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The Two Faces of the United Nations: The Tension Between Intergovernmentalism and Transnationalism

Bruce Cronin

There is a tension within the United Nations between intergovernmentalism and transnationalism, two forces that encompass different sets of interests and reflect distinct constituencies. As an intergovernmental institution, the UN reflects the overlapping interests of its member states, particularly those on the Security Council. Major initiatives and policies are promoted by accredited delegations, all of whom represent their governments. As a transnational organization, however, the UN also often represents a common good that transcends the sum of individual state interests. Such concerns are promoted by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and by the UN's specialized agencies, affiliated organizations, bureaucracy, and office of the secretary-general. In many cases, transnational concerns such as human rights or humanitarian relief conflict with the more traditional intergovernmental ones such as security. When this occurs, the UN is unable to function effectively.

This conflict between intergovernmentalism and transnationalism reflects a similar tension within the international system itself. Intergovernmentalism is certainly the dominant force in world politics, but transnational actors have also achieved increased visibility and influence within the global organization. From this perspective, the UN not only provides a forum for states to resolve their disputes, it also serves as a medium through which state and nonstate actors promote their often competing interests. Thus, the conflict between these forces within the UN can help to illustrate their respective roles in international politics.

In this article I examine this tension and explore what this may mean for the future of global politics. Since this is primarily a conceptual essay, I do not present original data nor examine specific cases in any detail. Rather my purpose is to identify and explain a phenomenon

and provide a framework through which one can undertake empirical studies in the future.

In the first section I examine the intergovernmental and transnational foundations of the UN system. I argue that while traditional theories of international organizations can explain the intergovernmental side of the UN, they have trouble accounting for the transnational aspects. In the next section I try to account for this other face of the UN by suggesting that the UN is not only a forum for interstate cooperation, but also an institutional embodiment of an "international community," independent of the states that compose it. The benefits that are enjoyed by this broadly defined community can be viewed as the common good. In the third section I examine the inherent tension between these two forces. I argue that when the interests of the states conflict with those of the broader community, the organization becomes paralyzed. In the last section I discuss the broader implications of the conflict for theories of international relations.

In distinguishing between intergovernmental and transnational functions, I use the following criteria: First, which constituency is being *served* in a particular operation or program: the member states, local populations, nongovernmental interest groups, the "international community" as a whole, or regional organizations? I define those programs that serve primarily nonstate actors as transnational. Second, who are the primary actors *initiating* the operation or program: the member states, specialists within the UN agencies, government representatives to functional bodies, NGOs, or the UN Secretariat? Those activities that require the active cooperation and participation of the states are intergovernmental. Those that rely primarily on UN agencies, NGOs, specialized agencies, or the Secretariat are considered transnational. Third, through what process are state interests defined in a particular issue: domestically, through consultation with representatives from other countries, through interaction among specialists or representatives of NGOs, or by initiation of the secretary-general? Interests that develop through diplomatic or domestic political channels are intergovernmental, while those that evolve from within the UN structure are transnational.

The United Nations as an International Organization

From an analytical perspective, the UN is an enigma. It does not fit neatly into the traditional category of an international organization, nor does it embody the characteristics of a budding world government.[1] It was originally conceived primarily as a collective security organization,

yet its goals, practices, and institutional structure suggest a far broader and more ambitious social agenda. It is an organization of, by, and for independent sovereign states, yet it is also a semi-independent actor staffed with a semiautonomous civil service.[2] Its constituency is the states, yet it also serves a wide range of nonstate actors, regional organizations, and even individuals regardless of nationality or boundaries.

On the one hand, the UN reflects the basic principles of intergovernmentalism.[3] It was created by member governments and is governed by representative consultative conference organs; it has a permanent secretariat.[4] Delegates representing the interests of their governments largely develop its policies and programs through a process of bargaining and collaboration. And like all intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), the UN is designed to equip the multistate system with an administrative mechanism that can do things for the states that they cannot do well by themselves. Alan James describes this side of the United Nations as follows:

> [The United Nations] fundamentally is nothing more than an association of sovereign states . . . each member will be trying to use the United Nations to further its own interests . . . States have not joined out of respect for the "U.N. idea" (but) for what they can get out of it.[5]

Both neorealist and liberal institutionalist theories can account for this face of the United Nations. For neorealists, the UN reflects the distribution of power and capabilities among its members. Created after World War II by the winning coalition, substantive authority rests with the great powers through the Security Council. During the Cold War, the organization's security policies largely reflected the dynamics of bipolarity and, subsequently, the interests of the only remaining superpower, the United States. In the area of political economy, the UN has reflected the structural conflict between North and South that comes from the skewed distribution of national material power capabilities in the international system.[6] As predicted by most realists, the outcome of this conflict has been generally determined by this same distribution of power. Finally, as realists would expect, the major powers have usually hesitated becoming involved in potentially violent situations where their vital interests were not threatened; indeed, they have demonstrated a clear unwillingness to trust their security to the global organization.[7] As a result, the organization has not fulfilled the promise of collective security as espoused by the founders.[8]

