Enforcers, managers, authorities? International organizations and implementation

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1 Introduction

This edited volume has explored the role that international organizations (IOs) play in implementation. The observation that states are increasingly delegating specific tasks to IOs – namely the translation of international agreements into laws, regulations, or institutions at the domestic level – led us to pose two main questions. First, what resources do IOs have at their disposal to ensure that states follow through on their international commitments, and how effective are these? Second, how do domestic institutions, actors, and political processes impede or facilitate the efforts of IOs? For the purposes of this volume, we defined implementation as a phase of the policy cycle that involves various actors and, unlike compliance and effectiveness, involves the active mobilization of resources. The case studies in this volume have generated interesting findings. They suggest that IOs not only use their instruments in more varied ways than the literature suggests, but also that authority plays a much more important role than previously assumed and that IOs lacking enforcement powers are not necessarily any less effective than those that do possess them. Moreover, while domestic institutions and opposition from dominant societal or state actors can hamper the implementation of international agreements, IOs are not entirely powerless in the face of such obstacles.

2 The institutional resources of international organizations

The contributors to this volume examined a broad range of IOs exhibiting varying degrees of institutionalization (see Figure 13.1). Of these, the European Union (EU) – as far as its activities within the First Pillar are concerned – occupies the top end of the scale. Not only do its organs enjoy a significant degree of autonomy, but also they are equipped with significant enforcement power. The European Commission can initiate infringement procedures with the European Court of Justice, if member states fail to implement directives or regulations, and respond to inaction with financial penalties. Closely following is the World Trade Organization (WTO) with its trade dispute settlement system whose decisions are binding for member states. At the other end of the spectrum are

Figure 13.1 International organizations ranked according to their degree of institu-
tionalization.

organizations – such as United Nations treaty secretariats, the Basel Committee
on Bank Supervision, the Financial Stability Forum (FSF), and the Financial
Action Task Force (FATF) – which exhibit a low degree of institutionalization
and possess few means by which to enforce international agreements beyond
naming and shaming. IOs, such as the World Bank (the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, IBRD), the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), or the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN),
on the one hand, and the International Labour Organization (ILO), the Council
of Europe (CoE), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and
the EU in its operations outside the First Pillar, on the other hand, can be found
somewhere in the middle of the scale. While their ability to act is much more
circumscribed by the will of the member states than the EU First Pillar, they do
possess a variety of means to punish non-implementation. The respective IOs
can closely monitor states, publish information that may affect their reputation
adversely, or penalize states by, for example, withholding loans or aid. What all
of these IOs have in common is that they enjoy some degree of authority and
resources to engage in capacity building. How much or how little, however, is
more difficult to determine since some of the means involved (such as expertise)
are less tangible than those associated with enforcement (such as legal penal-
ties). In the remainder of this section, we summarize the evidence generated by
the case studies regarding the use of the different approaches and the question of
effectiveness.

2.1 How do international organizations employ the different implementation approaches?

In the introductory chapter, we noted that scholars of international relations have advanced competing propositions regarding the various approaches to implementation. While some suggest that enforcement, management, and the normative approach are mutually exclusive and must be viewed in an 'either-or' fashion (e.g. Downs *et al.* 1996), others, by contrast, argue that they are compatible (e.g. Tallberg 2002). The chapters in this volume suggest that, in fact, IOs combine the different approaches to implementation in creative ways. In the field of social policy, Hartlapp, in Chapter 2, for example, finds that the EU used enforcement and capacity building successively; the ILO, meanwhile, combined the use of naming and shaming, and reporting techniques with knowledge and resource transfer, using these different approaches simultaneously to complement one another. Also, Martens and Balzer, in Chapter 7, demonstrate that in education policy, both the EU and the OECD make use of their reputation at the same time as they engage in capacity building. Similarly, examining civil service reform in Russia in Chapter 11, Gray shows that the IMF and the World Bank began with coercive measures, such as aid conditionality, but moved to capacity building when the former proved ineffective. Meanwhile, Piroska, in Chapter 10, finds that in the case of banking sector reform in Slovenia and Hungary, the IMF and the World Bank supplied information and technical assistance to the respective countries while at the same time using coercive measures by tying financial aid to conditions.

