

The common-information approach to multi-agent teams

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ACC Workshop on Learning and Control of Multi-Agent Systems
9 July 2024

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Acknowledgements



Demos Teneketzis



Ashutosh
Nayyar

Acknowledgements



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Jhelum
Chakravorty



Jayakumar
Subramanian



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
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**NSERC
CRSNG**




IDEaS
INNOVATION FOR DEFENCE
EXCELLENCE AND SECURITY




Common theme: multi-stage multi-agent
decision making under uncertainty



Networked control systems



Networked control systems



Networked control systems



Challenges

- ▶ Signals sent over wireless channels (**packet drops**)



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


Networked control systems



Challenges

- ▶ Signals sent over wireless channels (**packet drops**)
- ▶ **Different vehicles have different information**
 - ▶ Decentralized control
 - ▶ Decentralized estimation
 - ▶ Decentralized learning



Salient Features of Modern Engineering Systems

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Multiple agents

Agents have different partial information about the environment and each other

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Decentralized Coordination

All agents must coordinate to achieve a system-wide objective

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Communication and Signaling

Possible to explicitly or implicitly communicate information

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Dynamics may not be completely known or may change over time

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Teams versus Games

Teams vs Games



Teams

- ▷ All agents have **common objective**
- ▷ Agents **cooperate** to min team cost
- ▷ Agents are **not strategic**
- ▷ Solution concepts: person-by-person optimality, global optimality . . .



Games

- ▷ Each agent has **individual objective**
- ▷ Agents **compete** to minimize individual cost
- ▷ Agents are **strategic**
- ▷ Solution concepts: Nash equil, Bayesian Nash, Sub-game perfect, Markov perfect, Bayesian perfect, . . .

Teams vs Games



Teams

- ▶ All agents have **common objective**



Games

- ▶ Each agent has **individual objective**

In many engineering problems, game theory is used as an **algorithmic toolbox** to provide distributed solutions to **static** problems.

We are interested in finding **globally optimal** solution to problems where **agents have decentralized information**.

Teams have a reputation of
being notoriously difficult . . .

Some historical context

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S&C until the 1960s

- ▶ About 300 years of knowledge in designing **LTI systems**
- ▶ Good “intuitive” understanding of **frequency domain methods**
 - Root locus • Bode plots • Nyquist plots • Loop shaping

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Advances in 1960s

- ▶ Emergence of **state space methods** for filtering and control
- ▶ Could be implemented in digital computers (of that time!)

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
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State Space Design

- ▶ Linearize the system dynamics
- ▶ Design **optimal control** assuming full state feedback (LQR)
$$\text{control action}(t) = -\text{gain}(t) \cdot \text{state}(t)$$
- ▶ Estimate the state using noisy measurements (Kalman filtering)
$$\text{state estimate}(t) = \text{Function}(\text{estimate}(t-1), \text{measurement}(t))$$
- ▶ **Optimal controller:**
$$\text{control action}(t) = -\text{gain}(t) \cdot \text{state estimate}(t)$$



Conceptual difficulties in team problems

Witsenhausen
Counterexample
(1968)

- ▶ A two step dynamical system with two controllers
- ▶ Linear dynamics, quadratic cost, and Gaussian disturbance
- ▶ Non-linear controllers outperform linear control strategies . . .
 . . . cannot use Kalman filtering + Riccati equations
- ▶ Later papers: Non-linear can perform **arbitrarily well** compared to linear.

❑ Witsenhausen, "A counterexample in stochastic optimum control," SICON 1968.

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Whittle and Rudge Example (1974)

- ▷ Infinite horizon dynamical system with two symmetric controllers
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Complexity analysis

- ▷ All random variables are finite valued
- ▷ Finite horizon setup
- ▷ The problem of finding the best control strategy is in **NEXP**

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Why are team problems hard?

Why are team problems hard?

Why are single agent problems easy?

