

Climate Change and the Common-Pool Problem in Fisheries

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This version: October 10, 2025
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Abstract

How significant is the common-pool problem in global fisheries, and how will it be affected by climate change? Many fisheries are not fully contained in a single country's Exclusive Economic Zone, and therefore face an international common-pool problem. As the ocean warms and acidifies, fishery ranges will shift and alter the distribution of populations across borders. This could lead to maladaptive overexploitation, but could also increase conservation by countries gaining control. I construct a panel of fishery ranges and estimate how fisheries extraction responds to the share of a stock in the given management area. My results show a large increase in extraction in response to a decrease in the share of a stock in a managed area, consistent with the theory that controlling a smaller share of a stock reduces incentives for conservation. I then simulate the effects of climate change on fisheries extraction using these empirically estimated responses. The behavioral response to climate change is close to zero on net, but stock-gainers increase escapement (the quantity of available fish *not* caught) by 1.6 million tons (2.6%) and stock-losers decrease escapement by 1.5 million tons (3%). For the average stock, this behavioral response is 25% of the total effect of climate change. I also simulate fisheries outcomes under global cooperative management, and find an 87 million ton (77%) increase in escapement. In a more plausible scenario of US-Canada cooperation, escapement increases by 14% and the effect of climate change is slightly damped.

*Department of Economics, Harvard, adeloerabrust@g.harvard.edu. I am grateful to Joe Aldy, Ed Glaeser, Wolfram Schlenker, Jim Stock, and Charles Taylor for invaluable guidance, as well as to colleagues and workshop participants at Harvard for their excellent feedback. This paper also greatly benefited from comments from participants at the CU Environmental and Resource Economics Workshop. I am grateful to Hunt Allcott, Chris Costello, Bard Harstad, Kimberly Oremus, Matt Reimer, and Jim Sanchirico for insightful conversations. Many thanks to Christopher Free, Kristin Kaschner, Gabriel Reygondeau, and Juliano Palacios Abrantes for helpful discussions on data and methodology. All errors are my own. I gratefully acknowledge support from the Chae Family Economics Research Fund and the NMFS-SeaGrant Fellowship.

1 Introduction

How severe is the international common-pool problem in fisheries? How will it be affected by climate change? Many fisheries cross international management boundaries and are targeted by several countries.¹ When countries do not reap the full benefits of conservation, they will extract more from the fishery. In this paper, I leverage variation in fish stock ranges to estimate the effect of international sharing on fisheries extraction. I show that a one standard deviation increase in the share of a stock under a country's control decreases the extraction rate by 72%.

Climate change could alter incentives for conservation by causing fish populations to move.² On one hand, range shifts could induce preemptive overfishing, move stocks into countries with worse management (see Figure 1), or even move stocks into the internationally open-access high seas.³ However, countries expecting to benefit from range shift could increase conservation, and poleward movement of stocks would on average move them towards countries with longer coastlines and larger Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) (see Figures 2 and 3).⁴ I predict future stock control under different climate scenarios, and apply my estimates of the effect of stock control to simulate the behavioral response to climate change. I find that stock shifts have close to zero effect on average, but create clear winners

¹Palacios-Abrantes et al. (2020a) finds that 67% of their sample of commercially valuable fisheries are shared between at least two Exclusive Economic Zones.

²As changing climate alters the environmental characteristics of the ocean, many species of fish have and will migrate to seek the environmental conditions they are adapted to (Cheung et al., 2010; Pinsky et al., 2013; Poloczanska et al., 2013; García Molinos et al., 2016; Hodapp et al., 2023). These are generally shifts towards the poles to maintain preferred temperatures (Dahms and Killen, 2023). Several papers in the scientific literature have already identified pronounced range shifts in particular fisheries (Dulvy et al., 2008; Pershing et al., 2015; Wernberg et al., 2016; Kleisner et al., 2017; Yang et al., 2022; Champion et al., 2022; Crear et al., 2023; DeFilippo et al., 2023; Sarre et al., 2024; Frawley et al., 2025). The effects of range shift are even detectable in catch data (Cheung et al., 2013).

³Several papers have discussed how range shift could worsen management of transboundary stocks, but have not empirically estimated the response (Pinsky et al., 2018; Spijkers et al., 2018; Palacios-Abrantes et al., 2020b; Gullestad et al., 2020; Oremus et al., 2020; Vogel et al., 2023). Palacios-Abrantes et al. (2025) predicts climate change will shift many stocks that straddle EEZs and the high seas further into the high seas.

⁴To my knowledge, the literature has not considered the possible strengthening of international property rights due to range shift. For example, Gaines et al. (2018) is the most sophisticated prediction of the interaction between climate change and management to date, but simply assumes that all shifting stocks would transition to open access if not managed cooperatively.

and losers. Management areas expecting to gain control of the stock will respond by increasing escapement (the quantity of available biomass *not* caught) by 2.6%, whereas areas expected to lose control of the stock will decrease escapement by 3%. These effects are on the same order of magnitude as the historic effects of warming on fisheries productivity.⁵ Naturally, the biophysical effects of climate change are also significant.⁶ Under a simple calibration, I find that, for the average stock, omitting the behavioral response to range shift would miss 27% of the total effect of climate change.

I begin with a theoretical model in which a fisheries manager observes the biomass of fish in their management area every period and decides how much to harvest. Their optimal strategy is to set an escapement rule: that is, set a quantity of fish they will *not* catch by equating the marginal profit of catching an additional fish today with the discounted marginal productivity of the fish stock, which accounts for both the marginal profit from the future stock, the discount rate, the growth rate of the stock, and a parameter capturing how much of the total fish stock is in the management area of the fisheries manager, which I call the **country share**. The model predicts that when a fisheries manager does not control the entire stock, their privately optimal escapement rule does not internalize the returns to fisheries productivity that accrue outside of the management area, leading to inefficiently low escapement. This in turn implies greater catch conditional on biomass and an unconditionally higher extraction rate.

Next, I take these predictions to the data and document the relationship between fish stock ranges and extraction from the fishery. The main dataset for this project comes from the RAM Legacy Stock Assessment Database (noa, 2024). The RAM Database is a collection of stock assessment results for many of the world's most important fisheries with

⁵From 1930 to 2010, oceanic warming has been estimated to decrease fisheries yields by 4.1% (Free et al., 2019).

⁶Climate change is expected to affect marine ecosystems in several ways. Ocean warming decreases fisheries biomass on average by reducing individual fish sizes and population growth (Pauly and Cheung, 2018). Increased carbon concentrations also have an independent negative impact on fisheries through ocean acidification (Branch et al., 2013). Free et al. (2019) finds variation in the effect of temperature on fisheries productivity.

high-quality stock assessment results (Ricard et al., 2012). I identify stocks with data on catch and biomass after 2000, and create an unbalanced panel of these for all available years between 2000 and 2024. Figure 4 shows a map of stocks by country. It shows that the US and Canada together make up a majority of the stocks in the dataset, with Europe and Japan accounting for another significant share. All together, there are 326 stocks, representing 168 unique species, from 44 countries. For each stock, I also identify the relevant area using the shapefiles from the RAM Legacy Stock Boundary Database (Free, 2023). From catch and biomass, I construct escapement as (biomass - catch) and the extraction rate as (catch/biomass). Due to differences in how biomass is measured for each stock, in the core empirical work I use normalized versions of these measures, dividing each observation by the stock level average. In addition to the RAM database, I also bring in variables from other sources. For each country, I assign a fishery management score from the Environmental Performance Index (Block et al., 2024), and for each country-year I assign the lending interest rate from the World Bank. For each stock, I assign whether it is multi-nationally managed, from the RAM database, and whether it is managed with Individual Transferable Quota, based on the database in Lynham (2014) augmented by manual assignment. For each species, I add whether the species is pelagic/highly migratory and the intrinsic growth rate, from FishBase (Froese and Pauly, 2025).

For each species in the panel, I identify its suitable environmental conditions along 7 environmental variables from AquaMaps (Kaschner et al., 2019). I then find annual rasters of those environmental variables from NOAA and Bio-ORACLE (Assis et al., 2024). Based on those values and the environmental preferences of each species, I create annual predictions of suitable ranges. These predictions are imperfect proxies of true habitat ranges, as other variables that affect the presence of a species are not included (e.g. predator/prey relationships, contiguity, etc). Environmental suitability is also not a perfect measure of species abundance—while I observe the biomass of a species *within* the management area from the RAM database, I do not observe the biomass outside of the management area and cannot

base my measure of stock control on that. However, the variables that predict suitability are plausibly exogenous with respect to fisheries management, whereas range predictions based on catch would be confounded by the exact incentives studied here. Therefore I view my suitability measure as an exogenous proxy for the realized distribution of the fish population. For each stock-year, I calculate the suitable range within a wide buffer of the stock shapefile. I then find how much of the total suitable range in the buffer area falls within the Exclusive Economic Zone of the managing country, and use that as a proxy for the country share.

My main empirical contribution is to estimate the effect of the country share on extraction. I use normalized escapement, extraction rate, and catch as my primary outcomes. In the cross section, my proxy for the country share is negatively correlated with the extraction rate and catch conditional on biomass and positively correlated with escapement conditional on biomass. In my primary specification, I regress these on my proxy for the country share, controlling for stock and year fixed effects to isolate year-to-year variation in the country share distinct from common shocks to all fisheries in a year or time-invariant features of a fishery. The regression results show that the country share has a significant effect on extraction: a one percentage point decrease in the country share decreases escapement by 1.5%, increases the extraction rate by 2.5%, and increases catch conditional on biomass by 2.3% of their respective averages. The same pattern of results holds for alternative specifications, including first differences, long differences, and trends-on-trends regressions.

Finally, I simulate what my empirical results imply for fisheries under a few counterfactuals. First, I consider what my results predict for future fisheries due to climate change. I begin by creating predicted suitability rasters following the same AquaMaps methodology, based on predicted environmental conditions under various Shared Socioeconomic Pathways. I then recompute the country shares, and find that the predicted changes in country shares range from large decreases (-0.19) to large increases (+0.155). However, the vast majority of changes are clustered around zero. The range of country share changes implies changes in escapement that range from 28.6% reductions to 23.3% increases, though for most stocks

the implied changes are small. While the average effect is small, gross gains and losses are meaningful relative to the historic effects of warming. A slight majority of EEZs with stocks in my sample are predicted to be property rights winners under climate change.⁷ As a result, total escapement is predicted to increase, accounting only for the behavioral response. I compare these results to the biophysical effects of climate change, where I draw on the Basin Model Hypothesis from MacCall (1990) to project the future carrying capacity of each species. I follow Gaines et al. (2018) and other papers in the scientific literature in assuming that the carrying capacity of each species will change proportionally with its total suitable range predicted by AquaMaps. I combine the changes in incentives and carrying capacity to estimate a combined effect of climate change, which predicts a 20% increase in escapement and biomass for the average stock. However, omitting the behavioral response to range shift (i.e. projecting future escapement using only the biophysical channel) leads to a 27% misstatement of the combined effect of climate change, for the average stock.

My second counterfactual considers the global gains from collaborative management, imagining that every country managed their fish stock according to the global optimum. Specifically, I simulate what escapement would be if every country set fisheries policy as if all country shares for all stocks were 1. In that scenario, I find stock level increases in escapement of 67% on average, with global escapement from fisheries in my sample increasing by 86.7 million tonnes (76.4%). In total, the effects of the static transboundary problem is significantly larger than the effects of climate change I estimate in the previous counterfactual. However, under a simulation of a perfect bilateral agreement between the US and Canada, where each country agrees to fully internalize the territory of their neighbor but nothing more, I find that escapement would only increase by 14% from fisheries in those countries. This implies bilateral agreements are far from sufficient to address the global common-pool problem in fisheries.

