

# Risky

# Evolution

*understanding what may bite you with an infosec & privacy focused  
risk framework*

# AusCERT 2025 Tutorial

Supporting slides and notes for attendees only

# Contact

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# Acknowledgement of Country

*We acknowledge the traditional owners and custodians of country throughout Australia and acknowledge their continuing connection to land, waters and community. We pay our respects to the people, the cultures and the elders past, present and emerging.*


# Guidelines for this session

- If you have questions or example to work through, note them and I'll pause periodically in the first half for Q&A.
- If you need a clarification on something, please say it then and there.
- If I'm not loud enough, etc, let me know.  
I try and cater for all types of human-data-ingestion but don't know your type... so let me know!
- Chatham house rules here – please respect each other's privacy and confidentiality
- As always, let's keep it polite between everyone.

# Target Audience

- Already have an idea of cybersecurity and privacy concepts
- Want to **understand how** to either start/**build** a cybersec focused **risk framework** for their organization...
- ...and (even if you already have one) use it well and integrate with the rest of the organisation

# Agenda



# Terms of Reference

- cybersecurity - in these slides will just refer to cybersec / infosec / privacy, unless I'm clearly splitting them out
- Privacy is (of client, not of self)... we'll split it out as we come to it, mostly in the framework side of things



# Policy

- Like the rest of infosec, if you don't have it under a policy, you can't do much about it.
- Check for clashes between infosec and other risk statements in policy throughout your organisation
- Policy and risk tolerance comes from Board level.

# Why?



- Why do we want to quantify the risks?
  - We humans are pretty bad at identifying and quantifying risk
  - You can't improve on something if you can't measure it.
  - You can't mitigate a risk if you can't quantify it and break it down.
  - Prove you're doing something about something
    - Regulatory
    - Audit
  - You can ask for money to fix things without a business case

# What is risk?

- Something bad happening
- The [possibility/chance] of [thing] being exposed to something (bad) happening and will be have a [consequence/impact]
  - What is ‘thing’ here... could be a person, the organization... but as infosec we can see it as “information asset”
- Exposed to risk as children... mostly parents guided your view of risk
- flip it, it’s an opportunity


# Measure it

- Assets & owners
- Likelihoods
- Consequence & Impacts
- Velocity
- Threats



# Assets & Owners

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# Likelihood / Probability

- hmm

Likelihood	Probability	Description
Rare	< 15 %	Only likely in exceptional circumstances and unlikely to occur in the next five years
Unlikely	15 - 40 %	Not likely to occur, but may occur in the next three years
Possible	41 - 65 %	May occur within two years
Probable	66 - 85 %	Has happen in the past and/or could happen in the next year
Almost Certain	> 85 %	Happens from time to time and/or could happen in the next six months

# Consequence / Impact

Risk Category	Descriptive Note
CATASTROPHIC	Critical event/circumstance with potentially disastrous impact on business sustainability
MAJOR	Critical event or circumstance that can be endured with proper management
MODERATE	Significant event or circumstance that can be managed under normal conditions
MINOR	Event with consequences that can be readily absorbed but requires management effort to minimise the impact
INSIGNIFICANT	Some loss but immaterial. Existing controls & procedures should cope with event or circumstance

# Velocity

- Not so relevant in our industry, as most cybersecurity ‘events’ would be classed as “very rapid” in most enterprise risk velocity tables
- Included here to think about, as some consequences may take longer to manifest, or multiple instances, such as reputational damage.
- Definitely need to think to interface with Ent Risk Mgmt

Indication of the speed of onsite or the time it takes the organisation to feel the effects (consequence) once risk manifests

Velocity	Rating	Description
	Very Rapid	Very rapid onset, little/no warning, or instantaneous
	Rapid	Onset occurs in hours/days to < few weeks
	Moderate	Onset occurs in 1-6 months
	Slow	6+ months
	Very Slow	Year onwards



# Threats

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# STRIDE model

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From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

**STRIDE** is a model for identifying [computer security threats](#)<sup>[1]</sup> developed by Praerit Garg and [Loren Kohnfelder](#) at [Microsoft](#).<sup>[2]</sup> It provides a [mnemonic](#) for security threats in six categories.<sup>[3]</sup>

The threats are:

- [Spoofing](#)
- [Tampering](#)
- [Repudiation](#)
- Information disclosure ([privacy breach](#) or [data leak](#))
- [Denial of service](#)
- [Elevation of privilege](#)<sup>[4]</sup>

The STRIDE was initially created as part of the process of [threat modeling](#). STRIDE is a model of threats, used to help reason and find threats to a system. It is used in conjunction with a model of the target system that can be constructed in parallel. This includes a full breakdown of processes, data stores, data flows, and trust boundaries.<sup>[5]</sup>


Today it is often used by security experts to help answer the question "what can go wrong in this system we're working on?"

