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Introduction

The question this essay asks is 'Why, and when, do environmentalists fail in environmental campaigns'. Before answering, we first need to define what such failure is. The answer is fairly straightforward: failure is when a group campaigns to have a policy introduced and fails to convince the relevant decision-makers, *or,* when a group campaigns against a policy and fails to prevent its implementation. This constitutes failure. However, I would first like to note that sometimes when a group fails it nevertheless makes gains in other spheres; for example, it might become more cohesive, or its public profile might improve. However, rather than seeing such a gain as an additional campaign goal, I would call this a competing goal, that is, a goal which attracts activists away from their original, environmental goal.

Many activists tend to regard each campaign attempted as a link of a chain. The goal is not so much to win the battle – they might even lose it – the aim is to win the war.[1] They often claim that campaigns make an indirect impact – by direct means. The means, or action itself is seen by the public as direct, timely, spontaneous, courageous and thus impressive. This impression is meant to shift public opinion and put a stop to or bring about an amendment in government policies. This account, however, assumes that the question of *whether* indeed these activities exert an indirect impact still remains to be examined. Moreover, scholars writing on direct environmental action define it as 'protest action where protestors engage in forms of action designed not principally to change government policy or to shift the climate of public opinion through the media, but to change

An earlier version of this essay was presented as a paper to the annual conference of Environmental NGOs in Israel. The author learnt a lot from activists in this meeting, and thanks the participants for their helpful comments and suggestions. While writing this account he tried to find a balance between academic jargon and original style. His wish is that this account be accessible to a wide audience. Special thanks are due to Mathew Humphrey for his careful reading and comments. Thanks also to Meira Hanson for challenging his views. The opinions presented here are, however, his own, and if those reading this account suddenly feel that they want to play darts, he should be the target.

environmental conditions around them *directly*'. [*Doherty, 2000*]. Thus the definition of failure in this account describes the attempt to remove or prevent the actual environmental bad.

The research described here was mainly conducted in Israel and there are comparisons of cases in England and the USA. Ten reasons for environmental campaign failure have been identified. In what follows, these are presented in the form of '*Ten Commandments for How to Fail in an Environmental Campaign*'. There is no cynicism in this title or in what follows. Being an activist myself, the question of how to win this campaign, or, to be more precise, how to refrain from losing it, seems to me too serious to be locked behind the walls of false beliefs, prejudice, and theories that have never been examined. I hope that this analysis, as well as the other contributions in this volume, will contribute to the debate about activists' success and failures.

First Commandment: *Always Struggle For Total Change; Never Accept Reform or Compromise*

Two arguments that are made by many activists are at stake here. The first is that only an all-out – hence radical – fight brings results. The second is that the main point is to win the war, not the battles, and that since this is an all out war,[2] there can be no room for compromise. I would now like to examine both these claims critically.

Stephen Young distinguishes between two models of campaigning. One is the 'radical/populist'; the other is the 'moderate/conventional' [*Young, 1993: 23*]. The former employs unconventional political action, is never ready to compromise, and is confrontational in character and approach. The moderate/conventional approach uses established consultation procedures, dialogue with the authorities, is prepared to compromise, and is democratic in reaching decisions regarding whether to accept the authorities' decisions. The dispute between groups using the different models is not so much about what is wrong and who the enemies are, but about optimal solutions and about how to achieve them. In general terms, some groups regard themselves as 'insider groups', because they are accorded special consultative status, and others as 'outsider groups' which are denied access by the authorities to decision-making processes [*Young, 19–20*]. Young concludes that groups that develop a regular form of dialogue with local councils … have better prospects of influencing policies relating to statutory plans [*ibid*].

And yet, many activists see radical activism as the only effective measure, convinced that the 'system' will never react to moderate pressure. This is often claimed without adequate empirical proof. For example, Derek

Wall writes: 'The direct action anti-roads movements of the 1990s was given a kick-start by green activists frustrated and dismayed by the ineffectiveness of conventional environmental groups and traditional lobbying techniques. There is *some evidence* to suggest that such radical campaigning has shifted the balance of power between pro- and anti-road advocates' [*Wall, 1999: 187,* my emphasis]. But what does Wall mean by 'some' evidence? How is this measured? Indeed, McLeod [*1998*] argues that the violent protest against the export of live animals (in 1995) had only partial success in transforming of general public opinion.

Let me elaborate here by examining the activities of the anti-roads activist, 'Swampy' (real name – Daniel Hooper). In 1997, the then 24-year-old eco-warrior discovered a new way to fight the construction of new roads, starting with the A30 project near Exeter. He dug a tunnel and holed up there for several days, so that construction had to stop. There were those who assumed that Swampy's action changed other people's minds,[3] but it is very difficult to sustain this thesis. Swampy was mentor to 20 eco-warrior trainees from Europe (*The Guardian*, 15 Sept. 1998], but this does not imply that he had any widespread, positive impact on the thinking of large numbers of people about the environment. Several writers have suggested that Swampy — who was described as 'David cocking-a-snook at developers' Goliath excavators [*Ridley, 1998: 309*] – actually triumphed (Hugo Young, *The Guardian,* 21 July 1998). Young's proof for this is that even such organisations as the RAC have admitted that road building is not a solution. But why should we assume that the RAC and other previously pro-road organisations, reached this conclusion as a result of Swampy's acts? Perhaps these people tired of rush hour traffic snarl ups, and decided there had to be an alternative to road travel? Also, isn't it possible that a number of MPs changed their minds about building roads for all kinds of reasons?

Indeed, as Anna Murphy candidly writes (*The Observer,* 12 July 1998) 'Swampy might have got his cause noticed but, for many, he was never anything more than a bit of a joke'. In any case, now, some time after Swampy's activities, new roads are still being planned and opened. One year following his activism, Swampy's legacy appears to have faded: the only reference we find to him in the press after his 1997 protest was a story in August 1998 that Swampy had been fined £100 for admitting possession of magic mushrooms. When it comes to real politics, when it comes to making decisions, Swampy – and many like him – have still not made an impact. George Monbiot has admitted (*The Guardian,* 10 Sept. 1998) that John Prescott's anti-car positions were not very popular in the government. His plans were potentially offensive to the two constituencies that most scared Blair, wrote Monbiot: Big Business and Middle England. The government did not adopt Prescott's policies. In fact, wrote Monbiot, car

ownership in Britain would actually be encouraged. If this was so in 1998, how can we claim that Swampy triumphed in 1997?

Israel provides another example. In 1985, Kibbutz Kfar Hanasi, which is situated a mile from the River Jordan, one of Israel's main water resources, suggested diverting the river along a 1300 foot open canal into an artificial lake. From there, the water would be channelled into a 100 foot high artificial waterfall, at the bottom of which would lie turbines. Thence the water would be returned to the river [*de-Shalit and Talias, 1994*]. Although the scheme meant damaging the River Jordan in the only place where it still ran its original course, for economic reasons, several environmental bodies supported the plan. This was a bad starting point for environmentalists opposing the plan. However, the Society for the Protection of Nature in Israel (SPNI), Israel's largest NGO, steadfastly contested even the slightest alteration to the river course. They argued that the ecological damage would be incalculable. When, in 1990, the regional committee for planning dismissed all objections to the scheme, scenes of great violence erupted. Two weeks later, 20,000 people – the largest demonstration held in Israel that year – marched on the area in protest against the project. In June 1991, several activists chained themselves to tractors and threw the keys into the river. This proved effective in so far as several politicians decided to side with the protestors. However, the outcome was that the kibbutz decided to end all negotiation with the environmentalists. This marked the demise of the protest: the protestors failed in court, because there was nothing illegal about the kibbutz plans. In fact, it is quite likely that the court found it difficult to comprehend why the protestors had not agreed to a compromise in the first place. So, by rejecting all compromise, the protestors lost their entire case.