What accounts for this combining of implementation strategies or the propensity among IOs to use the resources available to them in a non-traditional fashion? One explanation appears to be the reluctance, or inability, of IOs to employ their most powerful weapon – enforcement. In this case, IOs may try to compensate for their limitations by using other instruments as functional equivalents by, for example, combining softer enforcement measures with managerial resources or by using capacity building in a coercive manner. Another explanation appears to be a growing recognition among IOs that non-implementation has a variety of causes, and that it can be more a symptom of inability than ill-will, and that different approaches may therefore be needed. For example, in her study on the EU, Hartlapp attributes the increased use of the managerial approach by the EU to the growing awareness that member states need help with implementing directives, together with a Commission Communication that recommends that cases should be handled by means other than infringement measures. Finally, IOs may combine different approaches to implementation with the aim of enhancing their credibility and effectiveness. In his study on the EU, Tallberg argues that it is the twinning of enforcement and management that makes the European Commission such an effective institution when it comes to combating violations on the part of member states. By combining monitoring, consultation, assistance, and naming and shaming with legal and economic sanctions, the Commission can step up the pressure making it an

increasingly attractive option for EU governments to follow through with implementation (Tallberg 2002: 617).

Several chapters in this volume add interesting caveats to the twinning thesis. First, while Tallberg assumes that IOs employ softer measures first and then move to stronger ones, Gray's study in Chapter 11 shows that this progression is not necessarily a natural one and that other logics are possible. Faced with growing opposition and little change in the Russian civil service, the IMF and the World Bank, for example, pursued exactly the opposite strategy. They shifted from an enforcement approach to a managerial one with the aim of maintaining their credibility and enhancing their effectiveness.

Second, the normative power of IOs, rooted in legitimacy and authority, appears to be a crucial, though neglected, nexus for both enforcement and management (see Figure 13.2). For either coercive measures or capacity building to work effectively, IOs depend on their image as neutral and impartial actors. Sharman, in Chapter 4, claims that the blacklisting activities of the OECD, the FSF, and the FATF worked precisely against tax havens because of the authority – the normative power – enjoyed by these organizations. Likewise, Conzelmann asserts in Chapter 3 that it was the intellectual authority of the OECD that contributed to the effectiveness of state reporting. And comparing the implementation of the equal pay directive in France, Germany, and the Netherlands, Van der Vleuten, in Chapter 8, finds that the European Commission was much more prone to using enforcement when its reputation as 'Guardian of the Treaties' was at stake.

Given that authority and legitimacy are so central to the influence of IOs, it is somewhat ironic that they are particularly volatile resources. Normative power is intersubjective. It depends on the perceptions of others and demands certain forms of behaviour on the part of IOs. Using it in combination with other resources is, therefore, not without risk. Enforcement and managerial skills require measures that may ultimately undermine the normative power of IOs. In the case of blacklisting, in Chapter 4, naming and shaming proved an effective way of promoting compliance among tax havens only in the short term and ultimately undermined the very authority that had initially contributed to the influence of IOs. Bauer, in Chapter 5, also draws attention to the potentially negative consequences when linking different approaches to implementation. The United


Figure 13.2 The crucial nexus between normative power, enforcement, and management.

Nations Convention to Combat Desertification Secretariat was able to steer the implementation of the Convention in the desired direction and was respected by governments. But its power declined when it began consistently to back the lobby efforts of developing countries, in other words, when it moved away its role as a neutral and impartial facilitator and became a political actor itself. Finally, Christou and Simpson, in Chapter 6, note that the contradiction between ICANN's strong enforcement resource – the control over ccTLDs – and its much weaker and continuously contested authority interfered significantly with its effectiveness. Rejecting the strong involvement of the United States in the organization, disgruntled members have attempted to sideline ICANN and searched for alternative modes of Internet governance by reviving the International Telecommunications Union and developing different models of Internet governance for the future, two of which directly challenged ICANN.

