# A Choreographic Language for PRISM

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**Abstract**

This is the abstract

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## 1 Formal Language

In this section, we provide the formal definition of our choreographic language as well as process algebra representing PRISM [**?**].

### 1.1 PRISM

We start by describing PRISM semantics. Except from transforming some informal text in precise rules, Our formalisation closely follows that found on the PRISM website [**?**].

**Syntax.** Let $\mathsf{p}$ range over a (possibly infinite) set of module names $\mathcal{R}$, $a$ over a (possibly infinite) set of labels $\mathcal{L}$, $x$ over a (possibly infinite) set of variables $\mathsf{Var}$, and $v$ over a (possibly infinite) set of values $\mathsf{Val}$. Then, the syntax of PRISM is given by the following grammar:

$$
\begin{array}{llcll}
\text{(Networks)} & N, M & ::= & \mathbf{0} & \text{empty network} \\
 & & \mid & \mathsf{p} : \{F_i\}_i & \text{module} \\
 & & \mid & M|[A]|M & \text{parallel composition} \\
 & & \mid & M/A & \text{action hiding} \\
 & & \mid & \sigma M & \text{substitution} \\
 & & & & \\
\text{(Commands)} & F & ::= & [a]g \to \Sigma_{i\in I}\{\lambda_i : u_i\} & g \text{ is a boolean expression in } E \\
 & & & & \\
\text{(Assignment)} & u & ::= & (x' = E) & \text{update } x\text{, element of } \mathcal{V}\text{, with } E \\
 & & \mid & A\&A & \text{multiple assignments} \\
\text{(Expr)} & E & ::= & f(\tilde{E}) \quad | \quad x \quad | \quad v &
\end{array}
$$

Networks are the top syntactic category for system of modules composed together. The term $CEnd$ represent an empty network. A module $\mathsf{p} : \{F_i\}_i$ is identified by its name $\mathsf{p}$ and a set of commands $F_i$. Networks can be composed in parallel, in a CSP style: a term like $M_1|[A]|M_2$ says that networks $M_1$ and $M_2$ can interact with each other using labels in the finite set $A$. The term $M/A$ is the standard CSP/CCS hiding operator. Finally $\sigma M$ is equivalent to applying the substitution $\sigma$ to all variables in $x$. A substitution is a function that given a variable returns a value. When we write $\sigma N$ we refer to the term obtained by replacing every free variable $x$ in $N$ with $\sigma(x)$. Marco: Is this really the way substitution is used? Where does it become important?

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**Semantics.** In order to give a probabilistic semantics to PRISM, we proceed by steps. First, we define $\{\![-]\!\}$, as the closure of the following rules:

$$\frac{}{F_i \in \{\![\mathsf{p} : \{F_i\}_i]\!\}}\ (\mathsf{Module}) \qquad \frac{[]E \to \{\lambda_i : x_i = E_i\}_{i\in I} \in \{\![M_j]\!\} \quad j \in \{1,2\}}{[]E \to \{\lambda_i : x_i = E_i\}_{i\in I} \in \{\![M_1|[A]|M_2]\!\}}\ (\mathsf{Par}_1)$$

$$\frac{[a]E \to \{\lambda_i : x_i = E_i\}_{i\in I} \in \{\![M_j]\!\} \quad a \notin A \quad j \in \{1,2\}}{[a]E \to \{\lambda_i : x_i = E_i\}_{i\in I} \in \{\![M_1|[A]|M_2]\!\}}\ (\mathsf{Par}_2)$$

$$\frac{[a]E \to \{\lambda_i : x_i = E_i\}_{i\in I} \in \{\![M_1]\!\} \quad [a]E' \to \{\lambda'_j : y_j = E'_j\}_{j\in J} \in \{\![M_2]\!\} \quad a \in A}{[]E \wedge E' \to \{\lambda_i * \lambda'_j : x_i = E_i \wedge y_j = E'_j\}_{i\in I, j\in J} \in \{\![M_1|[A]|M_2]\!\}}\ (\mathsf{Par}_3)$$

$$\frac{[]E \to \{\lambda_j : x_i = E_i\}_{i\in I} \in \{\![M]\!\}}{[]E \to \{\lambda_j : x_i = E_i\}_{i\in I} \in \{\![M/A]\!\}}\ (\mathsf{Hide}_1) \qquad \frac{[a]E \to \{\lambda_j : x_i = E_i\}_{i\in I} \in \{\![M]\!\} \quad a \notin A}{[a]E \to \{\lambda_j : x_i = E_i\}_{i\in I} \in \{\![M/A]\!\}}\ (\mathsf{Hide}_2)$$

