A Choreographic Language for PRISM

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Abstract

- 5 This is the abstract
- 6 **2012 ACM Subject Classification** Theory of computation → Type theory; Computing methodologies
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1 Introduction

- 12 This is the introduction
- 13 Contributions and Overview. Our contributions can be categorised as follows:

14

The Prism Language

- 16 We start by describing the PRISM language syntax and semantics. To the best of our
- knowledge, the only formalisation of a semantics for PRISM can be found on the PRISM
- website [?]. Our approach starts from this and attempts to make more precise some informal
- 19 assumptions and definitions.
- Syntax. Let p range over a (possibly infinite) set of module names \mathcal{R} , a over a (possibly
- infinite) set of labels \mathcal{L} , x over a (possibly infinite) set of variables Var, and v over a (possibly
- 22 infinite) set of values Val. Then, the syntax of the PRISM language is given by the following
- 23 grammar:

$$(\text{Networks}) \qquad N, M \quad ::= \quad \mathbf{0} \qquad \qquad \text{empty network} \\ \mid \ \mathsf{p} : \{F_i\}_i \qquad \qquad \text{module} \\ \mid \ M \mid [A] \mid M \qquad \qquad \text{parallel composition} \\ \mid \ M/A \qquad \qquad \text{action hiding} \\ \mid \ \sigma M \qquad \qquad \text{substitution}$$

(Commands) $F ::= [a]g \to \Sigma_{i \in I} \{\lambda_i : u_i\}$ g is a boolean expression in E

(Assignment)
$$u ::= (x' = E)$$
 update x , element of \mathcal{V} , with E $A \& A$ multiple assignments

(Expr) $E ::= f(\tilde{E}) \mid x \mid v$

- Networks are the top syntactic category for system of modules composed together. The term
- o represent an empty network. A module is meant to represent a process running in the
- system, and is denoted by its variables and its commands. Formally, a module $p:\{F_i\}_i$ is
- identified by its name p and a set of commands F_i . Networks can be composed in parallel,
- in a CSP style: a term like $M_1|[A]|M_2$ says that networks M_1 and M_2 can interact with
- each other using labels in the finite set A. The term M/A is the standard CSP/CCS hiding

m:2 A Choreographic Language for PRISM

operator. Finally σM is equivalent to applying the substitution σ to all variables in x. A substitution is a function that given a variable returns a value. When we write σN we refer to the term obtained by replacing every free variable x in N with $\sigma(x)$. Marco: Is this really the way substitution is used? Where does it become important? Commands in a module have the form $[a]g \to \Sigma_{i\in I}\{\lambda_i:u_i\}$. The label a is used for synchronisation (it is a condition that allows the command to be executed when all other modules having a command on the same label also execute). The term g is a guard on the current variable state. If both label and the guards are enabled, then the command executes in a probabilistic way one of the branches. Depending on the model we are going to use, the value λ_j is either a real number representing a rate (when adapting an exponential distribution) or a probability. If we are using probabilities, then we assume that terms in every choice are such that the sum of the probabilities is equal to 1.

Semantics. In order to give a probabilistic semantics to PRISM, we have two possibilities:
we can either proceed denotationally, following the approach given on the PRISM website [?]
or define an operational semantics in the style of Plotkin [?] and Bookes et al. [?]. Since the
semantics of the choreographic language we present is purely operational, we will opt for the
second choice.

[HERE WE NEED FORMAL DEFINITIONS OF TRANSITION SYSTEM, Markov Chain, etc. But perhaps not because of space reason we can just claim that our semeantics is a Markov chain/process/whatever]

▶ **Definition 1** (Discrete Time Markov Chain (DTMC)). A Discrete Time Markov Chain (DTMC) is a pair (S, P) where

S is a set of states

P: $S \times S \rightarrow [0,1]$ is the probability transition matrix such that, for all $s \in S$, $\sum_{s' \in S} P(s,s') = 1$.

▶ **Definition 2** (Continuous Time Markov Chain (CTMC)). A Continuous Time Markov Chain (DTMC) is a pair (S,R) where

S is a set of states

 $P: S \times S \to \mathbb{R}^{\geq 0}$ is the rate transition matrix.