Let us now explore the second aspect of this mistake. Various organisations have argued that, while they might have lost their battles against the roads, they ultimately win the war. To support this argument they point, for example, to the fact that the number of road construction plans in Britain has dropped since 1992. Doherty also supports this assertion when he claims that 'by 1997 the original plans for the roads programme were in disarray' [*Doherty, 1999: 276*], however, he himself admits that a need to cut public spending and a 'more sceptical attitude to road transport from within sections of the government also played a role' [*ibid.*; also *Doherty, 2000*]. It may be argued that the anti-roads campaigns increased the political and economic cost of road building, and that this, in turn, constructed the more sceptical attitude to road transport within sections of the government. But this remains to be proved (I elaborate below on other reasons for this re-thinking within the government). Moreover, as Wolfgang Rudig claims 'as on many occasions before, government action has been used to limit the

mobilization potential of protest groups' [*Rudig, 1995: 238*]. Thus, in fact, we find that the government curtailed motorway construction schemes as a means of disarming the environmental organisations.

It seems that many activists are quite aware that they lose many battles through their choice of extravagant strategies, and yet justify this with the argument that they ultimately win their wars. As indicated above, this paper means to focus on winning the interim battles. At the end of the day, activists want to prevent things from happening. If that is their goal, then they must win battles, not just wars. Moreover, their claim that the choice of extravagant tactics helps them in winning wars is questionable. Let me refer here to Paul Wapner's thesis [*1995: 307–8*]. He writes:

> In 1989 Greenpeace activists infiltrated a DuPont manufacturing plant in Deepwater, New Jersey. Activists climbed the plant's 180 feet water tower and hung a huge, blue ribbon banner awarding DuPont a prize for being the world's number one ozone destroyer.[4] The following day, Greenpeace bolted a steel box – with two people inside – onto the plant's railroad tracks and blocked the export of CFCs from the plant.

However, as Wapner admits, 'within minutes of removing the blockade, business proceeded as usual'. Wapner claims that although Greenpeace lost this case, they won in the propaganda stakes. But the success he ascribes to Greenpeace seems groundless. He claims that DuPont's workers continued to manufacture CFCs, but 'now they did so knowing that others knew about it and were *concerned*' (my emphasis). One may ask: so what? So people knew about it. They thought about it for briefly, and forgot it after. Or, even if they didn't forget about it later, did these people do anything about it? *Was the manufacture of CFC's stopped?*

Wapner goes on to claim that because Greenpeace captured its actions on film and distributed video news spots to TV stations throughout the world, vast numbers of people were able to understand the connection between the production of CFCs and ozone depletion [*Wapner, 1995: 308*]. This seems to be out of touch with reality. It is well known that many people do not understand what they see on the TV news.[5] While this is true for any news item, it is so *a fortiori* for ecology. Most people do not have a clue about the relationship between CFCs and the ozone layer or other similar issues,[6] not to mention when they learn about it in a 30-second TV news item. People often forget about these new items after several days. In the summer of 1999, the New Israel Fund decided to support a campaign against a huge new motorway in Israel. They advertised their campaign and there were reports about it. They then conducted a poll to see whether this had any impact. While they were campaigning ten per cent of the population declared they

knew about this campaign and the NIF's activities. Several days later only one per cent said so.[7] In Israel 50 per cent watch the main TV news show and above 80 per cent of the adults read a daily (real, not tabloid) newspaper. And yet, only one per cent knew about the NIF and its activities.

Furthermore, activities of the kind described by Wapner often alienate the public to Greenpeace and similar organisations: people interpret activists' activities as a proof of the environmentalists' hatred of, or at least indifference towards, workers. They regard such acts as an attack on the workers – not on the company's owners and board of directors – in this case DuPont. Thus people who watch the news are likely to conclude that environmentalists are rich people with plenty of free time (unlike the workers of DuPont) – who can afford to engage in such weird activities, and who don't care about the workers or their source of income.[8] Does this sound like winning a war or losing respect?[9]

Why does this mistake happen? Naturally activists involved with environmental NGOs are idealistic; they are willing to sacrifice time and energy for animal welfare, ecosystem integrity or the preservation of beauty spots. This is particularly so with regard to the younger, more radical activists [*Doherty, 1998: 277*]. Obviously, without such devoted people it is almost impossible to oppose the power of bureaucracy and capital, not to mention change reality. But, as Shakespeare queried, 'Hath not this rose a canker?' People like this do not give up easily – even when a small retreat might pay dividends. In their dogged efforts to achieve all or nothing they might fumble a potential victory without even noticing it.

The psychology of these activists is simple:[10] they feel that they know what is right, and they want to pursue justice. That is fine, but it is also a misconception of the political environment in which they live and operate, that is, democracy. Democracy is the best regime around, but it is incapable of accomplishing everything. Basically, it is a regime of compromise. It is not a regime in which justice triumphs absolutely. It cannot totally eradicate evil. In short, democracy is not a system through which ideals and values can be realised. Instead it is a mechanism – perhaps a dull one – which allows people who hold different ideals and values to find a way of living together. Not only *cannot* democracy totally realise all values and ideals, it is also *not supposed* to. This may be a pity, and indeed, as I will show below, many activists conclude that for this reason democracy is redundant. But it is also the magic of democracy: never have democracies fought against each other, and rarely have democracies witnessed violent domestic clashes. This is no small achievement. In fact, quite the contrary – not only because sparing bloodshed is a good thing in itself, but also for environmental reasons. Wars cause the worst ecological disasters human beings have managed to create. But alas, we often find activists who would hastily do

away with democracy in order to protect a forest, without understanding that relinquishing democracy might result in wars that would destroy dozens of such forests.

Second Commandment: ***Always Use the Terminology of Despair***

The question of what terminology to use when trying to persuade the public of the rightness of a particular environmental position is important since the public is generally unenlightened about ecology, and will find it difficult to judge the relevant issues. Thus many people rely on their 'gut feelings' when deciding whether or not to support a position. In these situations, developers can usually spend more on advertising and publicity campaigns than environmental organisations, and have better access to politicians and decision-makers. Thus environmental NGOs need to stir up public outcry for truth, but lacking the means to do so, must fall back on their only weapon – trustworthiness. They should therefore be extremely accurate about depicting the future, analysing consequences and conceivable scenarios resulting from different policies, and so on.

However, there is a problem: environmental organisations also need to sustain their membership. They do this by, among other things, relying on ideological commitment. To earn this, they try to show how desperate a situation is [*Taylor, 1992: 36*]. Furthermore, perhaps due to their frustration at their inability to convince others, and due to the perceived blindness to the truth in others, environmentalists often tend to exaggerate the despondency of their scenarios. Consequently, people often start off with doubts in their mind. Moreover, many developers can point to cases in which scenarios predicted by environmentalists have failed to materialise. One good example of this concerns the water policy for the Sea of Galilee in Israel. This lake is one of the most important sources of water for irrigation in Israel. Environmentalists have long argued that political pressure from farmers has caused over-pumping of the water, and warn that the system will eventually collapse when brackish underground water penetrates the lake. They drew what was meant to be a very strict minimum water level (the 'red line'), but after two years of serious drought, the government proceeded to pump below the red line. When nothing happened in terms of water quality, the environmentalists' credibility was lost.

