

A photograph of a railway track receding into the distance through a field of fallen leaves.

Train Verification and Control Envelope Synthesis

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KIT 06/2023



Cyber Physical Systems



```



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```



$$\begin{aligned}
 p' = v, v' = & a_l + a_a + a_s(p) + a_r(v) + a_c(p), a'_b = m_b \\
 \text{with } a_l \in [-b_{\max}, a_{\max}], a_a = \max(a_b, a_{b\max}) \quad 2
 \end{aligned}$$

Overview





Pt 1: Verified Train Controllers for the Federal Railroad Administration Train Kinematics Model: Balancing Competing Brake and Track Forces

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Stefan Mitsch

André Platzer

EMSOFT 2022







Train Control: Complicated




Train Control: Complicated




Train Control: Complicated



Train Control: Complicated




Formal Verification




[1] J. Brosseau and B. M. Ede, "Development of an adaptive predictive braking enforcement algorithm", Federal Railroad Administration, 2009.

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Formal Verification



Approach: Impact




[1] J. Brosseau and B. M. Ede, "Development of an adaptive predictive braking enforcement algorithm", Federal Railroad Administration, 2009.

Approach: Impact

Baseline^[1]

Verified
controller



[1] J. Brosseau and B. M. Ede, "Development of an adaptive predictive braking enforcement algorithm", Federal Railroad Administration, 2009.

Overview

Part 1: Train Verification

- Introduction
- Techniques
- Controller
- Evaluation
- Summary





Background: Dynamics

Rate of change of train velocity is acceleration


$$p' = v, v' = a_l + a_a + a_s(p) + a_r(v) + a_c(p), a'_b = m_b$$

with $a_l \in [-b_{\max}, a_{\max}], a_a = \max(a_b, a_{b\max})$

Rate of change of train position is velocity



Background: Dynamics



Unknown functions: slope, curve



$$p' = v, v' = a_l + a_a + a_s(p) + a_r(v) + a_c(p), a'_b = m_b$$

Unknown functions: slope, curve



Use worst case value ...

$$p' = v, v' = a_l + a_a + \boxed{a_s(p)} + a_r(v) + \boxed{a_c(p)}, a'_b = m_b$$

Unknown function: replace with
worst case value 0


Unknown function: replace with
worst case value m_s

m_s

0

Unknown functions: slope, curve

... with improving estimates.




$$a_s(p) \leq \bar{a}_s(p_0) = \min(m_s, a_s(p_0) + u \cdot h_{\max} \cdot T)$$


Other Proof Techniques

Circular Dependencies

Problem: Circular dependence while estimating worst case values.



Solution: Bootstrap cycle with naive values, then iterate.



Taylor Polynomial

Problem: Davis resistance integrates poorly.


$$\frac{\left(\sqrt{4(a_l + m_s)a_2 - a_1^2} \right) \cdot \tan \left(t \frac{\sqrt{4(a_l + m_s)a_2 - a_1^2}}{2} + \tan^{-1} \left(\frac{a_1 + 2a_2 v_0}{\sqrt{4(a_l + m_s)a_2 - a_1^2}} \right) \right) - a_1}{2a_2}$$

Solution: Taylor polynomial approximation.

Ghost Trains

Problem: Intermediate reasoning steps transcendental.

Solution: Reason about as ODE (here represents dynamics of a “ghost” train).




Overview

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Control Structure

Control code runs in a loop with some latency T (in our case, to the order of a second).



```

Theorem "WP2/slopecurve_offset_airbrakes_1"
Definitions
  /* Acceleration constants */
  Real a0; /* Strict upper bound on maximal constant acceleration. */
  Real a1; /* Accelerations that are linear in velocity. */
  Real a2; /* Accelerations that are quadratic in velocity. */
  Real a3; /* Maximal constant braking force (positive). */
  Real v0c; /* Coefficient in derivative of horizontal curve. */

  /* Situational track setup */
  Real maxSlope; /* Greatest allowed acceleration due to slope gradient, m_s in the paper */
  Real T0; /* End of loop period / system reaction time. */
  Real slopeAccTrainPos; /* Slope acceleration map (where trainPos is measured along the sloped track rather than along flat land, a_c in the paper). */
  Real maxVertCur; /* Maxima rate of change of slope (vertical curvature), h_max in the paper. */
  Real h0; /* Bound on friction due to horizontal curve (resistance at min radius), m in the paper. */
  Real Ap; /* maximum penalty brake acceleration */
  Real buildUpThreshold; /* Time offset until pressure brakes can be applied. */
  Real pressureChangeRate; /* Upper bound on rate of increase in acceleration due to air brakes when it is applied. */

