

OAKMUN
2025



Background Guide **UNGA**

**Reviewing the misuse of R2P to justify
unilateral or bloc based interventions**

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Letter from the Executive Board

Dear Delegates,

It is our high privilege and esteemed honour to welcome you to The United Nations General Assembly at The Oakridge International School Model United Nations 2025. We hope you understand the significant role you play as a member in this influential committee and that our objective is primarily to ensure that you consider this an amazing learning experience which sharpens your leadership skills, while having fun all the way through.

We look forward to having you in our committee and hope that you find this background guide helpful for your extensive research. The content given in the background guide is a compilation of various credible sources, in addition to the knowledge of the Executive Board and does not, in any way, reflect the personal opinion of the members of the Executive Board.

Further, please note that this background guide is designed to give you a description of the topics and the committee. This guide is not intended to represent exhaustive research on every facet of the topics. We encourage and expect each delegate to fully explore other topics than the ones mentioned in the guide and be able to identify and analyze the intricacies of the issues.

For delegates new to the MUN environment, we recommend familiarizing yourselves with the UNA-USA rules of procedure. Beyond procedural matters, your responsibilities remain consistent: thorough research on the agenda, understanding your nation's foreign policy, and relevant legal frameworks.

Lastly, please feel free to contact us at any of our Email IDs mentioned below and we'll try to respond at the earliest. Good luck and Godspeed.

Warm Regards,

SEAMEI OAKMUN'25 UNGA Executive Board

Samiksha.VB - Chairperson

Aditi Anand - Vice-Chairperson

Anagha Anand - Moderator

Addendum: Nature And Proof Of Evidence

Documents from the following sources will be considered as credible proof for any allegations made in committee or statements that require verification:

Appropriate Documents and articles from the **Reuters News agency** will be used to corroborate or refute controversial statements made in committee.

UN Documents: Documents by all UN agencies will be considered sufficient proof. Reports from all UN bodies including treaty-based bodies will also be accepted.

National Government Reports: Government Reports of a given country used to corroborate an allegation on the same aforementioned country will be accepted as proof. The documents stated above will hold a binding nature of the establishment.

Other sources like **Wikipedia, Amnesty International, Al Jazeera** or newspapers like the Guardian, and so on and so forth will not be accepted as credible proof; but may be used for a better understanding of any issue and even be brought up in debate if the information given in such sources is in line with the beliefs of a government or a delegate.

Please note that while background guides are supposed to provide the delegates with an overview of the agenda and further point them towards the right direction for further research, they are not considered valid sources of information and hence cannot be cited as proof of a fact at any point during the committee. Only the above-mentioned sources can be accepted as credible sources of evidence if asked for by the Executive Board.

Committee Overview

The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) is the primary deliberative, policymaking, and representative organ of the United Nations, comprising all 193 Member States with equal voting rights. While its resolutions are **recommendatory in nature and not legally binding**, they carry significant **political and moral weight**, often shaping international law and guiding Security Council action.

Under the UN Charter, the General Assembly holds the authority to:

- Discuss and make recommendations on any matters within the scope of the Charter (Article 10).
- **Consider and make recommendations** on principles of cooperation in the maintenance of peace and security, though it cannot authorize enforcement measures (Article 11).
- **Discuss questions relating to international peace and security**, except where the Security Council is already exercising its functions (Article 12).
- **Initiate studies and make recommendations** to promote the development and codification of international law (Article 13).
- **Approve the UN budget** and oversee financial matters (Article 17).

The UNGA is particularly important in debates around the **Responsibility to Protect (R2P)** because:

1. It provides a **universal platform** where all states, regardless of size or power, can express concerns about interventions carried out in the name of R2P.
2. It has adopted key resolutions codifying R2P principles (2005 World Summit Outcome Document, GA Res. 60/1).
3. It can call for **advisory opinions from the International Court of Justice (ICJ)** and establish **special investigative mechanisms**.
4. Unlike the Security Council, it is not subject to veto, making it a crucial forum when great power interests block consensus in the UNSC.

Introduction to the Committee

The doctrine of the **Responsibility to Protect (R2P)** occupies a complex position at the intersection of international law and international relations. Formally articulated in the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, R2P reaffirmed that sovereignty entails not only rights but also responsibilities: every state bears the primary duty to protect its population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. Should a state manifestly fail in this duty, the international community, acting through the United Nations, may take collective measures, including the use of force, in accordance with the UN Charter.

