

Enhanced Trapdoor Hashing from DDH and DCR

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JHU

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CNRS, IRIF
Université Paris Citè

Setting: Two-Round Sender-Receiver Computation

Public function F



Sender




Receiver


x

y


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
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
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


Setting: Two-Round Sender-Receiver Computation



What is the **minimum communication cost** of **semi-honest** secure protocols?

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
Privacy:

- does not learn y
- does not learn X


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Ideal World Two-Round Sender-Receiver Computation


Public function F




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


Ideal World Two-Round Sender-Receiver Computation



Total communication: $|y| + |F(X, y)|$

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

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Can secure protocols achieve similar efficiency?

Trapdoor Hash Functions (TDH)


[Döttling-Garg-Ishai-Malavolta-Mour-Ostrovsky'19]

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
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
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
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
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
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
Privacy: \mathbf{ek}_y hides y

(h, e) hides X

Efficiency: h is small i.e., $|h| = o(|X|) \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda)$

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
Efficiency: h is small i.e., $|h| = o(|X|) \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda)$

e has high rate i.e., $|e| \approx |F(X, y)|$

Rate:
$$\frac{|F(X, y)|}{|e|}$$

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
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
$$F(X, y) = \sum_i x_i \cdot y_i$$



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
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
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
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


Assumptions: DCR, DDH, QR, LWE

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

Can we improve the functionality of TDH
from **group-based** assumptions?

Enhanced Trapdoor Hash Functions from DDH and DCR

[Döttling-Garg-Ishai-Malavolta-Mour-Ostrovsky'19]

This work



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Expressivity

Supports computing
Bilinear-NC¹ programs



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
Encoding keys of size
 $|y|(1 + o(1))$

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
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
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
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

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
Applications 1: Compactness

Batch-OT with optimal rate from DDH




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
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Ideal World Communication: $2n$ bits

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
$$X = \alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_n, \beta_1, \dots, \beta_n$$




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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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
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Communication: $2 \cdot n \cdot (1 + o(1))$ bits

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
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This Work: $1 + o(1)$ rate

Semi-honest statistical sender privacy


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
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Ideal World Communication: $2n$ bits



Communication: $2 \cdot n \cdot (1 + o(1))$ bits

This Work: $1 + o(1)$ rate

Semi-honest statistical sender privacy

Before:

[Brakerski-Branco-Döttling-Pu'22]:

$1 + o(1)$ rate

DDH + LPN

[Boyle-Giboa-Ishai'17]:

DDH

$n \cdot (4 + o(1))$ bits communication

PKI setup

Applications 1: Compactness

Batch-OT with [optimal rate](#) from DDH

This Work: [1 + \$o\(1\)\$ rate](#)

Semi-honest [statistical](#) sender privacy

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[Boyle-Giboa-Ishai'17]: [DDH](#)
 $n \cdot (4 + o(1))$ bits communication
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[Boyle-Giboa-Ishai'17]: DDH
 $n \cdot (4 + o(1))$ bits communication
PKI setup

Implications of Batch-OT with optimal rate

Applications 1: Compactness

Batch-OT with [optimal rate](#) from DDH

This Work: [1 + \$o\(1\)\$ rate](#)

Semi-honest [statistical](#) sender privacy

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String OT: [\$o\(n\)\$ bits sender-to-receiver communication](#) and $n \cdot (1 + o(1))$ bits receiver-to-sender communication

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Rate-1 LTDF with public key size $o(n)$ bits with CRS

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Database size: 2^n

Upload communication [n + poly\(\$\lambda\$ \)](#) bits

Download communication $n \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda)$ bits

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Other Implications

Branching programs over
encrypted data
Correlated symmetric PIR

Applications 2: Compactness + Expressivity

Sublinear 2PC from DCR, with one-sided statistical security for layered circuits

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Bilinear-NC¹ ⊇ log log-depth circuits

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Bilinear-NC¹ \supseteq log log-depth circuits

This Work: $|x| + (2 + o(1)) \cdot \frac{|C|}{\log \log |C|} + |y|^{2/3} \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda)$ bits communication

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computationally secure input

Sublinear communication in
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[Couteau-Meyer-Passelégué-Riahinia'23]: $|x| + |y| + \frac{|C|}{\log \log |C|} + \text{poly}(\lambda)$ bits communication


Circular security of Paillier

Layered circuits over \mathbb{Z}_N

Applications 3: Compactness + Expressivity + Reusability


Improving Communication in the Amortized Setting

Public function F




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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
Applications 3: Compactness + Expressivity + Reusability