$$\frac{[a]E \to \{\lambda_j : x_i = E_i\}_{i\in I} \in \{\![M]\!\} \quad a \in A}{[]E \to \{\lambda_j : x_i = E_i\}_{i\in I} \in \{\![M/A]\!\}}\ (\mathsf{Hide}_3) \qquad \frac{[]E \to \{\lambda_j : x_i = E_i\}_{i\in I} \in \{\![M]\!\}}{[]E \to \{\lambda_j : x_i = E_i\}_{i\in I} \in \{\![\sigma M]\!\}}\ (\mathsf{Subst}_1)$$

$$\frac{[a]E \to \{\lambda_j : x_i = E_i\}_{i\in I} \in \{\![M]\!\} \quad a \notin \mathsf{dom}(\sigma)}{[a]E \to \{\lambda_j : x_i = E_i\}_{i\in I} \in \{\![\sigma M]\!\}}\ (\mathsf{Subst}_2)$$

$$\frac{[a]E \to \{\lambda_j : x_i = E_i\}_{i\in I} \in \{\![M]\!\} \quad a \in \mathsf{dom}(\sigma)}{[\sigma a]E \to \{\lambda_j : x_i = E_i\}_{i\in I} \in \{\![\sigma M]\!\}}\ (\mathsf{Subst}_3)$$

The rules above work with modules, parallel composition, name hiding, and substitution. The idea is that given a network, we wish to collect all those commands $F$ that are contained in the network, independently from which module they are being executed in. Intuitively, we can regard $\{\![N]\!\}$ as a set, where starting from all commands present in the syntax, we do some filtering and renaming, based on the structure of the network.

Now, given $\{\![N]\!\}$, we define a transition system that shows how the system evolves. In order to do so, let $\mathsf{state}$ be a function that given a variable in $\mathsf{Var}$ returns a value in $\mathsf{Val}$. Then, given an initial state $\mathsf{state}_0$, we can define a transition system where each of node is a (different) $\mathsf{state}$ function. Then, we can move from $\mathsf{state}_1$ to $\mathsf{state}_2$ whenever

That means that ones we have a set of executable rules, we can start building a transition system. In order to do so, we

$$W(M) = \{F \mid F \in \{\![M]\!\}\}$$

$$X = \{x_1, \ldots, x_n\}$$

$$\sigma : X \to V$$

## 1.2 Choreographies

**Syntax.** Our choreographic language is defined by the following syntax:

$$(\text{Chor})\quad C \;::=\; \{\mathsf{p}_i\}_{i\in I} \;+\!\{\lambda_j : x_j = E_j;\; C_j\}_{j\in J} \;\mid\; \mathsf{if}\ E@\{\mathsf{p}_i\}_{i\in I}\ \mathsf{then}\ C_1\ \mathsf{else}\ C_2 \;\mid\; X \;\mid\; \mathbf{0}$$

We briefly comment the various constructs. The syntactic category $C$ denotes choreographic programmes. The term $\{\mathsf{p}_i\}_{i\in I} \;+\!\{\lambda_j : x_j = E_j;\; C_j\}_{j\in J}$ denotes an interaction between the roles $\mathsf{p}_i$. The value $\lambda_j$ is a real number representing the rate. ...

## 1.3 Projection from Choreographies to PRISM

**Mapping Choreographies to PRISM.** We need to run some standard static checks because, since there is branching, some terms may not be projectable.

$$f : C \longrightarrow \texttt{network} \longrightarrow \texttt{network} \qquad \texttt{network} : \mathcal{R} \longrightarrow \mathrm{Set}(F)$$

$$\begin{array}{l}
f\Big(\ \mathsf{p}_1 \longrightarrow \{\mathsf{p}_i\}_{i\in I} + \{\lambda_j : x_j = E_j : C_j\}_{j\in J}, \texttt{network}\Big)\\[1ex]
=\\[1ex]
\mathsf{label} = \texttt{newlabel}();\\
\mathsf{for}\ \mathsf{p}_k \in \textbf{roles}\{\\
\quad \mathsf{for}\ j \in J\{\\
\quad\quad \texttt{network} = \mathsf{add}(\mathsf{p}_k, [\mathsf{label}]s_{\mathsf{p}_k} = \texttt{state}(\mathsf{p}_k) \to\ \lambda_j : x_j = E_j\ \&\ s'_{\mathsf{p}_k} = \texttt{genNewState}(\mathsf{p}_k));\\
\quad \}\\
\}\\
\mathsf{for}\ j \in J\{\\
\quad \texttt{network} = f(C_j, \texttt{network});\\
\}\\
\mathsf{return}\ \texttt{network}
\end{array}$$

