# **while the universal right to strike is constitutionally recognized in most countries, laws still prohibit workers from organizing strikes if they partake in “essential services.”**

Vogt and Subasinghe 20 (Jeff Vogt is the director for the Solidarity Center’s Rule of Law department and was previously the legal director of the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC). Ruwan Subasinghe Ruwan Subasinghe is Legal Advisor to the International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF). 23 April 2020 ”Will fundamental workers’ rights also fall victim to COVID-19?” https://www.equaltimes.org/will-fundamental-workers-rights#.YWkBxtrMLIU)

The COVID-19 pandemic has exposed in stark terms the fact that our economies are built on the systematic exploitation of workers, whether at our local grocery store or in distant farms, factories and offices producing food, clothing and other necessary goods and services. These workers were already in a difficult situation before the pandemic, working for low pay and often hired through unstable non-standard forms of employment or in the informal economy. Now, tens of millions of workers face layoffs, and many of those who do not have the luxury of teleworking are now in workplaces that are putting their health, and indeed, their life at risk in order that essential goods and services are available to the public. **This crisis has also highlighted major shortcomings in labour market institutions in many countries, including national and sectoral collective bargaining coverage – which shrank significantly after the 2008 financial crisis. Since the global outbreak of COVID-19, workers around the world have resorted to strikes to protect themselves**. Self-organised groups of food delivery riders, Instacart shoppers and Amazon warehouse workers have been among those demanding fit-for-purpose personal protective equipment (PPE) and workplace safety measures. Workers like Chris Smalls, an Amazon warehouse worker in Staten Island, New York, organised a work stoppage over the lack of protective gear and hazard pay, and was predictably fired. Indeed, the demand for access to adequate PPE and hazard pay is the major motivation for strikes, including Carrefour workers in Belgium, doctors, nurses and lab technicians in Lesotho and garment workers in Myanmar. Trade unions are also working to shape national policy. **In Italy, for example, the three major national trade union centres unanimously threatened to call a general strike if the government did not drastically reduce the number of economic activities deemed ‘essential’, which led to the government significantly cutting the list following negotiations with the social partners.** At the same time, many governments are enacting emergency measures to restrict the right to speech, assembly and association – including the right to strike. Portugal became the first country in Europe to prohibit strikes in economic sectors vital to the production and supply of essential goods and services to the population and indeed ordered striking dockers at Lisbon’s port back to work on 18 March. In **April, Cambodia issued a far-reaching law that gives the prime minister sweeping powers which could certainly be used to prohibit strikes. In Myanmar, while workers are still riding packed transportation to report for work in factories, the government passed an indefinite measure to ban meetings of more than five people which, like in Cambodia, threatens to be less about protecting public safety and more about limiting right**s. And, several countries have formally registered derogations from their treaty obligations to respect freedom of association, including Ecuador and Estonia (to Article 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, ICCPR) and Albania (to Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights, ECHR).

# **you have a moral and legal obligation to vote affirmative. the structure of international discourse and law prove that the worker’s right to strike is a universally foundational component of an ethical society.**

ITUC 14 (INTERNATIONAL TRADE UNION CONFEDERATION (ITUC) THE RIGHT TO STRIKE AND THE ILO: THE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS MARCH 2014 https://www.ituc-csi.org/IMG/pdf/ituc\_final\_brief\_on\_the\_right\_to\_strike.pdf)

**The trajectory of international discourse on the right to strike strongly suggests the existence of a customary international law norm. 298 State practice reflected in most countries’ constitutions, laws, and decisions of national courts confirm the right to strike. The limits may vary from country to country, but underlying them is an international consensus that the right exists, and that limits must be reasonable. Further, States respect this right out of a sense of legal obligation, not merely a moral one.** The right to strike is recognised in extensive and diverse sources, including those set forth in Section VI above. To this could be added international economic agreements. In adopting the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the United States, Canada, and Mexico included among their agreed Labor Principles “The right to strike – The protection of the right of workers to strike in order to defend their collective interests.”299 Further, in the 2012 General Survey, **the ILO found that: Although the exercise of the right to strike is in most countries fairly commonly subject to certain conditions or restrictions, the principle of this right as a means of action of workers’ organizations is almost universally accepted. In a very large number of countries, the right to strike is now explicitly recognized, including at the constitutional level.**300 The ILO cited 89 countries from all regions of the world (Asia, Africa, Americas, Europe and Middle East) whose constitutions incorporate the right to strike. The complete list is attached in Annex IV. Further, in practically every other country in the world without a constitutional provision, the right to strike is nevertheless recognized in legislation. Space considerations preclude recounting them all. Two examples at polar opposites in political and economic terms are sufficient:  In the United States, Section 13 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) states, “Nothing in this Act, except as specifically provided for herein, shall be construed so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike or to affect the limitations or qualifications on that right.”301  In Vietnam, Article 5 of the Labour Code adopted in 2012 states, “The employees are entitled to . . . be on strike.” Article 209 states, “The strike is the temporary, voluntary and organizational stopping of work of the labour collective in order to meet the requirements in the process of settlement of labour disputes.”302 **Both countries’ laws and regulations set out various procedural requirements for engaging in strikes such as time frameworks for bargaining, mandatory use of mediation, advance notice of strikes, maintaining minimum services and so on. To a greater or lesser degree, such requirements are common to the laws of all countries, but always resting on the foundational premise that workers have a right to strike.** China, although it removed the right to strike from its Constitution in 1982, adopted a trade union law that implicitly acknowledges the right to strike in saying: In case of work-stoppage or slow-down strike in an enterprise or institution, the trade union shall, on behalf of the workers and staff members, hold consultation with the enterprise or institution or the parties concerned, present the opinions and demands of the workers and staff members, and put forth proposals for solutions. With respect to the reasonable demands made by the workers and staff members, the enterprise or institution shall try to satisfy them. The trade union shall assist the enterprise or institution in properly dealing with the matter so as to help restore the normal order of production and other work as soon as possible.303 The ILO has been compiling a Compendium of court decisions invoking Conventions 87 and 98 and decisions of the Committee on Freedom of Association regarding the right to strike.304 While by no means complete, it includes the following rulings:  In 1995, Russia’s Constitutional Court found that a law prohibiting strikes in the civil aviation sector was unconstitutional. The Court acknowledged that “proceeding from the regulations of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the prohibition of the right to strike is admissible with regard to persons who are the complement of the armed forces, police and administration of the state . . . In addition, the international legal acts on human rights ascribe the regulation of the right to strike to the sphere of internal legislation. But this legislation must not go beyond restrictions permitted by these acts.” The Constitutional High Court concluded that any restriction of the flight personnel’s right to strike was illegal.305  In 2006, a Burkina Faso appeals court found that private sector workers who went on strike in support of a general labour protest movement were unlawfully dismissed, and ordered their reinstatement. The court considered that the strike, which was a general strike based on professional and economic interests aiming to find solutions to issues of social policy, was legitimate and lawful in accordance with the statements of the Committee on Freedom of Association of the Governing Body of the ILO as expressed in its Digest of Decisions. Interpreting the provisions of national law relating to strikes in the light of ILO Convention No. 87 and the Digest of Decisions, the Appeal Court ruled that the strike was legitimate and legal and declared that each of the appellants had been wrongfully dismissed.306  In 2006, the Fiji Arbitration Tribunal, in Fiji Electricity & Allied Workers Union v. Fiji Electricity Authority, 9 May 2006, [2006] FJAT 62; FJAT Award 24 of 2006, found that a constitutional provision guaranteeing the right to freedom of association and collective bargaining must also include a qualified right to strike, relying on the ILO Committee of Experts.  In a 2008 decision, Colombia’s Constitutional Court upheld restrictions on strikes of a political nature, but in so doing reaffirmed the right to strike. The court said that “organizations whose role is to defend the socio-economic and professional interest of workers should, in principle, be able to have recourse to strike action to support their positions in search of solutions to problems deriving from important economic and social policy issues, which have immediate consequences for their members and workers in general, in particular in the sphere of employment, social protection and living conditions.”307  In another 2008 decision involving the dismissal of a worker for joining a strike, Brazil’s Higher Labour Court ruled that the employer’s argument that the dismissal had been due to the worker’s refusal to carry out duties was an invalid one, since an absence from duties is inherent in strike action, and the behaviour of the employer in violating the principle of freedom of association and the free exercise of the right to strike could not be tolerated.308

# **absent leveraging collective bargaining power enabled by unconditional the right to strike, employer’s retain bargaining power over workers. unequal bargaining power continuously leads to increased unemployment, lower wages, and worse working conditions.**

Hafiz 21 (Hiba Hafiz, Assistant Professor of Law at Boston College Law School, “Structural Labor Rights” 2-12- 2021 Page 654 – 656 )

Workers’ collective power against increasingly dominant employers has disintegrated. With union density at an abysmal 6.2 percent in the private sector—a level unequaled since the Great Depression1 —the vast majority of workers depend only on individual negotiations with employers to lift stagnant wages and ensure upward economic mobility.2 But decentralized, individual bargaining is not enough. **Economists and legal scholars increasingly agree that, absent regulation, labor markets naturally strengthen employers’ bargaining power over workers.3 The social costs of unequal bargaining power are immense. When employers have monopsony power, or power to operate as wage setters rather than wage takers in the employment bargain, they hire fewer workers— increasing under- and unemployment—and those workers suffer suppressed pay and benefits as well as worse working conditions**.4 Monopsony power also reduces economic productivity because employers are not competing over wages to lure workers into jobs that are the best match for their productivity and skills.5 Monopsony has distributional effects as well, increasing in equality by allowing employers to capture rents from workers’ labor.6 In addition, when firms hire fewer workers, they produce less output and can charge higher prices that harm consumers.7 Existing law has failed to step in, leaving employers free to coordinate and consolidate labor-market power while limiting workers’ ability to do the same.8 Focused on consumer welfare, antitrust enforcers have allowed employers to merge without considering the effects of increased labor-market concentration on workers’ wages.9 And lax enforcement has enabled employers to engage in a range of conduct that suppresses worker pay, such as reaching wage-fixing and “no-poach” agreements with other employers and imposing restrictive noncompete provisions in employment contracts.10 **Unsurprisingly, in the absence of collective, or “countervailing,” power against employers, workers enter individualized bargaining at a significant disadvantage.11 And the empirical consensus is in: income inequality has spiked as workers have suffered economy-wide wage stagnation and a declining share of the national income for decades.12** When passed in 1935, the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or Act) was designed to overcome this disparity by lifting workers’ leverage as against their employers. The Act established labor rights as collective rights to ensure “equal[] . . . bargaining power between employers and employees.”13 It created a national labor enforcement agency—the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board)—to secure this balance.14 And its first members set out to establish a Division of Economic Research (DER) to ensure institutional alignment between this foundational purpose and the Board’s real-world enforcement.15 The DER furnished the Board with robust social scientific analyses to help the Board target its enforcement to ensure that workers’ bargaining strength matched that of employers.16 But employer lobbying and formalist interpretations of the NLRA have driven labor law from its original purpose. In its Taft-Hartley and LandrumGriffin Amendments to the Act, among other things, Congress exempted independent contractors from its jurisdiction and reduced workers’ strike protections.17 Even more, labor law doctrine restrained workers’ rights to isolated pockets of enterprise bargaining, or bargaining restricted to a single, narrowly defined employer, and limited protections for workers’ exercise of economic pressure against employer buyer power.18 This is particularly true in “fissured” workplaces, where the rise of franchising, outsourcing, subcontracting, and vertical disintegration has increasingly fragmented workplace structures, in part as a means of stripping upstream employers of compliance obligations under labor and employment law.19 So while employers retain rights to integrate, disintegrate, consolidate, or tacitly coordinate their power to their advantage under corporate, antitrust, contract, and property law,20 workers’ collective rights have eroded to the point where they lack any substantive ability to function as counterstructure—as effective countervailing power against employers. A legislative ban on Board hiring of economists cemented this collapse and relegated the Board to outlier status among federal agencies.21 Lacking a social scientist-staffed internal division, the Board was handicapped in its ability to tailor regulation to the policy goals of its organic statute.22 This lack of social scientific expertise has deprived the Board and the courts of the benefits of empirical analysis in evaluating how their decisions contribute to reducing workers’ bargaining power.23

# **states recognizing the unconditional right of workers to strike allows workers who lack union membership and are in non- standard forms of employment to take collective action**

Vogt and Subasinghe 20 (Jeff Vogt is the director for the Solidarity Center’s Rule of Law department and was previously the legal director of the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC). Ruwan Subasinghe Ruwan Subasinghe is Legal Advisor to the International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF). 23 April 2020 ”Workers’ right to strike in emergencies under international law” https://www.equaltimes.org/will-fundamental-workers-rights#.YWkBxtrMLIU)

The right to strike has been firmly established in international and regional legal instruments for decades. These include Convention 87 of the International Labour Organization (ILO), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Article 8) and the ICCPR (Article 22) at the global level, and the ECHR (Article 11) and the American Convention on Human Rights (Article 16) at the regional level. Indeed, the right to strike is now recognised as customary international law. While governments can derogate from certain legal obligations during public emergencies “threatening the life of a nation,” they can do so only to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation. The ILO’s tripartite Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA) has held that a general prohibition of strikes can only be justified in the event of an “acute national emergency” and then only for a limited period and to the extent strictly necessary to meet the requirements of the situation. This means a genuine crisis, such as those arising as a result of a serious conflict, insurrection or natural, sanitary or humanitarian disaster, in which the normal conditions for the functioning of society are absent. Even in such situations, responsibility for suspending a strike on the grounds of public health should not lie with the government, but with an independent body which has the confidence of all parties concerned. While the COVID-19 public health crisis may qualify as an acute national emergency, it is also evident that outright strike prohibitions would not be strictly necessary to meet the requirements of the situation, especially where other restrictions, such as minimum operational services or limits on physical gatherings and picketing, are available. Further, freedom of association provisions in other international instruments already provide exceptions to maintain public order or public health making derogations unnecessary and disproportionate. Indeed, the inability of trade unions to easily call their members out on strike in situations where they are compelled to work in unsafe work environments may even exacerbate the public health crisis. Having concluded that blanket prohibitions of strikes during a public health crisis are likely to be disproportionate even where the aim is legitimate, it is important to look at what types of strike actions and restrictions are permissible under international law. The CFA has consistently held that **strikes are “essential means available to workers and their organizations to protect their interests”.** This would necessarily mean that strikes to demand adequate PPE, a safe workplace or the closure of non-essential businesses would fall well within this scope of protection. **The right to take collective action over occupational safety and health issues is also intrinsically linked to the right of workers to remove themselves from dangerous work without fear of retaliation. This right, enshrined in ILO Convention 155 is especially important for workers in non-standard forms of employment who may not enjoy the right to freedom of association and are in any event 50 per cent less likely to be in a union than workers in open-ended contracts. In terms of strikes to put pressure on governments to introduce fiscal and monetary support packages, the CFA has held that workers may engage in collective action, including protests and strikes over matters beyond the traditional ambit of wages and conditions of work. So long as the strike is not “purely political**” in nature, such as an insurrection, the CFA has stated that, “organizations responsible for defending workers’ socio-economic and occupational interests should be able to use strike action to support their position in the search for solutions to problems posed by major social and economic policy trends which have a direct impact on their members and all workers in general, in particular as regards employment, social protection and standards of living.” While it has not yet had occasion to consider a strike over economic and workplace responses to a pandemic, it is clear that the CFA is likely to find such strikes to be protected.

# **currently, the right to strike is crucial to holding employers accountable, compelling wage increases, and enacting laws that expand social protection**

Vogt and Subasinghe 20 (Jeff Vogt is the director for the Solidarity Center’s Rule of Law department and was previously the legal director of the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC). Ruwan Subasinghe Ruwan Subasinghe is Legal Advisor to the International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF). 23 April 2020 ” The right to strike in essential services” https://www.equaltimes.org/will-fundamental-workers-rights#.YWkBxtrMLIU)

Governments around the world have been publishing lists of workers who provide ‘essential services’ and can therefore continue to go to work despite general lockdown measures. While the aim of such lists is to ensure the functioning of critical supply chains and public services during the pandemic, key workers risk having their right to strike restricted for the duration of the designation period. **The ILO has held that strikes could be restricted or even prohibited in essential services “whose interruption would endanger the life, personal safety or health of the whole or part of the population”. What is meant by essential services in the “strict sense of the term” will depend on the particular circumstances prevailing in a country**. However, **any restriction on the right to strike in essential services should be accompanied by compensatory guarantees, including adequate, impartial and speedy conciliation and arbitration proceedings.** Alternatively, minimum operational requirements may also be negotiated or required in essential services in the strict sense of the term. The CFA has previously found that the decision adopted by a government to require a minimum service in the Animal Health Division, in the face of an outbreak of a highly contagious disease, did not violate the principles of freedom of association. **It is nevertheless paramount that workers’ and employers’ organisations must be able to participate in determining the minimum services which should be ensured. Administrative authorities regulating strikes in essential services should also not overstep their mandates in a time of crisis, especially where the law permits unions to dispense with notice requirements in the event of a serious threat to the health and safety of workers.** The UN Special Rapporteur on the rights to peaceful assembly and of association, Clément Voule, has explained in a recent statement that: “Where human rights are the compass, we will be better placed to overcome this pandemic and build resilience for the future”. This includes the right to freedom of association, and to strike, without fear of retaliation. We agree. We fully recognise the severity of the COVID-19 public health crisis and acknowledge that international law permits governments to exercise emergency powers, within limits, in response to such situations. **However, governments simply cannot prohibit outright the right to strike or enact other disproportionate restrictions, which will certainly have a chilling effect on the right to freedom of association. Indeed, the right to strike is perhaps more important during this emergency, in order to be recognised as a worker, to hold employers to account over failures to provide protective equipment, to contest sweeping layoffs or, as a last resort, to demand wages owed and other benefits. And, we need the right to strike to press governments to enact laws extending social protection, including wage and income support. None of this will happen on its own, without working people organising to make it happen.**

# **social inequality creates a feeling of exclusion, political disempowerment, and enables authoritarianism – all of which damage wellbeing for the marginalized. human well-being exceeds any metric for weighing impacts that is grounded in neo classical economics.**

Peterson Institute for International Economics 20 (The Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE) is an independent nonprofit, nonpartisan research organization dedicated to strengthening prosperity and human welfare in the global economy through expert analysis and practical policy solutions., “How to Fix Economic Inequality? An Overview of Policies for the United States and Other High-Income Economies” 2020 Page 16 and 17 )

**Social and economic inequalities, for example inequalities of wealth and authority, are just only if they result in compensating benefits for everyone, and in particular for the least advantaged members of society.** John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971) There are opposing views on whether economic inequality needs to be narrowed, ranging from economic to political to philosophical. **The most obvious case for combating inequality rests on the notion of fairness—that everyone should have an equal chance at attaining prosperity.** On the other side of the argument, some influential economists have long held that there is a tradeoff between equality and growth—that greater inequality may be an inevitable outcome of higher output, but this point of view is hotly contested. Some social scientists think that inequality may be acceptable if people are also lifted out of poverty (regardless if others are becoming superrich). Others defend inequality as an inevitable result of differences in talent and the important role of free choices by individuals. They argue that excessive focus on inequality is misplaced. Here are some counterpoints and alternative ways of thinking about it. It matters who is treated unequally and why Discussions about solutions must take into account those people still excluded from economic security because of their race, gender, ethnicity, or place of birth, argues Adam S. Posen (PIIE). Inequality on the basis of discrimination is arguably worse as well as differently addressed than economic equality per se. By the same token, high wealth or income which doesn’t come from unfair advantages may not be bad in and of itself, even if that inequality should be reduced in pursuit of other goals. Inequality may hurt a country’s economy. Recent studies find evidence that inequality hampers a country’s growth, and this view is gaining ground among policymakers. Jason Furman (PIIE) warns that it is difficult to generalize about the causal relationship between inequality and growth but that policymakers don’t need to choose, because they can pursue well-known “win-win” options, **such as improving primary education**. **People at the bottom lack power and opportunities to get ahead. Economic growth metrics cannot by themselves measure human wellbeing, explains Danielle Allen (Harvard University). People must feel included and empowered in society. In an economy with high levels of inequality, people at the bottom lack options to gain wealth or participate in the political system. Inequality is undemocratic**. Thomas M. (Tim) **Scanlon (Harvard University) argues that inequality must be addressed when it results in unfair discrimination by democratic institutions—for example, when benefits like education and health care are available unequally, when opportunities for advancement are limited, or when citizens are subjected to racism, sexism, or shameful treatment for being poor.** **Authoritarians exploit inequality for political gain. Experts have linked rising inequality to the wave of populism and authoritarianism across the world—when governments exploit economic anxiety by appealing to “ordinary people” in opposition to “elites” who are accused of discriminating in favor of foreigners, immigrants, or minorities in the workforce**

# **social inequality is the root cause of conflict – studies prove**

Bahgat et al 17(KARIM BAHGAT GRAY BARRETT KENDRA DUPUY SCOTT GATES SOLVEIG HILLESUND HÅVARD MOKLEIV NYGÅRD (PROJECT LEADER) SIRI AAS RUSTAD HÅVARD STRAND HENRIK URDAL GUDRUN ØSTBY April 12, 2017 Background report for the UN and World Bank Flagship study on development and conflict Prevention, “Inequality and Armed Conflict: Evidence and Data” Page 185 – 186, Peace Research Institute Oslo, )

Conclusion: preventing conflict and sustaining peace What is the relationship between inequality and armed conflict, what are trends in inequality, and how can patterns of inclusion and exclusion be addressed? Getting the answer to these questions ‘right’ is crucial for developing successful policies for preventing conflict and sustaining peace. We have outlined the available scientific evidence on these questions. Inequality has been a central concern for a large scholarly body of work, but despite the substantial attention that has been paid to understanding vertical inequalities and conflict, there is no conclusive answer as to whether, why, and how this type of inequality impacts conflict. While the conventional wisdom is that inequality should trigger conflict, methodological and conceptual problems plague the study of vertical inequality and conflict. More problematic is the fact that this literature struggles to answer the question of how and why inequality mobilizes certain groups for violence. Partially in response to this, scholars have shifted focus to examining horizontal inequalities. **The horizontal inequality literature examines how inequalities based on group identities, such as ethnicity, region, and religion, influence the incidence of conflict. There is a solid amount of support in the literature for the argument that high levels of horizontal economic and political inequalities among the relatively deprived make violent conflict more likely,** but only mixed evidence regarding the relatively privileged, and very limited evidence for the influence of social horizontal inequalities. We still need more research and evidence about which types of group-based identities matter for mobilizing people to engage in conflict, and how and why they do. This includes a need for more knowledge about the role of perceptions and emotion in making certain identities more salient than others. Several prominent authors within the horizontal inequality literature (Gurr 1970, Stewart 2000, 2002, Cederman et al 2013) have pointed out the importance of perceptions of inequalities. The literature on perceived horizontal inequalities remains small, but the few studies that exist do find a relationship between perceived inequalities and attitudes towards violence. Importantly, these studies show that objective and perceived horizontal inequalities do not necessarily overlap. On the contrary, the correlation between the two is not as high as expected, a pattern we confirm and further document using fine-grained survey data. This is important, since it means that the relationship between perceived HI and conflict attitudes is not a proxy for the relationship found between objective HI and conflict. The pattern of overlap between objective and subjective inequalities also varies. It tends to be higher for (perceived) inequality between regions, but lower for inequality between ethnic groups. There are at leastwo plausible explanations for this. First, regions might simply not be the best group identifier to use as the basis of calculating HI – for most people the spatial or regional identity is not that relevant or salient compared to ethnic groups. Second, the survey question used to calculate perceived ethnic HI was specifically used to ask how the respondents’ ethnic group compared to other ethnic groups. That is, the respondent was asked to compare their ethnic group with other ethnic groups This highlights the need for more and better quality data to measure perceived inequalities, as well as data on how these perceptions are triggered. Without such data, we can not fully assess how inequalities affects conflict. It is essential that large survey undertakings, such as the AfroBarometer, continue to collect data on perceptions, which they failed to do in Round 5 and 6. The ShaSA surveys, which cover 10 African countries, also include questions of political perceptions, but they do not probe specifically for identity groups and are therefore less suitable for testing perceived horizontal inequalities. This, however, could easily be changed by adding a few more focused questions to the standard questionnaire. The evidence base for the relationship between inequality and armed conflict relies on high-quality, fine-grained data on inequalities. We document and map available sources that can be used to measure and track both vertical and horizontal (objective and perceived) inequalities. Inequality is a complex phenomenon. In a given country (or region) or a given time, to a large extent the level of inequality depends on how it is operationalized and measured. Vertical (economic) inequality is most commonly measured using the Gini coefficient. The best empirical database on income inequality data is the Wider Income Inequality Database, which is based on a wide variety of national surveys. These surveys differ in their reliability, coverage and definition of income. To construct a reliable measure of vertical inequality we sort all surveys according to their reliability, coverage and definition of income, and then use the best surveys for each country-year observation. It should be noted that this, not surprisingly, reveals that the best, most reliable data on income inequality are found in open, rich economies, whereas data on Africa and Asia is much less reliable. Perhaps more problematically, we find that countries with higher levels of inequality tend to systematically have lower quality data on such inequality. Nonetheless, using this data we find that the world currently has the highest levels if income inequality on record: globally, inequality decreased from 1960 to 1990, but then the trend reversed and inequality climbed back to 1960s levels. It has since stayed around or above these levels.