We now define the operational semantics as the minimum relation \longrightarrow satisfying the

61 following rules:

$$\frac{[B \to \{\lambda_i : x_i = E_i\}_{i \in I} \in \{[M_j]\} \quad j \in \{1,2\}}{[B \to \{\lambda_i : x_i = E_i\}_{i \in I} \in \{[M_1][A]]M_2\}} \text{ (Par_1)}}{[B \to \{\lambda_i : x_i = E_i\}_{i \in I} \in \{[M_1][A]]M_2\}} \text{ (Par_2)}}$$

$$\frac{[a]E \to \{\lambda_i : x_i = E_i\}_{i \in I} \in \{[M_j]\} \quad a \not\in A \quad j \in \{1,2\}}{[a]E \to \{\lambda_i : x_i = E_i\}_{i \in I} \in \{[M_1][A]]M_2\}} \text{ (Par_2)}}{[B \to \{\lambda_i : x_i = E_i\}_{i \in I} \in \{[M_1]\} \quad [a]E' \to \{\lambda'_j : y_j = E'_j\}_{j \in J} \in \{[M_2]\} \quad a \in A}{[B \to \{C' \to \{\lambda_i * \lambda'_j : x_i = E_i \land y_j = E'_j\}_{i \in I, j \in J} \in \{[M_1][A]]M_2\}} \text{ (Par_3)}}$$

$$\frac{[B \to \{\lambda_j : x_i = E_i\}_{i \in I} \in \{[M]\} \quad (Hide_1)}{[B \to \{\lambda_j : x_i = E_i\}_{i \in I} \in \{[M]\} \quad a \not\in A} \text{ (Hide_2)}}{[a]E \to \{\lambda_j : x_i = E_i\}_{i \in I} \in \{[M]\} \quad a \in A} \text{ (Hide_3)}}$$

$$\frac{[a]E \to \{\lambda_j : x_i = E_i\}_{i \in I} \in \{[M]\} \quad a \in A}{[B \to \{\lambda_j : x_i = E_i\}_{i \in I} \in \{[M]\} \quad a \not\in dom(\sigma)}} \text{ (Subst_1)}}{[B \to \{\lambda_j : x_i = E_i\}_{i \in I} \in \{[M]\} \quad a \in dom(\sigma)}} \text{ (Subst_2)}$$

$$\frac{[a]E \to \{\lambda_j : x_i = E_i\}_{i \in I} \in \{[M]\} \quad a \in dom(\sigma)}{[a]E \to \{\lambda_j : x_i = E_i\}_{i \in I} \in \{[M]\} \quad a \in dom(\sigma)}} \text{ (Subst_3)}$$

3 Choreographic Language

We now give syntax and semantics for our choreographic language. **Syntax.** Our choreographic language is defined by the following syntax:

(Chor)
$$C ::= \mathsf{p} \to \{\mathsf{p}_1,\ldots,\mathsf{p}_n\} \Sigma_{j\in J} \lambda_j : x_j = E_j; \ C_j \mid \text{ if } E@\mathsf{p} \text{ then } C_1 \text{ else } C_2 \mid X \mid \mathbf{0} \in \mathbb{C}$$

We comment the various constructs. The syntactic category C denotes choreographic programmes. The term $\mathbf{p} \to \{\mathbf{p}_1,\dots,\mathbf{p}_n\} \Sigma \{\lambda_j: x_j = E_j; C_j\}_{j \in J}$ denotes an interaction initiated by role \mathbf{p} with roles \mathbf{p}_i . Unlike in PRISM, a choreography specifies what interaction must be executed next, shifting the focus from what can happen to what must happen. When the synchronisation happens then, in a probabilistic way, one of the branches is selected as a continuation. The term if $E@\mathbf{p}$ then C_1 else C_2 factors in some local choices for some particular roles. [write a bit more about procedure calls, recursion and the zero process]

Semantics. Similarly to how we did for the PRISM language, we consider the state space Valⁿ where n is the number of variables present in the choreography. We then inductively define the transition function for the state space as follows:

$$\begin{split} &(\sigma,\mathsf{p}\to\{\mathsf{p}_1,\ldots,\mathsf{p}_n\}\,\Sigma_{j\in J}\lambda_j:x_j\!=\!E_j;\ C_j)\ \longrightarrow_{\lambda_j}\ (\sigma[\sigma(E_j)/x_j],C_j)\\ &(\sigma,\mathsf{if}\ E@\mathsf{p}\ \mathsf{then}\ C_1\ \mathsf{else}\ C_2)\ \longrightarrow\ (\sigma,C_1)\\ &X\stackrel{\mathsf{def}}{=} C\ \ \Rightarrow\ \ (\sigma,X)\ \longrightarrow\ (\sigma,C) \end{split}$$

From the transition relation above, we can immediately define an LTS on the state space.

Given an initial state σ_0 and a choreography C, the LTS is given by all the states reachable

from the pair (σ_0, C) . I.e., for all derivations $(\sigma_0, C) \longrightarrow_{\lambda_0} \ldots \longrightarrow_{\lambda_n} (\sigma_n, C_n)$ and i < n,

we have that $(\sigma_i, \sigma_{i+1}) \in \delta$ [adjust once the definition of probabilistic LTS is in].