This paper contributes to several literatures in environmental economics. It contributes

⁷However, it should be noted that my sample includes mostly well managed, poleward fisheries, rather than the poorly managed tropical fisheries which are most likely to be damaged by climate change.

to the literature on adaptation to climate change by studying a case with potential for *maladaptation*. There is a long and growing literature on adaptation to climate, much of which has focused on food systems.⁸ In general, adaptation in these contexts is thought to be a declining responsiveness of the outcome to the relevant weather variables.⁹ In my setting that need not be the case—more awareness of the consequences of range shift could lead to more pronounced effects, for example. Another strand of literature looks at specific adaptive strategies.¹⁰ I look at a particular *maladaptive* strategy, that both involves endogenous policy and comes from a change in the very nature of the externality. There is also a growing literature on climate adaptation in fisheries specifically. One strand of literature focuses on the resilience of fishing and coastal communities to climate change.¹¹ Another strand of literature studies how fishing strategies respond to climate shocks.¹² This paper advances the

⁸Burke and Emerick (2016) is a notable early example of this literature assessing adaptation in agricultural production to increasing temperatures. Burke et al. (2024) expands that methodology to other domains like mortality, crime, and economic output. Hultgren et al. (2025) predicts the full impact of climate change in agriculture accounting for adaptation.

⁹Many of the seminal papers in this literature show that adaptation flattens the relationship between extreme heat and mortality (Barreca et al., 2016; Heutel et al., 2021; Carleton et al., 2022)

¹⁰Guo and Costello (2013) looks at the differing values of adaptation on different margins in forestry, finding that “intensive” margin adaptations, like changing crop rotation intervals, have little value whereas “extensive margin” adaptations, like crop choice, have large value. Moscona and Sastry (2022) and Moscona and Sastry (2023) look at innovation in crop varieties as an adaptive strategy with public good components. Bradt and Aldy (2025) examine levees as an adaptive strategy and find that they shift the losses of flooding from protected to unprotected areas. I similarly look at a particular adaptive strategy, and in a setting with potential for spillovers that lead to winners and losers. Two papers in this literature are most similar to this one: Taylor (2025) looks at agricultural adaptation to climate change through irrigation, identifying specific investments that can be made to reduce the private damages of future climate change. Due to common-pool groundwater sources, these responses can be maladaptive in similar ways to the strategies discussed in this paper. However, in my setting the common-pool dynamic is the fundamental force that is changing, and the linked relationship between consumption and growth for a biological renewable resource changes the nature of the externalities. Hsiao et al. (2024) studies the response of trade policy to climate shocks in agriculture, and finds that trade restrictions due to domestic political economy can increase the projected losses of climate change. This paper similarly studies endogenous policy responses to climate change, but in a setting where the externalities operate through production rather than trade.

¹¹Oremus (2019) shows that temperature variation lowers fishing employment in New England. Reimer et al. (2025) discusses how management can increase adaptability to future climate change. Sethi et al. (2014), Koss (2025), and Kim and Reimer (2025) consider how diversification across fisheries and industries can dampen the effects of climate and other fisheries shocks.

¹²Shrader (2023) studies how fishing decisions respond to forecasts of ENSO phenomenon, and what this implies for the value of forecasts as an adaptation tool. Costello and Collie (2025) presents a model of dynamic climate adaptation where fishermen observe a weather draw from a climate distribution, and then make extraction decisions given the known growth function. The model differentiates between adaptation to the climate distribution and adaptation to a given weather draw. This paper takes a similar perspective on modeling adaptation, letting fishery managers respond annually to new draws of a climate outcome: the

econometric literature on fisheries adaptation to include the empirically estimated response of fisheries management to climate shocks.

This paper also contributes to a long literature on the cross jurisdictional management of spillover externalities.¹³ This literature has historically exploited variation in jurisdictional coverage to estimate how outcomes respond to management incentives. My paper has the advantage of exploiting variation in the severity of the spillovers holding jurisdictional claims fixed.¹⁴ Finally, this paper contributes to the related literature on property rights security and common pool resources.¹⁵ The most similar paper to this one is Liu and Molina (2021), which looks at the severity of the transboundary problem and estimates the cross-sectional relationship between the distribution of a stock across countries and the extraction rates of those fisheries. In this paper I use within fishery variation to isolate the effect of trans-boundary sharing holding all other characteristics of the fishery constant. Another strand of fisheries economics considers the importance of property rights in fishing. Most of these papers estimate the effect of using property rights to allocate catch allowances within a fishery,¹⁶ but a few consider property rights security from an international perspective. Noack and Costello (2022) is the closest in perspective to this paper, as it treats the share of the a fish stock that falls within a management area can be seen as a proxy for property rights

share of recruitment biomass they will control next period.

¹³Lipscomb and Mobarak (2017) is perhaps the canonical paper in this literature, that looks at how the management of externalities responds to jurisdictional scale. It finds that county-splits in Brazil lead to greater water pollution, consistent with the hypothesis that managers do not fully internalize the effects of externalities outside their jurisdictions. He et al. (2020) find similar results in China. Fang et al. (2019), Heo et al. (2025), and Li (2025) find the same dynamic for air pollution.

¹⁴These kinds of species and ecosystem shifts are not unique to fisheries (Pecl et al., 2017). However, the international institutions, economic significance, and data availability make fisheries a natural place to study this more general phenomenon of bioeconomics.

¹⁵Although this literature arguably traces back to Gordon (1954) or even before, the most relevant literature begins with Gordon Munro's work analyzing the international sharing of fish stocks under the present regime of Exclusive Economic Zones of 200 nautical miles, beyond which there is an internationally open access high sea (Munro, 1979, 1990, 2007; Miller and Munro, 2004). Hannesson (2011) analyzes the game theory of shared fisheries in this kind of environment, and even considers how climate induced changes in sharing can affect conservation. Kaffine and Costello (2011) describes a model of optimal extraction that depends on the share of recruitment accruing to the regulator, much like mine. On the empirical side, McWhinnie (2009) demonstrated that fisheries shared by more countries were more likely to be overfished. Englander (2019) showed that the 200 nautical mile limit matters for conservation, but also that foreign fleets can and do fish significantly right outside of those boundaries.

¹⁶See, for example, Costello et al. (2008) and Isaksen and Richter (2019).

security in an international context. In contrast, this paper takes a dynamic view of property rights security and exploits variation within a fishery in the share that falls within a given EEZ.¹⁷ This paper also has implications for the nature of domestic regulations, however. In particular, it can inform the use of Territorial Use Rights Fisheries (TURFs), where associations of fishermen are given property rights over a certain area. While Wilen et al. (2012) suggests that area-based property rights have advantages over traditional species-based property rights, these must be carefully designed in light of species range shift, since these shifts can effectively weaken the property rights security of a TURF system. This paper is also related to the small, contested literature on the “blue paradox,” the possibility of overfishing in anticipation of conservation.¹⁸ My paper documents anticipatory overextraction, albeit not in response to conservation per se. However, from the perspective of the fishing industry in a given location, loss of stock access due to climate change may not differ greatly from loss of stock access due to a marine protected area.

Methodologically, I contribute to the growing literature using biological and ecological methods in economics. In particular, a subset of that literature has made great use of habitat suitability models to proxy for the presence of a species.¹⁹ The typical approach in this literature has been to treat suitability as static in a given location and use variation in that suitability and/or its interaction with a treatment variable to make inferences about the effects of ecological phenomena. I extend this approach by creating a panel dataset of suitability for 168 different species, exploiting variation in suitability within a given location.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a simple model of fisheries extraction as a function of the share of a fish population under the jurisdiction of the fishery

¹⁷Other papers in this literature, such as Costello and Grainger (2018), are also conceptually similar in their treatment of the fishery manager as a partially captured regulator who advances the interests of fishermen given their property rights. In this case, however, I study property rights security in an international sense rather than as a feature of domestic regulation.

¹⁸McDermott et al. (2018) introduces the blue paradox and provides evidence of preemptive overextraction from an area that would later become a marine reserve. However, Hanich et al. (2018) suggests this may be a spurious result due to the choice of control group.

¹⁹See, for example, Alsan (2015); Flückiger and Ludwig (2020); Taylor (2020); Druckenmiller (2020); Frank and Sudarshan (2024); Frank (2024); Frank et al. (2025)

manager (the country share). Section 3 describes the data I use to empirically validate the model, with special attention to how I construct my measure of the country share. Section 4 describes my empirical strategy and Section 5 presents the results. In Section 6 I present the simulated predictions for various climate change scenarios as well as a hypothetical global collaborative management scenario. Section 7 concludes.

2 Theory

This section presents a model where a country decides how to extract from a fish stock that is shared with another country. Each country controls the harvest from the population of fish within its own territory.²⁰ However, the two populations of fish are connected in terms of reproduction, so the growth of each population depends on the biomass in the other. The fishery manager in country A cares only about maximizing fishing profits in its territory, but the available population will depend in part on the actions of country B.

Let the biomass available to fish in country i in period t be $X_{i,t}$. Harvest in country i in period t is $H_{i,t} \in [0, X_{i,t}]$. Let $S_{i,t} = X_{i,t} - H_{i,t}$ be the escapement from country i in period t .

The growth of the biomass in country i in period $t + 1$ depends on the escapement in both countries, i and j :

$$X_{i,t+1} = \theta_{i,t}G(S_{i,t}) + (1 - \theta_{j,t})G(S_{j,t}) \quad (1)$$

where $G(\cdot)$ is a common growth function with $G'(\cdot) > 0$ and $G''(\cdot) < 0$ and $\theta_{i,t} \in [0, 1]$ is the share of the population originating in i in period t that will remain in i in period $t + 1$. I let this value change over time. I will refer to $\theta_{i,t}$ as the “stock share.”

Let the revenues from fishing be $pH_{i,t}$, where p is the price of fish, and the costs of fishing

²⁰Under international law, each country has exclusive jurisdiction over fish found in their Exclusive Economic Zone, an ocean region up to 200 nautical miles from their coast.

be $cH_{i,t}$, such that the marginal profit is constant at \tilde{p} .

The goal of fishery manager of i is to maximize the discounted sum of profits in i , subject to the growth constraints of the stock and the discount factor δ .

$$\max_{H_{i,t}} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \delta^t \tilde{p} H_{i,t} \quad \text{s.t.} \quad X_{i,t+1} = \theta_{i,t} G(S_{i,t}) + (1 - \theta_{j,t}) G(S_{j,t}) \quad (2)$$

This yields the following Bellman equation:

$$V_i(X_{i,t}, X_{j,t}) = \max_{H_{it}} \left[\underbrace{\tilde{p} H_{i,t}}_{\text{Current Profit}} + \delta V_i(\underbrace{X_{i,t+1}}_{\theta_{i,t} G(S_{i,t}) + (1 - \theta_{j,t}) G(S_{j,t})}, \underbrace{X_{j,t+1}}_{(1 - \theta_{i,t}) G(S_{i,t}) + \theta_{j,t} G(S_{j,t})}) \right] \quad (3)$$

The Bellman equation yields the following First Order Condition:

$$\tilde{p} = \delta \left[V_{i,t+1|X_i} \theta_{i,t} G'(S_{it}^*) + V_{i,t+1|X_j} (1 - \theta_i) G'(S_{i,t}^*) \right] \quad (4)$$

The envelope conditions are the following:

$$V_{i,t|X_i} = \delta G'(S_{i,t}) \left[\theta_{i,t} V_{i,t+1|X_i} + (1 - \theta_{i,t}) V_{i,t+1|X_j} \right] \quad (5)$$

$$V_{i,t|X_j} = \delta G'(S_{j,t}) \left[(1 - \theta_{j,t}) V_{i,t+1|X_i} + \theta_{j,t} V_{i,t+1|X_j} \right] \quad (6)$$

Combining the first order equation and the first envelope condition, we can retrieve that $V_{i,t|X_i} = \tilde{p}$. The value of $V_{i,t|X_j}$ depends on whether the biomass of the country j' is large enough in period t : if $X_{j,t} > S_{j,t}^*$, then $V_{i,t|X_j} = 0$, since the optimal strategy of the country j is to fish its biomass down to the same escapement target regardless of the initial endowment, and so any marginal increase in $X_{j,t+1}$ has no effect on the continuation value of i . This is the relevant case for my empirics, as I do not observe zero catch in my data.²¹ Therefore assume $X_{j,t} > S_{j,t}^*$ so that $V_{i,t|X_j} = 0$ along the path.

