## Advantage

#### I affirm Resolved: A just government ought to recognize an unconditional right of workers to strike.

#### Contention One is Collective Bargaining

#### While the Universal Right to strike is constitutionally recognized in most countries, laws still prohibit workers from organizing strikes if they partake in “essential services.”

**Vogt and Subasinghe 20** (Jeff Vogt is the director for the Solidarity Center’s Rule of Law department and was previously the legal director of the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC). Ruwan Subasinghe Ruwan Subasinghe is Legal Advisor to the International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF). 23 April 2020 ”Will fundamental workers’ rights also fall victim to COVID-19?” https://www.equaltimes.org/will-fundamental-workers-rights#.YWkBxtrMLIU)

The COVID-19 pandemic has exposed in stark terms the fact that our economies are built on the systematic exploitation of workers, whether at our local grocery store or in distant farms, factories and offices producing food, clothing and other necessary goods and services. These workers were already in a difficult situation before the pandemic, working for low pay and often hired through unstable non-standard forms of employment or in the informal economy. Now, tens of millions of workers face layoffs, and many of those who do not have the luxury of teleworking are now in workplaces that are putting their health, and indeed, their life at risk in order that essential goods and services are available to the public. **This crisis has also highlighted major shortcomings in labour market institutions in many countries, including national and sectoral collective bargaining coverage – which shrank significantly after the 2008 financial crisis. Since the global outbreak of COVID-19, workers around the world have resorted to strikes to protect themselves**. Self-organised groups of food delivery riders, Instacart shoppers and Amazon warehouse workers have been among those demanding fit-for-purpose personal protective equipment (PPE) and workplace safety measures. Workers like Chris Smalls, an Amazon warehouse worker in Staten Island, New York, organised a work stoppage over the lack of protective gear and hazard pay, and was predictably fired. Indeed, the demand for access to adequate PPE and hazard pay is the major motivation for strikes, including Carrefour workers in Belgium, doctors, nurses and lab technicians in Lesotho and garment workers in Myanmar. Trade unions are also working to shape national policy. **In Italy, for example, the three major national trade union centres unanimously threatened to call a general strike if the government did not drastically reduce the number of economic activities deemed ‘essential’, which led to the government significantly cutting the list following negotiations with the social partners.** At the same time, many governments are enacting emergency measures to restrict the right to speech, assembly and association – including the right to strike. Portugal became the first country in Europe to prohibit strikes in economic sectors vital to the production and supply of essential goods and services to the population and indeed ordered striking dockers at Lisbon’s port back to work on 18 March. In **April, Cambodia issued a far-reaching law that gives the prime minister sweeping powers which could certainly be used to prohibit strikes. In Myanmar, while workers are still riding packed transportation to report for work in factories, the government passed an indefinite measure to ban meetings of more than five people which, like in Cambodia, threatens to be less about protecting public safety and more about limiting right**s. And, several countries have formally registered derogations from their treaty obligations to respect freedom of association, including Ecuador and Estonia (to Article 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, ICCPR) and Albania (to Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights, ECHR).

#### You have a moral and legal obligation to vote affirmative. The structure of international discourse and law prove that the worker’s right to strike is a universally foundational component of an ethical society.

**ITUC 14** (INTERNATIONAL TRADE UNION CONFEDERATION (ITUC) THE RIGHT TO STRIKE AND THE ILO: THE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS MARCH 2014 https://www.ituc-csi.org/IMG/pdf/ituc\_final\_brief\_on\_the\_right\_to\_strike.pdf)