At its core, R2P does not create new legal obligations beyond those already contained in treaty law (such as the Genocide Convention) and customary international law. Instead, it reframes existing obligations within a framework emphasizing state responsibility and international cooperation. However, the principle derives its normative strength from political consensus rather than from binding treaty law, and its reliance on Security Council authorization under Chapter VII of the Charter raises immediate questions about **legitimacy, selectivity, and potential misuse**.

This agenda focuses specifically on the **misuse of R2P in international interventions**. While the UN Charter (Articles 2(4), 2(7), and 39–42) establishes a clear prohibition on the unilateral use of force, powerful states have, at times, invoked R2P as a justification for military action outside of Security Council authorization or for interventions that exceed the scope of protecting populations. Such actions blur the line between humanitarian necessity and political opportunism, raising concerns about erosion of the prohibition on the use of force, selective enforcement, and the instrumentalization of humanitarian rhetoric for strategic ends.

Delegates must therefore approach this agenda with an eye toward both **doctrinal clarity and legal rigor**. Central questions include whether R2P has achieved the status of customary international law, whether unilateral invocations of R2P can ever be lawful, how precedent has shaped its application, and what safeguards are necessary to ensure that the principle is not distorted into a vehicle for interventionism. By grounding debate in the provisions of the UN Charter, the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice, and the practice of the Security Council and General Assembly, this committee will examine whether R2P is a safeguard against atrocity crimes or a potential Trojan horse undermining the very foundations of international law.

Major Aspects Of The Problem

1. Selective Application and Double Standards

The uneven application of R2P has eroded its credibility. When powerful states or blocs rally to intervene in strategically important conflicts, but remain silent in cases that lack geostrategic value, the doctrine loses its universal legitimacy. For instance, swift NATO action in Libya contrasted sharply with inaction in Myanmar or Yemen, where equally grave atrocities were documented. This inconsistency suggests that humanitarian principles may be subordinated to political convenience. The perception of double standards undermines trust in the doctrine and fuels skepticism among states in the Global South, many of whom view R2P as a selective tool of interventionism rather than a consistent humanitarian commitment.

2. Unilateral and Bloc-Based Interventions

R2P was never intended to provide unilateral authority for states or blocs to use force. Yet in practice, coalitions such as NATO have justified interventions without Security Council authorization on grounds of legitimacy, if not strict legality. Kosovo in 1999 is emblematic: NATO acted outside the Charter framework, arguing humanitarian necessity, thereby setting a precedent that others later invoked. Such actions weaken the collective security system by sidelining the Council, raising fundamental questions about whether unilateralism undercuts the very multilateral consensus on which R2P depends.

3. Mandate Inflation and Regime Change

Another recurring problem is the tendency of interventions to expand beyond the limited mandate of protecting civilians. Libya in 2011 illustrates this danger. The Security Council's Resolution 1973 authorized "all necessary measures" to protect civilians, but the operation evolved into a campaign to depose Muammar Gaddafi. Critics argue that this exceeded the Council's intent and eroded faith in R2P, making states like Russia and China deeply resistant to similar authorizations in subsequent crises such as Syria. This "mission creep" has long-term consequences: once protection mandates are seen as cover for regime change, the likelihood of securing future consensus plummets.

4. Sovereignty Versus Protection

The balance between sovereignty and protection remains contested. While the 2005 World Summit outcome document affirmed that sovereignty entails responsibility, many states continue to emphasize the inviolability of non-intervention under Article 2(7) of the Charter. The fear is not abstract: weaker states in Africa, Asia, and Latin America worry that R2P could legitimize neo-imperial interventions. The doctrine, they argue, risks hollowing out sovereignty unless safeguards against misuse are strengthened. In this light, sovereignty is not merely a legal shield but a political necessity for equitable participation in international order.

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5.Ambiguity in Legal Interpretation

The absence of a definitive legal framework governing R2P leaves the doctrine vulnerable to manipulation. The International Court of Justice has not endorsed a right of unilateral humanitarian intervention, but neither has it categorically outlawed it in dicta, leaving room for competing interpretations. Some Western scholars argue that emerging customary law allows humanitarian force under extreme conditions, while many non-aligned states insist that the Charter's prohibition on force admits no such exception. This ambiguity permits opportunistic invocation of R2P where political interests align, while simultaneously deterring action where interests diverge.

