CO 455H

ADS ON THE WEB AND AD BLOCKING CHALLENGES

Dr. Benjamin Livshits

Fraudulent Ad Blocking Extensions

Google pulls fake Adblock Plus extension from Chrome serving invasive ads



Response from Chrome...



- Since its discovery by SwiftOnSecurity, Google has removed the malicious extension, but that doesn't help those who have already downloaded it.
- □ To see if you have the real Chrome extension or not, make sure it's from adblockplus.org and that it's listed as an extension in the store, and not an app.
- Those who have downloaded the fake version can easily delete it, however. All you have to do is go to the hamburger menu on Chrome, click "More tools", then select "Extensions" and click on the trashcan icon next it.
- The fact that the extension was able to infiltrate Google's security raises concerns for the future, as to how the company will prevent similar add-ons from doing the same
- "There's no way their Chrome team is happy with this extension vetting/moderation situation," SwiftOnSecurity tweeted.

From Real Adblock Plus...

- In a blog post, the real Adblock Plus added it was glad the fake extension was pulled down, but added: "It's a bit troubling, of course, that it made it in there in the first place."
- Google is yet to comment as to why it wasn't able to distinguish the difference between the genuine and phony extensions. μ

SwiftOnSecurity Warning

- SECURITY EXPERTS have warned of a phony browser extension masquerading as Adblock Plus and serving users invasive online ads when it was supposed to be blocking them.
- SwiftOnSecurity warned of the fake extension via Twitter on Tuesday, some time after it had managed to sneak into the official Google Chrome Web Store and attract over 37,000 users. By that time, the damage was done.
- If you're wanting to know how to spot it, the only difference between the extension, called "AdBlock Plus", and the real deal is the capital B in the name. It also came from a developer who had called itself Adblock Plus, for that extra air of authenticity.

Third Party Web Tracking

based on a survey by Jonathan R. Mayer and John C.

Mitchell


http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/files/publication/files/trackingsurvey12.pdf

Overview

- Website creators were mostly responsible for their content themselves
- Today content is aggregated from a lot of different sources
- Third party content seems to come for free but...

There's a hidden price tag! But where?

Third Party Content on SFGate



SFGate's Privacy Policy: the Fine Print...

.....

2. Web Site Usage Information

(i) Cookies

We may use "cookies" to keep, and sometimes track, information

about you. Cookies are small data files that are sent to your browser or related software from a Web server when you visit it and are stored on your computer's hard drive for record keeping purposes. Cookies track where you travel on our Web Site and what you look at and purchase. They may store the information in your shopping cart, and/or your username and password. A cookie may enable us to relate your use of our Web Site to other information about you, including your Personal Information. These purposes serve to improve and personalize your experience on our Web Site.


You may occasionally get cookies from our advertisers, which is standard in the internet industry. We do not control these cookies, and these cookies are not subject to our privacy policies.

Most Web browsers can be set to inform you when a cookie has been sent to you and provide you with the opportunity to refuse that cookie. Additionally, if you have a Flash player installed on your computer, your Flash player can be set to reject or delete Flash cookies. However, refusing a cookie may, in some cases, preclude you from using, or negatively impact the display or function of, the Web Site or certain areas or features of the Web Site.




Bigger browsing profiles

- = increased value for trackers
- = reduced privacy for users




(Hypothetical tracking relationships only.)

The Advertising Ecosystem



The user is "being sold" to advertisers by content companies

Scale of Tracking



What Do Trackers Think?





Google web history

Today

- Searched for collecting web browsing histories
 - About Google Search History Accounts... google.com
- Searched for collecting web histories
- Searched for colleciting web histories
- Searched for what do advertisers know about me

This Is Who Facebook Thinks You Are |... - time.com

The Wall Street Journal Asks: What Do ... - eff.org

I'm Being Followed: How Google-and... - theatlantic.com

Who Do Online Advertisers Think You Are?... - nytimes.com

Searched for ghostery

Implications?



- Personalization can lead you down a road to a kind of informational determinism in which what you've clicked on in the past determines what you see next a Web history you're doomed to repeat.
- You can get stuck in a static, ever-narrowing version of yourself — an endless you-loop

Target Scandal

How Target Figured Out A Teen Girl Was Pregnant Before Her Father Did

+ Comment Now + Follow Comments

Every time you go shopping, you share intimate details about your consumption patterns with retailers. And many of those retailers are studying those details to figure out what you like, what you need, and which coupons are most likely to make you happy. Target, for example, has figured out how to data-mine its way into your womb, to figure out whether you have a



Target has got you in its aim

baby on the way long before you need to start buying diapers.