Optimal preprocessing symmetric Private Information Retrieval from DCR




Applications 3: Compactness + Expressivity + Reusability

Optimal preprocessing symmetric Private Information Retrieval from DCR



Rate- $\frac{1}{2}$ Private Set Intersection (PSI) and Fuzzy-PSI from DCR



Constructing Enhanced TDH

Constructing Enhanced TDH

Staged Homomorphic Secret Sharing

[Couteau-Meyer-Passelégué-Riahinia'23]



+

Trapdoor Hash Functions


[Döttling-Garg-Ishai-Malavolta-Mour-Ostrovsky'19]

Alternative view: Extending Succinct HSS [Abram-Roy-Scholl'24] using Staged HSS


Staged Homomorphic Secret Sharing



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



X




y
 $(\text{pk}, \text{sk}) \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(1^\lambda)$


Staged Homomorphic Secret Sharing


$$\text{ct}_y \leftarrow \text{Encrypt}(\text{pk}, y)$$

$$(\text{pk}, \text{sk}) \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(1^\lambda)$$

Staged Homomorphic Secret Sharing




X
 $ct_y \leftarrow \text{Encrypt}(\text{pk}, y)$
 $\text{share}_A, \text{share}_B \leftarrow \text{Share}(\text{pk}, X)$




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
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
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
Staged Homomorphic Secret Sharing




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
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
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



Staged Homomorphic Secret Sharing





Enhanced TDH = Staged HSS + Succinct Distribution of Shares

Public function F




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


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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Succinct Distribution of Staged Input Shares

Structure of Staged Input Shares

$$X = (x_1, \dots, x_n)$$



Succinct Distribution of Staged Input Shares

Structure of Staged Input Shares

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$$\mathbb{G}, g$$

$$\text{sk} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$$

$$\text{pk} = g^{\text{sk}}$$



Succinct Distribution of Staged Input Shares

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
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Share(pk, X)
share_A

For each bit b of sk

$$\text{ElGamal}(\text{pk}, b \cdot x_1) \quad \dots \quad \text{ElGamal}(\text{pk}, b \cdot x_n)$$



Succinct Distribution of Staged Input Shares

Structure of Staged Input Shares

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Share(pk, X)

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\mathbb{G}, g

$sk \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$

$pk = g^{sk}$



For each bit b of sk

$$\text{ElGamal}(pk, b \cdot x_1) \quad \dots \quad \text{ElGamal}(pk, b \cdot x_n)$$


=

$$(g^{r_1}, g^{sk \cdot r_1} \cdot g^{b \cdot x_1}) \quad \dots \quad (g^{r_n}, g^{sk \cdot r_n} \cdot g^{b \cdot x_n})$$

Succinct Distribution of Staged Input Shares

Structure of Staged Input Shares

$$X = (x_1, \dots, x_n)$$


For each bit b of sk

$$\begin{array}{ll} \text{ElGamal}(pk, b \cdot x_1) & \dots \\ & = \\ (g^{r_1}, g^{sk \cdot r_1} \cdot g^{b \cdot x_1}) & \dots \end{array} \quad \begin{array}{ll} \text{ElGamal}(pk, b \cdot x_n) & \\ & \\ (g^{r_n}, g^{sk \cdot r_n} \cdot g^{b \cdot x_n}) & \end{array} \quad \begin{array}{ll} g^{r_1} \dots & g^{r_n} \end{array}$$

Succinct Distribution of Staged Input Shares

Structure of Staged Input Shares

$$X = (x_1, \dots, x_n)$$



\mathbb{G}, g
 $sk \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$
 $pk = g^{sk}$



For each bit b of sk

$$\text{ElGamal}(pk, b \cdot x_1)$$

...

=

$$(g^{r_1}, g^{sk \cdot r_1} \cdot g^{b \cdot x_1})$$

$$\text{ElGamal}(pk, b \cdot x_n)$$

...

$$(g^{r_1}, g^{sk \cdot r_1} \cdot g^{b \cdot x_n})$$


$$g^{r_1} \dots g^{r_n}$$

share_B only consists of the random component of the ciphertext

Succinct Distribution of Staged Input Shares

Structure of Staged Input Shares

$$X = (x_1, \dots, x_n)$$



$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{G}, g \\ \text{sk} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p \\ \text{pk} = g^{\text{sk}} \end{aligned}$$



For each bit b of sk

$$\text{ElGamal}(\text{pk}, b \cdot x_1)$$

...