**The trajectory of international discourse on the right to strike strongly suggests the existence of a customary international law norm. 298 State practice reflected in most countries’ constitutions, laws, and decisions of national courts confirm the right to strike. The limits may vary from country to country, but underlying them is an international consensus that the right exists, and that limits must be reasonable. Further, States respect this right out of a sense of legal obligation, not merely a moral one.** The right to strike is recognised in extensive and diverse sources, including those set forth in Section VI above. To this could be added international economic agreements. In adopting the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the United States, Canada, and Mexico included among their agreed Labor Principles “The right to strike – The protection of the right of workers to strike in order to defend their collective interests.”299 Further, in the 2012 General Survey, **the ILO found that: Although the exercise of the right to strike is in most countries fairly commonly subject to certain conditions or restrictions, the principle of this right as a means of action of workers’ organizations is almost universally accepted. In a very large number of countries, the right to strike is now explicitly recognized, including at the constitutional level.**300 The ILO cited 89 countries from all regions of the world (Asia, Africa, Americas, Europe and Middle East) whose constitutions incorporate the right to strike. The complete list is attached in Annex IV. Further, in practically every other country in the world without a constitutional provision, the right to strike is nevertheless recognized in legislation. Space considerations preclude recounting them all. Two examples at polar opposites in political and economic terms are sufficient:  In the United States, Section 13 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) states, “Nothing in this Act, except as specifically provided for herein, shall be construed so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike or to affect the limitations or qualifications on that right.”301  In Vietnam, Article 5 of the Labour Code adopted in 2012 states, “The employees are entitled to . . . be on strike.” Article 209 states, “The strike is the temporary, voluntary and organizational stopping of work of the labour collective in order to meet the requirements in the process of settlement of labour disputes.”302 **Both countries’ laws and regulations set out various procedural requirements for engaging in strikes such as time frameworks for bargaining, mandatory use of mediation, advance notice of strikes, maintaining minimum services and so on. To a greater or lesser degree, such requirements are common to the laws of all countries, but always resting on the foundational premise that workers have a right to strike.** China, although it removed the right to strike from its Constitution in 1982, adopted a trade union law that implicitly acknowledges the right to strike in saying: In case of work-stoppage or slow-down strike in an enterprise or institution, the trade union shall, on behalf of the workers and staff members, hold consultation with the enterprise or institution or the parties concerned, present the opinions and demands of the workers and staff members, and put forth proposals for solutions. With respect to the reasonable demands made by the workers and staff members, the enterprise or institution shall try to satisfy them. The trade union shall assist the enterprise or institution in properly dealing with the matter so as to help restore the normal order of production and other work as soon as possible.303 The ILO has been compiling a Compendium of court decisions invoking Conventions 87 and 98 and decisions of the Committee on Freedom of Association regarding the right to strike.304 While by no means complete, it includes the following rulings:  In 1995, Russia’s Constitutional Court found that a law prohibiting strikes in the civil aviation sector was unconstitutional. The Court acknowledged that “proceeding from the regulations of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the prohibition of the right to strike is admissible with regard to persons who are the complement of the armed forces, police and administration of the state . . . In addition, the international legal acts on human rights ascribe the regulation of the right to strike to the sphere of internal legislation. But this legislation must not go beyond restrictions permitted by these acts.” The Constitutional High Court concluded that any restriction of the flight personnel’s right to strike was illegal.305  In 2006, a Burkina Faso appeals court found that private sector workers who went on strike in support of a general labour protest movement were unlawfully dismissed, and ordered their reinstatement. The court considered that the strike, which was a general strike based on professional and economic interests aiming to find solutions to issues of social policy, was legitimate and lawful in accordance with the statements of the Committee on Freedom of Association of the Governing Body of the ILO as expressed in its Digest of Decisions. Interpreting the provisions of national law relating to strikes in the light of ILO Convention No. 87 and the Digest of Decisions, the Appeal Court ruled that the strike was legitimate and legal and declared that each of the appellants had been wrongfully dismissed.306  In 2006, the Fiji Arbitration Tribunal, in Fiji Electricity & Allied Workers Union v. Fiji Electricity Authority, 9 May 2006, [2006] FJAT 62; FJAT Award 24 of 2006, found that a constitutional provision guaranteeing the right to freedom of association and collective bargaining must also include a qualified right to strike, relying on the ILO Committee of Experts.  In a 2008 decision, Colombia’s Constitutional Court upheld restrictions on strikes of a political nature, but in so doing reaffirmed the right to strike. The court said that “organizations whose role is to defend the socio-economic and professional interest of workers should, in principle, be able to have recourse to strike action to support their positions in search of solutions to problems deriving from important economic and social policy issues, which have immediate consequences for their members and workers in general, in particular in the sphere of employment, social protection and living conditions.”307  In another 2008 decision involving the dismissal of a worker for joining a strike, Brazil’s Higher Labour Court ruled that the employer’s argument that the dismissal had been due to the worker’s refusal to carry out duties was an invalid one, since an absence from duties is inherent in strike action, and the behaviour of the employer in violating the principle of freedom of association and the free exercise of the right to strike could not be tolerated.308