- In Target's case, it all comes down to your Guest ID number tied your credit card, name, and other info, which saves all kinds of data about what you buy.
- ian Andrew mined that data and saw patterns in it, for example — women on baby registries buy larger amounts of unscented lotion around the beginning of their second trimester. Bam! Send'em some coupons for other baby items.

How Does the Information Leak?

- HTTP Referrer (Use POST Requests!)
- document.title
- UserID in URLS (e.g Facebook)
- Scripts included in body of website can read the whole page!
- Some first parties deliberately make information available
 - (Homedepot, Wall Street Journal)

What Information is Gathered?

- Location
- Interests
- Purchases
- Employment status
- Sexual orientation,
- Financial challenges
- Medical conditions

....and much more.....

And Even Without Cookies!

Active fingerprinting

 os, cpu, clock skew time zone, display settings, installed fonts, plugins....

Passive fingerprinting

IP address, os, user agent, language, accept headers

2010 sample of 500,000 browsers over 80 percent identified!

Over 90% with Flash & Java installed!

Users Don't Seem to Like It

Survey results indicate a strong dislike of "targeted marketing"...

- No advertising based on tracking!
 (2009 Phone Survey Turow et al 87%)
- Behavioral targeting should be illegal!
 (2010 Poll USA Today Gallup 67%)
- "not okay" with behavioral advertising! (2012)
 Phone Survey Pew Research 68%)

So is This Legal - In the US?

- FTC prevent "unfair" or "deceptive" behaviour tracking related to "deceptive" behaviour
- First violation small (if any) payment, subsequent violation gets monetary penalties
- 2011 three(!) enforcement actions
- Advertising industry's self-regulatory programs concentrates on use of data

And What About the EU?

- 2002 ePrivacy directive only "strictly necessary" and "explicitly requested" information, "opt out" (almost no implications)
- 2009 amendment to "opt in" (no enforced compliance)
- 2012 consent must be explicit, penalties up to 2% of revenue
- Notion of "essential" cookies a lot of room for interpretation....

Opt Out Cookies I

Recently on SFGATE...




Opt Out Cookies II



How Data Powers Your Experience

You can opt out of any or all of the companies listed below. Opting out does not mean you will stop seeing ads. It means that the company you opt out of will no longer use your data to target ads to you.




Opt Out cookies III

- Fight fire with fire? Set Cookies to prevent other cookies from being set
- Manual updating useability?
- Expiration?
- Clear cookies (and opt-out cookies)
- Can be undone by third party itself opt out from behavioral targeting doesn't include the user is not tracked anymore!


Cookie Blocking

- Many browser extension to block third parties from setting cookies via blacklists
- Performance varies (Fanboy's list, down to TRUSTe)
- Recently, this functionaly has become available in modern browsers



Google Ad Preferences

Google Ads Preferences



Ghostery – Opting out



Google Analytics



Google Analytics Opt-out Browser Add-on

To provide website visitors the ability to prevent their data from being used by Google Analytics, we have developed the Google Analytics opt-out browser add-on for the Google Analytics JavaScript (ga.js, analytics.js, dc.js).

If you want to opt-out, download and install the add-on for your web browser. The Google Analytics opt-out add-on is designed to be compatible with Chrome, Internet Explorer 8-11, Safari, Firefox and Opera. In order to function, the opt-out add-on must be able to load and execute properly on your browser. For Internet Explorer, 3rd-party cookies must be enabled. Learn more about about the opt-out and how to properly install the browser add-on here.


Select a language ▼


Get Google Analytics Optout Browser Add-on

Available for Microsoft Internet Explorer 8-11, Google Chrome, Mozilla Firefox, Apple Safari and Opera.

Learn more about Google Analytics Privacy »

Firefox Lightbeam






Anti-Tracking Extensions

TABLE 1. COMMON BROWSER EXTENSIONS TO BLOCK ONLINE TRACKERS, INSTALLATIONS, AND UNDERLYING FILTER RULES (Aug. 2016).