  /* Upper bound on velocity for current velocity vel at acceleration a0 for one time period independently from particular curve or slope. */
  Real baseUpperVel(Real a0, Real vel) = min(slopeAcc + (maxVertCur)*vel, maxSlope);

  /* Maximum acceleration due to slope. */
  Real maxSlopeAcc(Real slopeAcc, Real vel) = min(slopeAcc + (maxVertCur)*vel, maxSlope);

  /* Maximum acceleration due to curve (negative since curves decrease). */
  Real maxCurveAcc(Real curvature, Real vel) = min(vel*2/(b0*maxSlope) + vel*buildUpThreshold*2, maxSlope*buildUpThreshold*2);

  /* The train will stop at most this much distance if braking from speed vel. */
  Real brakingDist(Real trainPos, Real vel) = min(vel*2/(b0*maxSlope) + vel*buildUpThreshold*2, maxSlope*buildUpThreshold*2);

  /* Velocity-dependent part of the acceleration that is always negative (since resistance). a_r in the paper. */
  Real resistance(Real vel) = a1*vel + a2*vel*2;

  /* Total acceleration acting on the train at any point for a controlled acceleration trainAcc at velocity vel from position trainPos. */
  Real acc(Real trainAcc, Real vel, Real trainPos) = trainAcc + slopeAcc(trainPos) + resistance(vel) + curvature(trainPos);

  /* Assumptions on new position (increasing time points). */
  Real upperVel(Real a0, Real slopeAcc, Real curvature); /* upperVel(a0, slopeAcc, curvature) = vel */
  Real baseUpperVel(Real a0, Real slopeAcc, Real curvature); /* baseUpperVel(a0, slopeAcc, curvature) = vel */
  Real maxCurveAcc(Real curvature, baseUpperVel(a0, curvature), vel)) * T0;

  /* Upper bound on distance covered for one time period under acceleration. */
  Real upperDist(Real vel, Real slopeAcc, Real curvature) = vel*T0 + 1/2*(a0 + maxSlopeAcc(slopeAcc, baseUpperVel(a0, vel)) + maxCurveAcc(curvature, baseUpperVel(a0, curvature))) * T0;

  /* Time till pipe pressure is at maximum given current pressure. */
  Real buildUpT(Real buildUp) = (Ap*buildUp)/pressureChangeRate;

  /* Utility functions for absolute values: True iff |x|<y */
  Bool absLessEq(Real x, Real y) <-> (x <= y || -x <= y);

  /* Assumptions on all changes in slope along actual track are bounded by maximal vertical curve and curve derivatives. */
  Bool limitedTrackChange() <-> (forall x (forall y (existsEq(slopeAcc(x)), maxVertCur*x)) & forall x (forall y (absLessEq(curvature(x)), crDer*x)));

  /* Assumptions on constants. */
  Bool conditionsOnConsts() <->
  a0>0; /* Strict upper bound on maximal constant acceleration, must be positive. */
  a1>0; /* Maximal constant braking force (positive). */
  a2>0; /* Accelerations that are linear in velocity. */
  a3>0; /* Accelerations that are quadratic in velocity. */
  & maxSlope>0; /* Greatest allowed acceleration due to slope gradient. */
  & b0>0; /* Time offset until pressure brakes can be applied. */
  & maxSlope*min(a0) > 0; /* Brakes have stronger effect than slope. */
  & maxSlope*min(a0) >= maxCurveAcc(curvature, baseUpperVel(a0, curvature)); /* Engine more powerful than effect of slope. */
  & maxCurveAcc(curvature, baseUpperVel(a0, curvature)) > 0; /* Maximal rate of change of slope (vertical curvature). */
  & h0>0; /* Bound on friction due to horizontal curve (resistance at min radius). */
  & crDer>0; /* Coefficient in derivative of horizontal curve. */
  & maxVertCur >= (min(slopeAcc, curvature) * maxSlope) / (maxSlope * buildUpThreshold); /* Track is built correctly: all slopes along actual track are within maxSlope. */
  & Ap>0; /* Maximally engaged air pressure brakes provide negative acceleration. */
  acc & buildUpThreshold>0; /* Air pressure brake propagation time is some positive number. */
  & pressureChangeRate>0; /* The rate at which acceleration provided by the pressure increases. */
End;