# **prioritizing other impacts over social inequality ideologically justifies self -evaluation processes that are congruent with the disproportionate distribution of society’s resources. when evaluating impacts, de valuing structural inequality’s significance confirms the self-view that a favorable social position is justified based on objective superiority. we must reject therefore reject impact evaluations that confirm the legitimacy of privileged positions.**

Stolte 83 (John F. Stolte, Adjunct Professor University of Texas MD Anderson School of Health Professions Professor Emeritus Northern Illinois University P.H.D. in Sociology at University of Washington June 1983 " The Legitimation of Structural Inequality: Reformulation and Test of the Self-Evaluation Argument" American Sociological Review , Jun., 1983, Vol. 48, No. 3"THE LEGITIMATION OF STRUCTURAL INEQUALITY: REFORMULATION AND TEST OF THE SELF EVALUATION ARGUMENT\*" )

Different in many ways, Marx's radical conflict theory (1886), Mosca's elite conflict theory (1939), and Parsons's functional theory (1949) are similar in one respect. Each describes an important process in stratification: **structural inequality is ideologically justified so as to "allocate feelings of potency, competence, and, above all, importance and self-worth in a manner congruent with (the distribution of) primary resources" (power, wealth, and pres- tige**) (Della Fave, 1980:959). Della Fave amplifies this insight, synthesizing ideas from Mead's (1934) theory of the self-concept and Bem's (1967) theory of self-perception. According to Mead, objectivity of self-view is promoted by seeing oneself from the per- spective of the "generalized other," a compos- ite conception of attitudes and expectations held in general by others toward the self. Mead used the economic marketplace to illustrate the impact of the "generalized other" on the self- concept (Reck, 1964). A person learns the "objective" value of an economic good through observing the price others regularly pay for it. Similarly, a person gets a sense of self-worth through the reflected appraisals, high or low, received generally across a career of symbolic interactions. 'Mead's theory is compatible with Bem's (1967) self-perception approach, subsumed as a special case within attribution theory (Kelley, 1967). A person looks at his/her own behavior as something to explain. S/he makes judgments about (attributions of) causes, in a manner taken to be reasonable with reference to an external, objective observer, thus achieving an explanation. **Della Fave argues that the "ex- ternal observer" of attribution theory is closely analogous to "the generalized other" of sym- bolic interaction theory.2 Considered in the context of structural in- equality, the two theories link self-evaluation and legitimation. If it is evident to a person that s/he occupies a favorable social position, s/he will develop a favorable self-evaluation. The evident facts of the situation and the positive reflected appraisals confirm that self-view. To an objective observer ("the generalized other"), it would seem reasonable to attribute the advantaged position to the "objective" superiority of the self in competence, in morality, etc. The person thus comes to be- lieve that s/he deserves to-occupy a privileged position.** Conversely, if it is apparent to a per- son that s/he occupies a disadvantaged social position s/he will develop an unfavorable self- evaluation. The negative reflected appraisals and the obvious facts of the situation lead the person to attribute his/her relative deprivation to the "objective" inferiority of the self. Con- sequently, the person will come to believe that s/he deserves to be located where s/he is lo- cated in the structure of inequality. Both ad- vantaged and disadvantaged actors will there- fore come to accept the structure of inequality as legitimate, right, and reasonable.

# **at the level of ontology, cartesian metaphysics paradigmatically informs the discussion of whether just governments ought to recognize the unconditional right of workers to strike. endemic to the cartesian interpretation of the world is a divide between mind and matter, subject and object, as well as nature and culture. workers are understood as rational and autonomous subjects that exerts mastery over the external natural order through the acquisition of material resources. a cultural cognitive and affective shift in our relationality to the earth is necessary to envision relationality to the earth and enable new bio social becomings.**

Schultz 17 (KARSTEN A. SCHULZ, Postdoctoral Research Fellow with the Governance and Sustainability Lab at the University of Trier, Germany, where he works on the political ecology of climate change adaptation and urban water use in West Africa. He completed his M.A. in Political Science at the University of Bonn, and his Ph.D. in Political Geography at the Center for Development Research (ZEF). He has previously published on a variety of topics such as climate change adaptation, urbanization, changing nature-society relations, and sustainability transformations. He is also a Research Fellow with the Earth System Governance Project. His latest publication is “Decolonizing political ecology: ontology, technology and the enchantment of nature” (Journal of Political Ecology). Decolonising the Anthropocene: The Mytho-Politics of Human Mastery Page 55 – 58

This being said, wide consensus exists among historians that the radical elevation of the human species over the nonhuman world by means of reflexive reason and scientific self-improvement is an idea of European origin (Leiss 1994). Moreover, there seems to be fair agreement that the idea of human mastery over nature has been progressively shaped by three influential cultural currents, the first of which is arguably the intellectual and artistic tradition of ancient Greece. In his broad historical account entitled The Beginnings of Western Science, David C. Lindberg (2007) illustrates that the emergence of pre-Socratic natural philosophy during the sixth century BC was marked by a distinct turn from a mythical worldview toward independent inquiry and generalised scepticism. **Nature came to be understood as an autonomous object which had to be comprehended through logical reasoning.** However, the gradual change that took place in Greece from the beginning of the sixth century BC was not simply a miraculous turn from mythos to logos that signalled the end of Greek mythology. Mythical thought can be found in every period of ancient Greece for which evidence exists ― to the end of antiquity and into the Middle Ages (Lloyd 1979). These influential mythical tropes certainly played their part in naturalising the ideology of human mastery within western cultural imaginaries. **Aristotelian, Platonic, and Stoic philosophy as well as the works of the Greek playwright Sophocles explicitly emphasised the divinity of the world, while simultaneously asserting ‘the godlike rationality and hence superiority of human beings, and the rightfulness of ruling over land, vegetable and animal life’** (Wybrow 1991: 129). **Western ideas of human mastery, in other words, never developed in a historical and scientific vacuum that was entirely free from mythical thought,** particularly if we turn our attention toward the second mythical tradition that played a decisive role in legitimising the human dominion over nature, the Judeo-Christian religious tradition. Decreed by divine providence, ‘Man’ was given dominium terrae, the cultural mandate to rule over God’s creation. Occasionally this mandate was interpreted in the sense of a paternalistic stewardship, while in other cases it was taken quite literally as a divine decree to subdue the earth and all living things.5 As a dominant cultural force and frame of reference for the interpretation of what I would call ‘second degree’ mythical thought (mythical thought that openly disavowed any intention to make a claim of absolute truth), **Christianity exerted a continuous influence throughout the entire early modern period — a period that witnessed the scientific revolution, the colonisation of the Americas, and the emergence of capitalism and the modern nation-state.** Reinforced by technological and scientific progress taking place at a hitherto unprecedented pace, **mythical themes of mastery ― that ‘man’ and spirit stand apart from nature and that human beings rightfully exercise authority over nature ― slowly blended with the modern scientific and capitalist worldview**. In the seventeenth century, iconic thinkers such as Francis Bacon and René Descartes set out to conquer nature by means of philosophy, science, and technology, driven by the desire to reconcile and transmute mythical, alchemical, and Christian influences under the aegis of a naturalistic and rationalistic worldview (Leiss 1994). **Particularly the Cartesian dualism between the extended physical world and the nonphysical world of thought was seen as the definitive completion of the pre-Socratic turn from mythos to logos, when myth finally became synonymous with the subjective and the irrational** (Scarborough 1994). From this point onward, myths could neither serve as cosmological narratives of the universe, nor as valid allegories of nature, for they were now fully associated with the inner realm of subjective experience and not with the outer realm of the objective physical world. In the same vein, myths had to be sharply distinguished from history as well, since history could from then on only refer to objective events. This Cartesian schism was further exacerbated by the spread of Enlightenment thought during the eighteenth century, which celebrated the power of reason and embraced a triumphalist scientism. Even though the Enlightenment was not a unified cultural expression with a single doctrine, it nevertheless gave rise to new forms of secular modernism which gradually reduced the influence of mythical and religious thinking as a dominant cultural frame of reference. **Simultaneously, the Enlightenment created its own utopian paradigm of the rational and autonomous individual who imposed upon nature as well as on herself or himself the orderly totality of a universal reason**. Nevertheless, the persistence of various mythical or spiritual imaginaries in our contemporary societies certainly illustrates that such a lasting demystification of life turned out to be a rather short-lived illusion. **If we consider contemporary discussions about the Anthropocene, we can easily see that the sediments of powerful mythical narratives advancing the idea of human mastery and distinguishing mind from matter, subject from object, and nature from culture can still be found in today’s political debates**. A number of scientists recently suggested that the Anthropocene should be seen as an opportunity and, ultimately, as a ‘good’ epoch in which human ingenuity and technology will provide the means to solve the critical environmental problems of our time (see, for example, Ellis 2011). These Promethean myths of ecomodernism, synthetic biology, and geoengineering are not only fallacies of control in the light of unprecedented changes which are currently occurring in the earth’s ecosystems. **They are also about to be woven into a new geopolitical master narrative that is on the verge of replacing the abstract totality of a single humanity with the abstract plurality of more-than-human entanglements**. Put differently, it is important to realise that more-than-human or posthuman accounts of the Anthropocene provide the discursive background for the mytho-politics of the newly proclaimed human epoch. From the contested metaphor of Gaia, popularised by James Lovelock as a synonym for earth system science (and recently reworked by the French philosopher and anthropologist Bruno Latour), to animistic and pantheistic currents in western environmental philosophy and non-western thought, there currently exists an intriguing interest in imagining other possible ways of relating to the world at large.6 **Decolonial scholars nevertheless argue that such attempts at conceptualising the relations between humans and more-than-human nature(s) must pay attention to the coloniality of power, knowledge, and being, while becoming more sensitive to the vital role that myth and mythology play in articulating alternatives to hegemonic western knowledge practices.** The idea of border thinking, in particular, alerts us to the limiting modes of relationality and representation that are inherent to the anthropocentric worldview, a worldview which perceives more-than-human nature primarily as an object (socially produced, biophysically constituted, or both). The gradual delinking from such a limiting perspective, and the simultaneous consideration of cosmologies which see nature as an active and ‘ensouled’ subject in its own right, so it seems, must therefore appear as one of the most radical projects imaginable vis-à-vis the epistemic hierarchy of westerncentric technoscience. Quite possibly, many scholars would fervently revolt against such a proposed bridging of established science/myth, rational/ primitive or fact/value divides ― particularly if such an attempt is performed without a certain ironic or subjective gesture ― for it conjures up vivid images of seemingly regressive elements that have been expelled from today’s dominant scholarly discourses: essence, spirit, esotericism, non-modernism, non-rationalism, romanticism, totalitarianism, and so on. And yet **it is evident that the predicaments of the Anthropocene, whether they are taken to be economic, spiritual, or sociopolitical in nature, will require a cultural-cognitive and affective shift in how (many) humans relate to the world they inhabit**. **While imagining the possibilities for new biosocial becomings, it is crucial to realise that contemporary societies are still influenced by older mythological substrata that carry with them the sediments of the ‘grand narratives’ of human mastery.** Such deep-seated sociocultural patterns must be taken very seriously in their capacity to shape the future outcomes of Anthropocene politics. After all, the ideology of human mastery might well survive without the much-critiqued nature/culture binary and become enshrouded in new Anthropocene myths. Advanced algorithmic or biopolitical control mechanisms and the capitalist-materialistic ethos of desire, production, and consumption are certainly well attuned to the Anthropocene rhetoric of biosocial complexity, indeterminacy, interconnectedness, and plurality (Pellizzoni 2015). By contrast, decolonial scholarship reminds us of the liberating potential and integrative function of myth and myth-making. The concept of mytho-politics, which I have outlined here, thus draws attention to the complex openness and suggestiveness of myth in the sense of an ideological ‘both/and.’ This means that, even if the role of mytho-politics in transforming imaginaries of biosocial relations is fully recognised, it is difficult to predict how the Anthropocene debate might develop in the near future. Will the discussion become more open to different views of knowing and being? Will it include marginalised perspectives which reject the objectification of nature and point toward the need for a decolonial politics of ‘delinking’ and ‘re-learning’? Or will the debate remain entrenched in western-centric and anthropocentric ideas of planetary stewardship, managerial control, and (bio-)technological fixes? Whatever the case may be, **it is clear that the discussion about the Anthropocene has already moved beyond questions of mere geological evidence. It has become a lively debate about the principles of thought, speech, and action which provide the seemingly ‘natural’ foundations for the idea of unlimited human mastery over the earth.**

# **cartesian metaphysics perpetually reduces land to an unlimited resource that is retrofitted into a commodity for sustainable labor. perpetual reduction of relationality to land to that of an external commodity entangled within a network of capitalist relations necessitates the anthropocentric deadening of being. indigenous economies that centralize relationality to land become degraded components of primitive and arcane life that are not measurable within settler registers of materialism.**

Henderson 14 (Worlds on the Edge: The Politics of Settler Resentment on the Saugeen/Bruce Peninsula by Phil Henderson B.A., The University of Western Ontario, 2014 A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of MASTER OF ARTS in the Department of Political Science Page 69 – 72,

As Emma Lowman and Adam Barker assert, attempting to disentangle and isolate capitalist, racial, gender, or colonial oppressions from one another is misguided. Each of these 3 processes operate simultaneously, overlapping and reinforcing one another in a variety of nonschematic ways. Still, settler states such as Canada remain committed to ongoing colonization, and this is the background condition establishing and enabling - or, rather, disabling - what settlers perceive as the immutable ground or bedrock upon which all possible political projects must be built. Glen Coulthard observes that settler colonies mobilize “discursive and nondiscursive facets of economic, gendered, racial, and state power” to secure the continuance of hierarchical social orders predicated from their genesis on dispossessing indigenous peoples. 4 As such, **a decolonial account of dispossession begins by rejecting settlers’ claims to territorial sovereignty as a matter of course**. Moreover, this rejection must continue to contour how political and economic issues are understood within the context of settler colonialism. Narrating the dispossessive drive’s development begins with this rejection, and with a subsequent coming to terms, as Michael Asch says, with the fact that wherever **indigenous peoples and persons are in Turtle Island today**, whether on rural reserves or in urban centres, they live on land that remains under their sovereignty and jurisdiction; and that **we [settlers] ourselves live on ‘unceded land’…** rather than arguing over the point, we need to begin by determining the implications for us and accepting the reality of our status on Indigenous lands.5 Analyses of dispossession that attend to this fact by recognizing the ongoing decolonial struggle to disrupt the settler colony’s presumption of sovereignty and its highly destructive economy begin to accommodate the radical alterity of multiple subject positions. A decolonial critique underscores that the neoliberal regime, which many scholars portray as something radically new, 70 is only an extension of the dispossessive drives which were initiated by and continue to sustain the processes of settler colonization, and now also begin to operate against newly disposable populations of settlers. Neoliberalization does not emerge ex nihilo; rather, it maintains colonization, expanding and entrenching processes of dispossession while striving to open North America to deeper exploitation by the settler economy. For the purposes of this project it is sufficient to trace the initiation of this animating dispossessive drive only as far back as its origins in North America. Though a longer history exists, and is a project worthy of serious consideration, it is nevertheless both too broad and too deep to be contained in this work. 6 With notable and important exceptions, the earliest settlers primarily aimed to establish trade and military alliances between Europe and the various indigenous peoples of northeastern Turtle Island. As Europe’s economy transformed, however, the importance of these partnerships 7 declined precipitously in the reckoning of settlers. The rise of a regime of accumulation predicated on industrial capitalism saw European populations and markets undergo a massive expansion**. To the instrumentalized mentality of early industrial capitalists, the territories of indigenous peoples represented at once a nearly unlimited resource to be commodified and a site to which the “Malthusian excesses” of Europe could be conveniently relocated and used as labour in the extractive economy.** The presence of sovereign indigenous peoples, who may have 8 traded with Europeans but would object to the total exploitation and destruction of their territories by industry, became an impediment to the unbridled expansion of capitalist markets. Exemplified in the repeatedly violated treaties between the Saugeen Anishinaabek and the Crown, as discussed in chapter one, the settler state continually ignored both the letter and spirit 71 of these treaties, using subterfuge and coercion to advance an economy that necessitates the dispossession of their treaty-partners. It is tempting to assert that this is merely an example of cynical self-interest trumping treaties - and, to some degree, it no doubt is. I do not, however, think this explanation can fully account for the voraciousness and reflexivity with which settlers continue dispossessing indigenous peoples. **Settler colonialism relies, as all political regimes do, on the development of a political subject through discourses and social practices that naturalize the distribution of power.** Developed just prior to the initiation of settler colonization, John Locke’s “powerfully and influentially elaborated” labour theory of property provided settlers with a cogent narrative to support their sense of proprietorship. Asserting that all the world was a commons awaiting a 9 claim to private ownership via its transformation through human labour, Locke’s theory presented North America as radically open to the imposition of European possession. 10 In actual fact, and this should be so clear as to hardly require comment, the indigenous peoples of Turtle Island had been extensively labouring in their territories since time immemorial. The economies of indigenous peoples were, however, radically different from those of Europeans. Many of these economies were “based on the land and the free, unrestricted access of everyone to its resources.” Because many indigenous peoples did not engage in the 11 same sort of hierarchically structured and highly destructive economies as Europeans, settlers discounted indigenous labour as too ‘rudimentary’ to warrant acknowledgement. This enabled settlers to assert that North America was unassisted by human improvement and, therefore, that indigenous peoples’ territorial sovereignty need not be recognized. These abstractive discourses encouraged settlers to transplant into North America the material “preconditions underwriting 72 the capital relation” in Europe. Through the regimes of private property, which were codified 12 into laws and enforced by both the violence of the settler state and by vigilante mobs of settlers, indigenous peoples’ access to their territories was gradually eroded by settler enclosures. Enclosure of North America into a patchwork of private properties initiates what Karl Marx refers to as primitive [ursprünglich: original, initial] accumulation. Repeated wherever 13 capitalist relations instantiate themselves, this process represents the severance of a people from their direct access to the land, and the mediating of that access through hierarchical proprietary regimes. As such, in North America, the development of capitalist relations and the foundations of private property - of settlers’ sense possessing land - enacts the dispossession of indigenous peoples of their territories and the degradation of their original economies through processes of settler colonization. This is to say that while the development of capitalism may not necessitate colonialism - the case of England problematizes such a linear causality - in North America the emergence and maintenance of capitalism relies on ongoing processes of settler colonization. That said, **the initiation of the dispossessive drive in North America through the processes of settler colonization cannot be reduced solely, or even primarily, to a materialist account.** As Lowman and Barker note, **beginning the story of dispossession from a materialist standpoint presents the risk that our narrative will act as a conduit for smuggling settler “biases into Indigenous ways of being.”** Instead - as treaty-partners - we must struggle to do the 14 difficult work of learning from indigenous peoples’ ontologies, especially as indigenous peoples have long been required to learn our systems of knowledge in an effort to merely survive settler coloniality’s capriciousness. **of the indigenous peoples across Turtle Island their ontologies place the initial moment of sociality in a culture of relationality to the land, which offers up knowledge to guide the proper conduct of relationships with human and nonhuman others. This is radically different from the anthropocentric deadening of being that is foisted on all nonhuman subjects within the ontological orientations of settlers - who generally hold that the human is the subject of primary consequence.** Put differently, the settler is produced as a subject within a regime of power that 19 locates the human - and, even then, only some humans historically - as the site of ethical concern or relationality. **Settler regimes of proprietorship** - of possessiveness - imposed by colonization, **attempt the dispossession of more than mere materiality**. **It is also always already working to dispossess indigenous peoples of their ways of being in relation to the world, their grounded understandings of responsibility to all relations.** Aileen Moreton-Robinson asserts that the processes of settler coloniality function to “disavow and dispossess the Indigenous subject of an ontology that exists outside the logic of capital”. 20 **As a matter of course settler colonization attempts to eliminate indigenous peoples’ ontological alterity and subsequently to reground the colonized subject in the colonizers’ ontology.** Duncan Campbell Scott confessed to this very aim when he suggested that the Indian Act (1876) would “solve the Indian problem” by ensuring that “there is not a single Indian in Canada that has not been absorbed into the body politic.” All difference was to be flattened 21 into the homogeneity of the settler subject. Used throughout the anglophone settler colonies, Residential Schools are a particularly vicious example of the technologies employed in the effort to dispossess indigenous children of all ontological alterity. Designed to “obliterate young children’s connections to indigenous culture”, Residential Schools simultaneously imposed 75 settler ontologies onto indigenous children. The goal, as Stephanie McMullen notes, was to 22 reproduce indigenous children as “assimilated subjects”, imbued with the values of “selfsupporting Christian farmers”. The dispossessive drive that animates settler colonization in its 23 commodification and exploitation of the land operates at two levels simultaneously: attempting to strip indigenous peoples of both their material and ontological relationship to their territories. In a decolonial critique these processes of dispossession must not, as happens so often, be rendered as merely historic events which recede with the passage of time. Moreton-Robinson notes that overwhelmingly settler accounts of colonialism reduce dispossession to “a mere blemish on the historical record,” an event which no longer brings weight to bear on the present except as an historic grievance. Even Marx is ambivalent about the contemporary relevance of 24 the originary dispossessive movement. In the first volume of Capital he writes that primitive accumulation “is nothing else than the historical process of divorcing the producer from the means of production… it forms the pre-historic stage of capital”. Marx thus relegates the 25 material and ontological dispossessions that initiate enclosures to a discrete and historically finalized fact. Subsequent Marxist scholars have worked to temper this historicizing tendency somewhat. David Harvey notably asserts that the concept of ‘primitive’ accumulation is misleading as it suggests that the processes of enclosure occurred in the past. He proposes subsuming what Marx identifies as primitive accumulation within the phrase “accumulation by dispossession”, a process that he says is occurring “at a certain level” to this day. Despite 26 recognizing primitive accumulation as operating in the present, Harvey nevertheless subtly recapitulates Marx’s historicism, suggesting that dispossession through primitive accumulation 76 occurs through a series of discrete and foreclosed acts. He writes that primitive accumulation is a “necessary though ugly stage” in the developmental movement of economies. While Harvey 27 recovers primitive accumulation from the archaic past, his insistence on stadial development imparts a certain historicism to the process: suggesting that dispossession occurs as a series of singular events, the conclusion and political neutralization of which are determinable. Such an account ignores the always ongoing struggle involved in sustaining dispossession. As MoretonRobinson notes, it “takes a great deal of work” to maintain the processes dispossessing indigenous peoples in the face of their ongoing resistance. Settler possession of the colony is 28 thus never achieved with finality; rather it is a continuous reiteration of dispossessive acts.

