trans\* status).¶ Most women of color, specifically, **cannot rely on institutions to “work” for them** and their claims. Better to find more agreeable workplace conditions.¶ That was my long answer [laughs]. My short answer is, “women get mad and leave” because they’re smart. The deck is already stacked so high against them that anger and how one’s anger is received is a sign of future disappointment and injustice. People with options rarely take the option of higher suffering for the sake of “sticking it out” in some random institution. And when they do, they see the institutional fight as worth the increased risk of experiencing greater disappointment and injustice in the future. I applaud these women for their service, as those who follow them will benefit.¶ There are still others of us who make the decision that, if one is going to be in a fight, then there are simply other more preferable struggles.¶ HRL: I couldn’t end this interview with you without asking about feminist pedagogy. I still vividly remember taking your Feminist Theory & Methodology course at Purdue six years ago, and it has been a great influence on my own teaching, especially my Feminist Theory course. I’m wondering if you can share some insight about the strategies you’ve developed over the years for teaching feminist theory. More specifically, what kinds of challenges do you face during those courses, and how have you managed to overcome, or at least mitigate, those challenges?¶ Here’s what I have learned: in order to talk the talk you should probably try to walk the walk.¶ Some have called me hardcore on this point. But I want everyone to understand that I learned how to be a Black feminist at my mama and grandmama’s knees. And it was, and still is, unacceptable to talk with authority about something that you are not willing to do, try, or seriously investigate.¶ **If you are not willing to read the nuances of Black women’s social theory outside of some framework that a European philosopher gave you, you are about the business of re-colonization with the privilege to do so**.¶ If you want to work on “sex work,” as an academic and have never engaged in or know anyone who has engaged in such work, you are about the business of re-colonization with the privilege to do so.¶ If you want to work on topics and issues in an African context as a U.S. citizen, and have only gone to that context a handful of times or not at all, and yet try to speak with an authority you have not earned, you are about the business of re-colonization with the privilege to do so.¶ There is so much pressure to do academic work in line with **colonizing intents**. It often is sold as rigorous academic engagement. But it looks like re-colonization to me.¶ From the constant desire to “brand” or to come up with something “new,” or to criticize instead of create or to talk with authority one has not earned, all of this (and so much more) lends itself to **machinations of re-colonization prevalent in academic spheres**.¶ The biggest challenge I’ve had is watching re-colonizing practices in the academy, being measured according to its markers of success, and remaining the Black feminist my mama raised to be.¶ The one that understands I inherit worlds left for me and my job may simply be “to make old ideas” feel differently on any given day (Audre Lorde); the kind of Black feminist that sees critique as a privilege earned by those who have taken the time to truly understand; the kind of Black feminist that sees myself as part of the world and not the world as a figment of my imagination. You see, I’m not searching for the next new thing. I’m not looking to produce the next original thought. I scarcely believe such a thing is possible. I do want to retain what we have that helps us make sense of this world and update it for today’s time with love. Always with love.¶ I leave what I cannot love to be cherished and updated by those who do or to simply fade away.¶ So the biggest challenge for me in the academy is to **root out the kinds of professional values that require my engagement in re-colonization and its demand for self-hatred**. That is what the academy, and most professional contexts, asks of many of us. “Love it and hate yourself.”¶ I struggle daily to say, “Not me, not today.” Some days I succeed, some days don’t.

**Psychoanalysis/Lacan**

**The Black body is sexually fetishized by the white body. Images of violence only satisfy the desires of the white body. Psychoanalysis can’t account for this negrophilia.**

**Marriott 2k**, David Marriott, was born and educated in England and received his Ph.D. in literature from the University of Sussex, On Black Men p.18-20, New York: Columbia University Press. \*edited for racialized language

That compulsion to bring the eye of the camera up close, to put themselves in the picture as spectators of torn black flesh, means that we - black men - can still look at those lynchers: look at them looking at teeth, nails, bone, skin. What are they thinking about as they gaze out at the camera, pointing up at black bodies dangling in the trees? Sullen, stern, defiant, satisfied, curious: what do they see? What do they want us to see? That, as Richard Wright puts it in a brief comment on another such image, 'the law is white' (Wright 194T 44)? Wright will come to use **the photographic evidence of lynching to present his own convictions about the spectacular place of black men in white scopic pleasure: 'the law is white'**. And if this is law, it is both fantasmatic and perverse. Consider, for example, the following account given by Howard Kester in The Lynching of Claude Neal in 1934: 'After taking the ~~nigger~~ to the woods ... they cut off his penis. He was made to eat it. Then they cut off his testicles and made him eat them and say he liked it' (Kester 1934, cited in Dowd Hall I984: 339)· As a response to the 'unspeakable crime' of black on- white rape, the act of forcing a man to ~~'fuck'~~ himself to death with his own excised genitals, to feed and gorge himself on his own violating (Violated) pleasure, may well have been hugely satisfying to those assembled - especially when the man got to confess his (seeming) enjoyment. **To hear him desire his own death - and so turn their terrible pleasure into his own violent wish - was to construct a vision of the castrated black man as one actively seeking the pleasures of castration**. And what of the black man's desires and identifications here? It must have been exhausting trying to name that pleasure, to mention - without choking - how much he liked that severed penis now become his dew protruding tongue. J I suppose that **this little bit of theatre serves to reveal, and support, a race hatred predicated on an identification between blackness and sexual guilt, an identification which generates the sadistic desire to witness the spectacle - the stench - of emasculated black men slowly bleeding to death. As such, it is a law which operates through visual terror.** The lesson to be learned through the murderous gazes of these white men is that you might be reduced to something that 'don't look human' - a reduction which is, precisely, your annihilation and their pleasure. In Red Wine First, published in 1947, Nedra Tyre records the thoughts of one Skinny Slaton: 'Well, said Skinny Slaton, shore as I'm born I'm gonna borrer me a kodak tomorrer and I'm coming back here and I'm gonna take me some pitchers of that. Don't look human, does it?' (Tyre 194T II2-13). The technological moment which gives us the Kodak - the first turn-of-the-century mass-produced roll-film camera - also gives us a way of venturing into some dark places. For Slaton, anxious to go borrow a Kodak, the photograph represents the climax of an unfolding drama. More than an aid to memory (though it is that too), **the photograph is a part of the process, another form of racist slur which can travel through time to do its work**: 'Don't look human, does it?' No doubt, Slaton is fascinated by what taking the picture can do and reveal about himself: a figure in a public event, a means to fashion the self through the image of a dead black man and the identification with fellow whites which can follow. At the same time, it is as if he wants to make an archive of what he sees, to preserve an event for the benefit of those who could not be there (friends, family, a son or daughter, perhaps). Wish you were here. A grotesque family album. Slaton wants others to see him there, to know he was present at the obliteration of a man whose end could not be imagined without this visible prop. Who can deny the (merciless) evidence of such a photo, its framing - and containing - of the stink of the real? To put this another way: **white men, and women, demand a keepsake, a memento** mori: toes, fingers, or - most highly prized - a black penis, a black scrotum. 'Miller's body hung thus exposed from three to five 0'clock', writes Ida B. Wells-Barnett in A Red Record in 1895, 'during which time, several photographs of him as he hung dangling at the end of the chain were taken, and his toes and fingers cut off' (Wells-Barnett 1991: 182). But how long will they keep, these organs and limbs, subject to the reek of putrefaction? They're not like the image, which registers a moment in time complete, pure, clean - free of the blood, and rot, of the lost body part. Reining in the spill of human wreckage, reviving the carnival atmosphere of the day, the photograph is there to be gazed at, and fingered, over and over again: Look at me. I was there. Again, it was all part of the ritual: this appetite for document, this devouring by the eye - as if only a camera can bring the spectator close enough for the eye to be embedded in flesh. And, of course, the camera plays its part in sustaining that appetite, prolonging the scene it is supposed to record. 'After three full hours had been spent in torturing the two', writes Sutton Griggs in The Hindered Hand in 1905, 'the spokesman announced that they were now ready for the final act. The brother of Sidney Fletcher was called for and was given a match. He stood near his mutilated victims until the photographer could take a picture of the scene' (Griggs 1905: 133-4; my italics). The final act in a popular melodrama: the camera itself the drive to document, to be in the show - becomes part of that drama, prolonging the agony of the mutilated blacks who must hope that death will come quickly. From the first act - the moment of accusation: rape, murder, theft - this is what the audience has been waiting for: confirmation, via a fatal iconography of the brute black male, that he really' don't look human'. 2 How do we look at these pictures now? How do we start to try to understand the hatred, and misery, on display through them? We know now - as we knew then - that most of the charges on which black men were 'tried' by Judge Lynch (to coin Ida B. Wells' wellknown phrase) were fabricated; they were ideological narratives, or fantasies, of black men as murderers, rapists, thieves: 'the black brute ... lurking in the dark' (Dowd Hall 1984: 344). In other words, **the act of lynching is part of a racial imaginary, a primal scene of racist culture in the southern states of America, in which black men bear the brunt of a hatred which seems, at times, to know no bounds.' Burdened by history, black men lived, and perhaps continue to live, in that climate, one permeated by racist fantasy - and the violence to which it so often gives rise**. As Wright was one of the first to point out in Black Boy, first published in 1945, you don't have to see a lynching to live with its effects: 'I had never in my life been abused by whites, but I had already become as conditioned to their existence as though I had been the victim of a thousand lynchings' (Wright 1945: 84)· 'The victim of a thousand lynchings? On Wright's reading the black man can die and die and die again - as if, as I suggested before, the identification between the black man looking and the black man lynched becomes irresistible. That identification can, in Wright's work, run riot through the black man's psychic and cultural life. Describing his response to the story of a black woman whose husband had been 'seized and killed by a mob', Wright insists on the 'emotional truth' of the feeling that 'there existed men against whom I was powerless, men who could violate my life at will' (the pedagogic value of the lynch photo/plot) (ibid.: 83-4). He doesn't know if the story is true or not, but it keeps him awake at nights: taking the place of his dreams, the lynching scene becomes a daytime nightmare. Relief comes only with the young Wright's resolve to 'emulate' the black woman who, concealing a rifle at her husband's funeral, shot dead four of his attackers. Revenge, defence, attack: a refusal to accept 'their cruelty as the law of my life' (ibid.: 84). But Wright knows the limits of that identification, one that has no 'objective value'. ) My spontaneous fantasies lived in my mind, he continues, 'because I felt completely helpless In the face of this threat that might come upon me at any time, and because there did not exist to my knowledge any possible course of action which could have saved me if I had ever been confronted by a white mob' (ibid.). No possible action, so Wright needs (and it is need rather than, say, wish) his defensive fantasy, his way of defending himself psychically against the death of a thousand lynchings. But no defence, either, because Wright knows that **this fantasy has no 'objective value': it cannot be made real, unlike the racist fantasy which structures reality for both whites and blacks.** Above all, Wright's exploration of his experience of white Southern culture uncovers an identification with, or interpellation by, what he - a black man - imagines white desire to be: 'Even when a white man asked us an innocent question', Wright recalls in Twelve Million Black Voices, first published in 1941, some unconscious part of us would listen closely, not only to the obvious words, but also to the intonations of voice that indicated what kind of answer he wanted; and, automatically; we would determine whether an affirmative or negative reply was expected, and we would answer, not in terms of objective truth, but in terms of what the white man wanted to hear. (Wright 1941: 41) Imagine the black man the white man wants you to be, then, and be him (or, at least, mime him). To push the point, our unconscious - or some of it, in Wright's terms - is given over to that work of second guessing, of dare and double dare. **There's no place here for what the black man wants, or for a black unconscious driven by its own desire and, aggression. On the contrary. The unconscious** (if that is what it I~) **is taken over, usurped, by the work of identifying (with) what the white man wants.** Even if the black man is a dead man, a lynched man? We can start to clarify this through one of the key works on race, hatred and fantasy: Frantz Fanon's Black Skin, White Masks, first published in French in 1952, translated into English in 1967. Towards the end of Black Skin, White Masks, Fanon describes his 5o0k as a 'mirror' in whose reflective image black men can view their own future. 'This book, it is hoped', he writes in 'The Negro and Psychopathology', 'will be a mirror with a progressive infrastructure, in which it will be possible to discern the Negro on the road to disalienation- (Fanon 196T 184). new image in the mirror is, for Fanon, crucial that disalienation is to take place: black men need to 10clZand be reflected, otherwise, to become other than the distorted -and fantasmatic image of white desire. Imagine a 'mirror of confusion' (ta-.use James Baldwin's phrase) in which only the shade, or shadow, ~ the black man can appear. An image of hate, a hated image. A phobic image, to use Fanon's terms. Listen, for example, to his account of the psycho-social dynamics of Negrophobogenesis: 'Is the Negro's [sexual] superiority real? Everyone knows that it is not. But that is not what matters. prelogical thought of the phobic has decided that such is the case' (ibid.: 159). - It is the triumph, and complexity, of Fanon's thinking that he was able to identify the inner life of specular confusion supporting the knot of phobic fantasy. For Fanon**, the problem is that white phobic anxiety about black men takes the form of a fetishistic investment in their sexuality'**: crudely, being well-hung, the black man must be hung well. In other words, the violated body of the black man comes to be used as a defence against the anxiety, or hatred, that body appears to generate. Describing that basic ambivalence as negro-phobia', Fanon uses the syntax of fetishism - 'I know, but all the same' - to account for the construction of the black man as phobic object: 'Everyone knows that he is not superior, but all the sa~.'. B~t, again, what of black men in all this? What, if anything, can be \_&limpsedof them i~ienating, and confusing, ima~s? What d.Q...b!ackmen see when they encounter. perhaps for the first time, a phobic image \_ofthe~selves in (white) cUlt!!!!ZJ . In Black Skin, Whzte Masks, we find once again the spectacle of a lynching that the black child hasn't seen but which, in some sense, appears to have happened to him. 'Frequently', Fanon argues in 'The Negro and Psychopathology', the negro who becomes abnormal [s'anormalise] has never had any relations with the White man. Has there been an ancient experience and repression in the unconscious [Y a-t-il eu experience ancienne et refoulement dans l'inconscient?]? Has the young black child seen his father beaten or lynched by the white man? Has there been a real traumatism [traumatisme effectif]? To all this we have to answer: no. Well then? (Fanon 1952: II8; 196T 145; t.m.) Well then? What has traumatised this black child who has not seen his father beaten or lynched? Fanon's statement on what the black child has seen, or not, implies that the child has been caught looking not-by the real but by his own racist imaginary, a capture inseparable from an exposure to the cultural representations of the 'white world'. But what if the cultural milieu of that white world insists that the child's eye zone in on such real traumas as ~ way of grounding its - racist culture's - own fantasy? Which it did. What if the cultural traffic in images of the black man as phobic object beaten, disfigured, lynched - is trauma enough? As Vicky Lebeau has pointed out in a recent discussion of Black Skin, White Masks, that, insight - the trauma of representation - is, in fact, central to Fanons analysis of the black child devouring [devore] and identifying with the stories and images of white culture. Brought up to think and act subjectively 'like a white man' (Fanon's phrase), Lebeau suggests that: , the black man who encounters himself as a phobic object within white culture encounters the dereliction of his own self-representation through that culture: dereliction as one of the effects of a hatred coming now from both inside and outside, which Fanon tracks throughout Black Skin, White Masks. (Lebeau 1998: II5) If Fanon seems impervious to the invasive possibilities of real, racial violence in that child's neurotic encounter, blind to the extent to which that evil twin lurking in the mirror of culture may prove to be more than a dark, imaginary double, it is worth taking a few moments to think about how this accusation squares with his continued insistence on the violence of the real. As a symbol of the self-destructive, lacerating ground upon which phobia and fantasy meet, the black child, in taking up the burden of such imagery, Fanon concludes, has been fatally exposed to the glare of those phobic anxieties constructed upon his visual image - as have other blacks exposed, for the first time, to the colonial fantasies of Euro-pean culture. This vision of blacks confounded by their reflected images is also acutely - powerfully - aware of the collusions between unconscious and cultural forms of violence; 'of a dreaming possessed not, or not only, by the subject's own wishful-shameful fantasies but by the real' (Lebeau 1998: 121). Not only is the 'sadistic aggression' [agressivite sadique] of culture most visibly at work in the child's 'sacrificial dedication [oblativitej' to his distorted image; his unconscious dreamlife has learned to play its part by demanding that debasement (Fanon I96T 147). There is, in other words, **a remarkable correlation between the image - the fantasy - of black men in cultural life and black self-images**. Behind those images and inverted screens lurks a dark intruder albeit framed by a black (and white) vision of black identity; an imago stalking a little black child through his memories and dreams. Fucking his (now) ~~nigger~~-loving wife, savouring the inheritance of that paternal secret, Jesse knows that what he had witnessed was a gift from his father. **That gift, the desire and power to castrate - to take and so to take on - the sexuality of black men, brings them together and forges their futures as white men**. Disconcertingly, what sustains Jesse (and his wife) 'as he laboured and she moaned' are the correspondences between that gift and the terrible, gaping wound (ibid.). There is much more here than simply coming. Jesse's blackface imitation of those two scenes - the lynching, his parents' sex which precedes it - may be sadistic, but his performance also thrives on imitating derogatory images of black men as either dangerously oversexed and/or emasculated or dead. One thing he knows for sure is this: **blackness is a vicarious, disfiguring, joyful pleasure, passionately enabling as well as substitutively dead. Taught that a devotion to the love of being white can only be secured by fearing and hating black men, for white boys** like Jesse, **exposed to the consuming, unconscious power of such racist imagery**, the costs of parting company from his father's 'lesson' was to leave oneself prone to unmanly isolation, **unable to recognise oneself as a man. Furthermore, the images of black men work**, as the story suggests, **to contain the dread and fear of castration shaping one's frustrated desire** to be like one's father in later life. Jesse's desire to be the man holding the knife instead of the man being cut shows a willingness to pay his dues and belong to something greater than himself, to be at one with the general will. Not being engulfed, diminished or disfigured is his reward for becoming a 'white' man. He has learned the glorious and gloriously apposite lesson **that, being white, he has a privileged ownership of the phallus, whereas black men, as abject representatives of death and castration, do not**. Let's go back to that lengthy passage I've just cited: everything that I have tried to explain about lynching as spectacle in this chapter - that it is not just a form of popular theatre, or pain as public entertainment, but a ritual, cathartic act of initiation and absolution - can be seen here, albeit refined into a disconcerting view of a white southern childhood and its racialised oedipal drama. While this story is framed entirely by the hurtful, self-mutilating nature of Jesse's oedipal frustration and racist aggression, it also, in effect, registers **the ongoing, unconscious power of that mutilation in the psychic lives of black men**. Let's face it, if Jesse has learned to see himself through the dying man's eyes, though the shock and turmoil of seeing and hearing those enigmattc scenes and silences at night, at home, it also seems important to observe that it is Baldwin, a black gay writer, who is imagining seeing that incision - that cut - through him. **Trying to untie the knots of displacement here, it occurs to me that what is striking and, at the same time, terribly depressing** about Going to Meet the Man, **is not only the spectacle of deforming - or disfiguring - black men at its centre**, but Baldwin's depiction of what will be a bond of prohibition linking the black boy Otis and Jesse as future lyncher. Yet again, **this shift or transposition is all about how white and black men learn to see each other through dark, distorted mirrors**; or, as Baldwin writes in 'No Name in the Street': And it is absolutely certain that white men, who invented the ~~nigger~~'s big prick, are still at the mercy of the nightmare, and are still, for the most part, doomed, in one way or another, to attempt to make this prick their own. (Baldwin 1998: 392)

**Lacan’s analysis cannot account for the specific material ways in which racialized violence occurs as opposed to gendered violence. His analysis is not only insufficient to discuss black suffering but also parasitic on said suffering.**

**Wilderson ’10** {Frank; Associate Professor of African-American Studies at UC Irvine and has a Ph.D. from UC Berkeley; “Red, White & Black: Cinema and the Structure of U.S. Antagonisms,” p. }/MR

The remainder of this chapter interrogates the efficacy of aesthetic gestures in their role as accompaniments to notions of emancipation within the libidinal economy (as opposed to Gramscian emphasis on political economy). This is a high-stakes interrogation because so much film theory (White, or, non-Black—Human—film theory) is in fee to Lacan and his underlying thesis on subjectivity and psychic liberation. It does not seek to disprove Lacan’s underlying theory of how the subject comes into subjectivity via alienation within the Imaginary and the Symbolic; nor does it seek to disprove his understanding of psychic stagnation (described as egoic monumentalization) as that condition from which the subject (and by extension, the socius) must be liberated. Rather than attempt to disprove **Lacan’s** (and, by extension non-Black film theory’s) evidence and assumptive logic I seek to show how, in aspiring to a paradigmatic explanation of relations, his **assumptive logic mystifies rather than clarifies a paradigmatic explanation of relations, for it has a vivid account of the conflicts between genders, or, more broadly, between narcissistic contemporaries and contemporaries who have learned to live in a deconstructive relation to the ego**—that is to say, **it offers a reliable toolbox for rigorously examining intra-Human conflicts** (and for proposing the aesthetic gestures, i.e., types of filmic practices, which either exacerbate [Hollywood films] or redress [counter-cinema] these conflicts) **but it has no capacity to give a paradigmatic explanation of the structure of antagonisms between Blacks and Humans. I argue that the claims and conclusions which Lacanian psychoanalysi**s (and by extension non-Black film theory) **makes regarding dispossession and suffering are (a) insufficient to the task of delineating Black dispossession and suffering, and (b) parasitic on that very Black dispossession and suffering for which it has no words.**

**Natal alientation disrupts lacan’s analysis in the context of the oedipal crisis because slavery destroyed families and as such the ability for analysis to occur.**

**Spillers 1996**, Hortense J. Spillers is the Gertrude Conaway Vanderbilt Professor of English at Vanderbilt University, "All the Things You Could Be by Now If Sigmund Freud's Wife Was Your Mother": Psychoanalysis and Race, Critical Inquiry, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Summer, 1996), pp. 728-733, Published by: The University of Chicago Press

By a detour off the customary path, **the oedipal problematic travels in this instance through the peer group, snared in the coils of looking and being seen. The Ortigues do not pause to elaborate on what is, to my mind, a point of saturation in their itinerary that could possibly bridge across Old and New World African cultures in a consideration of uncon-scious material, but I am not, for all that, claiming that there would be good reason on that basis to pose or even anticipate moments of a trans- historical (black) collective psyche**. Nevertheless **it seems to me that any sustained investigation along these lines might usefully isolate the gaze in its discrete cultural property as a route of organization for a comparative reading of intersubjective signals in divergent lifeworlds**. But I should try to be clear about this. The inquiry that I am describing would occur un- der some other auspices than the psychoanalytic, even though it might be informed by its protocols. In any case, the look and its dynamics would bring to focus several topics that come together in the name of subjectiv-ity, that is, the extent to which self-formation is authored elsewhere, in the split between the wanna-be and its objectivations in the place of an- other. The eyes in this case are nothing more nor less than the crucial relay of a "message" that either proffers or denies, though denial, as we know, is also a most powerful offer. The tales of the young Dakarois reenforce the unthinkable it is all too often up to someone else and for my money, we have little idea what this particular exchange of sub- textual motive, "choreographed" in the rise and fall of the eyelid, actually "sounds" like in cultural theory concerning black communities. Relatedly, is there not this conundrum: If the young male consultants of the Or- tigues's "recits" are bound to the "look" of others as feminist film theo- rists have suggested that the female "star" is 28 then what revisionary notions might be introduced to the conceptualization of the gaze as hetero- sexual currency? At least to the extent that it induces more questions than it disposes of, the "recit" of the consultation expands the genre of narra- tive art. The coil of the looks for the Ortigues, however, is entirely related to the psychoanalytic aims of Oedipe africain, and that is **to explore how the oedipal crisis finding one's place in the social order is resolved in a cultural context where the symbolic function of the father remains tied to the ancestors**. We can only sketch out a few more details of this running narrative: (1) **In the case where the father mediates between the dead ancestors and the living sons, the sons cannot think of themselves as the equal of the ancestor** (and therefore not of the father either) **and certainly not as his superior. What one must confront instead is the right to claim one's place within the group, as castration here is based on the collective register of obedience to the law of the dead, the law of the ancestors. To be excluded from the group or abandoned by it is the equivalent of cas- tration** (see OA, p. 75). When Samba, in the case that we have examined, was confronted by the baobab tree in his disturbing dream, he was essen- tially coming face to face, as it were, with a representative ancestral figure, as the baobab holds a privileged place in the culture as the site of the wisdom of the dead and of the living fathers. It is, therefore, collectively possessed. The appearance of the tree in the young man's dream appar- ently signalled his arrival on the threshold of manhood. In contrasting the European Oedipus with its African equivalent, the Ortigues suggest that the youth in the latter setting does not imagine killing the father but must be referred to the ancestors through him. Thus a second detail is added to the narrative: (2) **Because the ancestor is "deja mort" and "inattaquable," the sons constitute their own brothers in rivalry, the group that they must enter. This horizontal social arrange- ment yields two crucial representations "the collective phallus and the unbeatable ancestor," which conduces to "the game of rivalry-solidarity between the brothers." In this setup, everything that the brothers do re- garding one another acquires profound weight, inasmuch as one's suc- cessful achievement of status is predicated on it. "Rivalry, then, appears to be systematically displaced onto the 'brothers' who polarize the aggressive drives," as "aggression itself is primarily expressed under the form of persecutive reaction- formations." "The network of intersubjective relations would be strongly colored here by the fact that everyone is easily perceived as both vulner- able to persecution" and capable of serving its ends through the medium of a superior force or talisman.** "Under all circumstances, it is appropriate to protect oneself against harmful intentions," against apparently aggres- sive moves in the other, which energy, the authors observe, is deflected away from self-affirmation through action toward self-defense. "Blame, then, is barely internalized or constituted as such," since the material cause of the harm "lies outside oneself," where the "badness" reigns: "Everything happens as if the individual cannot bear to be perceived as internally divided and driven by contradictory desires." Les Structures an- thropologiques and Oedipe africain seem to strike a common chord on this point. We would also read Samba's predicament in this light.29 "**To the extent that the aggressive drives are not projected onto an- other, the subject remains conscious of them, but represses them, tries to control them." "Aggressive fantasies and emotions might then take the route of the secretive, muted, destructive, unacknowledgeable material about which silence is deemed appropriate," because mouthing it might "'discourage my parents,"' or "'they would count against me,"' or ex- pressing it would expose one's vulnerability, one's "locution," as it were. "Often, somatizations appeared as a means of inhibiting the instanta- neous expression of fantasies and aggressive impulses." What might oc- cur in the event of a repression is the dissimulation of mistrust and suspicion under the guise of an "imperturbable gentilesse" that is aimed at warding off a blow.** But such a "separate peace" might not yield the expected "detente," but could well result in "immediate depression" or the "emergence of aggressive fantasies." Unless a subject sought solitude in order to protect himself against anxiety reactions that had become overwhelming, the young consul- tants described to us the high degree to which they felt compelled to be with their friends . . ., to be part of the group, of the crowd. Even if nothing of particular importance accrued from a sporting event, a dance outing, an interminable round of talk . . ., the real thing was the presence of others necessary and reassuring in keeping the latent aggressive fantasies in the background.30 Could it be that male bonding or confraternity is based on keeping the latent aggressive fantasies at bay? In that sense, perhaps, the solidarity piece of the rivalrous relations would sheath, at all times, a decidedly violent possibility, all the more so for what it covers over. The "gang" in diasporic communities may well replicate this pattern of repression and closure. **We recall that the social formation of the brothers, banished in the Freudian myth for the crime of patricide and other impressive infamies, is the triggering mechanism of the incest taboo and the cut into human community**. But Freud's exiled issue have the opportunity to "return" with the boon of guilt. **As we think about the African Oedipus, according to the Ortigues's sketch of it, several half-formed, obscure questions crowd in: Did African Oedipus show a break in the fabric of narrative, in the incontestable roll and continuity of generation after generation, reaching the shores of death and the "full fatherhoo**d" ("pere a part en- tiere" [OA, p. 110]), **by way of the Atlantic slave trade?** The question springs to mind from a suggestive passage in Claude Meillassoux's Maid- ens, Meal, and Money, wherein Meillassoux, in elaborating the role of el- ders and juniors in the African "domestic community," cites other historical research on the matter: Populations that had been "brutally subjected to the effects of the European slave trade" often used the ju- niors not only as producers, "but ultimately commodities as well." Their severity toward them exaggerated by greed, the elders banished the ju-niors "for real or imagined crimes," as the young "were transformed into goods for the slave trade.''3l The slave trade, of course, bears none of the advantages of myth, but shows some of its earmarks, as the Atlantic trade might be thought of as one of the founding events of modern history and economy. But for our purposes here, **the execrable trade, in radically altering the social system in Old and New World "domestic community," is as violent and disruptive as the never-did-happenstance of mythic and oneiric inevitability.** In other words, **this historical event, like a myth, marks so rigorous a transition in the order of things that it launches a new way of gauging time and human origin: It underwrites, in short, a new genealogy defined by a break with Tradition with the Law of the Ancestors and the paternal intermediary. From my perspective, then, African Oedipus is the term that medi-ates a new symbolic order. It allows us to see that "father" designates a function rather than**, as Meillassoux points out, **a "genitor": the father is "he who nourishes and protects you, and who claims your produce and labor in return**."32 In that regard, **the African Oedipus removes the ele-ment of sentimentality from the myth and exposes it as a structure of relations instead. The riddle of origin that the Oedipus is supposed to constitute, first, as a crisis, then as a resolution of order and degree, was essentially cancelled by the Atlantic trade, as the "crisis,"** for all intents and purposes, has continued on the other side, the vantage from which I am writing. In the essay from which this writing is excerpted, I spoke about a subject in discourse, crossed by stigmata, as the psychoanalytic difference that has yet to be articulated. In the longer essay, I define the stigmatized subject as one whose access to discourse must be established as a human right and not assumed. I am referring specifically here to the history of slavery in the Americas and not only its traditions and practices of"chattel property," but, related to it, the strictures against literacy im-posed on the bonded. Inasmuch as **classical psychoanalytic practice works to transform symptomaticity into a narrative, I take it that discourse con-stitutes its primary value. The raced subject in an American context must, therefore, work his way through a layered imperative and impediment, which deeply implicates History in any autobiographical itinerary. I think that I am prepared to say that those markings on the social body of New World Africanity are the stripes of an oedipal crisis** (for male and female children) **that can only be cleared away now by a "confrontation" with the "scene" of its occurrence, but as if in myth.** In other words, **the discon-tinuity that the abandoned son demarcates here must be carried out as a kind of new article of faith in the non-Traditional, in the discovery of the Law of the living, not the dead, and in the circulation of a new social energy that confronts the future, not the past. Carrying out that line of thinking, we might be able to see in an apposite psychoanalytic protocol for the subjects of"race," broken away from the point of origin, which rupture has left a hole that speech can only point to and circle around, an entirely new repertoire of inquiry into human relations. Perhaps I come out here where I least expected: Fanon, to that extent my history must not imprison me, once I recognize it for what it is-might well have been right.**