=

$$\text{ElGamal}(\text{pk}, b \cdot x_n)$$

$$(g^{r_1}, g^{\text{sk}\cdot r_1} \cdot g^{b\cdot x_1})$$

...

$$(g^{r_1}, g^{\text{sk}\cdot r_1} \cdot g^{b\cdot x_n})$$



$$g^{r_1} \dots g^{r_n}$$

share_B only consists of the random component of the ciphertext

Attempt:

Succinct Distribution of Staged Input Shares

Structure of Staged Input Shares



For each bit b of sk

$$\begin{array}{ll} \text{ElGamal}(pk, b \cdot x_1) & \dots \\ & = \\ (g^{r_1}, g^{sk \cdot r_1} \cdot g^{b \cdot x_1}) & \dots \end{array} \quad \begin{array}{ll} \text{ElGamal}(pk, b \cdot x_n) & \\ & \end{array}$$

$$g^{r_1} \dots g^{r_n}$$

share_B only consists of the random component of the ciphertext

Attempt:


$$k \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\lambda$$

$$r_1, \dots, r_n \leftarrow \text{PRG}(k)$$

$$g^{r_1} \dots g^{r_n}$$



Succinct Distribution of Staged Input Shares

Structure of Staged Input Shares



For each bit b of sk

$$\begin{array}{ll} \text{ElGamal}(\text{pk}, b \cdot x_1) & \dots \\ & = \\ (g^{r_1}, g^{\text{sk} \cdot r_1} \cdot g^{b \cdot x_1}) & \dots \end{array} \quad \begin{array}{l} \text{ElGamal}(\text{pk}, b \cdot x_n) \\ (g^{r_n}, g^{\text{sk} \cdot r_n} \cdot g^{b \cdot x_n}) \end{array}$$



share_B only consists of the random component of the ciphertext

Attempt:

$$r_1, \dots, r_n \leftarrow \text{PRG}(k)$$

$$g^{r_1} \dots g^{r_n}$$

$$\xleftarrow{k, \text{pk}}$$


$$k \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\lambda$$

$$r_1, \dots, r_n \leftarrow \text{PRG}(k)$$

$$g^{r_1} \dots g^{r_n}$$


Succinct Distribution of Staged Input Shares

Structure of Staged Input Shares



For each bit b of sk

$$\begin{array}{ll} \text{ElGamal}(\text{pk}, b \cdot x_1) & \dots \\ & = \\ (g^{r_1}, g^{\text{sk} \cdot r_1} \cdot g^{b \cdot x_1}) & \dots \end{array} \quad \begin{array}{l} \text{ElGamal}(\text{pk}, b \cdot x_n) \\ (g^{r_n}, g^{\text{sk} \cdot r_n} \cdot g^{b \cdot x_n}) \end{array}$$



$$g^{r_1} \dots g^{r_n}$$

share_B only consists of the random component of the ciphertext

Attempt:

$$r_1, \dots, r_n \leftarrow \text{PRG}(k)$$

$$g^{r_1} \dots g^{r_n}$$

$$g^{\text{sk} \cdot r_1} \dots g^{\text{sk} \cdot r_n}$$

$$\xleftarrow{k, \text{pk}}$$


$$k \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\lambda$$

$$r_1, \dots, r_n \leftarrow \text{PRG}(k)$$

$$g^{r_1} \dots g^{r_n}$$


Succinct Distribution of Staged Input Shares

Structure of Staged Input Shares



For each bit b of sk

$$\begin{array}{ll} \text{ElGamal}(\text{pk}, b \cdot x_1) & \dots \\ & = \\ (g^{r_1}, g^{\text{sk} \cdot r_1} \cdot g^{b \cdot x_1}) & \dots \end{array} \quad \begin{array}{l} \text{ElGamal}(\text{pk}, b \cdot x_n) \\ (g^{r_n}, g^{\text{sk} \cdot r_n} \cdot g^{b \cdot x_n}) \end{array}$$




\mathbb{G}, g
 $\text{sk} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$
 $\text{pk} = g^{\text{sk}}$

$$g^{r_1} \dots g^{r_n}$$

share_B only consists of the random component of the ciphertext


Attempt:



Succinct Distribution of Staged Input Shares

Structure of Staged Input Shares

$$X = (x_1, \dots, x_n)$$



$$\begin{aligned} & \mathbb{G}, g \\ & \text{sk} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p \\ & \text{pk} = g^{\text{sk}} \end{aligned}$$



For each bit b of sk

$$\begin{array}{ll} \text{ElGamal}(\text{pk}, b \cdot x_1) & \dots \\ & = \\ (g^{r_1}, g^{\text{sk} \cdot r_1} \cdot g^{b \cdot x_1}) & \dots \end{array} \quad \begin{array}{ll} \text{ElGamal}(\text{pk}, b \cdot x_n) \\ (g^{r_n}, g^{\text{sk} \cdot r_n} \cdot g^{b \cdot x_n}) \end{array}$$

$$g^{r_1} \dots g^{r_n}$$

share_B only consists of the random component of the ciphertext

Observation: Can be computed succinctly using [techniques from Trapdoor Hashing](#) [Döttling-Garg-Ishai-Malavolta-Mour-Ostrovsky'19]