# **an earth centered conscientization constitutes continual relationality with mother earth for all beings. collective histories and lived realities of indigenous people all form a historical consciousness that activates sentiments of relationality and intimate stewardship. giving voice to all our relations enables activists and organizers to dissolve colonial conceptions of a separate natural world and embark in a social web of human and non- human relations that protects the earth.**

Klutz and Walter 18 (Jenalee Kluttz PhD Student, Education University of British Columbia Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada , Pierre Walter 17. THEORIZING ADULT EDUCATION, POWER AND SOCIO-ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE A Consideration of the Climate Justice Movement Page 195 – 198 INDIGENOUS FEMINISM, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, AND DECOLONIZING EDUCATION, RLA)

How then do notions of power, privilege and socio-environmental change play out in an Earth-centred positionality of place in environmental adult education? Since we as urbanized, colonized human beings have removed ourselves so thoroughly from being able to listen to and seek advice directly from the Earth (nor could we represent knowledge gained this way in textual form), we have no choice but to turn to human theorizing once more. Here, we look to Indigenous feminism, environmental justice, and decolonizing education for guidance. From theoretical work in Indigenous feminism, we understand that although Indigenous identities, societies and peoples are traditionally of Mother Earth, and have a history of working within an equitably differentiated gendered division of labor, and while both Indigenous men and women have been subject to genocidal colonial histories, dispossession of land and culture, White Supremacy and racism, Indigenous women also suffer additionally from systems of colonial-induced patriarchy cutting across indigeneity. That is, “**Indigenous women have endured a double erasure and (marginalization) – first, as indigenous peoples, and secondly, as women”** (Grande, 2004, p. 127). Thus, while maintaining an Earth-based positionality, Indigenous feminism seeks to identify and resist “the ways in which (Indigenous) women are subordinated to men and how women can be emancipated from this subordination” (Green, 2007, p. 21). Decolonizing education requires ,first, the historical study of human systems of oppression – settler colonialism, capitalism, patriarchy, systemic racism – which have destroyed Mother Earth and dispossessed Indigenous Peoples of their basic human rights to land, culture and livelihood. Second, it normally demands a recognition of direct personal complicity in these acts, not only by all present-day settler colonial peoples living on stolen lands (e.g. Canada, U.S. Japan, China, Australia, all of Latin America, Africa), but also by those residing in colonial states built upon these genocidal and environmentally catastrophic histories (England, Spain, France, Belgium, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal). **An ‘Earth-centred conscientization’ of adult learners continues through the histories and lived realities of Indigenous, poor, and racialized people bearing the costs of toxic waste, polluted water, and climate change; that is, of environmental racism, classism and oppression** (Irlbacher-Fox, 2014). Third, **decolonizing education recognizes that Indigenous Peoples have been defending the Earth and their very lands, lives, cultures, livelihood, human rights and identity against the violent onslaught of colonialism continuously for almost 600 years, continue to struggle today for the restoration of stolen ancestral lands, and are actively working to recover scared sites and cultural knowledge ripped away from them by non-Indigenous People** (Tuck & Yang, 2012). Finally, **with this historical consciousness in place, the question becomes how to re-establish a personal relationship with Mother Earth for all peoples (Plumwood, 2003), and for non-Indigenous people, how to develop a respectful and humble relationship with Indigenous Peoples, who are at once our teachers and ‘co-resisters’ as well as co-advocates for the return of stolen lands, the struggle against climate injustice, capitalism, racism and patriarchy, and the struggle for reconciliation and the healing of the Earth**. The Tsleil-Waututh Nation leading the movement against Trans Mountain are Sklilwkta or ‘People of the Inlet’: they are among the people most directly impacted by the pipeline construction and potential oil spills**. As people of the water, protection of the water is not simply a moral or ethical mandate, it is protection of self, of identity and existence, as well as a spiritual duty.** Yet all Tsleil-Waututh people do not experience their relationship to the water and the powers that threaten it in the same way: intersections of gender, “kinship, age, wealth, race, religion, political situation, and other characteristics affect and frame what one experiences as an indigenous person” (Whyte, 2014, p. 604), just like any other. **The positionality of Indigenous women within Tsleil-Waututh culture grants them particular understandings, identities, relations and responsibilities to water, similar to those they might have to children, elders or other family members**. Starting with water in the womb, water is thought of as life-giving and life-sustaining, and as such, women have a special duty to protect this relation. Of course, not all Indigenous women take up this responsibility, but elders acting as leaders of the movement often speak of this connection. When Indigenous women within the movement talk of their sacred duty to protect the water, they speak of it quite differently from non-Indigenous women or others who might see water as life-sustaining, but not as a living relation. **These different positionalities both embody and create different types of learning and knowledge generation and exchange within and from the movement. A non-Indigenous woman may resist the pipeline to protect the water as a social or moral responsibility, while an Indigenous woman struggles against colonial ideas that challenge her ability to do her spiritual or cultural duty to a relation (water**). Thus, for a non-Indigenous woman, protecting the water may bring about social or environmental consciousness, while for an Indigenous woman, it may support cultural learning and reconnection to spiritual practice. In the same sense, abuses of power, marginalization and oppression are not experienced by non-Indigenous women (or men) in quite the same way. However, by working side-by-side in the movements, these **adults co-enact a decolonizing education, learning from each other, questioning, revealing, undoing and replacing the hegemony of colonial truths with new knowledge of Indigenous history, epistemologies, colonialism, Earth-centered positionality and relations.** **Decolonizing education places human identity and social action into a web of both human and non-human relations - water, land, air, plants, animals - who cannot then be considered exploitable natural 'resources', and whom we are obligated to protect from harm** (Adams, 2003). Thus, 'water protector' becomes not only a name, but also an identity, a relation, a sacred duty, and a way of being. Centering Indigenous voices and leadership, activists and organizers are able to reflect on differences of oppression, identity, and ways of being, **as well as their roles within the movement and their own positioning as part of the collective we in relation to place.** Non-Indigenous climate justice activists in B.C. also have strong ties to land and water, sea, and sky, based on livelihood, life history, spirituality and identity. Some depend on agricultural production, fishing or coastal tourism to support themselves. **Many feel a deep spiritual connection to the immense beauty of B.C.'s landscapes and wild spaces**; others value the opportunities affored by the land and sea for hiking, kayaking, skiing, hunting, camping, boating or fishing. Some ties are shallow, some deep, some cultural, others spiritual or material. Some believe in rights to property and ownership; others see open, un-owned lands for all. However, in learning to see through a decolonizing lens, these and other adults in the movement begin to better understand the situated nature of power in relation to place and Indigenous peoples. **New knowledge uncovers our colonial mindset toward the Earth, where people's relations with nature are controlled by oil companies, governments, courts, rich white men, etc. working against, rather than with, nature** (Adams, 2003). Through a decolonizing lens, this knowledge is not limited to the present - where the fossil fuel industry is controlling relationships to land with implications for human and non-human futures - but also extends to the past teaching lessons of the reality of colonization that has controlled Indigenous communities' relationships to the land for hundreds of years. Positionality in relation to place is complex and varied among adults, in part depending on the extent to which their livelihood is place-based. For some, the Trans Mountain project is understood as both an immediate and future threat to ocean- and land-based livelihood because of oil spills, tanker traffic through marine ecosystems, and the effects of climate change, including sea level rise, acidification and warming. An understanding of environmental justice as integral to decolonizing education highlights these and other positionalities. Wealth, power and education may allow some to shift livelihood in the case of an oil spill or sea levels rise; poorer coastal fishing communities may not have the means to do so. A non-Indigenous organizer working in the coastal tourism industry may be more directly threatened by the pipeline than an Indigenous woman professional working in an urban office, and so on. The threat of the pipeline is experienced and learned differently - culturally, socially, spiritually and economically - depending on the intersects of social categories and positionality within the larger power structures in connection to place. Indigenous and non-Indigenous activists, for example, differ somewhat in their perspectives of the Earth’s role within the movement. Some colonial-settler activists, talking of protecting the non-human world (waterways, orcas, salmon, etc.), frame the Earth as a separate entity, and something to be guarded. **By contrast, Indigenous leaders not only speak of a responsibility to protect their relations, but also acknowledge the non-human world’s participation in the struggle. This is done in ways as simple as recognizing the presence of trees, birds, animals, and plants in the everyday events and activities of resistance**. It might mean drawing attention to eagles flying overhead who are watching over protest marches and rallies, or, before a protest action, acknowledging the history of a place; not only human histories, but also histories of other beings. In this way, **the non-human world is included in the movement rather than simply being a beneficiary of it, giving voice to ‘all our relations’, not just human voices. These recognitions and inclusions provide moments of learning where activists and organizers are encouraged to question colonial conceptions of a separate non-human world.** **Through learning from Indigenous leadership, the Earth and non-human relations are moved from the margins to “take their place as narrative subjects in a speaking and participating land, full of narratives and mythic voices” (Plumwood, 2003, p. 67). Inviting the Earth to be part of the conversation teaches an Earth-centred positionality, facilitated by Indigenous leaders and others who recognize the Earth’s agency and challenge a colonial ‘deafness’ to the non-human world** (Plumwood, 2003). In doing so, they begin a decolonizing dialogue in environmental adult education in which the Earth is an inseparable part of adult learning and education, culture, community, identity and human existence.

# **debate is a place of consciousness formation – all processes of observation and measurement endemic to positivist and empiricist research models contribute to our understanding of a subject that stands as an outside of observer to an external physical world. our intervention in the curriculum is necessary to recalibrate how we formulate and understand consciousness by situating it within the natural world instead of against it.**

We must question the performative practices through which ideas and inquiry manifest. Practices of scholarship, knowing, and civic responsibility are bound to cartesian premises of observer as subject and an external world as object of study. Re modulating a conception of inquiry outside of Cartesian dogma necessitates integrating affect and cognition in processes that enable being, feeling, committing, and living in the natural world.

**Rosiek et al 20** (Jerry Lee Rosiek, Professor of Education Studies at the University of Oregon where he teaches courses on the cultural foundations of education, the racial politics of education practice and policy, and qualitative research methodology. His scholarship has experimented with the use of fiction and narrative modes of representations and is informed by revisionist pragmatism, new materialist philosophy, critical race theory, and Indigenous studies literature. His writing has appeared in journals such as Harvard Educational Review, Education Theory, Educational Research and Phi Delta Kapan and his recently published book, Resegregation as Curriculum (coauthored with Kathy Kinslow), won the American Association for Teaching and Curriculum 2016 Book of the Year Award. Jimmy Snyder is a PhD candidate in the Critical and Sociocultural Studies in Education program at the University of Oregon with interests in tribal critical theory and the use of narratives in the education of social studies teachers. He is a citizen of the Kickapoo Tribe in Kansas and has over 20 years of experience working in tribal communities including teaching high school social studies on Kickapoo and Navajo reservations and coaching football at Haskell University. Scott L. Pratt is Professor of Philosophy and Executive Vice Provost for Academic Affairs at the University of Oregon where he teaches graduate seminars in American philosophy, surveys of African American and Native American philosophy, and feminist pragmatism as well as courses on the work of John Dewey, William James, Josiah Royce, Jane Addams, C. S. Peirce, and W. E. B. Du Bois. He is the author of a number of books, including Native Pragmatism, Logic: Inquiry, Argument and Order, and American Philosophy From Wounded Knew to the Present (co-authored with Erin Mckenna). He is a past president of the Josiah Royce Society and the most recent PastPresident of the Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy. "The New Materialisms and Indigenous Theories of Non-Human Agency: Making the Case for Respectful Anti-Colonial Engagement" **2020, Vol. 26(3-4) 331–346 Agential Realism: Ambitious Interventions and Performative Challenges** Page 335 Final Paragraph on page is not included in text displayed in card )

# **we must question the performative practices through which ideas and inquiry manifest. practices of scholarship, knowing, and civic responsibility are bound to cartesian premises of observer as subject and an external world as object of study. re modulating a conception of inquiry outside of cartesian dogma necessitates integrating affect and cognition in processes that enable being, feeling, committing, and living in the natural world.**

Rosiek et al 20 (Jerry Lee Rosiek, Professor of Education Studies at the University of Oregon where he teaches courses on the cultural foundations of education, the racial politics of education practice and policy, and qualitative research methodology. His scholarship has experimented with the use of fiction and narrative modes of representations and is informed by revisionist pragmatism, new materialist philosophy, critical race theory, and Indigenous studies literature. His writing has appeared in journals such as Harvard Educational Review, Education Theory, Educational Research and Phi Delta Kapan and his recently published book, Resegregation as Curriculum (coauthored with Kathy Kinslow), won the American Association for Teaching and Curriculum 2016 Book of the Year Award. Jimmy Snyder is a PhD candidate in the Critical and Sociocultural Studies in Education program at the University of Oregon with interests in tribal critical theory and the use of narratives in the education of social studies teachers. He is a citizen of the Kickapoo Tribe in Kansas and has over 20 years of experience working in tribal communities including teaching high school social studies on Kickapoo and Navajo reservations and coaching football at Haskell University. Scott L. Pratt is Professor of Philosophy and Executive Vice Provost for Academic Affairs at the University of Oregon where he teaches graduate seminars in American philosophy, surveys of African American and Native American philosophy, and feminist pragmatism as well as courses on the work of John Dewey, William James, Josiah Royce, Jane Addams, C. S. Peirce, and W. E. B. Du Bois. He is the author of a number of books, including Native Pragmatism, Logic: Inquiry, Argument and Order, and American Philosophy From Wounded Knew to the Present (co-authored with Erin Mckenna). He is a past president of the Josiah Royce Society and the most recent PastPresident of the Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy. "The New Materialisms and Indigenous Theories of Non-Human Agency: Making the Case for Respectful Anti-Colonial Engagement" 2020, Vol. 26(3-4) 331–346 Agential Realism: Ambitious Interventions and Performative Challenges Page 335 Final Paragraph on page is not included in text displayed in card )

One of the central challenges of applying agential realism to the practice of social science inquiry is working out its specific implications for methodological practice. The philosophies gathered under the banner of “new materialism” reconsider several foundational concepts central to social science as it has been traditionally understood—such as taken for granted notions of representation (MacLure, 2013), the idea of a single or stable object of inquiry (Barad, 2007; Mol, 2002), and the concept of “data” (Jackson & Mazzei, 2012). **Agent ontologies, however, put more than these individual concepts under reconsideration. They also question the performative practices through which we “have” ideas and the very idea of the “we” of inquiry itself. Barad’s agential realism is an effort to transform not just the ontology of our objects of study but also the ontology of subjects involved in inquiry, and the relation between objects and subjects.** More colloquially, it gestures toward a practice of inquiry that involves transformations not just of our ways of knowing but also of our ways of being, feeling, committing, and living in the world. We should not expect such a reorientation would be a smooth process even for those convinced of its necessity, that it would involve lurches, false starts, and backsliding of various forms. **The material-semiotic architecture that both enables and constrains our practices of scholarship, knowing, and civic responsibility in Western settler colonial societies is very old and runs deep. It is encoded into our language; our habits of perception, feeling, and desire, our identities, the social communities that sustain those identities and desires, the legal codes that bound and bind those communities, the material arrangements of property, land, food consumption, power grids, and much more.** We can critically question one part of this matrix, but the others remain as ballast that draw us back into past practices that are networked with other cultural and material aspects of the world. Consequently, as new materialist scholars invent ways to enact agentially realist inquiries, there is a significant risk that proposed innovations will be superficial and will be interpolated back into deeply ingrained practices of knowing and being. As Maggie MacLure (2017) observed in her 2016 Keynote to the International Congress of Qualitative Inquiry, It is difficult to think outside of the Enlightenment structures of the Cartesian self, and the stories it tells itself about progress, reason and the advancement of knowledge. So although we have come a long way in formulating cartographies for new materialist research, we are necessarily some way from the anticipated ontological transformations to our field. . . I think we continue to underestimate the sheer difficulty of shedding the anthropocentrism that is built into our world-views and our language habits. (p. 55) One of the risks for the new materialisms involves framing the goal of inquiry as producing an improved description of our objects of inquiry, while leaving unchanged the construction of the inquirer as a spectator subject. This can be seen in the emerging literature that seeks to document the operation of self-organizing nonhuman phenomena. This includes research on algorithms, cognitive biology, and neuroscience (Dixon-Roman, 2016, 2017; Hayles, 2017) that identify the ways in which non-human systems engage in pattern recognition and response to changing environments. It can also be seen in research on self-organizing socio-material systems such as disease (Mol, 2002), political formations (Bennett, 2010), or institutionalized racism (Rosiek & Kinslow, 2016). Such scholarship provides informative accounts of the materially dynamic, evolving, nature of our objects of inquiry often through the use of the Deleuzian vocabulary of assemblage (e.g., Alaimo, 2016; Bennett, 2010; Fox & Alldred, 2015; Mazzei, 2017; Taguchi, 2018). However, the ontology of the knowing subject assumed in scholars’ representation of these dynamic objects of study remains largely unaltered (MacLure, 2017). This reinscription of the enlightenment spectator subject can also be seen in the turn to affect in some new materialist scholarship (e.g., Clough, 2009; Gregg & Seigworth, 2010; Massumi, 2002; Zembylas, 2014). **In an effort to get outside of a conception of inquiry based primarily on linguistic representation, cognition, and epistemology, many scholars are shifting their attention to the immediacy of affect. Scholars working in this vein offer that the influence of non-human agents on us may take the form of influence on our affect as much as our cognition.** However, **in an effort to explicate this expanded view of knowledge, scholars often resort to descriptions of the ways affect and cognition are integrated in some practices of knowing, as opposed to performing that integration.**

# **default to an aggregate utilitarian calculus – maximizing aggregate utility for the general population allows for policies that align with each actor’s preference for equal material outcomes.**

Allen 17 (Daneille Allen, Director of the Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics at Harvard University and professor in Harvard’s Department of Government and Graduate School of Education, political theorist who has published broadly in democratic theory, political sociology, and the history of political thought, “Political Equality and Empowering Economies-- Toward a New Political Economy” Page 2 – 7 , Rose)

We were of course surprised not just by Brexit and Trump but also by the recession of 2008. We have therefore been living in a state of intellectual surprise for almost a decade. Why is it that we have been so blind-sided? The answer lies, I suggest, in the dominant liberal policy-making paradigms. The dominant liberal policy paradigm, emerging from places like Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government and operating in Washington think-tanks and policy making-spaces, fuses two things: utilitarian economic welfarism and Rawlsian welfarism. Let me explain**. On the utilitarian model the goal of policy is to maximize happiness or, better, utility, as the economists label it, for society. In its crudest forms, the effort to maximize aggregate utility relies on cost-benefit analyses, linked to preferences typically cast in terms of material goods.** Much modeling of utility maximization in relation to preferences has abstracted away from the contextual, social, psychological, and cultural particularities of individual economic actors. **The pursuit of utilitarian welfare maximization has typically focused on maximizing aggregate growth—in terms of income and wealth--and on using redistributive policies to spread the benefit of that growth**. John Rawls is a philosopher who in 1971 published an important book called Theory of Justice; and one of his main goals was to overturn utilitarianism. He sought to prioritize the right over the good, establishing as the purpose of political order the protection of a framework of right, not the pursuit of any particular good, even utility or happiness. Yet even as, philosophically, he sought to overturn utilitarianism, in many ways Rawlsianism has reinforced its practical applications. In the Rawlsian framework, the goal of a just society is to do two things. The first goal is to protect a set of basic liberties. Those basic liberties include things like the right of association, the right to free expression, and the right to participate politically. The second goal is to pursue social and economic structures, within the constraint of protecting those rights, that are to the benefit of the least well of in society (“the difference principle”) and that secure fair equal opportunity throughout the society. Rawls’ innovative and influential difference principle has anchored the major part of the reception of his work and led to a dominant focus, in philosophical discussions of justice, on the economic questions of distributive justice. These questions have gotten far more attention than his discussion of basic rights. Indeed, in the policy world, Rawlsianism has turned into a basic focus on redistributive taxation as the starting point for building a policy framework. Without intending to, Rawls reinforced the utilitarian paradigm precisely by hiving off consideration of basic rights from his treatment, via the difference principle, of social and economic spheres. **He provided support for the utilitarian focus on growth, so long as it was tethered to redistribution.** **In both utilitarian welfarism and Rawlsian welfarism, as expressed in the policy world, the core question for justice is one of material distribution**. **This is recognizable. When someone invokes the concept of “social justice,” the first thing that comes to mind tends to be matters of economic distribution and welfarist social rights**. Similarly, when a speaker invokes the concept of inequality, the relevant kind of inequality the speaker has in mind is almost invariably economic inequality. That’s what scholars and the general public know how to talk about, thanks to the intellectual support provided by policy paradigms coming out of utilitarian welfarism, on the one hand, and Rawlsian welfarism, on the other. Two features of this fused utilitarian-Rawlsian policy paradigm merit attention. The first is that both the utilitarian paradigm and the Rawlsian paradigm are universalizing. **That is, they both abstract away from the contextual specifics of any given society to develop their overarching policy guidelines (utility maximization, on the one hand; and the difference principle, on the other).** For instance, in Theory of Justice, Rawls seeks the definition of the right by asking us to imagine stepping behind “a veil of ignorance,” where we no longer know anything about our own social situation; from that perspective in the imagination, we are to try to identify the principles that would constitute a just society, **one that we will consider just regardless of whether we turn out to be one of the just society’s wealthier or poorer, male or female, black or white citizens and so forth**. The principles of justice are to be devised without taking into account any underlying demographic features of a society. Moreover, **they are understood to apply universally, to any social context.** In the context of utilitarianism, the move to abstract away from social particularity is less a matter of the intentional design of the theory and more a necessary consequence of its mathematization. In principle, utility is a concept that can embrace not only a given actors preferences for material outcomes but also his or her values and norms. But the project of “maximizing” utility requires that we convert preferences into something arithmetic, and so financial interests are conventionally used as a proxy for utility, thus flattening the particularities of preference that may in fact give meaning and shape to the life of any particular agent. As in the Rawlsian case, the move to treat material gain, money, as a proxy for utility permits universalization. Financial stakes can be translated into a currency and compared across countries and contexts without reference to the underlying demographic facts or situations on the ground in any given country. In other words, one of the things both of these intellectual paradigms do is turn our attention away from the underlying demographic and institutionalarrangements of a society. Our minds are trained away from questions such as: Who has power and on account of what sorts of institutional structures and according to what sorts of allocations of resources and opportunities? We lose the habit of analyzing the demographic and political specificity of any given society to the degree that we embrace and reinforce the habits of using utilitarian and/or Rawlsian welfarism. To give you a concrete example of the kind of abstraction I am trying to pinpoint, think about how the World Bank historically operated throughout the late 20th century. A set of boilerplate requirements for economic liberalization were applied to developing economies as conditions for receiving loans from the bank. The fact the stability of these welfarist policy paradigms has taught us to overlook underlying social and political phenomena flows, I think, from a small philosophical mistake made in the early 19th century, and characterizing most variants of liberalism ever since. The mistake was to draw a distinction between two halves of that set of basic rights protected by liberalism. I introduced the concept of basic rights in describing Rawls’ Theory of Justice, and provided as examples freedom of association, freedom of expression, and the right to participate in politics. With these three examples, I was limning the full spectrum of basic rights, including both halves as distinguished in the early 19th century. What does this mean exactly? An early 19th century French thinker named Benjamin Constant was the first to divide basic rights, basic human rights, into two categories. He called them the rights of the ancients and the rights of the moderns. The rights of the ancients comprised rights to participate in politics, in shaping the collective life of a society. We now call these positive liberties. The rights of the moderns, in contrast, comprise a right to property and the right to be left alone to take your property, which you have a right to, and to engage in commercial transactions in pursuit of your own wellbeing as you see fit. We call these negative liberties. The rights of the ancients were political rights, a right to be a part of a society that was working together to steer itself through collective decision making**. The rights of the moderns, forConstant, were about private autonomy, having the right to steer your own life, and being more or less left alone by any collective decision- making, to the maximum degree possible.** That distinction has worked its way into the philosophical tradition, and was extended by Isaiah Berlin in the early 20th century (who introduced the terms negative and positive liberties). Rawls, in Theory of Justice, argues that he’s putting the two sets of rights back together again and that we need to protect the whole set of basic rights. In fact, however, the political rights become sacrifice-able in his argument, in various technical ways that I won’t go into here (but do detail in Allen, “Difference without Domination”). Over the whole arc of Theory of Justice, we end up primarily focusing our thinking about politics on the conjunction of our private rights (the right to autonomy, property, association, expression, and so forth) with the economic questions associated with those rights-- the wealth associated with property and the need for redistribution that comes from the unequal flow of the gains of productivity across a population. In other words, when you lose sight of the political rights and focus primarily on the private rights or negative liberties, you can easily come to focus exclusively on economic questions and lose sight of political questions. That is what I see as having happened in the policy paradigms that dominated U.S. policy-making in the late 20th century. Another part of the story about the development of a truncated focus on economic questions— without reference to underlying political questions—relates to the transition over the course of the 20th century from the influence of law on public policy to the influence of economics. Sociologist Elizabeth Popp Berman (2014) has written well about the variety of factors— including new capacities for computation—that drove that change, and much more could be said about this transition. But the transition from law to economics also underscores the point I’m making**.** Legal thinking is fundamentally about the institutions of specific societies and about the consequences of particularities of those institutions for specific societies. Even sub-disciplines like comparative law that compare the legal systems in different places must begin by seeing the specificity of the legal institutions in each place under comparison. When law dominated the policy-making universe, universalizing policy approaches that abstracted from demographic and social specificity, were not broadly available. The abstracting, universalizing features of the fused utilitarian/Rawlsian welfarism that dominated policy making of the late 20th century seem to me to have produced the blindspots to society, politics, and political rights, that left us surprised not only by 2008 but also by Brexit and Trump.