**‘‘The flesh represents the body that sits on the very edge, on the underside, of the symbolic order, pre-symbolic and pre-linguistic, just before words and meaning’’**

**Goss 15**, Devon R. Goss is a Sociology Ph.D Student at the University of Connecticut, This is a review of Skin Acts: Race, Psychoanalysis, and the Black Male Performer by Michelle Ann. Published in Men and Masculinities 2015, Vol. 18(5) 630-637

The amount of academic research on the portrayals of African Americans in the media has surged in recent years, with scholars investigating the representations of African Americans in popular films and television shows and the ways that African Americans have navigated a segregated and stereotypical industry. Additionally, the study of black masculinity has gained attention in recent years, particularly with the presidency of Barack Obama. Michelle Ann Stephen’s Skin Acts: Race, Psychoanalysis, and the Black Male Performer brings these conversations together, adding an important layer to this analysis by drawing academic attention to the meaning of the skin through the lens of psychoanalysis. Through four case studies of the vocal and cinematic routines of black male performers, including the early 1900s minstrel performer Bert Williams, the 1930s singer Paul Robeson, the 1950s singer and actor Harry Belafonte, and reggae musician and 1970s star Bob Marley, Stephens aims to ‘‘understand ... **blackness at its most material signifier, the skin, as the site of sensory, interpersonal contact and racial, intersubjective knowing’’** (2014: 29). To this end, she utilizes a wide array of visual texts in her analysis including album covers, cartoons, film stills, and photographs, which are included throughout the book. Stephens’ main argument is that **black male performance underscores the ways that the white gaze aims to locate and understand racial and gender differences as essentialized features of the body, best understood by the skin. To this end she states, ‘‘The flesh represents the body that sits on the very edge, on the underside, of the symbolic order, pre-symbolic and pre-linguistic, just before words and meaning’’** (2014: 3). She brings Frantz Fanon’s idea of the epidermalization and the white gaze into conversation with Jacques Lacan’s psychoanalytical framework. In doing so, she expands contemporary racial theory by contending that **the gaze, color complexion, and physiognomy alone are not enough to explain the cultural success of these artists. Rather, it is the intersubjective and sensuous notions of the flesh that connect the audience and the performer.** Each chapter focuses in-depth on one performer. It is within these pages where Skin Acts particularly excels, as Stephens succeeds in placing these four performers within their cultural moment. Stephens argues that the historical context is essential for shaping the strategies that the performers utilize to reclaim the black male body. She contends that although the performances of Williams and Robeson are shaped by the reimagination of the black self in the wake of emancipation and reconstruction, Belafonte and Marley are shaped instead by decolonization, indicating a shift in the meaning of black male performance across the twentieth century. **Black male performers came to represent the relationship between race relations and the boundaries of the political–cultural norms of the decade, making their performances a particularly interesting microcosm of larger social forces**. Although it would be easy to lose the connection to masculinity within the focus on race and the politics of the skin, Stephens treats masculinity closely within her analysis, particularly through the psychoanalytic concept of phallicization. Although masculinity is often thought of as something that can transcend skin, Stephens argues that each of the performers that she investigates includes an element of gender relations within their performance, coming together in black masculinity. In doing so, she adds the concept of embodiment to Lacanian psychoanalysis. The book is well written and rich with analytic detail regarding each of the four case studies, particularly through the use of visual materials. Skin Acts is a valuable contribution to the literatures of race, psychoanalytic theory, masculinity, and performance. However, the book’s heavy reliance on psychoanalytic theory may limit its accessibility for readers without a working knowledge of Lacanian psychoanalysis.

**Queerness**

**The black queer reveals a fundamental contradiction in the basis of humanism itself. Emancipatory mediations against violence of humans provides the grounding for categories of “human” from which black bodies will always be excluded. In other words, the violence that the affirmative critiques is a product of the experience of unfreedom which is distinct from blackness which exists in a structural position of non-ontology.**

**Warren 13**, [Calvin, no he’s not the same as Wilderson, “Onticide: Toward an Afro-pessimistic Queer Theory”, P. 6-7]//MHELLIE

**The “Black Queer” does not and cannot exist.** This is an ethical statement about the tension between what Frank Wilderson would call “an experience of unfreedom” (Queerness) and a structural position of non-ontology (Blackness). [1] This term “non-ontology” suggests a negative axis of being—being not predicated on mere appearance in the phenomenal real (Fanon)—ontology’s necessary exclusion. The “black queer” throws into sharper relief a deep problem between ontology, freedom, and ethics. We could suggest that the term “black queer” dramatizes the fundamental tension in humanism itself, especially contemporary iterations of it: how to eradicate the violence that limits human potential, and expand the category of the human, when the violence rejected is absolutely necessary for the human to exist as such. In other words, **humanism is caught in an ethical dilemma, or double-bind. The “emancipatory meditations” against the violence that produces contingent experiences of unfreedom for humans also provides the grounding for the category of the human around which these meditations mobilize.** The “human” is a repository of violent practices and technologies that has crystalized over time. The ethical impulse is to resolve the tension within humanism, to wrest the “human” from the historical violence upon which it is founded. This ethical enterprise inevitably fails, for in the end, the human is nothing more than this very violence, rendering violence and the human mutually constitutive and coterminous. **The experience of unfreedom (suffering) is the outcome of this violence**. Making this suffering legible is the ethical drive of humanist thinking and the objective of a politics invested in “freedom.” Violence, humanity, unfreedom, and freedom constitute an unending cycle of desire, deferral, and despair. This cycle of violence captures the tension in humanism that much of contemporary theory either attempts to resolve (Ethics) or wishes to abandon (di- vesture). **The violence that constitutes the human and produces suffering is sustained through an ontological antagonism.** The boundaries of the human are shored-up by this antagonism and without it, the human, and the world within which it lives, would cease to exist. **The non- ontology of blackness secures the boundaries of the human; it delimits the coordinates of the human.** Blackness is an exclusion that enable ontology. In its exclusion from the realm of ontology, blackness is un- thinkable, innominate, and paradoxical. In essence, blackness exists to not exist—it embodies the most perplexing paradox that sustains ontology (or in psychoanalytic terms it is the Real of ontology). The field of Ethics, then, conceals a dirty secret: the ontological ground upon which it is situated is unethical. Ethics subverts itself, but it can only exist through this very subversion. All ethical discourses or- ganized around the elimination of suffering or the experiences of freedom are imbricated in this unethicality. Blackness is both the life and death of humanism and its ethics, and for this reason, it lacks a legible grammar to articulate this dread. It is an incomprehensible suffering, or an unending injury not understood as legitimate injury. To take matters further, **there would be no human suffering without the prior exclusion of blackness, but there would also be no world or human without this exclusion either.** It is an unresolvable antagonism. [2]

**Reform**

**Their reform of the political is a form of political hope that is a particularly insidious form of liberalism, in that it functions by relegating the solutions to the problems that it claims to solve for to a future, never to be actualized.**

**Warren 15,** [Calvin, PhD in nihilism, “Black nihilism and the politics of hope”, P. 221-22]//MHELLIE

Black nihilism is a “demythifying” practice, in the Nietzschean vein, that uncovers the subjugating strategies of political hope and de-idealizes its fan- tastical object. Once we denude **political hope of its axiological and ethical veneer, we see that it operates through certain strategies: 1) positing itself as the only alternative to the problem of anti-blackness, 2) shielding this alternative from rigorous historical/philosophical critique by placing it in an un- known future, 3) delimiting the field of action to include only activity recognized and legitimated by the Political, and 4) demonizing critiques or different philosophical perspectives.** The politics of hope masks a particular cruelty under the auspices of “happiness” and “life.” It terrifies with the dread of “no alternative.” “Life” itself needs the security of the alternative, and, through this logic, life becomes untenable without it. Political hope promises to provide this alternative—a discursive and political organization beyond extant structures of violence and destruction. The construction of the binary “alternative/no-alternative” en- sures the hegemony and dominance of political hope within the onto- existential horizon. The terror of the “no alternative”—the ultimate space of decay, suffering, and death—depends on two additional binaries: “problem/ solution” and “action/inaction.” According to this politics, all problems have solutions, and hope provides the accessibility and realization of these solu- tions. The solution establishes itself as the elimination of “the problem”; the solution, in fact, transcends the problem and realizes Hegel’s aufheben in its constant attempt to sublate the dirtiness of the “problem” with the pristine being of the solution. No problem is outside the reach of hope’s solution— every problem is connected to the kernel of its own eradication. The politics of hope must actively refuse the possibility that the “solution” is, in fact, another problem in disguised form; the idea of a “solution” is nothing more than the repetition and disavowal of the problem itself. The solution relies on what we might call the “trick of time” to fortify itself from the deconstruction of its binary. Because the temporality of hope is a time “not-yet-realized,” a future tense unmoored from present-tense justifi- cations and pragmatist evidence, the politics of hope cleverly shields its “solutions” from critiques of impossibility or repetition. Each insistence that these solutions stand up against the lessons of history or the rigors of analysis is met with the rationale that these solutions are not subject to history or analysis because they do not reside within the horizon of the “past” or “present.” Put differently, we can never ascertain the efficacy of the proposed solutions because they escape the temporality of the moment, always retreat- ing to a “not-yet” and “could-be” temporality. This “trick” of time offers a promise of possibility that can only be realized in an indefinite future, and this promise is a bond of uncertainty that can never be redeemed, only imagined. In this sense, the politics of hope is an instance of the psychoanalytic notion of desire: its sole purpose is to reproduce its very condition of possibility, never to satiate or bring fulfillment. This politics secures its hegemony through time by claiming the future as its unassailable property and excluding (and deval- uing) any other conception of time that challenges this temporal ordering. The politics of hope, then, depends on the incessant (re)production and proliferation of problems to justify its existence. Solutions cannot really exist within the politics of hope, just the illusion of a different order in a future tense. The “trick” of time and political solution converge on the site of “action.” In critiquing the politics of hope, one encounters the rejoinder of the dangers of inaction. “But we can’t just do nothing! We have to do something.” The field of permissible action is delimited and an unrelenting binary between action/ inaction silences critical engagement with political hope. These exclusionary operations rigorously reinforce the binary between action and inaction and discredit certain forms of engagement, critique, and protest. Legitimate action takes place in the political—the political not only claims futurity but also action as its property. To “do something” means that this doing must translate into recognizable political activity; “something” is a stand-in for the word “politics”—one must “do politics” to address any problem. A refusal to “do politics” is equivalent to “doing nothing”—this nothingness is constructed as the antithesis of life, possibility, time, ethics, and morality (a “zero-state” as Julia Kristeva [1982] might call it). Black nihilism rejects this “trick of time” and the lure of emancipatory solutions. To refuse to “do politics” and to reject the fantastical object of politics is the only “hope” for blackness in an anti- black world.

**Their conception of reform requires a model of a linear progression of time that ignores the fact that time does not progress, it accumulates. More bullets, more bodies, more death. The present is the future is the past is engrained in a globalized phenomenon of anti-blackness.**

**Dillon 13**, [Stephen, “Fugitive Life: race, gender, and the rise of the neoliberal-carceral state”, P. 88-95]//MHELLIE

In Specters of the Atlantic: Finance Capital, Slavery, and the Philosophy of History Ian Baucom argues for a conception of history that undoes liberal notions of progress, change, and time. Baucom’s theory of history centers the massacre of 132 slaves aboard the slave ship The Zong in 1781. Over three days, the slaves were handcuffed and thrown overboard in order to collect the insurance money that sealed their value even in death. For Baucom, **the massacre is the paradigmatic event of modernity. It encompasses the racial, financial, and epistemological regimes that have not only failed to dissolve with the passage of time, but instead, have intensified so that our current moment finds itself anticipated and enveloped by this event.** As Baucom argues, “Time does not pass, it accumulates.” Time does not wash away what has happened, dissolving terror and violence into the progress of the future, nor is the past passively sedimented in the present. Rather, the past returns to the present in expanded form so that the present “finds stored and accumulated within itself a nonsynchronous array of past times.”171 **The present is possessed by the logics and protocols of racial capitalism’s past—by a perfectly routine massacre that was and is repeated endlessly across space and time in the (post)colony**, prison, frontier, torture room, plantation, reservation, riot zone, and on and on. Racial terror returns from a past that is not an end to take hold—of bodies, institutions, infrastructure, discourse, and libidinal life—and does not let go. In this way, the past and present are not ontologically discrete categories, but rather, are complex human constructs. The present is not a quarantined, autonomous thing.172 What was begun does not end but instead intensifies so that the past and present become indistinguishable. Baucom’s theory of time as accumulation has profound implications for how we understand the future. Traditionally, the future is a space and time we do not know, a place of possibility, progress, and hope. The emptiness of the future is imagined as a space of seamless progress: a myth of Marxist teleology, a capitalist dream, a fantasy of nationalism and colonialism. When we imagine the future as the outcome of the passage of time, the past falls away and the present disappears so that the future becomes relief from the devastating weight of everything that has come before.173 Yet, if time does not pass but accumulates, then the future is not the triumph of a tendency inscribed in the present. It is not the dissolution of the past or the undoing of the present**. If time does not pass but accumulates, then the future is not liberated from the constraints of yesterday, but rather, is the place where the wreckage of then and now lives on.** When we think of time against the temporal regimes of the state, heternormativity, the nation, and capital, time drags, reverses, compresses, and accumulates. Engaging queerness as a force that distorts and undermines normative logics of sequence is to know that the conditions of possibility for the atrocities of the past have not faded, but rather, have intensified.174 It is to deploy what Jasbir Puar calls an “antecedent temporality” where one can see, feel, and engage the ghosts that are not yet here, but will be tomorrow and the next day and the next.175 If time does not pass but accumulates, then the past is where the future is anticipated, recollected, and demonstrated.176 If there is no progress, but instead repetition, modification, intensification, reversals, and suspensions, then we know what the future will be. The future will be what was before. Following Baucom, we can understand the Women’s Army as working against a notion of history as progress, and in its place, engaging the repetitions, accumulations, and intensifications of time as it circulates, suspends, and speeds up. For them, the progress of state revolution means “cutbacks in daycare centers, ending of free abortions, forced sterilization of minority women, discrimination against single women and lesbians in housing, and firing of single women in favor of men with families.”177 **The revolution is a new formation that reproduces and expands past forms of white supremacist and heteropatriarchial regulation and subjection**. Isabel, from the feminist radio station Radio Regazza, describes the revolutionary state as such: Angry unemployed people are rioting in the streets and the city is on fire with their rage. Now what do you think the government plans to do about this situation besides beating them over the head with billy clubs? Do they plan to supply them with jobs, with training programs, or with decent housing? Nah, uh uh. You know what they’re going to do? The same bloody tactic they pulled before the revolution, remember, and I’m here to warn you, it’s going to happen again. They’re already starting a shuffle board, an act on a grand scale where all the poor and the unemployed will be shoved economically into the ghetto. Isabel’s declaration that “it’s going to happen again” deploys an anticipatory logic that theorizes the past and present as a “preemption of future possibilities.”179 The future and the present compress, collude, and collide because the temporality of state violence is a time of repetition, intensification, and accumulation. Franz Fanon’s concept of “historicity” is instructive here. For Fanon, the past is ontologically sutured to race so that when “I discovered my blackness...I was battered down by tom-toms, cannibalism, intellectual deficiency, slave-ships, and above all else, above all: ‘Sho’ good eatin.’”180 For Fanon, white supremacy functions as a type of temporal prison where black liberation is delayed and destroyed by the capacity of past traumas (rooted in colonization and slavery) to affect, shape, and possess the present. Fanon looks to the past of European colonization and sees a mirror of the future, an “endless past/present of colonial domination.”181 In other words, **white supremacy is not just a spatial technology that inhabits infrastructure and institutions; it is also a temporal regime that refuses to abide by the progress of the law, language, or the passage of time.** As Kara Keeling writes, “The past constricts the present so that the present is simply the reappearance of the past.”182 And as Isabel makes clear, the state (whether pre or post-revolutionary) limits the possibilities of the present and future by binding both in a closed circuit of reverberation, magnification, and accumulation. When time accumulates it possesses, detains, and immobilizes. This is time as a form of capture. Isabel knows what is coming because it has already happened—in the past that is the future that has already arrived. There is not relief from knowing the past has vanished because the past is a warning of what is coming. It’s going to happen again. Throughout Born in Flames, countless members of the Women’s Army declare, “this is our time.” The time of the revolution was not the time to abolish white supremacy and heteropatriarchy. It was a time that left behind and captured poor (queer) women of color through the progress of democracy and equality. In this way, “our time” (or revolutionary time) and state time are two competing temporalities of violence in the film. State time extends and expands the violence of the past, while “our time”—a time of the underground, a revolutionary time—is a temporal regime that exceeds and undoes state time. Again, Fanon proves useful for understanding these differences. In The Wretched of the Earth, Fanon describes a “time lag, or a difference of rhythm, between the leaders of a nationalist party and the mass of the people.”183 According to Fanon, the rank and file of anti-colonial rebellions demand the complete and utter immediate destruction of the forms of power that render them “more dead than alive,” while both colonial and nationalist governments attempt to manage, temper, and restrain the demands of those who have no more time to give to the promises of a future that is always coming, but never arrives.184 For example, in the film, the state promises that “in the future” there will be jobs, an end to sexual violence, and racial and gender equality. But for Fanon, the “hopeless dregs of humanity” (or the wretched of the earth) are filled with an “uncontrollable rage” and thus exist in a temporal regime apart from that of the party or the nation. This is a time of intensity and immediacy (“the slaves of modern times are impatient”), where the future of the present as it is means no future at all.185 Like the financial, epistemological, and racialized legacies of slavery Baucom sees intensifying in our current moment, Fanon diagnoses the future of colonialism as the accumulation of the social, biological, and living death of the native. The native lives a death in life produced by the racism of slavery and colonialism. **The future’s horizon is the accumulation of past forms of racial terror and violence.** In this way, Baucom and Fanon draw connections between race and time that are crucial to questions of time and futurity. The relationship between race, gender, death, and the future is central to the immediacy and spontaneity of the Women’s Army and is foundational to the film’s critique of the state, time, and the future. We can turn to the Fanonian-inspired prison writings of George Jackson to further explore the relationship between death, race, and time. In his 1972 text Blood in My Eye, published shortly after he was shot and killed by guards at San Quentin prison, Jackson wrote of racism, death, and revolution: Their line is: ‘Ain’t nobody but black folks gonna die in the revolution.’ This argument completely overlooks the fact that we have always done most of the dying, and still do: dying at the stake, through social neglect or in U.S. foreign wars. The point is now to construct a situation where someone else will join in the dying. If it fails and we have to do most of the dying anyway, we’re certainly no worse off than before.186 Here, Jackson argues that the social order of the United States is saturated with an anti- blackness that produces, in the words of Ruth Wilson Gilmore, “the state-sanctioned or extralegal production and exploitation of group-differentiated vulnerability to premature death.”187 Jackson’s text is littered with polemical insights that link race and death in a way that preemptively echoes Michel Foucault’s declaration that racism is the process of “introducing a break into the domain of life that is under power’s control: the break between what must live and what must die.”188 When Jackson, Gilmore, and Foucault define race as the production of premature death, they make a connection between race and the future. Race is the accumulation of premature death and dying. For Jackson, race fractures the future so that the future looks like incarceration or the premature death of malnutrition, disease, and exhaustion. For Jackson, the future was the not the hopefulness of unknown possibilities. It was the devastating weight of knowing that death was coming cloaked in abandonment, neglect, incarceration, or murder. In other words, according to Jackson, **death was always already rushing toward the present of blackness**. Within Jackson’s analysis, the state is the primary mechanism for unevenly distributing racialized regimes of value and disposability.189 Following the writing of Fanon, Jackson argued that for this relationship to be abolished, “The government of the U.S.A and all that it stands for, all that it represents, must be destroyed. This is the starting point, and the end.”

**Attempts to mask the violence of the black body through change and value fail as the non-Human capacity of Blackness is defined by violence**

**Wilderson ’10** {Frank; Associate Professor of African-American Studies at UC Irvine and has a Ph.D. from UC Berkeley; “Red, White & Black: Cinema and the Structure of U.S. Antagonisms,”}/MR

MY THESIS with respect to the structure of U.S. antagonisms posits **violence as an idiom of power which marks the triangulated relation of modernity** (Red, White, and Black**) as the broad institutional effect of the Western Hemisphere and most pernicious expression of that institutionality, the United States of America**. My claim, building on the explanatory power of the Afro pessimists, is that **violence is at the heart of this idiom of power. Violence determines the essential contours of Settler/“Savage” and Master/Slave relations.** This notion of violence as a positioning matrix weakens the heretofore consensual poststructuralist notions of film studies, feminism, and Antonio Negri’s and Michael Hardt’s postindustrial Marxism, all of which assume symbolic negotiation (discourse) to be the essence of the matrix that positions subjects. The thesis seeks to mark film studies, feminism, psycho analysis, and Marxism as White, and to deessentialize the suffering which animates them, humiliating them in the face of the Slave and that part of the “Savage” positioned, ontologically, by genocide as opposed to sovereignty. In the preceding chapters there has been little discussion of violent “events” (save a brief discussion of genocide endured by Native Americans and how the carceral continuum of Black life morphs and shape shifts through legislation). This is because **the violence constitutive of the idiom of power that positions one U.S. antagonist as Settler/Master, another as Slave, and still another as “Savage” should not be reduced to its spectacle. It is not an event but rather a matrix of elaboration on which temporal and spatial capacity is possible for the Settler/Master, both possible and impossible for the “Savage,” and absolutely derelict for the Slave**. One can no more “show” the matrix of violence that positions the Slave than one can “show” psychoanalysis’s matrix of language, the large object A, the symbolic order that castrates the *infans* and brings (positions) him or her into subjectivity, that is, into a world of “contemporaries.” At the time of this writing, even the most radical and overtly political gestures in film studies have as yet to engage Hardt’s and Negri’s theo ries of political economy and its recomposed subject, “the multitude.” But this shortcoming plays out Master to Master and Settler to Settler: it is an intra Human discussion inessential to the Slave’s ethical dilem mas catalyzed by accumulation and fungibility. (The Slave, however, is often brought into the discussion not to advance the analysis but rather to avoid embarrassment.) Still engaging either the assumptive logic of Foucauldian disciplinary regimes (i.e., Kalpana Seshadri Crooks, Patrice Petro) or Gramscian hegemony (i.e., Stuart Hall, MaryAnnDoane, Stephen Heath, and early Kaja Silverman), film studies has either a minimalist agenda as regards the cinema’s socially transformative potential (that is, it is animated by notions of hybridity and change within the interstices of civil society), or it is hopeful for a realignment of cinematic practice whose counterhegemonic elements qualify as cultural accompaniment for major social and political change. All this is to say that film studies has yet to become underwritten by an ensemble of Negrian questions as regards the status of the spectator and the cinematic diegesis in a world where now (even) Whites are positioned more and more by what appears to Hardt and Negri as gratuitous violence and less and less by what had appeared to Antonio Gramsci and Michel Foucault as contingent violence. But as poles apart as Negrian Marxism and film studies may be, what binds Negri’s and Hardt’s unflinching paradigmatic analysis to the most unflinching interpretive film theory is a largely unspoken and unsubstantiated notion that all sentient beings (euphemistically referred to as “humans”—or bona fide subjects) possess the capacity to contest value in some kind of drama—in other words, “faith” in the notion that all people have the capacity for history and anthropology, the power to transform time and space. **The drama of value**, then**, is underwritten by the inspiration of the personal pronoun we. It is this inspiration that throughout this book I have attempted to deconstruct and humiliate. The inspiration of we**, to use a term from film theory, **is a form of suture. It papers over any contemplation of violence as a structuring matrix—and weds us to the notion of violence as a contingent event.** And the inspiration of we also sutures fields of study and political motivations as seemingly far apart as Negrian Marxism and Gramscian/Lacanian film studies, sutures them together by way of two basic assumptions: (1) that all people have bodies and (2) that all people contest dramas of value. Thus, **Marxism and film theory operate like police actions: they police our ability to contemplate how the Slave is not a lesser valued entity on a pole of higher valued entities but is instead exiled from the drama of value**. Acknowledgments of this exile are to be found, not in White meta commentary and not in White film theory but, oddly enough, in White films themselves. Monster’s Ball is a film that attempts to share the inspiration of Marxism and White film theory’s we but finds itself divided on the matter. It cannot be inspired by the assumptive we of its screenplay, that is, its most conscious narrative strategies, because at key moments its images and soundtrack act contrapuntally to the screenplay. The next three chapters are predicated on my claim that whereas the screenplay labors ideologically in support of a notion that exploitation and alienation (the Human’s grammar of suffering) explain the essential antagonism of the paradigm, strategies of cinematic form (as well as the irruption of contextual elements into the film’s production) labor ideologically in support of a notion that accumulation and fungibility (the Slave’s gram mar of suffering) explain the essential antagonism of the paradigm (and, through this explanation, render exploitation and alienation the touch - stones of a conflict). *Monster’s Ball’s* cinematic form dismantles the political common sense that scaffolds the film’s ethical dilemmas and the narrative’s argument that Blacks, like Whites, are “among the disparate entities” for which value is an arbiter. For Negri and Hardt these disparate entities face off as proletarian and capitalist, for White film theory the range of entities spans gay/straight, man/woman, postcolonial/empire, and more. In all of these combinations**, value, as “an arbitrator among disparate entities . . . labors to naturalize its very process of arbitration to the point of sublimation and fetishization**.”1 For Marxists, **this sublimation and fetishization is located in “the commodity [which] marks itself as unitary and selfinvolved. It masks the social relations to which it is inevitably tied and that it equally redacts**.”2 For film theory and White cinema (i.e., the political common sense of a screenplay’s ethical dilemmas or a White director’s auteurial intention) such as *Monster’s Ball,* **the phallus** (Kaja Silverman, Mary Ann Doane), **the frame** (Stephen Heath), or **Whiteness itself** (Richard Dyer, or Marc Forster’s auteurial intention) **are the points of representational coherence through which value “marks itself as unitary and self involved.” Like the commodity form, the phallus, the frame, and Whiteness** (as imagined rigorously by scholars of Whiteness and superficially by the screenplay of *Monster’s Ball)* **all mask the social relations to which they are tied and which they also redact. But we need to be mindful of two things at once; first, the ways in which this masking and redaction occur: the commodity form’s redaction of exploited labor power, the phallus’s masking of the (White) male’s castration by the symbolic order, the frame and the voice over’s alibi for the cinematic apparatus, and the racial labor that Whiteness depends on for its unracialized “normality”; and second, whereas such masking and redaction are essential to the grammar of suffering of the worker, the woman, the spectator, and the postcolonial, they are inessential to the grammar of suffering of the Slave. Value**, Lindon Barrett asserts through his reading of Gayatri Spivak’s *In Other Worlds,* **is not only a representation that masks and redacts social relations. By opening the lid on value in its fetishized form as money** (a “seemingly unitary phenomenon”) **one sees that money is not only a representation but a differential**: Value Money Capital. He concludes that: “It is this differential nature that value most successfully secrets when it most fully seems itself. The phenomenon of value—like its particular instantiations in political economy: the commodity, capitalist ideology, **money—is most fully exposed in terms of acknowledging its occluded differential economy, the circuit of displacement, substitution, and signification that value is always struggling to mask by means of a hypostasized ‘form**.’ In short**, the ideal referent and confirmation for value are the forms it is in the process of seeking to substantiate**.”3 My argument with the passage above has little to do with the content of Barrett’s claims. Certainly, **value is both the masking of social relations as well as the masking of its own** “circuit of displacement, substitution, and signification.” **But theories** (i.e., Marxism, feminism, and film theory**) which unpack the hypostasized “form” that value takes, as it masks both its differential and social relations, experience the humiliation of their explanatory power when confronted with the Black. For the Black has no social relation(s) to be either masked or unmasked—not, that is, in a structural sense. Social relations depend on various pretenses to the contrary; therefore, what gets masked is the matrix of violence that makes Black relationality an oxymoron. To relate, socially, one must enter a social drama’s mise en scène with spatial and temporal coherence—in other words, with Human capacity. The Slave is not so much the antithesis of Human capacity** (that might imply a dialectic potential in the Slave’s encounter with the world) **as she or he is the absence of Human capacity.** Having recapped the general project, we can begin to closely examine Settler/Master cinema, a cinema elaborated by an ensemble of questions that arise out of an explanatory rubric predicated on exploitation and alienation, a cinema in which the protagonist(s) who shoulders a film’s ethical dilemmas is an exploited and alienated Human. The apex of Humanness is Whiteness.4 Therefore, socially engaged cinema of which the director is White and whose standard bearer of ethical dilemmas is also White will be the focal point of our investigation. Enter *Monster’s Ball.*