$$\begin{array}{l}
f\Big(\ \mathsf{if}\ E@\{\mathsf{p}_i\}_{i\in I}\ \mathsf{then}\ C_1\ \mathsf{else}\ C_2, \texttt{network}\Big)\\[1ex]
=\\[1ex]
\mathsf{for}\ \mathsf{p}_k \in \textbf{roles}\{\\
\quad \texttt{network} = \mathsf{add}(\mathsf{p}_k, [\,]s_{\mathsf{p}_k} = \texttt{state}(\mathsf{p}_k)\ \&\ f(E));\\
\quad \texttt{network} = f(C_1, \texttt{network});\\
\quad \texttt{network} = f(C_2, \texttt{network});\\
\}\\
\text{return}\ \texttt{network}
\end{array}$$

# 2 Tests

In this section we present our experimental evaluation of our language. We focus on four benchmarks: the dice program and the random graphs protocol that we compare with the test cases reported in the PRISM repository[1]; the Bitcoin proof of work protocol and the Hybrid Casper protocol, presented in [2, 4].

## 2.1 The Dice Program

The first test case we focus on the Dice Program[2][5]. The following program models a die using only fair coins. Starting at the root vertex (state $s_0$), one repeatedly tosses a coin. Every time heads appears, one takes the upper branch and when tails appears, the lower branch. This continues until the value of the die is decided.




In Listing 1, we report the modelled program using the choreographic language while in Listing 2 the generated PRISM program is shown.

```
preamble
"dtmc"
endpreamble

n = 1;
Dice → Dice : "d : [0..6] init 0;" ;

{
DiceProtocol_0 ≔ Dice → Dice : (+["0.5*1"] " "&&" " . DiceProtocol_1
                                +["0.5*1"] " "&&" " . DiceProtocol_2)

DiceProtocol_1 ≔ Dice → Dice : (+["0.5*1"] " "&&" " .
                     Dice → Dice : (+["0.5*1"] " "&&" " . DiceProtocol_1
                                   +["0.5*1"] "(d'=1)"&&" " . DiceProtocol_3)
                               +["0.5*1"] " "&&" " .
                     Dice → Dice : (+["0.5*1"] "(d'=2)"&&" " . DiceProtocol_3
                                    +["0.5*1"] "(d'=3)"&&" " . DiceProtocol_3))

DiceProtocol_2 ≔ Dice → Dice : (+["0.5*1"] " "&&" " .
                     Dice → Dice : (+["0.5*1"] " "&&" " . DiceProtocol_2
                                    +["0.5*1"] "(d'=4)"&&" " . DiceProtocol_3)
                             +["0.5*1"] " "&&" " .
                     Dice → Dice : (+["0.5*1"] "(d'=5)"&&" " . DiceProtocol_3
                                   +["0.5*1"] "(d'=6)"&&" " . DiceProtocol_3))

DiceProtocol_3 ≔ Dice → Dice : (["1*1"] " "&&" ".DiceProtocol_3)
}
```

**Listing 1** Choreographic language for the Dice Program.

[1] https://www.prismmodelchecker.org/casestudies/
[2] https://www.prismmodelchecker.org/casestudies/dice.php

```
dtmc

module Dice
        Dice : [0..11] init 0;
        d : [0..6] init 0;

        [] (Dice=0) → 0.5 : (Dice'=2) + 0.5 : (Dice'=6);
        [] (Dice=2) → 0.5 : (Dice'=3) + 0.5 : (Dice'=4);
        [] (Dice=3) → 0.5 : (Dice'=2) + 0.5 : (d'=1)&(Dice'=10);
        [] (Dice=4) → 0.5 : (d'=2)&(Dice'=10) + 0.5 : (d'=3)&(Dice'=10);
        [] (Dice=6) → 0.5 : (Dice'=7) + 0.5 : (Dice'=8);
        [] (Dice=7) → 0.5 : (Dice'=6) + 0.5 : (d'=4)&(Dice'=10);
        [] (Dice=8) → 0.5 : (d'=5)&(Dice'=10) + 0.5 : (d'=6)&(Dice'=10);
        [] (Dice=10) → 1 : (Dice'=10);

endmodule
```

**Listing 2** Generated PRISM program for the Dice Program.

By comparing our model with the one presented in the PRISM documentation, we notice that the difference is the number assumed by the variable `Dice`. In particular, the variable assumes different values and this is due to how the generation in presence of a branch is done. However, this does not cause any problems since the updates are done correctly and the states are unique. Moreover, to prove the generated program is correct, we show that the probability of reaching a state where

$$\texttt{d=k} \text{ for } \texttt{k} = 1, \ldots, 6 \text{ is } 1/6.$$

The results are displayed in Figure 1, where we compare the probability we obtain with our generated model and the one obtained with the original PRISM model. As expected, the results are equiivalent.