# **recent kaiser engineer strikes prove that engineers have the motive and means to organize a collective strike. if world-wide states recognized the unconditional rights of workers to strike the results would be catastrophic.**

Stone 9/30/21 (J.R. Stone and I'm a reporter at ABC7 News, "Hundreds of striking Kaiser engineers rally in the streets of Oakland" 9 – 30 -21 https://abc7news.com/kaiser-strike-update-workers-october-2021-oakland-protest/11067308/)

OAKLAND, Calif. (KGO) -- Hundreds of Kaiser engineers took to the streets of Oakland Thursday to demand better wages. Union workers have been on strike for nearly two weeks and say they aren't going back until the two sides can come to an agreement on a fair contract. "**If you want to have a decent lifestyle, you have to make a few bucks," said engineer Lemont Reid. His thoughts echo that of the more than 700 union workers currently on strike.** RELATED: Kaiser Permanente announces tentative agreement with unions to avoid nationwide strike "They've offered us a 2% wage, we do make a decent wage but the way that this economy is right now a 13% increase in prices of everything, it doesn't equal out what they've offered us," says union worker Russell Tiffany. The situation has gotten so bad, trash wasn't picked up at Oakland Medical Center three days ago. An anonymous Kaiser employee shared trash pictures with ABC7 News and said union Waste Management employees did not cross the picket line. Kaiser says picketers blocked the waste hauling trucks, they also tell us the trash has since been cleared. Union representatives say Kaiser came with a take it or leave it contract earlier this month. They voted against it and authorized a strike. "They want to give a bonus and not an increase, which over time will result in lower wages," says union worker Matt Jones. RELATED: Oakland approves sale of city-owned garage for Kaiser HQ In a statement, Kaiser said that the engineers are some of the highest-paid in the nation in their profession if you include wages, benefits, and retirement. Those we talked with were quick to respond to that. "We're in the Bay Area and it's also one of the highest costs of living in the country," says Xitlali Sanchez of the Alameda Labor Council. "We keep the lights on, and the machines running, and air circulating in the building, what we do is important," says Christina Anderson. **"Something happens right now, there are no engineers in there. If you have a family member in there wouldn't you be worried and wonder if a bed needs to go down or a machine goes down? Who's going to fix it? There's nobody in there," says Local 39 engineer Cynthia Diaz.** RELATED: Bay Area Kaiser nurses protest lack of masks, medical supplies Kaiser refused an on-camera interview but gave a statement saying they are offering a "reasonable wage increase and no takeaways, but the union is demanding more." Union representatives say 24 Kaiser locations in Northern California are currently affected by the strike. Story updated Oct. 1, 2021 to include response from Kaiser employee about concerns from patients about the safety of facilities: "We made extensive preparations so that during this strike, engineering duties are handled by skilled and experienced engineers, including those brought in from Kaiser Permanente facilities in other regions across the country. In addition, they are being supported by qualified contractors and equipment specialists, all of whom have been appropriately prepared for this work."

# **if engineers leveraged their unconditional right to strike that would compromise the geo engineering sector. geo engineering is key to solve climate change.**

Dunne 18 (Daisy Dunne, BSc in biology from the University of Bristol and a science journalism MA from City, University of London. She previously worked at MailOnline covering science and technology. She was Carbon Brief's science writer from 2017-2020.9/5/2018 “Explainer: Six ideas to limit global warming with solar geoengineering” https://www.carbonbrief.org/explainer-six-ideas-to-limit-global-warming-with-solar-geoengineering)

Scientists agree that cutting global greenhouse emissions as soon as possible will be key to tackling global warming. But, **with global emissions still on the rise, some researchers are now calling for more research into measures that could be taken alongside emissions cuts, including – controversially – the use of “solar geoengineering” technologies**. **Solar geoengineering is a term used to describe a group of hypothetical technologies that could, in theory, counteract temperature rise by reflecting more sunlight away from the Earth’s surface.** From sending a giant mirror into space to spraying aerosols in the stratosphere, the range of proposed techniques all come with unique technical, ethical and political challenges. Carbon Brief spoke to the scientists who are pioneering research into these techniques to find out more about their potential uses, shortfalls and overall feasibility. Heating up All types of solar geoengineering – known also as solar radiation management (SRM) – are united by their goal of limiting the effect of sunlight on the Earth, but they vary widely in their approach. **Possible methods include reducing heat-trapping clouds, sending a giant sunshade up into orbit or releasing aerosols into the stratosphere.** It is worth noting that, although these technologies could theoretically lower global warming, they do not aim to reduce the amount of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere and, therefore, would not be able to directly address problems such as ocean acidification. However, research shows that using solar geoengineering could indirectly lower the amount of CO2 in the atmosphere by stemming permafrost melt, reducing energy-sector emissions and causing changes to the carbon-cycle feedback. The idea of engineering the climate in order to limit sunlight has been debated by scientists and politicians for more than 50 years, but – apart from studies based on computer simulations – very little field research has been carried out. However, in recent months, interest in SRM appears to be growing. In October of last year, scientists met in Berlin to discuss the future of geoengineering. Last November, the US House of Representatives held a subcommittee meeting on geoengineering, with SRM dominating the conversation. But this interest has been met with resistance by some scientists and campaigners, who say that the potential risks of such technologies are still far from fully understood. Some fear that a geoengineered world could come with its own set of environmental and societal challenges, which they say could be comparable to – or even worse than – climate change. Below, Carbon Brief outlines the possible uses, shortcomings, costs and feasibility of the six most commonly proposed solar geoengineering technologies. Aerosol injection Marine cloud brightening High-albedo crops and buildings Ocean mirror Cloud thinning Space sunshades Six proposed methods for Solar Geoengineering. Graphic by Rosamund Pearce for Carbon Brief. Solar Geoengingeering options. Graphic by Rosamund Pearce for Carbon Brief. Aerosol injection Spraying aerosols high up into the stratosphere is currently the most talked-about form of SRM. The technique, which is known as “stratospheric aerosol injection”, could cool the planet in a similar way to a large volcanic eruption. When a volcano erupts, it sends an ash cloud high into the atmosphere. The sulphur dioxide released in the plume combines with water to form sulfuric acid aerosols, which are able to reflect incoming sunlight. Volcanic plume rises from the Kilauea volcano following a 6.9-magnitude earthquake 4 May 2018 in Leilani Estates, Hawaii. Credit: Planetpix / Alamy Stock Photo. MKTG41 Volcanic plume rises from the Kilauea volcano following a 6.9-magnitude earthquake 4 May 2018 in Leilani Estates, Hawaii. Credit: Planetpix / Alamy Stock Photo. Researchers have proposed that artificially introducing aerosols into the atmosphere – via a plane or a high-altitude balloon – could have a similar cooling effect. The amount of cooling could be large, says Dr Anthony Jones, an atmospheric scientist at the University of Exeter. He tells Carbon Brief: “We know after the Mount Pinatubo eruption in 1991 there was a global cooling of about half a degrees for two or three years afterwards, so it does seem that injecting aerosols into the stratosphere is quite effective.” Research suggests that releasing aerosols could also help to bring back global rainfall patterns to their pre-industrial averages. However, this is dependent on how aerosols are used, Jones says. For example, his research finds that releasing aerosols in just the northern hemisphere could lead to a decrease in rainfall – and, therefore, an enhanced drought risk – in India and the African Sahel. And there’s a mix of other potential regional impacts, he explains: “We found that the solar geoengineering could either reduce the frequency and intensity of storms in the North Atlantic basin or, if you did radical solar geoengineering in just one hemisphere, then you’d actually increase the number of storms. “[Researchers] have looked at changes to climate extremes, such as heatwaves, extreme precipitation events, cold nights. They’ve found that solar geoengineering over land regions could be very effective at reducing these extremes.” Some scientists have raised concerns that, if aerosols were used to address global warming, the world could be left at risk of a “termination shock”. That is, if aerosols were released and then suddenly stopped – as a result of political disagreement or a terrorist attack, for example – global temperatures could rapidly rebound. This sharp temperature change could be “catastrophic” for wildlife, studies have suggested. However, other research argues that the likelihood of a termination shock has been “overplayed” and that measures could be put in place to ensure that the risk is minimised. **Aerosol injection could have an edge on other proposed forms of solar geoengineering because it would not require a large technological leap to become a reality, Jones says: “We have aircraft that can go to that altitude already, high up into the upper troposphere and lower stratosphere.**” However, existing aircraft may not be large enough to carry the equipment needed to perform the aerosol release, says Prof Alan Robock, a professor in the department of environmental sciences at Rutgers University. At the sidelines of this year’s European Geosciences Union General Assembly, where Robock took part in a panel debate on geoengineering, he told Carbon Brief: “Even if you could, what do you spray? Do you spray sulphur dioxide gas? When the sulphur comes down, it’s going to create acid rain.” Sulphur dioxide is often proposed as the most likely candidate for aerosol release. However, others have suggested that sulfuric acid or hydrogen sulfide could also be used. Despite recent research, it is still “very difficult” to gauge what the true impacts of using aerosols to cool the planet would be, says Dr Ben Kravitz, an atmospheric scientist from the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. This is because the technique “only exists in the modelling world”, he told Carbon Brief at the sidelines of a conference held in Berlin last October. In the video below, he explains why there is still “so much we don’t know”: With this issue in mind, a team of researchers from Harvard University plan to carry out later this year one of the first field experiments looking into the possible impacts of releasing aerosols. The timeline below offers more detail on how this experiment, known as SCoPEx, would work. It also includes the details of two previous attempts to bring solar geoengineering research out into the open. Marine cloud brightening The second most talked-about option for solar geoengineering is “marine cloud brightening”. In theory, this could involve using ships to spray saltwater into the clouds above the sea. Once airborne, the salt particles would act as “cloud condensation nuclei”, meaning they would facilitate the condensation of water vapour into liquid. As more water droplets are created, clouds would appear larger and brighter. Sea landscape with overcast stratocumulus clouds. Credit: progressman / Alamy Stock Photo. MDWT9P Sea landscape with overcast stratocumulus clouds. Credit: progressman / Alamy Stock Photo. These brighter clouds would reflect away more sunlight, says Prof Douglas MacMartin, an engineering researcher from Cornell University, who contributed to the US House of Representatives’ hearing on geoengineering. He tells Carbon Brief: “It would simply be making those existing clouds just a little bit brighter and could help cool planet.” Unlike aerosol injection, marine cloud brightening could, in theory, be used over very specific areas, he says: “It may be possible, for instance, to just cool over coral reefs. Or it may be possible to only cool in one particular region off the Gulf of Mexico that would reduce hurricane strength in that area. But I think a lot of that is still just an idea.” Research into these ideas has so far been scant, he says. A few studies based on modelling suggest that marine cloud brightening may be able to “restore temperatures and ice cover”, address coral bleaching, and could have a “mixed” impact on global crop yields. However, concerns remain over how using marine cloud brightening could affect other aspects of the climate system, MacMartin says: “In contrast to something like SAI [stratospheric aerosol injection] – where you have a very spatially small effect over the entire planet – you have a large and very localised effect and that could lead to much more regional variation in the climate response.” This variation could possibly lead to unfavourable weather in some parts of the world, says Dr Anthony Jones: “You may be getting global cooling of 1-2C on average, but that’s entirely confined to certain regions and that would really upset weather patterns, ocean circulation and local biology.” High-albedo crops and buildings Another proposed technique that is starting to turn heads is the idea of increasing the albedo of buildings in order to reflect more sunlight. Put simply, this would involve making rooftops and walls brighter – by painting them white, for example. Although this technique is much less controversial, it is also unlikely to make a large difference to global temperatures, says Prof Sonia Seneviratne, a geophysicist from ETH Zurich, who recently published a literature review on the topic. However, it could be used in cities to counteract heatwaves, she tells Carbon Brief: “In cities, it could potentially help reduce the highest temperatures to reduce health problems for the population during heatwaves. White buildings are already common in some areas, for instance, in the Mediterranean.” Sunset in Oia, Santorini, Cyclades, Greece. Credit: imageBROKER / Alamy Stock Photo. E7F5JB Sunset in Oia, Santorini, Greece. Credit: imageBROKER / Alamy Stock Photo. Scientists have also suggested that the same technique could be applied to crops, possibly by introducing genes that would give plants a waxy sheen. To date, research into this idea has remained theoretical. Seneviratne says: “If more reflective crop species can be developed…this could decrease local and regional temperatures, in particular, during heatwaves. However, these potential benefits should be carefully weighed against potential negative side effects, for instance, on crop productivity and, thus, food production.” The technique could be used on a smaller scale than other proposed technologies, such as stratospheric aerosol injection. This means the risk of issues, such as “cross-boundary conflict” and termination shock, could be much smaller, she says: “Land radiative management is not aiming to reduce the global temperature and so allows some regional limitation of the effects.” Ocean mirror A less well-known option for limiting the effects of sunlight would be to use an “ocean mirror”. In theory, this would involve using a fleet of sea vessels to churn up millions of tiny microbubbles on the ocean surface. This seafoam would reflect away sunlight, cooling the planet, explains Prof Julian Evans, an emeritus professor in materials science from University College London. He tells Carbon Brief: “The reflectance of ocean foam can be more than ten times higher than the ocean itself and the ocean occupies 71% of our planet’s surface so enhancing sea foam is a sensible and simple way to reflect a few per cent more sunlight. “Obviously, the main criterion for a climate intervention is that it must be capable of being shut down fast if things start to go wrong. An ocean foam is shut down when the bubbles burst.” Wake caused by cruise ship. Credit: Satida Inpakdee / Alamy Stock Photo. JPGFRB Wake caused by cruise ship. Credit: Satida Inpakdee / Alamy Stock Photo. While the possible cooling effect of microbubbles could be large, there could be drawbacks to the technique. In a 2010 research paper, Evans suggested that using microbubbles could reduce the amount of sunlight reaching below the ocean’s surface, which may negatively impact marine ecosystems. With less light penetrating the ocean surface, marine plants – otherwise known as primary producers – may be less able to carry out photosynthesis. This could lead to a drop in the number of marine plants, which could have knock-on effects further up the food chain. However, more recent research modelling the impacts of using microbubbles to address global warming found that the technique would not affect ocean primary productivity, a measure of the activity of primary producers. On top of this, creating enough microbubbles at the ocean’s surface to have an overall cooling effect on the planet could require large amounts of energy, according to research co-authored by Evans. The research paper notes that the main energy cost would come from sustaining the bubbles for several days or weeks after they are first created. Cloud thinning Another less-explored option for reducing the effects of sunlight at the Earth’s surface would be to “remove” cirrus clouds from the atmosphere. Cirrus clouds are thin, wispy clouds made of ice crystals, which form at high altitudes. The clouds reflect away some sunlight, but also absorb large amounts of long-wave radiation – meaning that, on balance, they warm the planet. Cirrus clouds against sun, Pomerania, Germany. Credit: imageBROKER / Alamy Stock Photo. HCB8ND Cirrus clouds against sun, Pomerania, Germany. Credit: imageBROKER / Alamy Stock Photo. The overall heat-trapping effect of cirrus clouds is so large that it exceeds that of human-released CO2, says Prof Ulrike Lohmann, an atmospheric scientist from ETH Zurich who recently published a review on cloud thinning in Science. She tells Carbon Brief: “Therefore, if we could remove all cirrus clouds, we could more than offset the warming caused by a doubling of CO2 [in the atmosphere].” **In theory, aerial vehicles such as drones could be used to deliver and then inject solid aerosol particles, such as desert dust or pollen, into cirrus clouds. Seeding the clouds in this way would cause them to dissipate more quickly, lessening their overall warming effect.** However, overseeding could lead to the formation of thicker and more persistent cirrus clouds, Lohmann says in her research paper: “If cirrus cloud thinning is not done carefully, the effect could be additional warming rather than the intended cooling.” On top of this, large questions remain over how cirrus cloud thinning could affect other aspects of the climate system, such as atmospheric circulation, the paper concludes: “Only after these questions are addressed could one move further to explore the costs and feasibility of cirrus cloud thinning.” Space sunshades The final SRM technology discussed by scientists involves sending a giant mirror – or fleet of mirrors – into orbit in order to reflect away more sunlight from the Earth. The size of the mirror would determine how much sunlight it could reflect back towards space and, therefore, its cooling effect, says Prof Govindasamy Bala, from the Divecha Centre for Climate Change at the Indian Institute of Science. He tells Carbon Brief: “Approximately a 2% reduction in incoming sunlight [using a sunshade] is sufficient to offset the warming from a doubling of CO2 from the pre-industrial level of 280ppm to 560ppm. The current CO2 level is about 400ppm.” But introducing a space mirror into orbit – either around the Earth or the sun – would be a huge technological challenge, Bala says. And, once introduced, it would need to be continually altered to deal with further rises in atmospheric CO2, he says: “On the positive side, sunshades are implemented in space and, hence, environmentally they are the least disruptive. However, as a negative, it requires the most advanced technology for implementation and, hence, the costs are probably prohibitively expensive when we compare with other solar geoengineering techniques.” Substitute or supplement? One issue looming over solar geoengineering research is how – if at all – it will be used by society. There is currently no clarity among policymakers over whether any technology, or combination of technologies, should one day be used to address global warming. A larger question mark hangs over how solar geoengineering could sit alongside mitigation efforts. Some scientists and campaign groups believe that solar geoengineering could be viewed by politicians as a quick “technofix” to climate change. If more research and development is channeled into these techniques, they argue, politicians may start to backpedal on their promises to cut their greenhouse gas emissions. This issue should be considered “the major barrier” to the implementation of solar geoengineering, says Bala: “People might think there is a solution to climate change and, hence, abandon the efforts in CO2 emission reduction. This might allow CO2 to build to dangerous levels in the atmosphere by the end of this century.” However, other scientists say that solar geoengineering should be considered as a “supplement” rather than a quick fix. Speaking at the Climate Engineering Conference held in Berlin last year, Keith said: “In my view, solar geoengineering is – at best – a supplement to emissions cuts, not a substitute for them. It is possible that a combination of emissions cuts, carbon removal and solar geoengineering could provide a significantly safer climate than emissions cuts alone or emissions cuts and carbon removal combined. Possible, but unproven.” Reaching 1.5C Earlier this month, MacMartin, Keith and Prof Katharine Ricke, a climate scientist from the University of California, San Diego, published a research paper exploring how solar geoengineering – via releasing aerosols into the stratosphere – could be used as part of an “overall strategy” for limiting global warming to 1.5C, which is the aspirational target of the Paris Agreement. The researchers used a set of climate models to simulate changes in temperature and other variables over the next three centuries under a range of future scenarios. The scenarios include: “business as usual” (BAU), which assumes no mitigation efforts are made (“RCP8.5”); “mitigation”, which assumes an intermediate level of emissions (“RCP4.5”) without negative emissions; “carbon dioxide removal” (“CDR”), which assumes moderate emissions with long-term CO2 removal; and “solar radiation management” (“SRM”), which is the same as the CDR pathway, but also includes enough SRM to limit temperatures to 1.5C above pre-industrial levels by 2100. The results are shown on the chart below, where colour shows the results for BAU (red), mitigation (orange), CDR (green) and SRM (blue). Dashed lines mark the start of a new century. Projected global average temperature rise above pre-industrial levels under a range of future scenarios, “business as usual” (BAU), which assumes no mitigation efforts are made (RCP8.5); “mitigation”, which assumes moderate emissions (RCP4.5) without <a href="https://www.carbonbrief.org/explainer-10-ways-negative-emissions-could-slow-climate-change">negative emissions</a>, “carbon dioxide removal” (CDR), which assumes moderate emissions with long-term CO2 removal; and “solar radiation management” (SRM), which is the same as the CDR pathway but also includes enough SRM to limit temperatures to 1.5C by 2100. Source: MacMartin et al. (2018) Projected global average temperature rise above pre-industrial levels under a range of future scenarios, “business as usual” (BAU), which assumes no mitigation efforts are made (RCP8.5); “mitigation”, which assumes moderate emissions (RCP4.5) without negative emissions, “carbon dioxide removal” (CDR), which assumes moderate emissions with long-term CO2 removal; and “solar radiation management” (SRM), which is the same as the CDR pathway but also includes enough SRM to limit temperatures to 1.5C by 2100. Source: MacMartin et al. (2018) The results show that, at around 2100, the mitigation scenario and CDR scenario result in global warming of around 2.7C, while the SRM scenario is used to hold warming at 1.5C. The SRM scenario assumes that the world would start releasing aerosols in 2030 and continue until past 2250. It expects aerosol release to reach a peak at around the year 2100, when close to 5m tonnes of sulphur dioxide would be released into the atmosphere. However, the researchers point out that using solar geoengineering to hold global warming to 1.5C would not have the same environmental effect as reaching the target using mitigation. This is largely because using SRM would not significantly reduce the amount of CO2 in the atmosphere. The research paper reads: “Since geoengineering would not affect the climate the same way [as mitigation], a lower global mean temperature anomaly achieved using geoengineering does not necessarily lead to lower aggregate climate risks. Choosing an appropriate level that balances different risks to the climate system will not be straightforward.” Also, in a similar way to negative emissions technologies, solar geoengineering would not see the additional benefits for health of reducing fossil fuel emissions and improving air quality. Controlling the global thermostat Another unresolved aspect of geoengineering research is the issue of governance. Though ideas are beginning to emerge, it is still not clear who could be responsible for carrying out and regulating solar geoengineering. At present, research into solar geoengineering is largely restricted to the US, the UK and other parts of Europe – although China recently launched the world’s largest geoengineering research programme. But earlier this month, a group of scientists and policymakers from the global south published a letter in Nature calling for developing nations to take the lead on SRM research. Developing countries are likely to be the most affected by future climate change, research shows.Therefore, “it is right” for these nations to play “a central role in solar geoengineering research, discussion and evaluation”, the group argues. A small number of initiatives aim to widen participation in SRM research. The Solar Radiation Management Governance Initiative (SRMGI) recently released funding for research projects that plan to model the impacts of SRM in developing nations. In addition, the Carnegie Climate Geoengineering Governance Initiative (C2G2) has been established to “encourage a broader, society-wide discussion about the risks, potential benefits, ethical and governance challenges raised by climate geoengineering”. Speaking to Carbon Brief last year, C2G2’s executive director Janos Pasztor said developing a system of global governance for solar geoengineering research and regulation will “require more global cooperation than has ever been attempted before”. The challenge could be so large that it could stop the development of solar geoengineering altogether, says Dr Anthony Jones: “I actually find it very difficult to imagine a scenario where all countries agree on a certain amount of global warming that they want to counteract. How much solar geoengineering do you do – and where? I really struggle to picture that scenario.” Agreeing on a global geoengineering strategy would require even more cooperation than efforts to cut global emissions, says Prof Alan Robock: “You’re asking if the world can come together and agree on geoengineering without agreeing on mitigation. I think the answer is for us to agree on mitigation. Paris is the first step, the pledges made there aren’t enough but have got to increase.” One way researchers could start to tackle the global governance issue is by dividing it into smaller parts, says Dr Joshua Horton, research director of geoengineering at Keith’s research team at Harvard University. He tells Carbon Brief: “There will be a number of governance challenges – related to moral hazards, decision making, democracy, compensation, termination risk – a whole slew of things that aren’t easy to solve. It helps to start by recognising there’s a complex of problems that need to be addressed.” Including more political scientists and governance experts in conversations about geoengineering will be vital to solving the problem, he adds: “If there are solutions, they’re the ones who are going to actually figure out how we can proceed and, if we can’t, they’ll be the ones to make that determination as well.”