**we refuse the state – they endorse the state**

**Martinot 5** (Steve Martinot, Adjunct Professor at the San Francisco State University, “Pro-Democracy and the Ethics of Refusal”, Socialism and Democracy, Vol. 19, No. 2)

In a system in which humans have been rendered secondary or irrelevant, a different ethics, which refuses the system of corruption as a system, a social structure, rather than simply point out the empirical appearance of corruption in government or political events, must ground our thinking. Neither political program nor organizational strategies, to the extent they continue to address themselves to this system as valid, are relevant to such a necessity. The terms of the two-party system, the corporate media, the system of representationism, and the congressional culture of "horsetrading" must be refused. That means that realigning the Democratic Party, trying to use the corporate media to get a democratic message out, organizing third parties as alternates to the two major parties in electoral processes, using electoral campaigns themselves, writing to Congress, demonstrating to make demands on the government, are all modes of simply addressing the government, and telling it and the corporate structure that we are firmly in place within their political culture of corruption. A counter-ethics can only be an ethics of refusal. An ethic of refusal can be exemplified thus: suppose someone lies to you every day, and he says something today; if you believe what he says today, then you are a total and utter fool. Insofar as the corporate media, the government, and all officials in the two-party system lie to us daily, while suppressing necessary information, there is nothing they say that should be believed (unless proven beyond all doubt, to the satisfaction of every skeptical question, in open public discussion, however long that takes). Insofar as these structures and institutions have shown themselves to be corrupt, there is nothing that they do that should not be considered corrupt, and rejected as invalid or illegitimate. Nothing the government does, domestically or in foreign policy, should be supported unless its reasons are submitted to open discussion and binding referendum. The ethics of refusal (the refusal, in advance, of everything the government, the corporations, or the media say or do) is square one. It is the first step toward liberation from the assumptions that these corrupt institutions can be realigned. It is the first step toward voiding support for what has impoverished us and rendered us irrelevant. It is the first step toward bringing those institutions to a halt. The time is long past when we can go to the government or the political parties with demands for information or policy. We have to satisfy those demands for ourselves by creating an alternate political structure with which to do so. This means to replace the ethics of going to the government, and thus granting it credence, with the establishment of a citizenship in autonomy whose job is to pull more and more people away from support for the government. The greatest betrayal of the ABB movement in the last election, in acceding to the meta-corruption of the two-party system, and assisting in shutting down the political space, lay in giving up its independence and autonomy. Democracy is now the name for an alternate political structure; and a pro-democracy movement is the name for enacting the ethic of refusal. If democracy is based on information, participation, and transparent honesty of political operations, policymaking, and elections, then alternate sources for these must be constructed and supported: alternate media and alternate sources of information; alternate networking of ideas; the construction of local political spaces in which to speak to ourselves, and not to a corrupt system; the use of political space to construct alternate organizations that make policy democratically, and are directed by the people who make it; the construction of health services, education and schooling, and community policing; an ethic of local community attention to crime and trouble that is restorative and not revenge-oriented; the organization of elections that the people sanction, though the corrupt power structure does not. Such an alternate political structure can only ground itself on an ethics of refusal, refusing all attempts of the government to control it. An alternate political culture must refuse to grant recognition or credence to the two-party system, to the structures of governance and information, and to the mythology of meta-corruption that still says those structures have legitimacy. This does not mean that actions should not be organized to directly confront the government, or the elite, and try to stop their fraud, their crimes and injustices. The ethic of refusal should not be construed as contradicting or obstructing direct action, nor those for whom direct action is desirable and feasible. But the relation (or non-relation) of direct action to alternate political structures needs to be understood; the relation of complicity between direct action's focus on power and the terms of institutional power needs to be understood. To contest governance in its own terms will only reaffirm the existence and operation of its power, and embed itself in its institutionity. The ethics of refusal makes its first principle standing outside the corruption of those social institutions; it is the principle of building outside the structures of corruption, and building and building, until the alternative becomes the inside, and the corrupt institutions are the outside. A pro-democracy movement, in its autonomy, can still insist on existing governments (city and state) fulfilling their responsibility to maintain the infrastructure: roads, buildings, utilities, water, garbage collection, etc. It is a separation between the source of policymaking and the administration of the infrastructure that pro-democracy makes feasible. For centuries, taxes have been paid, while government has focused on meeting corporate and military interests in the name of profitability (remember the public transportation boondoggle). If policy is relocated to the people, democratically, at the level of neighborhoods, cities, agrarian areas, in economic production and for local services, then that is where direction and control of the infrastructure must come from. This will take a long time to build. It will require dialogue rather than blueprint, between people, between neighborhoods, between towns, building itself through popular discussions and councils. But now is the time to start, when the profundity of the corruption has become so overt that there is nowhere else to turn.

**Rhizomes**

**Gateway issue on the question of the subject. They say that there is no subject, however the subject in this debate is both the one who struggles with the past and bears the future. The rhizome can’t be both overarching and particular, which dooms the perm. Glissant’s relationship to Deleuze was a gesture to his work, Glissant’s rhizomatic poetics concerning subjectivity emerges out of a confrontation with the abyss of history.**

**Drabinski 7** [John E. Drabinski, Professor of Black Studies at Amherst College, Between Europe and the Americas Spacing Difference : Different Spaces, “Glissant :: Deleuze :: Rhizome :: Nomad,” wordpress 5/15/7]

Glissant’s exposition and creative development of the concept of rhizome—and all attendant conceptions of times, memory, history, and the nomadic—gives his Poetics of Relation particular complexity. **The problematic is really quite straightforward: what and who is the subject?** The primary aim – even hope – of Glissant’s work is to produce or render a sense of Caribbeanness, a Caribbean subjectivity, which is something Fanon did not (could not?) accomplish. Why not Fanon? Fanon was the first to live his thinking, to paraphrase Glissant, and this “living” of his thinking delimits his theorizing of subjectivity. Now, Glissant’s remark sounds like praise of militancy, a kind of he-really-means-what-he-says admiration, but Glissant means here to underscore the fact that Fanon returned to Africa – both as a theorist and as an activist. Fanon, then, was seeking Africa, a root, a mother, a home. His work on negritude certainly gives plenty of evidence for Glissant’s remark. Glissant wants to render Caribbeanness, not Africanness. To think the “tortured geography” of the Caribbean as what tears asunder with trauma, pain, and loss every turn to the past, but also gives possibility to thinking. Without nostalgia, that is, into a future. Yet, central to that future is a notion indebted to a particularly European citation of thinking: Deleuze’s notion of rhizome. What comes into view through the concept of rhizome is a sense of subjectivity attentive to trauma and loss, but also open to a future liberated from nostalgia; the rhizome needs no single root and does not need (or even thrive on) fixity and permanence. Glissant is here playing on the peculiar geography of the Caribbean, of course, but also responding to the abyss of the past we have named “Middle Passage.” The abyssal rooting in the past generates Glissant’s poetics of detour, diversity, and relation. So, if an abyssal root gives creolized thinking to itself, which is precisely the claim Glissant makes about the relation of traumatic memory to the future, then how are we to conceive subjectivity**? Implicit in the interval between traumatic memory and open future is, of course, a subject. This subject is bound by the conditions of the Middle Passage and its production of the Caribbean context within which subjectivity emerges**. What is subjectivity born of an abyssal root? Who, what, and how is the Caribbean of “Caribbeanness”? Subjectivity is generated both by and as temporal interweaving. From past into present toward future, subjectivity emerges as both the product of memory and the bearer of an open future. This ek-static moment is the condition of subjectivity as such, but the function of traumatic memory changes everything. Subjectivity emerges from Glissant’s traumatic memory, rooted in abyss and given to thinking with ghostly figures. If subjectivity cannot appeal to a single root in history, memory, or place as a holder of center, then we have to think the subject without fixity. What names this subject? How can we think subjectivity without what, for Glissant, are ultimately nostalgic undertones and resonances of alienation and dispossession? Glissant’s answer in Poetics of Relation is the rhizome and its peculiar nomadic character. “Rhizome” names the poly-rooted character of Caribbean subjectivity—the creolized subject—and “nomad” denotes the mobility of this repudiation of the single root and assertion of creolization. Without a single root, yet rooted in an abyssal past-cum-future, nomadic subjectivity moves across the rich, even opaque, terrain of creolized intellectual space. It is precisely this movement and this terrain that sustains Glissant’s conception of subjectivity. Further, Glissant’s appeal to the rhizome opens the question of his relation to Deleuze, toward whom he only gestures. How is Glissant’s rhizome to be distinguished from Deleuze’s conception of the same—viz., what differences emerge when the rhizome emerges out of the historical experience of trauma, rather than the aporias of epistemology and metaphysics? **How, for Glissant, is the rhizome to be all at once rendered a noun, adjective, and a verb?** **How is rhizomatic subjectivity at once thought as collective and particular?** How do notions of opacity, relation, detour, and return describe the limits and possibilities of Glissant’s subject? The answer of course lies in Glissant’s development of the rhizome in a critical relationship to Deleuze’s work, a relationship that enacts, at the level of thinking subjectivity within historical experience, something akin to what Dussel calls “trans-modernity.” Dussel’s claim is that the post-modern proliferation of truths, destruction of the meta-narrative, and so on takes place in a kind of conceptual decadence – an excess or surplus within which foundations become untenable, if not absurd. The trans-modern, however, rejects modernity and post-modernity, not out of excess or surplus, but out of a condition of peripherality. From the periphery, there is no modernity to surmount, no single root to be repudiated through an emergence of narratives. Rather, to say it again, the periphery has never had such privileges; the indigenous, the afro-descended, the mixed, all begin without a fantasy or singular origins. Glissant’s notion of Caribbeanness is exactly this periphery come back to itself. A tortured geography, sure, because of the pain of the past, the trauma of the Middle Passage that gives birth to the literal and figurative space of the Caribbean. But also a geography which has never fantasized itself as modernity, which has always already had its roots in so many cultural fragments. Trans-modernity par excellence. As trans-modern, Glissant’s rhizome decisively transforms Deleuze’s Eurocentric post-modernity from another site and another experience of history, opening Caribbean subjectivity to what Poetics of Relation calls “Diversity.” Glissant’s rhizome does not emerge out of a conceptual excess. It emerges, rather, out of a history that gives an abyss to thinking, which is then translated into a future without nostalgia, diverse in its sources, already creolized, asking only that one say yes.

**Ruse of Analogy**

**The insertion of the figure of the slave into chains of equivalence necessarily obfuscates the unique experience that black folks have undergone. There can be no equivalent to the way that blackness is expunged from humanity. The very attempt to feel empathy with this position obliterates the very same position.**

**Dillon 13**, [Stephen, “Fugitive Life: race, gender, and the rise of the neoliberal-carceral state”, P. 39-41]//MHELLIE

In a similar way, the slave occupies the position of the unthought within dominant epistemologies. While the structural position of the worker has animated much of the left for the last two hundred years, the positionality and demands of the slave elude hegemonic and resistant forms of thought. For example, Boggs writes that black people remain “invisible” in the white radical imagination because white Marxists regard black militants as unfinished products who will arrive at the understanding that racism arises from capitalism and that the working class in the “irreconcilable foe” of capitalism. By doing so, the needs, demands, insights, and theories of the black freedom struggle are made “invisible” and are thus unthought. Yet, the slave is not just rendered invisible when unthought, the slave is often unthinkable even when she is present. For instance, in Commonwealth, their third book on biopolitics, empire, and capitalism, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri write: As a first approximation, then, think of this form of class struggle as a kind of maroonage. Like the slaves who collectively escaped the chains of slavery to construct self-governing communities and quilombos, biopolitical labor-power subtracting from its relation to capital must discover and construct new social relationships, new forms of life that allow it to actualize its productive powers. But unlike the maroons, this exodus does not necessarily mean going elsewhere. We can pursue lines of flight while staying right here, by transforming the relations of production and mode of social organization under which we live.72 For Hardt and Negri, the forms of class struggle required under the biopolitics of contemporary capitalism are like the tactics mobilized by slaves, even though in the end, the essence of maroonage (escape) is not required; the multitude can change the conditions of power by staying right where they are. **By constructing equivalence across time and positionality, Hardt and Negri erase the specificity of chattel slavery—the literal steel chains used to torture and immobilize slaves are compared to the metaphorical chains used by capital to manage the labor of the multitude.** In this way, Hardt and Negri reproduce the fungibility of the slave (the slave will be whatever it is most useful for the slave to be). This is what Frank Wilderson calls “the ruse of analogy” where “grammars of suffering” that are irreconcilable are made equivalent. Simply, the alienation and exploitation of the multitude (or the worker) is not comparable to the slave’s expulsion from humanity.73 Thus, the very attempt to empathetically identify with the slave results in the slave's obliteration. As Hartman writes, "Only if I can see myself in that position can I understand the crisis of that position."74 In order to empathize with the slave, Hardt and Negri insert the multitude into the position of the slave, thus eradicating the slave. The slave becomes a worker, and is thus no longer a slave.75 For Johnson and Trouillot, slavery’s connection to capitalism and freedom is unthinkable due to the epistemological boundaries of liberal Western thought. However, as evidenced by Hardt and Negri, even if the slave is not forgotten, even when she enters the realm of the thinkable, even when the slave is present, she is often erased. One can stare directly at the slave and not see her. **When the slave is made equivalent with what she is not, she is disappeared**. As such, the slave and slavery’s structural relation to the national order and capital is unthinkable and frequently unthought.76 Subsequently, race and white supremacy are constructed as appendages to the state and capital, as opposed to foundations.

**A reductionist understanding of blackness as just another identity category fuels anti-blackness. Attempting to defend the rights and liberties of people criminalized by state repression will fail without having blackness at the center of political strategy – the exclusion of blackness in their analysis only recoordinates civil society and doesn’t provide any liberation.**

**Sexton 2010** ~Jared, Associate Professor of African American Studies and Associate Professor of Film and Media Studies and one third of The Trifecta of Tough, "People-of-Color-Blindness: Notes on the Afterlife of Slavery," Social Text, Vol. 28, No. 2~ p.47-49/MR

**If the oppression of nonblack people of color** in, and perhaps beyond, the United States **seems conditional to the historic instance and functions at a more restricted empirical scope, antiblackness seems invariant and limitless (which does not mean that the former is somehow negligible and short-lived** or that the latter is exhaustive and unchanging). **If pursued** with some consistency, **the sort of comparative analysis outlined above would** likely **impact the formulation of political strategy and modify the demeanor of our political culture.** In fact, **it might denature the comparative instinct altogether in favor of a relational analysis more adequate to the task. Yet all of this is obviated by the silencing mechanism** par excellence **in Left political and intellectual circles today: “Don’t play Oppression Olympics!” The** Oppression Olympics **dogma levels a charge amounting to little more than a leftist version of “playing the race card.”** To fuss with details of compara- tive (or relational) analysis is to play into the hands of divide-and-conquer tactics and to promote a callous immorality.72 However, as in its conserva- tive complement, one notes in this catchphrase the unwarranted transla- tion of an inquiring position of comparison into an insidious posture of competition, the translation of ethical critique into unethical attack. **This** point **allows us to understand better the intimate relationship between the censure of black inquiry and the recurrent analogizing to black suffering mentioned above: they bear a common refusal to admit to significant differences of structural position born of discrepant histories between blacks and their political allies**, actual or potential. **We might**, finally, **name this refusal people-of-color-blindness, a form of colorblindness inherent to the concept of “people of color” to the precise extent that it misunderstands the specificity of antiblackness and presumes or insists upon the mono- lithic character of victimization under white supremacy**73 — **thinking** (the afterlife of) **slavery as a form of exploitation or colonization or a species of racial oppression among others**.74 The upshot of this predicament is that **obscuring the structural position of** the category of **blackness will inevitably undermine multiracial coalition building as a politics of radical opposition** and, to that extent, force the question of black liberation back to the center of discussion. **Every analysis that attempts to understand the complexities of racial rule** and the machinations of the racial state **without accounting for black existence within its framework—which does not mean simply listing it among a chain of equivalents or returning to it as an afterthought—is doomed to miss what is essential about the situation. Black existence does not represent the total reality of the racial formation — it is not the beginning and the end of the story—but it does** relate to the totality; it **indicates the (repressed) truth of the political and economic system.** That is to say, **the whole range of positions within the racial formation is most fully understood from this vantage point**, not unlike the way in which the range of gender and sexual variance under patriarchal and heteronormative regimes is most fully understood through lenses that are feminist and queer.75 What is lost for the study of black existence in the proposal for a decentered, “postblack” paradigm is a proper analysis of the true scale and nature of black suffer- ing and of the struggles — political, aesthetic, intellectual, and so on — that have sought to transform and undo it. What is lost for the study of nonblack nonwhite existence is a proper analysis of the true scale and nature of its material and symbolic power relative to the category of blackness.76 This is why **every attempt to defend the rights and liberties of the latest victims of state repression will fail to make substantial gains insofar as it forfeits or sidelines the fate of blacks, the prototypical targets of** the panoply of **police practices and the juridical infrastructure built up around them.** Without blacks on board, the only viable political option and the only effective defense against the intensifying cross fire will involve greater alliance with an antiblack civil society and further capitulation to the magnification of state power. At the apex of the midcentury social movements, Kwame Ture and Charles Hamilton wrote in their 1968 clas- sic, Black Power: The Politics of Liberation, that black freedom entails “the necessarily total revamping of the society.”77 For Hartman, thinking of the entanglements of the African diaspora in this context, the necessarily total revamping of the society is more appropriately envisioned as the creation of an entirely new world: I knew that no matter how far from home I traveled, I would never be able to leave my past behind. I would never be able to imagine being the kind of person who had not been made and marked by slavery. I was black and a history of terror had produced that identity. Terror was “captivity without the possibility of flight,” inescapable violence, precarious life. There was no going back to a time or place before slavery, and going beyond it no doubt would entail nothing less momentous than yet another revolution.78

**Damage is done when attempts are made to relate to the Black body**

**Hartman 03 Cut from (the position of unthought)**B. A., Wesleyan University (1984); Ph.D., Yale University (1992). Professor Hartman's major fields of interest are African American and American literature and cultural history, slavery, law and literature, and performance studies. She is on the editorial board of *Callaloo*. She has been a Fulbright, Rockefeller, Whitney Oates, and University of California President's Fellow. University of Nebraska press

I think that gets at one of the fundamental ethical questions/problems/crises for the West: the status of difference and the status of the other. It's as though in order to come to any recognition of common humanity, the other must be assimilated, meaning in this case, utterly displaced and effaced: "Only if I can see myself in that position can I understand the crisis of that position." That is the logic of the moral and political discourses we see everyday - the need for the innocent black subject to be victimized by a racist state in order to see the racism of the racist state

**Settler Colonialism**

**There are histories of a shared struggle in black-native struggles, but indigenous perspectives and scholars have denied the knowledge that allows one to redress the true horror of slavery and the loss of black culture.**

**Sexton 14** [Jared; Jared Sexton is the Director of African American Studies at the University of California, Irvine, where he also teaches film and media studies; “The Vel of Slavery: Tracking the Figure of the Unsovereign,” Critical Sociology, pp. 6-7; REJ]

Are native calls for black solidarity simply expedient in a situation of settler colonialism? My sense is that there is something more complicated, and concerning, at work. **If one surveys the writing on black-native solidarity in the field of Native Studies, one finds frequent reference to histories of shared struggle, strategic alliance, and cohabitation in place of or alongside acknowledgment of histories of Indian slavery, ongoing exclusion of black-native people, and pervasive anti-black racism.** In drawing up the historical balance sheet this way, **scholars suggest there is ground for black-native solidarity in the present.** Even where there is no denial or minimization of the history of Indian slavery, even where native anti-black racism is recognized and the struggles of blacknative people are affirmed, an argument is forwarded that solidarity in this moment can be retrieved from the past and refashioned for the future. In this sense, native peoples are seeking to reunite with lost allies, namely, those enslaved Africans from the early colonial period who demonstrated a ‘a spiritual worldview, land-informed practices, and were held together by kinship structures which created relationships that allocated everyone a role in the community’ (p. 127). This is political solidarity derived from ‘cultural similarities’. The implications of this claim are considerable. **If black-native solidarity is founded upon shared indigenous worldviews**, practices and kinship structures, **then the prerequisite for black people to move, politically and ethically, from settlers to allies ‘in the interest of a deeper solidarity’ with native people is, in a word, re-indigenization. In so doing, black people on the North American scene not only become politically relevant to settler decolonization but also, en route, redress ‘the true horror of slavery’ – the loss of culture: Diasporic Black struggles, with some exceptions, do not tend to lament the loss of Indigeneity and the trauma of being ripped away from the land that defines their very identities. From Indigenous perspectives, the true horror of slavery was that it has created generations of ‘de-culturalized’ Africans, denied knowledge of language, clan, family, and land base, denied even knowledge of who their nations are.** (Amadahy and Lawrence, 2009: 127)

**Blacks have only an abstract connection to land, unable to become settlers of the state. We must reframe the logics of blackness and natives in the context of white supremacy. The struggle against anti-blackness and white supremacy is a prerequisite and ultimately a struggle against colonialism.**

**Sexton 14** [Jared; Jared Sexton is the Director of African American Studies at the University of California, Irvine, where he also teaches film and media studies; “The Vel of Slavery: Tracking the Figure of the Unsovereign,” Critical Sociology, pp. 7-9; REJ]

From indigenous perspectives, diasporic black struggles would, first and foremost, need to lament the loss of indigeneity that slavery entails, a process that requires acknowledging that the loss is both historic and ongoing. This would be a more proper post-traumatic response than ‘internalizing colonial concepts of how peoples relate to land, resources, and wealth’ (p. 127). However, what becomes curious upon even the briefest reflection is the fact that ‘denied knowledge of language, clan, family, and land base’ – and the consequent temptation toward ‘internalizing colonial concepts’ – is precisely what native resistance and resurgence is struggling against to this day. To wit: ‘I believe that the systematic disconnection (and dispossession) of Indigenous Peoples from our homelands is the defining characteristic of colonization’ (Waziyatawin, 2012: 72). So, de-culturalization, or loss of indigeneity, is a general condition of black and native peoples, not one that native people can restrict to black people in order to offer (or withhold) sympathies. **The structuring difference between settler colonization and enslavement is to be found precisely in the latter’s denial of ‘knowledge of who their nations are’ – that is, deracination. On this count, the loss of indigeneity for native peoples can be named and its recovery pursued, and that pursuit can (and must) become central to political mobilization. The loss of indigeneity for black peoples can be acknowledged only abstractly and its recovery is lost to history, and so something else must (and can) become central to political mobilization.** Not the dialectics of loss and recovery but rather the loss of the dialectics of loss and recovery as such, a politics with no (final) recourse to foundations of any sort, a politics forged from critical resources immanent to the situation, resources from anywhere and anyone, which is to say from nowhere and no one in particular. From indigenous perspectives, this baseless politics can only ever be a liability. Without a base, which is to say a land base, a politics of resistance can only succumb to ‘civilization’s fallacies and destructive habits’. The quest for equality is perhaps the most pernicious of those fallacies. The conclusion of this line of thinking is that, **due to ‘the trauma of being ripped away from the land that defines their very identities’, landless black people in diaspora cannot mount genuine resistance to the settler colonial state and society; they can only be held apart from it as slaves.** Which is to say that, without the benefits of a land-base and **absent the constitutive exclusion of slavery, blacks are destined to become white, and thus settlers, in thought and action and**, moreover, **have effectively become so post-emancipation. But rather than argue that black people in North America** do, in fact, **have significant**, if attenuated, **indigenous worldviews**, practices and kinship structures or, in any case, can learn such from others in order to begin fighting the good fight; I submit **we must consider the possibility that** 1) **the ‘Black Diasporic struggles’** under examination **are irreducible to anti-racism**, 2) **that anti-racism is irreducible to demands upon the state, and** 3) **that demands upon the state are irreducible to statist politics. Blacks need not be indigenous and/ or enslaved Africans in order to be allies to native peoples in the Americas, whatever that might mean.** And I say all of this without need of mentioning the ‘notable exceptions’ otherwise known as the black radical tradition. What if there are, and will have always been, ways to pursue settler decolonization otherwise than as indigenous peoples and their immigrant allies, a movement from within that slavery whose abolition is yet to come? Of course, not all Native Studies scholars adhere to this cultural criterion of political solidarity. But even among those attempting to coordinate struggles among black and native peoples on a political basis, related problems arise. **The contributions of Andrea Smith in the last decade are perhaps most generative on this note** (Smith, 2006, 2010, 2012, 2013). In a series of recent articles, **Smith proposes one way to reframe the relational field of ‘people of color’ in North American political culture by thinking through the multiple logics of white supremacy, in relation to the enforcement of normative gender and sexuality, as a sort of permutation.** The author thus nominates the three pillars: Slavery/Capitalism, Genocide/Colonialism, and Orientalism/ War (Smith, 2010). **We might recast them here as Racial Slavery, Settler Colonialism, and Orientalism, with the understanding that all are coeval, at least, with the history of capitalism.** Each pillar operates according to a respective logic: the proprietary logic of slavery (through which captive Africans are rendered property of slaveholders and regarded as such by the larger society), the genocidal logic of settler colonialism (through which indigenous peoples are dispossessed of land, water and resources and made to disappear as indigenous peoples), and the militarist logic of Orientalism (through which the people of Asia, the Middle East, and eventually Latin America are constructed as inferior, yet threatening ‘civilizations’ subjected to imperial warfare and its domestic ramifications). The aim of this tripartite scheme is to illustrate for each pillar how those inhabiting its logic might become complicit in the victimization of those inhabiting the other; the object is the fostering of strategic alliances across multiple axes of power, rather than a politics based on notions of shared victimhood along a single axis. For present purposes, we are prompted to develop approaches to political struggle that address both the indigenous/settler binary and the slave/master binary, working for settler decolonization while dismantling the hierarchy established by racial slavery. And these movements would be set about in tandem with the movement to end American imperialism abroad. **Smith’s formulation seeks to ascertain the fundamental dynamics in the relative positioning of various social groupings.** The adjudication of those dynamics may involve not only the old canard of compromise (politics reduced to the art of being uncomfortable), but also the creation of new abilities to think in different registers in turn or at once. To this end, **‘we might focus on actually building the political power to create an alternative system to the heteropatriarchal, white supremacist, settler colonial state’** (Smith, 2012: 87). While the three pillars model seeks to typify and diagram interrelated logics, it makes no explicit attempt at analytical synthesis or integrated political strategy. Synthesis and strategy are implied, however, a point that becomes clear when we look more closely at the working definitions of racial slavery and settler colonialism. In ‘Three Pillars’, **Smith describes the logic of slavery as one that ‘renders Black people as inherently slaveable – as nothing more than property’. She goes on to situate slavery as the ‘anchor of capitalism’, but in a peculiar way: That is, the capitalist system ultimately commodifies all workers – one’s own person becomes a commodity that one must sell in the labor market while the profits of one’s work are taken by someone else. To keep this capitalist system in place – which ultimately commodifies most people – the logic of slavery applies a racial hierarchy to this system. This racial hierarchy tells people that as long as you are not Black, you have the opportunity to escape the commodification of capitalism. This helps people who are not Black to accept their lot in life, because they can feel that at least they are not at the very bottom of the racial hierarchy – at least they are not property; at least they are not slaveable.** (Smith, 2006: 67) We can agree that under the capitalist system one must sell their labor power and that it will be commodified as labor, which is to say it will be converted into a factor of production. We can agree that under the capitalist system the surplus value of social labor – not the bourgeois notion of individual work – is appropriated by the owners of the means of production and converted into profit. That is the basic structure of labor exploitation under capital.13 We must object, however, that labor exploitation is a commodification of ‘one’s own person’ or that the capitalist system ‘ultimately commodifies most people’. If this were true, then slavery as the conversion of person into property would simply be an extreme form of labor exploitation.14 Or, vice versa, exploitation would be an attenuated form of slavery. In either case, there would be only a difference of degree rather than kind between exploitation and slavery. At any rate, **disabusing ourselves of anti-black racism would, for Smith, enable us to see that they inhabit the same logic and that black struggles against racial slavery are ultimately struggles against capitalism. Something similar happens with respect to Smith’s statement of the relation between racial slavery and settler colonialism.** When she returns, in a more recent article on voting rights and native disappearance, to reprise her concept of racial slavery, she has this to say about the ideological formation of anti-black racism and its effects on critical intellectual production: Because Africa is the property of Europe, Africa must then appear as always, already colonized. […] The colonization of Africa must disappear so that Africa can appear as ontologically colonized. Only through this disavowed colonization can Black peoples be ontologically relegated to the status of property. Native peoples by contrast, are situated as potential citizens. Native peoples are described as ‘free’ people, albeit ‘uncivilized’. (Smith, 2013: 355) Smith rightly argues that **the racist designation of native people as free**, albeit uncivilized, **precitizens is not a privilege** (i.e. proximity to whiteness) **in relation to the racist designation of black people as unfree anti-citizens incapable of civilization** (i.e. antipode of whiteness) because the civilizing mission through which native peoples are forcibly assimilated into the settler colonial society is, in fact, a form and aspect of genocide. Yet, what is missed in the attempt to demonstrate that **Black Studies is also, like Native Studies, concerned with colonization is the plain fact that colonization is not essential, much less prerequisite, to enslavement. In other words, to say that it is only through ‘disavowed colonization’ that black people can be ‘ontologically relegated to the status of property’ is a feint, just as it is to suggest that capitalism ‘ultimately commodifies most people’.** In this case, enslavement would be enabled by a prior colonization that it extends perforce. If this were true, then slavery as the conversion of person into property would simply be an extreme form of colonization. Or, vice versa, colonization would be an attenuated form of slavery. In either case, there would be only a difference of degree rather than kind between colonization and slavery. At any rate, **disabusing ourselves of anti-black racism would**, for Smith, **enable us to see that black struggles against racial slavery are ultimately struggles against colonialism.**

**Decolonization is neither necessary nor a prerequisite to resolve anti-black violence and the experience of enslavement**

**Sexton 14** [Jared; Jared Sexton is the Director of African American Studies at the University of California, Irvine, where he also teaches film and media studies; “The Vel of Slavery: Tracking the Figure of the Unsovereign,” Critical Sociology, p. 9; REJ]

**Colonization is not a necessary condition of enslavement because: 1) slaves need not be colonial subjects, or objects of colonial exploitation**, and they do not face the fundamental directive of colonialism, ‘you, work for me’, though slaves often enough labor; and **2) slaves need not be settler colonial subjects**, or objects of settler colonial genocide, since they do not face the fundamental directive ‘you, go away’, **though slaves often enough are driven from their native land. But the crucial problem with this formulation of the relations between racial slavery, settler colonialism and capitalism** (leaving aside any problems with the pillar of Orientalism) **has to do with the drive to confound the position of blacks in order to describe them as exploited and colonized degree zero.** Regarding the latter, **Smith writes, ‘Africa is the property of Europe’**; Africa rather than the African. As in the reduction of slavery to the exploitation of labor, there is here an elision of the permanent seizure of the body essential to enslavement. What can be done to a captive body? Anything whatsoever. The loss of sovereignty is a fait accompli, a byproduct rather than a precondition of enslavement. Genocide is endemic to enslavement insofar as slavery bans, legally and politically, the reproduction of enslaved peoples as peoples, indigenous or otherwise, whether they are removed from their native land, subjected to direct killing, unlivable conditions, or forced assimilation; or they are kept in place, allowed to live, provided adequate means, or supported in their cultural practices. **Native Studies scholars misrecognize ‘the true horror of slavery’ as de-culturalization or the loss of sovereignty because they do not ask what slavery is in the most basic sense – its local and global histories, its legal and political structures, its social and economic functions, its psychosexual dynamics, and its philosophical consequences. Perhaps they do not want to know anything about it, as they evaluate it through the lens of their own loss and lament and redress it through the promise of their own political imagination. Slavery is not a loss that the self experiences – of language, lineage, land, or labor – but rather the loss of any self that could experience such loss. Any politics based in resurgence or recovery is bound to regard the slave as ‘the position of the unthought’** (Hartman and Wilderson, 2003).