**Figure 1** Probability of reaching a state where $d = k$, for $k = 1, \ldots, 6$.

## 2.2 Random Graphs Protocol



The second case study we report is the random graphs protocol presented in the PRISM documentation[3]. It investigates the likelihood that a pair of nodes are connected in a random graph. More precisely, we take into account the the set of random graphs $G(n, p)$, i.e. the set of random graphs with $n$ nodes where the probability of there being an edge between any two nodes equals $p$.

The model is divided in two parts: at the beginning the random graph is built. Then the algorithm finds nodes that have a path to node 2 by searching for nodes for which one can reach (in one step) a node for which the existence of a path to node 2 has already been found.

The choreographic model is shown in Listing 3, while in Listing 4, we report only part of the generated PRISM module (the modules $M_2$, $M_3$ and $P_2$, $P_3$ are equivalent to, respectively, $M_1$ and $P_2$ and can be found in the repository[4]).

```
        preamble
"mdp"
"const double p;"
endpreamble

n = 3;

PC ->
PC : " ";

M[i] -> i in [1...n]
Module[i] : "varM[i] : bool;";

P[i] -> i in [1...n]
P[i] : "varP[i] : bool;";

{
GraphConnected0 :=
        PC -> M[i] : (+["1*p"] " "&&"(varM[i]'=true)". END
                      +["1*(1-p)"] " "&&"(varM[i]'=false)". END)
        PC -> P[i] : (+["1*p"] " "&&"(varP[i]'=true)" . END
                      +["1*(1-p)"] " "&&"(varP[i]'=false)".
                      if "(PC=6)&!varP[i]&((varP[i] & varM[i]) | (varM[i+1] & varP[
                          i+2])) "@P[i] then {
                                     ["1"]"(varP[i]'=true)"@P[i] . GraphConnected0
                      })
}
```

**Listing 3** Choreographic language for the Random Graphs Protocol.

```
mdp
const double p;
```

[3] https://www.prismmodelchecker.org/casestudies/graph_connected.php
[4] https://github.com/adeleveschetti/choreography-to-PRISM

```
module PC
   PC : [0..7] init 0;

   [DPPGR] (PC=0) → 1 : (PC'=1);
   [YCJJG] (PC=1) → 1 : (PC'=2);
   [TWGVA] (PC=2) → 1 : (PC'=3);
   [NODPZ] (PC=3) → 1 : (PC'=4);
   [FDALJ] (PC=4) → 1 : (PC'=5);
   [DCKXC] (PC=5) → 1 : (PC'=6);
endmodule

module M1
   M1 : [0..1] init 0;
   varM1 : bool;

   [DPPGR] (M1=0) → p :(varM1'=true)&(M1'=0) + (1-p) :(varM1'=false)&(M1'=0);
endmodule

...

module P1
   P1 : [0..3] init 0;
   varP1 : bool;

   [NODPZ] (P1=0) → p:(varP1'=true)&(P1'=0) + (1-p):(varP1'=false)&(P1'=0);
   [] (P1=0)&(PC=6)&!varP1&((varP1 & varM1) | (varM2& varP3))
                                → 1 : (varP1'=true)&(P1'=0);
endmodule
```

**Listing 4** Generated PRISM program for the Random Graphs Protocol.

The model is very similar to the one presented in the PRISM repository, the main difference is that we use state variables also for the modules $\mathtt{P}_i$ and $\mathtt{M}_i$, where in the original model they were not requires. However, this does not affect the behaviour of the model, as the reader can notice from the results of the probability that nodes 1 and 2 are connected showed in Figure 2.




**Figure 2** Probability that the nodes 1 and 2 are connected.

## 2.3 Proof of Work Bitcoin Protocol




In [2], the authors decided to extend the PRISM model checker with dynamic data types in order to model the Proof of Work protocol implemented in the Bitcoin blockchain [6].

The Bitcoin system is the result of the parallel composition of $n$ Miner processes, $n$ *Hasher* processes and a process called *Network*. In particular:

- The *Miner* processes model the blockchain mainers that create new blocks and add them to their local ledger;
- the *Hasher* processes model the attempts of the miners to solve the cryptopuzzle;
- the *Network* process model the broadcast communication among miners.