#### Absent leveraging collective bargaining power enabled by unconditional the right to strike, employer’s retain bargaining power over workers. Unequal bargaining power continuously leads to increased unemployment, lower wages, and worse working conditions.

**Hafiz 21** (Hiba Hafiz, Assistant Professor of Law at Boston College Law School, “Structural Labor Rights” 2-12- 2021 Page 654 – 656 <https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2327&context=lsfp>)

Workers’ collective power against increasingly dominant employers has disintegrated. With union density at an abysmal 6.2 percent in the private sector—a level unequaled since the Great Depression1 —the vast majority of workers depend only on individual negotiations with employers to lift stagnant wages and ensure upward economic mobility.2 But decentralized, individual bargaining is not enough. **Economists and legal scholars increasingly agree that, absent regulation, labor markets naturally strengthen employers’ bargaining power over workers.3 The social costs of unequal bargaining power are immense. When employers have monopsony power, or power to operate as wage setters rather than wage takers in the employment bargain, they hire fewer workers— increasing under- and unemployment—and those workers suffer suppressed pay and benefits as well as worse working conditions**.4 Monopsony power also reduces economic productivity because employers are not competing over wages to lure workers into jobs that are the best match for their productivity and skills.5 Monopsony has distributional effects as well, increasing in equality by allowing employers to capture rents from workers’ labor.6 In addition, when firms hire fewer workers, they produce less output and can charge higher prices that harm consumers.7 Existing law has failed to step in, leaving employers free to coordinate and consolidate labor-market power while limiting workers’ ability to do the same.8 Focused on consumer welfare, antitrust enforcers have allowed employers to merge without considering the effects of increased labor-market concentration on workers’ wages.9 And lax enforcement has enabled employers to engage in a range of conduct that suppresses worker pay, such as reaching wage-fixing and “no-poach” agreements with other employers and imposing restrictive noncompete provisions in employment contracts.10 **Unsurprisingly, in the absence of collective, or “countervailing,” power against employers, workers enter individualized bargaining at a significant disadvantage.11 And the empirical consensus is in: income inequality has spiked as workers have suffered economy-wide wage stagnation and a declining share of the national income for decades.12** When passed in 1935, the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or Act) was designed to overcome this disparity by lifting workers’ leverage as against their employers. The Act established labor rights as collective rights to ensure “equal[] . . . bargaining power between employers and employees.”13 It created a national labor enforcement agency—the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board)—to secure this balance.14 And its first members set out to establish a Division of Economic Research (DER) to ensure institutional alignment between this foundational purpose and the Board’s real-world enforcement.15 The DER furnished the Board with robust social scientific analyses to help the Board target its enforcement to ensure that workers’ bargaining strength matched that of employers.16 But employer lobbying and formalist interpretations of the NLRA have driven labor law from its original purpose. In its Taft-Hartley and LandrumGriffin Amendments to the Act, among other things, Congress exempted independent contractors from its jurisdiction and reduced workers’ strike protections.17 Even more, labor law doctrine restrained workers’ rights to isolated pockets of enterprise bargaining, or bargaining restricted to a single, narrowly defined employer, and limited protections for workers’ exercise of economic pressure against employer buyer power.18 This is particularly true in “fissured” workplaces, where the rise of franchising, outsourcing, subcontracting, and vertical disintegration has increasingly fragmented workplace structures, in part as a means of stripping upstream employers of compliance obligations under labor and employment law.19 So while employers retain rights to integrate, disintegrate, consolidate, or tacitly coordinate their power to their advantage under corporate, antitrust, contract, and property law,20 workers’ collective rights have eroded to the point where they lack any substantive ability to function as counterstructure—as effective countervailing power against employers. A legislative ban on Board hiring of economists cemented this collapse and relegated the Board to outlier status among federal agencies.21 Lacking a social scientist-staffed internal division, the Board was handicapped in its ability to tailor regulation to the policy goals of its organic statute.22 This lack of social scientific expertise has deprived the Board and the courts of the benefits of empirical analysis in evaluating how their decisions contribute to reducing workers’ bargaining power.23