3.1 Projection from Choreographies to PRISM

- 83 Mapping Choreographies to PRISM. We need to run some standard static checks
- because, since there is branching, some terms may not be projectable.

$$\begin{array}{l} \big(q \in \{\mathsf{p},\mathsf{p}_1,\ldots,\mathsf{p}_n\}, J = \{1,2\},\ l_1,l_2 \text{ fresh}\big) \\ \mathsf{proj}(q,\mathsf{p} \to \{\mathsf{p}_1,\ldots,\mathsf{p}_n\} \sum_{j \in J} \lambda_j : x_j = E_j;\ C_j,s) = \\ \big\{[l_1]s_{\mathsf{p}_1} = s \to \lambda_1 : s_{\mathsf{p}_1} = s_{\mathsf{p}_1} + 1,\ [l_2]s_{\mathsf{p}_1} = s \to \lambda_2 : s_{\mathsf{p}_1} = s_{\mathsf{p}_1} + 2\} & \cup \\ \mathsf{proj}(\mathsf{p}_1,C_1,s+1) & \cup & \mathsf{proj}(\mathsf{p}_1,C_2,s+\mathsf{nodes}(C_1)) \\ \big(q \notin \{\mathsf{p},\mathsf{p}_1,\ldots,\mathsf{p}_n\}\big) \\ \mathsf{proj}(q,\mathsf{p} \to \{\mathsf{p}_1,\ldots,\mathsf{p}_n\} \sum_{j \in J} \lambda_j : x_j = E_j;\ C_j,s) & = \mathsf{proj}(\mathsf{p}_1,C_1,s) \ \cup \ \mathsf{proj}(\mathsf{p}_1,C_2,s+\mathsf{nodes}(C_1)) \\ \big(q = \mathsf{p}\big) \\ \mathsf{proj}(q,\mathsf{if}\ E@\mathsf{p}\ \mathsf{then}\ C_1\ \mathsf{else}\ C_2,s) & = \\ \big\{[]s_{\mathsf{p}_1} = s\&E \to \sum_{i \in I} \{\lambda_i ::_i\} s_{\mathsf{p}_1} = s_{\mathsf{p}_1} + 1, []s_{\mathsf{p}_1} = s\&\mathsf{not}(E) \to \sum_{i \in I} \{\lambda_i ::_i\} s_{\mathsf{p}_1} = s_{\mathsf{p}_1} + 1\} \\ & \mathsf{proj}(\mathsf{p}_1,C_1,s+1) \quad \cup \quad \mathsf{proj}(\mathsf{p}_1,C_2,s+\mathsf{nodes}(C_1)) \\ \end{array} \right.$$

4 Tests


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In this section we present our experimental evaluation of our language. We focus on four benchmarks: the dice program and the random graphs protocol that we compare with the test cases reported in the PRISM repository¹; the Bitcoin proof of work protocol and the Hybrid Casper protocol, presented in [2, 4].

91 4.1 The Dice Program

The first test case we focus on the Dice $Program^2[5]$. The following program models a die using only fair coins. Starting at the root vertex (state s_0), one repeatedly tosses a coin. Every time heads appears, one takes the upper branch and when tails appears, the lower branch. This continues until the value of the die is decided.

In Listing 1, we report the modelled program using the choreographic language while in Listing 2 the generated PRISM program is shown.



```
102
      preamble
103
      "dtmc"
104
      endpreamble
105
106
      n = 1;
107
108
      Dice \rightarrow Dice : "d : [0..6] init 0;";
109
110
111
      {\tt DiceProtocol}_0 \;\coloneqq\; {\tt Dice} \;\to\; {\tt Dice} \;:\; (\texttt{+["0.5*1"] " "\&\&" " . DiceProtocol}_1
112
                                                 +["0.5*1"] " "&&" " . DiceProtocol<sub>2</sub>)
113
114
      \mathsf{DiceProtocol}_1 \coloneqq \mathsf{Dice} \to \mathsf{Dice} : (+["0.5*1"] " "&&" "
115
                                  Dice \rightarrow Dice : (+["0.5*1"] " "&&" " . DiceProtocol_1
116
                                                      +["0.5*1"] "(d'=1)"&&" " . DiceProtocol3)
117
                                               +["0.5*1"] " "&&" "
118
                                  Dice \rightarrow Dice : (+["0.5*1"] "(d'=2)"&&" " . DiceProtocol_3
119
                                                       +["0.5*1"] "(d'=3)"&&" " . DiceProtocol3))
120
121
      {\tt DiceProtocol}_2 := {\tt Dice} \, 	o \, {\tt Dice} \, : \, (+["0.5*1"] \; " \; "&&" \; " \; .
122
                                  Dice \rightarrow Dice : (+["0.5*1"] " "&&" " . DiceProtocol_2
123
                                                      +["0.5*1"] "(d'=4)"\&\&" " . DiceProtocol_3)
124
                                             +["0.5*1"] " "&&" "
                                  Dice \rightarrow Dice : (+["0.5*1"] "(d'=5)"&&" " . DiceProtocol_3
                                                     +["0.5*1"] "(d'=6)"&&" " . DiceProtocol3))
128
     DiceProtocol_3 := Dice \rightarrow Dice : (["1*1"] " "&&" ".DiceProtocol_3)
129
     }
130
```

