Contingency Planning

Blueberry IT Consulting



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Magnus Øverbø, Robin Stenvi, Lasse T. Johansen
090832 100232 090749
Security planning and incident management
IMT 3521

Department of Computer Science and Media Technology Gjøvik University College 2012

Avdeling for informatikk og medieteknikk Høgskolen i Gjøvik Postboks 191 2802 Gjøvik

Department of Computer Science and Media Technology Gjøvik University College Box 191 N-2802 Gjøvik Norway

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Blueberry IT Consulting 2012/05/15

Executive summary

The purpose of this document is for Blueberry IT Consulting to be qualified to respond to the scenarios we have discovered and developed plans for during the course of our project. These plans will ensure that a scenario is handled efficiently without endangering human life, business function, classified information or compromising potential evidence. Though, for this to be the case it will require full cooperation of the entire staff, spearheaded by the leaders. Without sufficient backing from the leaders of Blueberry IT these plans would potentially do more harm than good, which is why we emphasize this part of the implementation process.

We started out by mapping Blueberry ITs business functions, procedures, existing policies and guidelines before we analyzed our findings and documented all threats and business functions related to Blueberry ITs business processes. This continued with weighting and analyzing Blueberry ITs business functions and each threats impact on the business. These two analysis is correlated and prioritized in the "Scenario Priority Document" which is used to decide which scenarios is to be developed further.

Then we performed a deep analysis of each of the top ten scenarios from the "Scenario Priority Document", which led to the development of the plans according to the subordinate plan classification, section 3.6.

Due to Blueberry ITs organizational size we set on developing the top ten scenarios from the "Scenario Priority Document". This would secure Blueberry IT from the ten most important scenarios in addition to avoid overwhelming them with plans which needs training and maintenance.

The plans is a result of careful consideration of Blueberry ITs internal and external business functions and policies. This ended up with an external document which is left out of the BCP document since it could cause conflicts during an incident.

We have finished developing plans for three of the ten different scenarios, due to the time limitations of the project. This means there is still seven scenarios left which it has to be developed plans for.

The plans we have developed so far is described in the "subordinate plan classification", section 3.6; "Unauthorized installation of software", "Flood" and "Phishing attack". Within these plans we have made incident and disaster response plans for 'Unauthorized installation of software" and "Flood", for the "Phishing Attack" we only developed a incident response plan since this particular scenario would after an incident cross over to becoming a different scenario.

The result of this document will help Blueberry IT Consulting with responding to incidents and disaster way more efficiently than before. This plan will also ensure that Blueberry IT Consulting will withstand serious blows to their business functions and still be able to resume business functions in a relatively short time. Much due to the mutual agreement with Strawberry Inc. in case one of them loose their main working facilities.

Of course all of this depends on proper management, initiative and implementation of the developed plans.

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1 Business Description

Blueberry IT Consulting was founded in April of 2005 by 10 students exiting from GUC and is a small company specializing in risk assessment of small and medium business'. The founders of Blueberry IT Consulting exited from GUC with their primary fields within IT, ranging from Information Security to Network Administration.

1.1 Business overview

In the beginning Blueberry consulted small businesses in the local area, and assisted newly founded businesses to establish security policies, guidelines and procedures. In addition Blueberry also provided services for installation and revision of the existing IT-systems in these businesses .

After three years of managing small businesses in Oppland, Buskerud and Hedmark, Blueberry stated a new vision to expand their marketplace in 2008. The vision was and still is to "Help the business in need of technical or organizational help". To comply with this vision Blueberry expanded their staff, and today it consists of over 30 employees which include receptionists and third party contractors. After the change Blueberry saw the opportunity to undertake projects in the centralized parts of Norway and Sweden, and as a result of this they expanded their geographical marketplace as well. An overview of their current employee hierarchy is displayed in figure 1.




Figure 1: Organizational hierarchy

Blueberry's primary focus is set on the organizational aspects of the financial and service categories where they perform risk assessments of both the technical and HR aspect. The work information Blueberry ITs employees produce is stored and processed on Blueberry's in-house IT-systems since they have adequate security in place to maintain confidentiality, integrity and availability(CIA).

Blueberry's headquarter is located by the waterfront in Gjøvik's prime real estate area. They work in the building along with several other firms, but they lease the entire 2nd floor for themselves. The other personnel in the building stems from several small local business firms, which

shares the third floor, the 4th floor is occupied by a telecommunications branch from Telenor AS. In addition the 1st floor serves as a public area with several conference rooms.