#### States recognizing the unconditional right of workers to strike allows workers who lack union membership and are in non- standard forms of employment to take collective action

**Vogt and Subasinghe 20** (Jeff Vogt is the director for the Solidarity Center’s Rule of Law department and was previously the legal director of the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC). Ruwan Subasinghe Ruwan Subasinghe is Legal Advisor to the International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF). 23 April 2020 ”Workers’ right to strike in emergencies under international law” https://www.equaltimes.org/will-fundamental-workers-rights#.YWkBxtrMLIU)

The right to strike has been firmly established in international and regional legal instruments for decades. These include Convention 87 of the International Labour Organization (ILO), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Article 8) and the ICCPR (Article 22) at the global level, and the ECHR (Article 11) and the American Convention on Human Rights (Article 16) at the regional level. Indeed, the right to strike is now recognised as customary international law. While governments can derogate from certain legal obligations during public emergencies “threatening the life of a nation,” they can do so only to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation. The ILO’s tripartite Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA) has held that a general prohibition of strikes can only be justified in the event of an “acute national emergency” and then only for a limited period and to the extent strictly necessary to meet the requirements of the situation. This means a genuine crisis, such as those arising as a result of a serious conflict, insurrection or natural, sanitary or humanitarian disaster, in which the normal conditions for the functioning of society are absent. Even in such situations, responsibility for suspending a strike on the grounds of public health should not lie with the government, but with an independent body which has the confidence of all parties concerned. While the COVID-19 public health crisis may qualify as an acute national emergency, it is also evident that outright strike prohibitions would not be strictly necessary to meet the requirements of the situation, especially where other restrictions, such as minimum operational services or limits on physical gatherings and picketing, are available. Further, freedom of association provisions in other international instruments already provide exceptions to maintain public order or public health making derogations unnecessary and disproportionate. Indeed, the inability of trade unions to easily call their members out on strike in situations where they are compelled to work in unsafe work environments may even exacerbate the public health crisis. Having concluded that blanket prohibitions of strikes during a public health crisis are likely to be disproportionate even where the aim is legitimate, it is important to look at what types of strike actions and restrictions are permissible under international law. The CFA has consistently held that **strikes are “essential means available to workers and their organizations to protect their interests”.** This would necessarily mean that strikes to demand adequate PPE, a safe workplace or the closure of non-essential businesses would fall well within this scope of protection. **The right to take collective action over occupational safety and health issues is also intrinsically linked to the right of workers to remove themselves from dangerous work without fear of retaliation. This right, enshrined in ILO Convention 155 is especially important for workers in non-standard forms of employment who may not enjoy the right to freedom of association and are in any event 50 per cent less likely to be in a union than workers in open-ended contracts. In terms of strikes to put pressure on governments to introduce fiscal and monetary support packages, the CFA has held that workers may engage in collective action, including protests and strikes over matters beyond the traditional ambit of wages and conditions of work. So long as the strike is not “purely political**” in nature, such as an insurrection, the CFA has stated that, “organizations responsible for defending workers’ socio-economic and occupational interests should be able to use strike action to support their position in the search for solutions to problems posed by major social and economic policy trends which have a direct impact on their members and all workers in general, in particular as regards employment, social protection and standards of living.” While it has not yet had occasion to consider a strike over economic and workplace responses to a pandemic, it is clear that the CFA is likely to find such strikes to be protected.