Also, people generally react in a very basic way to the threat of dire consequences and horrific scenarios. They simply repress and doubt what they hear – a common strategy when faced with alarming prognostications. Thus while environmentalists try to force an impression on the general public with their somewhat exaggerated predictions, the eventual outcome is counter-productive: many people simply disbelieve, do not want to believe, or even refuse to listen.

Environmentalists have to remember that words have power, and that often people are carried away with words. Sometimes this applies to the activists themselves. In Israel, for example, many of the public believed a group of activists which claimed that the damage to the few rivers left flowing in Israel was 'irreversible'. They took the activists at their word, and concluded that since things were irreversible, nothing could be done. And Dave Foreman (formerly of *Earth First!*) surely forgets who his potential allies are when he asserts that 'it is the hardy swain, the sturdy yeoman from the bumpkin proletariat … who holds the most violent and destructive attitudes towards the natural world' [*Chase, 1991: 51–2*]. If activists use such terminology, they will of course never manage to persuade the working classes or the 'sturdy yeoman' to support their environmental campaigns. (I elaborate about this below.)

Until now I have discussed the use of the language of despair as a means of manipulating public opinion. Often, however, the language of despair simply reflects honesty and sincerity. People become so worried and so tired of trying to change things, or feel frustrated with struggling against bureaucrats' obduracy time and time again, that they really do become desperate. However, when presenting their analysis of the situation as they see it, they must avoid using such language if they really want to win. Thus activists must carefully distinguish between exaggerating the gravity of a situation for rhetorical reasons, and presenting responsible scientific description of the state of affairs. They must not employ exaggerations when they are expected to use accurate descriptions.

Third Commandment: *Always Use Biocentric Arguments*

Many environmental activists have internalised the moral standpoint and language of environmental ethics. In other words, they have internalised 'biocentric' or 'ecocentric' arguments. Therefore, they reject anthropocentrism, that is, the placing of human beings in the centre of things – as a speceisist attitude. These activists often discuss animal rights, ecosystem integrity, etc.[11] My argument here is that regardless of whether biocentric theories are true or not, the radical language of biocentrism is, politically speaking, unwise.

Let me be clear: by arguing that environmentalists should leave aside biocentric arguments I do not mean they should also change their positions.[12] Rather I relate to the language used outside of the environmental circles. As Andrew Dobson argues [*1990: 20*], among environmentalists, ecocentrism and biocentrism are like an internal language, whereas anthropocentrism, or what Hayward [*1994*] might have termed 'enlightened anthropocentrism', should be used outside the environmental circles, where

people are not very likely to understand the meaning of biocentrism. I would therefore argue that while these activists may hold their ideological positions, they should, nevertheless, revise the terminology they use. Their language can still be confrontational, but it must also be understood.

Although sometimes biocentric arguments seem more dramatic and therefore more appealing, the use of biocentric arguments may still be counterproductive. For example, between 1988 and 1991, there was a campaign in Israel to prevent Voice of America's transmitters being installed in an area of desert traversed by millions of migrating birds each year [*de-Shalit and Talias: 1994*]. All biocentric arguments (for example, that electromagnetic radiation from the antennae would damage the birds' navigational systems) failed, because they seemed irrelevant to American and Israeli decision-makers.[13]

I would like to suggest that successful campaigns are campaigns that employ concepts and terminology which large numbers of people can relate to. A good example is when the WWF (World Wildlife Fund) declares that 'it is the responsibility of all who are alive today to accept the trusteeship of wildlife ... to hand [it] on to posterity as a source of wonder and interest, knowledge and enjoyment. ... This generation has no right, by selfishness ... to rob future generations of this great heritage.' [*Evans, 1992: 126*]. Note the language: they speak of '*trusteeship*' – a concept having religious connotations; '*source*' – a concept greatly disliked by environmentalists, but known to the public; '*selfishness*' and '*rob*' – no one wants to appear selfish or to rob; and '*heritage*' – a very familiar term in Britain.

The use of novel language (or jargon) could be the reason why, despite the fact that minorities and poorer populations do care about the environment, many among them do not support environmental NGOs. Dorcetta Taylor [*1992: 29*] claims that environmental organisations fail to address these minorities and their needs by 'continuing to place high priorities on wildlife and preservation issues' instead of combining these with social issues. It can thus be suggested that environmentalists often regard radicalism as inherent in the shift from anthropocentrism to biocentrism, rather than in standing at the side of the poor and the least advantaged who are exploited by polluting firms [*Benton, 1988, 1993; de-Shalit, 2000: Ch.6*]. However, by adopting this view, even if they manage to shift public attention to biocentrism, they will lose crucial support for their case.[14]

Fourth Commandment: *Don't Initiate; Just React!*

According to Brian Doherty [*1999*], activists in the new social and environmental movements, especially those in Britain which are oriented

toward more direct action, are young and often unemployed.[15] However, many small-scale, *local*, organisations consist of non-professional activists – working people in their thirties or forties, often at the peak of their careers.[16] They usually have little spare time, being very caught up with their work, families, children's education, caring for elderly parents, etc. They therefore tend to join NGOs and become more active post-factum, that is, after a pollution threat has materialised as a hazard, or when a local municipality decides to convert a small park into an industrial zone. Then they decide to react 'forcefully'.

Reaction, however, is by its very nature often too late, too weak, and most of the time too desperate. Action takes place under pressure of time, and the chances of persuading the authorities to re-think their policies are rather slim. As Shaw [*1996: 2*] has argued, 'activists must develop an agenda and then focus their resources on realizing it. Unfortunately, many activists have failed to establish and implement their own agendas and instead have focused on issues framed by their opponents.' The notion of 'framing' here is crucial. The first side to define the terms and boundaries of the battle is more likely to win since the terms and boundaries are defined according to the field or argument in which that side is the strongest. Indeed, activists are often dragged into defensive battles on issues they did not intend to fight, rather than being called on to define issues and promote productive campaigns. As Shaw [*1996: Ch.8*] writes, the meetings in which activists decide upon goals, tactics and strategies are long and tiring. It is a shame if after all the meetings and waste of energy, the NGOs find themselves fighting a totally different set of issues, or responding to campaigns and agendas set and framed by developers. In other words, activists must realise that contemporary politics often starts with setting the agenda.[17]

Moreover, if activists respond rather than initiate, they appear to be acting against those who are 'trying to get something done here'.[18] Often the public sees development as an effort to better the plight of the worse off, as in the case, say, of a new factory or a road cutting travel time from the periphery to the centre. If environmentalists later pop up and start opposing these projects, they appear to be interfering with a decent project proposed by kind-hearted people. Environmentalists who use the language of 'us and them', are seen as selfish people obsessing about marginal matters.

Fifth Commandment: *Always Declare That You Are Not Doing Anything Political*

One of the main mistakes made by environmental activists is to present their campaign as a-political.[19] Sometimes they believe that this is the way to gain

increased support from the left and the right. They are making three mistakes however: first, by thinking that a non-political cause will garner more support; second, by confusing 'political' with 'party oriented', and third, by failing to see just how political their campaign is.