Program
  Real trainPos; /* The position of the train. */
  Real vel; /* The speed of the train. */
  Real trainAcc; /* Acceleration/deceleration control, i.e., engine acceleration and braking. */
  Real buildUp; /* Time offset until pressure brakes can be applied. */
  Real slopeAcc; /* pressureChangeRate if controller has chosen to brake, 0 otherwise. */
  Real airbrake; /* Acceleration due to current pipe pressure. */
End;

Problem
  endTrainPos>stoppingDistance(trainPos, vel);
  & imbeddedConditions();
  & imbeddedTrackChange();
  & noBrake();
  & maxSlope;
  & airbrake>0;
  >
  {
    t:=0;
    {{!endTrainPos > stoppingDistance(endTrainPos, vel)}};
    {{!noBrake}};
    {{!maxSlope}};
  }
  18
}

```

Control Structure

Control code runs in a loop with some latency T (in our case, to the order of a second).



Control Structure

Control code runs in a loop with some latency T (in our case, to the order of a second).

```
{  
    t:=0;  
    {  
        { ? ( e-p > stoppingDistance(p, v, ab) );
```

$a_l := *; ?(-b_{max} \leq a_l \leq a_{max});$
 $m_b := 0; a_b := 0;$

only if there is a sufficient distance margin

$\} \cup$
 $\{ a_l := -b_{max}; m_b \text{Brake}_p; \}$

low acceleration

Always allow braking

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} p' = v, v' = a_l + m \\ & \& t \leq T \& v \geq 0 \end{array} \right.$$

$\{ p' = v, v' = a_l + \max(a_b, a_{b_{max}}) + a_s(p) + a_c(p) + a_r(v), a'_b = m_b, t' = 1 \}$
 Train Motion for at most time T
 $\& t < T \& v > 0$

Control Structure

Control code runs in a loop with some latency T (in our case, to the order of a second).

```
{
    t:=0;
    {
        { ?( e-p > stoppingDistance(p, v, ab) );
            al:=*; ?(-bmax ≤ al ≤ amax);
            Free Driving
            mb:=0; ab:=0;
        } ∪
        { al:= -bmax; mBrakep; }
    }
    {
        { p'=v, v'=al + max(ab, abmax) + as(p) + ac(p) + ar(v), a'b=mb, t'=1
            Train Motion for at most time T
            & t ≤ T & v ≥ 0
        }
    }*
}
```

Control Envelope

```

Theorem "WP2/slopecurve_offset_airbrakes_1"
Definitions
  /* Acceleration constants */
  Real a0; /* Strict upper bound on maximal constant acceleration. */
  Real a1; /* Accelerations that are linear in velocity. */
  Real a2; /* Accelerations that are quadratic in velocity. */
  Real a3; /* Maximal constant braking force (positive). */
  Real v0c; /* Coefficient in derivative of horizontal curve. */

  /* Situational track setup */
  Real madSlope; /* Greatest allowed acceleration due to slope gradient, ms in the paper */
  Real h_m; /* End of loop period / system reaction time. */
  Real slopeAccTrainPos; /* Slope acceleration map (where trainPos is measured along the sloped track rather than along flat land, ac in the paper). */
  Real maxVertCur; /* Maxima rate of change of slope (vertical curvature), hm (max) in the paper. */
  Real h_mRes; /* Bound on friction due to horizontal curve (resistance at min radius), mr in the paper. */
  Real Ap; /* maximum penalty brake acceleration */
  Real buildUpThreshold; /* Time offset until pressure brakes can be applied. */
  Real pressureChangeRate; /* Upper bound on rate of increase in acceleration due to air brakes when it is applied. */

  /* Upper bound on velocity for current velocity vel at acceleration a0 for one time period independently from particular curve or slope. */
  Real baseUpperVel(real a0, Real vel) = min(slopeAcc+(maxVertCur)*vel, madSlope);

  /* Maximum acceleration due to slope. */
  Real maxSlopeAcc(Real slopeAcc, Real vel) = min(slopeAcc+(maxVertCur)*vel, madSlope);

  /* Maximum acceleration due to curve (negative since curves decelerate). */
  Real maxCurveAcc(Real curvature, Real vel) = min(vel*2/(b0*madSlope)) * 2/(2*(b0*madSlope) + vel*buildUp(buildup));
  /* The train will stop in at most this much distance if braking from speed vel. */
  Real brakingDistanc(real trainPos, Real vel) = baseUpperVel(a0, vel);
  slopeAcc(trainPos), curvature(trainPos), 0) + upperDistVel(slopeAcc(trainPos), curvature(trainPos));