https://www.prismmodelchecker.org/casestudies/

 $^{^2}$ https://www.prismmodelchecker.org/casestudies/dice.php

Listing 1 Choreographic language for the Dice Program.

```
dtmc
133
134
     module Dice
135
              Dice : [0..11] init 0;
136
              d : [0..6] init 0;
137
138
                 (Dice=0) \rightarrow 0.5 : (Dice'=2) + 0.5 : (Dice'=6);
139
140
                 (Dice=2) \rightarrow 0.5 : (Dice'=3) + 0.5 : (Dice'=4);
                 (Dice=3) \rightarrow 0.5 : (Dice'=2) + 0.5 : (d'=1)&(Dice'=10);
141
                 (Dice=4) \rightarrow 0.5 : (d'=2)&(Dice'=10) + 0.5 : (d'=3)&(Dice'=10);
142
              Г٦
                 (Dice=6) \rightarrow 0.5 : (Dice'=7) + 0.5 : (Dice'=8);
143
                 (Dice=7) \rightarrow 0.5 : (Dice'=6) + 0.5 : (d'=4)&(Dice'=10);
144
              [] (Dice=8) \rightarrow 0.5 : (d'=5)&(Dice'=10) + 0.5 : (d'=6)&(Dice'=10);
145
              [] (Dice=10) \rightarrow 1 : (Dice'=10);
146
147
     endmodule
148
```

Listing 2 Generated PRISM program for the Dice Program.

By comparing our model with the one presented in the PRISM documentation, we notice that the difference is the number assumed by the variable Dice. In particular, the variable assumes different values and this is due to how the generation in presence of a branch is done. However, this does not cause any problems since the updates are done correctly and the states are unique. Moreover, to prove the generated program is correct, we show that the probability of reaching a state where

$$d=k \text{ for } k = 1, \dots, 6 \text{ is } 1/6.$$

The results are displayed in Figure 1, where we compare the probability we obtain with our generated model and the one obtained with the original PRISM model. As expected, the results are equivalent.




Figure 1 Probability of reaching a state where d = k, for k = 1, ..., 6.

4.2 Proof of Work Bitcoin Protocol

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
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In [2], the authors decided to extend the PRISM model checker with dynamic data types in order to model the Proof of Work protocol implemented in the Bitcoin blockchain [6].

The Bitcoin system is the result of the parallel composition of n Miner processes, n Hasher processes and a process called Network. In particular:

- The *Miner* processes model the blockchain mainers that create new blocks and add them to their local ledger;
- the *Hasher* processes model the attempts of the miners to solve the cryptopuzzle;
- the *Network* process model the broadcast communication among miners.

Since we are not interested in the properties obtained by analyzing the protocol, we decided to consider n = 4 miner and hasher processes; the model can be found in Listing 3.



```
168
    preamble
169
170
    endpreamble
171
    n = 4;
173
17
175
176
177
    PoW := Hasher[i] -> Miner[i] :
178
     (+["mR*hR[i]"] " "\&\&"(b[i]'=createB(b[i],B[i],c[i]))\&(c[i]'=c[i]+1)" \ .
179
            Miner[i] -> Network :
180
                    (["rB*1"] "(B[i]'=addBlock(B[i],b[i]))" &&
181
                    foreach(k != i) "(set[k]', =addBlockSet(set[k], b[i]))" @Network .PoW)
182
     +["lR*hR[i]"] " " && " " .
183
            if "!isEmpty(set[i])"@Miner[i] then {
184
                    ["r"] "(b[i]'=extractBlock(set[i]))"@Miner[i] .
185
                           Miner[i] -> Network :
186
                           (["1*1"] "(setMiner[i]' = addBlockSet(setMiner[i] , b[i]))"&&
187
                                → "(set[i]' = removeBlock(set[i],b[i]))" . PoW)
188
            }
189
            else{
190
                    if "canBeInserted(B[i],b[i])"@Miner[i] then {
191
                            ["1"] "(B[i]'=addBlock(B[i],b[i]))&&(setMiner[i]'=removeBlock
192
                                193
                    }
194
                    else{
195
                           PoW
196
                    }
            }
199
    }
200
```

Listing 3 Choreographic language for the Proof of Work Bitcoin Protocol.