So first, why do environmental activists assume that if they present their campaign as non-political it will gain more support? Through interviews that I conducted with activists in Israel and other countries, I learned that many of them think of politics as 'ugly', 'nasty', 'dirty', 'power games and nothing else', 'corrupt', 'career-oriented', or just 'another of the affluent bourgeoisie's games'. They believe that if they present their campaign as non-political, more people will be happy to support them; people who tend usually to keep politics at arm's length.

This seems, however, to contradict research observations regarding who joins public activism. People decide whether or not to support a case or campaign depending on whether they believe the case to be just or not, not according to whether it is political or not. Thus the more people see a case as just, the more they will join and support the activists. A very good example is the mass student strike organised in Israel between October and December 1998. The strike, for lower tuition fees, was launched with an announcement that it was not a political campaign. This, naturally, seemed very odd to many people, including students. Moreover, many people from the inner cities and poorer neighbourhoods refused to join forces with the students as long as the students failed to recognise the close linkage between lowering the costs of higher education and raising the chances of the less well-off for social mobility. However, once the students dared to admit their opposition to the government, and declared their campaign political, many unemployed people and social organisations came out in public support of the students and even joined a hunger strike by student leaders.[20]

The second mistake occurs when many environmentalists, including Green activists and politicians, declare themselves to be 'neither left nor right'. They claim instead to be 'ahead' [*Porritt, 1984: 14, 224–35;* also *Kitschelt and Helleman, 1990*]. This may be an excellent piece of copy editing, but it is far from the truth. The very author of this slogan, Mr. Porritt, who is without doubt one of Europe's leading Green politicians and activists, quite often raises the issue of 'rights' in his books, article, and essays [*Porritt, 1984: 115–17*], describing the minimum criteria for a green society as 'open, participatory democracy', 'harmony between people of every race', and so on [*Porritt, 1984: 10–11*]. This is clearly leftist terminology and rhetoric. It hails, perhaps from the revisionist left, but is far from part of right wing ideology. It is equally far from being apolitical. While it is true that not every issue that is political can be squeezed under the positions of existing parties, and that environmental NGOs do usually

conduct non-party campaigns [*Maor and Smith, 1993*], these are still political campaigns, by any definition of the word 'political'.

The third mistake is that many activists dislike being political so much that they shift the emphasis of their campaigns from political matters to issues more likely to be seen as non-political. Hence many concentrate on consumer habits and the number of babies born. But, as John Bellamy Foster argues, in doing this, such environmentalists misinterpret reality: they think that the general public, as consumers, is the enemy of the environment [*Foster, 1998: 188*]. But then, they overlook the complexity underlying environmental degradation.

> An ecological movement that stands for the Earth alone and ignores class and other social inequalities will succeed at best in displacing environmental problems, meanwhile reinforcing the dominant relations of power in global capitalism, with their bias towards the unlimited commodification of human productive energy, land and the built environment, and the ecology of the planet itself [*Foster, 1998: 188*].

Sixth Commandment: *Emphasise Legislation – Not Politics*[21]

Activists often pin their hopes on legislation. They assume that where there is a law there is no way developers or anti-environmental forces can harm the environment. There are, however, two problems with this: first, it is often counter-productive to legislate on the environment, and second, it is very easy to legislate; the question is are the laws enforceable?

To begin with, laws are rigid, whereas ecosystems change. It is difficult to revise laws in synch with changes in ecosystems. Sometimes therefore a law may be counter-productive. Take the case of deer protection in the UK: growing concern for the declining number of deer and deer species led to a series of acts.[22] These acts proved so effective that after 25 years 'deer are posing a significant threat to woodland management'. [*Evans, 1992: 118*]. But then, who would dare to re-legislate and limit the ban on deer hunting?

At the same time, efforts to force legislated protection for other types of wildlife have often failed due to the impossibility of enforcing the laws without becoming a police state. For example, a series of laws introduced in the 1960s to protect British flora [*Evans, 1992: 124*] failed for this reason. It thus seems that environmentalists need to work hard to change attitudes, rather than impose threats. Indeed, such was the case when the National Trust campaigned against the destruction of coastal areas which were being threatened by increased leisure time and rising numbers of holiday-makers. On this occasion, people listened, and enough money was donated to the NT

to allow it to acquire 160 kilometres of coastline [*Evans, 1992: 125*]. In Israel a similar case involved a campaign organised by the SPNI (Society for the Protection of Natured in Israel) during the 1960s to save wild flora. The campaign was based solely on education and public relations, and was highly successful. However, a law introduced to protect nature reserves in general has not been enforced because in many cases this would mean putting to trial so many people.[23] Environmentalists now realise they should have educated the public instead of campaigning for legislation.

Laws in themselves are often meaningless: in Britain, the 1968 Countryside Act extended the definition of national parks to cover woodlands, rivers and canals. However, the last area to be declared a national park was the Brecon Beacons in 1957 [*Evans, 1992: 82*]. Section 37 of this act also required all ministers to address agricultural, forestry, economic and social interests. [*Evans, 1992: 123*]. Notice, however, that some of these interests may contradict each other, for example, forestry interests may clash with agriculture, or social interests might conflict with economic ones. Thus ministers can dodge their obligation to address environmental issues on economic grounds.

After a comprehensive survey of 735 key sites in the UK conducted between the mid 1960s and 1977, efforts to introduce legislation that would protect sites of special scientific interest, mostly came to naught. Farmers owned most of the lands in question and would need to be compensated. However, the farmers either refused to accept compensation (in which case there was nothing to do), or began planning potentially damaging land usage, which, they declared they would abandon in return for 'appropriate compensation'. The Environment ministry had no funds to compensate farmers for their 'theoretical losses' [*Evans, 1992: 189*] and consequently as many as 255 SSSIs were irrevocably damaged before anything could be done.

According to Randy Shaw [*1996: 58–9*], environmentalists are the victims of 'random lawlessness' when a government itself refuses to enforce its own environmental regulations. He quotes American writer William Greider, who states that eighty percent of the Environmental Protection Agency's hazardous waste enforcement regulations are ignored. Moreover, says Greider, during the 1980s, 92,500 people earned their living by arguing over the content of federal regulations. This might indicate that the legislator was not serious when legislating environmental laws.

It is interesting to explore why this happens. Two reasons can be suggested. First, many MPs depend on their constituencies for their careers. If they are to win reelection, they must convince their constituents that they have worked hard in their interests. Thus when pressured to legislate, they do legislate, even if they consider the law to be unenforceable or illogical.

They would rather legislate and show that they made the effort, even if the effort is useless, than explain to their constituents that their legislative proposals are flawed. As a result, dozens of laws are passed each year without any intention of enforcing them. Environmental laws comprise a vast proportion of these laws, since citizens often approach their MP with environmental, often local, problems. Randy Shaw, an attorney, calls them 'hollow laws'. He writes: 'Such laws allow legislators to war a false pro-environmental mantle while creating the potentially dangerous illusion that Congress has addressed a critical problem' [*Shaw, 1996: 70*]. Shaw calls upon environmentalists to attack such legislation early enough in the process of legislation.