  /* Velocity-dependent part of the acceleration that is always negative (since resistance). ar in the paper. */
  Real resistance(Real vel) = a1*vel + a2*vel^2;

  /* Total acceleration acting on the train at any point for a controlled acceleration trainAcc at velocity vel from position trainPos. */
  Real acc(Real trainAcc, Real vel, Real trainPos) = trainAcc + slopeAcc(trainPos) + resistance(vel) + curvature(trainPos);

  /* Assumptions on new variables (including those from previous points). */
  Real upperVel(real a0, Real vel, Real slopeAcc, Real curvature);
  /* (trainAcc+maxSlopeAcc*slopeAcc, baseUpperVel(trainAcc, vel))
   * + maxCurveAcc(curvature, baseUpperVel(trainAcc, vel)))^2; */

  /* Upper bound on distance covered for one time period under acceleration. */
  Real upperDistVel(Real slopeAcc, Real curvature) = vel^4 * 1/2 * (
  a0 + maxSlopeAcc*slopeAcc, baseUpperVel(a0, vel)
  + maxCurveAcc(curvature, baseUpperVel(a0, vel)))^2;

  /* Time till pipe pressure is at maximum given current pressure. */
  Real buildUp(real buildup) = (Ap*buildup)/pressureChangeRate;

  /* Utility functions for absolute values: True iff |x|<y */
  Bool absLessEq(Real x, Real y) <-> (x < y & x >= -y);

  /* Assumptions on conditions: all changes in slope along actual track are bounded by maximal vertical curve and curve derivatives. */
  Bool limitedTrackChange() <-> (forall v |forall x |exists y |slopeAcc(x,y) ≤ slopeAcc(x,y) + maxVertCur*v);
  & (forall v |forall x |exists y |curvature(x,y) ≤ curvature(x,y) + crVertCur*v);

  /* Assumptions on constants. */
  Bool conditionsOnConsts() <->
  a0>0; /* Strict upper bound on maximal constant acceleration, must be positive. */
  a1>0; /* Maximal constant braking force (positive). */
  a2>0; /* Accelerations that are linear in velocity. */
  a3>0; /* Accelerations that are quadratic in velocity. */
  & madSlope>0; /* Greatest allowed acceleration due to slope gradient. */
  & b0>0; /* Time offset until pressure brakes can be applied. */
  & a0+madSlope+a1*min(v) > 0; /* Brakes have greater effect than time. */
  & a0+madSlope+a1*min(v) > 0; /* Engine more powerful than slope and slope. */
  & maxVertCur>0; /* Maximal rate of change of slope (vertical curvature). */
  & h_mRes>0; /* Bound on friction due to horizontal curve (resistance at min radius). */
  & v0c>0; /* Coefficient in derivative of horizontal curve. */
  & madSlope >= 0; /* Slope of the track. */
  & maxSlopeAcc(madSlope) <= curvature(maxSlope); /* Track is built correctly: all slopes along actual track are within madSlope. */
  & a0>0; /* Maximally engaged air pressure brakes provide negative acceleration. */
  & buildUpThreshold>0; /* Air pressure brake propagation time is some positive number. */
  & pressureChangeRate>0; /* The rate at which acceleration provided by the pressure brakes increases. */
End;

Program
real trainPos; /* The position of the train. */
real vel; /* The speed of the train. */
real trainAcc; /* Acceleration/deceleration control, i.e., engine acceleration and braking. */
real buildup; /* Time offset until pressure brakes can be applied. */
real madSlope; /* pressureChangeRate if controller has chosen to do otherwise, 0 otherwise. */
real airbrake; /* Acceleration due to current pipe pressure. */
End;