Institutionalists, in both their strong and weak varieties, can also explain the intergovernmental side of the UN. The world organization brings together governments that support the fundamental goals of peace,

security, and prosperity but recognize that in an interdependent world they can accomplish this only through interstate coordination and collaboration. Governments often find that by themselves they cannot achieve their objectives, since doing so depends upon exerting authority over actions within other states' jurisdictions. As a state's own vulnerability to others' actions increases, its willingness to trade some legal freedom for additional influence over others increases.[9]

Thus, the United States sought to create an international order along broadly multilateral lines, but it did not seek to endow the UN with extensive independent powers.[10] The creation of the UN did not challenge the basic assumptions government leaders held about the nature of interstate relations. The primary intergovernmental function of the organization—the coercive control of state conduct—reflects the conventional wisdom of balance of power and collective security theory: order in a multistate system depends upon the ability of states to check and control each other's behavior.[11] This can explain why states would create and participate in a multipurpose, universal membership organization that involves itself even in areas where no normative consensus exists.

The United Nations as a Transnational Organization

Despite this strong intergovernmentalist orientation, there is also another face to the UN. More than simply a forum to facilitate interstate negotiation on issues of mutual concern, the "UN system" is also a complex network of specialized agencies, NGOs, and affiliated semiautonomous organizations that serve a variety of constituencies in a wide range of areas. Many of the organization's regional commissions, for example, have developed a high degree of autonomy that is based on deep political ties to local (nonstate) constituencies. Similarly, many of the specialized agencies and affiliated organizations were established by multilateral treaty independently of the UN structure. UN member states and the Security Council have little control over these autonomously governed and financed bodies. The UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), for example, has its own secretariat and secretary-general. It operates semiautonomously from the UN Secretariat, although it is technically under the authority of the General Assembly.

The various agencies and affiliated organizations often initiate projects and policies that are at odds with the most powerful states. Moreover, their constituencies go well beyond states and governments.[12] For example, the International Labour Organization's (ILO) tripartite structure

places personnel from labor ministries, trade unions, and employee associations at the center of its work, and the World Bank maintains close ties to autonomous central banks and private financial institutions.

Moreover, the UN itself has become an independent international actor in both a legal and political sense. As the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled in 1949, the UN has an international legal personality, is subject to international law, and is capable of possessing international rights and duties.[13] This is reinforced by the way member states treat the organization. While at times the states view the organization as simply a forum for negotiation and conflict management, at other times they act as if the UN has its own identity, negotiating with and often blaming "it" for outcomes produced by the organization's actions.[14] This is particularly true within peacekeeping missions and programs initiated by the UN's specialized agencies. All of this helps to create a transnational identity for the organization, conferring upon it the status of "international actor."

Another indication of the UN's transnational nature is the multiple sources of power and authority within the organization. The United States and other great powers dominate the organization's security agenda, yet initiatives in other issue areas—for example development programs, technical and humanitarian assistance, and human rights activities—are led primarily by nonstate actors, semiautonomous agencies, and developing states. The Secretariat, which is composed of international civil servants headed by the secretary-general, is an autonomous organ, constitutionally independent from the Security Council and the General Assembly.[15] Although appointed by the intergovernmental organs, the secretary-general is technically responsible only to the UN Charter. As former Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar argued, the framers of the UN saw the need for someone who could "speak for the wider international interest, *an interest greater than the sum of the interests of the member states.*"[16]

Consistent with this, Pérez de Cuéllar added that his office had to serve two constituencies: the governments of the member states and the people for whom the governments act. Thus, the Secretariat's concerns must embrace the situation of the human community in general.[17] This means that sometimes he or she must act above and beyond the national positions of the membership.

This side of the UN cannot be easily explained by either neorealist or institutionalist theories of international relations. This is because the UN is both an intergovernmental *and* a transnational organization. While intergovernmentalism can be captured within traditional theories of international relations, transnational relations cannot.

In a generic sense, transnationalism refers to relations maintained by clearly identifiable actors linking at least two societies or subunits of national governments.[18] The term, however, does not encompass a single meaning, nor does it explain a single phenomenon. Rather, the literature on transnational relations discusses at least three related but distinct understandings.