Second, there is so much pressure on legislators to legislate and regulate environmental laws and regulations, that even if their motives were genuine and did take the environment seriously, they could not possibly acquire enough information to know a good law from a bad one. Environmental matters are complicated matters, and it takes time to study them. Legislators lack the time to do this thoroughly, and therefore legislate without giving due consideration to the implementation or enforcement of these laws. Their primary aim is to appear environmentally friendly.

Seventh Commandment: *Do Your Very Best to Attract Media Attention*

Many organisations think that at least some of their members must be experts at 'capturing media attention' [*Adams, introduction*].[24] They believe this since they tend to take the view that 'MP + TV = Success' [*Young, 1993: 26*]. They are so eager to gain a press review or an item on TV that they focus on protest gimmicks instead of real change. 'Silence is death', they say, and they will go out of their way to make as much noise as they can.

However, we find a recurring pattern of media and press coverage emerging for such protest acts. Journalists arrive on site, and make their report. But then, after given it roughly 20–30 seconds on TV, they move on. The first question that springs to mind is: What can environmentalists achieve in 30 second reports? It is usually very difficult to explain ecological issues to begin with, let alone in such a short time. Thus activists focus on other goals. They give up trying to convince the public through information and enlightenment – and that is their first mistake. The activists play by the rules of the game set by capitalism and its obsession with TV ratings: no serious discussion, no information to help the public make decisions.

Then the activists become frustrated. It dawns on them that 20 seconds on TV will not change anything. They infer that what they need to do is hold the media's attention longer. They undertake even weirder things. Out trots the media once more. This time presenting the activists as people who do

'odd' things. Next time these people climb trees or tie themselves to sundry objects, the media beings to lose patience. Their reporting takes on a negative slant. Consider, for example, the report on Israeli TV about a group of students, members of the '*Peula Yeruka*' (Green Action) organisation, who in the spring of 1999, climbed up and tied themselves to cranes, to demonstrate against the construction of mega-hotels on the actual sea shore. The media's immediate response was to report them, though for less than a minute. They interviewed one of the activists for roughly 15 seconds. The next day more students joined them. This time the TV report was shorter. Next thing the students did was threaten that if they did not receive a promise that the hotels would not be built they would remain on the cranes 'for ever'. The journalists took it literally and thought this was rather stupid: 'Can a person *really* live on a crane forever?' they queried. The report discussed a strange group of people, who did not really know what they wanted. The students did not budge. The TV news editor decided it was all a non-issue. No more reporting. Several days later one article newspaper grumbled about those people who can afford the time to do such things … Needless to say, the students have dispersed and the hotels are fast going up. What is worse, the general public did not know whether to like them or laugh at them. Eventually people decided they were 'pathetic'.[25]

If this was the only problem, fine. But those activists who chase the media put all their eggs in one basket – the wrong one. They forget that their goal is to end pollution, end damage to an ecosystem, etc. But they must never forget that the world out there is real. What we see on TV is not. Thus not only do they achieve a negative image in the public eye, they fail to solve the real problem they were fighting for in the first place. Thus, in 1993, one of Greenpeace's leading environmental campaigners, Chris Rose, wrote in all sincerity that a wrong approach was being taken in media-driven campaigning [*1993: 292*]. Greenpeace, he explained, had focused on capturing media attention, but since the organisation's target was 'packaging the messages to fit media opportunities and prejudices and paradigms of what is environmental news', it had failed in only managing to create a formulaic 'sameness' in its messages. This not only limited its members' imagination and creativity, but also gave TV viewers a sense of 'O.K. So this is serious. But haven't we heard it all before?' [*Rose, 1993*]. Moreover, since Greenpeace focused on how things would look on TV, reality and solving real problems had given way to virtual reality. The public felt that 'it was all on TV' and that therefore had nothing to do with them, argues Rose.

This approach not only serves to distance activists from problem solving, but might alienate many potential activists by encouraging them to believe that only campaigning of this kind works. Knowing that they

themselves are not the sort of people who climb trees and tie themselves to tractors, many of them might conclude they have nothing to offer.

Moreover, when action is directed deliberately toward to capturing media attention, the wrong message is sent to the public. A good example of this is Greenpeace's campaign against genetically modified crops. Greenpeace decided to 'go violent' in the case of genetically modified maize being grown in Norfolk. Some days before their action, the village in which the GM maize was being grown, assembled and resolved to oppose the raising of GM crop in their village – through non-violent means (*The Observer,* 1 Aug. 1999). Greenpeace, however, led by Lord Melchett, went storming over the field, destroying all the crops (*The Guardian,* 22 July 1999). Following violent clashes between Greenpeace activists and farmers (the Brigham brothers), a number of activists, among them Lord Melchett, were arrested. The story then changed tack: instead of focusing on GM trials on a farm-level scale, Lord Melchett and his arrest became the story. And, rather than the farmers and their risky crops being targeted for criticism, Greenpeace was condemned for its violence. Instead of the farmers being portrayed as anti-democratic and growing crops (against the will of the rest of the village) that might threaten local organic farming – Greenpeace was portrayed as anti-democratic. As the report ends, quoting one of the Brigham brothers: 'This has nothing to do with genetically modified organisms – it's whether we want democratic government or anarchy' (*The Guardian,* 22 July 1999). This was the message sent to anyone who read this report to its end.

Indeed, we see from the press reporting on the Newbury bypass campaign that it is not always so important to capture media attention: often what is important is what the media writes – not *if* it writes. Let us consider what the more environmentally sympathetic newspapers – *The Guardian* and *The Observer* – had to say on the bypass campaign: for example, on 25 October 1999 we read about the security guard who suffered a ruptured chest muscle when he was struck by a rock thrown from a catapult. This could well seem excessively violent to readers, whose sympathy would then go out to the innocent guard now in the hospital instead of at home with his family. This same journalist (Alex Bellos) had been far more supportive of the environmental campaign only a few months earlier. On 18 March 1996 he had written: 'Anger against the Newbury pass has united old and young, rich and poor, left and right'. On 19 February 1996 he reported that the bypass would only save two minutes of driving. *The Guardian's* John Vidal described the road builders as being engaged in a 'battle' against the protestors (15 Feb. 1996). But soon afterwards, as protestors started to prove their capacity for violence, Melanie Phillips claimed that (*The Guardian,* 24 March 1996) 'Greens are not Always Good for You', a critical

reference to Charless Secrett, then director of FoE, who had argued that the environmentalists were above the democratic process since they 'possessed unchallengeable truths.'

As already noted, one of the most radical activists in the anti-road campaign was Swampy. The initial coverage of his actions was very colourful and supportive. Alex Bellos wrote about 'Swampy Fever' (*The Guardian*, 12 May 1997). Swampy's first public appearance after his long stay in the tunnel was described in heroic terms: 'When Swampy came out of the tunnel he and his friends dug a journalist shouted across the melee of security guards and police officers: "why did you risk your life?"' 'The answer' writes Bellows, 'was eloquent, well spoken and on television. "It was the only way to get a voice these days. If I wrote a letter to my MP, would I have achieved all this? Would you lot be here now?"'