Since we are not interested in the properties obtained by analyzing the protocol, we decided to consider $n = 4$ miner and hasher processes; the model can be found in Listing 5.

```
preamble
"ctmc"
"const T"
"const double r = 1;"
"const double mR = 1/600;"
"const double lR = 1-mR;"
"const double hR1 = 0.25;"
"const double hR2 = 0.25;"
"const double hR3 = 0.25;"
"const double hR4 = 0.25;"
"const double rB = 1/12.6;"
"const int N = 100;"
endpreamble

n = 4;

Hasher[i] -> i in [1...n] ;

Miner[i] -> i in [1...n]
Miner[i] : "b[i] : block {m[i],0;genesis,0} ;", "B[i] : blockchain [{genesis,0;
    genesis,0}];" ,"c[i] : [0..N] init 0;", "setMiner[i] : list [];" ;

Network ->
Network : "set1 : list [];", "set2 : list [];", "set3 : list [];" , "set4 : list
    [];";

{
PoW := Hasher[i] → Miner[i] :
(+["mR*hR[i]"] " "&&"(b[i]'=createB(b[i],B[i],c[i]))&(c[i]'=c[i]+1)" .
       Miner[i] → Network :
              (["rB*1"] "(B[i]'=addBlock(B[i],b[i]))" &&
              foreach(k != i) "(set[k]'=addBlockSet(set[k],b[i]))" @Network .PoW)
 +["lR*hR[i]"] " " && " " .
       if "!isEmpty(set[i])"@Miner[i] then {
              ["r"] "(b[i]'=extractBlock(set[i]))"@Miner[i] .
                     Miner[i] → Network :
```

```
                        (["1*1"] "(setMiner[i]' = addBlockSet(setMiner[i] , b[i]))"
                            &&"(set[i]' = removeBlock(set[i],b[i]))" . PoW)
        }
        else{
                if "canBeInserted(B[i],b[i])"@Miner[i] then {
                        ["1"] "(B[i]'=addBlock(B[i],b[i]))
                        &(setMiner[i]'=removeBlock(setMiner[i],b[i]))"@Miner[i] . Pow
                }
                else{
                        PoW
                }
        }
)
}
```

**Listing 5** Choreographic language for the Proof of Work Bitcoin Protocol.

Part of the generated PRISM code is shown in Listing 6, the modules $Miner_2$, $Miner_3$, $Miner_4$ and $Hasher_2$, $Hasher_3$, $Hasher_4$ are equivalent to $Miner_1$ and $Hasher_1$, respectively. Our generated PRISM model is more verbose than the one presented in [2], this is due to the fact that for the `if-then-else` expression, we always generate the `else` branch. and this leads to having more instructions

```
ctmc
const T;
const double r = 1;
const double mR = 1/600;
const double lR = 1-mR;
const double hR1 = 0.25;
const double hR2 = 0.25;
const double hR3 = 0.25;
const double hR4 = 0.25;
const double rB = 1/12.6;
const int N = 100;

module Miner1
Miner1 : [0..7] init 0;
b1 : block {m1,0;genesis,0} ;
B1 : blockchain [{genesis,0;genesis,0}];
c1 : [0..N] init 0;
setMiner1 : list [];

[PZKYT] (Miner1=0) → hR1 : (b1'=createB(b1,B1,c1))&(c1'=c1+1)&(Miner1'=1);
[EUBVP] (Miner1=0) → hR1 : (Miner1'=2);
[HXYKO] (Miner1=1) → 1 : (B1'=addBlock(B1,b1))&(Miner1'=0);
[] (Miner1=2)&!isEmpty(set1) → r : (b1'=extractBlock(set1))&(Miner1'=4);
[SRKSV] (Miner1=4) → 1 : (setMiner1' = addBlockSet(setMiner1 , b1))&(Miner1'=0);
[] (Miner1=2)&!(!isEmpty(set1)) → 1 : (Miner1'=5);
[] (Miner1=5)&canBeInserted(B1,b1) → 1 : (B1'=addBlock(B1,b1))
                &(setMiner1'=removeBlock(setMiner1,b1))&(Miner1'=0);
[] (Miner1=5)&!(canBeInserted(B1,b1)) → 1 : (Miner1'=0);
endmodule
...
module Network
Network : [0..1] init 0;
```

```
set1 : list [];
...

[HXYKO] (Network=0) → 1 : (set2'=addBlockSet(set2,b2))&(set3'=addBlockSet(set3,b3
    ))&(set4'=addBlockSet(set4,b4))&(Network'=0);
[SRKSV] (Network=0) → 1 : (set1' = removeBlock(set1,b1))&(Network'=0);
...

endmodule

module Hasher1
Hasher1 : [0..1] init 0;

[PZKYT] (Hasher1=0) → mR : (Hasher1'=0);
[EUBVP] (Hasher1=0) → lR : (Hasher1'=0);

endmodule
```

**Listing 6** Generated PRISM program for the Peer-To-Peer Protocol.

However, for this particular test case, the results of the experiments are not affected, as shown Figure 3 where the results are compared. In this example, since we are comparing the results of two simulations, the two probabilities are slightly different, but it has nothing to do with the model itself.