These examples illustrate that legitimacy and authority are essential resources for IOs involved in implementation but that they cannot be taken for granted. IOs may be highly regarded among states today, but they fall into disrepute tomorrow if they are seen to take sides, push too hard, or embarrass governments too much. As Sharman puts it in Chapter 4, IOs are meant to 'change minds through reasoned debate in pursuit of common goals, not to twist arms to win zero-sum games'. Does this mean that IOs can never be active or take a stance? According to Bauer, they can, but it simply requires them to act cautiously and considerately.

2.2 Does greater enforcement power equate with greater effectiveness for international organizations?

IOs with greater powers of enforcement are often considered to be more effective than other IOs (see, for example, Downs *et al.* 1996). The case studies in this volume suggest that we should be more cautious in making this assumption for several reasons. First, daily news and scholars of international relations remind us that formal power does not necessarily equate with, or translate into, actual power. Even when IOs possess powerful tools, they may refrain from using them. It is often argued that this phenomenon comes about because of a lack of political will on the part of member states. Hartlapp, in Chapter 2, for example, demonstrates that the ILO is restricted in using its complaint procedure because it is 'dominated by a political logic' and highly contingent on the interests of, and consensus between, member states. Since the Second World War, the organization has used its most powerful instruments – to call on its member states and other IOs to sanction the country found in breach of ILO conventions – only once, in the case of Mayanmar in 1996. However, the case studies also indicate that apart from the ill-will of member states, there may be other reasons behind the reluctance of IOs to use their most powerful instruments.

For example, IOs may hesitate to use their strongest instrument against states because of anticipated negative consequences. They may fear that their power will be curtailed by member states, that their reputation and credibility might

suffer, or that they might lose their battle with the states concerned. Examining the implementation of European gender equality policies since the 1960s in Germany, the Netherlands, and France, Van der Vleuten, in Chapter 8, finds that the Commission did not initiate an infringement procedure against Germany at first, despite its failure to follow through on the equal pay directive, because it did not expect to win the case in court. Only when the pressure on the Commission rose, and its credibility was at stake, did it call on the European Court of Justice. Similarly, Sharman's analysis in Chapter 4 reveals that the FSF, the OECD, and the FATF stopped blacklisting countries that engaged in harmful tax competition and money laundering when their reputation and authority were at stake. Faced with criticism by both targeted states as well as other IOs (such as the IMF, the World Bank, and the UN), the respective IOs chose to terminate the use of what had proven a fairly successful tool.

Finally, lack of resources may also contribute to the failure to use enforcement mechanisms. In the case of the EU, several authors in this volume attribute the Commission's preference for naming and shaming or scoreboards – as opposed to infringement proceedings – to the shortage of administrative personnel available to systematically and comparatively conduct assessments of the implementation situation in member states (Hartlapp, in Chapter 2) and unfamiliarity with national implementation styles or administrative cultures (Versluis, in Chapter 9). Moreover, the time-consuming and tedious nature of the infringement procedure is, according to Hartlapp, another reason why the Commission is much less prone to use this procedure when member states fail to implement directives at all, or do so incorrectly, than when they are merely behind schedule.

Second, whether IOs equipped with more enforcement power are more effective than ones with less enforcement power depends on how, by whom, and under what conditions the resources of the various implementation approaches are applied. Conzelmann's comparison of the OECD and the WTO in Chapter 3, for example, shows that the OECD performs much better when it comes to state reporting, than the WTO, even though it possesses fewer coercive resources. According to Conzelmann, this paradoxical finding is explained by the variation in the autonomy of the respective secretariats and the way they use state reporting. In the case of the OECD, the secretariat enjoys a considerable degree of authority, is able to structure the agenda of review meetings, and uses the information to enhance transparency among governments, facilitating open exchange and mutual learning. The autonomy of the WTO Secretariat is much more circumscribed, by contrast. While it can exert influence by expressing thematic concerns or through close coordination with the chairperson of the review sessions, it is more dependent on the goodwill and the receptivity of its members, particularly the more powerful ones. Furthermore, state reporting is used in a coercive fashion, namely to exert pressure on members who fail to implement. Hence, enforcement power is not in itself sufficient for IOs to be effective. The effectiveness of enforcement power depends on who employs this power and in what way.