# Stride

Threat	Desired property	Threat Definition
Spoofing	<a href="#"><u>Authenticity</u></a>	Pretending to be something or someone other than yourself
Tampering	<a href="#"><u>Integrity</u></a>	Modifying something on disk, network, memory, or elsewhere
Repudiation	<a href="#"><u>Non-repudiability</u></a>	Claiming that you didn't do something or were not responsible; can be honest or false
Information disclosure	<a href="#"><u>Confidentiality</u></a>	Someone obtaining information they are not authorized to access
Denial of service	<a href="#"><u>Availability</u></a>	Exhausting resources needed to provide service
Elevation of privilege	<a href="#"><u>Authorization</u></a>	Allowing someone to do something they are not authorized to do

# Mitigations & Controls

- (Not going to try and suggest all the controls here today!)
- Look at all the levels – you have **natural control points between boundaries** such as between ‘people’ and ‘process’.
- Also ask the question “**why** are we (doing project / doing this)?” and see if the benefits of the identified opportunities outweigh the risk ‘costs’
- Build yourself a list of common controls for your organisation



# Risk Frameworks

# Framework

- A **framework** is a real or conceptual structure, or system of rules, intended to serve as a support or guide for the building of something that **expands** the structure **into something useful**
- Again, for those in the back, a framework is not a ‘ready thing’ that you can just use. It **needs to be formed** into something useful **for your organisation**.

# Roles & Responsibilities

## Example Structure

Position	Responsibility
Board	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Sets, monitors and approves the organisation's risk appetite statement(s)</li></ul>
Risk and Audit Committee	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Evaluates the adequacy and effectiveness of the organisation's risk management and compliance framework</li><li>• Advises Board on exposure and management of significant organisational risks</li></ul>
Governance area (Directors or Heads-of)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Provides risk services (training, facilitation, advisory) to assist (management &amp; staff) in their identification, assessment and treatment of risk</li><li>• Informs and reports to RAC</li><li>• Oversees the risk management framework</li></ul>
Management & Staff	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Manage risks in their areas of responsibility</li></ul>

# Risk Appetite & Tolerance

- Board (or equivalent) sets the risk appetite & tolerance
  - Typically done for each RMF category – see example from TransGrid

Risk No.	Principal Risks	Risk Description	Risk Appetite	Risk Tolerance
1	Health, safety & environment	There is a risk that TransGrid could have a serious health, safety and/or major environmental incident involving our workforce, or those of our contractors.	As Low As Reasonably Practicable	TransGrid has no tolerance for risks which could result in loss of life, permanent disability or significant environmental damage as a result of its activities.
			TransGrid requires all health, safety and environmental risks to be managed to as low as reasonably practicable.	
4	Protective and cyber security	There is a risk that critical IT or OT systems are subject to a cyber or physical attack.	MEDIUM	TransGrid has no tolerance for protective and cyber security risks that could result in a material safety, compliance, network reliability and/or social licence consequences.
			All protective and cyber security risks must be managed by continually enhancing insider and external threat protection, data loss prevention, system access (both logical and physical), infrastructure / site access and network strengthening. The Board accepted risk appetite for this risk is 'Medium'.	



# Risk Tolerance

Risk Rating	Tolerance / Escalation
Very High	<p><b>Unacceptable</b> / No Tolerance</p> <p>Immediate / Urgent action required</p> <p>Escalate to the / Executive Group</p>
High	<p><b>Highly Cautious</b></p> <p>Within 3 months / Action plan required</p> <p>Requires escalation to Senior Management</p>
Medium	<p><b>Tolerable</b> / Conservative</p> <p>Assess the risk and determine if current controls are adequate</p> <p>Management responsibility must be specified</p>
Low	<p><b>Acceptable</b></p> <p>Manage through routine procedures</p> <p>Unlikely to need specific application of resources.</p>
Very Low	