**Figure 3** Probability at least one miner has created a block.

## 2.4 Hybrid Casper Protocol




The last case we study we present is the Hybrid Casper Protocol modelled in PRISM in [4]. The Hybrid Capser protocol is an hybrid blockchain consenus protocol that includes features of the Proof of Work and the Proof of Stake protocols. It was implemented in the Ethereum blockchain [3] as a testing phase before switching to Proof of Stake protocol.

The approach is very similat to the one used for the Proof of Work Bitcoin protocol, so they model Hybrid Casper in PRISM as the parallel composition of $n$ `Validator` modules and the modules `Vote_Manager` and `Network`. The module `Validator` is very similar to the module `Miner` of the previous protocol and the only module that requires an explaination is the `Vote_Manager` that stores the tables containing the votes for each checkpoint and calculates the rewards/penalties.

The modeling language is reported in Listing 7 while (part of) the generated PRISM code can be found in Listing 8.

```
preamble
"ctmc"
"const int EpochSize = 2;"
"const k = 1;"
"const double rMw = 1/12.6;"
"const epochs = 0;"
"const double T;"
"const int N = 100;"
"const double rC = 1/(14*EpochSize);"
"const double mR =1/14;"
"const double lR = 10;"
endpreamble

n = 5;

Validator[i] -> i in [1...n]
Validator[i] : "b[i] : block {m[i],0;genesis,0};", "lastJ[i] : block {m[i],0;
    genesis,0};", "L[i] : blockchain [{genesis,0;genesis,0}];", "c[i] : [0..N]
    init 0;", "setMiner[i] : list [];", "heightCheckpoint[i] : [0..N] init 0;", "
    heightLast[i] : [0..N] init 0;", "lastFinalized[i] : block {genesis,0;genesis
    ,0};", "lastJustified[i] : block {genesis,0;genesis,0};", "lastCheck[i] :
    block {genesis,0;genesis,0};", "votes[i] : [0..1000] init 0;", "
    listCheckpoints[i] : list [];";

Network ->
Network : "set1 : list [];", "set2 : list [];", "set3 : list [];" , "set4 : list
    [];" , "set5 : list [];";

Vote_Manager ->
Vote_Manager : "Votes : hash []; ", "tot_stake : [0..120000] init 50;", "stake1 :
    [0..N] init 10;", "stake2 : [0..N] init 10;", "stake3 : [0..N] init 10;", "
    stake4 : [0..N] init 10;", "stake5 : [0..N] init 10;";

{
PoS := Validator[i] -> Validator[i] :
       (+["mR*1"] "(b[i]'=createB(b[i],L[i],c[i]))&(c[i]'=c[i]+1)"&&" " .
           if "!(mod(getHeight(b[i]),EpochSize)=0)"@Validator[i] then{
                    Validator[i] -> Network : (["1*1"] "(L[i]'=addBlock(L[i],b[i
                        ]))" && foreach(k!=i) "(set[k]'=addBlockSet(set[k],b[i]))
                        "@Network .PoS)
               }
               else{
                    Validator[i] -> Network : (["1*1"] "(L[i]'=addBlock(L[i],b[i
                        ]))" && foreach(k!=i) "(set[k]'=addBlockSet(set[k],b[i]))
                        "@Network.
                    Validator[i] -> Vote_Manager :(["1*1"] " "&&"(Votes'=addVote(
                        Votes,b[i],stake[i]))".PoS))
               }
        +["lR*1"] " "&&" " .
```

```
                    if "!isEmpty(set[i])"@Validator[i] then {
                            ["1"] "(b[i]'=extractBlock(set[i]))"@Validator[i] .
                                    if "!canBeInserted(L[i],b[i])"@Validator[i] then {
                                            PoS
                                    }
                                    else{
                                            if "!(mod(getHeight(b[i]),EpochSize)=0)"
                                                @Validator[i] then {
                                                    Validator[i] -> Network : (["1*1"] "(
                                                        setMiner[i]' = addBlockSet(setMiner
                                                        [i] , b[i]))"&&"(set[i]' =
                                                        removeBlock(set[i],b[i]))" . PoS)
                                            }
                                            else{
                                                    Validator[i] -> Network : (["1*1"] "(
                                                        setMiner[i]' = addBlockSet(setMiner
                                                        [i] , b[i]))"&&"(set[i]' =
                                                        removeBlock(set[i],b[i]))" .
                                                        Validator[i] -> Vote_Manager :
                                                        (["1*1"] " "&&"(Votes'=addVote(
                                                        Votes,b[i],stake[i]))".PoS ))
                                            }
                                    }
                    }
                    else{
                            PoS
                    }
          +["rC*1"] "(lastCheck[i]'=extractCheckpoint(listCheckpoints[i],lastCheck[i
               ]))&(heightLast[i]'=getHeight(extractCheckpoint(listCheckpoints[i],
               lastCheck[i])))&(votes[i]'=calcVotes(Votes,extractCheckpoint(
               listCheckpoints[i],lastCheck[i])))"&&" " .
                    if "(heightLast[i]=heightCheckpoint[i]+EpochSize)&(votes[i]>=2/3*
                         tot_stake)"@Validator[i] then{
                            if "(heightLast[i]=heightCheckpoint[i]+EpochSize)"@Validator[
                                 i] then{
                                    ["1"] "(lastJ[i]'=b[i])&(L[i]'= updateHF(L[i],lastJ[i
                                         ]))" @Validator[i].Validator[i]->Vote_Manager
                                         :(["1*1"]" "&&"(epoch'=height(lastF(L[i]))&(Stakes
                                         '=addVote(Votes,b[i],stake[i]))".PoS)
                            }
                            else{
                                    ["1"] "(lastJ[i]'=b[i])"@Validator[i] . PoS
                            }
                    }
                    else{
                            PoS
                    }
          )
}
```