A final problem with assuming a positive correlation between enforcement

power and effectiveness is that this presupposes an IO that functions almost perfectly across the board. However, the case studies suggest that 'weak' IOs perform much better when it comes to capacity building than IOs that have the means to sanction and monitor implementers. According to Hartlapp, in Chapter 2, the ILO fairs much better in terms of managerial skills than the EU, because its structure is better suited to financial assistance and knowledge transfer. When it comes to applying enforcement measures, the ILO is hampered by the institutionally entrenched need for consensus; in capacity building, by contrast, it enjoys much more autonomy. While member states can formally oppose the employment of management strategies, such as technical cooperation, this requires explicit and substantial opposition, a prerequisite that governments often fail to meet. Versluis, in Chapter 9, also stresses that performance is highly conditional. In the case of the EU, one needs to distinguish between formal implementation, defined as the 'transposition' of directives into domestic law, and 'practical implementation', involving the establishment of institutions, the adoption of policies, or the abolition of existing standards. While the EU performs rather well with respect to the former, practical implementation, according to Versluis, can genuinely be labelled 'a blind spot' for the Commission. It lacks the in-depth knowledge of practical, street-level implementation that is necessary for the infringement procedure to work efficiently. What accounts for this pattern? First, lacking enforcement power, IOs may turn what could be viewed as a shortcoming into a strength. Short of other options, they may devote a great deal of effort on finessing and honing their managerial skills. Second, IOs that do not possess coercive power may be more accepted among states because they provide financial or technical assistance without any strings attached.

In sum, many of the chapters in this volume point to a need for caution with the assumption that highly institutionalized IOs equipped with more enforcement power are more effective when it comes to implementation than those with fewer such powers or none at all. Under certain conditions, the most powerful IO can be hampered when its legitimacy is questioned, when the political will of member states is lacking, or when it lacks the necessary resources to use enforcement measures. Relatively weak IOs, on the other hand, can operate quite effectively and impose severe reputation and material costs. As the various examples illustrate, effectiveness is not simply a matter of having coercive tools but also hinges on the standing of the IO involved and how it uses its resources.

3 Domestic-level factors, international organizations, and implementation

The second objective of this volume was to assess the ways in which domestic-level factors impede or facilitate the work of IOs in implementation. In particular, we were interested in the role of domestic institutions and societal actors. While the two are closely related since, for example, the type of political system also affects power relations between actors; we nevertheless discuss them separately for reasons of simplicity in this section.

3.1 *Domestic institutions, international organizations, and implementation*

Scholars studying implementation in the context of the EU have stressed that a state's willingness to act on EU policies depends on their 'goodness of fit' with domestic institutions. The better the compatibility of these policies with political and societal arrangements at the national level, the more likely governments will be to undertake the needed changes, since the adjustment costs are expected to be minimal. By contrast, the greater the discrepancies between EU prescriptions and national conditions, the greater the likelihood that governments will resist and fail to implement (e.g. Knill and Lenschow 2001). Several chapters in Part III of this volume lend support to this proposition.

Examining the implementation of the Basel Capital Accords in Hungary and Slovenia, Piroska, in Chapter 10, attributes the variations observed between the two countries to institutional differences. In Hungary, the IMF and the World Bank encountered greater resistance from the government that benefited from cross-ownerships between state-owned banks and companies, had significant influence over the bank supervisory agency tasked with overseeing the implementation of the Accord, and tolerated an accounting system that still reflected the philosophy of the old planned economy and made it possible to hide debts. The two IOs found more conducive conditions in Slovenia, by contrast. In place of a weak agency, the strong and independent Slovenian Central Bank had been tasked with monitoring implementation. Moreover, cross-ownerships, debts, and bad assets proved less of a problem since the Slovenian government had already prescribed a bank rehabilitation process in the early 1990s and prevented the hiding of debts by, first, having state officials monitor the special relationship between banks and companies and by, second, granting shareholders a say in lending policies.