# Matrix

		Likelihood				
		Rare	Unlikely	Possible	Probable	Almost Certain
Consequence	Severe	Very Low	Medium	High	Very High	Very High
	Major	Very Low	Low	Medium	High	Very High
	Moderate	Very Low	Low	Medium	High	High
	Minor	Very Low	Very Low	Low	Medium	Medium
	Insignificant	Very Low	Very Low	Low	Low	Low

# Inherent Risk Summary

<i><b>Inherent Risks Summary</b></i>		Likelihood				
		Rare	Unlikely	Possible	Probable	Almost Certain
Consequence	Severe					
	Major			R01		
	Moderate			R04, R05, R06, R07, R08, R08		
	Minor				R02, R03	
	Insignificant					

# Target Risk Summary

<i><b>Inherent</b></i> <i>Risks Summary</i>		Likelihood				
		Rare	Unlikely	Possible	Probable	Almost Certain
Consequence	Severe					
	Major			R01		
	Moderate			R04, R05, R06, R07, R08, R08		
	Minor				R02, R03	
	Insignificant					

# Residual Risk Summary


<i><b>Inherent Risks Summary</b></i>		Likelihood				
		Rare	Unlikely	Possible	Probable	Almost Certain
Consequence	Severe					
	Major			R01		
	Moderate			R04, R05, R06, R07, R08, R08		
	Minor				R02, R03	
	Insignificant					

# Some Risk Frameworks

- ISO 31000
- NIST.SP.800 Risk Management Framework
- COBIT 2019
- FAIR (Factor Analysis of Information Risk)
- TARA (Threat Assessment and Remediation Analysis)

# NIST Risk Management Framework


- <https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/risk-management>
- Has a good ‘quick start’ version for ‘small enterprise’



<a href="#">Prepare</a>	Essential activities to <b>prepare</b> the organization to manage security and privacy risks
<a href="#">Categorize</a>	<b>Categorize</b> the system and information processed, stored, and transmitted based on an impact analysis
<a href="#">Select</a>	<b>Select</b> the set of NIST SP 800-53 controls to protect the system based on risk assessment(s)
<a href="#">Implement</a>	<b>Implement</b> the controls and document how controls are deployed
<a href="#">Assess</a>	<b>Assess</b> to determine if the controls are in place, operating as intended, and producing the desired results
<a href="#">Authorize</a>	Senior official makes a risk-based decision to <b>authorize</b> the system (to operate)
<a href="#">Monitor</a>	Continuously <b>monitor</b> control implementation and risks to the system

## The Seven Steps of the RMF Process

There are seven steps in the RMF process. All seven steps are required for successful execution of the RMF. The image below lists each step and their respective descriptions. While the process is shown as linear, after initial implementation, organizations can move between steps in any order, as needed.



# Links / References

Materials from this session	<a href="https://github.com/adrenalan/AusCERT2025">https://github.com/adrenalan/AusCERT2025</a>
STRIDE model	<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/STRIDE_model">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/STRIDE_model</a>
AICD cybersecurity risk links	<a href="https://www.aicd.com.au/risk-management/framework/cyber-security.html">https://www.aicd.com.au/risk-management/framework/cyber-security.html</a>
AICD cybersecurity & privacy regulation notes for Directors / SMBs	<a href="https://www.aicd.com.au/risk-management/framework/cyber-security/new-cyber-security-and-privacy-regulation.html">https://www.aicd.com.au/risk-management/framework/cyber-security/new-cyber-security-and-privacy-regulation.html</a>
ASIC note on Risk Appetite Statements	<a href="https://asic.gov.au/regulatory-resources/find-a-document/reports/corporate-governance-taskforce-director-and-officer-oversight-of-non-financial-risk-report/risk-appetite-statements">https://asic.gov.au/regulatory-resources/find-a-document/reports/corporate-governance-taskforce-director-and-officer-oversight-of-non-financial-risk-report/risk-appetite-statements</a>
ISO 31000 (wiki)	<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ISO_31000">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ISO_31000</a>
MITRE TARA	<a href="https://www.mitre.org/news-insights/publication/threat-assessment-and-remediation-analysis-tara">https://www.mitre.org/news-insights/publication/threat-assessment-and-remediation-analysis-tara</a>
NIST Risk Mgmt Framework	<a href="https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/risk-management">https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/risk-management</a>
ISACA COBIT	<a href="https://www.isaca.org/resources/cobit">https://www.isaca.org/resources/cobit</a>
FAIR institute	<a href="https://www.fairinstitute.org/what-is-fair">https://www.fairinstitute.org/what-is-fair</a>
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