First, it refers to those activities conducted regularly by nonstate actors across juridical borders.[19] This could include multinational corporations, social movements, transnational advocacy networks, or cultural groups.[20] Second, it can refer to contacts between government bureaucracies charged with similar tasks who act on their own in the absence of national decisions.[21] Such networks include state officials within subunits of national governments, international organizations, and regimes; these officials often pursue common agendas independent of their governments.[22]

Finally, the literature on epistemic communities explains how transnational networks of knowledge-based experts develop, transmit, and legitimize a set of ideas and beliefs across national borders. These ideas help state officials to identify their interests, frame the issues for collective debate, and clarify salient points for negotiation.[23] Ernst Haas, for example, demonstrates how communities of knowledge among independent actors can lead to policy consensus among state elites.[24] In one sense, the legitimation of certain ideas—such as the nonuse of force, decolonization, and human rights—is the most important role of the UN in global affairs. Many development programs are not aimed at resolving interstate disputes or providing for collective action among states. Rather, they are focused on disseminating ideas on economic policy and providing technical assistance and resources to facilitate these policies. In fact, the concept of sustainable development has spread largely because of the UN's actions. To the extent that these ideas are transmitted and legitimized independently of state interests or actions makes them transnational.

Each of these approaches explains how international organizations can develop policies and behaviors that transcend the sum of individual interests among their members. Transgovernmental networks, such as those that develop within the specialized agencies of the UN or within the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), can lead to transnational coalitions on particular policy questions. The UN system provides a forum for transgovernmental interactions that involves parts of governments dealing with their opposite numbers in other governments and with functionally identified parts of international organizations.[25]

Moreover, the involvement of NGOs in the UN network through Article 71 and "subcontracting" services has helped to expand the organization's identity from a strictly intergovernmental to a transnational organization as well.[26] This has practical consequences. Although governments remain the primary participants in the organization, NGOs have been deeply involved in norm and policy setting, policy execution, contracting, and interlevel mediation. This influence is felt the greatest at international conferences where their specialized knowledge and professional leadership help to shape the outcomes.[27] For example, the UN Conference on the Human Environment in 1972 was heavily influenced and attended by NGOs. While it accomplished little in the way of changing state policy, it empowered a growing transnational environmental movement, making the environment an important issue within the UN. NGOs can also play an important role in influencing member states in voting and in creating new programs. Amnesty International, for example, was the primary force in influencing the UN to create and fund an independent High Commissioner for Human Rights.[28]

This transnational aspect of the UN—and within the global system in general—has been developed and strengthened by several factors. First, some issues and missions do not specifically involve the actions of states and therefore do not easily lend themselves to intergovernmental cooperation. In some areas, states simply lack the competence to undertake the missions. In these areas, UN agencies and personnel are better positioned to initiate and oversee programs. Examples include the protection and relocation of refugees, humanitarian assistance, and community economic development and training.

Second, there are some tasks that the great powers would rather avoid or at least not expend their own resources in pursuing—for example, keeping the peace, monitoring elections, and exposing human rights violations.

Third, in some issue areas, states individually or collectively lack the legitimacy to act—for example, in prosecuting war crimes or international criminal activity. Since states strongly resist being judged by other states, any involvement by governments is usually tainted by political interest.

Fourth, many nonstate actors, such as NGOs and individual specialists, have developed close working relationships with UN agencies, creating a new constituency within the world organization.

Finally, as the UN developed its own independent identity, it has come to represent an "international community" that goes beyond the sum of its membership. Individuals and domestic groups often look to the UN to provide services and assistance.

In cases where transnational relations play a significant role within the organization, the distribution of power among states is not the most important factor in determining outcomes. The interests of NGOs, officials in specialized agencies, and even the Secretariat may not be the same as those of the most powerful member states. To the degree that these actors initiate programs and operations, the outcome may reflect organizational (bureaucratic) interests, consensual knowledge, or the perceived good of the populations they serve. In fact, this is one of the major complaints levied by the great powers against the organization.

The United Nations and the International Community

To the extent that the politics of the UN reflects the political dynamics of the international system, intergovernmentalism and transnationalism together can account for much of the UN's role in world affairs. Neorealist and institutionalist theories can explain the intergovernmental aspect of the UN, and theories of transnational relations can account for the participation of nonstate actors in the UN structure. There is, however, one additional factor. Traditionally, transnational models have been positioned at the microlevel of analysis: interactions among individuals or groups produce global or regional networks that transcend juridical borders. Yet, there is a deeper foundation for transnationalism, one that operates at the macrolevel—the level of the international community. It is on this level that I wish to focus, because as I will argue, this provides a unique foundation for the UN as a transnational organization.