In her comparative study on the implementation of EU directives regulating the handling of dangerous chemical substances, Versluis, in Chapter 9, also finds support for the 'goodness of fit' thesis. In the case of the Seveso II directive requiring chemical companies to develop major accident prevention and emergency plans, she finds little resistance in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, where existing inspection practices closely matched those prescribed by the EU, but inadequate implementation in Germany and Spain, where inspectors were accustomed to checking technical details rather than general management and where they approached matters from a civil protection perspective rather than an environmental occupational safety perspective. Finally, Van der Vleuten, in Chapter 8, also explains the initial resistance of the Netherlands, Germany, and France to European gender equality policies with missing or incompatible national legislation.

While the fit or misfit between domestic and international policies appears to be important, it does not seem the only reason why states embark on implementation or refrain from doing so. Versluis, for example, shows that differences in national implementation styles account for the variations observed regarding the

Seveso II directive, but not for the Safety Data Sheets directive. In this latter case, issue salience proved more critical. In three of the four countries examined (Spain, Germany, and the United Kingdom), other issues – such as, for example, ensuring the implementation of the Seveso II directive – were of greater importance to national inspectors than checking whether companies housing dangerous substances had prepared data sheets with correct and up-to-date information on chemical products.

Furthermore, rather than acting as obstacles, the chapters in Part III also suggest that IOs may also use domestic institutions as leverage to promote and ensure the implementation of international policies. Van der Vleuten, for example, finds that the governments of Germany, France, and the Netherlands ceased to resist the implementation of EU gender equality directives when a coalition of domestic actors and the Commission exerted pressure on them by reminding the governments of their professed national images. France was depicted as 'role model for social policy', Germany as 'guardian of fundamental rights', and the Netherlands as 'progressive government'.

In line with the 'goodness of fit' thesis, some scholars have argued that implementation hinges on the type of government of the states concerned (e.g. Slaughter 1995). According to this line of thinking, mature democracies provide an easier terrain for IOs than newly emerging ones. While the former are accustomed to rule of law, consensual agreements, independent judiciaries, and societal groups exerting pressure, the latter are often characterized by highly unstable political conditions and a rather weak civil society. Several case studies provide evidence for the relevance of this argument. In the case of Russian civil service reform in Chapter 11, Gray, for example, shows that the IMF and the World Bank had great difficulties in getting organized and made little progress in the desired direction when Yeltsin was still in power. Scandals and corruption surrounded Yeltsin's presidency, and those agencies such as Roskadry, tasked with overseeing the reform process, were dismantled shortly after they had been established. Only later, when Vladimir Putin took office and placed the state apparatus under tighter controls, did the efforts of the two IOs bear fruits. Galbreath's chapter on Estonian and Latvian minority policies also supports the assertion that the implementation of international policies is much more challenging for IOs in fledgling democracies. In both countries, the contested heritage of the Soviet Union's policies with regard to language and settlement prevented more liberal citizenship laws until the late 1990s.

Overall, IOs appear to be faced with greater difficulties in new democracies. Does this mean that things go smoothly in mature democracies? Not necessarily. As we have already illustrated, specific institutional characteristics and arrangements may obstruct an IO's implementation strategy even in more stable settings. Moreover, opposition from societal actors may frustrate the efforts of IOs.

3.2 *Domestic actors, international organizations, and implementation*

At the domestic level, different types of actors may have a stake in the implementation of internationally agreed-upon policies, including interest groups, companies, political parties, or bureaucrats. Some of them may be actively involved in bringing national policies in line with the respective international policies. Others, by contrast, may try to prevent them or consider this particular stage of the policy cycle as an opportunity to bring the contents of such policies closer to their preferences.