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Part of the generated PRISM code is shown in Listing 4, the modules Miner₂, Miner₃, $Miner_4$ and $Hasher_2$, $Hasher_3$, $Hasher_4$ are equivalent to $Miner_1$ and $Hasher_1$, respectively. Our generated PRISM model is more verbose than the one presented in [2], this is due to the fact that for the if-then-else expression, we always generate the else branch. and this leads to having more instructions

```
207
208
209
     module Miner1
210
        Miner1 : [0..7] init 0;
        b1 : block {m1,0;genesis,0} ;
212
        B1 : blockchain [{genesis,0;genesis,0}];
213
        c1 : [0..N] init 0;
214
        setMiner1 : list [];
215
216
         [PZKYT] (Miner1=0) \rightarrow hR1 : (b1'=createB(b1,B1,c1))&(c1'=c1+1)&(Miner1'=1);
217
         [EUBVP] (Miner1=0) \rightarrow hR1 : (Miner1'=2);
218
         [HXYKO] (Miner1=1) \rightarrow 1 : (B1'=addBlock(B1,b1))&(Miner1'=0);
219
         \label{eq:miner1} \begin{tabular}{ll} \begin{tabular}{ll} (Miner1=2) \& !isEmpty(set1) & r : (b1'=extractBlock(set1)) \& (Miner1'=4); \end{tabular}
220
221
         [SRKSV] (Miner1=4) \rightarrow 1 : (setMiner1' = addBlockSet(setMiner1 , b1))&(Miner1'=0)
              \hookrightarrow ;
222
         [] (Miner1=2)\&!(!isEmpty(set1)) \rightarrow 1 : (Miner1'=5);
223
         [] (Miner1=5)&canBeInserted(B1,b1) \rightarrow 1 : (B1'=addBlock(B1,b1))&(setMiner1'=

→ removeBlock(setMiner1,b1))&(Miner1'=0);
225
         [] (Miner1=5)&!(canBeInserted(B1,b1)) \rightarrow 1 : (Miner1'=0);
226
227
     endmodule
228
229
     module Network
230
     Network : [0..1] init 0;
231
        set1 : list [];
232
233
         [HXYKO] (Network=0) \rightarrow 1 : (set2'=addBlockSet(set2,b2))&(set3'=addBlockSet(set3,
235
236
              \rightarrow b3))&(set4'=addBlockSet(set4,b4))&(Network'=0);
         [SRKSV] (Network=0) \rightarrow 1 : (set1' = removeBlock(set1,b1))&(Network'=0);
237
238
239
     endmodule
240
241
     module Hasher1
242
     Hasher1 : [0..1] init 0;
243
244
     [PZKYT] (Hasher1=0) \rightarrow mR : (Hasher1'=0);
245
     [EUBVP] (Hasher1=0) \rightarrow 1R : (Hasher1'=0);
246
     endmodule
248
```

Listing 4 Generated PRISM program for the Peer-To-Peer Protocol.

However, for this particular test case, the results of the experiments are not affected, as shown Figure 2 where the results are compared. In this example, since we are comparing the results of two simulations, the two probabilities are slightly different, but it has nothing to do with the model itself.





Figure 2 Probability at least one miner has created a block.

4.3 Hybrid Casper Protocol



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The last case we study we present is the Hybrid Casper Protocol modelled in PRISM in [4]. The Hybrid Capser protocol is an hybrid blockchain consenus protocol that includes features of the Proof of Work and the Proof of Stake protocols. It was implemented in the Ethereum blockchain [3] as a testing phase before switching to Proof of Stake protocol.

The approach is very similat to the one used for the Proof of Work Bitcoin protocol, so they model Hybrid Casper in PRISM as the parallel composition of n Validator modules

and the module Vote_Manager and Network. The module Validator is very similar to the module Miner of the previous protocol and the only module that requires an explaination is the Vote_Manager that stores the tables containing the votes for each checkpoint and calculates the rewards/penalties.