During business hours the facility is controlled by a security guard which controls the public access for any visitors. The outside perimeter is monitored by CCTV cameras running on a 7 day loop before they're deleted. The camera feed is in addition continuously streamed to the guards monitoring station inside the building, along with the recording station which is placed in a secure location on site. The access control system is integrated throughout the entire building and requires a security card along with a six digit, personal passkey.

1.2 Assets

Blueberry IT maintain their own in-house IT-system and file storage so they can personally secure their clients information and provide online services to their employees. Their assets include both internal and external assets, in-house server farm, applications and hardware, emergency generator, renovation and printer service.

The external security service is provided by Securitas, which consists of CCTV-surveillance, security guard, access control and alarm system. Blueberry also has other external assets which is data and telecommunication services from Telenor, renovation, cleaning, power and food delivery.

The ISP provides the necessary and redundant communication lines for Internet and telephone service. It is also a public renovation service for water, sewage and trash, which results in an increased risk of throwing out confidential information. The cleaning crew which is hired from reliable firms and recommended by others companies, cleans the entire building for all companies located there. The power company supplies the entire building with a single electrical feed. Since the building doesn't have a redundant power supply it is critical that they have an emergency generator for running the critical systems.

Information: Database information, employee contracts, consulting contracts, documentation, manuals, procedures, incident response plans, business continuity plans, client data and information, personal information, employee records, finance records, software licenses and other physical media.

Software: Applications, software, development and in-house software.

Physical property: Laptops, smartphones, server farm, UPS, access point, physical inventory, file cabinets, office supplies and other equipment.

Services: Data and communication services and client consultation.

Employees: Services, experience, information and knowledge.

Reputation: Blueberry ITs reputation in the public domain, the clients reputation.

External services: Third party contractors, electric power supplier, emergency generator, Internet service provider, security service, CCTV, access control system, food delivery, renovation service, external data storage, external physical storage and printer service.

1.3 Business procedures and processes

With many different aspects of information security as their daily job, it is expected that Blueberry has a good security culture for maintaining the basic principles of CIA. The section that follows describes Blueberry's main procedures, including their basic safety procedures.

1.3.1 Risk management process

Blueberry's risk management process is based on the books "Principles of Incident Response and Disaster Recovery" [1] and "Principles of Information Security" [2]. Blueberry IT also relies on certain guides and standards like NSM-ROS, [3], and ISO 27005, [4]. This divides Blueberry's process into two main parts; identification and control.

Establishing project

When Blueberry get a project they have a brief overview meeting with the business to estimate the capacity, time and settlements needed to complete the task in hand. When the parts settles on a project the consultant from Blueberry and the business signs a contract for the work to be done. This also dictates the rules, the consequences and the scope of the project. In addition to put an estimate for total fee for the entire project Blueberry charges a start-up fee for the project until they reach the presentation of the security breach report. The finance services is handled by the accountant at Blueberry ITs office, which involves processing and storing the information on the local finance systems.

After this Blueberry establishes a repository on their in-house systems which acts like a dossier for the project. This is where all documentation, log-files, information and reports is stored during and after the project is complete. After this in-house procedure the consultant gathers the necessary employees of the business to participate in the the project. Then they hold a meeting where they gather the current business information corresponding to the the projects scope. Dependent on the contract, the business' information will be temporary stored on Blueberry's SVN server for easy access to the consultant.

Discovering security breaches

At the information gathering meeting they establish a timeline for the project which contains the outline of the project, including tasks, deadlines and milestones. After this meeting they categorise and document their findings and future tasks on the Blueberry server. Even though the consultant from Blueberry does the most work and has the responsibility for the project, the whole team is part of the process of risk control and decision-making processes. The next step after the initial meeting is to continue digging deeper into each part of the project, which means getting access to even more information. After each part of the project the team documents their findings according to the scope of their project and have a brief meeting internally with the team.

Security breach report

When they are done reviewing the current state of the business they create a final report of their findings and present the findings for the business' board of directors. Depending on the projects scope, the job might be finished or the team might have to develop countermeasures for their findings. The next part of this is to develop and implement solutions to the discovered security breaches. At this stage Blueberry IT charges the client for the work done this far.