²¹Without this assumption, the optimal escapement in each period is a slightly more complicated function which tracks both continuation values, but is still increasing in $\theta_{i,t}$ *ceteris paribus*.

Then we can solve for the private period t target escapement:

$$\theta_{i,t} G'(S_{i,t}^*) = \frac{1}{\delta} \quad (7)$$

This is the familiar “fundamental equation of renewable resources,” stating that escapement should equalize the marginal return to fisheries productivity with the marginal return to present catch, and does not depend on prices or costs due to the constant marginal profits assumption.

Then the Harvest function is given by

$$H_{i,t}^* = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } X_{i,t} \in [0, S_{i,t}^*] \\ X_{i,t} - S_{i,t}^* & \text{if } X_{i,t} > S_{i,t}^* \end{cases} \quad (8)$$

Which states that if the stock is below the optimal escapement it should not be fished, and if the stock is above the optimum escapement it should be fished down to that level.²²

It is also useful to work with the extraction rate, (H_i/X_i) , which is the share of the available stock that is caught. The extraction rate is given by:

$$ER_{i,t}^* = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } X_{i,t} \in [0, S_{i,t}^*] \\ \frac{X_{i,t} - S_{i,t}^*}{X_i} & \text{if } X_{i,t} > S_{i,t}^* \end{cases} \quad (9)$$

In equilibrium, when both stocks are at their respective optima, we have

$$G'(S_{i,t}^*) = \frac{1}{\delta \theta_{i,t}} \quad (10)$$

$$H_{i,t}^* = \theta_{i,t} G(S_i^*) + (1 - \theta_{j,t}) G(S_j^*) - S_{i,t}^* \quad (11)$$

$$ER_{i,t}^* = 1 - \frac{S_i^*}{X_i^*} \quad (12)$$

²²Since country j 's optimal harvest function takes the same form, country i does not internalize any changes to X_j it makes if $X_j > S_j^*$ —these will simply be captured in full by country j .

From here we can derive the first proposition:

Proposition 1 *A lower stock share θ_i implies a lower privately optimal escapement S_i^* and biomass X_i^* , a higher harvest H_i^* conditional on biomass, and an unconditionally higher extraction rate ER_i^* .*

Equation 10 implicitly defines the optimal stock, and reveals that it is increasing in the stock share θ_i because the growth function $G()$ is increasing in X . Equation 8 shows that, for any given biomass X_i , the optimal harvest is greater if X_i^* is smaller. However, this does not imply that a lower stock share leads to greater harvest unconditionally, since it will involve lower steady state harvest once the lower optimal biomass has been reached. Meanwhile, Equations 9 and 12 show that a lower stock share implies a higher extraction rate both in steady state and along the transition path.

This model also has a straightforward way to characterize the welfare losses in the non-cooperative equilibrium.

In a cooperative equilibrium, each country would set

$$G'(S_i^o) = \frac{1}{\delta} \quad (13)$$

Which does not include $\theta_{i,t}$ because it is irrelevant to global welfare who the beneficiary of stock growth is.

Proposition 2 *The privately optimal escapement S_i^* is strictly lower than the globally optimal escapement S_i^o if $\theta_{i,t} < 1$ and the size of the welfare loss is larger the smaller $\theta_{i,t}$.*

3 Data

3.1 Outcomes

The core dataset on fisheries extraction for this project comes from the RAM Legacy Stock Assessment Database, a database of catch, biomass, and other stock assessment results

reported by fisheries managers around the world. These measurements apply to a specific managed population of a certain species (for example, Arrowtooth Flounder found in the Gulf of Alaska). For 326 stocks it is possible to construct a panel of both catch and biomass beginning in 2000, from which I can also construct escapement (biomass - catch) and the extraction rate (catch/biomass). However, it must be noted that the measurement of biomass differs across stocks: in some cases it is an estimate of the true underlying biomass, but in other cases it might be a subset like spawning biomass, or biomass of a certain age or size band. As a result, constructing escapement and the extraction rate does not always yield logical results, and in my main specifications I use a normalized version of each outcome to create comparable values across stocks. Specifically, I divide each observation by the stock level average for that variable so that my outcomes are defined as variations from that average. The stocks in the RAM database typically represent well-managed, data-rich fisheries, predominantly in the developed world. Figure 4 shows the count of stocks in the database found in each Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). In the latest year with price data available from The Sea Around Us, the catch from these fisheries was collectively worth over \$15 billion (Tai et al., 2017). This is just 23% of the \$68 billion in catch value in the Sea Around Us Database, and less than 10% of the \$159 billion valuation of catch from all global capture fisheries (Sampson, 2024). Figure 5 maps the average catch value of RAM stocks in each Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) using price data from the Sea Around Us Database (Pauly et al., 2020). I match each stock in the RAM Legacy Stock Assessment Database with its shapefile in the RAM Legacy Stock Boundary Database (Free, 2023). For example, Figure 9 shows the management area for *Sebastodes Elungatus*, the Greenstriped Rockfish, which has historically been found off the southern pacific coast of the United States. This shapefile captures the “management area” for that particular stock but does not necessarily capture its range in a given year. In the case of the Greenstriped Rockfish, the managed area ends at the boundary of the US EEZ, whereas the population has historically extended into Mexico.

3.2 Country Share

In order to measure the share of a population that is managed in one of the RAM fisheries, I construct a proxy for each species' annual habitat range based on the environmental preferences of the species and the environmental characteristics of that year. Following the methodology of AquaMaps, a database of marine species habitats and environmental envelopes, I construct an annual raster of habitat suitability for each species in the stock assessment database based on those environmental envelopes (Kaschner et al., 2019). For each of six environmental variables, AquaMaps records the minimum and maximum suitable and minimum and maximum preferred level for each species. The six environmental variables are Sea Temperatures, Salinity, Primary Productivity, Depth, Sea Ice Concentration and Dissolved Oxygen Concentration. The AquaMaps method assigns a simple suitability probability based on each variable: If the level is outside of the minimum and maximum suitable range, the probability for that variable is zero. If the level is within the minimum and maximum suitable, the probability for that variable is one. In between the suitable threshold and the preferred threshold, the probability rises or falls linearly between zero and one for that variable. Figure 6 shows a graphical representation of this approach. Finally, all of the relevant probabilities are multiplied together to generate a single raster of environmental suitability probability. Depending on the species' characteristics, only some environmental variables are used: for species with preferred depths below 200 meters, the bottom ocean temperature, bottom salinity, and bottom dissolved oxygen concentrations are used. For other species, sea surface temperatures and surface salinity are used, and dissolved oxygen is not (Kesner-Reyes et al., 2020). The method produces a species specific raster of environmental suitability for a given set of rasters of environmental variables.

I replicate the AquaMaps method annually, using annual Sea Surface Temperatures from NOAA, a static measure of depth from AquaMaps, and decadal values for ocean bottom temperatures, salinity, primary productivity, sea ice concentrations, and dissolved oxygen concentrations from the Bio-ORACLE database (Assis et al., 2024). This gives me a raster

of predicted suitability in each grid cell for every species in the stock assessment data and every year from 2000 to 2024. I also construct predicted suitability rasters for 2030, 2040, and 2050 using predicted environmental rasters from Bio-ORACLE. Figure 7 shows the distribution of predicted suitability for Greenstriped Rockfish in 2020.

The species ranges generated with the AquaMaps method must be interpreted with caution for several reasons. Firstly, the AquaMaps method has a tendency to overpredict the suitability of an area for a species regardless of whether the species can actually be found there. A location can be suitable based on the few environmental predictors covered here, but the species may not be present due to a lack of food sources, ecological niches, or population connectivity. For example, Greenstriped Rockfish is found exclusively on the South pacific coast of North America, but the AquaMaps method might output that the Northeast coast of North America would be a highly suitable location for it based on environmental factors alone. Figure 7 shows exactly that. Therefore, in my empirical analysis, I focus on variation in suitability in areas around each stock's known range. A second concern with the AquaMaps method is that the suitability probabilities it generates should not be viewed as measures of species abundance. Instead, they are measures of whether a given location is likely to be suitable for that species given the environmental variables. While this complicates the interpretation of static uses of the AquaMaps method, variation in the suitability measure can still capture the movement of stocks. For example, Oremus et al. (2020) uses AquaMaps' predicted suitability changes to forecast stock shifts in the tropics under climate change. Thirdly, it should be noted that the AquaMaps method was originally created and applied on data using the long-run average of environmental characteristics, rather than the year-to-year variations in environmental characteristics that I use here. Therefore, the ranges I compute should be seen as an imperfect proxy of true species ranges, and not a measure of the distribution of the actual stock. Nevertheless, the AquaMaps method is publicly disclosed and reproducible on public data, and thus constitutes the best proxy available. In particular, it is well suited for my purposes as long as the variation in the predicted suit-

ability probabilities is correlated with the location of the stock because my identification strategy will exploit year-to-year variation in the predicted suitabilities.

Specifically, I exploit year-to-year variation in predicted suitabilities in areas that are known to have the species present. For example Figure 10 shows the predicted suitability for Greenstriped Rockfish in 2000 and 2050 in Southern California. Comparing the two maps, one can see the suitable range is predicted to shift northward due to climate change, precisely in the area the species is known to live. Concretely, I combine the suitability probabilities that I generate with the AquaMaps method with the known species location from the RAM Legacy Stock Boundary Database. Figure 8 shows an example shapefile for the Southern California population of Greenstriped Rockfish. For each RAM shapefile, I construct a 300 nautical mile buffer area around the shapefile, which I consider the relevant area to look for shifts in suitability. Liu and Molina (2021) treats the RAM shapefiles as a measure of habitat range—for my purposes I use them as a starting point to look at variation around that region. 300 nautical miles is quite large relative to the average shapefile size, so this likely results in an overestimated area in consideration. However, 300 nautical miles guarantees that at least some sizable part of the area considered falls outside of the Exclusive Economic Zone of the country responsible for managing the population in the RAM Stock Assessment Database. I then divide the 300 nautical mile buffer area into two regions: the area that falls inside the Exclusive Economic Zone of the country managing the population in the dataset (the managed area), and the area that falls outside of that, whether it be in another country or in the high seas (the unmanaged area). Figure 9 shows the buffer area, highlighted in two different colors to represent the managed and unmanaged areas. Then I calculate the overlap between the suitable range and each of these areas. Figure 11 shows the overlap between the two areas in the buffer, and predicted suitability for Greenstriped Rockfish in 2000 and 2050. I compute the total suitable range within each area as the sum of the cell-level suitability probabilities. Finally, I calculate my proxy for the country share as the ratio of the suitable range in the managed area to the total suitable range in the buffer area (inside and outside of

the relevant EEZ), which yields a value between 0 and 1.²³ In the case of the Greenstriped Rockfish, the northward shift of the suitable range of the species between 2000 and 2050 implies that the country share in the US' EEZ will increase significantly. In Appendix A, I walk through the method step by step for Maine Atlantic Halibut, which is predicted to decrease significantly in country share.

My final dataset is an administrative stock-by-year panel with the catch, biomass and extraction rate as well as the country shares calculated using the method described above. Table 2 presents the summary statistics. For empirical exercises, I normalize the catch, biomass, escapement, and extraction rate by dividing each value by the stock-level average to account for the significant differences in scale and measurement between stocks.