Problem
endTrainPos>stoppingDistance(trainPos, 0);
& conditionsOnConsts();
& limitedTrackChange();
& maxVertCur>0;
& madSlope>0;
& a0>0;
}
{
  t:=0;
  ((endTrainPos > stoppingDistance(trainPos, 0));
  & !airbrake);
  & !brake;
}

```

Envelope: Where the Complexity is

brakeDist_a(v, a_b) =

$$vt_b(v, a_b) + \frac{1}{2}(b_{\max} - m_s + a_b)t_b(v, a_b)^2 + \frac{1}{6}(m_p)t_b(v, a_b)^3 \\ + \frac{v - (b_{\max} - m_s + a_b)t_b(v, a_b) + \frac{1}{2}m_p t_b(v, a_b)^2}{2(b_{\max} - m_s - a_{b\max})}$$

$$t_b(v, a_b) = \min((a_{b\max} - a_b)/m_p, \\ \frac{(b_{\max} - m_s + a_b) - |(b_{\max} - m_s + a_b)^2 - 2m_p v|}{m_p})$$

$$\text{stopDist}_a(p, v, a_b) = vT + \left(\frac{a_{\max} + \bar{a}_s(p)}{2} + \frac{\bar{a}_c(p)}{2} \right) T^2$$

$$+ \text{brakeDist}_a \left(\left(v + (a_{\max} + \bar{a}_s(p) + \bar{a}_c(p))T \right)^2, 0 \right)$$



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
Limiting Undershoot while Maintaining Safety



Start braking





Train stops



End of movement authority

Limiting Undershoot while Maintaining Safety



Start braking




Train stops



End of movement authority

Summary

Proofs: <https://doi.org/10.1184/R1/19542610>



Verified controller for full FRA model dynamics. KeYmaera X proofs available online


Generalizable Techniques

- Dealing with unknown functions
- Circular dependencies
- Taylor polynomials
- Ghost dynamics



Verified Model Generalizability

- Abstraction of physical details
- Nondeterministic controller



Experiments

Controller limits undershoot while maintaining safety





Pt 2: CESAR: Control Envelope Synthesis via Angelic Refinements

Aditi Kabra

Jonathan Laurent

Stefan Mitsch

André Platzer

Overview


Part 2: Synthesis

- **Introduction**
- Problem Statement
- Game Logic and Solution
- Refinement
- Evaluation

28

Design by proof

Can we automate it?



30+ proof attempts!




FRA Model (a few equations)

Proving in KeYmaera X

Theorem Prover

Proof: ✓ All goals closed

Synthesis Pipeline



Synthesis procedure
fills out the hard parts



Control Envelope

```
27 // Maximum acceleration due to slope. If
28 Real maxSlope(Real slopeAcc, Real vel0 = maxSlopeAcc*maxCurveTime, maxSlope)
29
30 // Max deceleration due to curve (negative since curves decelerate). If
31 Real maxCurveDecel(Real curvature, Real vel1 = -minCurveTime*curvature);
32
33 // The train will stop in at most maxDistance if braking from speed vel1. If
34 Real maxBrakingDistance(Real maxSpeed, Real vel1) = 
35 Curve.BrakingDistance(maxSpeed, Real maxSpeed) * 
36 (vel1*vel1/(maxSpeed*maxSpeed)) + 1/2*pressureChangeRate*vel1*vel1*vel1/(maxSpeed*maxSpeed);
37
38 // The train will stop in at most maxDistance if of acceleration for a time period and then do
39 Real stoppingDistance(Real trainAcc, Real vel1 = BrakingDistance(maxSpeed), vel1, stopAccel);
40
41 // The train will stop in at most maxDistance if of acceleration for a time period and then do
42 Real stoppingDistanceForMax(Real trainAcc, Real vel1 = BrakingDistance(maxSpeed), vel1, stopAccel);
43
44 // Total resistance if train is always applying constant resistance - A_p in the
45 Real resistance(Real vel1 = vel0 + a*vel0*vel0);
46
47 // Total acceleration or decel on the basis of any point for a constant acceleration decel or vel
48 Real acc(Real trainAcc, Real vel, Real trainVel = trainAcc * slopeAcc*trainVel + resistance*vel);
49
50 // Slope based on max velocity (increased for one time period). If
51 Real upperVel(Real trainAcc, Real vel, Real slopeAcc, Real curvature) = vel
52 + (slopeAcc*maxSpeed*maxSpeed) / (maxCurveTime*curvature), maxUpperVtrainVel, vel1) +
53 maxCurveVel*curvature, maxUpperVtrainVel, vel1)/4;
```

Related work

Other Work

Controller Synthesis Techniques

7. Belta, C., Yordanov, B., Gol, E.A.: Formal Methods for Discrete-Time Dynamical Systems. Springer Cham (2017)
21. Liu, S., Trivedi, A., Yin, X., Zamani, M.: Secure-by-construction synthesis of cyber-physical systems. Annual Reviews in Control **53**, 30–50 (2022). doi: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.arcontrol.2022.03.004>
24. Moor, T., Davoren, J.M.: Robust controller synthesis for hybrid systems using modal logic. In: Benedetto, M.D.D., Sangiovanni-Vincentelli, A.L. (eds.) HSCC. LNCS, vol. 2034, pp. 433–446. Springer (2001)

Numerical Safety Shields

1. Safe Reinforcement Learning via Shielding, Alshiekh et al, AAAI 2018
2. Safe Reinforcement Learning via Formal Methods, Fulton et al, AAAI 2018
3. ModelPlex: Verified Runtime Validation of Verified Cyber-Physical System Model, RV 2014

Manual Verified Design Case Studies

1. Platzer, A., Quesel, J.: European train control system: A case study in formal verification. In: Formal Methods and Software Engineering, 11th International Conference on Formal Engineering Methods, ICFEM 2009, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, December 9-12, 2009.

This Work

Controller *Envelope* Synthesis

- Bounds permissible controllers
- Permits separation of safety critical and secondary concerns
- Can be used, e.g., as trusted envelope for machine learning

Symbolic

- Good for high dimension, infinite space/time problems
- Statically computable

Automated

- Faster
- Potentially more scalable for complex problems

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Problem

Fill in holes () in a template with a propositional formula.

prob \equiv **assum** \wedge $\sqsubset \rightarrow [((\cup_i (? \sqsubset_i ; \text{act}_i)) ; \text{plant})^*]$ **safe**.

Problem


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
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Assumptions on the system

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Conditions for controllability

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
Conditions for controllability

Branch between i
possible actions

Assumptions on the system


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Example:

Model 1 The train ETCS model (slightly modified from [29]). Framed parts can be automatically synthesized by our proposed tool.

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assum | 1 $A > 0 \wedge B > 0 \wedge T > 0 \wedge v \geq 0$

ctrlable | 2 $\wedge [_____] \rightarrow \{\}$

Conditions from necessary to safety

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ctrlable | 2 $\wedge [\quad] \rightarrow [\{$

| 3 ((?[$] ; a := A)$

When is it ok to accelerate?

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ctrlable | 2 $\wedge [_____] \rightarrow [\{$

ctrl | 3 $(\quad (?[_____]; a := A)$

ctrl | 4 $\cup (\quad (?[_____]; a := -B) \quad);$

When is it ok to brake?

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Fill in holes (`_____`) in a template with a propositional formula.

Example:

Model 1 The train ETCS model (slightly modified from [29]). Framed parts can be automatically synthesized by our proposed tool.