Developing solutions

This stage involves in-depth interviews with employees to gain knowledge about each function of the business. These interviews are meant to discover the business' assets and their related classification, but also to identify the threats related to the assets. All these procedures boils

down to being able to implement the correct solutions in the right order.

Solution report

At this point the team has developed the necessary solutions and ordered them by the factor of criticality to the business' functions. They then document and present their findings to the board of directors so it can be decided which countermeasures to implement. When Blueberry has presented the solution report they charge the client for the work done so far.

Implementation

Depending on the contract Blueberry might not be a part of this. The implementation procedures is divided into two parts, implementation and testing. The first part is to implement the solution according to the policy, guidelines and technical demands set by the business, followed by testing the solutions durability and resilience. After the tests are run they evaluate the solutions effect and plan accordingly.

Hand-over

The final stage after testing the solutions effect is to train and pass the systems on to the business. If this is a technical solution employees must be instructed and trained to use it correctly. If it instead is an organizational aspect employees must be informed, and properly trained to act accordingly to the new policies, guidelines and procedures.

All training and guides is documented and placed on the servers at Blueberry for safekeeping and easy access in case it is needed at a later date. In addition to the guides, etc., all needed documentation is handed over from Blueberry to the business.

After this final stage in the business process they charge the employer for their total outstanding fee and hands over the work.

Clean-up

After a project is done the cleanup procedure takes effect. This involves removing access rights to Blueberry's network, securely removing all files stated in the contract, securely removing all hard copies and storage devices, and making sure all access rights to the clients information systems is severed.

In the light of this it is clear that Blueberry ITs most important business functions is their ability to manage the project management system and their ability to manage invoicing. The different departments dependencies of Blueberry IT is shown in figure 2. This shows that the consulting department depends on several business functions described in table 2

1.3.2 Internal Procedures

Visitors: Visitation to Blueberry ITs offices is only allowed by appointment and upon entry and exit they have to sign the visitor protocol in the guard booth at the first floor. Then when a visitor is on the premises he/she should always be escorted around the premises due to security reasons.

Callers: All calls to Blueberry is in general answered and forwarded by the receptionist. It is the receptionists job, among else, to keep track of meetings, visitors and calls. All calls are registered in a call log.

Customer management: Blueberry IT gives their customers superb support through their help-




Figure 2: Dependencies between business functions and the different departments.

desk and analysts since it is imperative to keep a professional relationship with the customer. This involves full helpdesk support during normal business hours and access to all documentation during and after the project is ended.

Managing invoices: After each finished project stage the accountant is informed of the current outstanding payment. The accountant then creates an invoice and sends it to the customer. The accountant is also responsible for overseeing Blueberry ITs taxes, finances and expenditures.

Destruction/removal of information: All restricted and confidential information, see section 1.3.4, should be securely deleted from the system. If the information generated from one medium is to be archived it should be securely transferred to the archive and then permanently deleted from the medium. When private or confidential information is transferred between two points, it is by policy required to use a secure form for transmission. Management of public information that in large quantities can be perceived as private or confidential information should be treated as such.

1.3.3 External Procedures

Visitors and delivery Visitors and deliveries arrive first to the security guard on the first floor, which is then met or picked up by an employee from Blueberry.

Guard The guard is serviced by Securitas, which is a well known security provider for businesses and home-owners. They provide 24/7 CCTV, daytime guard-service and full shell security. The guard has access to the entire place except the server room, even at night time.

Janitor/cleaning services The janitor/cleaning services is hired from reliable sources and provide the necessary maintenance of the building. The janitor oversee everything from the generator to the plumbing in the building. This means he has access to every floor in the building excluding the server room, because of their employee status they have access only during business hours.

1.3.4 Asset classifications

Public: Information and assets which is legally distributed/available and otherwise non-threatening to the company or its customers. This is for example information distributed through Blue-

berry ITs website and information used in PR-campaigns.

Restricted: This is information and assets which is not critically threatening to the business, but is not meant to be available for public viewing. Disclosure of this information will yield minimal impact on the company's daily operations, but will result in a breach of trust either with the public or customers. This involves work schedules, superficial business information and other non-sensitive materials.

Confidential: Information and assets which is sensitive, business critical or otherwise legally obliged to be held confidential. Disclosure of this information will impact Blueberry IT in a way which disrupts or or threatens the company's daily operations. This involves, among else, information related to the privacy act, business procedures, and client information.