6.Accountability and Oversight Gaps

Finally, there is the issue of accountability. Once an intervention begins under the pretext of R2P, there are no institutional mechanisms to monitor compliance with the original mandate or to sanction actors who exceed it. Neither the Security Council nor the General Assembly has a systematic review process for interventions framed under R2P. Reports by the Secretary-General provide some oversight, but they remain political rather than judicial. The absence of robust accountability enables both overreach and selective enforcement, leaving victims of misuse with little recourse.

Case Studies

Kosovo (1999)

The NATO air campaign (Operation Allied Force), which began on 24 March 1999 and lasted seventy-eight days, was launched in response to reports of ethnic cleansing, mass displacement and widespread human-rights abuses in Kosovo. NATO commenced sustained air operations against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia without an express authorisation from the Security Council; Russian and Chinese opposition to use-of-force measures in the Council made any such Chapter VII mandate impracticable. The operation's architects framed the resort to force as a moral imperative to avert imminent atrocity, and commentators soon described the intervention in the vocabulary of "illegal but legitimate." The operational facts (dates, scope and duration) are recorded in NATO and contemporary accounts. [NATO Balkan Insight](#)

Legally, the Kosovo case raises three discrete but interlocking questions. The first is the *jus ad bellum* question: did the absence of Security Council authorisation render the campaign unlawful under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, absent a valid claim of self-defence under Article 51? The settled jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice—most prominently in the Nicaragua judgment—construes the Charter prohibition on the use of force broadly and permits only expressly recognised exceptions (self-defence, or Security Council authorisation). That restrictive framework gave authoritative weight to critiques that NATO's action lacked a clear legal basis.

International Court of Justice

The second question concerns normative doctrine and political legitimacy: could acute humanitarian necessity ever supply a legal or at least a politically persuasive justification for force when the Security Council is paralysed by veto? The ICISS formulation of R2P and its subsidiary tests (right authority, last resort, proportionality, reasonable prospects, right intention) were not invoked as a substitute for Charter procedure; rather, NATO's intervention exposed the normative gap between moral claims and legal authorisation. The third issue is precedent and state responsibility: by acting without Council authorisation, NATO created an ambiguous practice that later actors could point to when justifying extralegal measures. Subsequent reviews (including UN and tribunal-related inquiries) explored whether elements of NATO's conduct might have transgressed *jus in bello* obligations or given rise to wrongful acts under the Articles on State Responsibility, but the central *jus ad bellum* problem remained the absence of Council sanction and the doctrinal tension that created. [ICTYNSUWorks](#)

Iraq (2003)

The 2003 invasion of Iraq by a U.S.-led coalition proceeded without Security Council authorisation and was publicly justified by coalition states on a range of grounds including alleged threats from weapons of mass destruction, enforcement of earlier Council resolutions, and—at times—humanitarian and regime-change rhetoric about liberation from oppression. The absence of a fresh Chapter VII resolution authorising force made the intervention's *jus ad bellum* credentials controversial from the outset. The then-Secretary-General stated publicly that the invasion was not in conformity with the UN Charter and, from the UN Secretariat's perspective, unlawful. That assessment, together with the broad international debate it provoked, marks Iraq 2003 as a paradigmatic instance of humanitarian or moral language being used to bolster claims that lacked robust Council endorsement. [Al Jazeera](#)

From a legal standpoint, Iraq 2003 is important because it illustrates how humanitarian or human-rights rhetoric can be instrumentalised to advance objectives that include regime change and strategic advantage, thereby muddying the distinction between permissible coercive measures (as authorised by the Security Council) and prohibited unilateral uses of force. Under the Charter regime, the legality of force turns on whether an Article 51 self-defence threshold is met or the Security Council authorises enforcement; absent those, the default position is unlawfulness. The post-invasion consequences—state collapse, protracted instability, and serious civilian harm—also

problematic the “reasonable prospects” and “proportionality” elements of any R2P-like justificatory framework and lend weight to the critique that illegitimate, loosely-justified uses of force can produce humanitarian harms worse than those they purport to remedy. [United Nations International Court of Justice](#)

Libya (2011)

