Value of Common Information in Static Teams

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Decision Making:

✓ A single agent

✓ Multiple agents

Decision Making by Multiple Agents:

✓ Game Theory: Individual objectives

✓ Team Theory: Team objectives

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Necessary where centralized is not available/practical

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What is a Team?

A collection of multiple decision makers(agents) that have access to different information but aim to coordinate their actions to minimize(maximize) a common cost(reward) function.



Applications

Economics, Wireless Sensor Networks, Robotics, Traffic Management, and Smart Grids

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- ✓ Communication
- ✓ Computational complexity

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Dynamic Teams Solution, Decentralized Estimation, Sensor Networks, Multi Robot Task Assignments, etc.

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3 robots with 8 tasks
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




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
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Static Team Problem Formulation

Problem (Formulation)

- \checkmark n agents try to estimate x and (x, y_1, \ldots, y_n) jointly Gaussian
- $\checkmark \mathbb{E}[x] = \bar{x}, \ \mathbb{E}[y_i] = \bar{y}_i, \ \mathbb{E}[xy_i^{\mathsf{T}}] = \Theta_i, \ and \ \mathbb{E}[y_iy_i^{\mathsf{T}}] = \Sigma_{ij}.$
- ✓ Agent i observes y_i and chooses $u_i = g_i(y_i)$.

The performance is measured by

$$c(x, u_1, \dots, u_n) = \sum_{i \in N} \sum_{j \in N} u_i^{\mathsf{T}} R_{ij} u_j + 2 \sum_{i \in N} u_i^{\mathsf{T}} P_i x = u^{\mathsf{T}} R u + 2 u^{\mathsf{T}} P x$$

$$u = \begin{bmatrix} u_1 \\ \vdots \\ u_n \end{bmatrix}, \ P = \begin{bmatrix} P_1 \\ \vdots \\ P_n \end{bmatrix}, \ R = \begin{bmatrix} R_{11} & \cdots & R_{1n} \\ \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ R_{n1} & \cdots & R_{nn} \end{bmatrix}$$

Static team problem formulation

Static Team Problem

Assume:

 $\mathbf{A}(\mathbf{1}): R \geqslant 0 \text{ and } R = R^{\mathsf{T}}.$

A(2) : P, R, Θ , and Σ are common knowledge to all agents.

then choose decision rules $g = (g_1, \ldots, g_n)$ for all agents to minimize

$$J(g) = \mathbb{E}^g[c(x, u)].$$

Theorem (Radner 1962)

The optimal decision rules for static team problem are given by

$$u_i = K_i(y_i - \bar{y}_i) + H_i\bar{x}, \quad \forall i \in N;$$

$$u = \begin{bmatrix} H_1 \\ \vdots \\ H_n \end{bmatrix} = -R^{-1}P, K := \begin{bmatrix} K_1 \\ \vdots \\ K_n \end{bmatrix} = -\Gamma^{-1}\eta$$
where $n := \text{vec}(P, \Theta)$, and $\Gamma := [(\Sigma - 1)]$

where $\eta := \operatorname{vec}(P_1\Theta_1, \dots, P_n\overline{\Theta}_n)$ and $\Gamma := [(\Sigma_{ij} \otimes R_{ij})_{ij}]$ Moreover, the optimal cost J^* is given by

$$J^* = -\eta^{\mathsf{T}} \Gamma^{-1} \eta - \bar{x}^{\mathsf{T}} P^{\mathsf{T}} R^{-1} P \bar{x}.$$

Motivation for common information

Example

Before the system starts running, suppose it is possible to build an observation channel and broadcast its measurements to all agents.


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


Motivation for common information

Example

Before the system starts running, suppose it is possible to build an observation channel and broadcast its measurements to all agents.

What is the value of such common information?



Static team with common information formulation

- \checkmark In addition to x and y_i there is z available to every agent.
- \checkmark (x, y_1, \dots, y_n, z) are jointly Gaussian.
- \checkmark $\mathbb{E}[z] = \bar{z}, \mathbb{E}[xz^{\intercal}] = \Theta_c, \text{ and } \mathbb{E}[zz^{\intercal}] = \Sigma_{cc}.$
- \checkmark Agent *i* observes (y_i, z) and choose $\tilde{u}_i = \tilde{g}_i(y_i, z)$.
- \checkmark The performance is measured by the same cost.