1.4 Network and security

Blueberry IT is a big target for crackers and espionage, this drove Blueberry ITs to the decision of hosting their own in-house information system, excluding the secure off-site back-up solution. Due to this they're now able to promise their customers a secure storage of information in compliance with the principles of confidentiality, integrity and availability(CIA).

1.4.1 Network

The company hosts their own web services inside the building. Maintenance of these services and the rest of the network is the responsibility of Blueberry's own IT department. The company network is divided in two parts; the internal network, and the Demilitarized Zone(DMZ). Connection between the two zones is at a minimum, and connections should always be initiated from the internal network which is handled by the network firewall.

To detect suspicious traffic, an NIDS(Network Intrusion Detection System) is placed on the internal network before the internal firewall. That way they will be able to log traffic in the sensitive area, and not be overwhelmed by traffic in the DMZ(Demilitarized Zone).

The internal network consists of a database server where information about customers and projects is stored. The network also has a VPN server because a lot of the consultants is working away from the office. The rest of the network consists of work machines, and a wireless network. The database server is only accessible from the cabled and not the wireless internal network. The internal network also consists of a file server which is used as a subversion repository, when the consultants work together on a project.

Blueberry IT have placed the web-server, DNS-server and the e-mail server in the DMZ. A simple overview of the network topology is presented in figure 3.

The database server contains a lot of information about customers and saved projects. This is highly sensitive information and access is based on a "need to know" basis. For example the receptionist has access to name, phone numbers etc, but not specific detail about what kind of tests was run against a specific business.

The VPN server is the only way into the internal network from the outside, and it has to be properly secured. Only the people who absolutely need it will have access to VPN. So all the consultants who work away from the office will have access, but accountants for example will not have access unless it is during special circumstances.




Figure 3: Simple overview of the network topology

1.4.2 Rules and regulations

The company have strict routines for mobile devices. Smart phones or tablets should never contain restricted or confidential information. Laptops is used a lot in the job, which means they contain restricted and confidential information. For this reason, the whole laptop is set up with full disk encryption by the IT department before the employee receives the computer.

USB sticks are a vital part of Blueberry ITs daily business and because these sticks are small and easy too loose, the same procedure applies to these as with laptops. Because of this it is the IT-departments job to set up and distribute USB-stick to the employees, and keep track of them. Personal USB sticks are allowed to be used, but not to store any business information. The only place employees can store business information is on media approved by the Blueberry ITs IT-department.

All employees is required to properly secure their work equipment as a part of the employee contract they have signed with the company. In return the company promises to give adequate education on how to secure their equipment. This kind of security measures includes anti-virus, secure communication, physical security, clear-desk policy and other relevant topics. These rules is set by the Blueberry ITs security policy and guidelines.

Blueberry IT have an incremental daily backup strategy and a complete back-up each Friday night. These back-ups is stored both on site and off site. The off site storage facility is at a secure third party service provider, which complies with the same policies and legislative demands as Blueberry IT.

1.4.3 Physical security

As said previously, the place is divided in two parts, the first floor which is shared amongst other companies and the second floor which contains the offices and server room. Figure 4 shows the overview of how the second floor floor plan looks like.

Physical access to the premises is, like everything else, based on a "need to know" basis. The figure is color coded where yellow means an open area where customer and other may be. Green is restricted to the employees of the company. Pink is restricted to some employees. Most




Figure 4: Schematic of the office space

of the office is very open, except the server-room, so people can walk around. The server room is only accessible by Blueberry ITs IT-department.

2 Business Contingency Planning Policy

Purpose

The purpose of this policy is to set the tasks Blueberry IT Consulting is required to perform. This is in order for Blueberry to be in compliance with both legislative and ethical demands. In addition this policy sets the framework for fronting the development, maintenance and training of business continuity plans.

Scope

The scope of this policy applies to all planning committees within Blueberry IT and other parties involved in the Business Contingency Planning procedures. The policy dictates the main guidelines for performing, delegating and initiating the contingency planning within each department of Blueberry IT as well as Blueberry ITs centralized contingency planning committee. The policy is a part of Blueberry ITs main information security policy and is distributed along with that. The Info.sec policy is classified as an internal document and is freely distributed amongst Blueberry IT Consulting employees.

Funding

- Blueberry IT is required to set aside 25% of their profits to Business Continuity development and training.
- The business continuity budget is divided as follows:

20%: is set aside in a separate account as an emergency fund in case of a disaster strikes.