Static stochastic optimization problems

$$\min_{g: \mathcal{Y} \rightarrow \mathcal{U}} \mathbb{E}[c(X, g(Y))]$$

	$X = 0$	$X = 1$	$X = 2$	$X = 3$
$U = 0$	0.5	0.2	1.2	0.5
$U = 1$	1.2	0.5	0.2	0.3

$Y = 0$

$Y = 1$

Static stochastic optimization problems

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- ▷ Search complexity $|\mathcal{U}|^{|\mathcal{Y}|}$.



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
- ▷ This is a **functional optimization** problem.
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for each y , $\min_{u \in \mathcal{U}} \mathbb{E}[c(X, u) | Y = y]$

- ▷ Each sub-problem is a **parameter optimization** problem.
- ▷ Search complexity $|\mathcal{U}| \cdot |\mathcal{Y}|$.



Dynamic stochastic optimization problems



Dyanmics

$$X_{t+1} = f_t(X_t, u_t, W_t)$$


Observations

$$Y_t = h_t^i(X_t, N_t)$$

Control law

$$u_t = g_t(Y_{1:t}, u_{1:t-1})$$

Dynamic stochastic optimization problems



Dyanmics

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Observations

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
$$U_t = g_t(Y_{1:t}, U_{1:t-1})$$

Objective

Choose control strategy $g = (g_1, \dots, g_T)$ to minimize

$$J(g) = \mathbb{E} \left[\sum_{t=1}^T c_t(X_t, U_t) \right]$$

Dynamic stochastic optimization problems



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Objective

Dynamic
programming
solution

Choose control strategy $g = (g_1, \dots, g_T)$ to minimize

$$\Gamma = \sum_{t=1}^T \gamma^t c_t$$

- ▷ Define **belief state** $b_t = P(X_t | Y_{1:t}, U_{1:t-1})$.
- ▷ Write a DP in terms of the belief state b_t .
- ▷ Solution complexity: $T \cdot |\mathcal{U}| \cdot |\mathcal{Z}|$.

Why don't these simplifications
work for teams?

Static team problem


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
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
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Previous idea of

$$\text{for all } y^1, \quad \min_{u^1} \mathbb{E}[c(X, u^1, g^2(Y^2)) \mid Y^1 = y^1]$$

leads to person-by-person optimal solution (not globally opt.)


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
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There are additional challenges
in dynamic problems


k-step delayed sharing information structure

- ▶ Consider a network with coupled dynamics.
- ▶ Information exchange between nodes with unit delay.




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


k-step delayed sharing information structure

- ▶ Consider a network with coupled dynamics.
- ▶ Information exchange between nodes with unit delay.
- ▶ Fix the strategy of all but two subsystems which are k -hop apart. What is the best response strategy at these two nodes?
- ▶ Proposed by Witsenhausen in a seminal paper.
- ▶ Allows to smoothly transition between centralized ($k = 0$) and completely decentralized ($k = \infty$).



System Model




Dyanmics

$$X_{t+1} = f_t(X_t, U_t^1, U_t^2, W_t)$$

Observations

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
Information
Structure

$$I_t^i = \{Y_{1:t}^i, U_{1:t-1}^i, Y_{1:t-k}^{-i}, U_{1:t-k}^{-i}\}$$

Control law

$$U_t^i = g_t^i(I_t^i)$$

System Model



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
$$J(g_1, g_2) = \mathbb{E} \left[\sum_{t=1}^T c_t(X_t, U_t^1, U_t^2) \right]$$

Conceptual difficulty

The data I_t^i available at each controller is increasing with time.
How to find a sufficient statistic or an information state?


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
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- Unobserved state from the p.o.v. of ctrl 1: X_t, I_t^2 .
Information state $\pi_t^1 = \mathbb{P}(X_t, I_t^2 | I_t^1)$.

Conceptual difficulty


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

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- ▶ Unobserved state from the p.o.v. of ctrl 1: X_t, π_t^2 .
Information state $\pi_t^{1,2} = \mathbb{P}(X_t, \pi_t^2 | I_t^1)$.
- ▶ ... infinite regress ...

Conceptual difficulty

The data I_t^i available at each controller is increasing with time.
How to find a sufficient statistic or an information state?