3.3 Additional Data

To explore heterogeneity in the effects of the country share, I add several additional variables to my stock-by-year panel. One key aspect of heterogeneity is management methods and efficacy. Specifically, the theoretical model described in Section 2 applies to a fisheries manager capable of controlling annual harvest. If the state capacity of the relevant country is insufficient to optimally set the path of harvest over time, individual fishermen will instead fish according to their private optimum. This open access equilibrium simply equates present benefits and present costs, without any attention to the future growth of the stock. While this means the fishery will be overfished, it also means that the changing country share should have little effect on outcomes for the fishery. Therefore, I explore heterogeneity in management from a few different sources. The Environmental Performance Index for Fisheries from Block et al. (2024) is a country-level score from 0 to 100 meant to reflect the health and sustainability of fisheries in that country. While it is an equilibrium outcome, I treat it as a measure of baseline fisheries management. Building off of Lynham (2014), I manually identify which of the fisheries in my sample are managed with Individual Transferable Quotas

²³Figure 12 shows the cross sectional relationship between my country share measure and the extraction rate, and shows that higher country share is correlated with a lower extraction rate.

(ITQ). While the vast majority of stocks in the RAM database are managed by some form of Total Allowable Catch, only a few are managed by ITQs, which are known to be the most effective form of management for preventing fisheries decline (Costello et al., 2008; Isaksen and Richter, 2019). The political economy of ITQs can also align the dynamic incentives of fishermen with my model of the fishery manager (Grainger and Costello, 2014; Costello and Grainger, 2018). Finally, I also use the RAM database’s categorization of whether a fishery is managed internationally under a Regional Fisheries Management Organization to test whether this changes the effect of the country share. I also examine heterogeneity by the intrinsic growth rate of a species and the interest rate of the country. For each species, I add the intrinsic growth rate found on FishBase (Froese and Pauly, 2025). For each country and year, I add the lending interest rate from the World Bank (Bank, 2025).

4 Empirical Strategy

The main empirical analysis of this paper is to estimate the relationship between the country share and fisheries extraction. Section 3 described how I construct the country share proxy. Section 2 provided the main theoretical predictions that I will test in this paper, namely that a higher country share leads to lower escapement, a higher extraction rate, and higher catch conditional on biomass.

4.1 Escapement

My main outcome is escapement, as a test of the unconditional theoretical prediction that escapement (the quantity of biomass that is *not* caught) will be higher when the country share is higher. This prediction comes from the manager’s optimality condition equation and is the reason the optimal stock is lower when the country share is lower. To deal with differences in measurement across stocks, I use the normalized escapement in each year, which is given by dividing the escapement in that year (biomass minus catch) by the stock-

level average escapement. This normalized measure represents the escapement relative to the mean for that stock. I regress the normalized escapement on the the stock-by-year measure of the country share plus stock and year fixed effects. The fixed effects remove variation in the outcomes that are common across years for each stock or common across stocks for each year. My identification comes from year-to-year variation in the country share of a particular fishery, after removing shocks common to all fisheries within a year. The estimating equation is:

$$\text{Escapement}_{i,t} = \beta \text{Country Share}_{i,t} + \gamma_i + \lambda_t + \epsilon_{i,t} \quad (14)$$

where γ_i represents the stock fixed effects, λ_t represents the year fixed effects, $\epsilon_{i,t}$ is the error term, and β captures the effect of the country share on escapement. A one percentage point change in the country share implies a change in escapement of $\beta\%$ of the historic average. The model predicts that β should be positive, as a higher country share implies lower optimal escapement. In the case of escapement the theory would imply no distinction between steady state and transition, as the optimal strategy in each case is to fish down to the optimal level of escapement.

4.2 Extraction Rate

Next I include the extraction rate as an outcome. I test the unconditional theoretical prediction that the extraction rate will be higher when the country share is lower. In this case I regress the normalized extraction rate on the the stock-by-year measure of the country share and both stock and year fixed effects. Again the fixed effects remove variation in the outcomes that are common across years for each stock or common across stocks for each year. The identifying variation comes from year-to-year fluctuations in the country share of a particular fishery, after removing shocks common to all fisheries within a year. The estimating equation is therefore the same form as the estimating equation above:

$$\text{Extraction Rate}_{i,t} = \beta \text{Country Share}_{i,t} + \gamma_i + \lambda_t + \epsilon_{i,t} \quad (15)$$

where γ_i represents the stock fixed effects, λ_t represents the year fixed effects, $\epsilon_{i,t}$ is the error term, and β captures the effect of the country share on the extraction rate. A one percentage point change in the country share implies a change in the extraction rate of $\beta\%$ of the historic average. The model predicts that β should be negative, as a higher country share implies a lower extraction rate both in transition and in steady state.

4.3 Catch

I also consider catch as an outcome. In this case, I must control for biomass, as my theoretical prediction only states that a higher country share implies lower biomass condition on biomass. I regress normalized catch on the stock-by-year measure of the country share, while controlling for the normalized biomass, as well as stock and year fixed effects. The fixed effects will remove variation in the outcomes that are common across years for each stock or common across stocks for each year. Then I am isolating year-to-year variation in the country share and biomass for a given stock, while removing any common shocks across years. The regression equation is:

$$\text{Catch}_{i,t} = \beta \text{Country Share}_{i,t} + \alpha \text{Biomass}_{i,t} + \gamma_i + \lambda_t + \epsilon_{i,t} \quad (16)$$

where β captures the effect of the country share and α captures the effect of biomass. γ_i represents the stock fixed effects, λ_t represents the year fixed effects, and $\epsilon_{i,t}$ is an error term. From the theoretical model, we expect α to be positive, as a higher biomass leads to higher catch on all else equal, and β to be negative, as a higher country share implies a lower catch conditional on biomass. A one percentage point change in the country share implies a change in catch (conditional on biomass) of $\beta\%$ of the historic average.

4.4 Robustness

I also include some cross sectional regressions in Table 3. Columns (1), (3), and (5), show the relationship between the stock level average country share and the stock level average log escapement (conditional on average log biomass), extraction rate, and catch (conditional on average log biomass), respectively. Columns (2), (4), and (6) repeat these regressions with controls for the species-level intrinsic growth rate and the country-level interest rate, two variables that theory suggests should affect extraction. These tables show the same pattern of results. For ease of comparison with different outcome measures, I also include a regression table using the empirical strategy from above, but with the same outcome measures used in the cross section, in Appendix B.

For robustness, I repeat the regression specifications described above using different buffer distances to compute my proxy for the country share; specifically 100, 150, 200, 250, 300, 350 and 400 nautical miles. Coefficient plots for these regressions are included in Appendix B.

I also run first differences regressions as further robustness. In these I regress the year-on-year change in the outcome on year-on-year changes in the country share. In the case of catch as an outcome I also include the year-on-year change in biomass as a control. I run a similar design using long differences, where I compute the difference in the average outcome and average country share between 2000-2005 and 2015-2020, for each stock. This gives me a dataset of 266 long difference observations, which I use to run the same regressions. Appendix B includes regression tables for these specifications.

Finally, I also include the results of regressing the trend in the outcome on the trend in the country share. Specifically, I compute the five year trend (up-to and including the year of the observation) for each of my outcomes, the normalized biomass, and the country share. In Appendix B I include a table of regression results for this specification.

4.5 Heterogeneity

In order to explore the heterogeneity of effects, I also run regressions that include an additional variable and the interactions between that variable and the country share. In these cases, I am interested in the coefficient on the country share and the coefficient on the interaction term. Specifically, I run additional regressions with the following variables:

- **EPI Score.** I run regressions including the Fishery performance index from the Environmental Performance Index (Block et al., 2024). I include this country-level measure of fisheries performance as a proxy for overall management performance. Higher values of this variable reflect better managed and healthier fish stocks in the managing country as a whole. I include the interaction term to examine whether the effects of the country share are more significant for better managed fisheries—this prediction is logical because the theoretical model in Section 2 relies on the capability of the fishery manager to optimally set the dynamic path of extraction. If the fishery is effectively in open access, variation in the country share should not have the same effects.
- **ITQ Management.** I run regressions including an indicator variable for whether a fishery-year is managed using Individual Transferable Quota. I include this ITQ dummy to measure whether the country share has differential effects by management mechanism, given that the vast majority of stocks in the same do have some kind of statutory catch limit. Economists view ITQs as the most effective and efficient form of management, but their efficacy and political economy could exacerbate the effects of changing country shares. Like the logic above, a more effective regulator has a greater ability to act according to their privately optimal incentives for overextraction. Furthermore, ITQ systems that include catch shares (rights to future ITQ allowances) can also align fishermen’s incentives with the dynamic incentives of the regulator. Prior research has shown aggregate property rights insecurity can drive ITQ market outcomes, and affect regulatory decisions consistent with regulatory capture by ITQ

holders (Grainger and Costello, 2014; Costello and Grainger, 2018). Therefore, ITQ fisheries may be more sensitive to changes in the country share than other fisheries with catch limits but without property rights to catch.

- **Growth Rates.** I run additional regressions including the intrinsic growth rate of a species found on FishBase (Froese and Pauly, 2025). The theory in Section 2 states that the privately optimal escapement $S_{i,t}^*$ is found where $G'(S_{i,t}^*) = \frac{1}{\delta\theta_{i,t}}$. In a traditional parametrization of $G()$, the intrinsic growth rate enters as a multiplier that scales the relationship between the current biomass and the carrying capacity. The larger the intrinsic growth rate, the greater the growth of the biomass at any given value and the greater $G'()$. Therefore a greater intrinsic growth rate should increase optimal escapement, and decrease the optimal extraction rate and catch conditional on biomass, holding all else equal. It should also dampen the effect of the country share on the above variables.
- **Interest Rates.** I run additional regression including country-year specific lending interest rates from the World Bank (Bank, 2025). Section 2 states that the privately optimal escapement $S_{i,t}^*$ is found where $G'(S_{i,t}^*) = \frac{1}{\delta\theta_{i,t}}$. We can rewrite this condition as $G'(S_{i,t}^*) = \frac{1+r}{\theta_{i,t}}$, where r is the interest rate. This implies that as the interest rate is larger, the effect of the country share on optimal escapement should be larger as well.
- **Multinational Management.** I run additional regressions including an indicator for multinational management, which reflects whether the relevant RAM stock is covered by a multinational governing body like a Regional Fisheries Management Organization. RFMOs exist to manage internationally shared stocks, albeit particularly on the high seas beyond national jurisdiction. If a RAM stock includes the multinational management indicator, it means that there is some international body responsible for managing aggregate catch of the species in a broad geographic area. This kind of management would ideally suppress the private incentives of individual countries for overextraction,

but the efficacy of these international agreements is contested (Cullis-Suzuki and Pauly, 2010). In particular, their voluntary nature might mean that countries participate only when conservation measures align with their domestic incentives, and the agreements have no binding effects. I test whether multinationally managed fisheries are more or less sensitive to changes in country shares.

- **Highly Migratory.** I run additional regressions including an indicator variable for whether a species is highly migratory or pelagic that is included in the AquaMaps envelopes. Since these species are generally already internationally managed and are likely to straddle EEZs and the high seas, it is possible that these are less affected by changes to the country share. However, it is also entirely possible that countries do attempt to conserve these species, at least in so far as they expect to reap the rewards of conservation, and they may behave just like other species.²⁴
- **High Seas Share.** I also run a regression specification testing whether the effect of the country share that I estimate differs based on whether the spillovers accrue to a neighboring Exclusive Economic Zone or on the internationally open-access high seas. Specifically, I include a measure of the high seas share of the stock, following the same country share construction methodology outlined above but calculating the share of the suitable range within the buffer area that occurs in the high seas. I interact that measure with the national country share, to detect whether countries respond differently to spillovers in the high seas relative to those in other national jurisdictions. Due to their open access nature, high seas fisheries are generally more overfished than EEZs, and the Regional Fisheries Management Organizations meant to regulate them are generally considered ineffective (Cullis-Suzuki and Pauly, 2010). Palacios-Abrantes et al. (2025) predicts that many transboundary stocks will shift towards the high seas, increasing the importance of them for fisheries outcomes. However, from the

²⁴For example, Pons et al. (2018) shows that the management and enforcement of pelagic fishery regulations are worse for regional fisheries management organizations with more member countries.

perspective of the given country, it is not clear they should view spillovers in the high seas differently than spillovers to other countries. In my model, for example, the relevant parameter is simply what share of recruitment will accrue to the managing country—where the rest of the stock goes is irrelevant.