# **climate change causes extinction – their defense is based on inaccurate models**

Specktor 19 [Brandon Specktor, Senior Writer, "Human Civilization Will Crumble by 2050 If We Don't Stop Climate Change Now, New Paper Claims," Live Science, 6-4-2019, https://www.livescience.com/65633-climate-change-dooms-humans-by-2050.html]

It seems every week there's a scary new report about how man-made climate change is going to cause the collapse of the world's ice sheets, result in the extinction of up to 1 million animal species and — if that wasn't bad enough — make our beer very, very expensive. This week, a new policy paper from an Australian think tank claims that those other reports are slightly off; the risks of climate change are actually much, much worse than anyone can imagine. According to the paper, **climate change poses a** "near- to mid-term **existential threat to human civilization**," and there's a good chance **society could collapse** as soon as 2050 **if serious mitigation actions aren't taken** in the next decade. Published by the Breakthrough National Centre for Climate Restoration in Melbourne (an independent think tank focused on climate policy) and authored by a climate researcher and a former fossil fuel executive, the paper's central thesis is that climate scientists are too restrained in their predictions of how climate change will affect the planet in the near future. [Top 9 Ways the World Could End] The current climate crisis, they say, is larger and more complex than any humans have ever dealt with before. **General climate models** — like the one that the United Nations' Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) used in 2018 to predict that a global temperature increase of 3.6 degrees Fahrenheit (2 degrees Celsius) could put hundreds of millions of people at risk — fail to account for the sheer complexity of Earth'smany interlinked geological processes; as such, they **fail to adequately predict the scale of the potential consequences.** The truth, the authors wrote, is probably far worse than any models can fathom. How the world ends What might an accurate worst-case picture of the planet's climate-addled future actually look like, then? The authors provide one particularly grim scenario that begins with world governments "politely ignoring" the advice of scientists and the will of the public to decarbonize the economy (finding alternative energy sources), resulting in a global temperature increase 5.4 F (3 C) by the year 2050. At this point, the world's ice sheets vanish; brutal droughts kill many of the trees in the Amazon rainforest (removing one of the world's largest carbon offsets); and the planet plunges into **a feedback loop of ever-hotter, ever-deadlier conditions.** "Thirty-five percent of the global land area, and 55 percent of the global population, are subject to more than 20 days a year of lethal heat conditions, **beyond the threshold of human survivability**," the authors hypothesized. Meanwhile, droughts, floods and wildfires regularly ravage the land. Nearly one-third of the world's land surface turns to desert. Entire ecosystems collapse, beginning with the planet's coral reefs, the rainforest and the Arctic ice sheets. The world's tropics are hit hardest by these new climate extremes, destroying the region's agriculture and turning more than 1 billion people into refugees. This mass movement of refugees — coupled with shrinking coastlines and severe drops in food and water availability — begin to stress the fabric of the world's largest nations, including the United States. **Armed conflicts over resources**, perhaps **culminating in nuclear war**, **are likely.** The result, according to the new paper, is "outright chaos" and perhaps **"the end of human global civilization as we know it."**

# **strikes reduce real wages of workers as a whole – companies mitigate losses by hiring less employees. strikes also make gains at the expense of other workers who are excluded despite wanting to fill vacant jobs.**

Hazlitt 19 (Henry Hazlitt (1894–1993) was a well-known journalist who wrote on economic affairs for the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, and Newsweek, “How Unions Reduce Real Wages” \*\*\*\*Note ---The Text in the card comes from Chapter 13 of Henry Hazlitt’s 1973 Book “The Conquest of Poverty,” which the Mises Institute posted on 12/17/2019 The Mises Institute cites 12/17/2019 as the publication date, but the text originally appeared in Hazlitt’s book in 1973 the url: https://mises.org/wire/how-unions-reduce-real-wages)

Case For more than a century the economic thinking not only of the public but of the majority of economists has been dominated by a myth — the myth that labor unions have been on the whole a highly beneficent institution, and have raised the level of real wages far above what it would have been without union pressure. Many even talk as if the unions had been chiefly responsible for whatever gains labor has made. **Yet the blunt truth is that labor unions cannot raise the real wages of all workers.** We may go further: **the actual policies that labor unions have systematically followed from the beginning of their existence have in fact reduced the real wages of the workers as a whole below what they would otherwise have been.** Labor unions are today the chief antilabor force. To realize why this is so we must understand what determines wages in a free market. **Wage rates are prices. Like other prices they are determined by supply and demand.** And the demand for labor is determined by the marginal productivity of labor. **If wage rates go above that level, employers drop their marginal workers because it costs more to employ them than they earn. They cannot long be employed at a loss**. If, on the other hand, wage rates fall below the marginal productivity of workers, employers bid against each other for more workers up to the point where there is no further marginal profit in hiring more or bidding up wages more. So assuming mobility of both capital and labor, assuming free competition between workers and free competition between employers, there would be full employment of every person wanting and able to work, and the wage rate of each would tend to equal his marginal productivity. It will be said — it has in fact repeatedly been said — that such an analysis is merely a beautiful abstraction and that in the actual world this mobility and competition of labor and capital do not exist. There is, some economists have argued, in fact a wide range of "indeterminacy" in wages, and it is the function of unions to make sure that wage rates are fixed at the top rather than the bottom of this range or zone. We cannot reply that this indeterminacy theory is wholly wrong; but what we can say is that in relation to the problem of unions it is unimportant. The indeterminacy theory is true of wages only to the extent that it is true of other prices: it is true where the market is narrow or specialized. It is true, say, of highly specialized jobs in journalism, or in the universities, or in scientific research, or in the professions. But wherever we have large numbers of unskilled workers, or large numbers of approximately equal special but widespread skills — such as carpenters, bricklayers, painters, plumbers, printers, train-men, truckdrivers — this zone of indeterminacy shrinks or disappears. It is the craft unions themselves who insist that their individual members are so nearly equal to each other in competence that all should be paid on equal "standard" wage. And so we have the paradox that the unions exist and flourish precisely where they are least necessary to assure that their members get a market wage equal to their marginal productivity. It is true, of course, that an individual union can succeed in forcing the money wage rates of its members above what the free market rate would be. It can do this through the device of a strike, or often merely through the threat of a strike. Now a strike is not, as it is constantly represented as being, merely the act of a worker in "withholding his labor," or even merely a collusion of a large group of workers simultaneously to "withhold their labor" or give up their jobs. The whole point of a strike is the insistence by the strikers that they have not given up their jobs at all. They contend that they are still employees — in fact, the only legitimate employees. They claim an ownership of the jobs at which they refuse to work; they claim the "right" to prevent anybody else from taking the jobs that they have abandoned. That is the purpose of their mass picket lines, and of the vandalism and violence that they either resort to or threaten. They insist that the employer has no right to replace them with other workers, temporary or permanent, and they mean to see to it that he doesn't. **Their demands are enforced always by intimidation and coercion, and in the last resort by actual violence. So wherever a union makes a gain by a strike or strike threat, it makes it by forcibly excluding other workers from taking the jobs that the strikers have abandoned. The union always makes its gains at the expense of these excluded workers.**

# **hazlitt 19 (henry hazlitt (1894–1993) was a well-known journalist who wrote on economic affairs for the new york times, the wall street journal, and newsweek, “how unions reduce real wages” \*\*\*\*note ---the text in the card comes from chapter 13 of henry hazlitt’s 1973 book “the conquest of poverty,” which the mises institute posted on 12/17/2019 the mises institute cites 12/17/2019 as the publication date, but the text originally appeared in hazlitt’s book in 1973 the url: https://mises.org/wire/how-unions-reduce-real-wages)**

Overlooking the Victims **It is amazing to find how systematically the self-proclaimed humanitarians, even among professional economists, have managed to overlook the unemployed, or the still more poorly paid workers, who are the victims of the union members' "gains.**" It is important to keep in mind that the unions cannot create a "monopoly" of all labor, but at best a monopoly of labor in certain specific crafts, firms, or industries. A monopolist of a product can get a higher monopoly price for that product, and perhaps a higher total income from it, by deliberately restricting the supply, either by refusing to produce as much as he can of it, or by withholding part of it, or even by destroying part of it that has already come into existence. But while the unions can and do restrict their membership, and exclude other workers from it, they cannot reduce the total number of workers seeking jobs. Therefore whenever the unions gain higher wage rates for their own members than free competition would have brought, they can do this only by increasing unemployment, or by increasing the number of workers forced to compete for other jobs and so comparatively reducing the wage rates paid for such jobs. All union "gains" (i.e., wage rates above what a competitive free market would have brought) are at the expense of lower wages than otherwise for at least some if not most nonunion workers. The unions cannot raise the average level of real wages; they can at best distort it. As the gains of union workers are made at the expense of nonunion workers, it is instructive to ask what proportion union members constitute of the whole working population.The answer for the United States is that union members now number about 20 million, or not more than 25 percent of the total civilian labor force of 87 million. So the unions are in a distinct minority. This might not be a fact worth emphasizing if there were reason to think that the average earnings of union workers were below the average earnings of nonunion workers. But while statistical comparisons cannot be exact, the evidence is conclusive that the case is the other way round. It is the most skilled occupations that are most unionized. In brief, we have a one-quarter minority of already higher paid union workers exploiting a three-quarters majority consisting mainly of already lower paid nonunion workers. People could save themselves a good deal of misplaced sympathy if next time they read in their newspapers of a strike for a "decent wage," they take the trouble to compare what the strikers were already getting with, say, the official statistics of average wages for all nonagricultural workers. The "gains" of union labor, of course, need not be solely at the expense of nonunion labor; they may be at the expense of some union members themselves. **The higher wage rates gained in a particular industry (assuming an elastic demand for its product) will lead to less employment than otherwise in that industry. This may force unemployment on some of the members of the "successful" union. The result may then be that smaller aggregate wages will be paid in that industry than if the higher** wage rate had not been successfully imposed. In addition, any union's "gains" (continuing to use "gains" in the sense of any excess over what would have been free-market wage rates) will be at the expense not only of unemployment or lower pay for other workers, but at the expense of consumers, by forcing them to pay higher prices. But as the great bulk of consumers consists of other workers, this means that these gains will be at the expense not only of nonunion workers but also of other union workers. **The real wages of the mass of workers are reduced whenever they have to pay higher prices. Once it is clearly recognized that the strike-threat gains of each union are at the expense of all other unions, in forcing their members to pay higher prices for products, the whole myth of "labor solidarity" collapses. It is this myth that has kept the strike-threat system going.** It has created sympathy for strikes and tolerance of the public harm they do. **The mass of the working population has been taught to believe that all workers should support every strike, no matter how disorderly or for what unreasonable demands, and always to "respect the picket lines," because "Labor's" interests are unified. The success of any strike is thought to help all labor and its failure to hurt all labor.**

# **medical turn**

An unconditional right to strike leads to Doctor and HCW strikes – creates a moral hazard trades off with improved healthcare service

**Chima 13** (Sylvester C Chima MD, LL.M, LLD Associate Professor and Head: Program of Bio & Research Ethics and Medical Law, College of Health Sciences, UKZN Professor Chima, who was born in Nigeria, spent more than 15 years of his academic career in the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Caribbean. After qualifying as a medical doctor in Nigeria, Professor Chima practiced for many years in that country before going to Howard University, Yale University and Mount Sinai School of Medicine of New York University in the USA where he trained as a Pathologist and Neuropathologist. Apart from being a qualified Pathologist, in 2006 Professor Chima received a Master of Laws in Medical Law from Northumbria University, Newcastle-upon-Tyne in England. Professor Chima has worked around the globe in various prominent institutions such Yale-New Haven Hospital in Connecticut, the National Institute of Health in Bethesda, Maryland and Mount Sinai Medical Center in New York, USA. Prior to joining UKZN, he was Professor of Pathology and Medical Law at the International American Medical University in St Lucia, West Indies. Professor Chima has published papers in International journals such as BMJ, BMC Medical Ethics, Journal of General Virology, Human Biology, Nigerian Journal of Clinical Practice etc., and he is an author/co-author three books on Medical Law and Ethics and African Health issues. His latest book is entitled “A Primer on Medical Law, Bioethics and Human Rights for African Scholars”. Currently, Professor Chima is Associate Professor and Head, Programme of Bio & Research Ethics and Medical Law, School of Public Health, Nelson R Mandela School of Medicine, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, South AfricaArticle number: S5 (2013)"Global medicine: Is it ethical or morally justifiable for doctors and other healthcare workers to go on strike?" **Background** )

# **an unconditional right to strike leads to doctor and hcw strikes – creates a moral hazard trades off with improved healthcare service**

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**Doctor and HCW strikes have become a global phenomenon with increasing incidence in many countries [1, 2] and the potential to impact negatively on the quality of healthcare service delivery and the doctor-patient relationship which is based primarily on the fiduciary duty of trust** [3, 4]. **HCW strikes are not limited to any society, group, or country regardless of their level of socio-economic development**. In most democratic societies, strikes are a legitimate part of collective bargaining during labour negotiations [2–4]. Doctor and HCW strikes have been reported in highly developed countries such as USA [2, 5–7], UK [8]; New Zealand [9–11], Germany and France [2, 12]; middle income countries such as Israel [13, 14], India [15], Czech Republic [16], and South Africa [17–19]. Also in less developed countries such as Nigeria [20–22], Malawi [23] and Zambia [24] to name but a few. While HCW strikes occur globally, it appears the impact of strikes are more severely felt in less developed countries because of the poorer socio-economic circumstances and embedded infrastructural deficiencies. Such countries are generally confronted by issues of inadequate manpower, poor wages and working conditions [25], poor organizational ethics [26–28], and lack of viable alternative means of obtaining healthcare for the general population [29], thereby fulfilling the international criteria for vulnerability as defined by UNAIDS and other authorities [29, 30]. It **has been suggested that doctor and HCW strikes can create a tension between the obligation on doctors and other HCWs to provide adequate care to current patients versus the need to advocate for improved healthcare services for future patients and for society in general [2, 31]. There is also a potential conflict between doctors' role in advocating for improved healthcare service for others versus the need to advocate for justifiable wages for self and the fulfilment of basic biological needs like all humans [4, 32].** It has been suggested that since strikes are considered a fundamental right or entitlement during collective bargaining and labour negotiations [33]. Therefore to deny any employee the right to strike would be an argument for enslavement of such an employee, because this would simply mean that whatever the circumstances-such an individual must work! A situation deemed to be both ethically and morally indefensible [4]. It is pertinent to observe that there is an on-going paradigm shift in the organization of healthcare services and doctors' employment options with a change in the role of doctors from self-employment, and medical practice based on benevolent paternalism, to consumer rights and managed healthcare [2]. Historically, doctors had the sole responsibility within the doctor-patient relationship, to determine the costs of medical care to their patients, however, current trends show that doctors are increasingly becoming employees of managed healthcare organizations (HCOs) or employees of public health services [2, 34–36]. These changes in physicians' practices and methods of payment may impact on patient trust, physician behaviour and decision-making, thereby permanently altering the doctor-patient relationship [3, 37]. It has been observed, especially in advanced capitalist societies like the United States, that there is an on-going shift in doctors practice options from self-employment as owners of their own practices [34–36], to doctors becoming employees of HCOs in a managed healthcare environment [2, 34, 35]. The factors driving this sea change in physicians employment options have been ascribed to "the complex corporate environment coupled with the stress of high malpractice rates, the struggle for reimbursement, administrative duties and the general risks and burden of solo or small group practice" [35, 38]. One can therefore anticipate that in the near future there could be more wage negotiations and collective bargaining between doctors as employees and the employing HCOs [35, 36]. This will be similar to the practice in systems where medicine is centralized or socialized, and where doctors and HCWs are mostly public service employees [7, 10, 11, 14, 16, 18, 20]. These ongoing changes in the organization of healthcare services and modern medical practice may denote a change in the Hippocratic tenets of the medical profession, creating ethical and moral dilemmas [2, 39], which could permanently alter the nature of the relationship between doctors and patients [3, 37], and the putative 'contract' between medicine and society [10, 40].

# **an unconditional right to strike compromises essential services – endangers public health, safety, and property**

Reiff 20 (Mark R. Reiff, received a JD from Georgetown University and obtained his PhD in Legal and Political Philosophy from the University of Cambridge in 2003, "In the Name of Liberty: The Argument for Universal Unionization" Page 200 3.3 The Essential Services Argument https://books.google.com/books?id=axfeDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA200&lpg=PA200&dq=%22essential+services+argument%22+%22right+to+strike%22&source=bl&ots=AktKUOvqjh&sig=ACfU3U1zK6q\_CU0R8f89UY6f5d2AFpGdnA&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjFz\_353fDzAhUuTTABHc1tB3gQ6AF6BAgvEAM#v=onepage&q=%22essential%20services%20argument%22%20%22right%20to%20strike%22&f=false)

**One of the obvious differences between the public and private sector is that many workers in the public sector provide essential services; that is, services that we cannot do without, even for short periods. This makes any interruption to such services by a strike of the relevant workers a kind of threat that not only endangers the health, safety, and property of the community as a whole but also that of each of its individual members**. It also represents, of course, a threat to liberty, because threats to life and property are seen as threats to the very things that liberty entails. Because of the dire consequences of a strike by those tasked with providing such essential services, in turn, public employees have a degree of bargaining power far greater than that can be brought to bear on private employers. So much bargaining power, in fact, that if public employees were ever in a position to strike, they could effectively subject the public purse to hold up and extortion. The first thing to note about essential services argument is that it is not really an argument against public unionization per se, although we will see in a moment how its advocates attempt to extend it in this way, but an argument against the right to strike. And of course, as an argument against the right to strike, it does express some valid concerns. Which is why even when public employees are permitted to unionize, most public sector union members (in fact, about 80 percent) do not have a legally recognized right to strike. But while this ban on strikes is ridiculously overinclusive - nothing like 80 percent of public employees provide services to which a mere temporary, disruption could threaten lives and property - my argument does not claim that unionized public employees must have a right to strike. This is a matter for post-institutional regulation and is to be considered on a case-by-case basis depending on the nature of the services provided. For example, **fire, police, and emergency services would be essential in the relevant sense, and therefore the employees of such services should not be given the right to strike. Garbage collection and many other services would not be, or at least would not be unless a certain degree of disorder was reached, and thus unions of such employees could be permitted to strike until that degree of disorder was reached and employees ordered back to work by the declaration of the relevant executive official, a kind of authority that the executive holds now even with regard to strikes in the private sector.**  And some public employees would not raise this specter of disruption of essential services at all, and therefore would have the right to strike and stay out as long as they saw fit subject to the usual rules about continuing to be willing to engage in good-faith negotiations. 135 Moreover, even unions of public employees that have a right to strike may and often will bargain away the right for contractual concessions from the relevant employer, and these contractual bans may then be unions that do not have the right to strike is proof that unionization does not have to entail this right when it puts essential service at risk.