History of the problem

Witsenhausen's Assertion

Let $C_t = \{Y_{1:t-k}, U_{1:t-k}\}$ and $L_t^i = \{Y_{t-k+1:t}^i, u_{t-k+1:t-1}^i\}$.

Then $\mathbb{P}(X_{t-k} | C_t)$ is a sufficient statistic for C_t .

Rationale: $\mathbb{P}(X_{t-k} | Y_{1:t-k}, U_{1:t-k})$ is policy independent.

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Follow-up Literature

- ▷ **Assertion true for $k=1$**
[Sandell, Athans, 1974], [Kurtaran, 1976]
- ▷ **Assertion false for $k>1$**
[Varaiya, Walrand 1979], [Yoshikawa, Kobayashi, 1978]
- ▷ **No subsequent positive result!**

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Are there sufficient statistics or information states for C_t ?

Importance of the problem

Applications (of one-step delay sharing)

- ▶ **Power systems**: Altman et al, 2009
- ▶ **Queueing theory**: Kuri and Kumar, 1995
- ▶ **Communication networks**: Grizzle et al, 1982
- ▶ **Stochastic games**: Papavassilopoulos, 1982; Chang and Cruz, '83
- ▶ **Economics**: Li and Wu, 1991.

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
Conceptual Significance

- ▶ Understanding the **design of networked control systems**
- ▶ **Bridge** between centralized and decentralized systems
- ▶ **Insights** for the design of general decentralized systems.


Common information approach for teams

[Nayyar, Mahajan, Teneketzis (TAC 2011, 2013)]

Key idea: exploit common knowledge




Agent 1




Agent 2


Key idea: exploit common knowledge



Agent 1




Agent 2




Common knowledge


Key idea: exploit common knowledge



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


Agent 2




Common knowledge


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Agent 1




Agent 2




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
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


Agent 2




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
Key idea: exploit common knowledge



Agent 1



Agent 2



Common knowledge


Split $Y^1 = (L^1, C)$ and $Y^2 = (L^2, C)$.

for all c , $\min_{\gamma^1, \gamma^2} \mathbb{E}[c(X, \gamma^1(L^1), \gamma^2(L^2))] \mid C = c$

Reduction in complexity: $|\mathcal{U}|^8 \cdot |\mathcal{U}|^8$ to $4|\mathcal{U}|^2 \cdot |\mathcal{U}|^2$


Common-info approach for k-step delay sharing

Original System




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


Virtual Coordinated System




Common-info approach for k-step delay sharing

Original System



Virtual Coordinated System



Information split

- ▷ Common information: $C_t = I_t^1 \cap I_t^2 = \{Y_{1:t-k}, U_{1:t-k}\}$
- ▷ Local information: $L_t^i = I_t^i \setminus C_t = \{Y_{t-k+1:t}^i, U_{t-k+1:t-1}^i\}$.
- ▷ Prescription: $\gamma_t^i: L_t^i \mapsto u_t^i$.

Common-info approach for k-step delay sharing

Main Result

- ▶ The virtual coordinator is a single agent stochastic ctrl problem.
- ▶ **Information state**: for C_t : $b_t = \mathbb{P}(X_t, L_t^1, L_t^2 | C_t, \gamma_{1:t-1}^1, \gamma_{1:t-1}^2)$
- ▶ **Dynamic program**: $V_{T+1}(b) = 0$ and
$$V_t(b_t) = \min_{\gamma_t^1, \gamma_t^2} \{ \mathbb{E}[c_t(X_t, u_t^1, u_t^2) + V_{t+1}(B_+) | b_t, \gamma_t^1, \gamma_t^2] \}.$$
- ▶ Each step of the DP is a **functional** optimization problem.

Common-info approach for k-step delay sharing


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Salient Features


- ▶ The virtual coordinator is purely for conceptual clarity as it allows us to view the original problem from the p.o.v. of a “higher authority”. The presence of the coordinator is not necessary.
- ▶ The common information is known to both controllers and therefore both of them can carry out the calculations to solve the DP on their own.

The general common-info approach



► n controllers with general info structure $\{I_t^i\}_{i=1}^n$.