#### Currently, the right to strike is crucial to holding employers accountable, compelling wage increases, and enacting laws that expand social protection

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Governments around the world have been publishing lists of workers who provide ‘essential services’ and can therefore continue to go to work despite general lockdown measures. While the aim of such lists is to ensure the functioning of critical supply chains and public services during the pandemic, key workers risk having their right to strike restricted for the duration of the designation period. **The ILO has held that strikes could be restricted or even prohibited in essential services “whose interruption would endanger the life, personal safety or health of the whole or part of the population”. What is meant by essential services in the “strict sense of the term” will depend on the particular circumstances prevailing in a country**. However, **any restriction on the right to strike in essential services should be accompanied by compensatory guarantees, including adequate, impartial and speedy conciliation and arbitration proceedings.** Alternatively, minimum operational requirements may also be negotiated or required in essential services in the strict sense of the term. The CFA has previously found that the decision adopted by a government to require a minimum service in the Animal Health Division, in the face of an outbreak of a highly contagious disease, did not violate the principles of freedom of association. **It is nevertheless paramount that workers’ and employers’ organisations must be able to participate in determining the minimum services which should be ensured. Administrative authorities regulating strikes in essential services should also not overstep their mandates in a time of crisis, especially where the law permits unions to dispense with notice requirements in the event of a serious threat to the health and safety of workers.** The UN Special Rapporteur on the rights to peaceful assembly and of association, Clément Voule, has explained in a recent statement that: “Where human rights are the compass, we will be better placed to overcome this pandemic and build resilience for the future”. This includes the right to freedom of association, and to strike, without fear of retaliation. We agree. We fully recognise the severity of the COVID-19 public health crisis and acknowledge that international law permits governments to exercise emergency powers, within limits, in response to such situations. **However, governments simply cannot prohibit outright the right to strike or enact other disproportionate restrictions, which will certainly have a chilling effect on the right to freedom of association. Indeed, the right to strike is perhaps more important during this emergency, in order to be recognised as a worker, to hold employers to account over failures to provide protective equipment, to contest sweeping layoffs or, as a last resort, to demand wages owed and other benefits. And, we need the right to strike to press governments to enact laws extending social protection, including wage and income support. None of this will happen on its own, without working people organising to make it happen.**

## Framing

#### I value social inequality – social inequality is defined as disproportionate access to essential resources and opportunities that affect a person’s well- being.

#### My value criteria is that the judge should vote for a policy or action that best mitigates social inequality.

#### Reasons to prefer:

#### Most Practical Method: Debates about competitive policy options that mitigate or resolve social inequality compel in depth research practices and strategies that best analyze and concurrently resolve the question of how to mitigate social inequality. Leads to in depth debates on the ethicality and political implications of the resolution.

#### Moral Responsibility: Comparative policy analysis is the only way debaters can fulfill their responsibility to address social inequality since our negligence and frequent tendency to overlook social inequality is what allows inequality to continuously reproduce.

#### Reject any framework that only requires the negative to win the aff is bad without providing an alternative. These frameworks allow us to avoid responsibility in remedying social inequity.

#### Research Praxis: Social inequality persist both because of a lack of awareness and resolve. Research and analytical practices endemic to competitive policy -oriented debate on combating social inequity shapes and compels ethical subjects who utilize their research and analytical skills outside of debate.