**Listing 7** Choreographic language for the Hybrid Casper Protocol.

```
module Validator1
   ...
```

```
    [] (Validator1=0) → mR : (b1'=createB(b1,L1,c1))&(c1'=c1+1)&(Validator1'=1);
    [] (Validator1=0) → lR : (Validator1'=2);
    [] (Validator1=0)&(!isEmpty(listCheckpoints1)) →
        rC : (lastCheck1'=extractCheckpoint(listCheckpoints1,lastCheck1))&(
            heightLast1'=getHeight(extractCheckpoint(listCheckpoints1,lastCheck1)))
            &(votes1'=calcVotes(Votes,extractCheckpoint(listCheckpoints1,lastCheck1
            )))&(Validator1'=3);
    [NGRDF] (Validator1=1)&!(mod(getHeight(b1),EpochSize)=0) → 1 : (L1'=addBlock(
        L1,b1))&(Validator1'=0);
    [] (Validator1=1)&!(!(mod(getHeight(b1),EpochSize)=0)) → 1 : (Validator1'=3);
    [PCRLD] (Validator1=1)&!(mod(getHeight(b1),EpochSize)=0) →
        1 : (L1'=addBlock(L1,b1))&(Validator1'=4);
    [VSJBE] (Validator1=5) → 1 : (Validator1'=0);
    [] (Validator1=2)&!isEmpty(set1) →
        1 : (b1'=extractBlock(set1))&(Validator1'=4);
    [] (Validator1=4)&!canBeInserted(L1,b1) → (Validator1'=0);
    [] (Validator1=4)&!(!canBeInserted(L1,b1)) → 1 : (Validator1'=6);
    [MDDCF] (Validator1=6)&!(mod(getHeight(b1),EpochSize)=0) →
        1 : (setMiner1' = addBlockSet(setMiner1 , b1))&(Validator1'=0);
    [] (Validator1=6)&!(!(mod(getHeight(b1),EpochSize)=0)) → 1 : (Validator1'=8);
    [IQVPA] (Validator1=6)&!(mod(getHeight(b1),EpochSize)=0) →
        1 : (setMiner1' = addBlockSet(setMiner1 , b1))&(Validator1'=9);
    [IFNVZ] (Validator1=10) → 1 : (Validator1'=0);
    [] (Validator1=2)&!(!isEmpty(set1)) → 1 : (Validator1'=0);
    [] (Validator1=3)&(heightLast1=heightCheckpoint1+EpochSize)&(votes1>=2/3*
        tot_stake) → (Validator1'=4);
    [] (Validator1=4)&(heightLast1=heightCheckpoint1+EpochSize) →
        1 : (lastJ1'=b1)&(L1'= updateHF(L1,lastJ1))&(Validator1'=6);
    [EQCYO] (Validator1=6) → 1 : (Validator1'=0);
    [] (Validator1=4)&!((heightLast1=heightCheckpoint1+EpochSize)) →
        1 : (lastJ1'=b1)&(Validator1'=0);
    [] (Validator1=3)&!((heightLast1=heightCheckpoint1+EpochSize)&(votes1>=2/3*
        tot_stake)) → 1 : (Validator1'=0);
endmodule
...
module Network
   Network : [0..1] init 0;
   set1 : list [];
   set2 : list [];
   set3 : list [];
   set4 : list [];
   set5 : list [];

    [NGRDF] (Network=0) →
        1 : (set2'=addBlockSet(set2,b2))&(set3'=addBlockSet(set3,b3))&(set4'=
            addBlockSet(set4,b4))&(set5'=addBlockSet(set5,b5))&(Network'=0);
    [PCRLD] (Network=0) →
        1 : (set2'=addBlockSet(set2,b2))&(set3'=addBlockSet(set3,b3))&(set4'=
            addBlockSet(set4,b4))&(set5'=addBlockSet(set5,b5))&(Network'=0);
    [MDDCF] (Network=0) → 1 : (set1' = removeBlock(set1,b1))&(Network'=0);
    [IQVPA] (Network=0) → 1 : (set1' = removeBlock(set1,b1))&(Network'=0);
    ...
endmodule

module Vote_Manager
```

```
    Vote_Manager : [0..1] init 0;
    epoch : [0..10] init 0;
    Votes : hash[];
    tot_stake : [0..120000] init 50;
    stake1 : [0..N] init 10;
    stake2 : [0..N] init 10;
    stake3 : [0..N] init 10;
    stake4 : [0..N] init 10;
    stake5 : [0..N] init 10;

    [VSJBE] (Vote_Manager=0) →
        1 : (Votes'=addVote(Votes,b1,stake1))&(Vote_Manager'=0);
    ...
endmodule
```