**Discussions of native sovereignty as a capacity and cultural celebration is a form of savage negrophobia that turns their ethics**

**Sexton 14** [Jared; Jared Sexton is the Director of African American Studies at the University of California, Irvine, where he also teaches film and media studies; “The Vel of Slavery: Tracking the Figure of the Unsovereign,” Critical Sociology, pp. 9-10; REJ]

There is by now a literature on the historical relations between black and native peoples in the Americas, including, in the US context, the award-winning work of Tiya Miles (2006, 2010) and the signal contributions of Barbara Krauthamer (2013).18 But Frank B. Wilderson, III’s Red, White and Black may be the first sustained attempt to theorize, at the highest level of abstraction, the structural positions of European colonists, Indigenous peoples, and African slaves in the ‘New World’ encounter and to think about how the conflicts and antagonisms that give rise to those positions in the historic instance establish the contemporary parameters of our political ontology. At sovereignty. This is not a brief in favor of Wilderson’s project as resolution or answer. The upshot of Red, White and Black is a provocation to new critical discourse and just such an invitation is offered midway, even as it acknowledges the grand impediment: ‘What, we might ask, inhibits this analytic and political dream of a “Savage”/Slave encounter? Is it a matter of the Native theorist’s need to preserve the constituent elements of sovereignty, or is there such a thing as “Savage” Negrophobia? Are the two related’ (Wilderson, 2010: 182)? We might understand something else about the historical relations between black and native peoples if we bear in mind that the dynamics of Negrophobia are animated, in part, by a preoccupation with sovereignty. We have learned already that settler colonialism is governed by a genocidal commandment and that, as a direct result, survival becomes central to indigenous movements for settler decolonization. We have also learned that sovereignty, even disarticulated from the stateform, is the heading for thinking about this survival as a matter of politics.19 Yet, in its struggle against settler colonialism, the claim of native sovereignty – emerging in contradiction to the imposition of the imperial sovereignty of Euro-American polities20 – ‘fortifies and extends the interlocutory life of America [or Canada or …] as a coherent (albeit genocidal) idea, because treaties are forms of articulation, discussions brokered between two groups presumed to possess the same kind of historical currency: sovereignty’ (Wilderson, 2003: 236). **This point is not mitigated by the fact that native sovereignty is qualitatively different from**, not simply rival to, **the sovereignty of nation-states.** What links these statements discursively is an ‘ethico-onto-epistemological’ (Barad, 2007) point of contact: ‘At every scale – the soul, the body, the group, the land, and the universe – they can both practice cartography, and although at every scale their maps are radically incompatible, their respective “mapness” is never in question’ (Wilderson, 2010: 181).21 Capacity for coherence makes more than likely a commitment ‘to preserve the constituent elements of sovereignty’ (2010: 182) and a pursuit of the concept of ‘freedom as self-determination’.22 The political de-escalation of antagonism to the level of conflict is mirrored by a conceptual domestication at work in the field of Native Studies, namely, that settler colonialism is something already known and understood by its practitioners. The political-intellectual challenge on this count is to refine this knowledge and to impart it. The intervention of Native Studies involves bringing into general awareness a critical knowledge of settler colonialism.

**Black studies are always already a promise of decolonization. We must start with abolition as the route to decolonization or else we will re-elaborate anti-red anti-black civil society – the alt is a politics of UNSOVEREIGNTY that takes as its end goal the destruction of this world, including settler colonialism and its matrix of sovereignty slavery and genocide**

**Sexton 14** [Jared; Jared Sexton is the Director of African American Studies at the University of California, Irvine, where he also teaches film and media studies; “The Vel of Slavery: Tracking the Figure of the Unsovereign,” Critical Sociology, pp. 10-11; REJ]

We might contrast the unsuspecting theoretical status of the concept of settler colonialism in Native Studies with its counterpart in Black Studies: racial slavery. I remarked above that any politics of resurgence or recovery is bound to regard the slave as the position of the unthought. This does not suggest, however, that Black Studies is the field in which slavery is, finally, thought in an adequate way. The field of Black Studies is as susceptible to a politics of resurgence or recovery as any other mode of critical inquiry. Which is to say that the figure of the slave and the history of the emergence of the relational field called racial slavery remains the unthought ground of thought within Black Studies as well. The difference, provisionally, between these enterprises is that whereas Native Studies sets out to be the alternative to a history of settler colonialism and to pronounce the decolonial intervention, Black Studies dwells within an un-inheritable, in-escapable history and muses upon how that history intervenes upon its own field, providing a sort of untranscendable horizon for its discourse and imagination. The latter is an endeavor that teaches less through pedagogical instruction than through exemplary transmission: rather than initiation into a form of living, emulation of a process of learning through the posing of a question, a procedure for study, for black study, or black studies, wherever they may lead. Native Studies scholars are right to insist upon a synthetic gesture that attempts to shift the terms of engagement. The problem lies at the level of thought at which the gesture is presented. The settler colonial studies critique of colonial studies must be repeated, this time with respect to settler colonialism itself, in a move that returns us to the body in relation to land, labor, language, this writing, Wilderson’s text has not been taken up in the field of Native Studies, despite dedicating fully 100 pages to addressing directly the machinations of settler colonialism and the history of genocide and to critically reading a range of indigenous thinking on politics, cosmology, and lineage – and the capture and commodification of each – in order to ask the most pertinent questions about capacity, commitment, and concept. This might help not only to break down false dichotomies, and perhaps pose a truer one, but also to reveal the ways that **the study of slavery is already and of necessity the study of capitalism, colonialism and settler colonialism,** among other things; and that **the struggle for abolition is already** and of necessity **the struggle for** the promise of communism, decolonization, and **settler decolonization,** among other things. Slavery is the threshold of the political world, abolition the interminable radicalization of every radical movement. Slavery, as it were, precedes and prepares the way for colonialism, its forebear or fundament or support. Colonialism, as it were, the issue or heir of slavery, its outgrowth or edifice or monument. This is as true of the historic colonization of the Third World as it is the prior and ongoing settler colonization of the Fourth.23 ‘The modern world owes its very existence to slavery’ (Grandin, 2014a).24 What could this impossible debt possibly entail? Not only the infrastructure of its global economy but also the architecture of its theological and philosophical discourses, its legal and political institutions, its scientific and technological practices, indeed, the whole of its semantic field (Wilderson, 2010: 58). **A politics of abolition could never finally be a politics of resurgence, recovery, or recuperation.** It could only ever begin with degeneration, decline, or dissolution. Abolition is the interminable radicalization of every radical movement, but a radicalization through the perverse affirmation of deracination, an uprooting of the natal, the nation, and the notion, preventing any order of determination from taking root, a politics without claim, without demand even, or a politics whose demand is ‘too radical to be formulated in advance of its deeds’ (Trouillot, 2012: 88).25 The field of Black Studies consists in ‘tracking the figure of the unsovereign’ (Chandler, 2013: 163) in order to meditate upon the paramount question: ‘What if the problem is sovereignty as such’ (Moten, 2013)? Abolition, the political dream of Black Studies, its unconscious thinking, consists in the affirmation of the unsovereign slave – the affectable, the derelict, the monstrous, the wretched26 – figures of an order altogether different from (even when they coincide or cohabit with) the colonized native – the occupied, the undocumented, the unprotected, the oppressed. Abolition is beyond (the restoration of) sovereignty. Beyond the restoration of a lost commons through radical redistribution (everything for everyone), there is the unimaginable loss of that all too imaginable loss itself (nothing for no one).27 **If the indigenous relation to land precedes and exceeds any regime of property, then the slave’s inhabitation of the earth precedes and exceeds any prior relation to land – landlessness.** And selflessness is the correlate. No ground for identity, no ground to stand (on). Everyone has a claim to everything until no one has a claim to anything. No claim. This is not a politics of despair brought about by a failure to lament a loss, because it is not rooted in hope of winning. The flesh of the earth demands it: the landless inhabitation of selfless existence.

**Studies of settler colonialism must go hand in hand with resistance against white supremacy and anti-racism struggles**

**Smith 10** [Andrea Smith is a professor in the Department of Media and Cultural Studies at UC Riverside; “Indigineity, Settler Colonialism, White Supremacy”; http://www.worlddialogue.org/content.php?id=488; REJ]

**Whiteness in Settler Colonialism** As mentioned previously, **many Native studies scholars have refused engagement with ethnic studies or critical race theory because they think such engagement relegates Native peoples to the status of racial minorities rather than sovereign nations.** Yet, **even as Native studies articulate their intellectual framework around sovereignty, some strands within them also simultaneously presume the continuance of settler colonialism.** Glen Coulthard’s groundbreaking essay, “Subjects of Empire”, sheds light on this contradiction.27 He notes that in the name of sovereignty, Native nations have shifted their aspirations from decolonisation to recognition from the settler state. That is, **they express their political goals primarily in terms of having political, economic or cultural claims recognised and/or funded by the settler state within which they reside.** In doing so, **they unwittingly relegate themselves to the status of “racial minority”, seeking recognition in competition with other minorities similarly seeking recognition.** One such example can be found in the work of Ward Churchill. Churchill offers searing critiques of the United States’ genocidal policies towards Native peoples and calls for “decolonising the Indian nations”.28 Nevertheless, he contends that **we must support the continued existence of the US federal government because there is no other way “to continue guarantees to the various Native American tribes [so] that their landbase and other treaty rights will be continued”.29** Thus, **in the name of decolonisation, his politics are actually grounded in a framework of liberal recognition whereby the United States will continue to exist as the arbiter and guarantor of indigenous claims. In such a framework, Native peoples are then set up to compete with other groups for recognition.** Thus, it is not a surprise that Churchill opposes a politics that would address racism directed against non-indigenous peoples, arguing that Native peoples have a special status that should take primacy over other oppressed groups.30 **Such analyses do not take into account how settler colonialism is enabled through the intersecting logics of white supremacy, imperialism, heteropatriarchy and capitalism. Consequently, when Native struggles become isolated from other social-justice struggles, indigenous peoples are not in a position to build the necessary political power actually to end colonialism and capitalism. Instead, they are set up to be in competition rather than in solidarity with other groups seeking recognition. This politics of recognition then presumes the continuance of the settler state that will arbitrate claims from competing groups.** When one seeks recognition, one will define indigenous struggle as exclusively as possible so that claims to the state can be based on unique and special status. When one wants actually to dismantle settler colonialism, one will define indigenous struggle broadly in order to build a movement of sufficient power to challenge the system. Thus, **Churchill’s work replaces a black–white binary with an indigenous–settler binary.** While, as I have argued previously, this latter binary certainly exists, our analysis of it is insufficient if not intersected with other logics of white supremacy. In particular, we need to look at how “settlers” are differentiated through white supremacy. Much of the rhetoric of the Red Power movement did not necessarily question the legitimacy of the US state, arguing instead that the United States just needs to leave Native nations alone.31 As Native activist Lee Maracle comments: “AIM [the American Indian Movement] did not challenge the basic character or the legitimacy of the institutions or even the political and economic organization of America; rather, it addressed the long-standing injustice of expropriation.”32 **Native studies scholars and activists, while calling for self-determination, have not necessarily critiqued or challenged the United States or other settler states themselves.** The problem arising from their position, as Maracle notes, is that if we do not take seriously the analysis of race theorists such as Omi, Winant and Bell that define the United States as fundamentally white supremacist, then we will not see that it will never have an interest in leaving Native nations alone. Moreover, **without a critique of the settler state as simultaneously also white supremacist, all “settlers” become morally undifferentiated.** If we see peoples in Iraq simply as potential future settlers, then there is no reason not to join the war on terror against them, because morally they are not differentiated from the settlers in the United States who have committed genocide against Native peoples. **Native studies scholar Robert Williams does address the intersection of race and colonialism as it affects the status of Native peoples. Because Williams is both a leading scholar in indigenous legal theory, and one of the few Native scholars substantially to engage critical race theory, his work demands sustained attention.** Consequently, I consider his arguments in greater detail. Williams argues that while Native nations rely on the Cherokee nation cases33 as the basis of their claims to sovereignty, all of these cases imply a logic based on white supremacy in which Native peoples are seen as racially incompetent to be fully sovereign. Rather than uphold these cases, he calls on us to overturn them so that they go by the wayside as did the Dred Scot decision. I therefore take it as axiomatic that a “winning courtroom strategy” for protecting Indian rights in this country cannot be organized around a set of legal precedents and accompanying legal discourse that views Indians as lawless savages and interprets their rights accordingly ... I ask Indian rights lawyers and scholars to consider carefully the following question: Is it really possible to believe that the [Supreme] Court would have written [the landmark 1954 civil-rights case] *Brown* the way it did if it had not first explicitly decided to reject the “language in *Plessy v. Ferguson*” that gave precedential legal force, validity, and sanction to the negative racial stereotypes and images historically directed at blacks by the dominant white society?34 Williams shows that Native peoples, by neglecting the analysis of race, have come to normalise white-supremacist ideologies within the legal frameworks by which they struggle for “sovereignty”. **Native peoples can themselves unwittingly recapitulate the logic of settler colonialism even as they contest it when they do not engage the analysis of race.** Williams points to the contradictions involved when Native peoples ask courts to uphold these problematic legal precedents rather than overturn them: This model’s acceptance of the European colonial-era doctrine of discovery and its foundational legal principle of Indian racial inferiority licenses Congress to exercise its plenary power unilaterally to terminate Indian tribes, abrogate Indian treaties, and extinguish Indian rights, and there’s nothing that Indians can legally do about any of these actions.35 However, Williams’s analysis also tends to separate white supremacy from settler colonialism. That is, he argues that addressing racism is a “first step on the hard trail of decolonizing the present-day U.S. Supreme Court’s Indian law” by “changing the way that justices themselves talk about Indians in their decisions on Indian rights”.36 The reason for this “first step” is that direct claims for sovereignty are politically more difficult to achieve than minority individual rights because claims based on sovereignty challenge the basis of the United States itself.37 The result is that Williams articulates a political vision containing many of the contradictions inherent in Omi and Winant’s analysis. That is, he cites Derrick Bell to assert the permanency of racism while simultaneously suggesting that it is possible to address racism as a simpler “first step” towards decolonisation. I believe that when the justices are confronted with the way the legalized racial stereotypes of the Marshall model can be used to perpetuate an insidious, jurispathic, rights-destroying form of nineteenth-century racism and prejudice against Indians, they will be open to at least considering the legal implications of a postcolonial nonracist approach to defining Indian rights *under* [my italics] the Constitution and laws of the United States.38 If the implications of Bell’s analysis of the permanency of racism are taken seriously, it is difficult to sustain the idea that we can simply eliminate racial thinking in US governance in order to pave the way for “decolonisation”. Consequently, **Williams seems to fall back on a framework of liberal multiculturalism that envisions the United States as fundamentally a non‑racial democracy that is unfortunately suffering from the vestiges of racism**. He says: “I do not believe that the Court is a helplessly racist institution that is incapable of fairly adjudicating cases involving the basic human rights [and] cultural survival possessed by Indian tribes as indigenous peoples. I would never attempt to stereotype the justices in that way.”39 He seems to imply that the Supreme Court is not an organ of the racial state; it is simply a collection of individuals with their personal prejudices**. In addition, the strategy of addressing race first and then colonialism second presupposes that white supremacy and settler colonialism do not mutually inform each other—that racism provides the anchor for maintaining settler colonialism.** In the end, Williams appears to recapitulate settler colonialism when he calls for “decolonizing the present-day U.S. Supreme Court’s Indian law” in order to secure a “measured separatism for tribes in a truly postcolonial, totally decolonized U.S. society”.40 As we have seen, he holds out hope for a “postcolonial nonracist approach to defining Indian rights *under* [my italics] the Constitution and laws of the United States”, as if the Constitution itself were not a colonial document. Obviously, however, if the United States and its Supreme Court were “totally decolonised” they would not exist. In the end, Williams’s long-term vision for Native rights does not seem to go beyond state recognition within a colonial framework. That said, this critique is in no way meant to invalidate the important contributions Williams does make in intersecting Native studies with critical race theory. It may well be that the apparent contradictions in his analysis are the result less of his actual thinking than of a rhetorical strategy designed to convince legal scholars to take his claims seriously. Moreover, while conditions of settler colonialism persist, short-term legal and political strategies are needed to address them. **As Michelle Alexander notes, reform and revolutionary strategies are not mutually inconsistent; reformist strategies can be movement-building if they are articulated as such**.41 In this regard, Williams’s provocative call to overturn the precedents established in the Cherokee nation cases speaks to the manner in which Native sovereignty struggles have unwittingly built their short-term legal strategies on a foundation of white supremacy. And as Scott Lyons’s germinal work on Native nationalism in *X-Marks* suggests,42 any project for decolonisation begins with the political and legal conditions under which we currently live, so our goal must be to make the most strategic use of the political and legal instruments before us while remaining alert to how we can be co-opted by using them. But in the end, as Taiaiake Alfred43 and Coulthard argue, we must build on this work by rethinking liberation outside the framework of the white-supremacist, settler state. **A Kinder, Gentler Settler State?** What is at stake for Native studies and critical race theory is that without the centring of the analysis of settler colonialism, both intellectual projects fall back on assuming the givenness of the white-supremacist, settler state. On the one hand, many racial-justice theorists and activists unwittingly recapitulate white supremacy by failing to imagine a struggle against white supremacy outside the constraints of the settler state, which is by definition white supremacist. On the other hand, **Native scholars and activists recapitulate settler colonialism by failing to address how the logic of white supremacy may unwittingly shape our vision of sovereignty and self-determination in such a way that we become locked into a politics of recognition rather than a politics of liberation. We are left with a political project that can do no more than imagine a kinder, gentler settler state founded on genocide and slavery.**

**Social Good**

**The notion of using the market for social good, while seemingly benign is actually a malignant strategy to disciple those who deviate from the norm of the market and impede its productivity. The market constructs punishment as the necessary and complimentary dialectic to freedom.**

**Dillon 13**, [Stephen, “Fugitive Life: race, gender, and the rise of the neoliberal-carceral state”, P. 152-5]//MHELLIE

By centering the governmentality of the market in a theory of the social good, Posner argued for the disciplining of those who deviated from the market’s natural governance. In other words, **ways of life that exceeded the “voluntary free exchange” of the market, and thus deviated from the natural order of the market’s self-perpetuating cycle, were subjected to the social, civil, and living death of imprisonment**.344 As Posner and Friedman made clear, the free market relies on state-sponsored systems of punishment in order to maintain its dominance. What remains unspoken is that the market is a form of punishment in and of itself: whether one deviates from its demands or is forced outside its protection, one risks hunger, homelessness, illness, and premature death. To say that one will be punished if they “bypass” the market means that the market has borders, both metaphorical and physical. To escape or exceed its grasp is to risk imprisonment. It’s not just that the market requires the prison; as Posner argues, the market is a prison. If one becomes a fugitive from the governance of the market (voluntarily or by force), an entire apparatus of policing and penal technologies are mobilized to punish and capture the deviant. In a mirror image of law and order politics discussed in the previous chapter, **this conception of neoliberal freedom constructed punishment and policing as the necessary corollary to the liberation of the individual and the freedom of the market**. Neoliberal freedom was productive of the construction of the individual as a regulative ideal while also immobilizing those resistant or excessive to new economic, social, and political regimes that prioritized the market. In this way, neoliberal thought reproduces the very configurations and effects of power it seeks to vanquish. Discipline is inaugurated in the name of freedom, a penal state rises where state power is supposed to crumble, and the regulation of difference escalates under the banner of equality. **The language of neoliberal freedom does not just provide an ideological screen that obscures the unfreedom necessary to the free market**. While it produces a fantasy, its goal is not to hide a deeper truth, but rather, to create new capacities for control. Freedom, in other words, is not only ideological, but also biopolitical. The language of neoliberal freedom produces the forms of knowledge and subjectivity required for freedom to operate as a system of regulation and discipline. Freedom becomes a way of administering populations, not through the deception of a myth, but by making freedom a system of governance and management. 345 For example, Rose writes that neoliberal freedom implants “ways of calculating and managing that will make economic actors think, reckon, and behave as competitive, profit-seeking agents,” turns workers into motivated employees who will “freely strive to give their best in the work place,” and transforms “people into consumers who can choose between products.”346 In short, neoliberal freedom transforms materiality through the power of language.347 It alters desires, feelings, attitudes, and values.348 It creates subjects who manage themselves through responsibility and individuality. **Freedom is more than a discourse; it is a mechanism of biopolitical governance actualized by the power of language**. As Rose emphasizes, people and markets cannot be set free, “They have to be made free.”349 **Freedom is discipline**, a notion Friedman’s mentor Friedrich Hayek evinced when he wrote, “Man has not developed in freedom...Freedom is an artifact of civilization...Freedom was made possible by the gradual evolution of the discipline of civilization which is at the same time the discipline of freedom.”350 Hayek argues that freedom must be controlled, regulated, and managed. Regimes of power do not distort freedom and falsify subjectivity.351 Instead, **freedom and individuality are modes of subjection that look like liberation**. And as Friedman and Posner made clear, for those subjects not responsible enough to be guided by the discipline that is liberty, law and order would capture those who escaped freedom’s grasp.

**South Asian Conflict**

**China’s tactical weaponizing of ethno-racial hierarchies along the color line of antiblackness stands as the informative logic for South Asian conflict– its epidermal demarcation of liberal subject from the “darkened” of Vietnam, Malaysia, and Indonesia is the precursor to sovereign domination.**

**Shih 16** (Shu-mei Shih – professor in the Department of Comparative Literature, Asian Languages and Cultures, and Asian American Studies – UCLA, “Race and Relation: The Global Sixties in the South of the South” – ERW)

As I have suggested, Bandung was a pivotal moment that turned the lives of Chinese minorities from bad to worse. While at Bandung, Chinese Premier Chou En-lai affirmed that China had no desire to dominate her neighbors or spread her influence through the Chinese communities in Southeast Asia (Lee 52) by signing a treaty with the Indonesian government declaring that China would not try to influence how “the Chinese Question” in Indonesia would be resolved. This treaty, along with similar kinds of understanding with other Southeast Asian nations, presumably freed these nations from fear of China’s interference, yet, paradoxically, it also allowed them to act on their fear of China by prosecuting Chinese minorities in their nation-states. For example, the Tionghoa, besides being the target of race riots, were the target of dozens of discriminatory laws and policies from the late 1950s all the way up to the end of the period of “New Order” (1966–98). In 1960, the only Indonesian writer who had been nominated for the Nobel Prize in literature several times, Pramoedya Ananta Toer, published The Chinese in Indonesia, a seminal book criticizing Indonesian state racism against Chinese Indonesians, for which he had to pay the steep price of nine months in prison. Under the New Order, according to Melani Budianti, all “traces of Chineseness” were banned in Indonesia, including culture, language, and education (277). Indeed, it was not until the race riots of May 1998 and the subsequent overthrow of the Suharto government that the state’s racist policies against the Tionghoa were formally abolished. Bandung has been considered the inaugural moment for global “racial brotherhood” (Burton 352), but both the terms “racial” and “brotherhood” are haunted Comparative Literature Published by Duke University Press COMPARATIVE LITERATURE / 150 3 This was confirmed by multiple sources, according to the editorials of the special issue of TEMPO, a major radical journal in Indonesia, commemorating the 60th anniversary of Bandung Conference (24). It also appears that women who served on the hospitality committee were not allowed to refuse offering sexual services when told to do so (62). not only by what happened in individual Southeast Asian states following the Bandung conference, but also by revelations of what had transpired during the conference itself. The host of the conference, as has been recently revealed, ran a “hospitality committee” consisting of beautiful women, some of whom were already married, to offer, among other things, sexual services to the delegates.3 The masculinist thrust of the conference is perhaps best embodied in the all-tooauthoritarian states that the participant countries became: in the words of Samir Amin, “Bandung regimes” of one-party states and authoritarian regimes that abused basic human rights and deprived workers and peasants of economic rights (Lee 18–19). Most of the countries involved, including India and Zanzibar, **practiced racial nationalisms in which social inequality was structured by ethno-racial hierarchies** (Burton 354; Burges 200). As Dipesh Chakravarty points out, despite activating dialogues among decolonial thinkers (which he calls “the dialogical side of decolonization”), the Bandung Conference was also a setting where a developmentalist view of the postcolonial world was taught and circulated — what he calls the “pedagogical style of developmental politics” (45–68). The nation that would soon experience the extreme casualties of developmentalism in the Great Leap Forward, leading to thirty million famine-induced deaths, was none other than China itself. By 2015, the 60th anniversary of the Bandung Conference, the dialogical side of decolonization has given way completely to developmental politics, in which Third World and **AfroAsian solidarity has become nothing but hollow rhetoric**, confined to economic principles of cooperation and competition. Consider, for example, the special issue commemorating the conference — “60 Years: Asia-African Conference” — published in 2015 by the radical Indonesian journal TEMPO, **which intermittently has suffered government censure in the past.** While this special issue includes reminiscences about the conference, including a prominent reference to Richard Wright, as well as the exposé of the sexual service scandal, its major focus is Indonesia’s global economic presence, especially in competition with China. The editorials in the journal even taunt the Indonesian government for **not grabbing a sufficient enough share of the African market and promote an “industrial expansion into Africa**” (24). Rethinking our piety towards the global sixties has recently spurred critical reflections on the Bandung Conference, such as Antoinette Burton’s call for a new history that would “refuse all of Bandung’s pieties and romances and break, finally, from its presumptively fraternal narratives, if not its epistemological grasp” (358). More specifically, it also means a rethinking of the legacies of global Maoism. As a non-Stalinist and non-white Marxism, or “Marxism with Chinese characteristics,” Maoism had been widely considered an answer to Western imperialism and capitalism for Asia, Africa, and Latin America (Harding; Fiszman; Rothwell) at Paris ’68 (Fields; Fejto; Bourg), and for African and Asian Americans in the United States (Steven Lee; Hinderliter). But, as Yinghong Cheng notes, the “world revolution” rhetoric of Maoism, which had at the time **replaced whites with the Chinese as leaders of colored people of the world, actually helped blind the Chinese to their own racism** (Cheng; Shih, “Race and Revolution”), and Arif Dirlik’s recent essay summing up the meanings and implications of global Maoism concludes that there is little evidence of “any significant impact” of Maoism on Third World revolutionary moments; that China’s identification with the Third World, because of its size and power, “has not always been convincing”; and that, in the end, major Maoist groups in **Peru, Cambodia, India, and Turkey exemplified the “degenerative consequences of revolutionary goals” in their acts of random violence and terrorism** (234–35, 252). As I have shown throughout this essay, the perspectives situated on **the margins of the margins within the Global South** — vis-à-vis the lives of ethnic minority peoples in Vietnam, Malaysia, and Indonesia — register strongly opposing positions that clamor for a further rethinking of the global sixties. These perspectives starkly contrast the view of W.E.B. Du Bois, who went on a ten-week trip to China in 1959 and supplied an African American perspective that is distinct from those of Smith and Wright and perhaps more typical. Du Bois had written, as early as the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War, that the “awakening of the yellow races is certain” and that “the awakening of the brown and black races will follow in time” (34), and his trip to China appeared to confirm this. China “amazed and touched” him like no other nation in the world; it was a country where human nature is “freed of its most hurtful and terrible” and people are “full of joy and faith and marching on in a unison” (190). “Fifteen times I have crossed the Atlantic and once the Pacific,” he proclaims, and “I have seen the world. But never so fast and glorious a miracle as China” (195). Expressing solidarity especially on the global racial line, Du Bois declares to his African American readers back home: “China is flesh of your flesh and blood of your blood. China is colored and knows to what a colored skin in this modern world subjects its owner” (199). The China Du Bois saw in 1959 was a China engulfed in revolutionary euphoria. There was, however, also a different China, the China of the Great Leap Forward, the Anti-Rightist Campaign, and the Great Famine, all of which resulted in thousands of persecuted intellectuals and millions of corpses. **The picture of global racial alliance that China purportedly advocated was also not all that rosy.** **China’s engagement with Africa** — as can be seen by Chou En-lai’s no less than ten visits to various African countries between 1963 and 1964, the Chinese support for the building of the Tanzanian-Zambian highway, and, since 1961, Chinese offerings of scholarships to African students to study in China — **was marred by Chinese racism against Africans within China, especially on college campuses.** The first wave of African students in China was met with such violent racism that two-thirds of them repatriated to Africa within the first year, and, throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Chinese students rioted against African students across major cities of China, creating conditions that witnesses and participants described as **akin to “apartheid,” “cultural rape,” and even “pogrom”** (Shih, “Race and Revolution”). Du Bois’s lack of awareness of what was going on in China at the time reinforced a romantic racial internationalism also shared by such African American figures as Langston Hughes, who had visited China in 1933 during an earlier era of black internationalism, as well as Robert Williams, who spent four years in China in the 1960s. Despite all the best intentions and professed solidarities, however, in the end it is crucial to take into account China’s sheer size and power, as well as its long history as the subject of empire. **To Southeast Asia, China has always been the** Comparative Literature Published by Duke University Press COMPARATIVE LITERATURE / 152 **northern power.** Within the Third World or the Global South, then, there are further north-south differentiations, whose racialized effects reached Chinese Southeast Asians in the form of lootings, expulsions, rapes, and murders during the global sixties. The global sixties arc of histories and texts that I trace here, connecting France, Indonesia, China, Vietnam, and Malaysia, was inflected by fissures within the resistance towards the racialized power of colonialism, as postcolonial nationalisms across Southeast Asia themselves took the form of racial nationalisms. Furthermore, this arc is also crucially modulated by **China’s deft appropriation of the global racial line and its strategic Third-Worldization.** The suppressed relationalities within the Global South, involving the internal colony in the United States represented by Smith, Wright, and Du Bois and the postcolonies in Southeast Asia represented by Duong and Li, bubble up not only in Paris, Bandung, and Beijing, but also in Saigon, Kuala Lumpur, Jakarta, and Surabaya. Seen from such a relational perspective, the actual and symbolic geographies of the North and the South suggest a differentially inflected system of racialized power, which deeply fractured the global racial line of black, brown, and yellow peoples throughout the global sixties.