30%: is used for revision of the current plans

50%: is used for business continuity training.

• The task of delegating this money is the responsibility of the CFO

Organization

- The CEO is responsible for electing the Chief Business Continuity Planning Officer(CBCPO), from the following employees; Senior Prod. Manager, IT Consultants, IT Manager, SysAdmin, Chief Tech. Officer
- The CBCPO is the leader for the contingency planning management committee(CPMC)
- The CBCPOs is responsible for leading, monitoring and fronting the development of the Business Contingency Planning.
- The CBCPO is required to elect a BCP leader within each of the company's departments.
- The department BCP leader is a part of the main CPMC.
- The department BCP leader is in charge of its incident, disaster and business continuity planning committees.
- The department BCP leader is responsible for establishing the different planning committees within the department

• The CBCPO is responsible for supervising all departments development and maintenance of business continuity plans.

Training

- The Chief Management Officer(CMO) is required to implement measures to ensure user awareness in compliance with business contingency plans.
- The CMO is required to annually hold a mandatory in-house security seminar.
- During the security seminar all employees is guided through the different incident detection plans.
- The Chief Technical Officer(CTO) is required to send out a weekly e-mail regarding information security and contingency planning.
- The CBCPO is required to perform a structured walk-through or simulation for each scenario which endangers human life.
- The CBCPO is required to perform a structured walk-through or simulation for each of the ten incident response plans.
- All other contingency plans is to be annually executed as a "chalk talk" by the departments planning committee and supervised by the departments BCP leader.
- Special procedures during an incident is required to be executed as a training scenarios at certain intervals by the BCPO.
 - Every 6 months: Fire drill and emergency evacuation drills
 - Annually: Emergency shutdown of IT-systems
 - Each quarter: Test of information back-up system

Revision and development

- The CBCPO is responsible for developing and maintaining the Business Contingency Planning Policy
- The CBCPO is responsible for developing and maintaining the external "Scenario Priority Document"
- All attacks which has reasonable chance to endanger human life is automatically prioritized highest in the "Scenario Priority Document"
- The CPMC is responsible for developing and maintaining the business impact analysis.
- The department BCP leader is responsible for leading the development and maintenance of the contingency plans
- The department BCP leader is responsible for annually leading the revision of business contingency plans.
- Business continuity plans is required to be revised annually by the departments corresponding planning committee.
- The Business Impact Analysis is required to be revised annually by the CPMC.
- The "Business Continuity Planning Policy" is required to be revised annually by the CPMC.
- The CEO is responsible for the annually revision of the "salvage priority list".
- The CFO/Operations Office is responsible for the quarterly revision of the telephone register and equipment placement register.

3 Business Impact Analysis

The business impact analysis(BIA) is divided into six parts, where the first part is the analysis of the risk each threat poses to Blueberry IT. This is followed by the Business Unit Analysis(BUA) which indicates how the business would suffer under the loss of a business function. The following table, table 1, is an overview of the different attack scenarios from the weighted business risk analysis(WBRA), followed by a detailed description of our weighting. The next table, table 3.2, is an overview of the different business functions Blueberry IT provide and how it would impact if it is lost. This is followed by a description of our weighting.

When this analysis is done we developed an external document which correlates the information from the WBRA and WBUA and gives a list of the scenarios of the highest priority. The top ten scenarios, from the "Scenario Priority Document", is then listed in this document depicting the reasons for choosing them and if they've been fully developed.

This section is followed by a detailed examination of the scenarios impact on Blueberry's functions and assets, before their "worst", "best" and "most likely" scenario to occur is described. Finally it is decided which plans to develop for each of the scenarios in section 3.6.

3.1 Weighted Business Risk Analysis

The WBRA describes each scenario which was discovered during the risk assessment. The two main categories are weighted equally with a 50-50 split between "probability" and "consequence", though the "consequence" is subdivided into "damage cost" and "repair cost" with a total weight of 50%. The "repair cost" is weighted at 30% since the repair cost involves larger sums since it will involve upgrading equipment and future expenses. The "damage cost" is weighted at 20% since the damage cost is one single blow to the economy, but since it is all part of the consequence will the difference not be larger than 20%. Each threat scenario is followed by a short description which describes the weights it's been given. Prioritization of each scenario is covered in the appendix and is base upon which resources is most valuable to the company. This means that preservation of human life is prioritized above any other scenario. The template which is utilized for the WBRA is extrapolated from table 2-2[5] in the book "Principles of Incident Response and Disaster Recovery".