The Security Council’s adoption of Resolution 1973 on 17 March 2011 authorized Member States “to take all necessary measures” to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack, and imposed a no-fly zone and related measures under Chapter VII. On its face, Resolution 1973 was a Council authorization to use coercive means aimed at a narrow humanitarian objective; for many proponents it represented an operationalization of R2P’s pillar three through the Council mechanism. The contents and date of the resolution are part of the Council record. [United Nations Documentation United Nations](#)

The ensuing campaign exposed a legal and practical fault-line: although the Council authorized force for civilian protection, the military coalition’s campaign was widely criticized for “mission creep”—operations and targeting that materially contributed to the collapse of the Gaddafi regime and his eventual killing. Critics argued that the implementation exceeded the temporal and substantive limits implied by the mandate, thereby stretching Council language into outcomes it had not explicitly endorsed. States that had abstained from the resolution (and later commentators) urged that the outcome therefore undermined confidence in authorizations framed in R2P terms, because member states could not be sure that a narrowly drawn protective mandate would not be stretched into political transformation or regime change. That perception has had durable legal-political effects: it hardened resistance by permanent Council members to subsequent coercive proposals and sharpened calls for stricter definitions, oversight mechanisms, and post-authorization accountability. The question of whether the Libyan operation amounted to a breach of the Council’s intended limits raises complex issues of mandate interpretation, command responsibility and state responsibility; but regardless of the technical outcome, the reputational and doctrinal damage to R2P’s credibility is well documented. [United Nations Documentation](#)[JSTOR](#)[Declassified UK](#)

Syria (2011–present)

Syria poses a dual problem: both the danger of misuse and the harm of non-use. From the outset of the crisis there were credible allegations of mass atrocities, including indiscriminate attacks against civilians and, later, chemical weapons use. Efforts to translate those facts into Chapter VII measures were repeatedly frustrated by Security Council vetoes—most notably by Russia and China—on draft resolutions that would have either condemned the Syrian leadership or contemplated coercive measures; the pattern of vetoes is a matter of Security Council record and analysis. In parallel, the Council did adopt measures focused on chemical weapons removal (Resolution 2118) and established investigative mechanisms (including the Joint Investigative Mechanism), but the broader paralysis over enforcement illustrated the limitations of a Council-centric R2P where P5 divisions prevail. [Security Council Report](#)[+1UN Press](#)[Arms Control Association](#)

Legally, Syria demonstrates the perverse dynamics that can follow from earlier episodes of contested R2P practice. The Libyan aftermath became a principal argument for P5 members invoking sovereignty and non-intervention to block coercive measures—even in the presence of grave abuses—on the grounds that protective mandates risk metamorphosing into regime change. At the same time, the continued documentation of mass violations in Syria triggered alternative accountability avenues (fact-finding reports, referrals to ad hoc investigative mechanisms, and domestic prosecutions), but none substituted for the collective enforcement tools the Charter vests in the Council. The Syrian example underscores how legal legitimacy for coercive action under R2P is not just an abstract doctrinal question; P5 cohesion, credible evidentiary standards and structural safeguards against mandate abuse are preconditions for any sustainable R2P practice. [Security Council Report+1Arms Control Association](#)

Myanmar (Rakhine State, 2017 – Rohingya crisis)

The mass expulsion, systemic killings, sexual violence and village destruction affecting the Rohingya in 2017 gave rise to serious allegations of crimes against humanity and, according to some investigative bodies, acts meeting the high threshold of genocide. The Gambia filed an application at the International Court of Justice alleging breaches of the Genocide Convention by Myanmar, and the Court issued provisional measures ordering Myanmar to take certain immediate steps to prevent genocidal acts and to preserve evidence—an order of 23 January 2020 that remains a landmark in the field. The facts and the Court's procedural action are part of the ICJ record.

