It is unusual to see such sophisticated conceptual and theoretical work in combination with detailed case studies. It is perhaps even rarer to find an edited volume in which the editors and contributors appear to have worked so closely together that the overarching theoretical and conceptual apparatus, on the one hand, and the individual chapters, on the other, fit almost seamlessly. The result is a study with a breadth unattainable by a single author but with a coherence and degree of integration hardly ever achieved in a collection of essays.

The book is also commendable for its paradigmatic eclecticism. It draws heavily on ideational perspectives, especially constructivism. Constructivism holds that subjective and intersubjective understandings, more than material or objective forces, shape relations among states. Because stable peace is in essence a state of mind, a cognitive phenomenon, it is a particularly appropriate subject for constructivist analysis. Many of the chapters, including those by John Owen and Magnus Ericson, suggest that a constructivist approach can be quite helpful and perhaps even crucial in explaining the emergence and perpetuation of stable peace. In their fine concluding essay, Elgström and Jerneck, who describe themselves as "moderate constructivists," explicitly recognize the causal importance of international power structures, domestic political configurations, and other less ideational factors. Although neorealism does not figure prominently in the book—since it is skeptical that a peace of sufficient depth and duration to be described as "stable" could ever exist—certain chapters, particularly the one by Benjamin Miller, consider the international systemic origins of stable peace. Other essays examine such traditionally liberal or neoliberal variables as economic relations, international institutions, and regime type.

The study of stable peace overlaps with one of the most prominent research agendas in international relations of the past two decades: democratic peace theory. Lending support to the arguments of that theory, Kacowicz and Bar-Siman-Tov suggest that the presence of well-developed democratic regimes is sufficient, although not necessary, to maintain stable peace. But this book deemphasizes the earlier structural-constraint and normative explanations for democratic peace and focuses instead on the sense of identity shared by democratic (or liberal) states. One of the most interesting and potentially controversial claims is Owen's contention that the formation of common identity crucial to the consolidation of stable peace requires an enemy, an "other." The somewhat depressing but logical conclusion is that stable peace can never be universal. The best one can do is create islands of stable peace and attempt to minimize conflict among them.

If this is true, the democratized world advocated by many democratic peace theorists might not be so pacific after all. Owen's contention is also hard to reconcile with the generally optimistic thrust of constructivism and particularly the assertion of some constructivists that we could escape the pernicious effects of the anarchic Westphalian system if only we would think differently about it. It is, however, despite its origins in an ideational perspective, consistent with the neorealist belief that peace among some states is little more than a byproduct—often a fleeting one—of competition and conflict between those states and others. The compatibility of neorealist and constructivist analysis, in this limited respect at least, is just one of the book's many insights.

Stable Peace among Nations is an excellent work, the most theoretically developed and comprehensive study yet produced on the important but too rarely examined phenomenon of stable peace. It will doubtless remain so for some time.

A Changing United Nations: Multilateral Evolution and the Quest for Global Governance. By W. Andy Knight. New York: Palgrave, 2000. 257p. $65.00.

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Andy Knight examines the prospects for United Nations refrm in the post–Cold War era, offering both historical context as well as speculation about how conducive the contemporary international system is to building a next-generation global organization in the foreseeable future. This useful study, which seeks to blend a theoretical discussion with prescription, starts with a survey of the literature and competing perspectives on UN reform as well as a conceptual treatment of institutional change. It then traces the evolution of the UN, how it has responded to changes in its environment, and the many failed efforts at UN reform. Finally, Knight suggests a new governance model as the basis for a rejuvenated UN.