**Listing 8** Generated PRISM program for the Hybrid Casper Protocol.

The code is very similar to the one presented in [4], the main difference is the fact that our generated model has more lines of code. This is due to the fact that there are some commands that can be merged, but the compiler is not able to do it automatically. This discrepancy between the two models can be observed also in the simulations, reported in Figure 4. Although the results are similar, PRISM takes 39.016 seconds to run the simulations for the generated model, instead of 22.051 seconds needed for the original model.




**Figure 4** Probability that a block has been created.

## 2.5 Problems

While testing our choreographic language, we noticed that some of the case studies presented in the PRISM documentation [1] cannot be modeled by using our language. The reasons are various, in this section we try to outline the problems.

- **Asynchronous Leader Election**[5]: processes synchronize with the same label but the conditions are different. We include in our language the `it-then-else` statement but we do not allow the `if-then` (without the `else`). This is done because in this way, we do not incur in deadlock states.

[5] `https://www.prismmodelchecker.org/casestudies/asynchronous_leader.php`

- **Probabilistic Broadcast Protocols**[6]: also in this case, the problem are the labels of the synchronizations. In fact, all the processes synchornize with the same label on every actions. This is not possible in our language, since a label is unique for every synchronization between two (or more) processes.
- **Cyclic Server Polling System**[7]: in this model, the processes $\texttt{station}_i$ do two different things in the same state. More precicely, at the state 0 ($\texttt{s}_i\texttt{=0}$), the processes may synchornize with the process `server` or may change their state without any synchronization. In out language, this cannot be formalized since the synchronization is a branch action, so there should be another option with a synchronization.

## References


1 Prism documentation. `https://www.prismmodelchecker.org/`. Accessed: 2023-09-05.

2 Stefano Bistarelli, Rocco De Nicola, Letterio Galletta, Cosimo Laneve, Ivan Mercanti, and Adele Veschetti. Stochastic modeling and analysis of the bitcoin protocol in the presence of block communication delays. *Concurr. Comput. Pract. Exp.*, 35(16), 2023. `doi:10.1002/cpe.6749`.

3 Vitalik Buterin. Ethereum white paper. `https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/White-Paper`, 2013.

4 Letterio Galletta, Cosimo Laneve, Ivan Mercanti, and Adele Veschetti. Resilience of hybrid casper under varying values of parameters. *Distributed Ledger Technol. Res. Pract.*, 2(1):5:1–5:25, 2023. `doi:10.1145/3571587`.

5 D. Knuth and A. Yao. *Algorithms and Complexity: New Directions and Recent Results*, chapter The complexity of nonuniform random number generation. Academic Press, 1976.

6 Satoshi Nakamoto. Bitcoin: A peer-to-peer electronic cash system. `https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf`, 2008.


[6] `https://www.prismmodelchecker.org/casestudies/prob_broadcast.php`
[7] `https://www.prismmodelchecker.org/casestudies/polling.php`