**Sovereignty**

**Anti-blackness is the root cause of sovereignty and their analysis only magnifies the link – their failure to forefront the positionality of the slave replicates anti-blackness**

**Sexton 2010** ~Jared, Associate Professor of African American Studies and Associate Professor of Film and Media Studies and one third of The Trifecta of Tough, "People-of-Color-Blindness: Notes on the Afterlife of Slavery," Social Text, Vol. 28, No. 2~ p.40-42/MR

Agamben is incorrect to date the onset of this crisis and the advent of the paradigm of the camp with the “new laws on citizenship and on the denationalization of citizens” in Europe of the interwar years, that is, the rise of martial law in the first half of the twentieth century.48 The general failure of the inscription of nativity in the order of the nation-state and the state’s management of the biological life of the nation is predated and prepared by the strict prohibition of nativity under the regime of racial slavery and the state’s management of the biological life of the enslaved throughout the Atlantic world, most pointedly through the sexual regulation of race in the British North American colonies and the United States.49 And the racial circumscription of political life (bios) under slavery predates and prepares the rise of the modern democratic state, providing Social Text 103 • Summer 2010 41 the central counterpoint and condition of possibility for the symbolic and material articulation of its form and function.50 If in Agamben’s analysis the inscription of nativity in Euro-America is disquieted in the twentieth century by postcolonial immigration, the native-born black population in the United States — known in the historic instance as “the descendants of slaves” — suffers the status of being neither the native nor the foreigner, neither the colonizer nor the colonized.51 The nativity of the slave is not inscribed elsewhere in some other (even subordinated) jurisdiction, but rather nowhere at all. The nativity of the slave is foreclosed, undermining from within the potential for citizenship, but also opening the possibility of a truly nonoriginal origin, a political existence that signifies “the presence of an absence that discloses the absence inherent in all presence and every present.”52 Agamben overestimates the extent to which the question of nativity is displaced by the figure of the refugee. It is perhaps better to say that it is disturbed by the presence of strangers in a strange land. More simply, we might say to the refugee that you may lose your motherland, but you will not “lose your mother.”53 The latter condition, the “social death” in which one is denied kinship entirely by the force of law, is reserved for the “natal alienation” and “genealogical isolation” characterizing slavery. Here is Orlando Patterson, from his encyclopedic 1982 study: “I prefer the term “natal alienation” because it goes directly to the heart of what is critical in the slave’s forced alienation, the loss of ties of birth in both ascending and descending generations. It also has the important nuance of a loss of native status, of deracination. It was this alienation of the slave from all formal, legally enforceable ties of “blood,” and from any attachment to groups or localities other than those chosen for him by the master, that gave the relation of slavery its peculiar value to the master. The slave was the ultimate human tool, as imprintable and as disposable as the master wished. And this was true, at least in theory, of all slaves, no matter how elevated.54” True, even if one attains the income and educational levels of the mythic American middle class, the celebrity of a Hollywood icon, or the political position of the so-called leader of the free world. The alienation and isolation of the slave is not just vertical, canceling out ties to past and future generations (“the descendants of slaves” now understood as a strict oxymoron). It is also horizontal, canceling out ties to the slave’s contemporaries as well. The deracination of the slave, reduced to a tool, is total, more fundamental than the displacement of the refugee, whose status obtains in a network of persecuted human relations in exile rather than in a collection or dispersal of a class of things. Crucially, deracination is strictly correlative to the “absolute submission mandated by law” discussed by Hartman above, the most perfect example of the space of purely formal obedience defining the jurisdictional field of sovereignty. Because the forced submission of the slave is absolute, any signs whatsoever of “reasoning . . . intent and rationality” are recognized “solely in the context of criminal liability.” That is, “the slave’s will [is] acknowledged only as it [is] prohibited or punished.”55 A criminal will, a criminal reasoning, a criminal intent, a criminal rationality: with these erstwhile human capacities construed as indices of culpability before the law, even the potentiality of slave resistance is rendered illegitimate and illegible a priori. Again, this is true not only for the slave’s resistance to submission to this or that slaveholder but to the whole of the free population, what I called earlier the unequally arrayed category of nonblackness.

**Warming**

**Global Warming is not caused by humans writ large—it is caused by the uneven development engendered by Whiteness. The affirmative naturalizes the coercive racial politics at the heart of warming by universalizing its source and projecting its impacts far into the future. The imperial West started the process of warming, and the American racial state perpetuated it in the quest to export Whiteness. The affirmative only notices warming when it might destroy white bodies, invisibilizing millions of non-whites already killed.**

**Wynter 2007** (Sylvia, Professor Emeritus in Spanish and Romance Languages at Stanford Univeristy, “The Human being as noun? Or being human as praxis? Towards the Autopoietic turn/overturn: A Manifesto,” otl2.wikispaces.com/file/view/The+Autopoetic+Turn.pdf)

For if, as Time magazine reported in January 2007 (Epigraph 2), a U.N. Intergovernmental panel of Natural Scientists, were soon to release "a smoking-gun report which confirms that human activities are to blame for global warming" (and thereby for climate change), and had therefore predicted "catastrophic disruptions by 2100," by April, the issued Report not only confirmed the above, but also repeated the major contradiction which the Time account had re-echoed. This contradiction, however, has nothing to do in any way with the rigor, and precision of their natural scientific findings, but rather with the contradiction referred to by Derrida's question in Epigraph 3—i.e., But who, we? That is, their attribution of the non-natural factors driving global warming and climate change to, generic human activities, and/or to "anthropocentric forcings"; with what is, in effect, this mis-attribution then determining the nature of their policy recommendations to deal with the already ongoing reality of global warming and climate change, to be ones couched largely in economic terms. That is, in the terms of our present mode of knowledge production, and its "perceptual categorization system" as elaborated by the disciplines of the Humanities and Social Sciences (or "human sciences") and which are reciprocally enacting of our present sociogenic genre of being human, as that of the West's Man in its second Liberal or bio-humanist reinvented form, as homo oeconomicus; as optimally "virtuous Breadwinner, taxpayer, consumer, and as systemically over-represented as if it, and its behavioral activities were isomorphic with the being of being human, and thereby with activities that would be definable as the human-as-a-species ones. Consequently, the Report's authors because logically taking such an over-representation as an empirical fact, given that, as highly trained natural scientists whose domains of inquiry are the physical and (purely) biological levels of reality, although their own natural-scientific order of cognition with respect to their appropriate non-human domains of inquiry, is an imperatively self-correcting and therefore, necessarily, a cognitively open/open-ended one, nevertheless, because in order to be natural scientists, they are therefore necessarily, at the same time, middle class Western or westernized subjects, initiated 15 as such, by means of our present overall education system and its mode of knowledge production to be the optimal symbolically encoded embodiment of the West's Man, it its second reinvented bio-humanist homo oeconomicus, and therefore bourgeois self-conception, over-represented as if it were isomorphic with the being of being human, they also fall into the trap identified by Derrida in the case of his fellow French philosophers. The trap, that is, of conflating their own existentially experienced (Western-bourgeois or ethno-class) referent "we," with the "we" of "the horizon of humanity." This then leading them to attribute the reality of behavioral activities that are genre-specific to the West's Man in its second reinvented concept/self-conception as homo oeconomicus, ones that are therefore as such, as a historically originated ensemble of behavioral activitiesas being ostensibly human activities-in-general. This, in spite of the fact that they do historicize the origin of the processes that were to lead to their recent natural scientific findings with respect to the reality of the non-naturally caused ongoing acceleration of global warming and climate change, identifying this process as having begun with the [West's] Industrial Revolution from about 1750 onwards. That is, therefore, as a process that can be seen to have been correlatedly concomitant in Great Britain, both with the growing expansion of the largely bourgeois enterprise of factory manufacturing, as well with the first stages of the political and intellectual struggles the British bourgeoisie who were to spearhead the Industrial Revolution, to displace the then ruling group hegemony of the landed aristocracy cum gentry, and to do so, by inter alia, the autopoetic reinvention of the earlier homo politicus/virtuous citizen civic humanist concept of Man, which had served to legitimate the latter's traditionally landed, political, social and economic dominance, in new terms. This beginning with Adam Smith and the Scottish School of the Enlightenment in the generation before the American, French, and Haitian (slave) revolutions, as a reinvention tat was to be effected in now specifically bourgeois terms as homo oeconomicus/and virtuous Breadwinner. 116 That is as the now purely secular genre of being human, which although not to be fully (i.e., politically, intellectually, and economically) institutionalized until the mid-nineteenth century, onwards, when its optimal incarnation came to be actualized in the British and Western bourgeoisie as the new ruling class, was, from then on, to generate its prototype specific ensemble of new behavioral activities, that were to impel both the Industrial Revolution, as well as the West's second wave of imperial expansion, this based on the colonized incorporation of a large majority of the world's peoples, all coercively homogenized to serve its own redemptive material telos, the telos initiating of global warming and climate change. Consequently, if the Report's authors note that about 1950, a steady process of increasing acceleration of the processes of global warming and climate change, had begun to take place, this was not only to be due to the Soviet Revolution's (from 1917 onwards) forced march towards industrialization (if in its still homo oeconomicus conception, since a march spearheaded by the 116 See the already cited essay by J.G.A. Pocock "symbolic capital," education credentials owning and technically skilled Eastern European bourgeoisie)—as a state-directed form of capitalism, nor indeed by that of Mao's then China, but was to be also due to the fact that in the wake of the range of successful anti-colonial struggles for political independence, which had accelerated in the wake of the Second World War, because the new entrepreneurial and academic elites had already been initiated by the Western educational system in Western terms as homo oeconomicus, they too would see political independence as calling for industrialized development on the "collective bovarysme "117 model of the Western bourgeoisie. Therefore, with the acceleration of global warming and climate change gaining even more momentum as all began to industrialize on the model of homo oeconomicus, with the result that by the time of the Panel's issued April 2007 Report the process was now being driven by a now planetarily homogenized/standardized transnational "system of material provisioning or mode of techno-industrial economic production based on the accumulation of capital; as the means of production of ever-increasing economic growth, defined as "development"; with this calling for a single model of normative behavioral activities, all driven by the now globally (post-colonially and post-the-1989-collapse-of-the-Soviet Union), homogenized desire of "all men (and women) to," realize themselves/ourselves, in the terms of homo oeconomicus. In the terms, therefore, of "its single (Western-bourgeois or ethno-class) understanding" of "man's humanity," over-represented as that of the human; with the well-being and common good of its referent "we"—that, not only of the transnational middle classes but even more optimally, of the corporate multinational business industries and their financial networks, both indispensable to the securing of the Western-bourgeois conception of the common good, within the overall terms of the behavior-regulatory redemptive material telos of ever-increasing economic growth, put forward as the Girardot-type "cure" for the projected Malthusian-Ricardo transumed postulate of a "significant ill" as that, now, ostensibly, of mankind's threatened subordination to [the trope] of Natural Scarcity, this in the reoccupied place of Christianity of its postulate of that "ill" as that of enslavement to Original Sin."' With the result that the very ensemble of behavioral activities indispensable, on the one hand, to the continued hegemony of the bourgeoisie as a Western and westernized transnational ruling class, is the same ensemble of behaviors that is directly causal of global worming and climate change, as they are, on the other, to the continued dynamic enactment and stable replication of the West's second reinvented concept of Man; this latter in response to the latter's existential imperative of guarding against the entropic disintegration of its genre of being human and fictive nation-state mode of kind. Thereby against the possible bringing to an end, therefore, of the societal order, and autopoetic living Western and westernized macro world system in it bourgeois configuration, which is reciprocally the former's (i.e., its genre of being human, and fictive modes of kind's condition of realization, at a now global level. This, therefore, is the cognitive dilemma, one arising directly from the West's hitherto unresolvable aporia of the secular, that has been precisely captured by Sven Lutticken in a recent essay. Despite, he writes, "the consensus that global warming cannot be ascribed to normal fluctuations in the earth's temperature... [the] social and political components of this process have been minimized; man-made nature is re-naturalized, the new (un)natural history presented as fate." And with this continuing to be so because (within the terms, I shall add, of our present "single understanding of man's humanity" and the unresolvable aporia which it continues to enact), "[t]he truly terrifying notion is not that [global warming and climate change] is irreversible, but that it actually might be reversible—at the cost of radically changing the economic and social order..."119 The changing, thereby, of the now globally hegemonic biologically absolute answer that we at present give to the question to who we are, and of whose biohumanist homo oeconomicus symbolic life/death (i.e., naturally selected/dysselected) code's intentionality of dynamic enactment and stable replication, our present "economic and social order" is itself the empirical actualization.

**Root Cause**

**Ableism**

**Whiteness is the root cause of ableism – technologies of violence and surveillance used against people with disabilities originated in Eurocentric thought**

**Smith ‘4** [Phil, Executive Director, Vermont Developmental Disabilities Council, “Whiteness, Normal Theory, and Disability Studies”, Disability Studies Quarterly Spring 2004, Volume 24, No. 2, http://dsq-sds.org/article/view/491/668]

This point, that ableism is created by those who define themselves as able-bodied, as normal, and that it is a master status invisible to themselves, calls out for the need to develop what might be called normal theory and normal studies, similar to the development of whiteness theory and whiteness studies, that can unpack more fully the ideology of ableism and expose normality as a scopic site for the subjugation of people labeled as having disabilities. It is also likely, given the normative universalization of whiteness in modernist Western culture, that the construction of whiteness is at the complex, multiple roots of both racisms and ableisms. This is especially true given that eugenic science is at the heart of current special education, psychology, and the system of services and supports for people with disabilities (Kliewer and Drake 1998). Clearly, whiteness is intimately tied to modernist constructions of science (Kincheloe 1999). It would seem, then, that the projects of developing multiple, postmodern, normal studies may have as their subjects, at least in part, the complex ways in which whiteness ideology creates ableisms. Kincheloe (1999) argues cogently, when discussing the normative landscape of whiteness, that: This norm has traditionally involved a rejection of those who did not meet whiteness' notion of reason emerging from the European Enlightenment. Whiteness deployed reason – narrowly defined Eurocentric reason as a form of disciplinary power that excludes those who do not meet its criteria for inclusion into the community of the socio-politically enfranchised. Understanding such dynamics, those interested in the reconstruction of white identity can engage in the post formal (a theoretical effort to redefine the Eurocentric notions of intelligence and reason by examining such concepts in light of socio-psychological insights from a variety of non-western cultures [see Kincheloe and Steinberg 1993; Kincheloe 1995]) search for diverse expressions of reason. Such a project empowers white students seeking progressive identities to produce knowledge about the process of White identity reconstruction, the redefinition of reason, the expansion of what is counted as a manifestation of intelligence, and the phenomenological experience of challenging the boundaries of whiteness. (Paragraph 56) This analysis seems critical in understanding the relationship of whiteness studies and disability studies. The normative disciplinary power of whiteness undergirding the rationality of Eurocentric culture and thought segregates not only those defined as not-white from the terrains of equality, equity, and justice, but also those defined as not-Able (body or mind). A project of inclusion that reinvents whiteness by calculating freshly an ideology of diverse reasons, intelligences, and experiences will, of necessity, involve an exploration of the cartography of abled Normality. A broad whiteness studies approach must shake hands with a broad disability studies approach if either whiteness or ability is to be reconceptualized.

**Refusal of ableism within civil society is merely the upending of a conflict within civil society which mystifies the fundamental antagonism which structures America and the World: the absolute non-being of blackness – anti-blackness provides ontological and conceptual coherence to any notion of a "human" subject**

**Kim 13,** Hyo K. Kim is an assistant professor of English at Medgar Evers College, City University of New York, where he teaches Asian American literature and literary theory. He is currently involved in two research projects; one editing a collection of critical essays on Theresa Cha’s Dictee; another is a book-length study exploring the connections between minor affects and the aesthetics of minority literatures in the United States, Published in Penumbra: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Critical and Creative Inquiry, <http://unionpenumbra.org/article/the-ruse-of-analogy-blackness-in-asian-american-and-disability-studies/>

For instance, what at first glance seems merely naïve―that is **the observation that in the U.S. “[b]eing disabled is just like being black”―actually does index how disability cannot be synonymous with Whiteness**. For what is suggested through the forced parity between the construction of blackness and disability is that the disabled body or mind cannot properly embody Whiteness in toto. And that is what Anna Stubblefield demonstrates in “‘Beyond the Pale’: Tainted Whiteness, Cognitive Disability and Eugenic Sterilization,” which iterates how disabled white persons have historically been categorized as embodying a tainted form of whiteness. She convincingly argues that beginning from the 1800s in the U.S. those who were considered feebleminded, a form of cognitive disability, lost the full privileges attendant with white citizenship. As she writes, “ … to grasp feeblemindedness fully as a signifier of tainted whiteness, it is important to understand that the state-sponsored, involuntary sterilization of tainted whites meant that they had, in effect, lost the full protection that whiteness conferred in a white supremacist society” (178; emphasis added). Not only did the so-called feebleminded whites come to embody a compromised form of whiteness but also the “ … white men [and women] labeled as criminal, sexually deviate, homosexual, … or insane … ” (Stubblefield 178). What Stubblefield emphasizes is that **disability as a social construct cannot easily be detached from its imbricated positioning within a network of material forces that include not only race but sexuality, class, and gender**. Her study foregrounds **the need for Disability studies to attend to racialization as not a tangential focus but central to its overall theoretical and political project.** Interestingly Stubblefield’s study of how disability can dispossess whites of their “full personhood” under U.S. law seemingly lends support to what “Dismodernism” authorizes, which is **the idea that the suffering of blacks can be made equivalent to not only what disabled whites come to embody but also to all those other Others represented under the category of “people of color.” In short, disability has the potential to democratize civil society by recalling how all citizens are common in their humanity―that is, equally exposed to disability**. Yet, if we read between the lines of Stubblefield’s summary of how “feebleminded whites” can become “tainted,” the singularity of “blackness’s grammar of suffering” emerges. For **what distinguishes “blackness grammar of suffering” is how it does not operate according to the assumptive logic of capability. In other words, to approach “blackness’s grammar of suffering,” Wilderson insists that one must be able to imagine “an ethicality … so terrifying that, as a space to be inhabited and terror to be embraced” (41), it resists language. It is a “grammar of suffering” based not upon the logic of a “lost” capacity but that of a deontologized property, the Slave that is not “exploited and alienated” but rather “accumulated and fungible.” The effect of this singular grammar on Asian American and Disability studies is significant, but the impact of Wilderson’s critique on the “scholarly and aesthetic production” of the “Black theorist” is radical by comparison**. As he writes: This [“blackness’s grammar suffering”] makes the labor of disavowal in Black scholarly and aesthetic production doubly burdensome, for it is triggered by a dread of both being ‘discovered,’ and of discovering oneself, as ontological incapacity. Thus, through borrowed institutionality―the feigned capacity to be essentially exploited and alienated (rather than accumulated and fungible) in the first ontological instance (in other words, a fantasy to be just like everyone else, which is a fantasy to be)―the work of Black film theory [and by extension Black studies] operates through a myriad of compensatory gestures in which the Black theorists assumes subjective capacity to be universal and thus ‘finds’ it everywhere. (42) Placed within the frame of “blackness’s grammar of suffering,” I want to examine the consequences of Davis’s attempt to render disability cosmopolitan. While the move has the virtual effect of equalizing all bodies around human capacity to suffer―such an ethical cum political strategy requires the disavowal of how concepts such as “human” and “civil society” in the U.S. have structurally depended on the production of social death, i.e. the Black (and the Red). As it should be obvious by now, what **is therefore unthinkable in** Davis’s **attempt to make civil society cohere around the universality of human suffering is the contingent nature of the term human itself**. This in fact is what Bells intuits but cannot name in his influential essay entitled “Introducing White Disability Studies: A Modest Proposal.” Bell’s hesitation is partly attributable to how pain or suffering is both social (that is communicable, sharable by all humans in equal measure) and incommunicable within Disability studies. That is, **Disability studies’ uneven attention to the incommunicability of suffering is seemingly capable of accommodating the unrepresentability that is constituent of “blackness’s grammar of suffering.”** As Siebers insists, “[i]ndividuality derived from the incommunicability of pain easily enforces a myth of hyperindividuality, a sense that each individual is locked in solitary confinement where suffering is the only object of contemplation. People with disabilities are already too politically isolated for this myth to be attractive” (176). Yet in an attempt to intervene in the poststructuralist tendency to idealize “physical pain” as site of either transcendent power or pleasure, Siebers also adds, “… [p]hysical pain is [at once] highly individualistic, unpredictable, and raw as reality. Pain is not a resource of political change. It is not a well of delight for the individual” (178). What is directly pertinent to the present essay is how the universal figure of the “individual”- human marks the critical horizon of Disability theory. Or, to put a finer point to it via Widerson’s reading of Frantz Fanon’s Black Skin, White Mask, “… the Negro … ‘is comparison,’ nothing more and certainly nothing less, for what is less than comparison? … [And as such] ‘No one knows yet who [the Negro] is, but he knows that fear will fill the world when the world finds out’” (42). We find in the most sophisticated Asian Americanist deployment of poststructuralist strategies of reading―such as the one advanced in the influential work by Kandice Chuh―a similar call to abandon politics based on social identity.6 While I am in agreement with both Davis’s and Chuh’s overarching critique of uniform identity, I find troubling their wholesale critique of all identity formation as a priori essentialist. For such framing of social identity as necessarily restrictive can only lead to the return of the repressed in our present era of colorblindness―the ideal of abstract citizenship. As she writes: “‘Asian American’ … connotes the violence, exclusion, dislocation, and disenfranchisement that has attended the codification of certain bodies as variously, Oriental, yellow, sometimes brown, inscrutable, devious, always alien. It speaks to the active denial of personhood to the individuals inhabiting those bodies” (Chuh 27). In this, Chuh―along with Davis and Siebers―unwittingly announces the displacement and the erasure of “blackness’s grammar of suffering,” as their strategies of reading the presence or absence of justice within U.S. civil society is predicated upon exploitation and alienation of the a priori human subject. Nevertheless, by embodying the self―Disability studies helps to shift (though only slightly) critical theory toward an alternative ethicality that does not programmatically endorse the idea and ideals of abstract citizenship. For contrary to the liberal model of the political subject that achieves “hyperindividuality” through social and material detachment, the alternative model of subjectivity that is afforded through the disabled body is a self that is always already in the process of negotiating complex relations to the materiality of the social. Thus, the embodied model of subjectivity helps to re-imagine “personhood” as relation itself, leading not to the reification or essentialization of self, this relational model of subjectivity demands that any identity whatsoever be thought not as autonomous substance but rather as a site, comprising of unfinished, mobile, heterogeneously constituted relations across an embodied hermeneutic horizon. It bears mentioning here that it is this interconnected and radically open vision of “personhood” as relation that is foreclosed in the liberal model of abstract citizenship. For in the liberal model of the self, the ideal is to attain singular indeterminacy through the negation of such social relations, without which no self can hope to attain intelligibility. As Alcoff’s important work suggests: Social identities … are more properly understood as sites from which we perceive, act, and engage with others. These sites are not simply locations or positions, but also hermeneutic horizons comprised of experiences, basic beliefs, and communal values […] . We are not boxed in by them, constrained, restricted, or held captive―unless … it makes sense to say that we are boxed in by the fact that we have bodies . … (287) Interestingly **it is by attending to how the self is embodied and embedded in social reality that clarifies the radical singularity of the Black’s structural non-relationality, which in turn helps to bring into focus not only what Wilderson calls the “structural antagonisms” that contour U.S. civil society but also unexplored ethico-political limits and possibilities of sub-fields such as Disability and Asian American studies**. For according to Wilderson’s Red, White & Black what gives internal coherence to such terms as “human” and “civil society” in the U.S. is the disavowal of the structural (historical) relation blacks have with what is essentially non-human, a form of social death known as slavery. As he summarizes:

During the emergence of new ontological relations in the modern world, from the late Middle Ages through the 1500s, many different kinds of people experienced slavery. … But African, or more precisely **Blackness, refers to an individual who is by definition always already void of relationality. Thus modernity marks the emergence of a new ontology because it is an era in which an entire race appears, people who, a priori, that is prior to the contingency of the ‘transgressive act’** (such as losing a war or being convicted of a crime), **stand as socially dead in relation to the rest of the world**. (17-8)

Wilderson’s intervention therefore hinges on isolating and exposing this dual operation by which civil society makes sense of itself to itself―the simultaneous disavowal of and parasitic dependency on the Black. In other words, **the desire to make blackness an analogue of disability amounts to denying the structural relevancy of slavery to the formation of U.S. civil society. Wilderson’s reading of Fanon helps to articulate the radical singularity of “blackness’s grammar of suffering,” as it emphasizes how “… the gratuitous violence of the Black’s first ontological instance, the Middle Passage, ‘wiped out [his or her] metaphysics … his [or her] customs and sources on which they are based.’ Jews went into Auschwitz and came out as Jews. Africans went into the ships and came out as Blacks” (38). What Wilderson calls the “blackness’s grammar of suffering,” consequently, has no analogue in either the assumptive figure of the “individual” that subtends Disability studies and those other Others within U.S. civil society that have become included within the frame known as “people of color.” In this, “blackness’s grammar of suffering” gestures toward what is unnamable, a form of suffering that is in excess of any ethical language which is based upon the universal figure of the human. This is how Wilderson radically undermines the desire to transpose “blackness’s grammar of suffering” into the ethico-political language upon which civil society’s depends to make suffering (physical, psychic or otherwise) intelligible**. As he writes The ruse of analogy erroneously locates Blacks in the world―a place where they have not been since the dawn of Blackness. This attempt to position the Black in the world by way of analogy is not only a mystification, and often erasure, of Blackness’s grammar of suffering (accumulation and fungibility or the status of being non-Human) but simultaneously also a provision for civil society, promising an enabling modality for Human ethical dilemmas. It is a mystification and an erasure because … their grammars of suffering are irreconcilable. (37)

**Feminism**

**Spatial analysis is necessary intersectional – gender and class must be considered alongside racial formations**

**Razac 2007** (Sherene, professor of Sociology and Equity Studies in Education, the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education of the University of Toronto. "When Place becomes Race," Race and Racialization Essential Readings, 76)

It must be said at the outset that our focus on racial formations is automatically a focus on class and gender hierarchies as well.  Racial hierarchies come into existence through patriarchy and capitalism, each system of domination mutually constituting the other.  The lure of a spatial approach is precisely the possibility of charting the simultaneous operation of multiple systems of domination.  As Edward Soja explains in Postmodern Geographies, "the spatiality of social life is stubbornly simultaneous, but what we write down is successive because language is successive."  To consider, for example, the multiple systems that constitute spaces of prostitution, we must talk about the economic status of women in prostitution, the way in which areas of prostitution are marked as degenerate space that confirms the existence of white, respectable space, the sexual violence that brings so many young girls to prostitution, and so on.  Yet, beginning with any one practice privileges a particular system and leaves the impression that it is that system that is pre-eminent.  A spatial analysis can help us to see the operation of all the system as they mutually constitute each other.