5 Results

Table 3 shows the cross sectional relationship between country share and my outcomes. For five of the six columns the coefficient of interest, that of the country share variable, is statistically significant, and in all cases it is directionally consistent with theory. These cross sectional regressions leverage variation in country shares across different stocks. The relatively small effect sizes reflect the fact that there is plenty of other variation in what drives extraction.

Table 4 shows the coefficients of interest for my main specifications. Column (1) shows the effect of the country share on normalized escapement, controlling for stock and year fixed effects. Consistent with the theoretical predictions, it shows a large, statistically significant negative coefficient implying that a larger country share implies greater escapement. The magnitude of the coefficient is also quite large: it implies that if a management area were to increase its country share by 1, its escapement would increase by 151% of its historic average. While this may seem implausibly large, it should be noted that the variation in country shares is quite small. The within-stock standard deviation in country share is just 0.01, implying a 1.6% increase in escapement. As I'll discuss in more detail in Section 6, the predicted changes in country shares under climate change are larger, but still not as large as a 1 unit change: The largest predicted gain in country share in the data, 0.155, would imply a reduction in catch of 23.4% of the historic average, while the largest predicted loss in country share, -0.19, would imply an increase in catch of 28.7% of the historic average. These effects are quite significant, but not implausibly large. Finally, the average country

share being 0.51, these results would imply that if every stock were managed as if the country share were 1 (that is, every fishery manager internalized the full effect of recruitment), then escapement would be higher by 73.8% of the historic average.

Column (2) of Table 4 shows the results for the extraction rate. Consistent with the theoretical predictions, it shows a large, statistically significant negative coefficient. This implies that a larger country share causes a lower extraction rate. Once again the effect sizes are large but plausible: a one standard deviation increase in the country share would decrease the extraction rate by 72% of its historic average. Using the within-fishery standard deviation, a one standard deviation increase would decrease the extraction rate by 2.6%. Under the predicted climactic changes, the extraction rate effects would range from a 38.4% reduction to a 47.2% increase. Translating that into actual rates using the coefficient and the average extraction rate for each species, the range of climate change effects goes from an increase of 0.09 to a decrease of 0.07. These are significant but plausible changes for those respective stocks.

Finally, Column (3) of Table 4 report the results for catch. It shows that the country share has a large, negative, and statistically significant effect on catch once controlling for the available biomass. The magnitude of the affect is quite large: taken literally, it implies that if a given management area were to increase its country share by 1, its catch would go down by 231% of its historic mean. Again this impossibly large coefficient is consistent with a much more reasonable story: A one standard deviation increase in the country share (0.29) would imply a reduction in catch of 66.8% of the historic average. A within-fishery standard deviation increase (.01) would only imply a 2.4% reduction in catch. The predicted effects of climate change range from a 35.7% reduction to a 43.8% increase in catch, conditional on biomass.

5.1 Heterogeneity

In this section I discuss the results of the regressions I ran including an additional variable and the interaction between that variable and the country share. In these regressions, there are two coefficients of interest: the coefficient on the country share and the coefficient on the interaction term.

Table 5 shows the regression results for measures of management heterogeneity. Columns (1), (3) and (5) show the regression results using the fishery management score from the Environmental Performance Index as a regressor for escapement, extraction rate, and catch as outcomes, respectively. Columns (1) and (3) show that the effect of country share is driven by countries with high EPI scores, as the interaction term drives the headline result. The same is true for catch in Column (5), albeit the interaction term is not statistically significant. Together, these results support the theory that the country share effects are driven by countries with effective fisheries management and currently well-preserved stocks. Columns (2), (4) and (6) show the regression results using a dummy for ITQ management as a regressor for escapement, extraction rate, and catch as outcomes, respectively. In all three columns, both the country share coefficient and the interaction term with ITQ management are statistically significant and go in the same direction. I view this as evidence that the effect of the country share is stronger for fisheries managed by ITQs, consistent with more effective management being better suited for (mal)adaptive responses to climate change. This finding also suggests that more effective management is not necessarily as effective an answer to climate change as some have hoped (see, e.g. Gaines et al. (2018); Free et al. (2020); Melbourne-Thomas et al. (2022)).

Table 6 shows the regression results for measures of other theoretically important heterogeneity. Columns (1), (3) and (5) show the regression results using the intrinsic growth rate of a species as a regressor for escapement, extraction rate, and catch as outcomes, respectively. Every regression shows a large effect of the interaction between the country share and the growth rate, which is opposite in sign to the country share coefficient (the interac-

tion is only statistically significant in Columns (3) and (5)). While the coefficients appear large, this does not mean the growth rate actually flips the result, as the growth rate is small. I interpret the opposite sign as evidence that a larger growth rate dampens the effect of the country share, consistent with bioeconomic theory. That is, as the species growth rate is larger, variation in the country share matters less for determining the optimal fishing strategy. Columns (2), (4) and (6) show the the regression results using the country-year level interest rate as a regressor, for escapement, extraction rate, and catch, respectively. Counter to the theoretical prediction, the results show that a higher interest rate dampens the effect of country share. Columns (4) and (6) show large, statistically significant effects of the interaction term that are opposite the sign of the country share coefficient. Column (2) shows a small and insignificant effect.

5.2 Robustness

Table 11 shows the results of regressions with the same specification but slightly different measures of the outcomes meant to be consistent with the measures used in my cross sectional results. Column (1) shows the effect of country share on log escapement, which is positive, consistent with my predictions. In this case, Column (2), which uses the unnormalized extraction rate to be consistent with the cross section regressions, is not statistically significant. Finally, Column (3) reports the effect of the country share on log catch, and is negative, consistent with my predictions.

The appendix includes an additional table of heterogeneity analysis. Table 12 shows the coefficients for regressions that add indicators for multinational management and for highly migratory species, and that add the "high seas share" as an additional variable. None of these dimension of heterogeneity change the headline coefficient, and the interaction terms are not generally statistically significant. I interpret this as evidence that the effects of country share do not vary meaningfully on these dimensions, all of which capture some notion of the degree of international sharing. That is to say, conditional on the country share, the other

arrangements of international sharing don't appear to matter for fisheries extraction.

The appendix also includes figures showing how the coefficients on country share depend on the width of the buffer area around the shapefile of the stock. Figures 67, 68, and 69 show the coefficient plots for escapement, extraction rate, and catch, respectively. As a general pattern, the larger buffer windows are less precise and less likely to be statistically significant, consistent with measurement error eroding the result as the buffer area begins to include more and more extraneous area (from the perspective of management).

The appendix also includes the results of first differences and long differences regressions. Table 13 shows the regression results for all three outcomes in first differences. The coefficients on country share are directionally consistent with the prior results, although it is not statistically significant for escapement as an outcome. Table 14 shows the results for the three outcomes in long differences. Escapement and the extraction rate show statistically significant results with the expected sign. The catch results show the expected sign but are statistically insignificant. Finally, the appendix includes the results of regressing trends in the outcome variables on trends in the country share, in order to confirm that the effects detected are consistent with changes in the climate and not just annual variation in weather. Table 15 shows the regression results, which are consistent in direction and statistical significance with my main results.

6 Simulations

6.1 Climate Predictions

What do the results above imply for the effects of climate change? If changes in the country share lead to meaningful endogenous extraction responses, then it is possible that this behavioral response to range-shift will be a significant consequence of climate change in the fishing industry. However, this depends highly on how climate change will affect the country shares of different countries. In this section I predict the changes in country shares by 2050

and simulate what these would imply for global fisheries extraction.

My predictions of global country shares follow the methods discussed in Section 3 exactly, using predicted 2030, 2040, and 2050 values for all environmental variables except depth, which is left unchanged.²⁵ By default, I use the environmental predictions for SSP2-4.5, a climate scenario “middle of the road” that bases future projections on a continuation of historic trends. Appendix C shows that results are effectively the same under SSP1-1.9 and SSP5-8.5, which represent a lower and upper bound on plausible warming, respectively. Figure 14 shows a density graph of the country share for each decade in my dataset. It shows relatively little predicted change between the historic distribution and the distributions in 2030, 2040 and 2050. Figure 15 plots the change in the country share between the average from 2000 to 2024 and the predicted country shares in 2050. An immediate conclusion of this plot is that the changes in country share are not predicted to occur disproportionately in one direction: while climate change is predicted to reduce some country shares, it is also predicted to increase others. In fact, the mean change is predicted to be an increase of 0.003 (standard deviation: 0.03). The predicted changes in the country share are uncorrelated with the catch, catch value, or biomass size of the fishery. This general pattern is unchanged by the particular climate scenario used, which I explore in more detail in Appendix C.

To evaluate the consequences for escapement, I calculate the implied change in escapement by 2050 using the change in the country share from the historic average to its 2050 value, and interacting that with stock level averages and the coefficients from Table ???. Figure 16 shows the distribution predicted changes in escapement from that exercise. It shows a wide range of effects, with most clustered around zero. Summing up across all of the predicted escapement effects gives a net increase in escapement of around 100,000 tonnes, which is trivial compared to the average total escapement of 113,000,000. Figure 21 maps the total change in escapement for stocks in my sample by EEZ. It shows some significant winners and some significant losers. However, Figure 22 maps the percent change in escapement for

²⁵While sea levels are predicted to rise in ways that are significant for coastal communities, these changes are small relative to ocean depths.

those same stocks by EEZ, and shows that the most significant changes in percentage terms will be increases in escapement. This is a feature of averaging to the EEZ level: Figure 17 shows the density plot of percent change in escapement at the stock level, and shows no particular pattern for increases and decreases.²⁶

Thus far, I have discussed the effect of climate-induced range shift as if it were the only effect of climate change on fisheries. Naturally, that is not the case: climate change will also affect fisheries biomass due to warmer temperatures and greater acidity in the ocean (Branch et al., 2013; Free et al., 2019). Next, I set out to calculate how significant the behavioral response to range shift will be relative to these direct biophysical effects. Unfortunately, there is substantial uncertainty over these biophysical effects, and no perfect methodology available to forecast them. Therefore, I borrow a straightforward method that has been used to make climate predictions in the fisheries science literature, which assumes that the carrying capacity of a stock is proportional to its suitability-weighted range. This prediction comes out of the Basin Model Hypothesis first described in MacCall (1990). This relationship has been empirically validated in several species,²⁷ and has been used in many of the most sophisticated climate forecasts in fisheries.²⁸ I follow the methodology of Gaines et al. (2018) in using the species distribution maps from AquaMaps in the historic period and in 2050 as my endpoints. I assume that the carrying capacity of each species will change proportionally with the change in total suitable range. That is, if a species range is predicted to double, I assume the carrying capacity will double as well for all stocks of that species. Although this is unlikely to be accurate for all stocks, it is an actionable prediction with a basis in the scientific literature. Under a standard bioeconomic model, the S^* which satisfies the equilibrium condition $G'(S^*) = \frac{1}{\delta\theta}$ will be proportional to the carrying capacity.²⁹ Therefore,

²⁶This may be driven partially by the selection of stocks into my sample, as it disproportionately covers poleward stocks in the developed world, and does not include the large number of fish stocks around the tropics that are predicted to be the greatest climate losers (Oremus et al., 2020).

²⁷See, for example, Southward et al. (1995); Atkinson et al. (1997); Simpson and Walsh (2004); Sullivan et al. (2006); Zador et al. (2011); Pennino et al. (2020).