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
Information Split

- **Common information:**

$$C_t = \bigcap_{s \geq t} \bigcap_{i=1}^n I_s^i.$$

- **Local information:** $L_t^i = I_t^i \setminus C_t$.

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
- **Local information:** $L_t^i = I_t^i \setminus C_t$.

Partial history sharing

- $|L_t^i|$ is uniformly bounded.

- $\mathbb{P}^\psi(C_{t+1} \setminus C_t | C_t, \gamma_t^1, \gamma_t^2)$
doesn't depend on ψ .

The general common-info approach



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The general common-info approach



► n controllers with general info structure $\{I_t^i\}_{i=1}^n$

Implications and impact

- Subsumes many existing results (. . .)
- New results on sufficient statistics and DP for specific models (control sharing, mean-field sharing, NCS, and others)
- Common-information based refinements of Nash equilibrium in dynamic games with asymmetric information

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doesn't depend on ψ .

Some examples

Control sharing information structure

Dynamics

$$x_{t+1}^i = f^i(x_t^i, u_t, w_t^i)$$

Info structure

$$I_t^i = \{x_{1:t}^i, u_{1:t}\}$$

-
- Sandell and Athans, "Solution of some non-classical LQG decision problems," TAC 1974.
 - Mahajan, "Optimal decentralized control of coupled subsystems with control sharing," TAC 2013.

Multi-agent Teams—(Mahajan)

Control sharing information structure

Dynamics

$$X_{t+1}^i = f^i(X_t^i, \mathbf{u}_t, W_t^i)$$

Info structure

$$I_t^i = \{X_{1:t}^i, \mathbf{u}_{1:t}\}$$

Step 1: Using person-by-person approach

- ▶ Show that: $X_{1:t}^1 \perp X_{1:t}^2 \perp \cdots \perp X_{1:t}^n \mid \mathbf{u}_{1:t}$
- ▶ Implies no loss of optimality in shedding $X_{1:t-1}^i$ at agent i .

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- ▶ Implies no loss of optimality in shedding $X_{1:t-1}^i$ at agent i .

Step 2: Use common information approach

- ▶ Common-info based belief simplifies due to the conditional independence (see step 1)

Suff statistic for $\mathbf{u}_{1:t} = (\mathbb{P}(X_t^1 \mid \mathbf{u}_{1:t}), \dots, \mathbb{P}(X_t^n \mid \mathbf{u}_{1:t}))$

■ Sandell and Athans, "Solution of some non-classical LQG decision problems," TAC 1974.

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Mean-field teams

Dynamics

$$X_{t+1}^i = f^i(X_t^i, U_t^i, Z_t, W_t^i)$$

Info structure

$$I_t^i = \{X_t^i, Z_{1:t}\}$$

Mean-field

$$Z_t = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n \delta_{X_t^i}$$

Mean-field teams

Dynamics

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- ▶ Interesting model for applications with large population of a few types of agents
- ▶ Smart grids, IoT, ...

Mean-field teams

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
- ▷ Interesting model for applications with large population of a few types of agents
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Use common information approach


- ▷ Using ideas from exchangeable Markov chains show that

Suff statistic for $Z_{1:t} = Z_t$

Networked control over wireless channels




Networked control over wireless channels



Dyanmics

$$x_{t+1} = Ax_t + Bu_t + w_t$$

Networked control over wireless channels




Dynamics

$$x_{t+1} = Ax_t + Bu_t + w_t$$

Wireless Channel

- ▶ Sensor sends a packet to the controller using power level $p_t \in \mathcal{P}$.
- ▶ Packet is dropped with probability $q(p_t)$, which is decreasing in p_t .
- ▶ TCP-like transport layer protocol, so sensor knows when packet is dropped.