Problem Statement

Assume (A1) and (A2) are held. Then, choose decision rules $\tilde{g} = (\tilde{g}_1, \dots, \tilde{g}_n)$ for all agents to minimize $\tilde{J}(\tilde{g}) = \mathbb{E}^{\tilde{g}}[c(x, \tilde{u})]$.

Results

It can be solved the same way as Radner solved it.

Theorem (An extension of Radner's Solution)

The optimal decision rules for this problem are given by

$$\tilde{u}_i = \bar{K}_i(y_i - \bar{y}_i) + \bar{L}_i(z - \bar{z}) + H_i\bar{x}, \quad \forall i \in N;$$

$$\begin{bmatrix} \bar{K} \\ \bar{L} \end{bmatrix} := \begin{bmatrix} K_1 \\ \vdots \\ \bar{K}_n \\ \bar{L}_1 \\ \vdots \\ \bar{L}_n \end{bmatrix} = -\bar{\Gamma}^{-1}\bar{\eta}$$

Theorem (An extension of Radner's Solution)

$$\bar{\eta} := \text{vec}(\eta, P_1\Theta_c, \dots, P_n\Theta_c)$$
 and

$$\bar{\Gamma} \coloneqq \begin{bmatrix} \Gamma & \bar{\Gamma}_{12}^{ij} \\ \bar{\Gamma}_{21}^{ij} & \bar{\Gamma}_{22}^{ij} \end{bmatrix}$$

where, $\bar{\Gamma}_{12}^{ij} := [\Sigma_{ic} \otimes R_{ij}], \ \bar{\Gamma}_{21}^{ij} := [\Sigma_{cj} \otimes R_{ij}], \ and \ \bar{\Gamma}_{11}^{ij} := [\Sigma_{cc} \otimes R_{ij}].$ Moreover, the optimal cost \bar{J}^* is given by

$$\bar{J}^* = -\bar{\eta}^{\dagger} \bar{\Gamma}^{-1} \bar{\eta} - \bar{x}^{\dagger} P^{\dagger} R^{-1} P \bar{x}.$$

Then the effect of the link can be found from the following equation.

$$J^* - \bar{J}^* = \bar{\eta}^T \bar{\Gamma}^{-1} \bar{\eta} - \eta^T \Gamma^{-1} \eta = \bar{\eta}^T \bar{\Gamma}_d \bar{\eta}$$

Positive definiteness of Γ_d can be obtained with the same method as Radner(1962).

Evaluation

In above theorem broadcasting a common information to every agent decreases the optimal cost but, the linear equation which has to be solved is of a higher order.

- ✓ Common information approach
- ✓ Hierarchical approach

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Theorem (Common information approach)

The optimal decision rules for this problem are given by

$$\tilde{u}_i = \tilde{K}_i(y_i - \tilde{y}_i) + H_i \tilde{x}, \quad \forall i \in N;$$

$$\tilde{K} := \begin{bmatrix} \tilde{K}_1 \\ \vdots \end{bmatrix} = \tilde{\Gamma}^{-1} \tilde{\alpha}$$

$$\tilde{K} := \begin{bmatrix} K_1 \\ \vdots \\ \tilde{K}_n \end{bmatrix} = -\tilde{\Gamma}^{-1}\tilde{\eta}$$

where
$$\tilde{\eta} := \text{vec}(P_1 \tilde{\Theta}_1, \dots, P_n \tilde{\Theta}_n), \ \tilde{\Theta}_i := \mathbb{E}[xy_i^{\mathsf{T}}|z], \ \tilde{\Gamma} = [\tilde{\Sigma}_{ij} \otimes R_{ij}], \ \tilde{\Sigma}_{ij} = \mathbb{E}[y_i y_i^{\mathsf{T}}|z]$$

Moreover, the optimal cost \tilde{J}^* is given by

$$J^* = -\tilde{\eta}^{\mathsf{T}} \tilde{\Gamma}^{-1} \tilde{\eta} - \bar{x} P^{\mathsf{T}} R^{-1} P \bar{x} - \text{Tr}(\Theta_c \Sigma_{cc}^{-1} \Theta_c^{\mathsf{T}} P^{\mathsf{T}} R^{-1} P)$$