Whether IOs will have to reckon with domestic-level actors depends on their overall position in society and how these actors will be affected by the international agreement. Implementation should be easier for IOs when societal or state actors opposing or favouring the international agreement are equally positioned or when those benefiting from implementation enjoy significant influence. By contrast, IOs should have greater difficulties in states where societal or state actors suffering adverse effects from the international agreement are in a dominant position (cf. Ikenberry *et al.* 1988; Risse-Kappen 1995). Several chapters in Part III provide evidence for this proposition. In his analysis of minority rights policies in Estonia and Latvia, Galbreath, in Chapter 12, shows that due to their power in the national parliaments and the governing coalitions, conservative and far-right political parties in both countries successfully resisted pressure from the CoE and the OSCE until the 1990s to amend citizenship legislation. According to Gray, in Chapter 11, domestic power configurations also played a role when the IMF and the World Bank tried to induce reform of the civil service in Russia. The efforts of the two IOs had little effect under Boris Yeltsin's presidency when entrenched elements of the former Soviet bureaucracy still retained significant power. Finally, Van der Vleuten, in Chapter 8, finds that the European Commission faced greater difficulties regarding the implementation of equal rights policies in pluralist France, where women's organizations and trade unions were divided than in the corporatist Netherlands and Germany, where these groups were unified and enjoyed significant influence.

While IOs may be frustrated by the activities of dominant societal groups, they are not entirely powerless. Instead, they can try to manipulate the political opportunity structures of domestic actors. In the case of minority policies, European IOs were able to overcome the opposition of conservative and far-right parties towards more liberal citizenship legislation in Estonia and Latvia, when the carrot of EU membership was offered simultaneously. Similarly, Gray shows that the IMF and the World Bank were able to generate support among politicians and bureaucrats in support for civil service reform when shifting from an enforcement approach to managerial assistance. Van der Vleuten, too, demonstrates how the European Commission was able to ensure that the Dutch government implemented the equal pay directive by mobilizing and establishing contact with women's organizations and trade unions in favour of such legislation.

While IOs may have a particular strong interest in turning domestic tides in their favour, mobilizing support is by no means always a top-down process. In the case of Germany and EU equal-pay policies, Van der Vleuten points out that the impetus for the Commission to initiate infringement proceedings in the face of non-implementation came from the feminist groups, trade unions, domestic courts, and members of the European Parliament. Concerned about its reputation as 'Guardian of the Treaties' and criticized for its inaction, the Commission responded to increasing transnational pressure.

Most chapters in Part III of this volume suggest that IOs rarely succeed in ensuring implementation by themselves, and that they need powerful domestic allies to realize their objectives. Even a highly institutionalized IO such as the EU is paralyzed without support from domestic groups and courts. While allies are important for IOs, picking the right one from among the many potential candidates is no easy task, particularly in relatively unstable political systems such as the new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe. While in Slovenia, the independent Central Bank was the obvious partner, the preferred choice in Hungary was much less clear (Chapter 10). In Russia, Roskadry was initially a useful ally for the IMF and the World Bank; it was shut down by President Yeltsin overnight (Chapter 11) and replaced under Putin with the Commission for the Reform of Government. Sometimes, however, domestic support is not in itself sufficient, and IOs need to rely on international allies. In the case of Estonian and Latvian minority policies (Chapter 12), for example, the EU, OSCE, and the CoE profited from the pressure exerted by actors as diverse as the United States and Russia. However, even this combination of major power pressure and the carrot of EU membership could not cajole conservative political parties in both Baltic states into changing all their hard-line policies.

4 Implications for the study of international organizations

What are the implications of these findings for the study of IOs and implementation? First, this volume underscores the observation that the implementation of international decisions matters in the field of international policy-making. Implementation is a new phase in the policy cycle that provides opportunities for old and new actors to influence the consequences of such international agreements on the ground. It encompasses more than the match between actual behaviour and prescribed norms (compliance) or the amelioration of domestic problems with the help of international agreements (effectiveness). Implementation requires the mobilization of resources by many different actors with varying policy preferences. It therefore seems essential to continue our analysis beyond simple agenda-setting and decision-making. Studying implementation in greater depth not only tells us more about the process itself and the actors involved, but also how international agreements matter, how and why they may be contested, why they may not achieve the desired results, and why they may be amended.