# **the existence of an autonomous cartesian body also prefigures the very conditions for its exploitation and destruction. conceptualizing laborers within biological/physiological categories enables domination of lacking black bodies as well as ongoing processes abstraction and appropriation worker’s bodies through exploitive modes of production.**

Burden-Stelly 15 (The Modern Capitalist State and the Black Challenge: Culturalism and the Elision of Political Economy By Charisse Burden-Stelly A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in African American Studies in the Graduate Division of the University of California, Berkeley Cartesian Dualism Page 25 – 27 2015 ,RLA)

**The reduction of laborers to “biological/physiological categories”15 was a technique of domination that had long been applied to the colonized generally, and the Black African particularly.** **Complete domination was rationalized through the reduction of the Black to the body as the condition for the denial of his capacity for intellect: “The plantation order which made it illegal for a slave to learn to read and become educated, which exhausted the black with relentless work, then produced empirical evidence of the Negro’s ‘lack of intellectual faculties.**’ The Negro then becomes the SYMBOLIC OBJECT OF THIS LACK.”16 It can be assumed that “relentless” work is simply a physiological activity that requires no thinking, innovation, or mastery. Work is completely devoid of thought. “As against capital, labor is merely the abstract form, the mere possibility of value-positing activity, which exists only as a capacity, as a resource in the bodiliness of the worker.”17 For the Black, this “**capacity” and “bodiliness” was directly related to the incapacity for reason and rationality. This reduction of labor to the body, and its complete bifurcation from “intellectual faculties” links the Black experience of abstraction of labor to the Cartesian mind/body split.** This is so because abstraction under conditions of freedom assumes the capacity for choice. Thus, it is located in the mind and leads to distortion and false consciousness. Based on conditions of unfreedom, choice was denied to the Black, hence the reduction of Black labor to the realm of the body. As Ramòn Grosfoguel explains, “Descartes claims that the mind is of a different substance from the body. This allows for the mind to be undetermined, unconditioned by the body…. Without ontological dualism, the mind would be located in a body, would be similar in substance to the body and, thus, conditioned by the body…”18 Lewis Gordon adds, “Descartes argued that the mind was distinct from the body because the latter was sensory, changing, and contingent but the former was linked to cogitation or thinking, which revealed essential or necessary invisible features of realitythat were not sensible but comprehensible. Further, parts of the body could be destroyed while thinking continued intact. In thinking, we are linked to God, who thinks reality in its clarity and distinctness.”19 **The potential for the destruction of the body is essential here. It follows that if labor belongs to the body, and if the body can be destroyed, then labor has an intrinsic relationship to violence and subjection to dismemberment as a negation of its existence**. The mind, in contradistinction, is a link to God, a safe haven that allowed the world to be apprehended and understood without the vulnerability of the body. As such the mind is representative of life and living, while the body is under the constant threat of death. Life, to use Hegel’s expression, ‘is a standing fight’ against the possibility of the dismemberment with which death threatens the unity of the living body. Life, in Marx’s analysis of capital, is similarly a ‘standing fight’ against the process of abstraction that is constitutive of the category ‘labor.’ It is as if the process of abstraction and ongoing appropriation of the worker’s body in the capitalist mode of production perpetually threatens to effect a dismemberment of the unit of the ‘living body.’20 Thus labor, the body, the slave, and the Black come together as “lack,” as vulnerability, and as proximity to violence. Thus, “the mind” is essential to Culturalist discourse, inasmuch as the mind can be understood as “spirit… ‘whatever substance is purely active, immaterial and always gains understanding through itself (i.e. directly), and acts from self-motion and with intention in regard to an end and goal of which it is conscious of itself.”21 Culturalism seeks to avoid the shame elicited by embodied labor, which represents the space devoid of education, intellect, literacy, and by extension, civilization. **The Cartesian mind became the trope that provided the means of overcoming the precariousness and lack of the (Black) body because it provided the self with certitude of existence through its immateriality (read superstructural situatedness), as Kwasi Wiredu points out: “[a]s far as he [Descartes] is concerned, the alleged fact that one can doubt all spatial existence and yet at the same time be absolutely certain of one’s existence under the dispensation of the Cogito implied ‘I’, the ego, exists as a spiritual, non-spatial, immaterial entity.”2**2 Black intellectuals sought to distance themselves from physical labor, which had come to be conflated with enslavement and abjection, and asserted their Black modern subjectivity through intellectual labor—especially aesthetic and cultural production—to assert their equality with whites. This is what Sylvia Wynter refers to as the “colonization of desire”: The most desired attribute was the ‘intellectual faculty.’ The sign that pointed to one’s possession of the attribute was whiteness of skin. This sign that pointed to its nonpossession was blackness of skin… The black exists as the Symbolic Object constituting the Lack, the Void of these qualities… That a man, or almost a man can exist, lacking these things, sets into play the terror that these attributes can be lost.23 The colonized desire is engendered by the threat of slipping into the realm of the nonintellectual, the realm of the slave/laborer. The “terror of lack”24 required the New Negro to assert himself on cultural grounds as an escape from the embodied figure of the Old Negro—“the symbol of the Negative Other, the very principle of Lack.”25 Cold War Culturalism was directly transferred from the civilization narrative of the New Negro that associated Black embodied labor with savagery. Both forms of Culturalism, predicated on the departure from the waiting room of history through culture, sought to release the Black from the savagery symbolized by Black skin. The accommodation of the antiradical pedagogy of the state by Black Cold War liberals rested upon this notion that “blackness of the skin” was the sign of nonpossession of intellect. Liberation was collapsed into the realm of culture as Black radical critique became a danger to the state. The inherent contradiction is that “the deliberate creation of lack [is] a function of the market economy.”26 It can only be resolved by a struggle that is waged at the level of the base. Otherwise, the materialities of dispossession—i.e. the exploitation of labor, the inequitable distribution of resources based on the extraction of surplus value, the entrenchment of poverty and the global axial division of labor—would remain uncontested. A focus on the relations of production threatened the order based on the “non-value of being black.”27 More importantly, any challenge to the “non-value of black being” threatened the hegemonic social order.

# **debate is a place of consciousness formation – all processes of observation and measurement endemic to their research model contribute to our understanding of a subject that stands as an outside of observer to an external physical world. our intervention in the curriculum is necessary to recalibrate how we formulate and understand consciousness by situating it within the natural world instead of against it.**

We must question the performative practices through which ideas and inquiry manifest. Practices of scholarship, knowing, and civic responsibility are bound to cartesian premises of observer as subject and an external world as object of study. Re modulating a conception of inquiry outside of Cartesian dogma necessitates integrating affect and cognition in processes that enable being, feeling, committing, and living in the natural world.

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# **western bio centrism taints their understanding of death through the imposition of a colonial world view that denies the entanglement of the spiritual, the emotional and the physical. rather than conceptualizing death as an end to the body as an anatomical unit, death is the catalyst for the body’s return to mother earth and the spirit’s transcendence.**

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 “The End of Life is an Auspicious Opportunity for Healing: Decolonizing Death and Dying for Urban Indigenous People” page 51 - 58   
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Indigeneity in Urban Settlements The dramatic increase in the Indigenous population in Canada over the last decade largely results from ethnic mobility (the phenomenon by which individuals and families change their ethnic affiliation) and much of this growth has occurred in urban settlements (Peters & Andersen, 2013). The urban Indigenous community is highly diverse in their identity, lived experiences, and degree of connection to Indigenous culture (Peters & Andersen, 2013). Many urban Indigenous people are second and third generation city dwellers, thus their Indigeneity may not be primarily defined by connection to ancestral land (Peters & Andersen, 2013). Contemporary urban Indigenous people “choose from a variety of other resources to construct identities, including pan-Aboriginal cultures and activities in urban areas”(Peters & Andersen, 2013). Urban Indigenous communities are often arranged around cultural and health care organizations. Cultural engagement has been shown to be beneficial to the health and well-being of Indigenous people (Auger, Howell, & Gomes, 2016; Gone, 2011; Gone & Looking, 2011). However, government policies aimed at cultural extermination and assimilation have resulted in a tremendous loss of Indigenous knowledge, including end-of-life practices and ceremonies. Cultural disruption poses a real risk of permanently losing much of this knowledge given the oral nature of Indigenous knowledge. Rediscovering traditional death ceremonies, increasing access to cultural supports, enhancing death education, and improving relationships with health service providers are of great importance to urban Indigenous people (Anderson, Chalklin, Downey, Lee, & Rodin, 2017). Fortunately, **there are signs of Indigenous cultural and ceremonial revitalization in urban spaces and the end of life stage offers an auspicious healing opportunity.** Indigenous Concepts of Death and Dying **The absence of a word for death in most Indigenous languages underscores how differently the end-of-life experience is constructed by Indigenous people.** Despite being a very heterogeneous group, Indigenous people worldwide share elements of a common spirituality and worldview (Duggleby et al., 2015). **The colonial worldview frames death through a linear, biomedical, and physical lens. Indigenous people view themselves as a spirit having a human experience** (P. Keshane, personal communication, Jan 2017). **Birth and death are inextricably linked as a transition of the spirit through this world. Thus, the end-of-life is a transition of the spirit rather than solely the end of the body. The last stages of life are an auspicious opportunity for healing of the spirit - and spirit is healed through ceremony** (J. Longboat, personal communication, March 2016). The following is an excerpt from Basil Johnston’s (Johnston, 2010) book in which he recounts the Anishinaabe story of the Gift of the Stars (Annangoog Meegiwaewinan), the origins of children to the physical world. It is transcribed here in its entirety to honor the knowledge embedded in the story and to allow for a wholistic interpretation of its message. Johnston begins this story about a five year old, Southwind, and the teachings from his grandmother: "What are stars, grandmother?" he asked. "Babies," his grandmother answered. Southwind looked back up. The stars looked like sparks. But babies they must be. Had his grandmother not said so? So many babies. They filled the entire sky. A star fell. Southwind gasped. "Oh! Grandma! The baby is going to get hurt!" "Don't fret grandson. The baby won't get hurt. It will fall gently as a feather into someone's arms. Someone's going to receive a wonderful gift tonight. It will make them happy." Southwind's grandmother explained. "What kind of gift?". Some woman is going to get a baby that will make her happy,'' Southwind's grandmother said. Southwind looked back up into the sky. Not a word did he say. His mind was too small, too young to understand how stars and babies and gifts could be the same thing. To help Southwind understand, his grandmother told him, "One time you were a little star and you came down as a baby to your mother and to your father and to all of us. You made us all very happy. If ever a star falls near you, take it. Take it home! Look after it. It is a great gift that will make you happy." (Johnston, 2010, p. 19.) Southwind’s grandmother explained that boys don’t receive babies, but they do receive different gifts. “In that moment Southwind wanted a star to fall nearby so that he could take it up, bring it home and look after it. But none ever fell nearby. Always they fell far away. Always they were gifts for somebody else but not for him. For five years Southwind watched stars with his grandmother. Then he stopped going with his grandmother. Looking at stars was boring. Three more years went by. His grandmother fell ill. One night Southwind went out to the knoll where his grandmother used to watch the stars. Before Southwind got to the crest of the little hill, a star fell and it fell just the other side of the hill, where there was a pond. Southwind ran up the knoll and then down the other side to the edge of the pond. But there was nothing in the pond, nothing but white flowers that he'd never before seen. There was no gift. He turned to go back home. "Take me. Take me home. I am medicine. I will make your grandmother well!" a voice said. The little voice came from the middle of the pond. But there was no one there. Again and again the voice called, "Take me! Take me home with you." At last Southwind entered the water, waded out to the middle of the pond. In front of him was the white flower that called out. "Take me! Take me home! I am medicine. I am your gift." Southwind was about to yank the flower from its stalk when it screamed, "No! All of me! All of me!" But it was not an easy thing to lift the flower from its bed. To do this Southwind had to go underwater many times to dig the long root of the flower from its muddy bed. When he finally dug the flower out, Southwind took it home. With the flower Southwind's father made a medicine. They gave it to the old sick woman. The medicine made her better. Some months later Southwind and his grandmother were standing on the knoll studying the stars. He said to her, "No'okomiss, the flower gift that I received; it was really meant for you, wasn't it?. In a way it is. But it was meant for everybody. But that's the way all human gifts are." (Johnston, 2010.p, 20). The reader can interpret the various lessons within this story, but it is noteworthy that this is a children’s story, which educates about the cycle of life. This story addresses the entering of the spirit into this physical world, by the birth of a baby. **In** **death, the spirit is returning to the stars: departing the body as the physical body returns to the first mother, mother earth. In 2016, a diverse group of highly engaged key informants from community, clinical, policy, government, and educational perspectives gathered to consider First Nations, Inuit, and Metis (FNIM) palliative and end-of-life care issues** (Anderson et al., 2017). Numerous themes emerged from facilitated discussions and world cafes including: differing urban and remote community experiences, the need for death education, cultural barriers, challenging interactions with western medical personal, systemic racism, opportunities for healing, and the absence of spirit in the biomedical palliative care system (Anderson et al., 2017). The importance of this topic in the urban context has been affirmed by multiple sources including Indigenous Elders, the Toronto Indigenous Health Advisory Circle, and Anishnawbe Health Toronto. The Medicine Wheel The Medicine Wheel is a circular, wholistic, relational representation of the elements of life including the physical, emotional, mental, and spiritual aspects of self in addition to life stages, seasons, sacred medicines, and the four directions (Dapice, 2006). The Medicine Wheel is widely used for health and wellbeing including as a tool for healing from the imbalance caused by colonialism (Dapice, 2006). Its use is congruent with a theoretical framework for conceptualizing death and dying as it represents the cycle of life. Furthermore**, it opens the space to challenge the idea that the only death is physical and the possibility that death of all parts of self may not occur simultaneously. The explicit nature of spirit in the medicine wheel is critical at the end of life since the modern healthcare model rarely makes space for spirit.** Using examples to explore this concept, I will artificially divide the discussion into the four realms of self and subsequently demonstrate the impossibility of separating them – again consistent with the Indigenous worldview of interconnectedness and relational accountability. Kaswentha – The Two Row Wampum Based upon the Haudenosaunee principles of peace, respect, and friendship, the Two Row Wampum documents the relationship between Turtle Island’s Onkwehonweh (original people) and the first European explorers. Indigenous legal scholar Robert A. Williams Jr (1990). describes the Two Row Wampum: When the Haudenosaunee first came into contact with the European nations, treaties of peace and friendship were made. Each was symbolized by the Gus-Wen-Tah, or Two Row Wampum. There is a bed of white wampum which symbolizes the purity of the agreement. There are two rows of purple, and those two rows have the spirit of your ancestors and mine. There are three beads of wampum separating the two rows and they symbolize peace, friendship and respect. These two rows will symbolize two paths or two vessels, travelling down the same river together. One, a birch bark canoe, will be for the Indian people, their laws, their customs and their ways. The other, a ship, will be for the white people and theirs laws, their customs, and their ways. We shall each travel the river together, side by side, but in our own boat. Neither of us will try to steer the other's vessel. (p. 327) Thus, this belt of wampum reflects both the separation and interaction of First Nations people and the newcomers that continues to this day. This relationship applies to modern urban settlements with the same veracity as the original agreement in 1613. I propose that the modern urban Indigenous experience is rooted in the three white rows between the two purple rows – the space in between. This space in between the two rows seems congruous with post-colonial scholar Homi Bhabha’s concept of a ‘third space’ (Bhabha, 2004) and Willie Ermine’s ethical space (Ermine, 2004). This is a liminal space where two or more cultures interact. Ermine (2004) describes the ethical space as: “The in-between space, relative to cultures, [is] created by the recognition of the separate realities of histories, knowledge traditions, values, interests, and social, economic and political imperatives. The positioning of these two entities, divided by the void and flux of their cultural distance, and in a manner that they are poised to encounter each other, produces a significant and interesting notion that has relevance in research thought. The positioning of the two entities creates the urgent necessity for a neutral zone of dialogue.” (p. 20) In Haudenosaunee teachings this area is defined by peace, friendship, and respect. The urban Indigenous lived experience is often one of variable cultural connection; neither completely in the canoe or in the ship but in some third space between. Conceptualizing Urban Indigenous Death and Dying: The Medicine Wheel and Two Row Wampum Exist in Urban Settlements The Medicine Wheel and the Two Row Wampum offer a vision for restoring respect, balance, and spirit to the end-of-life journey. These two teachings can be used to navigate the unique challenges at the intersection of death, urbanity, and Indigeneity. Together they act as an Indigenous theoretical framework for end-of-life research, policy, and practice. Despite the plurality of cultures in urban settlements on Turtle Island, colonization informs and dominates most systems. Western, colonial worldviews are transactional, hierarchal, and extractive by design. This is the antithesis of relational, collectivist, and egalitarian Indigenous worldviews. Reconciliation for urban Indigenous communities involves negotiating this challenging paradox. However, rather than developing new strategies, I posit existing knowledge – the Medicine Wheel and the Two Row Wampum – can offer an attractive way forward. The Medicine Wheel does not frame aspects in isolation, opposition, or as separable. Intrinsic to the Medicine Wheel is a pathway for change, healing, and reconciliation. Urban Indigenous people do not have the option of living in isolation - although aspects of the colonial system continue to strive to achieve this. As a healing tool, the Medicine Wheel can help address imbalances caused by colonialism, including in relationships by (re)connecting with Indigenous culture. This is of great importance to Indigenous people at the end of life. The original tenets of the Two Row Wampum treaty offer a vision for weaving a relationship that is not dominated by the hegemonic culture. Approaches to this relationship that involve fitting the circular (Indigenous) into a hierarchy (western) have routinely failed Indigenous people. Trying to extract the “best” of both worlds inevitably results in the dominant culture deciding what qualifies as the “best”. While the Two Row Wampum explicitly prohibits steering each other’s vessels, it recognizes we travel the river together and provides a space for interaction. This space between the Indigenous canoe and the western ship is mediated by peace, friendship, and respect. For urban Indigenous people, existing in this liminal, ethical (third) space involves the praxis of building meaningful relationships with both the Indigenous and the non-Indigenous. Paolo Freire’s concept of praxis refers to the linking of theory, informed action, and critical reflection (Freire, 2000). Dialogue, the flow of meaning, is the principle mediator of praxis. I propose that dialogue, grounded in peace, friendship, and respect, and informed by the Medicine Wheel and Two Row Wampum teachings, can improve the end-of-life experience for urban Indigenous communities. Physical The last stages of life frequently involve challenges to one’s physical wellbeing. The western health care system focuses on the physical realm. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the approach to pain. Despite recognizing the concept of ‘total pain,’ (Mehta, 2008; Wein, 2010) in reality, pain is viewed almost exclusively in terms of physical pain as evidenced by the near ubiquitous use of opiates as a remedy (Middleton-Green, 2008; Montes-Sandoval, 1999). **An Indigenous approach would recognize the interconnectedness of the physical, emotional, spiritual, and mental aspects of pain in endeavoring to mitigate the total experience of pain** (Gone, 2009). What does this look like? Through ceremonies such as drumming and smudging which can be incorporated into institutional policies, pain management can take a more Indigenous perspective if combined with traditional Indigenous healing and/or healing circles. Reducing any aspect of pain reduces total pain. The physical structure and regulations of health care institutions are routinely hostile to Indigenous people. This is relevant in urban settlements because most of us will die in hospitals, despite our stated preferences to die at home (Kelly et al., 2009; McGrath, 2007; St Pierre-Hansen, Kelly, Linkewich, Cromarty, & Walker, 2010). Dying at home can be challenging given the high degree of mobility, precarious housing, and homelessness affecting urban Indigenous communities (King, Smith, & Gracey, 2009; Snyder & Wilson, 2015). Physical and policy limits on the number of people allowed in a room and failing to provide adequate space for family in many institutions precludes the role of the larger family, kin, and community networks that coalesce to support a dying individual. These barriers hinder the ability of a broad network of family and kin to empower the spirit for transition (Duggleby et al., 2015). Institutional policies in long term care homes, hospices, and health care facilities often prevent important ceremonies such as smudging or the pipe ceremony. The physical layout of hospitals is intended to hide death. People enter through brightly lit, well appointed, visible front doors but the deceased are removed through unseen service doors often located at the rear of the building. The deceased are rapidly cocooned in body bags, rendered invisible, and moved to places others cannot go or see. It is as if death is shameful and to be hidden. This isn’t surprising, given the illness-based, medical model’s perception of death as a failure. This **presents a barrier for Indigenous people who may wish to maintain a connection to their recently deceased loved one. Touching and bathing the body is an act of love and respect which can empower and release the spirit and support grieving.** Superimposed upon the hidden nature of death in institutions is the invisibility many Indigenous people already experience in the health care system. For Indigenous people, death in urban hospitals is another form of systemic racism that further marginalizes Indigenous ways of knowing. Mental There are many aspects of the mental realm which reflect the tensions between Indigenous and non-Indigenous ways of thinking. Families speak of the difficulty reconciling the health care system’s drive for expediency with Indigenous consensual approaches to decision-making. An example of this is seen in the determination of substitute decision makers (SDM). The colonial approach to defining a SDM is hierarchal and legally framed by way of a presumed series of relations based on blood and lineage. Even the term lineage is inconsistent with an Indigenous way of viewing the world. Indigenous decision-making is not rooted in hierarchical authority but instead in consensus building. I was recently told the story of an Indigenous man who was gravely injured in an accident. The healthcare team felt he was unlikely to recover and decisions regarding care were necessary. The medical team wanted an expedient decision from a SDM dictated by a non-Indigenous, hierarchal, legal protocol. The family, kin, and community gathered to take an Indigenous approach to decision-making. They sat in a circle and shared stories about this man’s life, with people stepping out of the circle after each round if they felt others knew him better. This continued until only three individuals remained. None fit the legal criteria for SDM but everyone agreed they had the deepest understanding of who he was as a human being and what his care decisions would have been. Thus, a community-based, consensual approach to decision-making was employed resulting in a less expedient but more appropriate decision. This is an example of how difficult conversations may require more time, but grounding decision-making in authentic relationships and Indigenous approaches to dialogue is essential to achieve outcomes acceptable to Indigenous communities. A final sad comment is necessary here though. Although the health care professionals were accepting of this decision-making strategy, and health care colleagues I have discussed this with find the approach appealing, the actual SDM transaction had to be carried out in a colonial, hierarchal manner. Emotional The sting of death can be lessened by family and community support or heightened if the circumstances of death are re-traumatizing. Intergenerational trauma expands unless addressed and this is particularly true for those grieving the loss of a loved one. Colonization (e.g., the Indian Act, residential school system, Sixties Scoop, forced relocation, child welfare system) is at the root of intergenerational trauma, and has resulted in many Indigenous people experiencing repeated and ongoing traumas from a wide variety of sources, including health care professionals and institutions (Barker, Goodman, & DeBeck, 2017; Howard, 2014; Kirmayer, Gone, & Moses, 2014; Myhra, 2011; Reeves & Stewart, 2017). Therefore, death and dying may retraumatize individuals and communities resulting in expanded intergenerational trauma unless affected people are afforded opportunities to address both past and ongoing traumas (Gone, 2013). The Medicine Wheel became unbalanced through colonial practices. Restoring balance to the Medicine Wheel through decolonization offers a path to heal. Dying well, within institutions, requires more than cultural safety – it requires empathy and dignity (Chochinov, 2013; Thompson & Chochinov, 2008). A health care system that is unable to deliver on these most basic human needs has failed. Sadly, Indigenous people encounter this failure routinely. In urban settings it is common to encounter stories of Indigenous people experiencing challenges accessing elders, traditional healers, or cultural supports as they are dying due to communication barriers with western healthcare institutions (Harrison J. personal communication, Jan 2017). Even when access to cultural support does occur, it frequently occurs late in their journey (Vautour, J. personal communication, Mar 2017). This limits the healing opportunities for individuals and families, particularly for people wishing to explore their identity and culture at the end of life. The benefits ascribed to early palliative care are not routinely afforded to Indigenous people. Improved relationships between the health care system and Indigenous organizations may enhance the opportunities for emotional support through connection to community and culture. Spiritual **Lastly, and most importantly, is the spiritual realm.** In western health care there is an aversion to all things spiritual. Health care professionals and institutions continue to erect physical as well as policy barriers which impede communal and spiritual activities at the end of life. As **Indigenous people, ‘we are a spirit having a human experience.’ It’s not surprising that one of the most sought out services at the end of life is receiving one’s spirit name. Creating space for spirit is both paramount and challenging at the end of life. The last stages of life are an auspicious opportunity for healing of the spirit. Spirit is healed through ceremony**. It is only very recently that Indigenous ceremonies are being permitted in some health care settings. That ceremonies (e.g., smudging, pipe ceremony) are still restricted in many institutional settings is particularly egregious given the history of legislated bans on Indigenous ceremony and culture. The Indian Act of 1876 outlawed Indigenous cultural and ceremonial practices in an effort to force assimilation (Joseph, 2018), the effects of which continue to be felt by many Indigenous people who are seeking to reclaim their cultural and spiritual practices. Although institutional policies regularly restrict Indigenous ceremonies, in my experience most health care workers are genuinely curious and accepting of Indigenous ceremonies. It is evident that there remains a disconnect between policy and practice that needs to be bridged. This too speaks to the need to construct meaningful relationships.