²⁸See, for example, Cheung et al. (2016); García Molinos et al. (2016); Gaines et al. (2018); Free et al. (2020); Sala et al. (2021)

²⁹Letting $G(S) = S + rS(1 - \frac{S}{K})$ gives optimal escapement $S^* = \frac{K}{2r}(1 + r - \frac{1}{\delta\theta})$ where K is the carrying

I first estimate the optimal escapement given the 2050 country share for each stock following the methods I describe above. Then I multiply it by the proportional change in biomass to arrive at the escapement under the combined effects of climate change. To estimate only the biophysical effect, I simply multiply the average historic escapement by the proportional change in biomass.

Now I can describe how the behavioral response to climate change relates to the biophysical response. Figure 23 shows the distribution of climate change's effects on escapement for both the purely biophysical model and the combined model. Figure 24 plots the difference between the biophysical and the combined model. For the average stock, using only the biophysical model would miss approximately 27% of the full effect of climate change, although there is substantial heterogeneity across stocks. Figure 26 maps the percent change in escapement due to the combined effects of climate change by EEZ. Comparing it to Figure 22, we see general increases in escapement due to the dominance of the biophysical channel. On net, escapement is predicted to increase by 20.3%. However, Figure 27 plots the error in the Biophysical-Only prediction of escapement in 2050. It shows significant errors for several EEZs from only using the biophysical prediction. Furthermore, the general pattern of climate change increasing biomass may well be an artifact of my sample of relatively poleward, cold water stocks, which may stand to benefit from warming in the short-to-medium run.

While escapement is the primary outcome of interest in this paper due to its theoretical importance and empirical tractability, the most important fisheries outcomes for policy are biomass, catch, and catch values. Here, then, I take my results a step further to calculate the implied effects of climate change on these variables. In order to simulate future biomass, I use the empirical relationship between escapement in one period and biomass in the next. Figure 13 plots normalized biomass against lagged, normalized escapement; it shows a relatively strong, positive, and approximately linear relationship. To allow for some concavity in the growth function, I run a quadratic regression of normalized biomass capacity.

on lagged normalized escapement, and use those regression results (found in Table 7) to turn escapement predictions into biomass predictions. These generally follow the predicted changes in escapement pretty closely. Figure 28 shows the predicted changes in biomass by EEZ due to the combined effects of climate change. Figure 29 shows the same for percent changes. Both show the same pattern of general increases. On net, biomass increases by 19.8% when accounting for the combined effect of climate change.

To predict catch in these future projections, I calculate catch as the difference between predicted biomass and predicted escapement, bounded below by zero. Figures 30 and 31 show the level and percent changes in catch at the EEZ level. Both show general increases, as expected from the increase in biomass. Overall I predict a 17.7% increase in catch from this approach. I also predict the value of catch, assuming that the price of each species does not change from its latest year in the Sea Around Us ex-vessel price database (Tai et al., 2017). Figures 32 and 33 show the level and percent change in catch value by EEZ. Like catch, they show large increases—catch value increases by 21.2% in my predictions. Again, it must be emphasized that these results don’t necessarily apply to the totality of global fisheries, as my dataset covers only a subset of stocks representing around 26% of global catch.

6.2 Cooperative Equilibrium

What would global fisheries look like in a cooperative equilibrium, where countries internalize the effects they have on each other? Here, I set the country share to 1, and see how the extraction rate, escapement, and biomass would differ from their historic averages. Specifically, I find the difference between 1 and the historic average country share, and then multiply that difference by the escapement regression coefficient from Column (2) of Table 4 and the stock level average escapement. The result is the hypothetical average escapement *if* the fishery manager internalized the effects of their fishing on its neighbors as well.

Figure 34 shows the historic and hypothetical cooperative distributions escapement. Un-

der hypothetical cooperation, escapement would be 86.7 million tonnes (76.4%) higher. Figure 35 shows the implications of higher escapement for biomass, using the empirical relationship between escapement and biomass in Figure 13. Table 7 shows the coefficients for a regression of biomass on lagged escapement and lagged escapement squared, which I use for predicting biomass under alternative escapement scenarios. Figure 35 shows a biomass distribution that has been shifted meaningfully to the right. Biomass in total would be 98.3 million tonnes (71.3%) tonnes higher.³⁰ Figures 36 plots the same comparison for catch, and also shows a large shift to the right in the distribution which amounts to an increase of 11 million tonnes in total.

Next, I explore the spatial heterogeneity of these effects. Figure 37 shows the total change in escapement by EEZ, and Figure 38 shows the percent change in escapement by EEZ. Both show that there are significant increases in escapement, although there is also meaningful heterogeneity across EEZs. The largest changes in percentage terms come from EEZs with low average country shares, such as the Mexican Pacific Coast, Brazil, and Greenland. Finally, Figures 39 and 40 show the total change and percent change in biomass, respectively, using only the change in escapement from the particular stock region. These show the same pattern of significant changes with large heterogeneity, in the same places. Finally, Figures 42 and 44 show the percent changes in catch and catch values at the EEZ level. These show general increases, with select EEZ exhibiting enormous changes in percentage terms due to very small starting values. Figures 41 and 44 show changes in level terms. These maps show large increases in escapement and biomass, which become large increases in steady state catch. These results indicate that the global cost of the transboundary problem is quite significant, and much larger than the expected effects of property rights reallocation under climate change.

³⁰The effect on biomass is more muted than on escapement due to the curvature of the growth function.

6.3 US-Canada Cooperation

However, the fully cooperative equilibrium above is highly unrealistic. Even if all neighboring countries could agree to internalize their spillovers on each other, fishing on the internationally open-access high seas would still mean that not all of the returns to conservation would be internalized by fisheries managers. Short of a benevolent and omnipotent world government, this is not a plausible counterfactual. In this section I discuss a much more realistic counterfactual: cooperation between the US and Canada. The US and Canada have some history of cooperating on fisheries management going back to the 1924 Halibut Treaty which is still the basis of the modern International Pacific Halibut Commission (Crutchfield and Zellner, 2002). This is one of several fisheries conservation agreements Canada has in the pacific, mostly with the United States (Bond and McDorman, 2010). Relations are more fraught in the Atlantic, where the US and Canada have disputes over the management and jurisdiction of important commercial stocks like American Lobster (Cook, 2005). The US and Canada also have many other international agreements and sites of cooperation, which facilitate a hypothetical fisheries agreement by creating frameworks of cooperation and avenues for side payments. Finally, the US and Canada are the two best represented countries in my dataset (149 stocks total), making the specifics of the counterfactual less likely to depend on only a few stocks.

In this counterfactual, I suppose that both the US and Canada agree to behave in fisheries management as if they had a joint Exclusive Economic Zone. Operationally, that means that my country share computation method treats the US EEZ as Canadian stock control for the purpose of Canadian stocks, and vice versa. Mechanically this must increase the measured country shares, but the precise magnitudes will vary by stock based on the location and shape of the stock shapefile and the distribution of the suitable range. In particular, this approach will continue to treat suitable range in the high seas as an uninternalized spillover from the point of view of the fisheries manager. Figure 18 shows the average country shares at the EEZ level in the baseline data (no cooperation). Figure 46 maps the change in effective

country shares if the US and Canada were to adopt the cooperative agreement I describe. Figure 45 shows the stock level distribution of changes in effective country shares in this counterfactual.

What implications would such collaboration have on fisheries management? Figure 47 shows the stock level distribution of changes in escapement based on the changes in country share and the effect of the country share on escapement estimated above (see Table 4). Figure 48 shows the distribution of percent changes in escapement. Figures 49 and 50 maps these changes at the EEZ level. It shows that the Canadian Pacific coast and the US Atlantic coast both show significant increases in escapement (by 35% and 30%, respectively). This aligns naturally with the location and distribution of those stock: Many stocks on the Canadian Pacific coast extend either into the Pacific coast of the continental US or into the Gulf of Alaska. Similarly, many stocks in the Gulf of Maine spill over into the Bay of Fundy and the coast of Nova Scotia. Figures 51 and 52 map these changes in terms of biomass (in level and percentage terms, respectively), and show a muted version of the same effect: biomass increases by anywhere from 1% in the US West Coast to 21% in the Canadian West Coast. Figures 54 and 56 map the percent changes in catch and catch value, respectively. They show that the same regions that increase escapement would also be predicted to decrease catch on net. However, these catch results do not account for the spillovers to neighboring regions, which are the motivation for the increased conservation to begin with.

Overall, my results imply that cooperation between the US and Canada would increase escapement by 5.44 million tonnes (14%) in total. Steady state biomass would in turn increase by 5.1 million tonnes (12%). Catch would barely decrease on average (-0.9%), but this result masks a large decrease in catch on the Pacific coast of Canada and in the New England region of the United States. The catch decreases come from highly valuable stocks, however, so catch value would decrease by 13.9%. These results apply only for the specific managed stocks in my dataset, however, so this does not account for the spillover benefits that are the real motivation for such cooperation. These results are based on the historical

values in my dataset, and do not include the potential effects of climate change. However, US-Canada cooperation could also help address stock shift under climate change. Figure 57 plots the change in country share predicted under climate change against the hypothetical change in effective country share under climate change *if* the US and Canada had a cooperative agreement. For many stocks this change does not matter, as the other country in the agreement is not the relevant shifting area, but for several stocks the cooperative agreement significantly reduces the changes in country share implied by climate change.

7 Conclusion

In this paper I study how fisheries extraction responds to changes in the share of a population found within a management area. The core empirical result is that extraction in a management area does respond to the “country share” controlled: using panel variation in the country share, I show that a lower country share causes higher catch conditional on biomass, consistent with overextraction due to property rights insecurity. The effects are quite large for reasonable variation in the country share.

As climate change alters the environmental conditions of the ocean, many species are predicted to undergo changes to their habitat ranges which could change the relative shares controlled by different countries. This paper investigates the implications of climate-induced range shift for fisheries extraction. I find that climate change is predicted to have relatively small effects on country shares on average, but there is significant heterogeneity across fisheries. For the average stock, the behavioral response to range-shift is approximately 25% of the effect of climate change.

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8 Tables

Table 1: Distance to Equator Regressions

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Avg. Coastline Length (km)	Avg. EEZ Area (km ²)	Avg. EPI Score
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Degrees from Equator	57.408*** (7.081)	7,190.809*** (317.310)	-0.010*** (0.001)
Constant	13,084.570*** (736.944)	1,519,061.000*** (33,021.610)	20.172*** (0.146)
Observations	721	721	721
R ²	0.084	0.417	0.065

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Results from regressing the average value of each measure within latitude on the distance from the equator in degrees. Column (1) shows the average coastline length for countries at that latitude. Column (2) shows the average EEZ area for countries at that latitude. Column (3) shows the average fishery management score from the Environmental Performance Index for countries at that latitude.

Table 2: Summary Statistics

Variable	Value
Unique Years	24.00
Unique Stock IDs	326.00
Unique Scientific Names	163.00
Country Share (mean)	0.53
Country Share (sd)	0.29
Extraction Rate (mean)	0.17
Extraction Rate (sd)	0.17
Escapement (mean)	399185.23
Escapement (sd)	1056573.39
Biomass (mean)	482240.50
Biomass (sd)	1313272.89
Catch (mean)	83055.27
Catch (sd)	385919.45

Summary statistics for main panel dataset.

Table 3: Cross Section Regressions

	Dependent variable:					
	Log Mean Escapement			Extraction Rate		Log Mean Catch
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Mean Country Share	0.021* (0.011)	0.008 (0.015)	-0.128*** (0.028)	-0.099*** (0.032)	-0.217*** (0.058)	-0.185** (0.082)
Log Mean Biomass	0.107*** (0.001)	0.105*** (0.002)			0.134*** (0.007)	0.132*** (0.009)
Growth Rate		-0.050** (0.020)		0.273*** (0.042)		0.466*** (0.108)
Mean Interest Rate		-0.093 (0.067)		0.308** (0.142)		0.071 (0.363)
Constant	1.162*** (0.017)	1.214*** (0.022)	0.239*** (0.017)	0.076** (0.030)	0.726*** (0.088)	0.524*** (0.123)
Observations	326	206	326	206	323	204
R ²	0.953	0.957	0.062	0.253	0.570	0.570
Residual Std. Error	0.059 (df = 323)	0.057 (df = 201)	0.146 (df = 324)	0.122 (df = 202)	0.301 (df = 320)	0.310 (df = 199)

Note:

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01

Results from cross sectional regression of average outcomes on average country shares (each observation is one stock). Odd columns also include controls for species level intrinsic growth rates and average country-year level interest rates. A positive coefficient on the Country Share for Escapement implies that a larger quantity of fish is not caught in fisheries where the managing authority controls a greater share of the fish population. A negative coefficient on the Country Share for the Extraction Rate and Catch (conditional on Biomass) implies that larger quantities of fish are caught when the managing authority controls a smaller share of the fish population.