The author "tries to understand the UN's place in the broader history of multilateral evolution, how the UN system has changed, and why" (p. 11). Although he nicely captures the "institutional foundations" in 1945 (p. 65) and summarizes the key developments since, it is hard to improve on the work of many who have traveled this path, notably Inis Claude (*Swords into Plowshares*, 4th ed., 1984, and "The Record of International Organizations in the Twentieth Century," Tamkang Chair Lecture Series, 1986). The most original aspect of the book is the conceptual treatment of organizational change processes and how these relate to the problem of global governance, that is, the analysis of the pressures being felt by the UN, as a sovereignty-based interstate organization, to adapt to a world being buffeted by both centrifugal (subnational) and centripetal (transnational) forces that are eroding sovereignty.

There is something of a disconnect between the purported empirical thrust of the book and the normative agenda that seems to color much of the analysis. On the one hand, Knight states that "the broad purpose of this book . . . is to describe, analyze, understand, and explain the phenomenon of multilateral evolution as a concept and a practice" (pp. 10–1). On the other hand, much of the discussion is hortatory and reflects antiestablishment, antistatist biases, even though Knight accuses others (American unilateralists and other anti-UN types) of wearing "ideological blinkers" (p. 28). For example: "Future institutions of global governance must become more proactive, addressing underlying reasons for global and domestic conflicts" (p. 9). "Unless the UN can reconstitute itself so that 'we the people' can be brought back into the picture, there is a good chance that some of the emerging multilateral arrangements may be designed in a way that will bypass this organization" (p. 9). "With the end of the Cold War political space was created for the emergence of a human security agenda reflecting the aspirations of social forces, human groups, and individuals across the globe" (p. 169).

It is hard to dispute Knight's statement that, in light of globalization in the economic sphere, new kinds of violence threatening in the security sphere, and numerous other shifts in the landscape of world politics, "there is a need to update the UN machinery to accommodate changes occurring in the broader international society and system" (p. 20). But even if there is a compelling logic that dictates a reformation in international governance arrangements, will, in the words of Stanley Hoffmann (*Primacy or World Order*, 1978, 193), "the need forge a way?" Knight's answer is somewhat confusing. Although "a new consensus on the place of the UN in international politics seems to be developing" (p. 129), "the role of the UN in any new global arrangement is . . . very much unclear" (p. 150).

Studies of international organization in general and the

UN in particular always struggle to avoid the twin traps of bad realism and bad idealism, of succumbing to either excessive cynicism or excessive wishful thinking. Knight tries to get around this problem by framing his work as an exercise in critical theory. He spends considerable time discussing the agent-structure issue and how international institutions like the UN are creatures of habit and practice yet are able to break out of routines and undergo change. He acknowledges the role of power and interests—"multilateral institutions reflect the underlying configuration of power at a particular critical juncture" (p. 184)—but is strangely silent on whether the United States or any other key state actors would support the governance model he proposes as a basis for UN reform.

After a survey of various approaches to UN reform, ranging from those of "status quo advocates," "incremental process reformists," and "adaptive reformists" to more radical views ("dissolutionists" and "successionists"), Knight boils down the modes of changing international organizations to three: reform, adaptation, and learning (p. 40). He argues that neither reform (explicit, planned, formal restructuring) nor adaptation (informal, reflexive, nonpurposive organizational responses to changing circumstances) have worked to make the UN a more effective multilateral institution. He calls for learning as the preferred mode of change and offers a "subsidiarity" model as the best chance for "rethinking" how the UN should function. Similar to the model adopted by the European Union, subsidiarity amounts to "sharing the labour of governance with central, regional, and local bodies" (p. 173). The book is surprisingly sparing in its elaboration of what this would entail, and only a few pages at the end (pp. 170–8) describe the model. Indeed, at a time when Knight admits economic issues threaten to overtake traditional security issues as a paramount global concern, the only real recommendation he puts forth is in the war/peace area: a greater role for regional organizations, such as the Organization of African States and the Organization of African Unity, and, as conflict managers. Not only is this an underwhelming recommendation after almost 200 pages, but also, as the author recognizes, regional organizations have not had much success in the security field over the years.