**Model Minority**

**You need to include blackness in discussion of the model minority**

**Kim 13,** Hyo K. Kim is an assistant professor of English at Medgar Evers College, City University of New York, where he teaches Asian American literature and literary theory. He is currently involved in two research projects; one editing a collection of critical essays on Theresa Cha’s Dictee; another is a book-length study exploring the connections between minor affects and the aesthetics of minority literatures in the United States, Published in Penumbra: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Critical and Creative Inquiry, <http://unionpenumbra.org/article/the-ruse-of-analogy-blackness-in-asian-american-and-disability-studies/>

Min Hyoung Song recently highlighted a disavowed yet structurally inevitable entanglement between blackness and Asian Americans in U.S. civil society when he noted that Asian Americans are becoming “less of a model whose successes specifically berate blacks and other racial minorities for their lack of resolve and more a kind of, for lack of a better term, super-minority whose successes berate everyone [including the disabled] who fails somehow to succeed” (18). Song’s provocative take on the evolving status of the “model minority” maps what I see as a potentially productive dialogue between Disability studies and the contemporary critique of the concept of an Asian-American model minority.1 Also, as Song makes explicit, **we should also include in this dialogue the construction of blackness in any discussion of the “model minority” because the term insinuates that there is an antithesis of the “model” and it is safe to say within the Americas that people of African descent have historically and are now under the greatest scrutiny in that category**. In this way, Asian Americans’ emergent status as “super-minority” also correlates with what Michelle Alexander has recently diagnosed as the “‘**color blind’ public consensus that personal and cultural traits, not structural arrangements, are largely responsible for the fact that the majority of young black men in urban areas across the United States are currently under the control of the criminal justice system or branded as felons for life”** (234-5). Broadly put, the aim of the present essay is to foreground how subfields such Asian American and Disability studies can participate, however unwittingly, in deflecting attention from what Alexander calls the “structural arrangements” that contour blackness within U.S. civil society. In doing so, I hope to intervene in the ongoing depoliticization of ethnic/minoritarian studies within higher learning.

**Militarization**

**Anti-blackness is the Root Cause of militarization in the US and abroad**

**Nopper and Kaba 14** (Tamara K. [& Mariame](https://www.jacobinmag.com/author/mariame-kaba-and-tamara-k-nopper/) , [Tamara K. Nopper](http://tamaranopper.com/) is a sociologist, writer, and editor. [Mariame Kaba](http://www.usprisonculture.com/blog/) is the founding director of Project NIA, a grassroots organization with a vision to end youth incarceration. , "Itemizing Atrocity," Jacobin, <https://www.jacobinmag.com/2014/08/itemizing-atrocity/> //SC)

\*edited for ablest language

According to the [Economist](http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21599349-americas-police-have-become-too-militarised-cops-or-soldiers?fsrc=scn/tw/te/pe/copsorsoldiers), “America’s police have become too militarized.” Not to be outdone, [Business Insider](http://www.businessinsider.com/police-militarization-ferguson-2014-8) published an article by Paul Szoldra, a former US marine who professed to be aghast at the scenes of camouflage-wearing, military-weapon-toting police officers patrolling the streets of an American city in armored vehicles. Szoldra quotes one of his Twitter followers, another former soldier, who [wrote](https://twitter.com/Travis_Waldron/status/499291525512429568): “We rolled lighter than that in an actual warzone.” Some may be surprised to ~~see~~ such stories run in magazines like the Economist and Business Insider, but suddenly discussions about America’s militarized police forces are semi-mainstream. In the wake of the police killing of African-American teenager [Michael Brown](http://blogs.riverfronttimes.com/dailyrft/2014/08/mike_brown_shooting_ferguson_family.php?utm_content=buffer09ee4&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer) in Ferguson, Missouri and the subsequent [riots](https://www.jacobinmag.com/2014/08/in-defense-of-the-ferguson-riots/) and protests, social media is littered with images of tear gas, tanks, and police in military gear with automatic weapons — all aimed at black people in the city. Several publications and writers have rushed to alert us about their stories on the militarization of the police. Commentators have encouraged us to connect the dots between what is happening overseas and what is happening here. Hashtags referring to Ferguson and Gaza share the same caption. We are told by some that the war on terror has come home. Presumably, connecting these dots and making these comparisons will offer more clarity about the current situation faced by Ferguson’s beleaguered black residents. But what will we better ~~see~~ and know? And who and what will be (once again) invisible and unheard in the process? In her book [Scenes of Subjection](http://global.oup.com/academic/product/scenes-of-subjection-9780195089837;jsessionid=CEC0E139C6CAED0620EE11E5953C620D?cc=us&lang=en&), Saidiya Hartman writes: Rather than try to convey the routinized violence of slavery and its aftermath through invocations of the shocking and the terrible, I have chosen to look elsewhere and consider those scenes in which terror can hardly be discerned . . . By defamiliarizing the familiar, I hope to illuminate the terror of the mundane and quotidian rather than exploit the shocking spectacle. Hartman’s emphasis on “the terror of the mundane and quotidian” is her attempt to address the dilemma of black people having their suffering ~~(un)seen~~ and ~~(un)heard~~ by non-blacks — including those who purport to care: At issue here is the precariousness of empathy . . . how does one give expression to these outrages without exacerbating the indifference to suffering that is the consequence to the benumbing spectacle or contend with the narcissistic identification that obliterates the other or the prurience that too often is the response to such displays? This was the challenge faced by [Frederick] Douglass and other foes of slavery. . . A century and a half after Douglass fought against slavery, the police have become more militarized in terms of weapons, tanks, training, and gear. SWAT teams have been deployed at an accelerated rate and for an increased number of activities. Reports, like the one recently published by the [ACLU](https://www.aclu.org/war-comes-home-excessive-militarization-american-policing), provide some details about these technologies of war amassed by local police departments. [Julilly Kohler-Hausmann](http://www.usprisonculture.com/blog/2011/12/28/jon-burge-torture-and-the-militarization-of-the-police/), [Radley Balko](http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2014/06/24/new-aclu-report-takes-a-snapshot-of-police-militarization-in-the-united-states/), and others have explained that the militarization of US police can be traced back to the mid-1960s. For example, in 1968, urban police forces were able to buy new equipment and technologies thanks to funding from the newly passed Safe Streets Act. The social anxiety and fear engendered by the Vietnam War and domestic urban rebellions led by black people provided license for the police to turn these new products on the marginalized populations of inner-city America. SWAT teams, batterrams, and no-knock warrants (immortalized by [Gil Scott Heron](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1fXmHAEi_5w&list=RD1fXmHAEi_5w) and written about by [James Baldwin](http://www.thenation.com/article/159618/report-occupied-territory)), all predate contemporary hyper-militarized police forces. Black people have been the overwhelming targets of these instruments of war. In his 1982 song “Batterram,” presaging our current uber-militarized police force, Toddy Tee [raps](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=We1Q2t0EkxI): And the chief of police says he just might (Flatten out every house he sees on sight) Because he say the rockman is takin him for a fool. **For blacks, the “war on terror” hasn’t “come ‘home.’” It’s always been here**. How then might we consider the emphasis on the militarization of policing as the problem as another example of “the precariousness of empathy”? The problem with casting militarization as the problem is that the formulation suggests it is the excess against which we must rally. We must accept that the ordinary is fair, for an extreme to be the problem. The policing of black people — carried out through a variety of mechanisms and processes — is purportedly warranted, as long as it doesn’t get too militarized and excessive. Attention is drawn to the “spectacular event” rather than to the point of origin or the mundane. Circulated are the spectacles — dead black bodies lying in the streets or a black teenager ambushed by several police officers in military gear, automatic weapons drawn. Along with these dramatic images, numbers and statistics are the main metric for soliciting empathy and galvanizing people into action. It is the size and power of the gun. It is the number of cops at the scene. It is the tank pointed at protestors. It is the forty-one bullets shot at a [black immigrant](http://www.nytimes.com/1999/02/05/nyregion/officers-in-bronx-fire-41-shots-and-an-unarmed-man-is-killed.html) standing in his doorway. The eight to ten times a [black teenager](http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/08/13/ferguson-missouri-teen-shooting-witness/13992387/) was shot “like an animal” when walking to ~~see~~ his relatives or the four hours his body laid in the street while family members and neighbors watched and waited helplessly. The at least eleven times a [black woman](http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-28199303) was punched by a cop straddling her on the side of a highway. The over two minutes a forty-eight-year-old [black woman](http://www.theroot.com/articles/culture/2014/08/nypd_probes_alleged_dragging_of_half_naked_mom_into_hall.html), half-naked, was kept in the hallway and surrounded by about a dozen cops after being dragged out of her apartment. The number of black people [stopped and frisked](http://www.nyclu.org/news/new-nyclu-report-finds-nypd-stop-and-frisk-practices-ineffective-reveals-depth-of-racial-dispar). The mind-numbing images and numbers keep coming. And shock and awe often greet their arrival. Both the pictures and statistics become the stuff of (at times hard-fought for) headlines, reports, social commentaries, and “teachable moments.” Sadly, their circulation seems to demonstrate, as [Frank Wilderson](http://www.yorku.ca/intent/issue5/articles/frankbwildersoniii.php) puts it, that “taxonomy can itemize atrocities but cannot bear witness to suffering.” These images and numbers are not trivial or unimportant. Like the black people killed, injured, humiliated, and haunted, they matter and shouldn’t be ignored. The greater the number of shots fired, the greater likelihood of being hit. The amount of time spent physically contained by cops increases the possibility of harm. Other black people have to live with the trauma of having seen and heard these images in real time or virally, the numbers accumulating as they fly and tick away and scream and gasp in the air. Yet we know it only takes one shot from a cop to kill. And as the police killing of [Eric Garner](http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/19/nyregion/staten-island-man-dies-after-he-is-put-in-chokehold-during-arrest.html?_r=0) shows, it can take no shot at all. The problem is not just the excess. Yet one gets the sense that the only way to generate a modicum of concern or empathy for black people is to raise the stakes and to emphasize the extraordinary nature of the violations and the suffering. To circulate repeatedly the spectacular in hopes that people consider the everyday. It’s a fool’s errand because it often doesn’t garner the response desired or needed. And it leaves black people in the position of having to ratchet up the excess to get anyone to care or pay attention. What next, some might ask? What more could happen after Ferguson and the hyper-militarization of the police? A bomb dropped on blacks in the United States? That has already [been done](http://philadelphia.cbslocal.com/2013/05/13/survivor-remembers-bombing-of-philadelphia-headquarters/), decades ago. To the point: **spectacle as the route to empathy means the atrocities itemized need to happen more often or get worse, to become more atrocious each round in hopes of being registered**. How does black suffering register when we are told that it is the militarization of the police that is the problem? Again, Hartman is instructive, writing of “the narcissistic identification that obliterates the other.” It is true that militarization is a global phenomenon. It is true that the United States and its allied countries enforce their brutal agendas throughout the world through military force, sanctions, and “the war on terror.” It is also true that, despite the black diaspora’s effort to emphasize what happens to black people worldwide (including in the United States), references to globalization, militarization, and the war on terror are often treated as markers of non-blackness — and among some progressives, as code for “needing to go beyond black and white” or for blacks in the United States to not be so “US-centric” (read: “self-absorbed”). Hence the odd historiography about the militarization of the US police as emerging from the (relatively new) war on terror found in some of the current commentary. Some may promote the effort to “connect the dots” in service of a more nuanced analysis or to encourage international and interracial solidarity. We can also consider this an example of “the precariousness of empathy,” with blacks required to tether their suffering to non-blacks (and processes often erroneously treated as non-black, such as “militarization” and “globalization”) in the hope of being seen and heard. This is also a marker of the compulsory solidarity that is demanded of black people without any expectation that this solidarity will be reciprocated. Relatedly, the push for coalition and the use of analogies suggests a difficulty to name precisely what black people experience in the United States. Scenes of police violence against blacks in Ferguson seemingly become more legible, more readable and coherent, when put into conversation with Iraq or Gaza. And yet something gets lost in translation. The sentiments — “I thought I was looking at pictures of Iraq but I was looking at America!” or “Ferguson=Gaza” or “now [blacks in the United States] know how the Third World feels” — circulate on social media. Such statements express a belief in American exceptionalism and a certain amount of glee and resentment towards African-Americans while professing empathy. Amid this, we are left with the difficulty to name both the spectacle and the quotidian violence blacks in the United States experience day after day, from the police and the racially deputized. What do we call this incessant violence? How do we describe it beyond the “spectacular event”? Occupation? War? Genocide? Life? Death? We conclude with more questions: How do we rightfully account for the increased militarization of the police as a problem without forgetting what [Joy James](http://www.upress.umn.edu/book-division/books/resisting-state-violence) reminds us: “the dreams and desires of a society and state will be centered on the control of the black body” — or as [Jared Sexton](http://www.scribd.com/doc/118686369/People-of-Color-Blindness-Notes-on-the-Afterlife-of-Slavery-Jared-Sexton) emphasizes: blacks serve as “the prototypical targets of the panoply of police practices and the juridical infrastructure built up around them?” How do we contend with [Wilderson’s](http://www.socialjusticejournal.org/archive/92_30_2/92_04Wilderson.pdf) assertion that “white people are not simply ‘protected’ by the police. They are — in their very corporeality — the police?” What does all this mean when we think about hyper-militarized police forces that weaponize white supremacy against black bodies and the specter of blackness among others? How does it feel to be the prototypical target? What do the spectacles of policing — as well as the responses to it — both reveal and camouflage in regard to the “terror of the mundane and quotidian,” a terror that is often taken for granted, even in critical commentary?

**Neoliberalism**

**Chattel Slavery and the slave ship in particular are foundational to modern systems of domination and neoliberalism.**

**Dillon 13**, [Stephen, “Fugitive Life: race, gender, and the rise of the neoliberal-carceral state”, P. 69-71]//MHELLIE

Chattel slavery is central to the contemporary politics of the market in addition to the politics of life and death in general. Indeed, terror’s constitutive relationship to the production and management of race began on the “floating dungeon” of the slave ship. As a paradigmatic technology of modernity, the slave ship—a machine that was simultaneously a prison, a factory, a market, and an instrument of warfare—and its social relations inaugurated the economic, discursive, and institutional life of transnational capitalism.136 The carceral, the imperial, and the industrial were intertwined in the biopolitical regulation of black life, the expansion of capital, and the production of blackness, whiteness, and white supremacy. **The slave trade produced methods for controlling populations; disciplining, torturing, and immobilizing the body; regulating health and hygiene; and extending the market beyond the economic**. Additionally, it produced regimes of race and racism wherein blackness was subjected to “open and absolute vulnerability,” making white life dependent upon black (living) death.137 In short, the slave trade inaugurated methods for ranking life and measuring value that have yet to be undone.138 We can position slavery and its various technologies of domination (ship, plantation, sexual violence, management of birth) as preceding Giorgio Agamben’s argument that the concentration camp is the paradigmatic figure of modernity.139 In Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, Agamben argues that the juridico-political structure of the camp is a “hidden matrix of the politics in which we are still living.”140 For Agamben, the camp is the “new biopolitical nomos of our planet,” and our future resides in our ability to recognize the ways that the camp inhabits and drives the architecture of cities, airports, and the distribution of life and death across the globe. The camp is not a historical anomaly but a temporal and spatial structure that is continually brought back to life. That is, it may change name and shape but its function remains the same. As with Agamben’s call to see space, time, and power in a new way in order to make visible the camp’s possession of our everyday, I am arguing that we must learn to see the spirit of slavery in spectacles of racialized violence and death. In addition, we must also learn to recognize it in the operations that go by the names freedom, humanity, and democracy. Such a project requires an understanding that the biopolitics and necropolitics of slavery are not relegated to an amputated past, nor do they reside in a time progress will soon leave behind. Rather, the slave trade’s logics and technologies have intensified, expanded, and become more insidious. The past does more than repeat: it envelops, seduces, and multiplies.141

**Impacts**

**Black Women**

**The modern neoliberal-carceral state rests upon the space left by the millions of black bodies that have perished in civil society’s war on blackness. It uniquely impacts women of color and its effects are manifest in heir**

**Dillon 13**, [Stephen, “Fugitive Life: race, gender, and the rise of the neoliberal-carceral state”, P. 71-6]//MHELLIE

In many ways, Shakur’s “Women in Prison: How We Are” is a ghost story, a story of those dead to the law, dead to the world, and living a death in life.142 It is a story that confronts what goes unseen by virtue of its banality and thinks what is unthought within the analytics of black nationalism, white feminism, late liberalism, and white radicalism. Shakur’s essay is about the people who constitutively haunt a new phase in the life of global capitalism. **The imprisoned women of color in the text compose the “detritus” of neoliberalism—the human waste necessary to its success**.143 Shakur writes: There are no criminals here at Riker’s Island Correctional Institution for Women (New York), only victims. Most of the women (over 595 percent) are black and Puerto Rican. Many were abused as children. Most have been abused by men and all have been abused by ‘the system’...Many are charged as accessories to crimes committed by men. The major crimes that women here are charged with are prostitution, pick pocketing, shoplifting, robbery, and drugs...The women see stealing or hustling as necessary for the survival of themselves and their children because jobs are scarce and welfare is impossible to live on.144 Shakur describes the effects of this process on the body of a woman named “Spikey”: She is in her late thirties. Her hands are swollen. Enormous. There are huge, open sores on her legs. She has about ten teeth left. And her entire body is scarred and ashen. She has been on drugs about twenty years. Her veins have collapsed. She has fibrosis, epilepsy, and edema. For Shakur, prison, deindustrialization, and welfare animate a network of management and control that specifically targets black women. Throughout the essay, Shakur describes the late-twentieth-century post-industrial city as a place emptied of jobs, littered with abandoned buildings, and surrounded by policing and penal technologies. Indeed, **the effects of neoliberalism’s economic and policing technologies are written on the decaying bodies of Shakur’s fellow captives**. Yet caged bodies do not decompose of their own volition; they are produced by the regimes of power that detain and envelope them. For Shakur, open sores and missing teeth are traces of power’s touch, holes left by its mundane routines. Her description of bodily disintegration captures the diffuse violence and quotidian routines of domination that order black life but that are invisible in their banality. Terror eludes detection by operating behind rational categories— naturalized by social science and the state—like crime, poverty, and pathology.145 **Neoliberalism’s management of life and death is not just evident in spectacles of warfare, state violence, or mass starvation. The mark of its operation sometimes looks like swollen hands and scarred flesh**. For Shakur, the affective, economic, racial, and gender politics of chattel-slavery returned under an emerging neoliberal-carceral state. The spirit of slavery animated the bars of prison cells and the coldness that surrounded captured black bodies; it seeped past the razor wire and concrete walls of the prison, structuring poverty on the street, regulatory violence in the welfare office, and the unfreedom that governs an anti-black world. Shakur describes this when she writes in her autobiography, “The only difference between here and the streets is that one is maximum security and the other is minimum security. The police patrol our streets just like guards patrol here. I don’t have the faintest idea how it feels to be free.”**146 Shakur goes on to connect this carceral regime to the poverty produced by an emergent neoliberal state: The rest of the women who weren’t doing time for the numbers were in for some kind of petty theft, like shoplifting or passing bad checks.** Most of those sisters were on welfare and all of them had barely been able to make ends meet. The courts had shown them no mercy. They brought in this sister shortly after I arrived who was eight months pregnant and had been sentenced to a month for shoplifting something that cost less than twenty dollars.147 Here, Shakur names the connections between carceral and policing apparatuses and the market’s production of poverty. By centering women of color in her analysis of this landscape, Shakur apprehends the ways that gendered and racialized methods of survival performed in the empty lots abandoned by capital become crimes to fill prisons, which in turn fill empty spaces.148 In the late 1970s, criminalization became the weapon of choice in dealing with the social problems produced by the globalization of capital and the resistance it engendered.149 **The imprisoned women of color—the “butches,” “fems,” “bulldaggers,” and “stud broads”—centered in Shakur’s analysis show the ways that heterosexism, white supremacy, and neoliberalism collude to immobilize poor (queer) women of color**. Shakur’s writing highlights the centrality of gender, sexuality, and race to the ways that the neoliberal-carceral state renders socially and civically dead human beings “who come from places where dreams have been abandoned like the buildings.”150 Thus, we can understand heterosexism, racism, and the prison as colluding technologies that exist in the shadow of the abandoned buildings that litter Shakur’s post-industrial landscape. In other words, the very foundations of neoliberalism’s theories, techniques, and operations rest upon racialized and gendered logics, even as white supremacy and heterosexism are incessantly disavowed in its distribution of life and death. Although it produces the neutral discourses of equality, diversity, freedom, and opportunity, neoliberalism necessitates force, punishment, warfare, immobilization through incarceration, and the uneven distribution of social and biological death.151 State violence is not the exception to neoliberalism, but rather, is its condition of possibility. Simply, the neoliberal state requires the management, regulation, and immobilization of surplus or expendable populations. When a guard tells her that the Thirteenth Amendment did not abolish slavery, but rather, transferred it to the prison, Shakur connects deindustrialization and the market under neoliberalism to slavery and the prison: Well, that explained a lot of things. That explained why jails and prisons all over the country are filled to the brim with Black and Third World people, why so many black people can’t find a job on the streets and are forced to survive the best way they know how. Once you’re in prison, there are plenty of jobs, and, if you don’t want to work, they beat you and throw you in the hole...Prisons are a profitable business. They are a way of legally perpetuating slavery.152 Within this analytic, the market mimics and colludes with the prison’s anti-blackness. Through the racialized and gendered production of poverty and criminality, the market functions as a type of prison. If a critical genealogy of the prison leads us back to the coffle, the plantation, the sweat box, and the slave ship**, the market also leads back to slavery’s economic, ontological, and epistemological technologies**. Because slavery returns to possess the present, for Shakur, it also returns to drive resistance. Shakur uses memory and imagination in order to recall histories of “fierce determination” and struggle: “I can imagine the pain and strength of my great-great grandmothers who were slaves and my great-great grandmothers who were Cherokee Indians trapped on reservations.”153 Shakur draws on the affective force of the dead to help combat the changing contours of global capitalism, white supremacy, and institutionalized sexism. She remembers “women who delivered babies, searched for healing roots, and brewed medicines. Women who darned socks, and chopped wood, and layed bricks. Women who could swim rivers and shoot the heads off a snake...fierce women who could stop you with a look out the corners of their eyes.”154 Shakur is forced to rely on memory and imagination because she is in prison, and because histories of slaves and slavery have been rendered unknowable. This is the space produced by stories that were never recorded and lives that never existed beyond the confines of social death. Using memory and vision, Shakur names and makes visible the disappeared and the destroyed. She apprehends the ways that the socially dead of now and then form the foundation of the neoliberal-carceral state. **Neoliberalism rests upon the emptiness left by those who have captured, detained, or killed**. Through their absence, 2.5 million people in prison and jail order the world we inhabit. Capital moves freely across space where millions of bodies should be. This space is produced by the demise of the golden age of capitalism and the destruction of social movements militantly pursued throughout the 1970s. The disappeared are the required refuse of neoliberalism.155 Neoliberalism generates order, choice, freedom, and prosperity through the disappearance of millions of people. For Shakur, captive black women are at the center of this equation.

**Hypervisibility**

**Hypervisibility means junior partners get to pass off as white meanwhile black is always demarcated as deviant.**

**Sexton 10** (Jared, Associate professor at UC Irvine Curtain of the Sky; published in 2010)

**The hyper-visibility of the black is an effect of the sheer corporeality attributed to the black in the racist imagination, the over-presence of her ‘tangible personality’ or ‘actual being’**. Fanon writes: ‘**The Negro symbolizes the biological’ (Fanon 2008: 144), where the projective evacuation of biological existence from certain Western philosophical conceptions of intelligence denigrates the body as a permanent threat to the continuity of reason. More precisely, the biological threat is sexual in nature and it is the unmitigated sexualization of blackness, the reduction of the black to sexual being – to the flesh of genitalia, in fact – and the resulting blackening of sex and sexuality, that characterizes negrophobia**. Perhaps **it goes without saying that this reduction of the body to flesh links the libidinal economy of sexual fetishism to the political economy of commodity fetishism in the most acute way.** **This suggests that while it is impossible to be anti-Semitic (persecuting Jewishness as the corporate presence of cunning or sinister intelligence, leading to the loss of property or political power) without also being anti-black (persecuting blackness as the embodied antithesis of intelligence, a consuming violence leading to madness and the loss of bodily integrity), it is quite possible to be anti-black without also being anti-Semitic**; or, perhaps more relevant to racial formation in the USA, without also being anti-Indian or anti-Asian. In other words, **one can reject without contradiction the thesis that it is best to be white and Christian – the postulate of white superiority, and even pursue the re-signification of a historically disparaged Jewishness, Indianness, Asianness, etc., while endorsing, in whole or in part, the thesis that it is nonetheless worst to be black – the postulate of black inferiority.** For Lewis R. Gordon, whose black existential philosophy has reframed Fanon’s thought in Anglophone academic cirles since Homi K. Bhabha’s landmark introduction to the 1986 Pluto Press edition of Black Skin, White Masks: ‘there is no way to reject the thesis that there is something wrong with being black beyond the willingness to “be” black – not in terms of convenient fads of playing blackness, but by paying the social costs of anti-blackness on a global scale’ (Gordon 1997: 67). **What are these social costs and what might it mean to pay them, if they represent the price of being ethical in an anti-black world? In point of fact, to speak of ‘black inferiority’ in this schema is euphemistic**. Fanon **diagnoses in the lived experience of the black not a feeling of inferiority, but rather ‘a feeling of not existing’** (Fanon 2008: 118). Fanon’s existential phenomenology of non-existence not only extends and, in a sense, radicalizes the Du Boisian concept of ‘double con- sciousness’, first described in the latter’s 1897 Atlantic Monthly article, ‘Strivings of the Negro People’, as the ‘strange experience’ of ‘being a problem’: not causing a problem with one’s act or even posing a problem with one’s demand**, but being a problem in one’s very existence. Fanon’s thought also embeds a deeper meditation on the ontology of race, an ontology that, because the product of maneuvers of powers real and symbolic, is a properly political ontology**. How, then, does Fanon perform the conceptual displacement of white supremacy with anti-blackness?