```
assum | 1  A > 0 ∧ B > 0 ∧ T > 0 ∧ v ≥ 0
ctrlable | 2  ∧ _____ → [{  
    ctrl | 3      ( (?[_____]; a := A)  
    | 4      ∪ (?[____]; a := -B) );  
plant | 5      (t := 0; {p' = v, v' = a, t' = 1 & t ≤ T ∧ v ≥ 0})
```

System differential equation

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plant | 5 $(t := 0; \{p' = v, v' = a, t' = 1 \& t \leq T \wedge v \geq 0\})$

safe | 6 $\}^*](e - p > 0)$

Safety contract

Problem: Example Solution

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assum | 1 $A > 0 \wedge B > 0 \wedge T > 0 \wedge v \geq 0$

ctrlable | 2 $\wedge [e - p > v^2 / 2B] \rightarrow [\{$ There's enough space to stop if we start braking now

ctrl | 3 $((?[]); a := A)$

| 4 $\cup (?[]; a := -B)) ;$

plant | 5 $(t := 0; \{p' = v, v' = a, t' = 1 \& t \leq T \wedge v \geq 0\})$

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Fill in holes () in a template.

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assum | 1 $A > 0 \wedge B > 0 \wedge T > 0 \wedge v \geq 0$

ctrlable | 2 $\wedge e - p > v^2 / 2B \rightarrow [\{$

 | 3 $(\text{?} [e - p > vT + AT^2 / 2 + (v + AT)^2 / 2B]; a := A)$

There's enough space to stop if we accelerate for one time period and then keep braking

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Problem: Example Solution

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```
assum | 1  A > 0 ∧ B > 0 ∧ T > 0 ∧ v ≥ 0
ctrlable | 2  ∧  $e - p > v^2 / 2B$  → [{  
    ctrl | 3      ( (?  $e - p > vT + AT^2 / 2 + (v + AT)^2 / 2B$ ; a := A)  
        | 4      ∪ (? true; a := -B) ); You never make life worse by braking  
    plant | 5      (t := 0; {p' = v, v' = a, t' = 1 & t ≤ T ∧ v ≥ 0})  
    safe | 6      }*](e - p > 0)
```

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

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Fill in holes ($\boxed{\quad}$) in a template with a propositional formula.

prob \equiv assum $\wedge \boxed{\perp} \rightarrow [((\cup_i (\boxed{?G}_i); act_i)) ; plant)^*] safe.$