#### Fairness: Social inequality is the primary motive for researchers and experts that research and discuss state recognition of the unconditional right of workers to strike. Therefore a framework that emphasizes social inequality is predictable and contestable.

#### Social inequality creates a feeling of exclusion, political disempowerment, and enables authoritarianism – all of which damage wellbeing for the marginalized. Human well-being exceeds any metric for weighing impacts that is grounded in neo classical economics.

**Peterson Institute for International Economics 20** (The Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE) is an independent nonprofit, nonpartisan research organization dedicated to strengthening prosperity and human welfare in the global economy through expert analysis and practical policy solutions., “How to Fix Economic Inequality? An Overview of Policies for the United States and Other High-Income Economies” 2020 Page 16 and 17 <https://www.piie.com/sites/default/files/documents/how-to-fix-economic-inequality.pdf>)

**Social and economic inequalities, for example inequalities of wealth and authority, are just only if they result in compensating benefits for everyone, and in particular for the least advantaged members of society.** John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971) There are opposing views on whether economic inequality needs to be narrowed, ranging from economic to political to philosophical. **The most obvious case for combating inequality rests on the notion of fairness—that everyone should have an equal chance at attaining prosperity.** On the other side of the argument, some influential economists have long held that there is a tradeoff between equality and growth—that greater inequality may be an inevitable outcome of higher output, but this point of view is hotly contested. Some social scientists think that inequality may be acceptable if people are also lifted out of poverty (regardless if others are becoming superrich). Others defend inequality as an inevitable result of differences in talent and the important role of free choices by individuals. They argue that excessive focus on inequality is misplaced. Here are some counterpoints and alternative ways of thinking about it. It matters who is treated unequally and why Discussions about solutions must take into account those people still excluded from economic security because of their race, gender, ethnicity, or place of birth, argues Adam S. Posen (PIIE). Inequality on the basis of discrimination is arguably worse as well as differently addressed than economic equality per se. By the same token, high wealth or income which doesn’t come from unfair advantages may not be bad in and of itself, even if that inequality should be reduced in pursuit of other goals. Inequality may hurt a country’s economy. Recent studies find evidence that inequality hampers a country’s growth, and this view is gaining ground among policymakers. Jason Furman (PIIE) warns that it is difficult to generalize about the causal relationship between inequality and growth but that policymakers don’t need to choose, because they can pursue well-known “win-win” options, **such as improving primary education**. **People at the bottom lack power and opportunities to get ahead. Economic growth metrics cannot by themselves measure human wellbeing, explains Danielle Allen (Harvard University). People must feel included and empowered in society. In an economy with high levels of inequality, people at the bottom lack options to gain wealth or participate in the political system. Inequality is undemocratic**. Thomas M. (Tim) **Scanlon (Harvard University) argues that inequality must be addressed when it results in unfair discrimination by democratic institutions—for example, when benefits like education and health care are available unequally, when opportunities for advancement are limited, or when citizens are subjected to racism, sexism, or shameful treatment for being poor.** **Authoritarians exploit inequality for political gain. Experts have linked rising inequality to the wave of populism and authoritarianism across the world—when governments exploit economic anxiety by appealing to “ordinary people” in opposition to “elites” who are accused of discriminating in favor of foreigners, immigrants, or minorities in the workforce**

#### Social Inequality is the root cause of conflict – studies prove

**Bahgat et al 17**(KARIM BAHGAT GRAY BARRETT KENDRA DUPUY SCOTT GATES SOLVEIG HILLESUND HÅVARD MOKLEIV NYGÅRD (PROJECT LEADER) SIRI AAS RUSTAD HÅVARD STRAND HENRIK URDAL GUDRUN ØSTBY April 12, 2017 Background report for the UN and World Bank Flagship study on development and conflict Prevention, “Inequality and Armed Conflict: Evidence and Data” Page 185 – 186, Peace Research Institute Oslo, <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Inequality%20and%20Conflict%20Full%20Report.pdf>)