**Alternatives**

**Black Affirmation**

**Blackness isn’t just reducible to a commodity within neoliberal exchange but rather is codified as a commodity to the world only rendered meaningful through contours of death. Only affirmations of vitality within spaces of death can flip this ascription of value.**

**Moten and Harney 14** (Fred Moten – PhD UC Berkley. Fellow in the Humanities Council and the Center for African American Studies at Princeton University and a member of the writing faculty of the Milton Avery Graduate School of the Arts, Bard College. Member of the Critical Theory Institute at the University of California, Irvine; Stephano Harney – Professor of Strategic Management Education at Singapore Management University, “Michael Brown”, <http://boundary2.dukejournals.org/content/42/4/81.full.pdf> - ERW)

The state can’t live with us and it can’t live without us. Its violence is a reaction to that condition. The state is nothing other than a war against its own condition. The state is at war against its own (re)sources, in violent reaction to its own condition of im/possibility, which is life itself, which is the earth itself, which blackness doesn’t so much stand in for as name, as a name among others that is not just another name among others. That **we survive is beauty and testament**; it is neither to be dismissed nor overlooked nor devalued by or within whatever ascription of value; that we survive is invaluable. It is, at the same time, insufficient. We have to recognize that a state—the racial capitalist/settler colonial state—of war has long existed. Its brutalities and militarizations, its regulative mundani- ties, are continually updated and revised, but they are not new. If anything, **we need to think more strategically about our own innovations**, recognizing 4. I want to thank Rachel O’Reilly for bringing Ah Kee’s work to my attention. See her “Compasses, Meetings and Maps: Three Recent Media Works,” Leonardo 39, no. 4 (2006): 334–39. Published by Duke University Press boundary 2 84 boundary 2 / November 2015 that the state of war is a reactive state, a machine for regulating and capi- talizing upon our innovations in/for survival. This is why what’s most disturbing about Michael Brown (aka Eric Garner, aka Renisha McBride, aka Trayvon Martin, aka Eleanor Bumpurs, aka Emmitt Till, aka an endless stream of names and absent names) is our reaction to him, our misunderstanding of him, and the sources of that mis- understanding that manifest and reify a desire for standing, for stasis, within the state war machine which, contrary to popular belief, doesn’t confer citi- zenship upon its subjects at birth but, rather, at death, which is **the proper name for entrance into its properly political confines**. The prosecution of Michael Brown, which is the proper technical name for the grand jury inves- tigation of Darren Wilson, the drone, is what our day in court looks like and always has. The prone, exposed, unburied body—the body that is given, in death, its status as body precisely through and by way of **the withholding of fleshly ceremony**—is what political standing looks like. That’s the form it takes and keeps. This is a Sophoclean formulation. The law of the state is what Ida B. Wells rightly calls lynch law. And we extend it in our appeals to it. **We need to stop worrying so much about how it kills, regulates, and accumulates us, and worry more about how we kill, deregulate, and dis- perse it.** We have to love and revere our survival, which is (in) our resis- tance. We have to love our refusal of what has been refused. But insofar as this refusal has begun to stand, insofar as it has begun to seek standing, it stands in need of renewal, now, even as the sources and conditions of that renewal become more and more obscure, more and more entangled with the regulatory apparatuses that are deployed in order to suppress them. At moments like this we have to tell the truth with a kind of viciousness and, even, a kind of cruelty. **Black lives don’t matter, which is an empirical state- ment** not only about black lives in this state of war but also about lives. This is to say that lives don’t matter; nor should they. It’s the metaphysics of the individual life in all its immateriality that’s got us in this situation in the first place. Michael Brown lived and moved within a deep and evolving under- standing of this: if i leave this earth today atleast youll know i care about others more then i cared about my damn self. . . . But we have to consider how, and what it means that, his testament is transformed into an expression of mourning and outrage such as this upon the nonoccasion of the nonindictment: Go on call me “demon” but I WILL love my damn self. Published by Duke University Press boundary 2 On Race and Innovation Dossier / Harney and Moten 85 I suffer with but also through this expression of our suffering. For this expres- sion of our disavowal of the demonic—however brutally the police and/or the polis, in their soullessness, ascribe it to or inscribe it upon us—is erst- while respectability’s voluntary laying down of arms, its elective demobili- zation of jurisgenerative force. Meanwhile, Michael Brown is like another fall and rise through man—come and gone, as irruption and rupture, to remind us not that black lives matter but that black life matters; that **the absolute and undeniable blackness of life matters.** The innovation of our survival is given in embrace of this daimonic, richly internally differentiated choreography, its lumpen improvisation of contact, which is obscured when class struggle in black studies threatens to suppress black study as class struggle. How much has black studies, as a bourgeois institutionalization of black study, determined the way we understand and fight the state of war within which we try to live? How has it determined how we understand the complex nonsingularity that we know now as Michael Brown? It would be wrong to say that Michael Brown has become, in death, more than him- self. He already was that, as he said himself, in echo of so much more than himself. He was already more than that in being less than that, in being the least of these. To reduce Michael Brown to a cypher for our unfulfilled desire to be more than that, for our serially unachieved and constitutionally unachievable citizenship, is to do a kind of counterrevolutionary violence; it is to partake in the ghoulish, vampiric consumption of his body, of the body that became his, though it did not become him, in death, in the reductive stasis to which his flesh was subjected. Michael Brown’s flesh is our flesh; he is flesh of our flesh of flames.5 On August 9, like every day, like any other day, black life, in its irre- ducible sociality, having consented not to be single, got caught walking— with jurisgenerative fecundity—down the middle of the street. Michael Brown and his boys: black life breaking and making law, against and under- neath the state, surrounding it. They had foregone the melancholic appeal, to which we now reduce them, for citizenship, and subjectivity, and human- ness. That they had done so is the source of Darren Wilson’s genocidal instrumentalization in the state’s defense. They were in a state of war and they knew it. Moreover, they were warriors in insurgent, if imperfect, beauty. What’s left for us to consider is the difference between the way of Michael Brown’s dance, his fall and rise—the way they refuse to take place when 5. I’m thinking, here, of a collaboration between Theodore Harris and Amiri Baraka, Our Flesh of Flames (Philadelphia: Anvil Arts Press, 2008). Published by Duke University Press boundary 2 86 boundary 2 / November 2015 he takes to the streets, the way Ferguson takes to the streets—and the way we seek to take, but don’t seem to take to, the streets: in protest, as mere petitioners, fruitlessly seeking energy in the pitiful, minimal, tempo- rary shutdown of this or that freeway, as if mere occupation were something other than retrenchment (in reverse) of the demand for recognition that actually constitutes business as usual. Rather than dissipate our preoccu- pation with how we live and breathe, we need to defend our ways in our per- sistent practice of them. It’s not about taking the streets; it’s about how, and about what, we should take to the streets. What would it be and what would it mean for us jurisgeneratively to take to the streets, to live in the streets, to gather together another city right here, right now? 3 Meanwhile, against the dead citizenship that was imposed upon him, the body the state tried to make him be, and in lieu of the images we refuse and can’t have, **here is an image of our imagination.** Michael Brown Sr. yells as the coffin of his son, Michael Brown, is lowered into the ground at St. Peter’s Cemetery in St. Louis, August 25, 2014. Photo courtesy of Richard Perry/The New York Times/Redux. Published by Duke University Press boundary 2 On Race and Innovation Dossier / Harney and Moten 87 This is Michael Brown, his descent, his ascension, his ceremony, his flesh, his animation in and of the maternal ecology—Michael Brown’s innovation, as contact, in improvisation. Contact improvisation is how we survive genocide. we didn’t get here by ourselves. black takes like black took. we were already beside our selves, evidently. eventually, we were upside ourselves in this wombed scar, this womblike scarring open scream tuned open, sister, can you move my form? took, had, give. because he wasn’t by himself he’s gone in us. how we got over that we didn’t get here is wanting more than that in the way we carry ourselves, how we carry over our selves into we’re gone in the remainder. here, not here, bought, unbought, **we brought ourselves with us so we could give ourselves away**, which is more than they can take away, even when its more than we can take.

**Black Fem**

**Using the critical lens of black feminism is essential to realizing how the necropolitics of slavery possess the biopolitics of neoliberalism. It clarifies how civil society manages certain populations using terror and death and allows for the narrative of a different story of neoliberalism.**

**Dillon 13**, [Stephen, “Fugitive Life: race, gender, and the rise of the neoliberal-carceral state”, P. 60-2]//MHELLIE

The predominant narrative about the relationship between the market, the body, population, and life under neoliberalism rests upon the unthinkability of slavery. That is, the theories and epistemologies mobilized to make sense of neoliberalism are incapable of connecting slavery to neoliberalism’s biopolitics. My argument is not that slavery is like neoliberalism, but that the racialized and gendered logics, discourses, and biopolitical power of the market under slavery possess and structure the market under neoliberalism. Indeed, if “[n]eoliberalism is merely the most recent [form of] governmentality that relies on market knowledge and calculations for a politics of subjection and subject-making” then what is the role of slavery’s production of global capital, race, and technologies of subjection in this process?118 If neoliberalism requires the expulsion of the past from the present, how can a genealogy of neoliberalism that centers slavery alter how we understand neoliberalim’s operations? What histories of the market and the economic can black feminism provide so that we tell a different story about neoliberalism? Through its engagement with the unknowable and unthinkable, black feminism makes possible a critical genealogy of neoliberalism and biopolitics that can account for chattel slavery. By doing so, we can understand anti-blackness as foundational to neoliberalism. In addition, we can adjust our understanding of the relationship between the market, the body, and the population. Because **black feminism is a formation that makes sense of the management of populations through an engagement with the production of terror and death, it can help us tell different story about neoliberalism, one where the past lives on in the present, one where “all of it is now.”** Dorothy Roberts’ analysis of the torture of contemporary prisoners using a restraint chair (also know as the “slave chair” or “devil’s chair”) offers a model for the project I am attempting. Roberts argues that a chain of racialized technologies used to torture (chairs, chains, rope, bars, and so on) blur the distinction between past and present. For Roberts, torture has been a primary mechanism for the production of race and the racial state in the United States, and something as mundane as a chair is mobilized to produce a racial order. A chair is one node in a vast network of spatial- temporal power and violence that produces race as life and death. The design and use of the chair is more than haunted by slavery’s methods of population management and control: slavery’s power possesses and animates the chair (in name and operation). The chair has a life of its own; the chair has an affect. Through its investment with biopolitical power, the chair disassembles time and space so that the past does not linger in the present, but becomes indistinguishable from it. Terror forces the past to emerge within the present. We can understand the market in a similar capacity; **the market functioned as a biopolitical and carceral technology under chattel slavery, and these logics continue to animate aspects of its operation**. The market possessed the body, managed populations, and mimicked the carceral. **By engaging a black feminist genealogy of slavery and the market—one composed by imprisoned black feminists writing within an ascendant neoliberal state—we can understand the necropolitics of slavery as possessing the biopolitics of neoliberalism**. In other words, it is not only the slavery of prison that is central to neoliberalism, but also the prison of the market.

**2NC**

**Assata Shakur examines the way in which society functions as a jail for marginalized bodies, securing capital and whiteness. This is a biopolitical power that is the animated spirit of slavery manifest.**

**Dillon 13**, [Stephen, “Fugitive Life: race, gender, and the rise of the neoliberal-carceral state”, P. 76-8]//MHELLIE

By centering racialized genders in her analysis of the 1970s United States, Shakur captures the necessity of Wacquant’s “carceral mesh” to the implementation of neoliberalism.156 She writes, “My sisters on the streets, like my sisters at Riker’s Island, see no way out” because “we were, and still are, in a much more terrible jail.”157 For Shakur, the spaces of the prison, ghetto, and home are neither compartmentalized nor discrete; rather, they collude with each other, composing an expansive grid of captivity that immobilizes and disposes of racialized and gendered populations. If Shakur’s “jail” captures some, it also immunizes other bodies from such routine abjection and social death, thus securing capital, whiteness, and white life. The market is central to this regime of power. It is complicit in the process of producing surplus life, life that will be policed and imprisoned. White supremacy, (hetero)sexism, and the market overdetermine the presence of Shakur and her fellow captives in prison. Shakur’s conception of “jail” undoes normative conceptions of space by exceeding the walls of the prison proper. Her conception of power is not just disciplinary, but also biopolitical. Power does not just restrict the body; it possesses it. Power manages life, bodies, and populations from the inside; power bends space, and also bends time because this jail— this network of management and immobilization—is animated by the spirit of slavery. Slavery’s production of social and biological death did not end with emancipation, did not cease with end of segregation, and refused to heed under civil rights legislation. Its logic and power exceeds the realm of law. The past comes back not just to haunt, but to structure and drive the contemporary operations of power. By centering anti-black technologies and discourses, Shakur challenges normative conceptions of space and time to demonstrate the ways that neoliberalism’s mechanisms of control are expansive in the spatial and temporal sense. Neoliberal-carceral technologies track, manage, and immobilize rebellious or surplus life—a process that is driven and informed by technologies inaugurated under the Atlantic slave trade. We were, and still are, in a much more terrible jail. In her essay, those resisting the massive restructuring of capitalism in the 1970s are part of a five-century-long struggle against slavery and white supremacy, while the forces opposing them are part of that same history. For Shakur, Davis, and Williams, we do not seize hold of the past in order to make sense of the present; sometimes the past grabs hold of you first. One does not choose what of the past is relevant to the now—possession is not so simple. The spirit of slavery has its own desires that exceed our control or even our conscious thought. But for the demonic to be exorcised, you must first know that you are possessed.

**Burn it down**

**Vote neg – freedom is an illusion created by the shackles of civil society, we must burn the 1AC to the ground  
Farley 5 – Boston College (Anthony, “Perfecting Slavery”,**[**http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1028&context=lsfp**](http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1028&context=lsfp)**)**What is to be done? Two hundred years ago, when the slaves in Haiti rose up, they, of necessity, burned everything: They burned San Domingo flat so that at the end of the war it was a charred desert. Why do you burn everything? asked a French officer of a prisoner. We have a right to burn what we cultivate because a man has a right to dispose of his own labour, was the reply of this unknown anarchist. 48 The slaves burned everything because everything was against them. Everything was against the slaves, the entire order that it was their lot to follow, the entire order in which they were positioned as worse than senseless things, every plantation, everything. 49 “Leave nothing white behind you,” said Toussaint to those dedicated to the end of white-overblack. 50 “God gave Noah the rainbow sign. No more water, the fire next time.” 51 The slaves burned everything, yes, but, unfortunately, they only burned everything in Haiti. 52 Theirs was the greatest and most successful revolution in the history of the world but the failure of their fire to cross the waters was the great tragedy of the nineteenth century. 53 At the dawn of the twentieth century, W.E.B. Du Bois wrote, “The colorline belts the world.” 54 Du Bois said that the problem of the twentieth century was the problem of the colorline. 55 The problem, now, at the dawn of the twenty-first century is the problem of the colorline. The colorline continues to belt the world. Indeed, the slave power that is the United States now threatens an entire world with the death that it has become and so the slaves of yesterday, today, and tomorrow, those with nothing but their chains to lose, must, if they would be free, if they would escape slavery, win the entire world. We begin as children. We are called and we become our response to the call. Slaves are not called. What becomes of them? What becomes of the broken-hearted? The slaves are divided souls, they are brokenhearted, the slaves are split asunder by what they are called upon to become. The slaves are called upon to become objects but objecthood is not a calling. The slave, then, during its loneliest loneliness, is divided from itself. This is schizophrenia. The slaves are not called, or, rather, the slaves are called to not be. The slaves are called unfree but this the living can never be and so the slaves burst apart and die. The slaves begin as death, not as children, and death is not a beginning but an end. There is no progress and no exit from the undiscovered country of the slave, or so it seems. We are trained to think through a progress narrative, a grand narrative, the grandest narrative, that takes us up from slavery. There is no up from slavery. The progress from slavery to the end of history is the progress from white-over-black to white-over-black to white-overblack. The progress of slavery runs in the opposite direction of the pastpresent-future timeline. The slave only becomes the perfect slave at the end of the timeline, only under conditions of total juridical freedom. It is only under conditions of freedom, of bourgeois legality, that the slave can perfect itself as a slave by freely choosing to bow down before its master. The slave perfects itself as a slave by offering a prayer for equal rights. The system of marks is a plantation. The system of property is a plantation. The system of law is a plantation. These plantations, all part of the same system, hierarchy, produce white-overblack, white-over-black only, and that continually. The slave perfects itself as a slave through its prayers for equal rights. The plantation system will not commit suicide and the slave, as stated above, has knowing non-knowledge of this fact. The slave finds its way back from the undiscovered country only by burning down every plantation. When the slave prays for equal rights it makes the free choice to be dead, and it makes the free choice to not be. Education is the call. We are called to be and then we become something. We become that which we make of ourselves. We follow the call, we pursue a calling. Freedom is the only calling—it alone contains all possible directions, all of the choices that may later blossom into the fullness of our lives. We can only be free. Slavery is death. How do slaves die? Slaves are not born, they are made. The slave must be trained to be that which the living cannot be. The only thing that the living are not free to be is dead. The slave must be trained to follow the call that is not a call. The slave must be trained to pursue the calling that is not a calling. The slave must be trained to objecthood. The slave must become death. Slavery is white-over-black. White-over-black is death. White-over-black, death, then, is what the slave must become to pursue its calling that is not a calling.

**Black Nihilism**

**The alternative is a call for black nihilism – this allows us to map black spirituality and optimism beyond imprisonment within the onto-existential horizon.**

**Warren**, Assistant Professor of American Studies, **2015** (Calvin, research fellow at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee in Africology, "Black Nihilism and the Politics of Hope", CR: The New Centennial Review, 15.1, accessed on 9/26/15, hhs ew)

For West and Brogdon, nihilism is a spiritual-psychic disorder that requires a spiritual antidote. In this configuration of the spiritual, the nihilist is in need of deliverance—deliverance from the bondage of “hope-death.” We might, however, think of the nihilists not as the fleshly embodiment of “hope-death” but as spiritualists invested in the deliverance of the spiritual from the clutches of the Political. The black nihilist, in this regard, is profoundly spiritual and addresses the contamination of the spiritual by its political sequelae. Unlike the political-theologian, the nihilist does not promise redress within the structure of the political, for this is impossible, but offers, instead, rejection of the political as a spiritual practice itself.4 In a very thought-provoking discussion published in Religious Dispatches about the murder of Trayvon Martin and George Zimmerman’s acquittal, J. Kameron Carter, Anthea Butler, and Willie James Jennings conceptualize anti-blackness as a form of spiritual idolatry (Carter 2013). Evoking the seminal text Is God a White Racist? (1973), written by Dr. William R. Jones, these scholars suggest that anti-black political organization is often anchored in a racist theology—one that considers anti-blackness God’s will. Jones put the theodicy question to Black Liberation theologians and questioned this undying fealty to a liberation grounded in political reconfiguration and emancipatory rhetoric. Is God a White Racist? not only articulates the disjuncture between emancipatory “hope” and the devastating reality of black suffering but also questions the place of the Political within this liberation theology. This theology, indeed, presupposes certain metaphysical assumptions about the Political—progress, linear time, and agency—and Jones reveals a certain paradox within liberation theology: it is grounded in the Political but lacks a strong political philosophy to justify this grounding (i.e., a philosophy that connects the theological to the Political). This becomes even more problematic because these metaphysical presumptions are themselves instruments of anti-blackness. Anti-blackness, ironically, becomes the very foundation for the purported liberation from anti-blackness in this theology. This is precisely the contradiction that Jones intimates throughout the text, and it is this entanglement that renders political liberation somewhat of a ruse. In the article “Christian Atheism: The Only Response Worth Its Salt to the Zimmerman Verdict” (2013), J. Kameron Carter perspicuously foregrounds the problem of the Zimmerman verdict as a perverse deification of anti-blackness. If the shooting of Trayvon Martin was “god’s will,” as Zimmerman expressed to Sean Hannity in an interview, then this god considered black death a moral imperative, or an act of righteousness, and Zimmerman, in shooting Trayvon Martin, assumed the role of the obedient disciple. For Carter, this god is nothing more than an idol, a spiritual imposture created by modernity and its institutions: The white, western god-man is an idol that seeks to determine what is normal. It is a norm by which society governs the body politic or regulates, measures, evaluates, and indeed judges what is proper or improper, what is acceptable citizenship. It is this idol, the idol of “the American god,” that is the symbolic figure Zimmerman identified himself with and in relationship to which he judges Trayvon Martin as, in effect, religiously wanting—wanting in proper citizenship, and ultimately wanting in humanity. (3) The “white, western-god-man” (or the “American god”) that Carter describes bears resemblance to what Sylvia Wynter would call “Man” (2003, 322)—both are philosophical-theological apparatuses of anti-blackness, and they function to colonize essential spheres of existence (“Man” colonizes human and the “white, western-god-man” colonizes God). The “white, western-god-man” and “Man” index a process of extreme epistemological and metaphysical violence, and this violence serves as the foundation of Western society and its politics. The only response to this epistemological and metaphysical violence, according to Carter, is atheism. It is here that we hear an uncanny resonance with Ernest Bloch’s Atheism in Christianity (1971), in which “a good Christian must necessarily be a good atheist.” True Christianity necessitates a certain atheism—in fact it depends on it—to fortify the boundaries between the just/ unjust and the righteous/unrighteous. In other words, when a Christian encounters the idol of anti-blackness, she must assume an atheistic posture toward this idol to remain faithful (or as Carter would describe it to be “worth your salt”). The atheism that Carter proffers, however, is entangled in the metaphysical bind that sustains the very violence his atheism is designed to dismantle. For him, this atheism entails “social, political, and intellectual struggle... struggle in solidarity with others, the struggle to be for and with others, the struggle of the multitude, the struggle that is blackness [as] the new ecclesiology” (2013, 4). The term “struggle” here presents political metaphysics as a solution to the problem of anti-blackness—through labor, travail, and commitment one embraces progress and linearity as social goods. With this metaphysics, according to Carter, we can “struggle to get rid of these ‘Stand Your Ground’ Laws that are in place in many states besides Florida, struggle against state legislatures (such as North Carolina’s) that are enacting draconian laws of various sorts, struggle in the name of the protection of women’s agency about their own bodies—in short, struggle to imagine a new politics of belonging” (4). This struggle contains the promise of overcoming anti-blackness to usher in a “not-yet-social-order.” Again, the trick of time is deployed to protect “struggle” from the rigorous historical analysis that would demand evidence of its efficacy. The “not-yet-social-order,” situated in an irreproachable future (a political prolepsis), can only promise this overcoming against a history and historicity of brutal anti-black social organization. Carter is looking for a political theology—although we’ve always had one under the guise of democratic liberalism—that will provide conditions of life by mobilizing the discourses of hope and future temporality. The problem that this theology encircles, and evades, is the failure of “social justice” and “liberation theology” to dismantle the structure of anti-black violence; this brings us full circle to the problem that Dr. William R. Jones brilliantly articulated. Are we hoping for a new strategy, something completely novel and unique, that will resolve all the problems of the Political once and for all? If the Political itself is the “temple” of the idolatrous god—the sphere within which it is worshipped and preserved—can we discard the idol and purify the temple? Does this theology offer a political philosophy of purification that will sustain the “progress” that struggle is purported to achieve? In short, how does one translate the spiritual principle of hope into a political program—apolitical theology? The problem of translation haunts this theology and the looking-forward stance of the political theologian cannot avoid the rupture between the spiritual and the Political. Can we reject this racist god and, at the same time, support the political structure that affirms this idol? Can we be “partial” atheists? This becomes a problem for Carter when he suggests that we abandon this idol but fails to critique the structure of political existence, which sustains the power of this idol. Atheism as imagined here would entail rejecting the racist-white-god, or a racist political theology, and replacing it with a just God, or an equitable political theology. Will replacing the idol with a more just God transform the Political into a life-affirming structure for blackness? Unless we advocate for a theocracy, which is not what I believe Carter would propose, we need an answer to this question of translation. The answer to this question is glaringly absent in the text, but I read this absence as an attempt to avoid the nihilistic conclusion that his argument would naturally reach. We might even suggest that one must assume a nihilistic disposition toward the Political if justice, redress, and righteousness are the aims. The problem with atheism, then, is that it relies on the Political as the sphere of redemption and hope, when the Political is part of the idolatrous structure that it seeks to dismantle. In this sense, Dr. William R. Jones becomes an aporia for Dr. Kameron Carter’s text, if we read Jones as suggesting that black theology offers no cogent political philosophy, or political program, that would successfully rid the Political of its anti-black foundation. The Political and anti-blackness are inseparable and mutually constitutive. The utopian vision of a “not-yet-social order” that purges anti-blackness from its core provides a promise without relief—its only answer to the immediacy of black suffering is to keep struggling. The logic of struggle, then, perpetuates black suffering by placing relief in an unattainable future, a future that offers nothing more than an exploitative reproduction of its own means of existence. Struggle, action, work, and labor are caught in a political metaphysics that depends on black-death. The black nihilist recognizes that relying on the Political and its grammar offers nothing more than a ruse of transformation and an exploited hope. Instead of atheism, **the black nihilist would embrace political apostasy:** **it is the act of abandoning or renouncing a situation of unethicality and immorality**— in this sense, **the Political itself**. The apostate is a figure that “self-excommunicates” him-/herself from a body that is contrary to its fundamental belief system. As political apostate, the black nihilist renounces the idol of anti-blackness but refuses to participate in the ruse of replacing one idol with another. The Political and God—the just and true God in Carter’s analysis— are incommensurate and inimical. This is not to suggest that we can exclude God, but that any recourse to the Political results in an immorality not in alignment with Godly principles (a performative contradiction). The project to align God with the Political (political theology) will inevitably fail. If anti-blackness is contrary to our beliefs, self-excommunication, in other words “black nihilism,” is the only position that seems consistent. We can think of political apostasy, then, as an active nihilism when an “alternative” political arrangement is impossible. **When faced with the impossibility of realizing the “not-yet-social order,” political apostasy becomes an empowered hermeneutical practice; it interprets the anti-black Political symbolic as inherently wicked and rejects it both as critique and spiritual practice.**

**Fugitivity -> solves neoliberalism**

**Neoliberal freedom has emerged as a response to calls for social freedom, relegating demands for freedom to the position of the impossible. However, the weakness of neoliberal freedom is that it is predicated on that which is under the realm of coherence, that which can be named. This is precisely why we advocate for the position of the fugitive—fleeing to the underground which is a space where the specter of neoliberalism refuses to reside.**

**Dillon 13**, [Stephen, “Fugitive Life: race, gender, and the rise of the neoliberal-carceral state”, P. 158-161]//MHELLIE

Like the politics of law and order, we can understand neoliberal freedom as a response to the “freedom dreams” articulated by the liberation movements of the 1960s and ‘70s.362 **The neoliberal language of freedom worked to control, manage, and capture the notions of freedom produced by the left by rendering them unthinkable and impossible**. Unlike the ways that black freedom was articulated in the 1960s and ‘70s, neoliberal freedom was predicated on a contingency that could be named: the state, economic regulation, and physical coercion.363 But **the forms of political, social, economic, and ontological undoing required for black freedom escape the logic of neoliberal thought**. They are not contingent, but infinitely expansive, open, and always already taking flight. Black freedom required the end of white supremacy, the police, prisons, the military, the state, the country, modern subjectivity, and in the case of black feminist notions of freedom, heteropatriarchy, sexism, misogyny, and on and on. Indeed, **neoliberal thought functions to manage and contain the demands that would make black freedom possible by rendering them unthinkable.** The arguments and language that sustain Capitalism and Freedom are made possible by an epistemology that cannot see or understand anything beyond the abstract individual. In this way, neoliberal freedom transforms the biopolitical organization of life and death into individual problems with market solutions. Since freedom is tied to individuality, Friedman cannot see or name the biopolitical distribution of life and death neoliberal freedom requires and inaugurates. In this way, the neoliberal theory of freedom sustains the forms of devaluation and unfreedom it aims to abolish. The language of neoliberal freedom inaugurated a world where abandonment would be managed by the prison and a new form of state domination would come into being, not through centralization, but rather, through deregulation and privatization.364 Yet while neoliberal freedom was tightening its grasp on the possibilities of thought and world-making, a space came into being that tried to escape everything that freedom had been and was becoming. The underground and fugitive offered alternatives to the epistemological and ontological norms produced by the discourse of neoliberal freedom. Indeed, while Deleuze assists with understanding the crushing weight of language’s power, he also points to lines of flight and modes of escape that can aid thinking about the relationship between neoliberal freedom and the underground. Embedded within Deleuze’s theory of language as a form of capture is also an articulation of the ways that language stutters, stalls, and fails, thereby leading to rupture and undoing. For Deleuze, within every moment of capture there are also possibilities to flee: “For the question was not how to elude the order-word but how to elude the death sentence it envelopes, how to develop its power of escape, how to prevent escape from veering...into a black hole, how to maintain or draw out the revolutionary potential of the order-word.”365 If language can take hold of its object in the spirit of order, control, and regulation, then for Deleuze and Guattari, there are ways to turn “order into...passage,” rupture, and flight.366 In her analysis of how the writings of George Jackson affected the thought of Deleuze and Guattari, Michelle Koerner provides a useful example of this process: Jackson’s use of language could be understood as a “weapon” precisely because Jackson’s lines were shot through with such violent hatred of the “words and syntax of his enemy” that he “has only one recourse: to accept this language but to corrupt it so skillfully the whites will be caught in his trap.” In corrupting the “words and syntax” of domination, one directly attacks the “conditions that destroy life,” because language is here considered a mechanism by which one’s thought, agency, relations, and subjectivity are “caught” by Power.367 Jackson understood language as a technology of capture coextensive with police and the prison, but he also saw it as a means of escape. The regulatory norms of grammar and style include and validate certain usages while relegating others to a space of devaluation, which for Jackson meant the destruction of life. Yet by corrupting what captured him, he produced alternative forms of knowledge, feeling, and seeing since the production of “resistant subjectivities always involves a dismantling of the dominant order of language.”368 The underground is a space we can include within this understanding of flight from the “death sentence” of language, knowledge, and power. The underground was, of course, a space where fugitives evaded the law, but it was also a place where they escaped dominant systems of governance, ontology, and epistemology. In fact, **the space of the underground was brought into being by the forms of violence neoliberal freedom could not name.** It emerged to document, contest, and undo the forms of state violence that acted as the condition of possibility for the rise of the neoliberal-carceral state. **The underground was a space where the ghosts of neoliberal thought refused to remain imperceptible, where what was forcefully forgotten returned, and where freedom took on unimaginable and impossible meanings.**

**Global Color Line analysis**

**Only attuning analysis to the global color line as a praxis of social fracturing endemic to the globality of antiblackness can theorize the incentives of contemporary conflict.**

**Feldman 2016** (Keith P. Feldman – Assistant Professor Comparative Ethnic Studies UC Berkeley; Theories of Race, Nation, and Empire; Cultural Theory; African, Arab, and Jewish Diasporas; Visual Culture Studies; Transnational American Studies- Ph.D., University of Washington, 2008 (with honors) M.A., The George Washington University, 2003, B.A., Brown University, 2000 (cum laude) “On Relationality, On Blackness: A Listening Post”, Pgs. 112-115 – ERW)

-We don’t only control the RC to their impacts but also control the internal link to escalation insofar as blackness is weaponized to mark difference which is then open to violence – proves alt is net better than the plan.