Weighted Risk Analysis					
Threat	Probability	Damage	Repair	Total	
		cost	cost		
Weighted score:	0.5	0.2	0.3	1.0	
	0,5	0,7	0,8	0,63	
Information leakage					
High damage high risk. It also have a high cost because it is					
difficult to discover and repair.					
Continuing on next page					

Weig	hted Risk Analy	siscontinued		
	Probability (0.5)	Damage cost (0.2)	Repair cost (0.3)	Total (1.0)
Social engineering attack via e-mail	0,8	0,4	0,3	0,57
	spam-filter, bu because of rou	ıt it would mos	t likely cause n	go through the ninimal damage
Destruction of project management system	0,2	0,8	0,9	0,53
	ment system i the damage co	s low, though a st is high. The i	in the case of s repair cost of th	project manage- uch an incident is incident is ex- lace and restore
Flood	0,5	0,6	0,5	0,52
	The chances for a flood to occur is moderate, and the damage cost to business for inability to properly function is moderate. The repair cost is low since the flood doesn't directly affect them on the second floor.			
Unauthorized software installation	0,6	0,5	0,4	0,52
	The probability for this act is low, but it will usually take time and resources to repair.			
Loss of information	0,5	0,4	0,5	0,48
	This is not uncommon since information is often transported by portable storage mediums and on paper. The damage cost is moderate since storage mediums is encrypted and papers doesn't contain sensitive information. Repair cost is moderate since Blueberry must initiate an investigation and then implement proper counter measures.			
Lightning	0,3	0,7	0,6	0,47
	The chances for this incident to occur is low due to in-place countermeasures. The damage cost is high because all of Blueberry ITs IT-systems is connected to the infrastructure. Repair cost is also high since they need to repair and restore their systems.			
Worm on the internal network	0,3	0,7	0,6	0,47
	With strict access routines and well educated staff, the likelihood is small, the damage however could be very severe. It would take a moderate amount of time and resources to fix the network.			
Water leakage	0,3	0,7	0,6	0,47
		ı. Both in exter	rnal costs and r	convenient when resources wasted uing on next page

Weig	hted Risk Analy	siscontinued		
	Probability (0.5)	Damage cost (0.2)	Repair cost (0.3)	Total (1.0)
Destruction of the buildings structure	0,4	0,5	0,5	0,45
	the damage is and business f	moderate since functionality. T	e it will result it he repair cost i	and the costs of n lost work time is also moderate ong with a split
Unauthorized access to wireless network	0,5	0,4	0,4	0,45
		network is ve		lerately easy to nd would prob-
Destruction of finance system	0,2	0,7	0,7	0,45
	when it occurs	s the damage is billing informa significantly h	s high due to lo tion. The cost o	ever happen, but loss of customers of repairing this restoration and
Loss of user equipment	0,6	0,3	0,3	0,45
Fire	equipment. The equipment wh	ne damage cost	is moderate si e repair cost is	ak or loose their ince its only the s also moderate
The	The likelihood damage cost is	for a fire to constant the state of the stat	occur is extrem repair cost is re	ely low, but the eal high, but not dlord is respons-
Unauthorized access to work laptop	0,4	0,6	0,4	0,44
A A	via malware. I	It does contain s	sensitive inform	attack vector is nation and could uld be large.
Accidental deletion of data	be used to further attacks so the damage could be large. 0,7			
Sabotage of access control equipment	0,5	0,4	0,3	0,42
	Sabotaging the access control system is probable since there is many able to access it. The damage cost is moderate, and the repair cost is low since it is an external service.			
Sabotage of project and finance system	0,3	0,3	0,7	0,42
-	I	1	Contin	uing on next page