[International Court of Justice](#)[TIME](#)

The Myanmar episode is legally salient because it shows the limits of R2P where geopolitical alignments block coercive Council action but treaty obligations nonetheless create avenues for international adjudication and other accountability measures. The Genocide Convention imposes on all States the obligation to prevent and to punish genocide; where the Council is unable or unwilling to act, affected or third States may resort to judicial fora (ICJ, ICC) or to political measures in the General Assembly. The Gambia's ICJ filing exemplifies how legal duty can be operationalised absent Chapter VII enforcement, but the remedies the Court can provide—provisional measures, eventual judgments—do not themselves coerce immediate protective military action; enforcement remains politically fraught. Thus Myanmar highlights the dual legal lesson that treaty obligations can constrain state conduct and provide adjudicative recourse, even while they do not fully solve the enforcement problem created by Council deadlock. [International Court of Justice](#)[Human Rights Watch](#)

Ukraine (2022–present)

In early 2022 Russia advanced public claims that intervention or special measures were justified to protect Russian-speaking populations in eastern Ukraine from alleged genocide—an invocation of protective language that the international community overwhelmingly rejected as baseless and as a pretext for territorial aggression. The General Assembly convened an emergency special session under the Uniting for Peace procedure and adopted resolutions deplored the aggression and demanding withdrawal; simultaneously, Ukraine brought a case under the Genocide Convention to

the International Court of Justice, which in its Order of 16 March 2022 indicated provisional measures, including an order requiring Russia to suspend military operations (the Court's jurisdictional and provisional measures decisions are on record). These institutional responses illustrate how legal remedies and political censure can be pursued in parallel where Council action is constrained by a permanent member's involvement. [Digital Library International Court of Justice](#) Legally, the Ukraine matter is worst-case evidence of how rhetoric invoking protection can be inverted to justify aggression. The Genocide Convention context raised complex jurisdictional and evidentiary questions—whether the Convention was being deployed legitimately to address alleged genocidal intent, or instrumentally to cloak broader territorial objectives. The ICJ's provisional measures emphasised the Court's capacity to require steps to prevent irreparable harm and preserve rights pending final adjudication, but the practical effect of such orders depends on political will and complementary multilateral pressure. Ukraine therefore reinforces several durable lessons for R2P: the need for rigorous evidentiary standards before invoking atrocity language; the danger that protective rhetoric can be weaponised for expansionist ends; and the importance of preserving institutional channels (GA, ICJ, treaty fora) that can respond when the Security Council cannot act.

Key Terms

- **Sovereignty**

Sovereignty is the foundational principle of international law, codified in Article 2(1) and Article 2(7) of the UN Charter. It denotes the supreme authority of a state over its territory and population, free from external interference. In the R2P debate, sovereignty is reframed as responsibility: states not only enjoy rights but also owe duties to protect their populations from atrocity crimes. The tension arises when external actors invoke sovereignty to shield abuses or, conversely, disregard it to justify intervention.

- **Non-Intervention**

Closely tied to sovereignty, the principle of non-intervention prohibits external interference in the internal affairs of states. Article 2(7) of the UN Charter enshrines this principle, while General Assembly Resolution 2131 (1965) further affirms it. Any intervention, whether military, political, or economic, is generally prohibited unless authorized by the Security Council or falling under exceptions like self-defense. This principle often clashes with R2P's call for international action.

Responsibility to Protect (R2P)

R2P, endorsed in the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, is a political commitment rather than a binding treaty norm. It has three pillars:

Each state has the primary responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.

- **Responsibility to Protect (R2P)**

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Each state has the primary responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.

1. The international community must assist states in fulfilling this responsibility.
2. Should a state manifestly fail, the international community must be prepared to take collective action, in accordance with the Charter.
3. Misuse arises when states bypass the UN framework or invoke R2P selectively to justify otherwise unlawful interventions.

- **Humanitarian Intervention**

Distinct from R2P, humanitarian intervention refers to the unilateral or collective use of force without Security Council authorization to prevent mass atrocities. While some states and scholars argue that customary law permits such interventions, the prevailing view—affirmed by the ICJ in Nicaragua and DRC v. Uganda—is that no such legal exception exists outside Charter provisions. The Kosovo precedent remains the most contentious example.

- **Use of Force (Article 2(4) of the UN Charter)**

Article 2(4) prohibits the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. The only recognized exceptions are Security Council authorization under Chapter VII or self-defense under Article 51. R2P does not, in itself, create a new legal exception, making its misuse a matter of direct tension with Article 2(4).

- **Security Council Authorization**

Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council has the exclusive authority to determine threats to peace and authorize enforcement measures, including the use of force. Authorization is the legal anchor for collective R2P interventions. When states circumvent or over-interpret Council resolutions—as in Libya 2011—the line between lawful enforcement and unlawful misuse becomes blurred.