Succinct Distribution of Staged Input Shares

Structure of Staged Input Shares

$$X = (x_1, \dots, x_n)$$



$$\mathbb{G}, g$$

$$\text{sk} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$$

$$\text{pk} = g^{\text{sk}}$$



Succinct Distribution of Staged Input Shares

Structure of Staged Input Shares

$$X = (x_1, \dots, x_n)$$



$$(g^{r_1}, g^{\text{sk} \cdot r_1} \cdot g^{b \cdot x_1}) \\ \vdots \\ (g^{r_1}, g^{\text{sk} \cdot r_1} \cdot g^{b \cdot x_n})$$

Goal

$$g^{r_1} \dots g^{r_n}$$



$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{G}, g \\ \text{sk} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p \\ \text{pk} = g^{\text{sk}} \end{aligned}$$

Succinct Distribution of Staged Input Shares

Structure of Staged Input Shares

$$X = (x_1, \dots, x_n)$$



$$(g^{r_1}, g^{\text{sk} \cdot r_1} \cdot g^{b \cdot x_1}) \\ \vdots \\ (g^{r_1}, g^{\text{sk} \cdot r_1} \cdot g^{b \cdot x_n})$$

Goal

$$g^{r_1} \dots g^{r_n}$$




$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{G}, g \\ \text{sk} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p \\ \text{pk} = g^{\text{sk}} \end{aligned}$$

$$g_1, \dots, g_n \leftarrow \mathbb{G}$$

$$r_1 \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$$


Succinct Distribution of Staged Input Shares

Structure of Staged Input Shares




Succinct Distribution of Staged Input Shares

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
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
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
Succinct Distribution of Staged Input Shares

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
Succinct Distribution of Staged Input Shares

Structure of Staged Input Shares



Succinct Distribution of Staged Input Shares


Structure of Staged Input Shares



$$(g_1^{sk \cdot r_1} \cdot g^b, g_2^{sk \cdot r_1}, \dots, g_n^{sk \cdot r_1}) \cdot X^T$$
$$= \left(\prod_{i=1}^n g_i^{x_i} \right)^{sk \cdot r_1} \cdot g^{b \cdot x_1} = h^{sk \cdot r_1} \cdot g^{b \cdot x_1}$$

Succinct Distribution of Staged Input Shares


Structure of Staged Input Shares



$$\begin{aligned} & (g_1^{\text{sk} \cdot r_1} \cdot g^b, g_2^{\text{sk} \cdot r_1}, \dots, g_n^{\text{sk} \cdot r_1}) \cdot X^T \\ &= \left(\prod_{i=1}^n g_i^{x_i} \right)^{\text{sk} \cdot r_1} \cdot g^{b \cdot x_1} = h^{\text{sk} \cdot r_1} \cdot g^{b \cdot x_1} \end{aligned}$$


Succinct Distribution of Staged Input Shares

Structure of Staged Input Shares



Succinct Distribution of Staged Input Shares

Structure of Staged Input Shares




$$(g_1^{\text{sk} \cdot r_1} \cdot g^b, g_2^{\text{sk} \cdot r_1}, \dots, g_n^{\text{sk} \cdot r_1}) \cdot X^T = h^{\text{sk} \cdot r_1} \cdot g^{b \cdot x_1}$$

$$(g_1^{\text{sk} \cdot r_2}, g_2^{\text{sk} \cdot r_2} \cdot g^b, \dots, g_n^{\text{sk} \cdot r_2}) \cdot X^T = h^{\text{sk} \cdot r_2} \cdot g^{b \cdot x_2}$$


Succinct Distribution of Staged Input Shares

Structure of Staged Input Shares




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Structure of Staged Input Shares




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
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Structure of Staged Input Shares




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
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
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Structure of Staged Input Shares




Succinct Distribution of Staged Input Shares

Structure of Staged Input Shares



Succinct Distribution of Staged Input Shares

Structure of Staged Input Shares



Conclusion

- Discussed approach assumes circular security of ElGamal. Constructing from plain **DDH** and **DCR** requires **extending to circular-secure variants** [Boneh-Halevi-Hamburg-Ostrovsky'08] [Brakerski-Goldwasser'10]
- DDH-based **Staged HSS evaluation** has **noticeable error probability** which affects **privacy**. Requires developing new techniques to build trapdoor hash functions

Conclusion

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Thank You