Browser Extension	Filter-Rules	Firefox Users	Chrome Users
AdBlock Plus (ABP)	ABP	18,689,656	10,000,000+
AdBlock	ABP	NA	10,000,000+
Ghostery	custom (proprietary)	1,337,831	2.348.209
uBlock (Origin)	ABP	1,243,409	3,852,990
AdBlock Edge	ABP	408,410	NA
Disconnect	custom (GPL)	265,773	797,097
Blur	custom (proprietary)	176,027	329,446
Privacy Badger	algorithmic	80,291	324,062

Block Me If You Can: A Large-Scale Study of Tracker-Blocking Tools

Private Search



Key challenge: can you still receive somewhat personalized search results and remain (mostly private)?

Private Browsing

□ Private Browsing allows you to

- Historically speaking, web browsers store information such as browsing history, images, videos and text within cache.
- In contrast, privacy mode can be

vser does brov What about browser extensions? n for ns. Inte rowse the I data that Should they be supported in savir ter date. sable the private browsing mode? **s** and Flash info cookies.

which **sites** and **pages** you've visited

It is still possible to identify frequented websites by associating the IP address with the user on the server end.

Do Not Track HTTP header

```
DNT = "DNT" ":" BIT
```


```
    => opt out of tracking
    => opt in to tracking
```

absent => no expressed preference

User Agent Requirements

- MAY include a DNT header in any HTTP request
- SHOULD provide a user interface
- MAY adopt no-expressed-preference or opt-out by default
- MUST NOT transmit opt-in without user consent

Firefox UI



Second and Third Parties

Opt out: a server acting in a third-party capacity MUST NOT track a user or user agent unless subject to an exception.

- A third party is a functional entity with which the user does not reasonably expect to share data.
- E.g., ad networks, analytics providers, social plug-in providers

Tracking includes collection, retention, and use of all data related to the request and response.

Exceptions

- Explicit user consent for tracking
- Third-party tracking exclusively on behalf of first party
- Data unlinkable to a user or UA
- Logging:
 - □ Single site logs: 2 weeks
 - Logs for ad fraud: 1 month
 - Logs for security: 6 months
 - Logs for financial fraud: 6 months


Server Requirements

Server SHOULD echo request header

```
GET /thirdpartycontent.html HTTP/1.1
Host: thirdparty.example.com
DNT: 1
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Mon, 7 March 2011 01:23:45 GMT
Server: Apache/2.2.17 (Unix)
Content-Length: 123
Connection: close
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
DNT: 1
```

Stateless Fingerprinting

EFF Fingerprinting Tester https://panopticlick.eff.org



Panopticlick Testing

ΙF



Brave



Fingerprinting Components

```
https://github.com/Valve/fingerprintis/blob/master/fingerprint.is
                                                                        getScreenResolution: function () {
                                                               262:
                                                               263
                                                                          var resolution;
  214:
           getPluginsString: function () {
                                                                           if(this.screen orientation){
                                                               264
             if(this.isIE() && this.ie activex){
 215
                                                               . . .
  216
               return this.getIEPluginsString();
                                                               270
                                                                        },
  . . .
                                                               271
  220
           },
                                                               272:
                                                                        getCanvasFingerprint: function () {
  221
                                                               273
                                                                          var canvas =
                                                             document.createElement('canvas');
           getRegularPluginsString: function () {
 222:
                                                                          var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
                                                               274
             return this.map(navigator.plugins, function
  223
(p) {
               var mimeTypes = this.map(p, function(mt){
  224
  . . .
  229
           },
 230
 231:
           getIEPluginsString: function () {
             if(window.ActiveXObject){
 232
  233
               var names =
['ShockwaveFlash.ShockwaveFlash',//flash plugin
  . . .
           },
  260
  261
```

Canvas Fingerprinting

HTML5 Canvas Fingerprinting

Convers Compart in Very Drawers .

Canvas is an HTML5 API which is used to draw graphics and animations on a web page via scripting in JavaScript.

But apart from this, canvas can be used as additional entropy in web-browser's fingerprinting and used for online tracking purposes.

The technique is based on the fact that the same canvas image may be rendered differently in different computers. This happens for several reasons. At the image format level – web browsers uses different image processing engines, image export options, compression level, the final images may got different checksum even if they are pixel-identical. At the system level – operating systems have different fonts, they use different algorithms and settings for anti-aliasing and sub-pixel rendering.

This is the first in the wild PoC of the Canvas Fingerprinting. Below you can see if the Canvas is supported in your web browser and check whether this technique can keep track of you. In addition a little continuing research will show how realy unique and persistent Canvas Fingerprint in real life, and whether your signature in BrowserLeaks database (nothing is collected right here!).