# **consciousness occupies a terrain that cannot be falsified by the most scientific renditions of materialism. neurophysiology can’t even falsify that physicality is true.**

Evans 05 (Charles Stephen Evans, University Professor of Philosophy and Humanities at Baylor University.[1] Evans was born on May 26, 1948, in Atlanta, Georgia. He holds a BA with high honors (philosophy) from Wheaton College, an MPhil (philosophy) from Yale University, and a PhD (philosophy) from Yale University. “Separable Souls: Dualism, Selfhood, and the Possibility of Life after Death”   
Page 1-2 , RLA)

What should Christians think about the constitution of the self? When the Heidelberg Catechism says "my only comfort in life and death is that I belong, body and soul, to my faithful Savior Jesus Christ," is this language to be taken as sober metaphysics or is it merely a poetic flourish? Recently a number of Christian philosophers, theologians, and scientists have argued that the traditional Christian view of the self, a dualistic account that sees human persons as having an immaterial soul as well as a physical body, should be rejected in favor of a monistic, physicalist view. There are various motivations for this move, some grounded in theology, others in philosophy, and others in science. A common argument of the theological type is that the monistic view of the self is the biblical one; dualism represents the deleterious influence of Greek philosophy on the Christian tradition. A common philosophical criticism is that a dualism of mind and body cannot account for interaction between the two entities. The third type of argument typically claims that dualism, while logically possible, is increasingly implausible in light of recent scientific findings, particularly with respect to neurophysiological research. In this paper I want to focus mainly on the third or scientific type of alleged difficulty for dualism, though I will very briefly indicate some reasons why I am less concerned about the first two types of arguments. In my view the claim that Scripture teaches a monistic materialism is mistaken; I believe that John Cooper has shown this in his book Body, Soul, and Life Everlasting: Biblical Anthropology and the Monism-Dualism Debate.1 Cooper sees three possible biblical views of life after death: (1) A gap theory: future resurrection with a period of non-existence between death and the resurrection. (2) Immediate resurrection upon death. (3) The traditional view: there is a future resurrection with continued existence ("the intermediate period") between death and that resurrection. There are some scriptural passages consistent with the "gap" theory and some others that are consistent with the immediate resurrection theory. However, each is contradicted by the passages consistent with the other view, and no passages plainly teach either of those views.2 The traditional view that the resurrection is a future event, but that the deceased believer enjoys communion with Christ between death and that resurrection, is the only view that is consistent with all of the scriptural evidence and that seems to be plainly taught in some passages. This third view plainly presupposes a dualistic ontology, since the person must be distinct from his or her body to exist between the biological death of that body and the resurrection. (It is also at least arguable that without a dualistic ontology, the resurrection is not possible. There are difficulties in seeing how the new resurrected body can be identical to the body that died; I believe that it is the soul that continuously exists that makes the resurrected body to be the body of the person that died.) Many of the alleged philosophical difficulties are problems that have been repeatedly answered. In any case, the most commonly cited problem, which is that a non-material reality cannot interact causally with a physical entity, is one that a Christian should not take seriously, since if such a principle held, God could neither create a physical world nor act within it. It is in any case odd, I think, for Christians to advocate a form of materialism on philosophical grounds, since a careful look at recent work on the mind-body problem clearly shows that materialism is in what could be called a state of crisis.3 **Although most philosophers today are materialists, many will acknowledge that materialism currently has no solution to two major problems with respect to the nature of mind.** First, **contemporary materialists do not know how to explain consciousness. The problem is so severe that one group of materialists, the so-called "new mysterians," has more or less given up, conceding that consciousness simply is a mystery that materialism will never explain**.4 The second difficult problem for materialists is explaining the nature of intentionality or "aboutness." **Many mental states of acts have meaning, and it is not clear how a physical entity or state can be meaningful without a mind to provide that meaning.** Given these difficulties, why are most philosophers materialists about human persons? The only answer that makes sense to me is that they are materialists about everything. **Philosophers who are metaphysical naturalists and who are committed to materialism believe that there must somehow be a true materialist account of the human self, even if they have no idea what that account may be.** Christians, however, surely should not share this assumption. In any case I believe it is the third type of problem that is most influential in pressing against dualism today. For example, Nancey Murphy, while admitting that scientific evidence does not prove that dualism is false, claims that "recent scientific advances do indeed provide scientific evidence for [physicalism]".5 After discussing some recent work in neurophysiology, Murphy claims that non-reductive physicalism is "not merely a philosophical thesis, but also the hard core of a scientific research program." She concludes that there is "ample scientific evidence" for the physicalism she espouses.6 Even William Hasker, who in the end espouses a type of dualism and rejects physicalism, sees contemporary scientific evidence as presenting problems for traditional dualistic views. He argues that there are two problems with traditional Cartesian dualism: "**The first is that it cannot plausibly account for the extensive and intimate dependence of mind on brain that we find to exist."7 While dualism is compatible with mind-body interaction, it does not seem to Hasker to fit comfortably with the detailed scientific findings about the way that the mind is dependent on the brain for its activity.** The second problem Hasker sees is that dualism cannot plausibly be incorporated into an evolutionary account of human origins. Of course some scientific creationists might say "so much the better for dualism" at this point, but Hasker wants a view of mind and body that is consistent with evolutionary theory. In what follows I shall argue for two claims: (1) **Recent advances in neurophysiology give us no evidence in favor of physicalism; the plausibility of at least some forms of dualism, rightly conceived, has not been diminished at all.** Scientific findings have given us reason to reject particular versions of dualism but not to reject all versions. There are some dualistic views that are plainly incompatible with scientific findings, but these findings have not affected the plausibility of other forms of dualism at all. (2) Recent forms of socalled non-reductive materialism or physicalism advocated by Christians may, when closely examined (depending on how some crucial interpretive questions are answered), turn out not to be materialistic views at all, but rather forms of dualism. Such views are at least close enough to dualism that a dualist may incorporate some of their features into a dualistic account. Both of my theses turn crucially on what is to count as "dualism," as well as what is to count as "materialism." Before turning to those issues, I need to make one important terminological note. In this paper I shall use the terms "mind" "soul," "person," and "self" more or less synonymously, to refer to whatever a person refers to when that person uses the term "I" to refer to himself or herself as a conscious agent. Of course this terminological practice does not determine whether or not that entity that is referred to in this way is a material thing, a non-material thing, or some combination of the two.

# **all of their definition presuppose western materiality - prioritizing materiality confines indigenous being to the western domain of physicality where being indigenous is always understood as being the irrational savage at an anatomical level – this legitimizes indigenous erasure.**

Hokowhitu 09 (Brendan Hokowhitu, The University of Waikato Te Pua Wānanga ki te Ao, The Faculty of Māori & Indigenous StudiesHamilton, New Zealand Position Dean and Professor, The University of Waikato, Indigenous Existentialism and the Body Page 108 – 111, January 2009, RLA)

Exhuming ghosts: A genealogy of the Indigenous body Indigenous studies, as with feminist cultural studies, is best to position itself outside the Western, white masculine intellectual tradition of mind/body dualism: ‘an approach which refuses to privilege mind over body … and which assumes that the body cannot be transcended, is one which … emphasises contingency, locatedness, the irreducibility of difference, the passage of emotions and desire, and the worldliness of being’.13 Such a positioning is double-edged, however, as **the colonial project ‘limited the identity of the colonised to the materiality of their bodies’14 and thus the analysis must be at once deconstructory and existential.** Meaning, it is dangerous ground not to firstly problematise Indigenous theorisation stemming from the body, prior to foregrounding the body as a realm of study from where Indigenous existentialism can develop. Hence, this sub-section entitled ‘exhuming ghosts’. In part, white colonial patriarchy effected colonisation because it claimed to embody the power of reason and, consequently, universal interests. Key to enlightenment rationalism and its reliance on reason to know and to authenticate the objective world was its faith in the mind/body dichotomy orated by Plato and canonised by Descartes. In his 1871 book, The Descent of Man, 15 Charles Darwin emphasises the key differences in intellectual development (that is to say language, observation, curiosity, memory, imagination and reason) between primitive and civilised peoples.16 Darwin and other evolution theorists played an indirect but nonetheless highly significant role in the tainting of European accounts of Indigenous peoples. Indigenous cultures as unenlightened were, from an occipital logic, inherently more ‘physical’, ruled by their passions, and less intelligent than their civilised brethren**. The apparent lack of division between the indigene’s mind, body, spirit and the external world only served to augment the belief of European colonisers that they were indeed encountering savage races. Moreover, Enlightenment philosophers avoided questions of inconsistency in equality and autonomy arising from colonial subjugation by locating the Indigenous being in the realm of the physical and irrational, a site that denied full humanity itself.**17 **If savagery is understood from the perspective of Enlightenment rationalism, then it is apparent that it portends a state of unenlightenment, where reason is ruled by physical impulses and/or superstition.** What Foucault refers to as the invisible ‘breath’ that inhabits discontinuous discourses, even as they mutate,18 I conceive of as ‘physicality’ with reference to the colonised Indigenous savage. **As a sub-theme of the primitive/modern dialectic, physicality describes a complex of interconnecting discourses that enables unitary discursive knowledge to develop around the colonised Indigenous subject.** The thematic of Indigenous 108 VOLUME15 NUMBER2 SEP2009 physicality in the colonial state was ‘capable of linking, and animating a group of discourses, like an organism with its own needs, its own internal force and its own capacity for survival’.19 Darwin’s evolutionary theory, for instance, ‘directed research from afar’ acting as ‘a preposition rather than named, regrouped, and explained … a theme that always presupposed more than one was aware of … forcibly transformed into discursive knowledge’.20 Such discursive knowledge underpinned Indigenous ‘savagery’ and was transcribed into physical terms, onto the Indigenous body and about Indigenous bodily practices. For this essay, it is important to establish that the collision of supposedly embodied Indigenous epistemologies with disembodied Enlightenment rationalism left an inauthentic void that the Europeans, at least, desired to chart through authenticating disciplines such as anthropology and archaeology**. Enlightenment reason, as the determinant of truth and falsehood, was applied to the untranslatable—the epistemologies of other cultures.** The process involved, firstly, authenticating Indigenous knowledge by translating the untranslatable. That is, by encompassing and reconfiguring the incomprehensible into comprehensible forms. The authentication element in this equation is crucial because from the premise of the Enlightenment reason, knowledge was only authentic if it was known to the mind. That is, the embodied cultural concepts from ‘other’ epistemologies were only authentic if they were comprehensible to Western cognition**. The first principle of colonising the Indigenous body, then, was to bring the philosophical underpinnings of the savage under the logic of the coloniser, to authenticate the inauthentic.**21 In the universe of disembodied Enlightenment rationalism, it was assumed that reason (that is, European reason) could differentiate between truth and falsehood and, thus, the physical world was inherently translatable. The embodied practices of Indigenous epistemologies challenged that knowable world and, as a result, the reason of Enlightenment rationalism. The embodied holistic epistemologies of Indigenous societies determined the non-compartmentalisation of the ‘physical’. As opposed to the rational European subject, Indigenous subjectivity was not divorced from the body, nor the rationale from the passions, and so forth.22 **It is also important to recognise Indigenous subjectivities and their consequent bodily practices were often communally defined. Here the distinction can be made with the Western individual subject (who has prevailed in Western thought since the Enlightenment), whose person is comprised of a central and unique core, which determines their distinct identity.** The dissimilarity is important because, as opposed to a singular self, it indicates an Indigenous existentialism that incorporates multiple identities across time, including genealogical and spiritual associations, and communally defined bodily practices. The importance of the visible appearance of indigeneity and its genealogical tithing to moral deficiencies cannot be underestimated to the conception of the Indigenous body today. The Western conception of what it means to be Indigenous is in great part a visual BRENDAN HOKOWHITU—INDIGENOUS EXISTENTIALISM 109 phenomenon, ‘with all the political and ideological force that the seemingly naturalness of the body as the locus of difference can claim … [a] cultural training that quite literally teaches the eye not only how but what to see’.23 Allegorically, it is crucial to make the connection of the rationality of the European with the body of the colonised Other, underscored by: the eighteenth century resurrection of classical values of beauty and their similitude with the criteria of value in the classical economic tradition. Equilibrium and utility functioned in classical economic theory in ways analogous to proportion, symmetry, and refinement for classical aesthetics. Both sets of criteria determined an order of balance and harmony established on the basis of the geometric model ... By the late eighteenth century, beauty was established in terms of racial properties: fair skin, straight hair, organthous jaw, skull shape and size, well composed bodily proportions, and so on. To fail to possess these traits was considered a fault inheritance … Aesthetic value solidified into natural law, which in the eighteenth century was considered as compelling as the laws of nature, economics and morality precisely because they were all deemed to derive from the same rational basis.24 **The corporeal ‘reality’ of the asymmetrical Indigenous body undoubtedly naturalised colonial endeavour and Indigenous subjugation, allowing colonialist claims to moral superiority dependent upon what Robyn Wiegman refers to as ‘bodily fictions’ that ‘unproblematically reflect the natural meaning of flesh**’.25 Here, Bourdieu is useful as he conceives of the body metaphorically: ‘the bearer of symbolic meaning and values and a key site through which social differences are created, perpetuated and reinforced’.26 Bourdieu is also useful in thinking of the Indigenous body in terms of ‘physical capital’,27 especially in relation to mind/body duality in that symbolic meaning inscribed onto the Indigenous body determined inferior mental capacity and thus only contained capital in the inverse sense. The Indigenous body symbolised the physical realm and, thus, was employed for its physical labour, observed for its performativity, and humanised through the physical pursuits of sport.28 For many of the Indigenous parents of my generation, Bourdieu’s analysis becomes important because of its concern with the body in relation to the working class who, through bodily cognition as a necessary effect of a physically intensive life, developed different relations to their bodies than the white middle or dominant classes.29 Moreover, for Indigenous communities, sub-cultures developed throughout much of the twentieth century based on a relationship with a physically labouring body that, in turn, has come to symbolise traditional Indigenous cultures. For instance, the relationship between physical labour and sport with the Mäori male body has determined a traditional Mäori masculinity symbolically reified within the physical realm.30 As a consequence, many Indigenous communities remain predominantly working class. However, if we are to perceive of present day culture 110 VOLUME15 NUMBER2 SEP2009 as ‘postmodern’ then the relationship to the body with work and production becomes less important than an analysis of the fragmentation of the Indigenous body within late-capitalism.

# **mauro 11 (salvatore engel-di mauro, associate professor of geography, state university of new york at new paltz, "fighting for socialism on great turtle island— the struggle against settler colonialism," 2011 , rla)**

**The U.S. and Canada are settler colonial dictatorships.** This is hardly a revelation. Yet **most anti- capitalist leftist radicals seem unaware of or indifferent to this truth, a fact that is well illustrated by the paucity of concern expressed in socialist publications and other outlets with decolonization struggles on Great Turtle Island** (the name some Native Peoples give to what is often called"North America"). **This struggle should, however, be understood as fundamental to bringing about the demise of U.S. imperialism and building a post-capitalist alternative**. There has, of course, always been verbal acknowledgment of this and even a few efforts among socialists to recognize and act upon settler colonialism. Still, it has rarely figured prominently or centrally in any socialist platform in this part of the world, **nor have the contradictions inherent in a Eurocentric socialism** (in which I include anarchism) **been systematically confronted**—at least not without less than flattering results (see for example the book edited by Ward Churchill, number 7 on our list of readings below). It is disconcerting that most socialists, especially in the U.S., still cannot grasp what should be most obvious: The decolonization of Great Turtle Island would mean the end of U.S. imperialism everywhere—and with it a likely fatal weakening of all U.S.-supported institutions of repression worldwide. This is even more reason for considering the matter to be of some urgency. The recurring, intertwined social and environmental catastrophes generated through the capitalist mode of production are most clearly expressed in the genocides perpetrated against Indigenous Peoples. To put the matter succinctly, capitalist environmental degradation (not just global warming) is threatening or has already destroyed lives and livelihoods worldwide, with or without U.S. imperialism, and largely at the expense of the least powerful. Meanwhile, catastrophes are used to deflect attention away from capitalism as the root cause of those very same catastrophes. Indigenous Peoples have played and continue to play a pivotal role in the struggle against the capitalist mode of production and against any attempt to obscure the causes of worldwide environmental devastation.¶ We should, of course, acknowledge that **any expectation of a unified perspective and/or action developing among socialists and revolutionaries** (now a small, often marginalized if not persecuted political fraction of mainstream settler colonial society) **and all Indigenous Peoples of Great Turtle Island, or even of the Indigenous communities themselves, would be unrealistic**. Indigenous societies, for many reasons (some traceable to pre-invasion histories) are internally fractured, if not at times even mutually hostile. Some are even openly supportive of colonial governments. And socialists are similarly divided and politically diverse. But such **difficulties can be no excuse for the continuing indifference of most socialists towards the settler colonial dictatorships on which the modern industrial living standards** (shared, for the most part by these groups of radicals themselves) are based.¶ A counter-trend might be developing with recent collaboration and expressions of affinity among some Indigenous and socialist activists, especially in Canada (see works 1, 3, 11 and 14 on the list below). With **the tendency worldwide for Indigenous Peoples to play a central role in resisting further capitalist encroachments and ecological destruction,** such linkages could not be more opportune, as noted by Hugo Blanco (again see list of readings). **Indigenous Peoples on Great Turtle Island do not need socialists to carry on with their struggles.** Major capitalist assaults on livelihoods and ecosystems have been successfully repelled through alliances between Indigenous communities and parts of the rural working class in places like Wisconsin, to cite one example, while most socialists, especially Marxists, have largely missed the boat. Arguably, this is due to several assumptions that are both long-standing and foundational. Then let us add: completely **Eurocentric.** Such **assumptions must be shed once and for all—which will also, of course, mean major shifts in political organizing practices and programmatic objectives.** But if **an ecologically sensible socialist current** (or really any socialist current) **is to flourish and challenge the status-quo in Great Turtle Island such a paradigm shift is essential**. These **Eurocentric assumptions include** inter-related notions of 1) **stage-based social change, with one "mode of production" giving way logically and inevitably to another, socialism becoming possible only based on the productive forces generated by capitalism** (which Marx himself began rethinking, even if extremely late in his life, thanks to Vera Zasulich); 2) **the working class as the only revolutionary subject within capitalist society;** and 3) the state as the primary vehicle for revolutionary change. (See also, from this last point of view, reading 5 below.) The first assumption remains common to most left-wing groups which, among other things, persist in their belief that progress is tied to integrating masses of people into a single polity (with democratic central planning) and increasing the level of technology (now of an environmentally friendly variety). **If we start with these assumptions, the claims for land restitution raised by Indigenous Peoples, and their reticence to accept any assimilation, immediately become obstacles to "progress." Further, there is no room for Indigenous traditional life-ways in this worldview, because these stand in the way of resource extraction for the sake of the (not so) general good**. **The second assumption makes it necessary to explain away actual revolutionary subjects** that do not live up to Marxist preconceptions, such as peasants in the Russian, Mexican, and Chinese revolutions, and **Indigenous Peoples** who are **countering both settler colonialism (capitalist expansionism) and environmental devastation** simultaneously. For most socialists it remains too difficult to abandon these two foundational assumptions. But the third—the role of the state—probably raises the most tenacious resistance. And **yet if we continue to insist on statist strategies in a context where states have been imposed on often previously egalitarian societies, it is tantamount to partaking in a reinforcement of the settler colonial dictatorship and in the complete annihilation of such egalitarian societies once and for all**. This is not only a matter of subordinating questions related to Indigenous Peoples' sovereignty to other "more central" struggles. **In territories such as Great Turtle Island and northern Siberia, where states did not exist prior to colonizer invasions, projecting a centralized state as the key to creating a socialist society actively undermines Indigenous Peoples' anti-colonial struggles and thereby any prospect of establishing ecologically sustainable egalitarian** (i.e., ecosocialist) **societies.** But even anarchist currents are not immune to criticism. Why, for example, have anarchists only recently paid close attention to settler colonialism? This includes even some Indigenous activist currents. Eurocentric anti-statism, such as Proudhon's federalism or Landauer's structural renewal, is just as counterproductive as the traditional Marxist approach. There is even the occasional proposal for "a radical rehabilitation of the state" coming from Indigenous communities themselves—for example in Canada. These are reminiscent of the reformist concept of "democratizing" the state, and not therefore likely to be of use. This is because **the capitalist mode of production, which is inherently expansionistic, is based on the state as one of its main pillars. There is no confederacy or Indigenous- settler coexistence possible alongside a capitalist system of production, with its relentless pressure to ransack ecosystems everywhere for the endless accumulation of capital.** The mere everyday bustling of a capitalist society, with its incessant internal conflicts and violent repressions, necessitates ever-larger amounts of resources, often taken violently.

# **jordan-zachery 16(julia jordan-zachery, ph.d. black studies program public and community service department providence college, director and professor of public and community service, winter 2016 the heritage journal is a biannual newsletter for the black studies program at providence college. we invite our scholarly community—students, faculty, staff, alum and community members to contribute to heritage. pieces can take multiple forms such as art, poetry or prose; they can be reflective or analytical page 7 – 9. the card starts with the second paragraph on page 7 and the last paragraph on page 8 extends to the beginning of page 9 2016 ) rla**