Whether an international community exists is central to understanding the tension between intergovernmentalism and transnationalism in the UN. Kenneth Waltz's systems theory posits an international environment where autonomous, atomistic states interact on the basis of competition, rivalry, necessity, and mistrust.[29] States build relationships and occasionally cooperate, but they do not develop deep social bonds between themselves. Under these conditions, it is difficult for cohesive institutional structures to develop, because the kinds of institutionalizing mechanisms that can work so powerfully in domestic polities are not available.[30]

Others, however, have suggested that there is a broader community that transcends the individual actors. In particular, two bodies of literature posit, alternatively, an international community of states and a global community of humankind. The former builds on the "anarchical society" model developed by Hedley Bull, Martin Wight, and other members of the "English School."[31] Robert Jackson, for example, argues

for the existence of an international community of sovereign states that can be identified by generally accepted procedural norms and standards of conduct that are specified in the charters of international organizations and in public international law.[32]

Underlying this is a more fundamental association that consists of the traditional community of diplomats and customary international law that would exist even in the absence of a formal, universal organization such as the UN. In essence, the international community is one of diplomats and national leaders.

Within this context, the world organization is guided not only by the interests of its members and associates, but also by norms that transcend the state interests. For example, the norm of sovereign equality has significantly shaped the procedural and substantive policies of the UN. While power remains an important variable in determining how policies are made and negotiations are conducted, the exercise of power is greatly constrained by this principle. Moreover, the norm of self-determination constrains even powerful states by influencing the legitimation of statehood and the decisions as to who may become a state.

Some people view the international community as emanating not from states, but from the social condition of humankind. This community cuts across national boundaries and is governed by a set of fundamentally moral and ethical norms that even sovereign states are obliged to observe. According to Christian von Wolff, for example, individuals

> do not cease to be members of that great society which is made up of the whole human race, because several have formed together a certain particular society. . . . After the human race was divided into nations, that society which before was between individuals continues between nations.[33]

This view was also articulated by Immanual Kant, who argued that "the peoples of the earth have thus entered in varying degrees into a universal community, and it has developed to the point where a violation of rights in *one* part of the world is felt *everywhere*."[34] Thus, the essential nature of international politics lies in the transnational social bonds that link individuals around the world. This approach sees human interests as being more important than national interests.[35]

Within the context of this community, the institution of sovereignty is strongly balanced against the interests of state populations. When state interests conflict with accepted cosmopolitan values, the latter outweighs the interests of the state. As the global organization representing the international community, the UN becomes responsible for protecting populations and promoting individual interests.

I suggest an international community that falls somewhere in between these two models, and it is this community that is partly represented by the UN. States and their agents are certainly the primary actors in international politics, but there is growing evidence that a transnational civil society exists independent of states.[36] The practices of NGOs are an institutional manifestation of this phenomenon, yet some argue that it exists on a deeper level. In other words, civil society is created not only through specific intergroup contacts across borders, but also by the institutional structure of the nation-state system. Thus, the international community has both intergovernmental and cosmopolitan aspects.

John Boli, John Meyer, and several other sociologists see the development of a world polity as a broad cultural order that has explicit origins in Western society.[37] Within a highly institutionalized world polity, contemporary constructed actors (including nation-states) organize and legitimize themselves in terms of universalistic models like citizenship, socioeconomic development, and rationalized justice.[38] From this perspective, the UN is at least partly a reflection of this world polity.

If we assume that there is both a community of states and some elements of a global civil society, then the institution of an "international community" should reflect both. Yet since the actors and institutions and the norms guiding their relations change over time, it would be misleading to talk of the international community in the abstract. The international (European) community that developed after the Napoleonic Wars was based on different sets of actors and norms than the one that evolved after World War II.

Therefore, I would define international communities as historically situated collectivities of recognized political actors who maintain formal, ongoing relationships with each other in international affairs on the basis of an integrated set of procedural and political norms. Such actors include government officials, diplomats and representatives from international and transnational organizations, and social movements. They can be identified through membership in intergovernmental and transnational institutions, but also through common practice. For example, transnational social movements and organizations, such as Greenpeace, become international actors when they are treated as such by state officials and officially sanctioned institutions.

From this perspective, international communities are historically specific and reflect the political organization and normative character of the international system as it develops during a particular era. Once the underlying principles become embedded within international institutions, they can help to shape both state practices and the attitudes of

national leaders by defining types of acceptable behaviors.[39] Through these institutions, the international community can take on a life of its own independent of the individual states it comprises. That is, once norms become diffused, adapted, and implemented, they become a political force in international relations and the institutions embodying these norms become independent actors. In this sense, the international community becomes a unit of analysis.