Conclusion: preventing conflict and sustaining peace What is the relationship between inequality and armed conflict, what are trends in inequality, and how can patterns of inclusion and exclusion be addressed? Getting the answer to these questions ‘right’ is crucial for developing successful policies for preventing conflict and sustaining peace. We have outlined the available scientific evidence on these questions. Inequality has been a central concern for a large scholarly body of work, but despite the substantial attention that has been paid to understanding vertical inequalities and conflict, there is no conclusive answer as to whether, why, and how this type of inequality impacts conflict. While the conventional wisdom is that inequality should trigger conflict, methodological and conceptual problems plague the study of vertical inequality and conflict. More problematic is the fact that this literature struggles to answer the question of how and why inequality mobilizes certain groups for violence. Partially in response to this, scholars have shifted focus to examining horizontal inequalities. **The horizontal inequality literature examines how inequalities based on group identities, such as ethnicity, region, and religion, influence the incidence of conflict. There is a solid amount of support in the literature for the argument that high levels of horizontal economic and political inequalities among the relatively deprived make violent conflict more likely,** but only mixed evidence regarding the relatively privileged, and very limited evidence for the influence of social horizontal inequalities. We still need more research and evidence about which types of group-based identities matter for mobilizing people to engage in conflict, and how and why they do. This includes a need for more knowledge about the role of perceptions and emotion in making certain identities more salient than others. Several prominent authors within the horizontal inequality literature (Gurr 1970, Stewart 2000, 2002, Cederman et al 2013) have pointed out the importance of perceptions of inequalities. The literature on perceived horizontal inequalities remains small, but the few studies that exist do find a relationship between perceived inequalities and attitudes towards violence. Importantly, these studies show that objective and perceived horizontal inequalities do not necessarily overlap. On the contrary, the correlation between the two is not as high as expected, a pattern we confirm and further document using fine-grained survey data. This is important, since it means that the relationship between perceived HI and conflict attitudes is not a proxy for the relationship found between objective HI and conflict. The pattern of overlap between objective and subjective inequalities also varies. It tends to be higher for (perceived) inequality between regions, but lower for inequality between ethnic groups. There are at leastwo plausible explanations for this. First, regions might simply not be the best group identifier to use as the basis of calculating HI – for most people the spatial or regional identity is not that relevant or salient compared to ethnic groups. Second, the survey question used to calculate perceived ethnic HI was specifically used to ask how the respondents’ ethnic group compared to other ethnic groups. That is, the respondent was asked to compare their ethnic group with other ethnic groups This highlights the need for more and better quality data to measure perceived inequalities, as well as data on how these perceptions are triggered. Without such data, we can not fully assess how inequalities affects conflict. It is essential that large survey undertakings, such as the AfroBarometer, continue to collect data on perceptions, which they failed to do in Round 5 and 6. The ShaSA surveys, which cover 10 African countries, also include questions of political perceptions, but they do not probe specifically for identity groups and are therefore less suitable for testing perceived horizontal inequalities. This, however, could easily be changed by adding a few more focused questions to the standard questionnaire. The evidence base for the relationship between inequality and armed conflict relies on high-quality, fine-grained data on inequalities. We document and map available sources that can be used to measure and track both vertical and horizontal (objective and perceived) inequalities. Inequality is a complex phenomenon. In a given country (or region) or a given time, to a large extent the level of inequality depends on how it is operationalized and measured. Vertical (economic) inequality is most commonly measured using the Gini coefficient. The best empirical database on income inequality data is the Wider Income Inequality Database, which is based on a wide variety of national surveys. These surveys differ in their reliability, coverage and definition of income. To construct a reliable measure of vertical inequality we sort all surveys according to their reliability, coverage and definition of income, and then use the best surveys for each country-year observation. It should be noted that this, not surprisingly, reveals that the best, most reliable data on income inequality are found in open, rich economies, whereas data on Africa and Asia is much less reliable. Perhaps more problematically, we find that countries with higher levels of inequality tend to systematically have lower quality data on such inequality. Nonetheless, using this data we find that the world currently has the highest levels if income inequality on record: globally, inequality decreased from 1960 to 1990, but then the trend reversed and inequality climbed back to 1960s levels. It has since stayed around or above these levels.