The modeling language is reported in Listing 5 while (part of) the generated PRISM code can be found in Listing 6.

```
270
     preamble
271
272
     endpreamble
273
    n = 5;
274
275
     {
276
     PoS := Validator[i] -> Validator[i] :
277
        (+["mR*1"] "(b[i]'=createB(b[i],L[i],c[i]))&(c[i]'=c[i]+1)"&&" "
27
      if "!(mod(getHeight(b[i]),EpochSize)=0)"@Validator[i] then{
279
          Validator[i] -> Network : (["1*1"] "(L[i]'=addBlock(L[i],b[i]))" && foreach(k
28

→ !=i) "(set[k]'=addBlockSet(set[k],b[i]))"@Network .PoS)
281
282
      else{
283
          Validator[i] -> Network : (["1*1"] "(L[i]'=addBlock(L[i],b[i]))" && foreach(k
284

→ !=i) "(set[k]'=addBlockSet(set[k],b[i]))"@Network . Validator[i] ->

285

→ Vote_Manager :(["1*1"] " "&&"(Votes'=addVote(Votes,b[i],stake[i]))".PoS

286
              \hookrightarrow ))
287
288
        +["lR*1"] " "&&" " . if "!isEmpty(set[i])"@Validator[i] then {
289
```

```
["1"] "(b[i]'=extractBlock(set[i]))"@Validator[i] .
290
           if "!canBeInserted(L[i],b[i])"@Validator[i] then {
291
               PoS
292
           }
293
           else{
294
          if "!(mod(getHeight(b[i]),EpochSize)=0)"@Validator[i] then {
295
            Validator[i] -> Network : (["1*1"] "(setMiner[i]' = addBlockSet(setMiner[i])
296

→ , b[i]))"&&"(set[i]' = removeBlock(set[i],b[i]))" . PoS)

297
          }
298
          else{
299
            Validator[i] -> Network : (["1*1"] "(setMiner[i]' = addBlockSet(setMiner[i]
300
                 → , b[i]))"&&"(set[i]' = removeBlock(set[i],b[i]))" . Validator[i] ->
301
                → Vote_Manager : (["1*1"] " "&&"(Votes'=addVote(Votes,b[i],stake[i]))
302
                → ".PoS ))
303
304
        }
305
      }
306
      else{PoS}
307
       +["rC*1"] "(lastCheck[i]'=extractCheckpoint(listCheckpoints[i],lastCheck[i]))&(
308
            → heightLast[i] '=getHeight(extractCheckpoint(listCheckpoints[i],lastCheck[i
309
            → ])))&(votes[i]'=calcVotes(Votes,extractCheckpoint(listCheckpoints[i],
310
            \hookrightarrow lastCheck[i])))"&&" " .
311
         if "(heightLast[i]=heightCheckpoint[i]+EpochSize)&(votes[i]>=2/3*tot_stake)"
312
313

→ @Validator[i] then{
           if "(heightLast[i]=heightCheckpoint[i]+EpochSize)"@Validator[i] then{
314
             ["1"] "(lastJ[i]'=b[i])&(L[i]'= updateHF(L[i],lastJ[i]))" @Validator[i].
315
                  → Validator[i]->Vote_Manager :(["1*1"]" "&&"(epoch'=height(lastF(L[i
316
                  → ]))&(Stakes'=addVote(Votes,b[i],stake[i]))".PoS)
317
318
           else{["1"] "(lastJ[i]'=b[i])"@Validator[i] . PoS}
319
320
         else{PoS}
321
322
    }
323
324
```