Weig	hted Risk Analy	siscontinued		
	Probability (0.5)	Damage cost (0.2)	Repair cost (0.3)	Total (1.0)
				not very likely.
				is properly se-
	cured and moi	nitored. The rep	air cost is high	due to the work
	needed to rest	ore and improv	ve the security,	along with pur-
	suing the incid	lent.		
Hard-disk on backup server crashes	0,4	0,3	0,5	0,41
	The backup pr	ocedures are re	dundant which	make sure that
				re based on time
	and resources	spent.		
Unauthorized access to file server	0,3	0,7	0,4	0,41
	The file serve	r is placed sect	urely on the ir	iternal network
				ain sensitive in-
				ne wrong hands.
	-	d make it easy		
Functional bugs in 3rd party soft-	0,6	0,2	0,2	0,40
ware				
	These kind of	hugs might ha	ve a slight imp	act on the busi-
	ness, but it will most likely be corrected fast and it will be			
	barely noticea		se con coccu jun	
Theft of finances	0,3	0,6	0,4	0,39
				pen either by er-
				is high since it
				y of large faults
				he repair cost is
				revision of the
	accounting an		in a complete	reviolent of the
Sabotage of physical documents	0,4	0,3	0,4	0,38
bubblings of physical accuments		'		ents is moderate
				net in the office.
				ents are low, but
				done a complete
	check of the in		ice it mas to be	aone a complete
Unauthorized access to database	0,3	0,7	0,3	0,38
Ondationzed decess to database				ternal network.
				reputation, but
		d mean that it i		
Unauthorized access to VPN ac-	0,3	0,4	0.5	0,38
count	0,3	0,4	0,3	0,30
<u> </u>	The biggest att	tack vector here	is weak passwo	ords which there
				rmediate attack
		cker could use i		
Web site defacement	0,3	0,5	0,4	0,37
THE SILE GERGERICH	0,0			uing on next page
			Contin	and on next page

Weig	hted Risk Analy	siscontinued			
	Probability (0.5)	Damage cost (0.2)	Repair cost (0.3)	Total (1.0)	
				out would cause	
				ompany is in se-	
		t to repair wou	ld be small bec	ause of extensive	
	backups.				
Accidental removal of critical equipment	0,3	0,5	0,4	0,37	
	The probabilit	y that this erro	r will occur is l	ow, but mistakes	
	do happen. Th	e impact of thi	s will be moder	ate because crit-	
	ical equipment or information storage devices will be una				
	counted for, but only temporary lost and not stolen.				
Unauthorized physical access to restricted areas	0,2	0,6	0,5	0,37	
	These areas h	as enhanced se	curity, which	in return makes	
				ss control system	
	higher.				
Unauthorized physical access to	0,2	0,6	0,5	0,37	
Blueberry's internal facilities	-,-	-,-		-,-,	
	The areas wit	⊥ hin Blueberry's	office is also s	secured with en-	
	The areas within Blueberry's office is also secured with enhanced security and the damage cost is covered by other				
	threats. The repair cost will be the same as over.				
Filing error	0,5	0,1	0,3	0,36	
		1 1	1 1	rmation is lost.	
Earthquake	0,1	0,5	0,7	0,36	
1		'	1 1	because of the	
				e it's only the in-	
				pair costs is high	
		ssary to replace			
Social engineering attack via	0,5	0,1	0,3	0,36	
phone	,	,	,		
	It is moderate	ly likely that b	pecause the nu	mbers are freely	
				ver would likely	
				ctly this kind of	
	incidents.	<i>J</i> 1	Ü	, ,	
Hard-disk on laptop crashes	0,4	0,3	0,3	0,35	
				egularly so most	
		-	-	configuring the	
	new work env			, , ,	
Hard-disk on file server crashes	0,4	0,3	0,3	0,35	
				operation very	
	fast, but good backup routines ensures that very little data will be lost.				
Hard-disk on database server	0,4	0,3	0,3	0,35	
crashes	, ,	5,5	5,5	5,55	
	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	Contin	uing on next page	
			Contin	and on near page	