Table 4: Panel Regressions

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Norm. Escapement	Norm. Extraction Rate	Norm. Catch
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Country Share	1.506*** (0.554)	-2.481*** (0.743)	-2.306*** (0.669)
Norm. Biomass			0.556*** (0.020)
Stock FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	4,884	4,875	4,884
R ²	0.002	0.002	0.150

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Results for regressing outcomes on my proxy for share of the total stock found in the managing country's exclusive economic zone. Regressions include fixed effects for the management stock and year. Sample years 2000–2024. Standard errors are clustered at the stock level. A positive coefficient on the Country Share for Escapement implies that a larger quantity of fish is not caught in years where the managing authority controls a greater share of the fish population. A negative coefficient on the Country Share for the Extraction Rate and Catch (conditional on Biomass) implies that larger quantities of fish are caught when the managing authority controls a smaller share of the fish population.

Table 5: Management Heterogeneity Regressions

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Norm. Escapement	Norm. Extraction Rate	Norm. Catch			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Country Share	-5.113 (3.381)	1.452*** (0.555)	8.451* (4.508)	-2.415*** (0.745)	1.510 (4.043)	-2.252*** (0.671)
Norm. Biomass					0.526*** (0.020)	0.556*** (0.020)
EPI Score	-0.166 (257,774.300)		-0.103 (348,956.600)		-0.010 (308,178.900)	
Country Share×EPI Score		0.404** (0.204)		-0.671** (0.272)		-0.233 (0.244)
ITQs			-0.952** (0.453)		1.745*** (0.607)	1.517*** (0.547)
Country Share×ITQs				1.000** (0.500)	-2.052*** (0.672)	-1.815*** (0.604)
Stock FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	4,864	4,845	4,855	4,836	4,864	4,845
R ²	0.002	0.003	0.004	0.005	0.137	0.151

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01

Note:

Regression results for heterogeneity regressions involving management proxies. Odd columns show the results interacting the country share with the fishery management score from the Environmental Performance Index. Odd columns show results interacting the country share with a stock-year indicator for management with Individual Transferable Quotas. Results show that the headline effect of the country share is magnified by better management, measured through either the EPI score or the use of ITQs.

Table 6: Rate Heterogeneity Regressions

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Norm.	Escapement	Norm.	Extraction Rate	Norm.	Catch
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Country Share	3.024** (1.368)	1.888*** (0.513)	-5.555*** (1.768)	-2.777*** (0.794)	-4.090*** (1.579)	-2.562*** (0.706)
Norm. Biomass					0.561 *** (0.020)	0.548*** (0.025)
Country Share×Growth Rate			11.917*** (4.425)		9.244** (3.950)	
Interest Rate		0.290 (0.361)		-1.032* (0.559)		-1.312*** (0.496)
Country Share×Interest Rate		0.010 (0.764)		3.040** (1.184)		4.106*** (1.050)
Stock FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	4,330	4,021	4,330	4,012	4,330	4,021
R ²	0.002	0.004	0.002	0.005	0.163	0.121

Note:

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01

Regression results for additional heterogeneity regressions. Odd columns show the results interacting the country share with the species level intrinsic growth rate. Odd columns show results interacting the country share with the country-year level interest rate. Both variables appear to dampen the effect of the country share, as the interaction term is opposite in sign to the uninteracted country share coefficient in most cases. However, these results are only statistically significant for two of the three outcomes.

Table 7: Biomass Prediction Regression

<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
Normalized Biomass	
Lag Norm. Escapement	0.928*** (0.026)
Lag Norm. Escapement Sq.	-0.092*** (0.011)
Constant	0.180*** (0.015)
Observations	4,556
R ²	0.612
Residual Std. Error	0.208 (df = 4553)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Results for regression of normalized biomass on lagged escapement and lagged escapement squared. I use this regression to predict biomass given my escapement results. The quadratic form allows for a non-linear relationship between lagged escapement and biomass, as one would expect from a concave growth function.

9 Figures

Figure 1: EPI Score and Distance to Equator




Figure 2: Coastline and Distance to Equator




Figure 3: EEZ Area and Distance to Equator





Figure 4: Map of RAM Stocks



RAM Stocks
10 20 30 40

Figure 5: Map of Average Catch Values




Figure 6: Temperature Envelope for Greenstriped Rockfish




Figure 7: Greenstriped Rockfish Suitability in 2020




Figure 8: Greenstriped Rockfish RAM Shapefile




Figure 9: Greenstriped Rockfish Management Areas




Figure 10: Greenstriped Rockfish Suitability




Figure 11: Greenstriped Rockfish Management and Suitability




Figure 12: Avg. Extraction Rate Vs Avg. Country Share




Figure 13: Normalized Escapement Vs Normalized Biomass




Figure 14: Country Share Density by Decade




Figure 15: Country Share Change by 2050




Figure 16: Escapement Changes by 2050 (Behavioral Only)




Figure 17: Escapement Percent Changes by 2050 (Behavioral Only)




Figure 18: Average Country Share by EEZ




Figure 19: 2050 Average Change in Stock by EEZ

2050 Prediction Under SSP245




Figure 20: Total Escapement by EEZ (Historic Average)




Figure 21: 2050 Total Change in Escapement by EEZ (Behavioral Only)




Figure 22: 2050 Percent Change in Escapement by EEZ (Behavioral Only)




Figure 23: 2050 Change in Escapement (Biophysical Vs Combined)




Figure 24: Error in Biophysical-Only Escapement Prediction




Figure 25: 2050 Total Change in Escapement by EEZ (Combined Effects)




Figure 26: 2050 Percent Change in Escapement by EEZ (Combined Effects)




Figure 27: Error in Biophysical-Only Escapement Prediction by EEZ




Figure 28: 2050 Total Change in Biomass by EEZ (Combined Effects)




Figure 29: 2050 Percent Change in Biomass by EEZ (Combined Effects)




Figure 30: 2050 Total Change in Catch by EEZ (Combined Effects)




Figure 31: 2050 Percent Change in Catch by EEZ (Combined Effects)




Figure 32: 2050 Total Change in Catch Value by EEZ (Combined Effects)




Figure 33: 2050 Percent Change in Catch Value by EEZ (Combined Effects)




Figure 34: Historic and Cooperative Escapement Distributions




Figure 35: Historic and Cooperative Biomass Distributions




Figure 36: Historic and Cooperative Catch Distributions




Figure 37: Change in Escapement Under Global Cooperation by EEZ




Figure 38: Percent Change in Escapement Under Global Cooperation by EEZ




Figure 39: Change in Biomass Under Global Cooperation by EEZ




Figure 40: Percent Change in Biomass Under Global Cooperation by EEZ




Figure 41: Change in Catch Under Global Cooperation by EEZ




Figure 42: Percent Change in Catch Under Global Cooperation by EEZ




Figure 43: Change in Catch Value Under Global Cooperation by EEZ




Figure 44: Percent Change in Catch Value Under Global Cooperation by EEZ




Figure 45: Change in Effective Country Share Under US-Canada Agreement




Figure 46: Change in Effective Country Share Under US-Canada Agreement by EEZ




Figure 47: Change in Escapement Under US-Canada Agreement




Figure 48: Percent Change in Escapement Under US-Canada Agreement




Figure 49: Change in Escapement Share Under US-Canada Agreement by EEZ




Figure 50: Percent Change in Escapement Share Under US-Canada Agreement by EEZ




Figure 51: Change in Biomass Under US-Canada Agreement by EEZ




Figure 52: Percent Change in Biomass Under US-Canada Agreement by EEZ




Figure 53: Change in Catch Under US-Canada Agreement by EEZ




Figure 54: Percent Change in Catch Under US-Canada Agreement by EEZ




Figure 55: Change in Catch Value Under US-Canada Agreement by EEZ




Figure 56: Percent Change in Catch Value Under US-Canada Agreement by EEZ





Figure 57: Climate-Induced Country Share Changes, With and Without US-Canada Agreement



A Country Share Measure

A.1 Country Share Construction

In this section, I describe the full process of generating my country share measure using the American Atlantic Halibut fishery as an example. The goal is to produce a proxy for the share of the fish population originating in a given country that will remain in the country next period. This is my empirical measure corresponding to θ_i in the theoretical model in Section 2.

The first step in the process is to generate annual suitability rasters for each species based on their particular environmental preferences. Therefore, I begin with the species-level environmental preferences for the relevant species, *Hippoglossus Hippoglossus*, which can be found in Table 8.

Table 8: Atlantic Halibut Environmental Preferences

Parameter	Used	Min	Min Pref	Max Pref	Max
Depth (m)	1	50.00	313.00	864.00	2000.00
Temperature (°C)	1	-0.92	2.23	10.86	18.98
Salinity (psu)	1	5.21	28.51	34.96	37.77
Primary Production ($\text{mgC}\cdot\text{m}^3\cdot\text{day}^{-1}$)	1	1.65	3.77	13.71	42.40
Sea Ice Concentration (0–1 frac.)	1	-0.98	0.00	0.06	0.58
Dissolved Bottom Oxygen ($\text{mmol}\cdot\text{m}^{-3}$)	0	1.33	170.27	310.10	408.48
Distance to Land (km)	0	0.00	9.00	305.00	685.00

Because the minimum depth is less than 200 meters, I use the surface values for Temperature and Salinity, and do not use Dissolved Oxygen to form environmental envelopes. Distance to Land preferences are never used. Depth suitability is set to 1 if the depth of a grid cell is greater than the minimum preferred depth, and to 0 if the depth is less than the minimum depth; for values in between the suitability rises linearly from 0 to 1. For the other four variables, I construct a grid cell-level of suitability for each variable in each year based on where the value falls relative to the minimum, minimum preferred, maximum preferred, and maximum. Figure 58 shows an example of how suitability is calculated for a generic environmental variable: suitability is zero if the value is less than the minimum or greater than the maximum, 1 if the value is between the minimum preferred and maximum preferred, transitions linearly between 0 and 1 between the minimum and minimum preferred, and transitions linearly between 1 and 0 for between the maximum preferred and maximum.

Figure 58: Generic Environmental Envelope





Figure 59 shows the four environmental envelopes used for Atlantic Halibut.


Figure 59: Environmental Envelopes for Atlantic Halibut



With all of the relevant environmental envelopes, I then create an annual raster of habitat suitability based on annual rasters of each environmental variable. Sea Surface temperatures come from NOAA, Depth (static) comes from AquaMaps, and the rest of the variables come from Bio-ORACLE (Assis et al., 2024). I then generate annual, global maps like in Figure 60. The figure shows the predicted suitability of each grid cell for Atlantic Halibut in 2020.


The predicted ranges are massive overpredictions—one can easily see it shows suitable ranges for Atlantic Halibut outside of the Atlantic.

Figure 60: Atlantic Halibut Suitability in 2020



To deal with the overprediction problem, I focus on habitat suitability in ranges around areas known to contain the species. Since my outcomes come from the RAM Stock Assessment Database, I use the relevant shapefiles for each stock as a starting place for determining the range of the stock. These shapefiles define the management area from the perspective of the fishery managers and, therefore, are generally nested in national boundaries. Figure 61 shows the shapefile for the US stock of Atlantic Halibut, found in the Gulf of Maine.