1. Safety (valid dL formula)
2. Always some control option $((assum \wedge I) \rightarrow \vee_i G_i)$

Quality of Solution



- Good solution: more permissive
- $S' \geq S$ when $\models \text{assum} \rightarrow (I \rightarrow I')$ and $\models (\text{assum} \wedge I) \rightarrow \wedge_i (G_i \rightarrow G'_i)$
- Unique optimum

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Background: Game Logic

dL has nondeterminism
 $(a := A \cup a := B)$

Players resolve nondeterminism



Operators

$(a := A \cup a := B)$



$(a := A \cap a := B)$



$\alpha \cap \beta, \alpha^x, ?\phi^d, \{x' = f(x)Q\}^d$

Angel wins if in the end, $a=A$

Demon wins if in the end, $a=A$

Duality

$$\neg \langle a \rangle \neg P \leftrightarrow [a]P$$

$$[\alpha]P \quad \langle \alpha \rangle \neg P$$

Axioms

dGI without loops: translation in first order logic.

$$[(v := 1 \cap v := -1); \{x^{\wedge'} = v\}]x \neq 0$$

$$= [(v := 1)] [\{x^{\wedge'} = v\}]x \neq 0 \vee$$

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
$$= \forall t \geq 0 x + t \neq 0 \vee \forall t \geq 0 x - t \neq 0$$

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
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
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
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
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The set of all states from which a perfect controller can keep the system safe forever

$I^{\text{opt}} \equiv [(\cap_i \text{act}_i) ; \text{plant})^*] \text{safe}$

Controller chooses in its best interest

By construction, loop invariant

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$$I^{\text{opt}} \equiv [((\cap_i \text{act}_i) ; \text{plant})^*] \text{safe}$$

Controller chooses in its best interest

By construction, loop invariant

Allow any control action that is guaranteed to keep the system within I^{opt}

$$G_i^{\text{opt}} \equiv [\text{act}_i ; \text{plant}] I^{\text{opt}}.$$

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- *But two dGL constructions need more than FOL .

Computing Propositional Arithmetic Solutions

- Easily checked at runtime
- Use the semantics of dGL (which are in terms of FOL^*)
- *But two dGL constructions need more than FOL .
 - Loops: Defined in terms of fixed point \rightarrow Approximate with “Refinement”
 - Differential equations: Presupposes an ODE solution \rightarrow Approximate

Overview

Part 2: Synthesis

- Introduction
- Problem Statement
- Game Logic and Solution
- **Refinement**
- Evaluation

Refinement


$$I^{\text{opt}} \equiv [((\cap_i \text{act}_i) ; \text{plant})^*] \text{safe}$$

Want to remove
this

Refinement

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
Want to remove
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Action Choice Refinement

The game obtained by restricting the controller to one action

$$\left[\left(\begin{array}{l} a := -B; t := 0; \\ \left\{ p' = v, v' = a, t' = 1 \quad t \leq T \wedge v \geq 0 \right\} \end{array} \right)^* \right] e - p > 0$$



Is harder than the game where the controller chooses between multiple actions

$$\left[\left(\begin{array}{l} (a := -B \cap a := A); t := 0; \\ \left\{ p' = v, v' = a, t' = 1 \quad t \leq T \wedge v \geq 0 \right\} \end{array} \right)^* \right] e - p > 0$$

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
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
$$\left[\left(\begin{array}{l} (a := -B \cap a := A); t := 0; \\ \left\{ p' = v, v' = a, t' = 1 \quad t \leq T \wedge v \geq 0 \right\} \end{array} \right)^* \right] e - p > 0$$

One Shot Unrolling



If you repeat a time bounded ODE

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
That's like executing the ODE for arbitrarily long

$$\left[a := -B; \left\{ p' = v, v' = a, t' = 1 \quad v \geq 0 \right\} \right] e - p > 0$$

Action Choice Refinement

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
$$\left[\left(\begin{array}{l} a := -B; t := 0; \\ \left\{ p' = v, v' = a, t' = 1 \quad t \leq T \wedge v \geq 0 \right\} \end{array} \right)^* \right] e - p > 0 \quad 2$$



Is harder than the game where the controller chooses between multiple actions



$$\left[\left(\begin{array}{l} (a := -B \cap a := A); t := 0; \\ \left\{ p' = v, v' = a, t' = 1 \quad t \leq T \wedge v \geq 0 \right\} \end{array} \right)^* \right] e - p > 0 \quad 1$$