Adding the concept of international community to our analysis enhances our understanding of international relations and the UN in two ways. First, the concept is more specific and thus more operational than either Bull's anarchical society or Waltz's international system. Both models are conceived as broad environmental conditions that allow for a limited set of generalizations about state behavior. Neither concept can account for what Robert Gilpin calls "systemic change," which can occur without changing the essential features of the international system (or society) itself (that is, the nature of the units and the constitutive rules underlying the structure).[40]

Second, it allows for a wider range of actors other than states without diminishing the influence of states. International communities reflect specific configurations of actors, each of whom may represent different constituencies. The identities and relative influence of these actors are historically contingent. Thus, one does not have to settle the debate over the importance of transnational organizations or international institutions in global affairs. Rather, we can engage in empirical study about specific actors within a specific context during a specific historical era.

How, then, do we know when an international community exists and how can we measure the level of cohesion? There is no simple formula for determining this, but I suggest three possibilities:

First is the degree to which there is a consensus among the most influential states on the fundamental principles of global politics.[41] Recognizing that the great powers drive much of international politics, a stable international community requires a fair amount of cohesion among the leading states in the system. Since all political communities have dissidents and outsiders, absolute consensus is not required for an international community to form. At the same time, a strong organized opposition by powerful revisionist states can greatly disrupt its cohesion. Thus, the bifurcation of the world into two hostile great power blocs during the Cold War prevented the development of such a community.

Second is the degree to which these principles are supported by secondary states and domestic groups. A collectivity comprising a select group of states may constitute a type of community; however, if closed

and exclusive, it cannot be called an international community. Similarly, principles shared by a collectivity of state elites but rejected by domestic social and cultural groups cannot form the basis of an international community either.[42]

Third is the extent to which there is a universal-membership organization with the legal and moral authority to create and enforce norms of behavior. Stability and cohesion require an institutional expression of the community as well as a means for facilitating group commitment.

Intergovernmentalism vs. Transnationalism in the UN

The above discussion suggests that transnationalism and intergovernmentalism reflect distinct constituencies and therefore produce different behavioral incentives to the actors involved. The UN system comprises at least four different types of actors serving at least three distinct constituencies. The actors include the intergovernmental decisionmaking bodies (Security Council and General Assembly), the affiliated organizations and specialized agencies, the Secretariat, and the associated NGOs. Its constituencies are the member states, local populations who are the recipients of programs and services, and the broadly defined international community.

The fact that the UN assumes both intergovernmental and transnational tasks is not in and of itself a problem. Conflict arises when the organization fails to distinguish between its role as an intergovernmental organization coordinating the activities of its membership and its role as a transnational network promoting some type of common good. The cosmopolitan values that underlay the international community often conflict with the needs and interests of the member states. This poses a problem in cases where the UN assumes commitments that are not in the states' interest to fulfill.

Governments represent the interests of their states, interests they are expected to pursue. They are often unwilling to promote transnational goals on behalf of a foreign population or a broader "international community," particularly when these goals do not either directly benefit their domestic constituencies or fulfill a vital state interest.[43] While the Security Council is technically empowered to act on behalf of the global organization, it usually represents the interests of the great powers. For this reason, it is not well suited to deal with the many transnational issues that fall within the UN's mandate, such as human rights, humanitarian assistance, and sustainable development.

The coercive control of state behavior is probably the most important intergovernmental function of the UN. It requires the use of military and economic sanctions, something that only states can apply effectively. In the case of interstate aggression, genocide, or war crimes, the intergovernmental bodies of the UN can legitimately evoke the "breach of the peace" clause and mobilize member governments to take action. Yet, since intergovernmentalism is primarily concerned with the relations between states, it is less effective in addressing other relationships within the international community. This is particularly true with issues in which coercion is not an effective means for resolution.

The issue of human rights offers a good illustration. The principle of sovereignty clearly prohibits states from either interfering in the internal affairs of other states or passing judgment on their legal or judicial systems.[44] This is reflected in Article 2(7) of the UN Charter.[45] Human rights violations are an affront to the affected population, but a violation against one party by another does not automatically vest a third party with the legitimacy to correct the infraction.[46] If, however, human rights abuses are understood to be violations of generally accepted cosmopolitan norms, the affront is an offense against the international community and therefore a transnational issue justifying collective intervention. This was the thinking behind the International Criminal Court.