But in reply dare I ask, what exactly did Swampy achieve? What long-run popular support did he gain? Would not a mass, silent demonstration have achieved the same? Admittedly certain newspapers, normally condemnatory of law breaking activists, had 'fallen in love with him', but they still didn't take any notice of the real issue. Swampy gave the magazines and newspapers a touching human interest story. But did we not lose the environment somewhere? Was this a story about whether Britain needed the A30 and other roads? Or was it about a boy who was willing to sacrifice himself. Or was it to do with the 'thrill' at finally having a peacetime hero? Indeed, it is interesting to note that Swampy went on to appear on a TV celebrity show, on "Have I got News for You" show, and that he was interviewed for a teenage magazine and earned the doubtful distinction of being compared to the 'Spice Girls'. He was actually asked by a record company to record a version of 'I am a mole and I live in a hole' under the name of 'Swampy and the Swampy Girls' (*The Guardian, 18 May* 1997, p.3). Swampy became an overnight celebrity (for a short time), while the car culture remained.[26]

Eighth Commandment: *Promote the Organisation Itself*

It is commonly known, from studies of organisations, that they are often established for an ad-hoc purpose, but having solved whatever problem they wished to solve, they remain active, although their function does change. It is often the case that organisation members so enjoy belonging to this type of organisation that sustaining and fostering the organisation becomes paramount for many members and activists. Orly Peled [*1994*] studied the socio-economic and motivational background of the membership of Israel's largest environmental NGO, the Society for the Protection of Nature in Israel (SPNI). She found that a high percentage of those who were active

and received actual payment for their involvement, had joined, or remained within the SPNI for social reasons. People reported feeling wanted and needed, that they had made good friends, or had experienced enhanced self-esteem since joining the organisation. People often join an NGO for reasons of this nature and only later adopt its environmental position.

Members and activists often ascribe far more to the organisation and to the experience of being active in a campaign than they had hoped to find when they joined. A good example is the list of 'lessons' which Merrick says he learned through being involved in the Newbury bypass campaign:

> How to get on with people, about western politics, commitment, passion, making chapatties, when to accept someone's word, when to step in and when to step back, my body, my capacity to learn, trusting myself, getting along with whoever crosses your path, hope, love, defiance in the face of power, corruption and ridicule, the politics, fucking quietly so as not to wake up those around you, grand gestures, fruity porridge, loyalty to old friends, the joy of new ones, violence, truth, perception of beauty, the strength of collective will, determination, the way of the exceptional can become mundane, the way the mundane can become exceptional, empowerment, resolve, having visions, seeing the facts, acting responsibly in the midst of enormity and crassness, being a responsible ancestor, history, about the future, never giving up [*Merrick, 1997: 6*].

Often activists become so involved and committed that a sense of belonging to a very intimate community develops. In such cases, activists are likely to be trapped by the 'having fun' mentality. If 'enjoying it' is a serious component of the protest, the activists will continue with their existing protest strategy even if it fails and needs to be revised. Merrick's testimony is so honest and naive that it is revealing. He devotes much space to describe in details his sexual experiences during the campaign [*Merrick, 1997: 84*]. Merrick goes on to describe the music tapes they had and how they enjoyed listening to them while up in the trees. However, as one reads this fascinating document one has the feeling that the saving the trees was gradually forgotten. It could have been any objective: the original, environmental goal becomes instrumental to having fun, fostering the group, forming a community, and so on.

However, not only do members try to foster the organisation for personal reasons, the organisation finds itself in the position of having to promote itself. Because people join up not so much because their support is in 'demand', but because they are attracted to what the organisation can 'supply' [*Jordan and Maloney, 1997: Chs.4–6*], organisations thus feel they must market themselves to potential members. This means that much of

their energy and time is spent on persuading those who are already in to stay in, and in convincing potential members to join, instead of persuading developers and politicians that their projects are unfriendly to the environment and should therefore be abandoned.

Ninth Commandment: ***Never Be Benevolent To Other Organisations***

Many activists report tensions between organisations and their activists. These tensions, they claim, prevent the organisations from presenting a united front. There is rivalry between organisations for similar financial and human sources, donations, media attention, and social kudos. They even compete for membership. Several organisations, usually the more radical ones, were established by people who had been frustrated with the way their previous organisations led their campaigns. For example, the first *Earth First! UK* group was founded by two students in Hastings, East Sussex. The students and those who joined them from local peace and anti-nuclear networks, had participated in other green groups and ended up disillusioned with them [*Doherty, 2000*].[27] In fact, many activists are members of more than one organisation. For example, 65.8 per cent of *FoE* members belong to other environmental organisations [*Jordan and Maloney, 1997: 79*]. This means that these groups find themselves in competition for members.[28]

It is important to note that often the tensions derive from the more 'genuine' environmentalists, but work against them. Often environmentalists throw mud at those more established organisations, claiming that they are not radical enough, picturing those who have more access to decision making centres as 'not genuine environmentalists' (see below). Thus, the public learns to identify those who succeed, who get to be listened, as not genuinely environmentalists. However, consequently, when a more radical organisation does achieve something, it ceases to be genuinely environmental in the eyes of the public. Similarly, as Jordan [*1998: 315*] claims, among academics there is a tendency to relabel any group using non-conventional strategies as 'social movements', but once the groups begins to succeed, it ceases to be a movement.

I now want to explore the four sources of these tension: tension between local and national organisations, tension between grass-roots activists and the professional echelon, personal differences and ideological divergences among activists.

The first source of tension, then, emerges from the clash between the local and the national – or even the international – organisation. These clashes are about what is really important, how a specific case fits the broader picture of environmental campaigning, which values should be emphasised and when. The local, often *ad-hoc*, organisations tend to

suspect the national ones for not paying them sufficient attention and for 'having a different agenda', while the national organisations tend often to underestimate the local organisations' potential. Moreover, national and international organisations wish to be involved in all campaigns, but also, at the same time, to distribute their energy and money wisely and invest more of their resources in cases in which the odds of winning are more favorable. They want also to feel they have mastered the relevant subject matter.

We find a good example of this in the Twyford Down anti-roads campaign in the UK. In February 1992, the British government decided to construct a road in Twyford Down in Hampshire to shorten the travelling time between Southampton and London. *Friends of the Earth (FoE)* entered the town and established its protest camp on 13 March 1992. However, when warned by their lawyers that they would be liable to fines of £250,000, they packed up and left. A well-established organisation like the *FoE* cannot afford the sort of bad press and publicity that a court case would bring – or for that matter the economic damage [*Lamb, 1996: 6*]. Local organisations interpreted their action as betrayal and defeatism. Not long after, *FoE* was back to work, fighting assorted road development schemes on several fronts. For them, the Twyford Down affair, and the M25 campaign were 'two battles in the same war' [*Lamb, 1996: 10*]. However, many of the people and organisations that stayed on at Twyford Down did not see things this way. They had believed that the Twyford Down protest was to be the 'launching ground for the direct action road protest' [*Wall, 1999: 65*]. Thus relations between the *FoE* and other groups such as *Road Alert* 'turned sour' [*Lamb, 1996: 10*].[29] Roger Higman of *Friends of the Earth* complained that there were 'elements of jealousy' on both sides [*Lamb, 1996: 202*]. While local organisations indeed accept that in certain cases the national organisation knows too little about the issue at stake, the locals nevertheless claim that national inaction derogates the issue at stake, which, in turn, can have negative repercussions on the locals' chances of success.[30]

Tensions between smaller and larger environmental organisations might also be due to the greater power of the larger organisations and their dominance over access to decision-makers. This is very frustrating for many small, local, or minor organisations, which feel they have failed to put their message across. For example, there have been many complaints about the larger organisations from an environmental justice perspective, by many activists [*Shlosberg, 1999: 143, fn. 3; Dowie, 1995*].