A central twofold question of our time is: (1) How much government/governance do more than six billion human beings want in their lives, that is, what is the proper relationship between state and society, and (2) to the extent it is understood that some measure of government/governance is needed, what is the optimal level for maximizing benefits in a given issue area, that is, global, regional, national, or local? Knight's book, at times very insightful and eloquent, makes a modest contribution in helping us confront this puzzle. One only wishes he had carried the analysis farther.

The International Law Commission of the United Nations. By Jeffrey S. Morton. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2000. 225p. $29.95.

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Before the eyes of the world, between 600,000 and 800,000 Tutsi were murdered, many hacked to death in front of their families. Rather than confront Hutu power and challenge those responsible for this attempted genocide, the UN pulled out of Rwanda. President Clinton later apologized for the inaction and passivity of the United States. U.S. indifference toward the Rwandan holocaust endures as the Clinton administration's paramount foreign policy failure. After World War II the international community pledged that genocide would never again be tolerated, but in Rwanda it was. Can victimized peoples ever put their trust in the UN and international law? Is it possible both to establish internationally binding codes of conduct that criminalize genocidal practices and to enforce these codes?

Jeffrey Morton helps answer those questions through his exploration of the work of the International Law Commission (ILC) of the UN in two specific endeavors: the establishment of a binding code of international crimes and the creation of a standing international court. His descriptive and empirical study focuses on the evolution of the term "international crimes" and the ILC debates that resulted in the *Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind* and the *Draft Statute of the International Criminal Court*. (These documents are included in the book's appendix.) Since the end of the Cold War, the ILC has devoted most of its time to these issues of international criminal law. Morton's book provides a valuable overview of the significant accomplishments of the ILC in these critical areas.

Students of international law will find the first four descriptive chapters on the history and work of the ILC particularly useful. Morton begins with a well-written summary of the history and organization of the ILC and proceeds with clarifying analysis of ILC work on international crimes, the draft code of crimes, and the international criminal court. He adeptly summarizes the breadth of international crimes, including international terrorism, drug trafficking, torture, colonial domination, genocide, apartheid, war crimes, crimes against humanity, aggression, aircraft hijacking, and piracy. His history of the struggle to codify a draft code of crimes against the peace and security of mankind dramatically illustrates the unprecedented challenge the ILC confronted. The clear summary of the legal sources used and the principles enshrined in the draft code by the ILC is of particular value to scholars of international law.

Morton's chapter on the international criminal court provides a concise review of attempts to establish the court, culminating in the Rome conference in June 1998, and a review of the arguments for and against the creation of a permanent body. Morton focuses on the role of the ILC in drafting the statute for the court. Much progress has been made by the ILC in codifying legal principles into binding rules. The end of the Cold War opened a political door for the creation of an international criminal court, and the ILC moved with dispatch to draft a workable statute.

In the final two chapters, Morton presents an empirical analysis of the ILC. He constructs a database through content analysis of the recorded debate among ILC members on the wording, substance, and scope of the respective draft articles. Commission members' positions are treated "as observations that, when coded, generate data regarding the degree of consensus within the commission on draft articles" (p. 79). Numerical values are assigned to statements, ranging from 1 (minimal consensus) to 5 (maximum consensus). From these data, Morton seeks answers two questions: "(1) Do commission members function independent of or as extensions of their home governments? and (2) What impact, if any, did the end of the cold war have on the International Law Commission" (p. 102)?

On the first question, Morton concludes, "the empirical results are clear and conclusive: the political arena in which nation-states compete for the attainment of their vital interests has penetrated the International Law Commission to such extent that commission debate is a microcosm of world politics. The existence of a cohesive East European bloc of commission members, conflict between commission members from Eastern and Western blocs, a North-South divide, and Southern cooperation in commission debate indicate in the strongest of terms that, indeed, the International Law Commission is a reflection of the political, ideological, and economic struggles of the international arena" (pp. 102–3).

In regard to the second question, the data reveal that the end of the Cold War greatly affected the ILC. "The conflic-