- **Selectivity**

Selectivity refers to the inconsistent application of international principles depending on political context. Some crises (e.g., Libya) have seen robust R2P action, while others (e.g., Syria, Myanmar) have faced paralysis. This undermines R2P's credibility, reinforcing accusations that it is applied only where it aligns with the interests of powerful states.

- **Mandate Creep (or “Mandate Inflation”)**

This term describes situations where states or coalitions exceed the scope of Security Council resolutions. In Libya, the Council authorized force to protect civilians, but NATO’s campaign was widely seen as pursuing regime change. Such overreach erodes trust in future R2P authorizations, as states fear mandates will be stretched beyond their intended limits.

- **Customary International Law**

Customary law derives from consistent state practice accepted as law (*opinio juris*). A central debate in R2P scholarship is whether the principle has crystallized into customary law or remains a political doctrine. Most scholars and states maintain that R2P is not binding law, but a political commitment supplementing existing obligations under treaties like the Genocide Convention.

- **Genocide Convention (1948)**

The Convention imposes binding obligations on states to prevent and punish genocide. Unlike R2P, it has a clear legal basis. States sometimes invoke the Genocide Convention (as Russia did in Ukraine) to justify intervention. However, such claims must meet evidentiary thresholds and procedural safeguards; otherwise, they constitute misuse.

Important Frameworks

The United Nations Charter

The UN Charter is the foundational legal text governing the use of force and sovereignty in international relations. Its provisions create the legal boundaries within which R2P must operate. Article 2(4) establishes the prohibition on the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, a rule widely regarded as a cornerstone of international law. Article 2(7) further emphasizes the principle of non-intervention in domestic affairs, carving out an exception only where enforcement action is authorized by the Security Council under Chapter VII. Articles 39 through 42 provide the Council with the exclusive authority to determine threats to peace and to mandate coercive measures, including the use of force. Article 51 recognizes the inherent right of self-defense in the event of armed attack. Taken together, these provisions leave little space for unilateral military action under humanitarian pretexts, unless sanctioned collectively by the Council. Any misuse of R2P therefore must be examined in light of these strict Charter rules, which prioritize collective decision-making over unilateralism.

The 2005 World Summit Outcome Document (GA Resolution 60/1)

The 2005 World Summit marked the political birth of R2P as a global commitment. Heads of state and government endorsed the principle that each state carries the primary responsibility to protect its population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. They also agreed that the international community should assist states in fulfilling this

responsibility, and, should a state manifestly fail to do so, the community should be prepared to take collective action through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter. The Outcome Document is not a treaty and does not create binding obligations, but its adoption by consensus at the highest level gave it strong political weight. Importantly, the language carefully conditions coercive measures on Security Council authorization, a safeguard meant to prevent unilateral claims of R2P. Any intervention that bypasses this requirement stretches the Summit's mandate and undermines the doctrine's legitimacy.

General Assembly Resolution 63/308 (2009)

This resolution reaffirmed the commitment of Member States to the principles agreed in 2005 and requested the continuation of dialogue on R2P. The significance of Resolution 63/308 lies in its confirmation that R2P remains a subject of ongoing debate and refinement within the General Assembly. It also reflects the Assembly's role as custodian of the principle, ensuring that discussions about its scope, implementation, and potential misuse remain transparent and inclusive. While the resolution does not create new legal obligations, it keeps R2P under constant review, offering the Assembly a forum to scrutinize both genuine applications and attempts at misuse.

The ICISS Report of 2001

The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty's report is the intellectual blueprint of R2P. It reframed the debate from a "right to intervene" to a "responsibility to protect," embedding five precautionary principles: right intention, last resort, proportionality, reasonable prospects, and right authority. Although never adopted as binding law, the report continues to guide debates by setting normative criteria against which interventions can be assessed. When interventions fail to meet these tests, as arguably happened in Libya where proportionality and right authority were contested, the credibility of R2P is damaged. The report thus remains a touchstone in evaluating whether interventions are consistent with the original doctrine or represent its distortion.