Canvas Support in Your Browser :						
Canvas (basic support)	✓ True					
Text API for Canvas	✓ True					
Canvas toDataURL	✓ True					
Database Summary :						
Unique User-Agents	216343					
Unique Fingerprints	7047					
Your Fingerprint :						
Signature	√ 81E42236					
Uniqueness	99.61% (835 of 216343 user agents have the same signature)					
Image File Details :	BrowseriLeaks,com canvas: 1.0					
File Size	4689 bytes					
Number of Colors	209					
PNG Hash	B2522922E7860375635A13B552A960FD					
PNG Headers	Chunk:	Length:	CRC:	Content:		
	IHDR	13	477A703E	PNG image header: 220x30, 8 bits/sample, truecolor+alpha, noninterlaced		
	IDAT	4632	81E42236	PNG image data		
	IEND	0	AE426082	end-of-image marker		

amiunique.org

Are you unique?

Yes! (You can be tracked!)

38.63 % of observed browsers are **Chrome**, as yours.

0.32 % of observed browsers are Chrome 62.0, as yours.

55.92 % of observed browsers run **Windows**, as yours.

16.51 % of observed browsers run **Windows 10**, as yours.

63.71 % of observed browsers have set "en" as their primary language, as yours.

6.29 % of observed browsers have UTCO as their timezone, as yours.

However, your full fingerprint is unique among the 525721 collected so far. Want to know why?

Click here

View more details


View graphs

Fingerprint Details

My fingerprint

Attribute	Similarity ratio 6	Value	
User agent 1	<0.1%	$\label{eq:mozilla/5.0} $$ 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/62.0.3202.75 Safari/537.36"$	
Accept 1	7.33%	$"text/html, application/xhtml+xml, application/xml; q=0.9; image/webp, image/apng, ~\gamma"; q=0.8"$	
Content encoding 1	33.62%	"gzip, deflate, br"	
Content language 1	0.68%	"en-GB"	
List of plugins	24.05%	THE	
Platform 1	43.37%	"Win32"	
Cookies enabled 3	79.18%	"yes"	
Do Not Track	50.48%	"NC"	
Timezone 6	6.29%	"O"	
Screen resolution 1	<0.1%	"1440x2560x24"	
Use of local storage 1	75.95%	"yes"	
Use of session storage 1	75.95%	"yes"	
Canvas 1	1.37%	Cwm fjordbank glyp exercise z. @ Cwm fjordbank glyphs vext quiz, @	
WebGL Vendor 1		"Google Inc."	
WebGL Renderer 1		"ANGLE (Intel(R) HD Graphics 630 Direct $3D11$ vs_ 5_0 ps $_5_0$)"	
List of fonts 1	43.19%	"Flash not detected"	
Screen resolution 1	43.20%	"Flash not detected"	
Language 1	43.20%	"Flash not detected"	
Platform 1	43.20%	"Flash not detected"	
Use of AdBlock 1	33.42%	"yes"	


Operating systems



Overall Statistics: Number of entries: 525663

Browsers


Click the slices to view versions.



Extension Fingerprinting https://extensions.inrialpes.fr

Are you identifiable?

Yes, you are identifiable, as there are no other users who looks like you among the 20331 users we tested so far:



Are you identifiable...

by your extensions?	N/A	
by your website logins?		
by your browser fingerprint?		
by your extensions, web logins and browser fingerprint together?		

Website Fingerprinting

Website login details (login-leak)

Your browser's website login presence fingerprint is not unique! We found 52 collision(s) among the 20331 browsers tested so far! 60/60 Websites where you seem to be logged into: Website Detection method Twitter Redirection URL hijacking (check it here) Google Plus Redirection URL hijacking (check it here) Redirection URL hijacking (check it here) Reddit Redirection URL hijacking (C check it here) Amazon.fr Redirection URL hijacking (check it here) Amazon.de Redirection URL hijacking (check it here) Amazon.it Amazon.co.uk Redirection URL hijacking (check it here) VK Redirection URL hijacking (check it here) Content-Security-Policy violation eBay.com LinkedIn Content-Security-Policy violation Forbes Content-Security-Policy violation » Report false login detections