The second source of tension is when one organisation tends to work with professionals, while the other works on the grass roots level. Each claims to know how best to make an impact. Both may be right and wrong at the same time. When I discussed this matter with media representatives in Israel, many of them claimed that the 'local' arena is more attractive to

them: they would rather present local, non-professional, under-dog activists fighting for a cause than interviewing professors or technicians who claim to know it all. The local is more interesting in terms of ratings, they admit. However research demonstrates that it is not necessarily the local people who solve the problems. Often local people play a 'discovery role' [*Rootes, 1999: 5*], but 'once an issue is securely on the national agenda, the baton of protest passes to the bigger battalions of better resourced environmental movements organisations' [*Rootes, 1999*]. As Schlosberg [*1999*] explains, in the USA, while many small, local organisations regard the national and larger organisations as being too paternalistic and disempowering, replacing these organisations with a spontaneous, egalitarian network does not always solve the problem of being able to sustain long term protest.

At this point Randy Shaw takes sides, blaming the Washington based, main stream national environmental groups (the 'Big Ten') for being more concerned with maintaining their status within the establishment than changing reality [*Shaw, 1996: 59*]. In fact, thousands of people make a living working for these organisations, and do not want to kiss good bye to their livelihood. They fear that this will happen if the organisation becomes antagonistic to the establishment and therefore loses its political status. Shaw suspects that they therefore spend a great deal of energy and time confronting grass-roots environmental organisations instead of solving problems,[31] and even if this is not objectively the case, the suspicion is there, overshadowing relations between the national and the smaller, local organisations.

Naturally, some tensions between organisations result from personality differences among the people involved in them. However, to students of environmental politics, it often seems that every conceivable tension of this kind exists among environmentalists. For example, Merrick [*1997 51*] describes his frequent debates with people representing other organisations and other approaches – mainly those opposed to the protestors' 'direct action' approach. Looking disdainfully down at his opponents, his parting shot to them is: 'Ideas without action are called bullshit, If you can't walk it like you talk it, shut up till you learn how.' Derek Wall quotes an interview with Charles Secret, director of *FoE UK* in the mid-1990s, about the relationships between *FoE* and *Earth First!*: 'One of the things which pissed me off when I came back into *FoE* was these 20-somethings, who told me I had it all wrong and theirs was the only way of contributing, "Who the xxxx are you?"' [*Wall, 1999: 112*].[32]

However, this is also an ideological type of tension deriving from different organisations interpretations of the social causes of environmental problems. The differences relate to the question of whether the root social cause of environmental problems is the 'system' or the 'structure' (in Marxian terms). Those who see it as the latter conclude that the situation can

only be partially improved by changing people's views; in fact, since people's views reflect their socio-economic status, they will only change their political behaviour if the structure changes. As a result, the activists who take this view do not engage in heroic, self-sacrificing acts, but in consistent and, indeed, dull efforts to change the structure of society: to change production relations, to make institutions more environment friendly, and so on. However, those who accuse the 'system' of being the root of all evil, blame it on mentality, on crookedness, on corruption. But the problem with corruption is that it conceals itself from public sight – by corrupt means. So, these people claim, the way to fight the 'system' is to expose, *corum populo*, those misdemeanours. This of course, calls for courageous men and women and personal devotion. You cannot beat a 'system' which has been described as 'hierarchy, bureaucracy and compromised strategies' [*Wapner, 1995:: 300*] using huge, cumbersome, complicated multi-million-dollar corporations[33] with thousands of employees, or indeed by political parties. Instead, these people argue, what we need is direct action by dedicated individuals against actual instances of ecological abuse.[34]

Some activists believe that an authoritative, national 'convention' would solve the problem of the distrust and enmity dividing the organisations. Randy Shaw, for example, writes:

> A national convention could accomplish several goals. First, it could help create a specific national environmental agenda. Most of the public does not really understand what environmentalists want at the national level. Confusion over the specifics of environmentalists' demands weakens political accountability; it is not always clear to the public when a betrayal has occurred. For example, even people sympathetic to the environmentalist position on the spotted owl would have had a difficult time learning the 'true' pro-environment position (if one existed). Such a position could have become widely known through adoption by a convention. If the convention voted that the only pro-environment position on the spotted owl was a total ban on harvesting in the owl's habitat, politicians who supported weaker restrictions would be seen as opposing rather than supporting environmentalists. This clarity would still not prevent groups like the Wilderness Society from hailing weaker restrictions as a great environmental victory, but the public would know that the weaker restrictions violate the national environmental platform [*Shaw, 1996: 269–70*].

This paragraph seems to me rather frightening. What is described here is the end of debate, the narrowing of freedom of opinion, the death of pluralism.

Rather than open and free debate on what constitutes the right solution, this is a vision of despotic and irreversible decisions, together with a threat to those who do not conform with the national convention, or, in fact, the majorities. As was argued by J.S. Mill over 150 years ago, an open, never ending debate is crucial if we are to know better, or at least to know why we think what we think. We should never believe that a solution is right because the majority, or the national convention, says so. We should understand *why* it is the right solution, and if we have doubts we should be able to raise them. Thus the relationships between the national conventions and larger NGOs, and the local groups should be founded on mutual respect and reciprocal consultation rather than hierarchy and authority. Tensions are destructive, but we also need to be very cautious regarding the solutions.

Tenth Commandment: *Do* Not *Trust This Research: It is the Advice of a 'Softie'!*

There are very few who would dare deny that many, if not most, academics who study environmental politics, philosophy, or economics, also support the environmental movement, at least to some degree. They may also be committed to a particular environmentalist school of thought, whether ecocentrism or ecofeminism, etc. Therefore this account could be read as a manifesto of the more 'square', or perhaps more conservative (*not* with a capital C) environmentalists. Indeed, I might be suspected of being precisely such a 'boring environmentalist' and indeed have been 'accused' of this by more radical environmentalists on the basis of some of my academic works [*1995*, *1997*, *2000*]. And yet, it is important to note that in my own case, I reached the position of a 'moderate' following research and continuing exploration of the conclusions of my research. Thus this account is *not* a 'softy' manifesto, though I suspect many would like to claim it is and ignore it.

Current environmental activism is very promising. In many countries environmental problems have become legitimate issues on the political agenda, and no doubt environmental activists were responsible for this. However, it is my fear that when environmental campaigns succeed they are anlaysed and studied carefully, and many claim to be liable for them, whereas failures remain orphans. It has been my aim here to analyse these failures without disheartening anybody. Indeed, I believe that if activists learn from failures, especially when there appears to be a pattern in those failures, they can improve their chances of success tremendously.