Where and how, then, are we to think Blackness in relation? Such a question could be answered in advance by the ante-relationality sedimented in the antiBlack ordering of the modern world. At the same time, Blackness also elucidates a field formation suffused with descriptive and analytical concerns with a deep and **enduring relation to the contours of a modernity** animated by the lacerating trade winds of diaspora. Indeed, Black life emerges out of always already heterogeneous “overlapping diasporas” (Lewis), a horizon at once stilled, fixed, and determined from without and at the same time, as Harney and Moten evince in the above epigraph, enacted in excess, beyond and beneath the regulatory functions of state and capital. As Glissant elaborates (see epigraph), **the channels of Black diaspora are** both **the condition of** and the counterpoint to **modern globality**. It is a heteroglossic languaging that routinely announces and enunciates the practice and theory of the impossible on the uneven terrain of the transatlantic world. The study of Blackness forecasts insights into diasporic relationalities even as it renders the structural and systemic foundations of capitalist/colonial modernity as concerned fundamentally with anti-relationality. Coloniality binds diaspora to institutionalizations of violence and forces diaspora into the frame of the nation-state, deploying an epistemic containment policy that buries, obscures, and delimits relationality’s unbounded potentiality. Diaspora, as Stuart Hall reminds us, signals the interconnections of difference. The dispersion at its mercurial core renders diaspora in persistent apposition to the violence of the nation-state, a condition that is simultaneously a mark of the unhomely and the worldly. The positivist presentiments that give the lie to what once might have been called liberal multiculturalism and now often travels under the name “diversity” have begun to fall away (Ahmed). Its hegemony was never complete, to be sure. It was always contested, and hence always worked over and through. Those policies for representation that obscure plans for redistribution have been targeted by heterogeneous forms of resistance to state-sanctioned anti-Blackness expressed **intimately, affectively, bodily, structurally**, an anti-Blackness **that is both cause and consequence of the ongoing violence of capital accumulation** (Kish and Leroy). In their respective contributions to this forum, Therí Pickens and Vincent Schleitwiler foreground contemporary movements to contest anti-Black state violence, as well as the pressing invitations to relationality — connection, solidarity, linkage, resonance — that such movements evince. They also identify a relation to Blackness as a sign and scene of futurity, of hosting forms of relation yet to come. Pickens underscores how Arab American cultural production that relates to Blackness confronts the impulses both to universalism and to exceptionalism, as well as to the volatility of an anti-Black antagonism that circumscribes entry into U.S. civil society. Arab American fiction invites exploring the possibilities of relation to Blackness with eyes wide open to these tensions. For Pickens, the Arab American literary relation to Blackness has the capacity to interrupt the exceptionalist linear narrative of progress that organizes conventional immigrant narratives and yields alternative insights into formations of affect, kinship, and history. By theorizing Blackness as a “when” as much as a “what,” Pickens reveals the potentialities as yet encrypted in Arab American literary and cultural narratives. Schleitwiler takes the contemporary flourishing of collective action against antiBlack state violence as an invitation to engage the ethically troubled matrix of comparison required to write through the modalities of lynching that underwrite but also exceed their denomination as such. With Du Bois’s turn-of-the-century “colorline” heuristic in mind, Schleitwiler formulates **imperialism as animated by a will both to rule over and to do justice to difference.** While both Comparative Literature and Comparative Ethnic Studies have critically investigated the former for some time now, the latter invocation of “**imperialism’s racial justice” allows us to see how** practices of **imperial rule are catalyzed** not just **through** spectacular domination, torture, and violence, but also through an articulated investment in the inclusion of **hierarchically differentiated humanity in liberal educative and juridical institutions.** That is, **imperialism always seeks to regulate the terms through which difference** is included. Rather than cede the field of comparison wholly, Schleitwiler calls on us to attend to comparison’s “demons”: those “figure[s] of unpredictability and indeterminacy lurking within the knowledge of a world ordered by competing imperialisms that can never finally guarantee the universality to which they aspire.” Because imperialism’s comparative imaginary is always partial, incomplete, and haunted, Schleitwiler finds in that always-provisional claim to totalizing its rule over difference potential critical lines of flight. Genealogies of American empire, as Pickens and Schleitwiler provide, crystallize the problematic of Blackness and relation. Provincializing these genealogies is another matter altogether, and, in her contribution to the forum, Shu-mei Shih takes up precisely this task. In extending a method of “relational comparison,” Shih identifies the “Global 1960s” as the explosive flashpoint that reveals a decolonial arc of transnational and comparative epistemes producing imagined geographies rich with symbolic and material articulations of anti-imperialism. Part of that thread signifies China in general, and Maoism in particular, as quintessentially animating a generative Third Worldism for the times. This is the China embraced by Du Bois in 1959, a site through which revolutionary racial brotherhood signified as Afro-Asian solidarity was to be conceived. Yet, a practice of “relational comparison,” as Shih argues here, reveals another crucial thread in stark counterpoint to Du Bois. To the South of China (both geographically and epistemically) lay violent minoritizations, such as of the Hoa in Vietnam and Chinese Malaysians, predicated not simply on the long shadow of European colonialism but also **on the active imperial race-making emerging out of China.** The geographic impetus of the color line as the figure par excellence of racial solidarities is persistently interrupted by a rendering of the South of the South that reveals its **fractures, frictions, and racial contradictions.** This forum as a whole thus presents four cuts that sound out the multiplicity that Blackness signifies along numerous and sometimes contrary scholarly trajectories. Emerging from distinct institutional locations, it raises questions that are as much articulated to the conjuncture in which we live as to the registers of futurity that both precede and open out in advance of their very asking. As with the sharpest questions, their answers are hardly preordained

**Unflinching Paradigmatic Analysis**

**Our alternative is to enter a constant interrogation of the black positionality to render civil society incoherent. We create a political cognizance endorsed by every negative ballot that spreads the word to break down civil white society.**

**Wilderson, ’10** [2010, Frank B. Wilderson is an Associate Professor of African-American Studies at UC Irvine and has a Ph.D. from UC Berkeley, “Red, White & Black: Cinema and the Structure of U.S. Antagonisms,”]

**STRANGE AS** it might seem, this book project began in South Africa. During the last years of apartheid I worked for revolutionary change in both an underground and above-ground capacity, for the Charterist Movement in general and the ANC in particular. During this period, **I began to see how essential an unflinching paradigmatic analysis is to a movement dedicated to the complete overthrow of an existing order**. The neoliberal compromises that the radical elements of the Chartist Movement made with the moderate elements were due, in large part, to our inability or unwillingness to hold the moderates' feet to the fire of a political agenda predicated on an unflinching paradigmatic analysis. Instead, we allowed our energies and points of attention to be displaced by and onto pragmatic considerations. Simply put, **we abdicated the power to pose the question**—and the power to pose the question is **the greatest power of all**. Elsewhere, I have written about this unfortunate turn of events ***(Incognegro: A Memoir of Exile and Apartheid),*** so I'll not rehearse the details here. Suffice it to say, this book germinated in the many political and academic discussions and debates that I was fortunate enough to be a part of at a historic moment and in a place where the word revolution was spoken in earnest, free of qualifiers and irony. For their past and ongoing ideas and interventions, I extend solidarity and appreciation to comrades Amanda Alexander, Franco Barchiesi, Teresa Barnes, Patrick Bond, Ashwin Desai, Nigel Gibson, Steven Greenberg, Allan Horowitz, Bushy Kelebonye (deceased), Tefu Kelebonye, Ulrike Kistner, Kamogelo Lekubu, Andile Mngxitama, Prishani Naidoo, John Shai, and S'bu Zulu.

**AT:**

**AT: Cap Root Cause**

**Capitalism in no way can explain the middle passage, rather the middle passage began with the symbolic desire for the values represented by whiteness in opposition to the deviance represented by blackness. In this way the global anti-black libidinal economy was created.**

**Tibbs and Woods 08**, [Donald, teaches at Drexel University; Trayvon P., assistant professor at Sonoma State University, “The Jena Six and Black Punishment: Law and Raw Life in the Domain of Nonexistence”, P. 248-250]//MHELLIE

The Atlantic slave trade was a profound historical rupture, fundamentally degrading the personality of black human beings, all the while obsessing over black flesh.81 In the very processes employed to produce the body of the African slave for consumption and use in the global libidinous system of racial capitalism, slavery bestows visibility on the structure and enormity of what is usually private and incommunicable, contained within the  boundaries of the bodies of those who suffer pain. At its base, slavery achieves the conversion of absolute pain into the fiction of absolute power  in an obsessive, self-conscious, fetishistic, and parasitic display of agency.82 For this reason, the procedures essential to the history of racial slavery and its pernicious afterlife have not been its brutal regime of labor exploitation nor its utility to the advent and maturation of Eurocentric capitalism.  Rather, slavery is enabled by, and dependent upon, the most basic of operations: “symbolic and material immobilization, the absolute divestment of sovereignty at the site of the black body: its freedom of movement, its conditions of labor, its physical and emotional sustenance, its social and sexual reproduction, its political and cultural representation.”83 The legacy  of slavery that continues to impress itself upon our social, psychic, and legal  structures into the twenty-first century, bears this imprint of bodily  dispossession and aggrandizement.  To put it another way, we are working from a definition of slavery that is grounded in an analysis of what the practice signals about the symbolic universe and how physical bodies are constructed in relationship to each other. **White supremacy’s reliance upon black dehumanization means that enslavement of Africans was never reducible to mere economic logic.**  White violence against the black body was compelled by a complex mixture of conscious identification, unconscious fears, and subconscious longings.84 Loss of one’s own body signals capture by direct relations of force. As a captive entity, fixed in an undynamic state, “subject to be mortgaged, according to the rules prescribed by law,”85 the slave did not enter into a transaction of value. In this way, slavery was a social death; this is what it means to say that slaves did not exist as human beings.86 The ethos of slavery that we are pointing to is an economy of desire in which value is produced. However, because value works by mystifying its very processes of determining values, the worth of white and black bodies appears natural, Rather than as the result of violent encounters.87 The symbolic economy of slavery is more fundamental to its existence than is the political economy. **In other words, the constituent elements of slavery begin with desire for the symbols of purity, honor, and humanity represented by whiteness and made possible by blackness and for the pleasure, exoticism, and self-loathing epitomized by blackness as constructed in opposition to whiteness**. In addition to the surplus value produced from their labor, the accumulation of black bodies generated a symbolic economy in which slaves were valuable simply for the fact that they existed as things for the satisfaction of the whims of the captor.88 It is for this reason that the work performed by black slaves is historically significant, but it was not the primary reason for the slaves’ (non)being. In the constellation of values that white supremacy establishes, bourgeois democracy mystifies the value of black bodies. As Cornel West puts it:  [White supremacy] dictates the limits of the operation of American  democracy—with black folk the indispensable sacrificial lamb  vital to its sustenance. Hence black subordination constitutes the necessary condition for the flourishing of American democracy, the tragic prerequisite for America itself. This is, in part, what Richard Wright meant when he noted, “**The Negro is America’s metaphor.”89  To state it more pointedly, black death provides the very conditions of  possibility for white life**.90 This point is not hyperbole or melodrama; it is  drawn from an analysis of the discursive structure of slavery and the  material realities it calls into being. Slave codes in the southern United States demanded that slaves receive clothing, food, and lodging sufficient to their basic needs. Slaves, although dead to rights and responsibilities—civil death—were reduced to nothing but the physical bodies, unprotected against capture, mutilation, and torture.

**AT: Black/White Binaries bad**

**Anti-blackness is a global phenomenon that is mapped onto bodies through structural positioning.**

**Copeland and Sexton 3** (2003, Huey Copeland – Ph.D., Director of Graduate Studies and Associate Professor of Art History with affiliations in the Department of African American and African Diaspora Studies at the University of California, Berkeley, Jared Sexton – Director of African American Studies, School of Humanities Associate Professor, African American Studies School of Humanities Ph.D. at the University of California, Berkeley, “Raw Life: An Introduction”, Volume 13, No. 2, Spring/Summer 2003, published University of Nebraska Press)

It is at this impasse and with such questions that the essays collected here begin: with the notion derived from Fanon, of the impossibility of representing race, either for the slave or the master, outside of an entrenched visual schema predicated on the fungibility of the black slave that this reckoning comes to the fore at this moment and that it connects cultural practitioners working across a range of disciplines –art, history, literature, film, critical theory –not only suggests the longevity of Fanon’s insight, but also underlines the pressing need to think the structural and structuring function of racial difference for our symbolic economies. For it is that very function which contemporary racial theory more often than not seeks to leap over, in the process revealing its own ineffectuality, a kind of willful blindness that cannot be overstated. In its single-minded capacity to concentrate on everything except that which matters most in the restructuring of white supremacy, such theory is undoubtedly more egregious than intellectual faux pas or public disservice. It is a modality of complicity, or better, fraud. But the fraudulence of this diverse intellectual project is not only analytic; it is also ethical. Besieged by the conservative restoration, the Left finds itself today enamored of political pragmatism and in thrall to the lures of counter-hegemonic populism. From the emergent networks of anti-globalization to the reinvigorated peace movement, from the embattled environmentalist campaigns to the desperate efforts at urban police reform, the official rhetoric is multiracial and the organizational logic is coalition. Yet, for whatever energies are dispensed in elaborating the new complexity of race in the age of globality, the radical imagination inexorably comes to rest on the assumption of horizontality, that is ot say, a progressive community-in-struggle, even if only a possible one. Indeed, it has become commonplace in the U.S. to call for a paradigm shift with respect to racial theory and the politics of anti-racism. This clarion call resonates in the ivory towers of academe, in the pages of the most useless print media outlets, certainly in the alternative press, and in the policy papers and strategic deliberations of progressive non-profit institutes and community-based organizations. What we are told, in a variety of tones and tenors, is that race matters are no longer –if they ever were – “simply black and white” at the least, the focus of such a Manichean lens is deemed inadequate to apprehend the current and historical relatity of U.S. racial formation (to say nothing of the Americas more generally or other regions of the world) At its worst, this dichotomous view is rendered as politically stunting and, moreover, as effectively excluding “discussion of the colors in the middle, now inexorable parts of the Black/White spectrum.” We now enjoy a vast literature in the social sciences and humanities detailing the vexed position (or positions), between the black and the white. “Neither black nor white” thus indicates not only the articulation of multiracial (or Mixed race) identity claims in the post-civil rights era, but also the contemporary reformulations of critique and political mobilization among Asian Americans, Pacific Islanders, Chicana/os, Latina/os, and Native American peoples. Of course, racial discourse in what would become the U.S., from the colonial era onward, has always been multi-polar, so to speak, and the psychodynamics of race have always been quite complex; the lines of force and the relations of racial power have been reconfigured regularly across a multiplicity of times and spaces. In fact, the notion of a black/white paradigm is something of a theoretical fiction, deployed for a wide range of purposes. In our attempts to displace it, then, we do well to recognize it as a recent emergence, involved in an imaginary lure that says more about the historical preoccupations of white supremacy than it does about, say, the blind insistence of black scholars, activists, or communities. When perusing the critical literature on the “explanatory difficulty” of present-day racial politics, one frequently wonders exactly to whom the demand to go “beyond black and white” is being addressed. Also puzzling is the singularly incoherent nature of the reasoning demonstrated in current race talk, a failure, that is, to offer cogent accounts of the implications of this newfound (or, more precisely, rediscovered) complexity. Taken together, these twin ambiguities beg a key question: what economies of enunciation are involved in this broadly atterned discursive gesture to put an end to “biracial theorizing”? Legal scholar Mari Matsuda offers a provocative thought on this score. During a symposium on critical race theory at the Yale Law School in 1997 she claimed: We when say we need to move beyond Black and white, this is what a whole lot of people say or feel or think: “**thank goodness we can get off that paradigm, because those black people made me feel so uncomfortable. I know all about Blacks, but I really don’t know anything about Asians**, and while we’re deconstructing that Black-white paradigm, we also need to reconsider the category of race altogether, since race, as you know, is a constructed category, and thank god I don’t have to take those angry black people seriously anymore.” Importantly, the comment is drawn from an otherwise sympathetic mediation on a particular danger attendant to the desire for new analyses, and the often anxious drive for multiracial coalition, **namely, the persistent risk of forgetting the centrality of anti-blackness to global white supremacy**. Fanon, again, is prescient: “Wherever he goes, the negro remains a Negro” (B, 173). Wherever; there is no outside. **Too often we forget**, here in the U.S. especially, **that there are blacks everywhere**. When so many speak of the peculiarity of race as a North American obsession (one hears of the odd rigidity of the Anglo-Saxon racial formation), it is important to think about black people as situated in those myriad locales supposedly outside of or alternate to the black-white binary. Lewis Gordon, philosopher and leading contemporary commentator on Fanon, writes: Although there are people who function as “the blacks” of particular contexts, there is a group of people who function as the blacks everywhere. They are called, in now-archaic language –Negroes. **Negroes are the blacks of everywhere, the black of blacks, the blackest blacks**. **Blackness functions as the prime racial signifier**. It is the element that enters a room and frightens Reason out… The historical specificity of blackness as a point from which the greatest distance must be forged entails its status as metaphor.

**AT: No more slavery**

**Forced Labor is not an element of slavery, but accumulation and fungibility are.**

**Wilderson ’10** {Frank; Associate Professor of African-American Studies at UC Irvine and has a Ph.D. from UC Berkeley; “Red, White & Black: Cinema and the Structure of U.S. Antagonisms,”}/MR

I raise Eltis’s counterposing of the symbolic value of slavery to the economic value of slavery in order to debunk two gross misunderstandings: One is that work—or alienation and exploitation—is a constituent element of slavery. **Slavery**, writes Orlando Patterson, **“is the permanent, violent domination of natally alienated and generally dishonored persons***.”18* Patterson goes to great lengths to delink his three “constituent elements of slavery” from the labor that one is typically forced to perform when one is enslaved. **Forced labor is not constitutive of enslavement because whereas it explains a common practice, it does not define the structure of the power relation between those who are slaves and those who are not**. In pursuit of his “constituent elements” of slavery, a line of inquiry that helps us separate experience (events) from ontology (the capacities of power—or lack thereof—lodged in distinct and irreconcilable subject positions, e.g., Humans and Slaves), Patterson helps us denaturalize the link between force and labor so that we can theorize the former as a phenomenon that positions a body, ontologically (paradigmatically), and the latter as a possible but not inevitable experience of someone who is socially dead.19 The other misunderstanding I am attempting to correct is the notion that the profit motive is the consideration in the slaveocracy that trumps all others. David Marriott, Saidiya Hartman, Ronald Judy, Hortense Spillers, Orlando Patterson, and Achille Mbembe have gone to considerable lengths to show that, in point of fact, **slavery is and connotes an ontological status for Blackness; and that the constituent elements of slavery are not exploitation and alienation but accumulation and fungibility** (as Hartman puts it):20 **the condition of being owned and traded**.

**AT: Performance**

**A reading of fanon is necessary for a reconfiguration of the canon as well as performance studies.**

**Aranke 13,** (Fred Hampton’s Murder and the Coming Revolution Sampada Aranke is a PhD Candidate in Performance Studies at University of California at Davis.)

Like the well-known Oakland Black Panther Chapter, Hampton instituted Fanon’s texts as mandatory for membership in the Chicago BPP, as well as for the youth education programs conducted throughout the city. In all of his works, Fanon gives us both a psychoanalytic and material history of blackness. In other words, he offers a material history of blackness, as well as insights into how that material history structures both the black psyche and (therefore) body. Though in Wretched of the Earth Fanon specifically addresses the world of the colonized subject, it was not   uncommon for black radicals in the U.S., including members of the BPP, to express solidarity and kinship with Third World struggles for liberation1. Especially because the condition of colonized subjects, as detailed by Fanon, soclosely reflected the violent reality of being black in America. Fanon’s text also calls for self-determination as it encourages those who are colonized to engage in militant warfare against their oppressors. The Black Panther Party for Self Defense viscerally identified with this kind of radical black self-determination. So much so that the BPP adopted Fanon’s text nationally as mandatory reading for membership in the organization. If read as an early prototypic Performance Studies text, Fanon’s theorizations of black life — both in Wretched of the Earth and Black Skin, White Masks — are given to us in the form of photographic snapshots: a kind of photo essay thatweds the narrative and the visual towards a more cohesive understanding of black life. He freezes experiential moments of terror, anxiety, confusion, and anger in order to make sense of the structures that produce these affects. These photographic narrative moments — at the train station platform, sitting alone in transit, waiting patiently for a film to start, speaking with colleagues — make visible the palpable tensions that produce blackness. In this paper, I primarily deploy Black Skin, White Masks as a model for thinking through the structural implications of blackness. I suggest that bringing Fanon into the canon might bring us closer to a kind of Performance Studies that negotiates how blackness (as a structural position) founds the conditions of invisibility, absence, and fixity that foreground any generative investments in performance.

**AT: “Progress”**

**All “progress” made so far has actually only been done to further exploit the black body**

**Hartman 03 Cut from (the position of unthought)**B. A., Wesleyan University (1984); Ph.D., Yale University (1992). Professor Hartman's major fields of interest are African American and American literature and cultural history, slavery, law and literature, and performance studies. She is on the editorial board of *Callaloo*. She has been a Fulbright, Rockefeller, Whitney Oates, and University of California President's Fellow. University of Nebraska Press

And this is where the larger narrative of capitalism comes into play. Because, basically, in most places in the world, you have a transition from slavery to other modes of involuntary servitude. In my work, I critique the received narrative about the transition from slavery to freedom in the American context, but we could also look at that same kind of transformation in relation to the anti-slavery rhetoric that comes to legitimize the colonial pro ject in Africa. By the nineteenth century, slavery was the dominant mode of production in West Africa. Eventually, the European nations decided "This is an awful institution and we need to stop it," so we get King Leopold masking his atrocities in the Congo in the discourse of anti-slavery, or British colonial figures in Ghana effectively saying, "Well, we saved you from the slave raider so you should be grateful."19 In both cases, it's the same notion: "We've given you your freedom, so now you're in our debt."

**AT: Slaves had agency**

**Claims of “Slave Agency” put a happy face on death and genocide**

**Sexton 2010** ~Jared, Associate Professor of African American Studies and Associate Professor of Film and Media Studies and one third of The Trifecta of Tough, "People-of-Color-Blindness: Notes on the Afterlife of Slavery," Social Text, Vol. 28, No. 2~ p.34-35/MR

In pursuit of her thesis, **Hartman challenges** the prevailing modes of historical writing about slavery, including the sort of **folkloric ethnography** for which Abrahams gained an international scholarly reputation. Hartman extends the work of Hayden White (in his Metahistory and Tropics of Discourse) in reading the text of Abrahams’s 1992 Singing the Master as typical of the pastoral genre that emplots history as comic romance. **“When history is emplotted in the comic mode**,” she suggests, **“its mode of historical explanation tends to be organicist and its ideological implications conservative.”**18 Abrahams **celebrates the capacities of the slave to subvert the regime through** her **signifying beyond the master’s awareness and comprehension**, but Hartman demonstrates how **this celebration relies upon** an **erasure of** the **structural violence**, the hardly discernible terror, of compelled performance. Mbembe thus defends Abrahams’s American pastoral against Hartman’s criticism when he mobilizes the former as support for the idea that in spite of the terror and the symbolic sealing off of the slave, he or she maintains alternative perspectives toward time, work, and self. This is the second paradoxical element of the plantation world as a manifestation of the state of exception. Treated as if he or she no longer existed except as a mere tool and instrument of production, the slave nevertheless is able to draw almost any object, instrument, language, or gesture into a performance and then stylize it. Breaking with uprootedness and the pure world of things of which he or she is but a fragment, the slave is able to demonstrate the protean capabilities of the human bond through music and the very body that was supposedly possessed by another.19 Mbembe’s conjectural phrasing—asserting a supposed possession of the body rather than a political-juridical order that enforces its actuality—has the effect of diminishing the violence of slave law in the very scenes of subjection that Hartman shows to be central to “the construction of racial difference and the absolute distinctions of status between free white persons and black captives.”20 It also seeks to discredit the scholarship that operates according to such assumptions. Put slightly differently, **it** seeks to **resurrect** the same **problematic attributions of “humanity,” “agency,” and “personhood**” that Hartman identifies as **key components of** the racial **domination of blacks in “the tragic continuities between slavery and freedom.”** Uncritical, and ultimately romantic, ethnographic claims, like those Mbembe draws upon, about the slave’s capacity and capability for “stylization” are theoretically untenable since the publication of Scenes of Subjection over a decade ago. I am talking broadly here about the sort of claims about slavery that rely on phrases like “In spite of the terror” and “ . . . nevertheless. . . .”21

**AT: Speaking for others**

**The political ontology of the black body is rooted in slavery - the slave is inherently black. Means blackness is a prior question in anti-whiteness resistance**

**Sexton 2010** ~Jared, Associate Professor of African American Studies and Associate Professor of Film and Media Studies and one third of The Trifecta of Tough, "People-of-Color-Blindness: Notes on the Afterlife of Slavery," Social Text, Vol. 28, No. 2~ p.36-37/MR

Not all free persons are white (nor are they equal or equally free), but slaves are paradigmatically black. And because blackness serves as the basis of enslavement in the logic of a transnational political and legal culture, it permanently destabilizes the position of any nominally free black population. Stuart Hall might call this the articulation of elements of a discourse, the production of a “non-necessary correspondence” between the signifiers of racial blackness and slavery.27 But it is the historical materialization of the logic of a transnational political and legal culture such that the contingency of its articulation is generally lost to the infrastructure of the Atlantic world that provides Frank Wilderson a basis for the concept of a “political ontology of race.”28 The United States provides the point of focus here, but the dynamics under examination are not restricted to its bounds. Political ontology is not a metaphysical notion, because it is the Social Text 103 • Summer 2010 37 explicit outcome of a politics and thereby available to historic challenge through collective struggle. But it is not simply a description of a political status either, even an oppressed political status, because it functions as if it were a metaphysical property across the longue durée of the premodern, modern, and now postmodern eras. That is to say, the application of the law of racial slavery is pervasive, regardless of variance or permutation in its operation across the better part of a millennium.29 In Wilderson’s terms, the libidinal economy of antiblackness is pervasive, regardless of variance or permutation in its political economy. In fact, the application of slave law among the free (that is, the disposition that “with respect to the African shows no internal recognition of the libidinal costs of turning human bodies into sentient flesh”) has outlived in the postemancipation world a certain form of its prior operation — the property relations specific to the institution of chattel and the plantationbased agrarian economy in which it was sustained. Hartman describes this in her 2007 memoir, Lose Your Mother, as the afterlife of slavery: “a measure of man and a ranking of life and worth that has yet to be undone . . . a racial calculus and a political arithmetic that were entrenched centuries ago.”30 On that note, it is not inappropriate to say that the continuing application of slave law facilitated the reconfiguration of its operation with the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, rather than its abolition (in the conventional reading) or even its circumscription “as punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted” (on the progressive reading of contemporary critics of the prison-industrial complex). It is the paramount value of Loïc Wacquant’s historical sociology, especially in Wilderson’s hands, that it provides a schema for tracking such reconfigurations of anti-blackness “from slavery to mass imprisonment” without losing track of its structural dimensions, its political ontology.31

**Any revolution that doesn’t account for the black existence is doomed to failure and co-option by whiteness. Only a revolution centered on blackness and the narrative of the slave can be successful**

**Sexton 10** (Jared, Associate Professor, African American Studies School of Humanities, “People-of-Color-Blindness” Social Text 103 • Vol. 28, No. 2, PG 48-49) AT

The upshot of this predicament is that obscuring the structural¶ position of the category of blackness will inevitably undermine multiracial¶ coalition building as a politics of radical opposition and, to that extent,¶ force the question of black liberation back to the center of discussion. Every¶ analysis that attempts to understand the complexities of racial rule and¶ the machinations of the racial state without accounting for black existence¶ within its framework—which does not mean simply listing it among a¶ chain of equivalents or returning to it as an afterthought—**is doomed** to¶ miss what is essential about the situation. Black existence does not represent¶ the total reality of the racial formation—it is not the beginning and the end¶ of the story—but it does relate to the totality; it indicates the (repressed)¶ truth of the political and economic system. That is to say, the whole range¶ of positions within the racial formation is most fully understood from this¶ vantage point, not unlike the way in which the range of gender and sexual¶ variance under patriarchal and heteronormative regimes is most fully¶ understood through lenses that are feminist and queer.75 What is lost for¶ the study of black existence in the proposal for a decentered, “postblack”¶ paradigm is a proper analysis of the true scale and nature of black suffering¶ and of the struggles—political, aesthetic, intellectual, and so on—that¶ have sought to transform and undo it. What is lost for the study of nonblack¶ nonwhite existence is a proper analysis of the true scale and nature of its¶ material and symbolic power relative to the category of blackness.76¶ This is why every attempt to defend the rights and liberties of the¶ latest victims of state repression will fail to make substantial gains insofar¶ as it forfeits or sidelines the fate of blacks, the prototypical targets of¶ the panoply of police practices and the juridical infrastructure built up¶ around them. Without blacks on board, the only viable political option and¶ the only effective defense against the intensifying cross fire will involve¶ greater alliance with an antiblack civil society and further capitulation¶ to the magnification of state power. At the apex of the midcentury social¶ movements, Kwame Ture and Charles Hamilton wrote in their 1968 classic,¶ Black Power: The Politics of Liberation, that black freedom entails “the¶ necessarily total revamping of the society.”77 For Hartman, thinking of the¶ entanglements of the African diaspora in this context, the necessarily total revamping of the society is more appropriately envisioned as the creation¶ of an entirely new world:¶ I knew that no matter how far from home I traveled, I would never be able¶ to leave my past behind. I would never be able to imagine being the kind of¶ person who had not been made and marked by slavery. I was black and a¶ history of terror had produced that identity. Terror was “captivity without¶ the possibility of flight,” inescapable violence, precarious life. There was no¶ going back to a time or place before slavery, and going beyond it no doubt¶ **would entail nothing less momentous than yet another revolution.**