One Shot Unrolling



If you repeat a time bounded ODE

$$\left[\left(\begin{array}{l} a := -B; t := 0; \\ \left\{ p' = v, v' = a, t' = 1 \quad t \leq T \wedge v \geq 0 \right\} \end{array} \right)^* \right] e - p > 0 \quad 3$$




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
$$\left[a := -B; \left\{ p' = v, v' = a, t' = 1 \quad v \geq 0 \right\} \right] e - p > 0 \quad 4$$

One Shot Refinement

$$\left[a := -B; \left\{ p' = v, v' = a, t' = 1 \mid v \geq 0 \right\} \right] e - p > 0$$



$$\forall t(v - Bt \geq 0 \rightarrow p + vt - \frac{Bt^2}{2} > e)$$



$$I = \boxed{p + \frac{v^2}{2B} > e}$$

One Shot Refinement

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


$$I = \boxed{p + \frac{v^2}{2B} > e}$$

- ▶ Action permanence: $(act_i ; plant ; act_i) \equiv (act_i ; plant)$
- ▶ In practice: when a control action corresponds to a “mode” of behavior.

One-shot Unrolling: Example

- 1-shot unrolling lets the controller choose one action and run it forever.




1 iteration

1-shot unroll

2-shot unroll

One-shot Unrolling: Example

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
2 iterations

1-shot unroll


2-shot unroll

One-shot Unrolling: Example

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2 iterations




1-shot unroll




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One-shot Unrolling: Example


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
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
2-shot unroll

One-shot Unrolling: Example


- 1-shot unrolling lets the controller choose one action and run it forever.
- Bounded unrolling allows a “switch” in action choice



2 iterations



1-shot unroll



2-shot unroll

Bounded Unrolling

- n switches to reach the region I_o in which safety is guaranteed indefinitely
- Controller has chance to switch within $[\theta, \theta + T]$ window because plant can never execute for time greater than T

Bounded Unrolling


- n switches to reach the region I_o in which safety is guaranteed indefinitely
- Controller has chance to switch within $[\theta, \theta + T]$ window because plant can never execute for time greater than T

	forever $\equiv (\cap_{i \in P} act_i) ; plant_\infty$		
step $\equiv (\theta := * ; ?\theta \geq 0)^d ; (\cap_{i \in P} act_i) ; plant_{\theta+T} ; ?safe^d ; ?t \geq \theta$	Controller chooses some time θ in the future	For a controller choice chosen up to time θ	While staying safe By time θ the controller reaches established safe region I^{n-1}



$$I^{n+1} \equiv I^n \vee [\text{step}] I^n \quad I^0 \equiv [\text{forever}] \text{safe}$$

Dual Game


Duality



Optimal?



Check Environment Game
 $(\langle \alpha \rangle \neg P)$



Algorithm: CESAR

- Recursively compute bounded unrolled invariants I^n .

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 - Unrolling budget reached

Algorithm: CESAR

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 - Unrolling budget reached
- With resulting I , compute each hole fill using

$$G_i \equiv [\text{act}_i ; \text{plant}] I$$

Overview

Part 2: Synthesis

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- **Evaluation**

Evaluation

Benchmark Suite with different control challenges

Table 2: Summary of the benchmark suite and most important control challenges.

Benchmark	Control Feature Introduced
Gears	Many (namely 8) actions to choose from.
ETCS	Nondeterministic, bounded acceleration (from case study [29]).
Table Tennis	Introduce two-dimensional motion.
Reservoir	Dynamics mixes variables that controller can and can't influence.
Reaction	Conjunctive safety constraints.
Merge	Disjunctive safety constraints.
Wall	Requires state-dependent fallback actions.
Parachute	Action switching restricted: cannot close parachute once open.
Corridor	Requires unrolling fallback for optimal synthesis (Fig. 1).
Sputtering Car	Unsolvable continuous dynamics.

Evaluation

Benchmark	Synthesis Time (s)	Memory (MB)	Checking Time (s)
Gears	5.97	41.30	2.6
ETCS	4.32	40.96	7.6
Table Tennis	2.79	40.13	1.4
Reservoir	4.95	39.99	2.1
Reaction	9.93	41.10	3.1
Merge	3.30	40.22	4.7
Wall	3.74	40.33	11.7
Parachute	3.37	40.16	5.0
Corridor*	7.14	41.71	1.9
Sputtering Car	2.12	39.63	1.1

Future Work

- Handle hard dynamics

Unknown
Functions

Circular
Dependencies

Taylor
Polynomials

Ghost
Dynamics

- Generalize to differential game logic

Time
Triggered
Control

Event
Triggered
Control

Free
Assignments

Adversarial
Agents

Thank You!



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