i suppose you could say this is my humble¶ attempt at becoming whole, as my auntie (a tribal¶ elder) phrases it. **both communities i represent**¶ **have been embroiled in a constant struggle with the**¶ **white supremacist struggle for visibility since the**¶ **dawn of american history**. so to insist on being¶ whole, on coming together and on beginning, is¶ inherently political. **thus, the question i am charged**¶ **with is: how do i create space for me**?¶ i suppose the first step is to out myself¶ publicly. this is big. for almost the last decade, **i**¶ **would have died before i told you i’m black**¶ **pokanoket wampanoag—or, if we’re being totally**¶ **reductionist, black indian**. never mind the fact that¶ i was born and raised in providence, rhode island,¶ one of the first colonial settlements in america¶ where native american and black people have been¶ in community since the seventeenth century; that i¶ and my family are born of, and in constant¶ contention with, this history. so it’s ironic for me to write about visibility¶ because, as a new englander, **i’m coming from the**¶ **fringes of both indian country and black america,**¶ **the very intentionally invisible meridian between**¶ **the projects and the rez. white people have taken**¶ **great pains to whitewash new england, so blackamerica and indian country alike often call into**¶ **question the respective cultural legitimacies of**¶ **black and native people here**. in other words (as¶ i’ve heard and have been told), there aren’t “real”¶ black folks or “real” indians where i come from.¶ perhaps that is where the irony really lies because,¶ in the linear narrative of american history we tell¶ ourselves, it was in new england that the old and¶ new worlds first collided. **here they exploded in a**¶ **racially ambiguous, colored/brown/”what are you,**¶ **anyway?” supernova: the afterlife of colonization,**¶ **genocide, and chattel slavery in the all-consuming**¶ **contexts of white supremacy and anti-blackness.** **inhabiting this cultural and literal (physical)**¶ **space is as odd, surprising, and disconcerting as it**¶ **sounds**. **miraculously, though, i grew up with some**¶ **exposure to my indigenous heritage thanks to my**¶ **grandparents.** but **when they died within a year of**¶ **each other, the task of explaining myself and my**¶ **ontology became overwhelming. this was the end**¶ **of 2007.** i was fifteen and a sophomore at a snobby¶ private school in providence. in the days and weeks¶ after thanksgiving and into the new year, i pressed¶ the flowers from my grandparents’ funerals in my¶ bible; turned sixteen a week before the first¶ inauguration of barack obama, which i watched¶ starry -eyed and hopeful with the rest of black¶ america; and i decided once and for all i could no¶ longer be pokanoket wampanoag.¶ it’s a hell of a thing to be fifteen and¶ struggling to be acknowledged. it seemed that no¶ matter who i encountered, i was often mistaken for¶ biracial (as in, black and white), cape verdean, dominican, or puerto rican. **i was never “black**¶ **enough” in terms of my phenotype and my**¶ **mannerisms—and, of course, the dominant**¶ **narrative is that native americans don’t exist**¶ **anymore**. **at school, my white teachers and peers**¶ **policed my identity on a daily basis.** while my¶ classmates worried about prom dates and asking¶ their crush out to pizza after school, **i confronted**¶ **and struggled with the american obsession with**¶ **racial pigeonholing. every day, i was charged with**¶ **explaining the whole of my complex history—of**¶ **justifying my very being.** thus, i learned **that the thing about the black**¶ **indian thing is that it’s contentious at best.** my¶ heritage and my experience as a brown-skinned¶ new england girl implicates everyone—and i do¶ mean everyone—in this country. **regardless of**¶ **one’s positionality, the black indian identity**¶ **inevitably opens up questions of race vis-à-vis**¶ **blackness and native-ness** **(e.g., what does it mean**¶ **to be black? what does it mean to be native**?). **it is**¶ **a pandora’s box of our misconceptions about,** and¶ obsessions with, race, **the romanticizing of native**¶ **americans, blood quantum, the one-drop rule.**¶ ultimately, **its real controversy lies in that it**¶ **requires us to confront histories of oppression that**¶ **the white establishment has deemed inconvenient.** america has complicated the act of¶ existing for me which, where i came from, went¶ unquestioned and undiscussed. **in my family, there**¶ **were never any useless fractions or percentages**¶ **assigned to either ethnicity**, **nor** any **mythical, fullblooded**¶ **cherokee princesses floating around my**¶ **family tree. the very real people who do populate**¶ **my family tree are powwas and preachers, black**¶ **panthers and tribal elders,** activists in both¶ communities; schoolteachers, nurses, veterans,¶ catholics, red sox fans—my parents, grandparents, aunts, uncles, and cousins. some of my family¶ “look” black, live their lives exclusively as black¶ people, and are very involved in the black¶ community; others “look” native, live their lives¶ exclusively as native people, and are very involved¶ in the tribe, native community of new england, and¶ indian country writ large. we didn’t necessarily¶ talk about our duality all the time, but we surely¶ lived it. so i **tried to assert both sides of my heritage**¶ **authentically. eventually**, though, **i just accepted**¶ **that anti-blackness (in the form of desiring to be**¶ **anything but black) is the lens through which most**¶ **people would perceive my pokanoket heritage.** i¶ **also didn’t like how in that paradigm,** **being native**¶ **does not exist as a viable and relevant cultural**¶ **identity, but it functions only as an object, and one**¶ **whose sole function is to abet anti-blackness**. for about the last eight years, i’ve been¶ constructing an exclusively black american identity. in¶ college, i soaked up every bit of black history,¶ literature and culture i came across. the more i¶ learned about black experiences in this country and¶ the world, **the more i critiqued and deconstructed**¶ **the idea of blackness as a monolith.** consequently,¶ **the once-potent accusation of not being “black**¶ **enough” lost its sting.** **i felt more than sufficiently**¶ **black, and proud of it. as i started to become more**¶ **radical in my thinking**, however, i felt convicted that¶ i had all but abandoned my wampanoag heritage.¶ how could i be a conscious person of color **if i was**¶ **consciously editing my history to exclude another**¶ **disempowered group?** the short answer: not very. **that’s how i got here, negotiating the**¶ **decidedly rebellious act of insisting on a black and**¶ **pokanoket duality**. in the last eight years, the¶ flowers from my grandparents’ funerals have all¶ but disintegrated in the thin pages of paul’s¶ epistles; **the myth of post-racial america has beenstained by the blood of trayvon martin, sara lee**¶ **circle bear, freddie gray, paul castaway, sandra**¶ **bland**, laquan mcdonald, and countless other **black**¶ **and native victims of systemic, racialized american**¶ **violence**. barack obama is leaving the white house¶ soon, and the whole of (non-white) america¶ watches anxiously to see which of the odd¶ assortment of candidates will be his predecessor.¶ most importantly, in the last eight years, i¶ graduated high school and went to college, where i¶ learned definitively that while i don’t have many of¶ the answers i want, i’d better start asking the right¶ questions. and **i realized it is impossible for me to**¶ **not be pokanoket.**

# **douglas 2015**

[Nick, the author of Finding Octave: The Untold Story of Two Creole Families and Slavery in Louisiana. September 28, 2015 "KNOW YOUR BLACK HISTORY: Slave Revolts Part 1", http://www.afropunk.com/profiles/blogs/know-your-black-history-slave-revolts-part-1-blacks-and-native]

This **alliance between Native Americans and slaves started long before Jamestown.** In the late 1500s slave traders like Sir Walter Raleigh marooned shiploads of slaves on the U.S. coast to pursue the more lucrative pirating of Spanish galleons carrying Latin American gold. Other slave ships were forced ashore by the slaves themselves, who then escaped into the interior of the U.S. These escaped slaves became known as maroons. It seems only natural that escaped slaves would gravitate to, and be accepted by Indian tribes. The first recorded slave revolt with the aid of Native Americans was in 1526 in a Spanish settlement in present-day South Carolina near the Pedee River. One hundred slaves revolted against 500 Spaniards after nearby Indians became hostile to the settlement. The slaves integrated into the Native American community after wiping out the Spaniards. There was slavery in the Americas before Europeans arrived. Native North Americans took captives during wars with other tribes and forced them into small-scale slave labor. Captives were often traded back to their tribes in captive exchanges. But large-scale slave labor and slaveholding was unknown to Native Americans before the Europeans arrived. European’s appearance in North America changed slavery for Native Americans. European’s need for labor, especially in the Southern colonies, broke down the previous system. Indian tribes began to make raids with the goal of selling captives as slaves to the Europeans. This affected the power balance between tribal nations and disrupted inter-tribal functioning. Enslaving Native Americans was a dangerous and tricky proposition for the early European settlers. Settlers relied on various Indian tribes for survival and protection: the French relied on the Choctaw: the British counted on the Chickasaw and Cherokee. And Native American slaves, unlike Africans uprooted from their ancestral homelands, were likely to escape and return to their tribes. To increase their slavery profits, some Europeans began selling Native Americans into slavery in the Caribbean. Between 1675 and 1715, thirty-to fifty-thousand Native American slaves (this is a conservative estimate) were sold from the southern colonies into slavery in the Caribbean. Due in part to this slave trade, the Yamasee Indians waged war in 1715 against British colonists. The Yamasee War forced most white colonists in South Carolina and the southeast to flee to Charlestown, North Carolina. The British colonists who took refuge in Charlestown were only saved by the Cherokees, who helped them survive the attack. As Native Americans had increasingly hostile encounters with ever, encroaching European settlers, they became natural allies of the arriving black slaves. Both groups fiercely resisted Europeans’ efforts to enslave them. Many tribes made the strategic calculation that aiding blacks revolting against slavery, was in their own best interest. White settlers and leaders fought furiously throughout U.S. history, even resorting to wholesale murder, to disrupt this powerful, centuries-old alliance. Colonists in South Carolina were so worried about slave and Indian alliances that they passed laws in 1725 and 1751 that prohibited holding slaves near Native Americans on the frontier. South Carolina Governor James Glen stated in 1758: “It has always been the policy of this government to create an aversion of the Indians to the Negroes.” During a 1739 outbreak of smallpox Europeans told the Cherokees the outbreak was brought by African slaves to create tension between them. (Of course, the disease was introduced to the Americas by Europeans.) American policy regarding blacks and Indians was to keep them “separated and mutually hostile.” Individual colonies encouraged this policy. Virginia offered Indians who caught escaped slaves 35 deerskins as a reward. North Carolina rewarded Indians with three blankets and a musket. The Natchez Uprising in 1729 was an Indian land dispute and slave revolt. The Natchez were upset with the French settler’s insistence on using a sacred burial ground as a farm. They plotted with black slaves, the Choctaw, Tunica, Yazoo and other Indian tribes to simultaneously attack French settlements throughout the Mississippi Valley. The Indians promised the slaves who participated that slavery would be abolished in the Mississippi Valley. Each tribe kept bundles of sticks in their lodges to count the days until the attack. A Natchez princess, who had a son with a Frenchman, got wind of the attack and warned the French. They ignored her. She slipped into the Natchez lodge and took out a few sticks from the bundle to sabotage the timing, so the many tribes would not attack in concert as planned. The Natchez and slaves attacked prematurely but still took over Ft. Rosalie in present day Mississippi, killing 250 French settlers. The French authority Etienne Perier realized that the Indians and slaves had planned this attack in advance and became extremely fearful of this new alliance. To drive a wedge between the Indians and slaves, and to prevent any future alliances, he ordered a group of slaves to murder a peaceful tribe called the Chaouachas. His plan worked. Indians in the area started referring to black slaves as “black white men” It took a year for the French to defeat and capture most of the remaining Natchez, due in large part to how well the slaves who allied with the Natchez fought. In 1776 the new U.S. government outlawed the enslavement of Indians. The government treaty negotiated with Indians included clauses that Indians should return escaped slaves. The Indians returned none. Andrew Jackson was one of the many people who actively sought to break the alliance between Native Americans and black slaves. Jackson had seen first-hand how successful the cooperation could be between these two groups. Choctaw and free people of color had successfully helped him defeat the British in the Battle of New Orleans in 1815. He distrusted the French-speaking free blacks known as Creoles and hated the Indians. As president he ordered the forced relocation of the Five Civilized Tribes (civilized tribes included: Cherokee, Chickasaw, Choctaw, Seminole and Creek /Muscogee) to lands west of the Mississippi. It is no coincidence that Jackson began this relocation with the Choctaw in 1830. French Creoles and Choctaw Indians had a history of interdependency and cooperation that had endured for 100 years. A Choctaw chief was the first to call this forced relocation “a trail of tears and death,” possibly referring to the Choctaw tradition of ritual crying at the death of friends and relatives. After the 1830s black slave revolts continued unabated and intensified even through the Civil War. Because of President Jackson’s genocidal Indian policies, after 1830 black Americans could not count on large numbers of Native Americans in the fight against slavery. There was one exception: the Seminoles and the Black Seminoles. . The Seminoles were a loose confederation of the Creek, Miccosukee, other tribes and a large number of runaway slaves and their descendants. In 1740s the Spanish destabilized British colonial slavery in the area surrounding Florida by promising runaway-slaves freedom and land if they reached Spanish-controlled Florida. Many slaves escaped from Georgia and Alabama to freedom in Florida, where they joined this loose confederation of Indians. The First Seminole War erupted in 1817, when the U.S Army attempted to take the Miccosukee chief Neamaltha into custody. The Seminoles and Miccosukee had been conducting reprisals along the Georgia/Florida border in reaction to Georgia colonists stealing Native American livestock. Ironically, Andrew Jackson relied on a force of 2,000 Creek warriors to invade Northern Florida and take over the two largest Spanish settlements. The outcome of the invasion was the ceding of Florida to the Americans in 1819 and the Seminoles leaving Northern Florida. When Jackson tried to force the Seminoles to leave Florida under the Indian Relocation Act of 1830, the Seminoles refused. In December 1835 the Second Seminole War began. Up to 400 black slaves escaped plantations in Florida and joined the Seminoles. The escaped slaves became known as the Black Seminoles. The force of Black Seminoles and Seminole Indians succeeded in destroying 21 sugar plantations in Central Florida. After a number of embarrassing defeats the U.S. Army tried to split the Seminole force by offering the escaped slaves freedom if they would consent to be relocated west of the Mississippi. Few slaves accepted. After three years of fighting, the U.S Army—unable to defeat the Seminoles— offered Black Seminoles freedom in exchange for surrender. The Second Seminole War was the only successful emancipation of black rebels prior to the Civil War. Today Seminoles continue to inhabit their ancestral land in Florida. The Seminole Wars are rarely talked about because Southerners and the U.S. Army would never admit to being defeated by a group of black rebels and Indians. Black slaves and Native Americans shared common ground from the moment that the first black slaves set foot in the U.S. Their combined resistance to slavery was seen as such a powerful threat to the status quo that slaveholders used every method available to them from legislation, to wholesale murder, to forced relocation of Native Americans to break this powerful alliance. In the end black and Native American alliances were important in ending the evil institution of slavery. It is important to look at the history of Indian and black slave relationships in the context of current day. By censuring this amazing history we forget common ground that can be a powerful force for change.

# **king 13**

[2013, Tiffany Jeannette King, “IN THE CLEARING: BLACK FEMALE BODIES, SPACE AND SETTLER COLONIAL LANDSCAPES”, PhD Dissertation]

We must consider that Settler colonialism shapes and constitutes Black life, **specifically slavery and its afterlife in America.** While slavery and anti-Black racism should be active and robust analytic frames that guide Black Studies and help us understand Black subjectivity in the Western Hemisphere, settler colonialism also structures Black life. The genocide of Native peoples, the perpetual making of Settler space and Settler subjectivity—as unfettered self actualization—do not immediately stop existing as forms of power when they run into Black bodies. The way that settler colonial power looks and manifests itself **just changes;** **it does not stop.** Settler colonialism, as a subjectless discourse, is a form of productive power that touches all that live in the US and Settler colonial nations.30 Though it touches and shapes everyone’s life it does so in very different ways. For the purposes of my own research I am arguing that settler colonialism’s normalizing power enacts genocide against Native peoples (disappears Native people) but it also shapes and structures antiBlack racism. The ontological positions that were created by slavery, specifically the Slave are still alive and well however, **settler colonial power intersects with, works through and structures the repressive and productive power that makes the Black captive fungible and socially dead**. Throughout, In the Clearing poses the question, in what ways does settler colonial power help structure slavery and anti-Black racism? This project ultimately argues that **slavery and anti-Black racism are not adequate to fully understand the material and discursive processes that create Blackness in all of its embodied genres in North America**. Slavery and anti-Black racism are also not the only repressive powers that make the Black body abject, fungible and situated at the outer limits of being-ness. Both **slavery and settler colonialism structure modernity and need to be fully conceptualized as forms of power that help constitute Blackness**. Conceptualizing the ways that settler colonialism and slavery co-constitute one another is an essential component of this dissertation.

# **moreton-robinson 8**

(Aileen, Queensland University Prof of Indigenous Studies, Transnational Whiteness Matters)kh

Morrison further suggests in " Black Matters" that the African American presence has also "shaped the body politic, the Constitution, and the entire history of the [USA] culture." Indigenous peoples are outside the scope of Morrison's analysis. Through the centering of the African American presence, Native American texts that have challenged, resisted and affected the American literary imagination, politics, history and the Constitution remain invisible. This silence is an interesting discursive move considering that the best-selling novels within the USA in the late eighteenth century were captivity narratives. And as Native American legal scholar Raymond Williams argues **it was** the positioning of Indians as incommensurable savages within the Declaration of Independence **that enabled** " ' **the Founders**' **vision of America's growth** and potentiality **as a new form of expansionary white racial dictatorship in the world**."ll The most valuable contribution of Morrison's work for my purposes is her thesis that "**blackness**," whether real or imagined, **services the social construction and application of whiteness in its myriad forms**. In this way **it is utilized as a white epistemological possession**. Her work opens up a space for considering how this possessiveness operates within the whiteness studies literature to displace Indigenous sovereignties and render them invisible. WHITE POSSESSIVENESS Most historians mark 1492 as the year when imperialism began to construct the old world order by taking possession of other people, their lands and resources. **The possessive nature of this enterprise informed the development of a racial stratification process on a global scale that became solidified during modernity. Taking possession of Indigenous** people's **lands was a quintessential act of colonization** and was tied to the transition from the Enlightenment to modernity, which precipitated the emergence of a new subject into history within Europe. Major social, legal, economic and political reforms had taken place changing the feudal nature of the relationship between persons and property in the 16th and 18th centuries. "These changes centered upon the rise of 'possessive individualism,' that is, upon an increasing consciousness of the distinctness of each self-owning human entity as the primary social and political value. "12 Private ownership of property both tangible and intangible operated through mechanisms of the new nation state in its regulation of the population and especially through the law. By the late 1700s people could legally enter into different kinds of contractual arrangements whereby they could own land, sell their labor and possess their identities all of which were formed through their relationship to capital and the state. **A new white property owning subject emerged into history and possessiveness became embedded in everyday discourse as** "**a firm belief that the best in life was the expansion of self through property and property began and ended with possession of one's body**."13 **Within the realm of intra-subjectivity possession can mean control over one's being**, ideas, one's **mind**, one's feelings **and** one's body or within inter-subjectivity it can mean the act or fact of possessing **something that is beyond the subject** and in other contexts it can refer to a state of being possessed by another. Within the law possession can refer to holding or occupying territory with or without actual ownership or a thing possessed such as property or wealth and it can also refer to territorial domination of a state. **At an ontological level the structure of subjective possession occurs through the imposition of one's will**-la-be **on the thing which is perceived to lack will**, thus it is open to being possessed. This enables the formally free subject to make the thing its own. Ascribing one's own subjective will onto the thing is required to make it one's property as " willful possession of what was previously a will-less thing constitutes our primary form of embodiment; it is invoked whenever we assert: this is minc."14 To be able to assert ' this is mine' requires a subject to internalize the idea that one has proprietary rights that are part of nonnative behavior, rules of interaction and social engagement. Thus possession that forms part of the ontological structure of white subjectivity is reinforced by its sociodiscursive functioning. WHITE WRITING A number of texts have been written historicizing the acquisition of white identity and the privileges conferred by its status through a trope of migration, which is based on the assumption that all those who came after the white people had taken possession are the immigrants. White possession of the nation works discursively within these texts to displace Native American sovereignties by disavowing that everyone else within the USA are immigrants whether they came in chains or by choice. The only displacement that is theorized is in relation to African Americans. Theodore Allen's work on how the Irish became white in America illustrates that the transformation of their former status as the blacks of Europe relied on their displacement by African Americans in the new country. IS David Roediger di scusses how the wages of whiteness operated to prevent class alliances between working class whites and African Americans. 16 Karen Brodkin 's excellent book on how Jews became white demonstrates that the lower status of African American workers enabled Jewish class mobility.17 Jacobsen illustrates that European migrants were able to become white through ideological and political means that operated to distinguish them from African American blackness.18 **The black/white binary permeates** these analyses enabling **tropes of** migration and **slavery to work covertly** in these texts **erasing the continuing history of colonization and the Native American sovereign presence**. **Blackness becomes an epistemological possession** that Allen, Roediger, Brodkin and Jacobsen **deploy[ed] in analyzing whiteness and race, which forecloses the possibility that the dispossession of Native Americans was tied to** migration and **the establishment of slavery driven by the logic of capital. Slaves were brought to America as the property of white people to work the land that was appropriated from Native America tribes**. Subsequently, migration became a means to enhance capitalist development within the USA. Migration, slavery and the dispossession of Native Americans were integral to the project of nation building. Thus **the question of how anyone came to be white or black in** the United States of **America is inextricably tied to the dispossession of the original owners and the assumption of white possession**. The various assumptions of sovereignty beginning with British 'settlers' the formation of individual states and subsequently the United States of America all came into existence through the blood-stained taking of Native American land. **The USA as a white nation state cannot exist without land and clearly defined borders**, it is the legally defined and asserted territorial sovereignty that provides the context for national identifications of whiteness. In this way I argue **Native American dispossession indelibly marks configurations of white national identity**. Ruth Frankenberg acknowledges in the introduction to her edited collection Displaying Whiteness that whiteness traveled culturally and physically, impacting on the formation of nationhood, class and empire sustained by imperialism and global capitalism. She wrote that notions of race were tied "to ideas about legitimate 'ownership' of the nation, with 'whiteness' and' Americanness' linked tightly together" and that this history was repressed. After making this statement she then moves on to discuss immigration and its effects. 19 Her acknowledgement did not progress into critical analysis that centered Native American dispossession, instead Frankenberg represses that which she acknowledges is repressed . Repression operates as a defense mechanism to protect one's perception of self and reality from an overwhelming trauma that may threaten in order to maintain one's self image. **Repressing the history of Native American dispossession works to protect the possessive white self from ontological disturbance. It is far easier to extricate oneself from the history of slavery if there were no direct family and material ties to its institution and reproduction.** However, **it is not as easy to distance one's self from a history of Indigenous dispossession when one benefits everyday from being tied to a nation that has and continues to constitute itself as a white possession**. Within the whiteness studies literature whiteness has been defined in multiple ways. It is usually perceived as unnamed, umnarked and invisible, and often as culturally empty operating only by appropriation and absence .20 It is a location of structural privilege, a subject position and cultural Praxis. Whiteness constitutes the norm operating within various institutions influencing decision making and defining itself by what it is not. 22 It is socially constructed and is a form of property that one possesses, invests in and profits from.2..1 Whiteness as a social identity works discursively becoming ubiquitous, fluid and dynamic24 operating invisibly through pedagogy.25 What these different definitions of whiteness expose is that it is something that can be possessed and it is tied to power and dominance despite being fluid, vacuous and invisible to white people. However, these different conceptualizations of whiteness, which use blackness as an epistemological possession to service what it is not, obscure the more complex way that white possession functions sociodiscursively through subjectivity and knowledge production. As something that can be possessed by subjects it must have ontological and epistemological anchors in order to function through power. As a means of controlling differently racialized populations enclosed within the borders of a given society, white subjects are disciplined, though to different degrees, to invest in the nation as a white possession that imbues them with a sense of belonging and ownership. This sense of belonging is derived from ownership as understood within the logic of capital and citizenship. In its self-legitimacy, white possession operates discursively through narratives of the home of the brave and the land of the free and through white male signifiers of the nation such as the Founding Fathers, the 'pioneer' and the 'war hero.' Against this stands the Indigenous sense of belonging, home and place in its sovereign incommensurable difference.

# **alcoff ‘03**

[Linda Martin, Syracuse University Department of Philosophy, “Latino/AS, Asian Americans, and the Black-White Binary” The Journal of Ethics 7, 5.2.2003. <http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1023%2FA%3A1022870628484.pdf >//wyo-hdm]

The reality of race in the U.S. has always been more complicated than black/white. The initial exclusionary laws concerning testimony in court, as mentioned earlier, grouped “blacks, mulattoes, and Native Americans.” The Chinese laborers brought to the West in the 1800’s had speciﬁc rulings and ideological justiﬁcations used against them, restricting their right not only to vote or own property but even to marry other Chinese. This latter ruling outlasted slavery and was justiﬁed by invoking images of Asian overpopulation. To avoid reproduction, Chinese women were allowed to come as prostitutes but not as wives, a restriction no other group faced. The Mexicans defeated in the Mexican–American War were portrayed as cruel and cowardly barbarians, and although the Treaty of Guadalupe–Hidalgo ratiﬁed in 1848 guaranteed the Mexicans who stayed in the U.S. full rights of citizenship, like the treaties with Native Americans neither local governments nor the federal courts upheld the Mexicans right to vote or respected the land deeds they held before the Treaty.18 By the time of the Spanish– American War of 1898 the image of barbarism used against Mexicans was consistently attributed to a Latin-Catholic heritage and expanded for use throughout Latin American and the Caribbean, thus subsequently affecting the immigrant populations coming from these countries as well as justifying U.S. claims of hegemony in the region.19 The so-called Zoot Suit riots in Los Angeles in 1943 targeted Mexicans and their ethnically speciﬁc style of dress. The attempts made to geographically sequester and also to forcibly and totally assimilate Native American groups were not experienced by any other group, and had their own ideological justiﬁcations that combined contradictory images of the Great Chain of Being with the romanticized Noble Savage. Native peoples were **represented as vanquished, disappearing, and thus of no account**. The paradigm of an antiblack racism intertwined with slavery does not help to illuminate these and other speciﬁc experiences of other nonwhite groups, where ideologies often relied on charges of evil, religious backwardness, horde mentalities, being a disappearing people, and other projections not used in regard to African Americans. **The hegemony of the black/white paradigm has stymied the development of an adequate account of the diverse racial realities in the U.S**., and weakened the general theories of racism which attempt to be truly inclusive. This has had a negative effect on our ability to develop effective solutions to the various forms racism can take, to make common cause against ethnic and race based forms of oppression and to create lasting coalitions, and has recently played a signiﬁcant role in the demise of afﬁrmative action. I will support these claims further in what follows.