Figure 61: Shapefile for US Atlantic Halibut Stock



With the RAM shapefile, I then identify the relevant EEZ for management based on what EEZ shapefile most overlaps with the RAM shapefile. This lets me distinguish between the US East Coast and the US West Coast even if the RAM dataset would only tell me that the primary country is the US, for example. I also restrict my attention to the area around the RAM shapefile. First I create a raster identifying the shapefile and 300 nautical miles around it. The 300 nautical mile buffer ensures that at least some significant area falls outside of the managing country's EEZ. I then divide that large buffer region into two parts, the managed area and the unmanaged area. Figure 62 shows this for the US Atlantic Halibut stock. The blue area is the area that falls inside the US EEZ, whereas the red area is the area that falls outside. I focus my attention on variation in suitability found in this range.

Figure 62: Atlantic Halibut Management Areas





Figure 63 shows the predicted suitability for Atlantic Halibut in the area around the RAM shapefile for 2000 and 2050. Zooming in on this area where the species is known to be found highlights the actual anticipated effects of climate change. Comparison of the two maps shows a clear northward shift, with the suitability mass moving more into Canadian waters. This aligns with the scientific literature on the shift in the range of Atlantic halibut, which has identified movement from the US to Canada (Czich et al., 2023).


Figure 63: Atlantic Halibut Suitability in 2000 and 2050



Finally, I put the habitat suitability and the management areas together. Figure 64 shows


both the predicted suitability and the management areas for 2000 and 2050. To compute the country share I then calculate the share of the total predicted suitability in the entire buffer area (the sum predicted suitability over red and blue grid cells) that falls inside the management area (just the blue grid cells). This gives a country share of 0.380 in 2000 and a country share of 0.197 in 2050, indicating that the share of the relevant stock that is found in the US's EEZ is predicted to decline significantly from its historic highs due to climate change.

Figure 64: Atlantic Halibut Management and Suitability



Repeating this process for every year between 2000 and 2024, and again for projections in 2030, 2040 and 2050, gives me a country share variable I can add to my panel. It is variation in that variable within a given fishery that I use to identify the effect of the country share on extraction outcomes. Figure 65 shows the calculated values for the US' Atlantic Halibut country share for each year in my data. It shows a trend of declining country share, with significant variation within the historic data.

Figure 65: US Atlantic Halibut Country Share Over Time



A.2 Country Share Validation

In this section I discuss the empirical exercises I do to validate my measure of the country share.

A.2.1 State Variation

First, I construct a state-year level measure of suitability for each of the 168 species in the RAM stock assessment databases. I do this by combining the species-year environmental suitability rasters I generated (explained in Section 3) with a raster of the US EEZ matched to the nearest state. That gives me a grid cell level measure of suitability, which I can attribute to a specific state. For each state-species-year, I calculate the predicted suitable habitat for the species.

Second, I show that the predicted suitable habitat for the species predicts catch of that species in that state in that year. Figure 66 shows the relationship between the suitable range measure and catch in the cross section. Table 9 shows a regression of catch on suitable habitat, controlling for State-Species and Year fixed effects. It shows a statistically significant positive relationship with high explanatory power. I interpret this as favorable evidence that my suitability measure is predicting variation in the available biomass. State level evidence is nice for this, because it allows to use variation in suitability across areas that won't have a confounding behavioral response.

Figure 66: State Catch Vs Suitability




Table 9: Regressing State Catch on Suitability

<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Catch (Tonnes)
Suitable Habitat	54.902* (29.450)
State-Species FE	Yes
Year FE	Yes
Observations	6,806
R ²	0.930
Residual Std. Error	4,865.306 (df = 6364)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Results of regressing state-species-year level catch on estimated suitable habitat in the most proximate areas of the US Exclusive Economic Zone. Results show that my suitability proxy does predict variation in catch within-country, where preemptive and adversarial responses are less likely.

A.2.2 Recruitment

My country share measure is supposed to be an empirical proxy of θ in my model from Section 2. In that model, θ specifically captures what share of recruitment from period t escapement a country expects to receive in period $t+1$. Therefore, another way of validating the country share measure is to show that it predicts recruitment. In Table 10 I show the results of regressing normalized biomass on the lags of normalized escapement, country share, and the interaction between the two. The table shows that a higher country share leads to greater biomass next period, conditional on escapement, consistent with its theoretical role.

Table 10: Regressing Biomass on Lagged Escapement and Country Share

<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
Normalized Biomass	
Lag Norm. Escapement	0.696*** (0.020)
Lag Country Share	0.883*** (0.335)
Lag Country Share×Norm. Escapement	-0.037 (0.036)
Stock FE	Yes
Year FE	Yes
Observations	4,558
R ²	0.599

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Results of regressing biomass on lagged escapement and lagged country share. Positive coefficient on lagged escapement confirms that higher escapement in the prior period increases current biomass. Positive coefficient on lagged country share confirms that higher country share in the prior period increases current biomass.

B Robustness

B.1 Additional Outcomes

Table 11: Log Panel Regressions

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Log Escapement	Log Catch
	(1)	(2)
Country Share	1.487** (0.647)	-3.312*** (0.985)
Log Biomass		0.777*** (0.027)
Stock FE	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes
Observations	4,884	4,884
R ²	0.001	0.160

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Regression results for panel regressions using log(Escapement) and log(Catch) as outcomes for robustness. Regressions use stock and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the stock level. Sample years are 2000-2024. Results are consistent with my main specification, showing that higher country shares increase escapement and decrease catch conditional on biomass.

Table 12: Other Heterogeneity Regressions

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>											
	Norm. Escapement				Norm. Extraction Rate				Norm. Catch			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(9)	(9)	(9)
Country Share	1.695*** (0.620)	1.611*** (0.566)	1.714*** (0.574)	-3.022*** (0.831)	-2.256*** (0.759)	-2.487*** (0.743)	-3.371*** (0.747)	-2.215*** (0.683)	-2.315*** (0.669)			
Norm. Biomass								0.556*** (0.020)	0.556*** (0.020)	0.556*** (0.020)	0.556*** (0.020)	0.556*** (0.020)
Country Share×Multinational				-0.937 (1.376)		2.682 (1.843)			5.278*** (1.657)			
Country Share×Migratory					-2.499 (2.745)		-5.333 (3.678)			-2.144 (3.311)		
High Seas Share						0.189 (0.444)		-0.212 (0.583)		-0.306 (0.525)		
Country Share×HS Share							-4.100 (2.996)					
Stock FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	4,884	4,884	4,884	4,875	4,875	4,875	4,875	4,884	4,884	4,884	4,884	4,884
R ²	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.002	0.152	0.152	0.150	0.150	0.150

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01

Note:

Regression results for additional heterogeneity regressions. Columns (1), (4) and (7) show results interacting the country share with a stock-level indicator for multinational management. Columns (2), (5) and (8) show results interacting the country share with a species-level indicator for highly migratory behavior. Columns (3), (6) and (9) show results interacting the country share with the high seas share. None show any consistent difference between the baseline country share effect and the effect on stocks with more multinational sharing.

Table 13: First Differences Regressions

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Δ Norm. Escapement	Δ Norm. Extraction Rate	Δ Norm. Catch
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Δ Country Share	0.215 (0.366)	-2.297*** (0.709)	-1.677*** (0.648)
Δ Norm. Biomass			0.347*** (0.031)
Constant	0.002 (0.004)	-0.034*** (0.008)	-0.030*** (0.007)
Observations	4,232	4,225	4,232
R ²	0.0001	0.002	0.029

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Regression results for first difference regressions of changes in outcomes on changes in the country share. Standard errors are clustered at the stock level. Sample years are 2000-2024. Results are generally consistent with my main specification, with columns (2) and (3) showing that increases in the country share cause decreases in the extraction rate and catch conditional on biomass. Column (1) shows a positive, but statistically insignificant coefficient. Its sign is consistent with my main results.

Table 14: Long Differences Regressions

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Δ Norm. Escapement	Δ Norm. Extraction Rate	Δ Norm. Catch
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Δ Country Share	4.194* (2.174)	-3.226* (1.874)	-1.919 (1.777)
Δ Norm. Biomass			0.565*** (0.067)
Constant	0.011 (0.057)	-0.320*** (0.049)	-0.295*** (0.046)
Observations	172	172	172
R ²	0.021	0.017	0.298
Residual Std. Error	0.737 (df = 170)	0.635 (df = 170)	0.594 (df = 169)

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Regression results for long difference regressions of changes in average outcomes on changes in the average country share. Standard errors are clustered at the stock level (2000-2005 vs 2015-2020). Results are generally consistent with my main specification, with columns (1) and (2) showing that increases in the country share cause increases in escapement and decreases in the extraction rate, respectively. Column (3) shows a negative, but statistically insignificant coefficient, consistent with the main results.

Table 15: Trends-on-Trends Regressions

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Escapement Trend (1)	Extraction Rate Trend (2)	Catch Trend (3)
Country Share Trend	1.101* (0.590)	-3.179*** (0.969)	-2.369*** (0.875)
Biomass Trend			0.574*** (0.028)
Stock FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,587	3,582	3,587
R ²	0.001	0.003	0.112

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Regression results for regressions of trends in outcomes on trends in the country share. Regressions use stock and year fixed effects. Sample years are 2000-2024. Results are generally consistent with my main specification, showing that an increasing trend in the country share causes an increasing trend in escapement, and decreasing trends in the extraction rate and catch conditional on biomass.

B.2 Alternative Buffer Distances

Figure 67: Escapement on Country Share with Various Buffer Distances




Figure 68: Extraction Rate on Country Share with Various Buffer Distances





Figure 69: Catch on Country Share with Various Buffer Distances



C Climate Scenarios

In this section I present differing results by climate scenario, for three different Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs): SSP1-1.9, SSP2-4.5, and SSP5-8.5. These scenarios combine socioeconomic narratives with greenhouse gas emissions trajectories, designed to facilitate integrated assessment and climate model projections (O'Neill et al., 2014). For example, SSP1-1.9 depicts a world where rapid decarbonization limits warming to around 1.5 °C by 2100. SSP2-4.5 represents a “middle-of-the-road” pathway, where socioeconomic and technological trends broadly follow historical patterns, leading to intermediate forcing levels and warming of roughly 2–3 °C. The baseline results I show in the paper come from SSP2-4.5. Finally, SSP5-8.5 assumes rapid fossil-fueled development with limited climate policy, yielding very high end-of-century forcing and warming outcomes. These scenarios thus differ in their socioeconomic assumptions, emissions pathways, and associated climate outcomes. For my purposes, I take the environmental projections associated with each scenario from Bio-ORACLE (Assis et al., 2024). I use the environmental projections to predict the effects of climate change on each fishery’s country share in that scenario.

The most notable result of this climate scenario analysis is that the general pattern of results does not depend on the specifics of the climate scenario. In the relatively less warming scenario, SSP1-1.9, the predictions are similar to the more extreme scenario, SSP5-8.5, but simply more muted. Places predicted to lose country share still lose, just less dramatically, and all of the follow on effects of that are dampened. This follows naturally from the effects of climate on the country share in the different scenarios: Figure 70 shows the distribution of changes in country shares in each scenario. It shows the same general shape (centered around zero with wide tails) for each scenario, with wider and flatter distributions as the scenarios involve more warming.

Figure 70: Country Share Changes by Scenario




Figure 71: Total Change in Escapement by EEZ Under SSP119

2050 Prediction Under SSP119




Figure 72: Percent Change in Escapement by EEZ Under SSP119

2050 Prediction Under SSP119





Figure 73: Total Change in Escapement by EEZ Under SSP585

2050 Prediction Under SSP585




Change in Escapement (Tonnes)

-500,000 0 500,000 1,000,000

Figure 74: Percent Change in Escapement by Under SSP585

2050 Prediction Under SSP585



Percent Change in Escapement

-5% 0% 5% 10% 15%