The intergovernmental bodies of the UN are not able to adequately represent the international community on these issues for several reasons. First, the great powers in the Security Council do not wish to accept the protection of human rights as an obligation. This would require them to become involved whenever a situation was labeled as such, even if their vital interests were not at stake. The Council has demonstrated this attitude by the way it frames human rights issues. The few times they became directly involved in a humanitarian or human rights situation—for example, Haiti, Somalia, and Bosnia—the Council labeled them as "breaches of the peace" rather than as violations of human rights agreements.[47] This allowed them to justify their involvement under Chapter VI, thereby considering it a matter of international security.

As a result, the actions of the Security Council tend to be highly inconsistent, a function of self-defined interest rather than international law or treaty obligations. When treated as an intergovernmental issue, human rights have been highly politicized, particularly during the Cold War. For that reason, it has been extremely difficult for the UN to act even in cases where there is a general agreement on the infraction.

Second, since intergovernmental bodies tend to reflect the distribution of power among its members, weaker states hesitate to grant the organization substantive authority in any area that could potentially threaten their sovereignty. Tension and mistrust between North and South, for example, greatly hampers human rights work, since many developing countries view it as internal interference.[48]

For these reasons, the most effective action on human rights has been conducted by NGOs and the UN's specialized agencies. While human rights *enforcement* has been weak to nonexistent, the UN has been successful in establishing widely accepted standards, investigating serious abuses, and promoting human rights activism at the domestic level.

A similar conflict has arisen within the UN's peacekeeping function. Peacekeeping evolved as a form of noncoercive conflict control when Cold War constraints prevented the Security Council from taking steps permitted in the charter.[49] Thus, it was not a result of strategic interaction among states but an innovative program initiated by the secretary-general.

Under the direction of the Security Council, the role of the peacekeepers has been expanded from acting as a barrier between previously warring parties to include aiding in state-building efforts, creating civil administration, facilitating democratization, promoting human rights, disarming militias, protecting populations from attack, caring for displaced persons, and even enforcing Security Council resolutions. Peacekeeping thus increasingly requires that civilian political officers, human rights officials, election monitors, and refugee and humanitarian aid specialists play as central a role as the military. Divorced from the UN's intergovernmental coercive function, it often requires more technical than military training. This necessarily brings in NGOs and experts from specialized agencies. The increase in involvement by different types of actors has made it difficult for those overseeing the missions to balance the humanitarian aspects of their missions that are promoted by the transnational bodies with the overtly military directives coming from the intergovernmental Security Council.

Part of the problem is the failure by states to distinguish between the intergovernmental and transnational activities of the UN. Boutros Boutros-Ghali categorizes at least four different operations that now fall under the single label of peacekeeping. They include preventative diplomacy (noncoercive action to prevent disputes from arising); peacekeeping (the deployment of a UN presence in the field); peacemaking (action to bring hostile parties to an agreement, through Chapter VI); and peacebuilding (action to identify and support structures that will ultimately

strengthen peace).[50] To this, one could add peace enforcing (imposing a peace settlement through Chapter VII). The first two could be considered to be UN organizational functions, but the latter three involve intergovernmental coercion.

Negotiations leading to a dispute settlement clearly fall within Chapter VI, an intergovernmental function; however, once the agreement is made, the states are supposed to turn the operation over to the UN Secretariat, an agency that claims to represent the collectivity. Yet the great powers often resist providing troops from their own militaries for peacekeeping, particularly if it does not fall within their definition of "vital interests." Such sacrifices tend to be unpopular domestically. Moreover, state militaries are rarely trained for the highly technical task of peacekeeping. Finally, since the great powers often refuse to allow their soldiers to serve under a UN command, the UN presence is often paralleled with national ones. As a result, peacekeeping has often expanded into military operations.

Conclusion

The UN was created by and for states, and diplomats generally consider the organization to be a forum for interstate negotiation, cooperation, and conflict resolution. However, the UN's agenda also encompasses transnational concerns that do not directly involve state officials or state interests. Over the past several decades, the UN's missions and services have expanded far beyond their original conception to include humanitarian relief, democratization, the promotion of economic development, and the protection of human rights. Accompanying this expansion has been an increase in the authority of the organization's specialized agencies and a growing involvement of transnational NGOs. As a result, international institutions, such as the UN, provide opportunities for nongovernmental actors to promote their agendas. This complicates international politics because traditional state concerns such as security and stability are balanced against cosmopolitan values.

This not only empowers new actors but also creates new constituencies. UN special agencies and NGOs have responded by expanding their functions and forging close relationships with many of these new groups and populations. Yet, since states tend to view their domestic populations as their primary constituents, they have been unable to effectively resolve many problems and issues that transcend state borders.