Results

Theorem (Hierarchical approach)

The optimal decision rules for common information problem are given by

$$\tilde{u}_i = K_i(y_i - \bar{y}_i) + L_i(z - \bar{z}) + H_i\bar{x}, \quad \forall i \in N;$$

where

$$L = -\Gamma_L^{-1}(\eta_c - \Gamma_c \tilde{\Gamma}^{-1} \tilde{\eta})$$

where $\Gamma_L = [(\Sigma_{cc} \otimes R_{ij})_{ij}], \ \Gamma_c = [(\Sigma_{cj} \otimes R_{ij})_{ij}],$ $\eta_c := \operatorname{vec}(P_1 \Theta_c, \dots, P_n \Theta_c).$

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example

A decentralized estimation problem

- \checkmark n sensors. x and y_i are zero mean. Let w_0, w_1, \dots, w_n be independent Gaussian random variables with distribution $\mathcal{N}(0, \Sigma_{w_i})$.
- \checkmark Assume local information of each agent is obtained by $y_i = C_i x + w_i$.
- ✓ Minimize the following performance with cross terms


$$c(x, u_1, \dots, u_n) = \sum_{i=1}^n (x - u_i)^{\mathsf{T}} R_{ii}(x - u_i) + \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{j=1, j \neq i}^n (u_i - u_j)^{\mathsf{T}} R_{ij}(u_i - u_j)$$

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


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Solution

Following common information approach the optimal decision rules are given by

$$u_i = \tilde{K}_i(y_i - \tilde{y}_i) + H_i\tilde{x}$$

where

$$\tilde{K} = \tilde{\Gamma}_e^{-1} \tilde{\eta}_e$$

$$L = \begin{bmatrix} \sum_{j=1}^{n} R_{1j} & -R_{12} & \cdots & -R_{1n} \\ \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ -R_{n1} & -R_{n2} & \cdots & \sum_{j=1}^{n} R_{nj} \end{bmatrix}^{-1} \begin{bmatrix} R_{11} \\ \vdots \\ R_{nn} \end{bmatrix} = R^{-1}R_d$$

$$\tilde{\Gamma}_e := \begin{bmatrix} \tilde{\Sigma}_{11} \otimes \sum_{j=1}^n R_{1j} & -\tilde{\Sigma}_{12} \otimes R_{12} & \cdots & -\tilde{\Sigma}_{1n} \otimes R_{1n} \\ \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ -\tilde{\Sigma}_{n1} \otimes R_{n1} & -\tilde{\Sigma}_{n2} \otimes R_{n2} & \cdots & \tilde{\Sigma}_{nn} \otimes \sum_{j=1}^n R_{nj} \end{bmatrix}$$

 Γ_e is strictly diagonally dominant. So by circle theorem it is positive definite. The optimal cost J^* is given by

$$J^* = -\tilde{\eta}_e^{\mathsf{T}} \tilde{\Gamma}_e^{-1} \tilde{\eta}_e - \text{Tr}(\Sigma_x C_0^{\mathsf{T}} (C_0 \Sigma_x C_0^{\mathsf{T}})^{-1} C_0 \Sigma_x R_d^{\mathsf{T}} R^{-1} R_d) + \text{Tr}(\sum_{i=1}^n R_{ii} \Sigma_x)$$

Table : Cost function

| Cost matrix | With common info | Without common info |
|-------------|------------------|---------------------|
| | 18.655 | 22.244 |
| | 17.968 | 21.4807 |
| | 17.135 | 20.8493 |

Conclusion

- \checkmark Value of common information in a LQG system.
- \checkmark Two methods to compute the optimal strategy performance.
 - ✓ Common Information Approach: Means and covariance of the observations are the conditional means and covariance given the realization of the common information.
 - ✓ Hierarchical Structure Approach: For high-dimensional (e.g., a video) observations. Communicating corrective terms instead of the common observations.

Future Works:

- ✓ Which link is the best to broadcast?
- ✓ Dynamic Team Problem

Thank you!