#### Prioritizing other impacts over social inequality ideologically justifies self -evaluation processes that are congruent with the disproportionate distribution of society’s resources. When evaluating impacts, De valuing structural inequality’s significance confirms the self-view that a favorable social position is justified based on objective superiority. We must reject therefore reject impact evaluations that confirm the legitimacy of privileged positions.

**Stolte 83** (John F. Stolte, Adjunct Professor University of Texas MD Anderson School of Health Professions Professor Emeritus Northern Illinois University P.H.D. in Sociology at University of Washington June 1983 " The Legitimation of Structural Inequality: Reformulation and Test of the Self-Evaluation Argument" American Sociological Review , Jun., 1983, Vol. 48, No. 3"THE LEGITIMATION OF STRUCTURAL INEQUALITY: REFORMULATION AND TEST OF THE SELF EVALUATION ARGUMENT\*" <https://www-jstor-org.libproxy2.usc.edu/stable/pdf/2095226.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A6688370106fdb605957cbc72d593fa30>)

Different in many ways, Marx's radical conflict theory (1886), Mosca's elite conflict theory (1939), and Parsons's functional theory (1949) are similar in one respect. Each describes an important process in stratification: **structural inequality is ideologically justified so as to "allocate feelings of potency, competence, and, above all, importance and self-worth in a manner congruent with (the distribution of) primary resources" (power, wealth, and pres- tige**) (Della Fave, 1980:959). Della Fave amplifies this insight, synthesizing ideas from Mead's (1934) theory of the self-concept and Bem's (1967) theory of self-perception. According to Mead, objectivity of self-view is promoted by seeing oneself from the per- spective of the "generalized other," a compos- ite conception of attitudes and expectations held in general by others toward the self. Mead used the economic marketplace to illustrate the impact of the "generalized other" on the self- concept (Reck, 1964). A person learns the "objective" value of an economic good through observing the price others regularly pay for it. Similarly, a person gets a sense of self-worth through the reflected appraisals, high or low, received generally across a career of symbolic interactions. 'Mead's theory is compatible with Bem's (1967) self-perception approach, subsumed as a special case within attribution theory (Kelley, 1967). A person looks at his/her own behavior as something to explain. S/he makes judgments about (attributions of) causes, in a manner taken to be reasonable with reference to an external, objective observer, thus achieving an explanation. **Della Fave argues that the "ex- ternal observer" of attribution theory is closely analogous to "the generalized other" of sym- bolic interaction theory.2 Considered in the context of structural in- equality, the two theories link self-evaluation and legitimation. If it is evident to a person that s/he occupies a favorable social position, s/he will develop a favorable self-evaluation. The evident facts of the situation and the positive reflected appraisals confirm that self-view. To an objective observer ("the generalized other"), it would seem reasonable to attribute the advantaged position to the "objective" superiority of the self in competence, in morality, etc. The person thus comes to be- lieve that s/he deserves to-occupy a privileged position.** Conversely, if it is apparent to a per- son that s/he occupies a disadvantaged social position s/he will develop an unfavorable self- evaluation. The negative reflected appraisals and the obvious facts of the situation lead the person to attribute his/her relative deprivation to the "objective" inferiority of the self. Con- sequently, the person will come to believe that s/he deserves to be located where s/he is lo- cated in the structure of inequality. Both ad- vantaged and disadvantaged actors will there- fore come to accept the structure of inequality as legitimate, right, and reasonable.