UN intergovernmental organs have their own problems that have little to do with transnational concerns. Collective security has been elusive,

many state interests appear to be irreconcilable, and vast discrepancies in wealth and power clash with the democratic ideals of the organization. Yet even with issue areas and programs that do not involve interstate relations, the intergovernmental bodies are unable to represent the mythic international community. This is largely because intergovernmentalism and transnationalism are often incompatible. The former promotes state interests, while the latter pursues cosmopolitan concerns. Although states often prefer to ignore the latter, it is becoming increasingly difficult to do so in an interdependent world. Yet states are not well disposed to act in these areas. Transnational issues not only often clash with issues of state, but governments lack the competence and capabilities to deal with them.

From the perspective of IR theory, this suggests a paradox in international relations. IGOs, such as the UN, increasingly assume a wide range of tasks that their member states lack the competence, will, and/or technical expertise to perform—for example, peacekeeping. As a result, the member states are forced to assign many of these responsibilities to NGOs and other nonstate actors, whose interests and constituencies are often at odds with those of the states. The larger and more complex these IGOs become, the more tasks they assume and the more they are forced to "contract out" their services to specialized agencies and NGOs. The greater the involvement of NGOs within the IGOs, the more transnational concerns threaten to replace intergovernmental ones on the organizational agenda. Thus, states dominate the global agenda, but international organizations such as the UN provide opportunities for nongovernmental actors to exercise a level of influence in world politics that they would otherwise never be able to achieve. 🌐

Notes

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1. For an analytic description of international organizations, see Clive Archer, *International Organizations* (London: Routledge, 1983), p. 35, and Leon Gordenker and Thomas G. Weiss, "Pluralizing Global Governance: Analytical Approaches and Dimensions," in Gordenker and Weiss, eds., *NGOs, the UN and Global Governance* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1996), p. 19.

2. See, for example, Thomas Weiss, David Forsythe, and Roger Coate, *The United Nations and Changing World Politics,* 2d ed. (Boulder: Westview, 1997), p. 93.

3. Intergovernmentalist theories suggest that the development of international organizations can best be explained through the sequential analysis of national preference formation and strategic interaction among sovereign states. See Andrew Moravcsik, "Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 31, no. 4 (December 1993): 481.

4. A. LeRoy Bennett, *International Organizations: Principles and Issues* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1995), pp. 2–3.

5. Alan James, "The Secretary-General as an Independent Political Actor," in Benjamin Rivlin and Leon Gordenker, eds., *The Challenging Role of the UN Secretary General: Making "the Most Impossible Job in the World" Possible* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1993), p. 24.

6. Stephen D. Krasner, *Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), p. 268.

7. For the basis of this assumption, see John Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," in Michael Brown, et al., eds., *The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995), pp. 356, 357.

8. For a discussion of collective security, see, inter alia, Arnold Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988), chaps. 11, 12; Kenneth Thompson, "Collective Security Reexamined," *American Political Science Review* 47, no. 3 (September 1953); and Inis Claude, *Swords into Plowshares* (New York: Random House, 1971). For more recent treatments, see Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, "Concerts, Collective Security and the Future of Europe," *International Security* 16, no. 1 (summer 1991); and Richard K. Betts, "Systems of Peace or Causes of War?" *International Security* 17, no. 1 (summer 1992).

9. See Robert Keohane, "Sovereignty, Interdependence, and International Institutions," in Robert Keohane, ed., *International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory* (Boulder: Westview, 1989), pp. 93–94.

10. See John Gerard Ruggie, "Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution," in Ruggie, ed., *Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 28.

11. See Inis Claude, "Reflections on the Role of the UN Secretary-General," in Benjamin Rivlin and Leon Gordenker, eds., *The Challenging Role of the UN Secretary-General: Making "the Most Impossible Job in the World" Possible* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1993), p. 257.

12. See Lawrence S. Finkelstein, "The Coordinative Function of the UN Secretary-General," in Rivlin and Gordenker, *The Challenging Role of the UN Secretary-General.*

13. See "Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations," *International Court of Justice Reports* (1949): 174.

14. See, for example, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, *A Dangerous Place* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1978).

15. See Chapter XV of the UN Charter.

16. Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, "The Role of the U.N. Secretary-General," in Adam Roberts and Benedict Kingsbury, *United Nations, Divided World: The UN's Role in International Relations* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), pp. 128–129 (emphasis added).

17. Pérez de Cuéllar, "The Role of the U.N. Secretary-General," pp. 138, 141.

18. Thomas Risse-Kappan, "Bringing Transnational Relations Back In," in Thomas Risse-Kappen, ed., *Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures, and International Institutions* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univesity Press, 1995), p. 4.

19. Ibid., p. xii.

20. On transnational advocacy networks, see Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998). On transnational social movements, see Jackie Smith, Charles Chatfield, and Ron Pagnucco, eds., *Transnational Social Movements and Global Politics* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1997).

21. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence,* 2d ed. (New York: Harper Collins, 1989), p. 34.

22. Risse-Kappan refers to this as trans-governmental coalitions (Risse-Kappan, *Bringing Transnational Relations Back In*, p. 4). See also Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence,* p. 34.

23. See *International Organization* 46, no. 1 (winter 1992).

24. Ernst Haas, *When Knowledge Is Power: Three Models of Change in International Organizations* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990).

25. See Finkelstein, "The Coordinative Function of the UN Secretary-General, p. 67.

26. Article 71 of the UN Charter empowers the Economic and Social Council to "make suitable arrangements for consultation with non-governmental organizations which are concerned with matters within its competence." This relationship was further expanded and strengthened by ECOSOC Resolution 1296, passed in 1968.

27. Leon Gordenker and Thomas G. Weiss, "NGO Participation in the International Policy Process," in Gordenker and Weiss, *NGOs, the UN and Global Governance,* p. 213; Antonio Donini, "The Bureaucracy and Free Spirits: Stagnation and Innovation in the Relationship Between the UN and NGOs," in Gordenker and Weiss, *NGOs,* p. 84.

28. See Helena Cook, "Amnesty International at the United Nations," in Peter Willetts, ed., *The Conscience of the World: The Influence of Non-Govenrmental Organizations in the U.N. System* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1996), pp. 93–97.

29. Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: Random House, 1979), chap. 6.

30. Stephen Krasner, "Compromising Westphalia," *International Security* 20, no. 3 (winter 1995): 149.

31. Hedley Bull, *Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977); and Martin Wight, *Systems of States* (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1977).

32. Robert Jackson, "International Community Beyond the Cold War," in Gene M. Lyons and Michael Mastanduno, *Beyond Westphalia: State Sovereignty and International Intervention* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), pp. 62, 69.

33. Christian von Wolff, Jus Gentium Methodo, quoted in David Armstrong, *Revolution and World Order: The Revolutionary State in International Society* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), p. 28.

34. Immanuel Kant, "Perpetual Peace," in Hans Reiss, ed., *Kant: Political Writings* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 107–108 (emphasis in original).

35. See Robert Johansen, *National Interest and the Human Interest* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980); Mel Gurtov, *Global Politics in the Human Interest* (Boulder: Lynn Rienner, 1994); and Richard Falk, *Toward a Just World Order* (Boulder: Westview, 1982).

36. For a discussion of this concept, see M. J. Peterson, "Transnational Activity, International Society and World Polity," *Millennium* 21 (1992): 37–88.

37. John W. Meyer, "The World Polity and the Authority of the Nation-State," in George Thomas, et al., *Institutional Structure: Constituting the State, Society and the Individual* (Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage, 1987), p. 41.

38. John W. Meyer, et al., "World Society and the Nation-State," *American Journal of Sociology* 103, no. 1 (July 1997): 148.

39. See, for example, Oran Young, *International Cooperation: Building Regimes for Natural Resources and the Environment* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), chap. 3.

40. Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 42–43.

41. Andreas Osiander cites three key issues that states must settle in order to create a "consensus agenda": the identity of the international actors, their relative status vis-à-vis one another, the distribution of territory and population between them, and the procedures through which the relations among the actors are conducted. See Osiander, *The States System of Europe, 1640–1990: Peacemaking and the Conditions of International Stability* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), chap. 1.

42. See Bruce Cronin, *Community Under Anarchy: Transnational Identity and the Evolution of Cooperation* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), chap. 4.

43. For an example of this view, see Michael Mandelbaum, "Foreign Policy as Social Work," *Foreign Affairs* (January–February 1996): 16–32.

44. The Act of State Doctrine holds that states may not sit in judgment on the acts of other states that are taken within their own territory. See *Underhill* v. *Hernandez,* U.S. Supreme Court, 1897, 168 U.S. 250.

45. Article 2(7) states, in part, that "nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state."

46. Friedrich Kratochwil makes this argument in "Sovereignty as Dominium: Is There a Right of Humanitarian Intervention?" in Lyons and Mastanduno, *Beyond Westphalia,* p. 35.

47. See, for example, Security Council Resolution 814 (1992), authorizing the UN to protect the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the population of Somalia.

48. See Tom Farer and Felice Gaer, "The UN and Human Rights: At the End of the Beginning," in Roberts and Kingsbury, *United Nations, Divided World*, p. 268.

49. See Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Empowering the United Nations," *Foreign Affairs* 71, no. 5 (winter 1992/93): 90.

50. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace* (New York: United Nations, 1995, pars. 20, 21).