Listing 5 Choreographic language for the Hybrid Casper Protocol.

```
325
    module Validator1
326
327
328
        [] (Validator1=0) \rightarrow mR : (b1'=createB(b1,L1,c1))&(c1'=c1+1)&(Validator1'=1);
329
        [] (Validator1=0) \rightarrow 1R : (Validator1'=2);
330
        [] (Validator1=0)&(!isEmpty(listCheckpoints1)) \rightarrow
331
             rC : (lastCheck1'=extractCheckpoint(listCheckpoints1,lastCheck1))&(
332
                  → heightLast1'=getHeight(extractCheckpoint(listCheckpoints1,lastCheck1
333
                  → )))&(votes1'=calcVotes(Votes,extractCheckpoint(listCheckpoints1,
334

    lastCheck1)))&(Validator1'=3);
335
        [NGRDF] (Validator1=1) & ! (mod(getHeight(b1), EpochSize) = 0) \(\to 1\) : (L1'=addBlock(
336
             \hookrightarrow L1,b1))&(Validator1'=0);
337
        [] (Validator1=1)\&!(!(mod(getHeight(b1),EpochSize)=0)) \rightarrow 1 : (Validator1'=3);
338
        [PCRLD] (Validator1=1)&!(mod(getHeight(b1),EpochSize)=0) \rightarrow
339
             1 : (L1'=addBlock(L1,b1))&(Validator1'=4);
340
        [VSJBE] (Validator1=5) \rightarrow 1 : (Validator1'=0);
341
        [] (Validator1=2)&!isEmpty(set1) \rightarrow
342
```

```
1 : (b1'=extractBlock(set1))&(Validator1'=4);
        [] (Validator1=4)&!canBeInserted(L1,b1) → (Validator1'=0);
        [] (Validator1=4)&!(!canBeInserted(L1,b1)) \rightarrow 1 : (Validator1'=6);
345
        [MDDCF] (Validator1=6)&!(mod(getHeight(b1),EpochSize)=0) \rightarrow
346
             1 : (setMiner1' = addBlockSet(setMiner1 , b1))&(Validator1'=0);
347
        [] (Validator1=6)&!(!(mod(getHeight(b1),EpochSize)=0)) → 1 : (Validator1'=8);
348
        [IQVPA] (Validator1=6)&!(mod(getHeight(b1),EpochSize)=0) \rightarrow
349
             1 : (setMiner1' = addBlockSet(setMiner1 , b1))&(Validator1'=9);
350
        [IFNVZ] (Validator1=10) \rightarrow 1 : (Validator1'=0);
351
        [] (Validator1=2)&!(!isEmpty(set1)) \rightarrow 1 : (Validator1'=0);
352
        [] (Validator1=3)&(heightLast1=heightCheckpoint1+EpochSize)&(votes1>=2/3*
353
             \hookrightarrow tot_stake) \rightarrow (Validator1'=4);
35
        [] (Validator1=4)&(heightLast1=heightCheckpoint1+EpochSize) \rightarrow
355
             1 : (lastJ1'=b1)&(L1'= updateHF(L1,lastJ1))&(Validator1'=6);
356
        [EQCYO] (Validator1=6) \rightarrow 1 : (Validator1'=0);
357
        [] (Validator1=4)&!((heightLast1=heightCheckpoint1+EpochSize)) \rightarrow
358
             1 : (lastJ1'=b1)&(Validator1'=0);
359
        [] (Validator1=3)&!((heightLast1=heightCheckpoint1+EpochSize)&(votes1>=2/3*
360
             \hookrightarrow tot_stake)) \rightarrow 1 : (Validator1'=0);
361
     endmodule
362
363
     module Network
364
        Network : [0..1] init 0;
365
        set1 : list [];
        set2 : list [];
        set3 : list [];
        set4 : list [];
369
        set5 : list [];
370
371
        [NGRDF] (Network=0) \rightarrow
372
             1 : (set2'=addBlockSet(set2,b2))&(set3'=addBlockSet(set3,b3))&(set4'=
373

    addBlockSet(set4,b4))&(set5'=addBlockSet(set5,b5))&(Network'=0);
374
        [PCRLD] (Network=0) \rightarrow
375
             1 : (set2'=addBlockSet(set2,b2))&(set3'=addBlockSet(set3,b3))&(set4'=
376
                  \hookrightarrow addBlockSet(set4,b4))&(set5'=addBlockSet(set5,b5))&(Network'=0);
377
        [MDDCF] (Network=0) → 1 : (set1' = removeBlock(set1,b1))&(Network'=0);
378
        [IQVPA] (Network=0) \rightarrow 1 : (set1' = removeBlock(set1,b1))&(Network'=0);
379
380
     endmodule
381
382
     module Vote_Manager
383
        Vote Manager : [0..1] init 0;
384
        epoch : [0..10] init 0;
385
        Votes : hash[];
386
        tot_stake : [0..120000] init 50;
387
        stake1 : [0..N] init 10;
388
        stake2 : [0..N] init 10;
389
        stake3 : [0..N] init 10;
        stake4 : [0..N] init 10;
391
        stake5 : [0..N] init 10;
392
393
        [VSJBE] (Vote_Manager=0) \rightarrow
394
             1 : (Votes'=addVote(Votes,b1,stake1))&(Vote_Manager'=0);
395
396
     endmodule
397
```

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Listing 6 Generated PRISM program for the Hybrid Casper Protocol.

The code is very similar to the one presented in [4], the main difference is the fact that our generated model has more lines of code. This is due to the fact that there are some commands that can be merged, but the compiler is not able to do it automatically. This discrepancy between the two models can be observed also in the simulations, reported in Figure 3. Although the results are similar, PRISM takes 39.016 seconds to run the simulations for the generated model, instead of 22.051 seconds needed for the original model.




Figure 3 Probability that a block has been created.