Second, implementation is no longer a topic only of public administration and comparative political systems but also one that scholars of international

relations need to devote more attention to. As the various case studies in this volume demonstrate, IOs affect governance not only between, but also within, nation-states. While the EU is the most obvious example in this respect, since its First-Pillar policies have direct effect and trump national legislation, other IOs also impact on domestic societies. Consider the IMF or the World Bank whose loans are tied to conditions requiring states to restructure their political systems and economies. Thus far, scholars have been more concerned with the question of why IOs are established or what role they play in the consummation of international agreements, but less with the question of how they affect the world around them (Barnett and Finnemore 1999: 726). In the light of the growing involvement of IOs in domestic affairs, however, it may be time to shift our focus to investigate how IOs instigate change at the national level, why they are more – or less – successful in some settings than others, and how their involvement in implementation in turn affects their global governance functions.

Third, we need more nuanced theories about the scope conditions of implementation approaches. The case studies in this volume challenge most of the assumptions that have been advanced by proponents of the enforcement approach (e.g. Downs *et al.* 1996). Neither do IOs employ enforcement tools nearly as often as the approach leads us to expect, nor do they use coercive measures in an exclusionary fashion. Instead, IOs appear to rely more frequently on a combination of managerial and normative resources and the use of enforcement instruments in a non-coercive manner (for example, employing monitoring as a tool for capacity building). While the chapters in this volume offer some insight as to why IOs may engage in such behaviour, much more empirical research is needed to determine more precisely when, and why, IOs employ different approaches to implementation in a complementary fashion or employ the instruments associated with them in an unconventional fashion.

The fourth important conclusion emerging from this volume is that the authority and legitimacy of IOs is crucial when it comes to implementation. IOs depend on their image as 'neutral bystanders' and 'experts'. Even in the absence of coercive measures, they can play a powerful role if they have an information advantage over member states and are highly regarded among them. However, this role becomes much weaker if their legitimacy and authority are contested. Maintaining this power requires IOs to be astute and to know exactly when to exert pressure on member states, when to let off, and when to withdraw. While scholars of international relations have paid greater attention to the normative power of IOs in recent years, they have mainly done so by focusing on other phases of the policy cycle than implementation (for exceptions, see Risse *et al.* 1999 and Finnemore 1996). This is surprising. The translation of international agreements seems to be a particularly hard case for testing the power of IO authority, since states have to respond with concrete and often costly measures at the domestic level. Furthermore, the implementation phase also offers an excellent opportunity to examine the interaction between normative and other types of power, given that IOs, as noted above, rarely rely on just one type. The case studies in this volume suggest that an uneasy relationship exists between

normative and coercive power that warrants further study. While enforcement measures may yield short-term success in having states follow through on their international commitments, they may threaten the existence and influence of IOs in the long run by damaging their authority and reputation. Finally, our findings regarding the normative power of IOs also draw attention to aspects that have hitherto been neglected in the principal–agent literature. Interested in the ways in which states control IOs to which they have delegated parts of their sovereignty, scholars working largely from a rationalist perspective (for a summary, see Bendor *et al.* 2001) have stressed the role of institutional checks ('fire alarms') and active monitoring ('police controls'). However, the case studies indicate that there may be other mechanisms at work that keep the agents from becoming too independent. On the one hand, IOs themselves may exercise self-restraint. Concerned about their credibility and authority, they may, as some chapters demonstrate, refrain from engaging in behaviour that might upset their members. On the other hand, normative power can also be used by principals as a means to prevent their agents from shirking. Knowing that normative power is the Achilles' heel of IOs, member states may use this as an instrument to prevent their agents from shirking by raising doubts about their credibility and impartiality. In the light of these dynamics, it would be a worthwhile endeavour to pay closer attention in future to what one might call the 'politics of reputation' when analyzing the relations between IOs and their membership (cf. Mercer 1996).

In summary, the case studies in this volume provide plenty of food for thought for scholars interested in the role of IOs and questions of implementation. The evidence generated by the various contributors makes clear that the involvement of IOs in this phase of the policy cycle can hardly be captured with one particular approach. Rarely are IOs exclusively enforcers, managers, or authorities. Rather, in most instances we observed, they wore at least two of these hats, if not all three.

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