Networked control over wireless channels



Dynamics

$$x_{t+1} = Ax_t + Bu_t + w_t$$


Wireless
Channel

$$y_t = \begin{cases} x_t & \text{w.p. } 1 - q(p_t) \\ \mathcal{E} & \text{w.p. } q(p_t) \end{cases}$$

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
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$$\begin{aligned} I_t^s &= \{x_{1:t}, y_{1:t-1}, u_{1:t-1}\} \\ I_t^c &= \{y_{1:t}, u_{1:t-1}\} \end{aligned}$$

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Networked control over wireless channels



Dynamics

$$x_{t+1} = Ax_t + Bu_t + w_t$$

Decision
strategies

$$p_t = f_t(I_t^s), \quad u_t = g_t(I_t^c).$$

Wireless
Channel


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Information
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Networked control over wireless channels



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Per-step cost

$$x_t^T Q x_t + u_t^T R u_t + \lambda(p_t)$$


Control cost + comm. cost

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Objective

$$J(f, g) = \mathbb{E} \left[\sum_{t=1}^T c(x_t, u_t, p_t) \right]$$

Conceptual difficulties

Packet-drop is a non-linearity

- The closed loop system is non-linear. Choice of optimal control strategy is not obvious.

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- Not obvious if there is separation of estimation and control.

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Sensor can use power-levels to signal information

- As an example, suppose $\mathcal{P} = \{0, 1\}$, with $q(0) = 1$ and $q(1) = 0$. If the controller doesn't receive a packet, it knows that the state lied in the set where the transmitter chooses $p = 0$.
- Related to real-time communication (a notoriously difficult problem).

Common-info based solutions to NCS

Large literature on these models

- ▶ Using the common-info based dynamic program, prove that there are optimal transmission strategies that don't depend on the control strategy.
- ▶ Highly non-trivial because the state space of the DP is belief valued; the action space is function valued.
- ▶ Implication: there is **no dual effect** and there is separation of estimation and control.
- ▶ Note that there is no contradiction. Under an arbitrary policy, control has a dual effect; under the optimal policy it doesn't.

■ Rabi, Moustakides, and Baras, "Adaptive sampling for linear state estimation," SICON 2012.

■ Lipsa and Martins, "Remote state estimation with communication costs for first order LTI systems," TAC 2011.

■ Molin and Hirsche, "Event triggered state estimation: An iterative algorithm and optimality properties," TAC 2017.

■ Chakravorty and Mahajan, "Remote estimation over a packet-drop channel with Markovian state" TAC 2020.

Common information based approach to linear systems

LQ system

Linear dynamics and quadratic cost

PHS Info structure

$$I_t^i = \{C_t, L_t^i\}$$

-
- Mahajan and Nayyar, "Sufficient statistics for linear control strategies in decentralized systems with partial history sharing", TAC 2015
 - Afshari and Mahajan, "Decentralized linear quadratic systems with major and minor agents and non-Gaussian noise", TAC 2023

Multi-agent Teams—(Mahajan)

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Structure of optimal strategies

► $u_t^i = K_t^c \hat{S}_{t|c} + K_t^i L_t^i$
where $\hat{S}_{t|c} = \mathbb{E}[X_t, L_t^1, L_t^2 | C_t, \gamma_{1:t-1}^1, \gamma_{1:t-1}^2]$.

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How to compute optimal gains?

- Framework based on fundamental ideas of linear systems:
- State splitting
 - Completion of squares
 - Orthogonal projection
 - Conditional independence
- Noise need not be Gaussian. Identify optimal (possibly non-linear) controllers or best linear controllers.

[1] Mahajan and Nayyar, "Sufficient statistics for linear control strategies in decentralized systems with partial history sharing", TAC 2015

[2] Afshari and Mahajan, "Decentralized linear quadratic systems with major and minor agents and non-Gaussian noise", TAC 2023

Common information resolves conceptual
difficulties in decentralized control

Common information resolves conceptual difficulties in decentralized control

But, this is a workshop on learning and control

Learning in dynamic teams

Implications of common-info approach

- ▶ Converts planning in multi-agent teams to a POMDP
- ▶ In the learning setting, use your favorite RL algo for POMDP at the coordinator (offline training) or each agent's local copy of the coordinator (online training)
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But no theory! How do we develop RL theory MARL?

Tentative Roadmap for MARL Theory

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Next Steps

- ▶ Credit assignment (among agents)
- ▶ Agents helping each other to learning

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Thank you