General Assembly Resolution 377 (Uniting for Peace, 1950)

The "Uniting for Peace" resolution provides the General Assembly with an important, though limited, role in situations where the Security Council is paralyzed by vetoes. It allows the Assembly to convene emergency special sessions and recommend collective measures, including, in exceptional cases, the use of force. However, these recommendations are non-binding. The resolution has been used in crises ranging from the Korean War to the Ukraine invasion in 2022. Its significance for R2P lies in its capacity to preserve a degree of collective legitimacy even when the Council is deadlocked. While it does not authorize coercive action, it gives the Assembly the power to articulate international consensus and to challenge unilateral claims of legitimacy.

International Court of Justice Jurisprudence

The ICJ has never directly ruled on R2P, but its jurisprudence shapes the legal environment in which R2P is debated. In *Nicaragua v. United States* (1986), the Court underscored the strict prohibition on the use of force and rejected claims of humanitarian necessity as justification for intervention. In the *Bosnia Genocide* case (2007), the Court clarified the obligations of states to prevent genocide but stopped short of endorsing unilateral military measures. The advisory opinion on Kosovo (2010) dealt narrowly with the legality of unilateral declarations of independence but left open questions about humanitarian intervention. Collectively, these rulings reinforce the view that humanitarian action must remain within Charter parameters, while leaving ambiguities that states have sometimes exploited to justify interventions.

Regional Frameworks: The African Union and Beyond

The African Union's Constitutive Act includes a groundbreaking provision authorizing intervention in cases of grave atrocity crimes, reflecting a regional determination to prevent repeats of Rwanda and similar tragedies. However, in practice, AU interventions have generally sought or relied on Security Council authorization, consistent with the Charter framework. The "Ezulwini Consensus" adopted by African states insists that while regional organizations can play a critical role in implementing R2P, any enforcement action must ultimately be sanctioned by the Security Council. Other regional organizations, such as the European Union or ASEAN, have been less explicit, but their involvement in R2P-related crises shows how blocs can serve as both vehicles for collective protection and potential instruments of politicized misuse.

QARMAS

1. How can the UNGA, within its recommendatory mandate, establish guidelines to distinguish legitimate R2P action from misuse for political or unilateral purposes?
2. What legal clarifications or interpretative declarations can the GA recommend regarding the relationship between R2P and the UN Charter's prohibition on unilateral force?
3. Should the GA recommend the creation of an independent review mechanism to monitor interventions carried out under R2P and assess mandate compliance?
4. How can the GA encourage greater accountability for states or blocs that exceed UNSC mandates while invoking R2P?
5. What steps can be taken to strengthen the role of regional organizations (e.g., AU, ASEAN) in implementing R2P without enabling bloc misuse?

6.How can the GA promote non-coercive R2P measures (capacity-building, humanitarian aid, sanctions) as alternatives to military force?

7.Should the GA recommend codifying limits on unilateral humanitarian interventions in international law to prevent their abuse?

8.What role can the ICJ play in providing advisory opinions on contested interventions claimed under R2P?

9.How can GA resolutions ensure that atrocity prevention mechanisms remain effective while safeguarding against geopolitical manipulation?

10.What monitoring frameworks can the GA recommend to ensure consistent, non-selective application of R2P across all crises?

Research Guidelines

While researching for a Model United Nations Conference, it is important as a delegate to understand that a well researched delegate always has the edge over their competition, and is more inclined to make better speeches and have a coherent train of thought.

With that being said, it is also important to note the quality of your research, and the sources of it. Having fallacious or wrong research will only deduct points from your final tally, and it is necessary to sidestep the enormous chunk of information available, and pick at only what is vital and necessary.

Here are a couple pointers you need to keep in mind during your research for OAKMUN'25 or for any other future MUN you might compete in:

1.Check the index of large documents to find a general gist of what you might be looking for.

2.While trying to find documents to defend your country's actions or stance on a particular issue, make sure to always refer to official documentation from your country's government or external affairs/foreign ministry.

3.Sources such as NEWS18, CNN, Fox News, Al Jazeera or any other local news will not be accepted as primary source of PROOF, UNGA official site reports are to be referred to as helpful for both, as source of understanding and proof.

4. Official UN Documents for statistics and figures can be referred to in committee. Some examples are: Journals published by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime or any other UN Committee, UN Resolutions, etc.

5. Any documentation that possesses a certain threshold of AI generated text will be immediately scrapped by the executive board and further actions will follow. Plagiarism will also be dealt with strictly, and will not be tolerated favourably.

6. A Plagiarism threshold limit will also be imposed on documents submitted to the Executive Board.