NOTES

1. See, for example, the statement by Merrick, the road activist (*Merrick, 1997: 66*).
2. Many activists present the situation as a moral debate, rather than as a political one. The fight is on values and ideas, not on distributive shares. Rudolf Bahro, for example, complains about the give and take culture of politics [*1986: 196–210*], and therefore thinks that politics only leads to self-extermination [*1994: 79–150*]. Only an all-out war, with no compromise, will win, he claims.
3. George Monbiot's essays in the *The Guardian* suggest so.
4. DuPont were responsible for 25 per cent of the world annual production of CFCs.
5. During the Gulf War of 1991, tourism from the USA to Britain dropped significantly because many Americans had seen on TV how the Iraqis were bombing neighbouring countries, and were afraid to travel to Britain, being unable to distinguish the UK from the Middle East.
6. A group of my students examined this in neighbourhoods of different social-economic backgrounds and found very little evidence of understanding the issues at stake. For example, during the Gulf War, Iraq bombed Israel with conventional missiles. Israelis were very concerned about the possibility of chemical weapons being used. A month later my students interviewed supermarket customers about whether they were checking for chemicals in the products they were purchasing, referring, of course, to different kinds of additives. However, many people were surprised and answered that they could not see why they should check, given that it was known that Iraq had not fired chemical warheads.
7. I thank Mr Eli'ezer Y'aari of the NIF.
8. For such attitudes see Morrison and Dunlap [*1986*]. For a critique of these positions see Eckersley [*1989*].
9. Moreover, what does a total change campaign imply? It in fact implies distrust and despair with democratic politics. Swampy claims that he did what he did because regular politics does not work. Hugo Young writes that the lesson learned from Swampy's activities is that parliamentary democracy is counter-productive (*The Guardian*, 13 March 1997). Or consider, for example, Rudolf Bahro's speech of resignation from the Greens, in which he claims that parliamentary democracy and parties are "counter productive tools" [*Bahro, 1986: 210–11*]. I have elaborated on this point in de-Shalit [*2000: Ch. 5*].
10. This is based on interviews and discussions with activists. But see also Rose [*1993: 291*] where he discusses environmental activists' commitment to protecting the natural world, and their favour of the 'optimism of the action over the pessimism of the thought'.
11. At other times, the language used by many activists is not necessarily biocentric, but is nevertheless so radical or odd that it may seem totally alien to large numbers of potential supporters. Merrick, an activist in the Newbury bypass campaign quotes a flyposter from January 1996: "We, the road protesters … in the true spirit of England, in the true spirit of our mythical heroes, King Arthur and Robyn Hood, we are prepared to stand up for truth and justice." [*Merrick, 1997: 1*] He then goes on to compare himself to the heroes and heroines that England has always produced while 'in great need' [*Merrick, 1997: 1*], and calls himself 'the Great Mighty Eco-Warrior' [*Merrick, 1997, 6*, capitals in original].
12. Often environmentalists complain that they are asked to be 'reasonable'. For such a complaint regarding the Big Ten's attitude to grass-roots activists see Shaw [*1996: 60–61*].
13. However, arguments raised by an epidemiological expert concerning the impact of the transmitters on local inhabitants did hit the spot, and the programme was abandoned. Perhaps the most famous case involving the use of a biocentric argument was when Christopher Stone, a nature loving lawyer from California suggested that trees had a right of standing before the Supreme Court. Stone however lost the case. [*Stone, 1979*: 'A Personal Preface'].
14. What language will people understand and be most likely to internalise? This question demands a separate paper. Here I shall just remark that I subscribe to the view that it is the language of environmental justice [*Schlosberg, 1999*]. Activists should show, time and time again, that the environment has to be protected as a matter of social justice, and that environmental nuisance is more likely to harm the elderly, the poor and the weaker segments of society. At a time when garbage and waste are being transported from one country to another, it is the weaker elements in society who end up with it buried next door.

15. Although according to McLeod [*1998*], 73 per cent of the demonstrators in Brightlingsea against live animal transport were between the age of 41 and 70, 38 per cent were retired and 80 per cent had never protested before.
16. Findings of a survey I conducted in Israel
17. Zaller [*1992*], for example, argues that voters, or the general public, have a variety of interests and other considerations, most of which do not tie in with each other. Hence the first party to set up the agenda is more likely to have an impact on these voters or potential supporters than the party that responds, simply by virtue of being the first to address their reservations.
18. In 1997–99, when the mayor of Haifa in Israel, Mr Amram Mitzna confronted resistance to his programmes to build several marinas on the beautiful, open and wild seashore south of the city, he used this argument against environmentalists.
19. This is also done by academics. Ridley characterises these campaigns as standing 'outside the run of established politics, involving people who would be offended if described as politicians' [*Ridley, 1998: 309*].
20. For more details: www.haaretz.co.il/arch/index.asp/students
21. This title might be misleading. I do not mean that the two – legislation and politics – are mutually exclusive. Legislation is, of course, part of politics. However, the core of politics, in its democratic and participatory meaning, is the bargaining, public deliberation, and agreements that are reached between activists, organisations, often with the help of politicians. Many students of politics today consider legislation to be the target of most political actions, but this is not how politics has always been seen. See Crick [*1993*] and Cunningham [*1994*].
22. For example, in the 1966 Scotland Deer Act: the Protection of Deer Act (1959) was extended to all deer species in Scotland; in 1963 the Deer Act was extended and provision made to protect red, fallow, roe and silka deer in England and Wales [*Evans, 1992: 118*].
23. In several cases the law could not be enforced for political reasons. The Arab minorities in Israel regard many of the nature reserves, especially those bordering with their villages as another mechanism of the Israeli government to limit the Arabs in Israel. Demands by the SPNI and other environmentalists to enforce the law in one of Israel's largest nature reserves, in Mount Miron, ended up with the local Arab villagers campaigning with slogan such as 'environmental fascists'. The environmentalists withdrew, realising that education would be a much better way to prevent damages.
24. However, Wolfgang Rüdig writes that 'there are signs that the media stunts performed by Greenpeace have lost much of their novelty value' [*Rüdig, 1995: 231*].
25. This is based on interviews that I conducted during these events. For more details see www.haaretz.co.il/arch
26. Admittedly, some cuts in road programmes were done, but often due to the Treasury's desire to cut public expenditure [*Doherty, 1998: 383*].
27. See also the tables of membership trends among UK environmental campaigning organisations in Jordan and Maloney [*1997: 13*]. It is clear that while some groups gain more members others lose theirs, and the total number remains more or less stable. This prompts the suspicion that new members are actually the former members of other organisations.
28. Jordan and Maloney [*1997: 118–19*] argue that participation is a function of mobilization and of groups persuading people to become members. Since potential members have more or less the same class, education, income and occupational background [*1997: 106–7*], groups compete over members.
29. Notice that Lamb wrote this book in collaboration with the FoE. Other sources simply blame the FoE for abandoning the battlefield. See Wall [*1999: 67–8*].
30. Randy Shaw describes such a case when Clinton and Gore promised the inhabitants of East Liverpool, Ohio, to protect them against the interest of the Waste Technology Industry before the elections of 1992, but turned their backs on the local people after the elections. See Shaw [*1996: 59–66*].
31. In Israel, the Society for the Protection of Nature employs thousands of staff. The Society competes for grants against smaller organisations. According to a recent report, if a minor NGO competes against the SPNI for grants, its chances are slim [*de Hartouch, 2000*].

32. See also the description of such personal tensions between *FoE* campaign coordinator, Andrew Lees, and other organisations [*Wall, 1999: 122*].
33. For example, by 1990, the revenue of Britain's National Trust was some £56 million per annum [*Young, 1993: 18*].
34. Hence, Earth First! UK would like to be called a 'disorganisation' rather than 'organisation' [*Lamb, 1996: 4*].

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