Standard Fingerprinting

Standard fingerprint details

Your browser's standard fingerprint is unique among the 20331 browsers that were tested so far! Detected browser properties: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) User agent: Chrome/62.0.3202.75 Safari/537.36 Resolution (available): 2560x1440 (2520x1440) Timezone: en-US Language: Arial, Arial Black, Arial Narrow, Book Antiqua, Bookman Old Style, Calibri, Cambria, Cambria Math, Detected fonts: (ca. 500 fonts tested in Century, Century Gothic, Century Schoolbook, Comic Sans MS, Consolas, Courier, Courier New, JavaScript) Garamond, Georgia, Helvetica, Impact, Lucida Bright, Lucida Calligraphy, Lucida Console, Lucida Fax, Lucida Handwriting, Lucida Sans, Lucida Sans Typewriter, Lucida Sans Unicode, Microsoft Sans Serif, Monotype Corsiva, MS Gothic, MS PGothic, MS Reference Sans Serif, MS Sans Serif, MS Serif, Palatino Linotype, Segoe Print, Segoe Script, Segoe UI, Segoe UI Light, Segoe UI Semibold, Segoe UI Symbol, Tahoma, Times, Times New Roman, Trebuchet MS, Verdana, Wingdings, Wingdings 2, List of plugins Canvas image: k glyphs vext quiz, 😃 WebGL image:

Ad Blocking

Motivation



Trump Travel Ban Goes to Supreme Court

Curbs on Entry From Six Countries Can Take Partial Effect



Where the Senate Health **Care Bill Fails**

By RON JOHNSON It promises to replace Obamacare, but it relies on the same big-

Nancy Pelosi: Washington's Latest Wicked Witch


By SUSAN CHIRA Female politicians are attacked in ways that play off biases shared by

The Opinion Pages



By MICHAEL D. SHEAR and ADAM TIDTAY 2 minutes and

It's Worse on Mobile Devices



Over 50% Traffic From Ads!!!

E Q SEARCH

The New York Times

Pursues I.P.O. Looms Over



NONFICTION
The iPhone Is 10 Years
Old. Here's the Story of Its
Birth.



Move Over, Bitcoin. Ether Is the Digital Currency of the Moment.



Tech Titans Ma Pilgrimage to V to Discuss Gov Systems

BUSINESS DAY

The Cost of Mobile Ads on 50 News Websites

By GREGOR AISCH, WILSON ANDREWS and JOSH KELLER OCT. 1, 2015

Ad blockers, which Apple first allowed on the iPhone in September, promise to conserve data and make websites load faster. But how much of your mobile data comes from advertising? We measured the mix of advertising and editorial on the mobile home pages of the top 50 news websites – including ours – and found that more than half of all data came from ads and other content filtered by ad blockers. Not all of the news websites were equal. RELATED ARTICLE

en a 4G LTE network


Solution: Ad-blocking




With AdblockPlus (ABP)



Ad Blocking in Practice



(a) forbes.com



(b) independent.co.uk

Fig. 1. Examples of ad-block detection responses.


WE'VE DETECTED THAT YOU'RE USING AD BLOCK PLUS OR SOME OTHER AD BLOCKING SOFTWARE. IN ORDER TO KEEP OUR SITE FREE, THIS SITE IS SPONSORED IN PARTY BY ADVERTISEMENTS. **DISABLE** ADBLOCK R DISABLING AD BLOCKER ON THIS WEBSITE ENJOYED THE CONTENT. THANK YOU! Adblock Detected We have detected that you are using adblocking plugin in you browser. Adblocker detected! Please consider reading The revenue we earn by the advertisements is used to manage this website, we request you to whitelest our website in you adblocking plugin. We've detected that you are using AdBlock Plusore some other adblocking software which is preventing the page from fully loading. We don't have any banner, Flash, animation, obnuzious sound, or popup ad. We do not implement these annoying types of ads! We need money to operate the site, and almost all of it comes from our online advertising. Please add our site to your ad blocking whitelist or disable your adblocking software.

Blocking Lists: filterlists.com

∓ FilterLists

			•
List	FilScore	Tags	Description
Adware Filters	100		Blocks ads injected by adware.
YouTube: Pure Video Experience	100		Block all YouTube annoyances.
Adblock YouTube Ads	99		Blocks ads on YouTube.
Anti-PopAds	99		Blocks shady, annoying pop-under ads from the infamous PopAds ad network.

Speedups Due to Ad Blockers



Blocking Adblockers



Business ▶ Policy



Adblock Plus blocks Facebook block of Adblock Plus block of Facebook block of Adblock Plus block of Facebook ads

This arms race will never end



Most read



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Elon Musk reveals Mars colony rocket capable of bringing pizza joints to the red planet



Amazon.com just became a 90,000-seat Azure case study