4.4 Problems

While testing our choreographic language, we noticed that some of the case studies presented in the PRISM documentation [1] cannot be modeled by using our language. The reasons are various, in this section we try to outline the problems.

- Asynchronous Leader Election³: processes synchronize with the same label but the conditions are different. We include in our language the it-then-else statement but we do not allow the if-then (without the else). This is done because in this way, we do not incur in deadlock states.
- Probabilistic Broadcast Protocols⁴: also in this case, the problem are the labels of the synchronizations. In fact, all the processes synchronize with the same label on every actions. This is not possible in our language, since a label is unique for every synchronization between two (or more) processes.
- Cyclic Server Polling System⁵: in this model, the processes $station_i$ do two different things in the same state. More precicely, at the state 0 (s_i =0), the processes may synchronize with the process server or may change their state without any synchronization. In out language, this cannot be formalized since the synchronization is a branch action, so there should be another option with a synchronization.

³ https://www.prismmodelchecker.org/casestudies/asynchronous_leader.php

 $^{^4}$ https://www.prismmodelchecker.org/casestudies/prob_broadcast.php

⁵ https://www.prismmodelchecker.org/casestudies/polling.php

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m:14 A Choreographic Language for PRISM

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A denotational semantics for PRISM

We proceed by steps. First, we define $\{-\}$, as the closure of the following rules:

$$\frac{|E \to \{\lambda_i : x_i = E_i\}_{i \in I} \in \{[M_j]\} \quad j \in \{1,2\}}{|E \to \{\lambda_i : x_i = E_i\}_{i \in I} \in \{[M_1|[A]]M_2\}\}} \quad (\mathsf{Par}_1)}{|E \to \{\lambda_i : x_i = E_i\}_{i \in I} \in \{[M_j]\} \quad j \in \{1,2\}}} \quad (\mathsf{Par}_2)$$

$$\frac{[a]E \to \{\lambda_i : x_i = E_i\}_{i \in I} \in \{[M_j]\} \quad a \not\in A \quad j \in \{1,2\}}{|a]E \to \{\lambda_i : x_i = E_i\}_{i \in I} \in \{[M_1|[A]]M_2\}\}} \quad (\mathsf{Par}_2)}{|E \to \{\lambda_i : x_i = E_i\}_{i \in I} \in \{[M_1]\} \quad [a]E' \to \{\lambda'_j : y_j = E'_j\}_{j \in J} \in \{[M_2]\} \quad a \in A} \quad (\mathsf{Par}_3)}$$

$$\frac{[BE \to \{\lambda_j : x_i = E_i\}_{i \in I} \in \{[M]\} \quad (\mathsf{Hide}_1)}{|E \to \{\lambda_j : x_i = E_i\}_{i \in I} \in \{[M]\} \quad a \not\in A} \quad (\mathsf{Hide}_2)}{|a]E \to \{\lambda_j : x_i = E_i\}_{i \in I} \in \{[M]\} \quad a \in A} \quad (\mathsf{Hide}_3)$$

$$\frac{[a]E \to \{\lambda_j : x_i = E_i\}_{i \in I} \in \{[M]\} \quad a \in A}{|E \to \{\lambda_j : x_i = E_i\}_{i \in I} \in \{[M]\} \quad a \notin A} \quad (\mathsf{Subst}_1)$$

$$\frac{[a]E \to \{\lambda_j : x_i = E_i\}_{i \in I} \in \{[M]\} \quad a \notin \mathsf{dom}(\sigma)}{|a]E \to \{\lambda_j : x_i = E_i\}_{i \in I} \in \{[M]\} \quad a \notin \mathsf{dom}(\sigma)} \quad (\mathsf{Subst}_2)$$

$$\frac{[a]E \to \{\lambda_j : x_i = E_i\}_{i \in I} \in \{[M]\} \quad a \in \mathsf{dom}(\sigma)}{|a]E \to \{\lambda_j : x_i = E_i\}_{i \in I} \in \{[M]\} \quad a \in \mathsf{dom}(\sigma)} \quad (\mathsf{Subst}_2)$$

The rules above work with modules, parallel composition, name hiding, and substitution. The idea is that given a network, we wish to collect all those commands F that are contained in the network, independently from which module they are being executed in. Intuitively, we can regard $\{[N]\}$ as a set, where starting from all commands present in the syntax, we do some filtering and renaming, based on the structure of the network.

Now, given $\{[N]\}$, we define a transition system that shows how the system evolves. Let state be a function that given a variable in Var returns a value in Val. Then, given an initial state state_0 , we can define a transition system where each of node is a (different) state_1 function. Then, we can move from state_1 to state_2 .