Weighted Risk Analysiscontinued				
	Probability (0.5)	Damage cost (0.2)	Repair cost (0.3)	Total (1.0)
				o not loose a lot
	of data, but i	t still takes tin	ne recovering a	nd that is work
	time lost.			
Hard-disk on web server crashes	0,4	0,3	0,3	0,35
	A backup serv	er is in place so	there will be	very little down-
	time, most co	sts are directed	d towards setti	ing the environ-
	ment to the pi	revious standar	ds.	
Vendor stops supporting software	0,2	0,5	0,5	0,35
				roduct suddenly,
	if they do it m systems.	ight take consid	derable resourc	es to update our
Loss of access credentials	0,6	0,1	0,1	0,35
	1 .	1 '		n because of its
				nce employees is
				nation with a six
	digit PIN. The repair cost is low since it is only a matter of			
	disabling and issuing a new ID and PIN.			
Unauthorized physical access to	0,3	0,4	0,4	0,35
the premises				
	It is implemented good physical security, the damage is covered by other threats. The damage cost and repair cost is for covering repair and replacement of the access control			
	is for covering			
Theft of information	is for covering system.	g repair and rep	placement of th	ne access control
Theft of information	is for covering system.	repair and rep	olacement of th	ne access control 0,34
Theft of information	is for covering system. 0,3 This occur rar	repair and reposite of the second sec	olacement of the old	ne access control 0,34 ner. Even though
Theft of information	is for covering system. 0,3 This occur ran the damage c	repair and reposited in the second reposite in the second reposite in the second reposit reposit reposit reposit is low since the second reposit repos	olacement of the 0,5 uncommon either the informat	0,34 ner. Even though ion is encrypted
Theft of information	is for covering system. 0,3 This occur rar the damage c and physical is	repair and reposite of the second reposite of	olacement of the 0,5 uncommon either the information to be of a second control of the control of	0,34 ner. Even though ion is encrypted sensitive nature.
Theft of information	is for covering system. 0,3 This occur rar the damage c and physical in Repair cost is	repair and reposite of the second reposite of	0,5 uncommon either the informate not to be of a selection.	0,34 ner. Even though ion is encrypted sensitive nature. st initiate an in-
Security bugs in 3rd party soft-	is for covering system. 0,3 This occur rar the damage c and physical in Repair cost is	g repair and reposit of the control	0,5 uncommon either the informate not to be of a selection.	0,34 ner. Even though ion is encrypted sensitive nature. st initiate an in-
	is for covering system. 0,3 This occur ran the damage c and physical is Repair cost is vestigation an 0,5	g repair and reposit of the second se	0,5 uncommon either the informate not to be of a Blueberry muent proper cour	ne access control 0,34 ner. Even though ion is encrypted sensitive nature. st initiate an innter measures. 0,33
Security bugs in 3rd party soft-	is for covering system. 0,3 This occur ran the damage c and physical is Repair cost is vestigation an 0,5 There are strice	y repair and reposit of the state of the sta	0,5 uncommon eitle the informat not to be of a Blueberry muent proper cour 0,2	ne access control 0,34 ner. Even though ion is encrypted sensitive nature. st initiate an innter measures. 0,33 en a security bug
Security bugs in 3rd party soft-	is for covering system. 0,3 This occur ran the damage c and physical is Repair cost is vestigation an 0,5 There are strice	y repair and reposit of the state of the sta	0,5 uncommon eitle the informat not to be of a Blueberry muent proper cour 0,2	ne access control 0,34 ner. Even though ion is encrypted sensitive nature. st initiate an innter measures. 0,33
Security bugs in 3rd party software	is for covering system. 0,3 This occur ran the damage c and physical is Repair cost is vestigation and 0,5 There are strick is found, so it is system.	y repair and reposit of the state of the sta	0,5 uncommon eitle the informat not to be of a Blueberry muent proper cour 0,2	ne access control 0,34 ner. Even though ion is encrypted sensitive nature. st initiate an innter measures. 0,33 en a security bug
Security bugs in 3rd party soft-	is for covering system. 0,3 This occur ran the damage c and physical is Repair cost is vestigation an 0,5 There are strict is found, so it business. 0,3	g repair and reposit is low since information is a moderate since d then implemed 0,1 It procedures for will probably	0,5 uncommon either the informate not to be of a seal Blueberry mulent proper country of the control of the control of the country of the cou	ne access control 0,34 ner. Even though ion is encrypted sensitive nature. st initiate an innter measures. 0,33 en a security bug e impact on the
Security bugs in 3rd party software	is for covering system. 0,3 This occur ran the damage c and physical is Repair cost is vestigation an 0,5 There are strict is found, so it business. 0,3 It is unlikely t	g repair and reposit of the state of the sta	0,5 uncommon either the informate not to be of a sent proper country multiple of the proper country when the proper country when the proper country when the proper it is a sent proper country when the proper country when the proper country is a sent proper country when the proper country is a sent proper country is a sent proper country in the proper company is a sent proper country in the proper country is a sent proper country in the proper country is a sent proper country in the proper country in the proper country is a sent proper country in the proper country in the proper country is a sent proper country in the proper country in the proper country is a sent proper country in the proper country in the proper country is a sent proper country in the proper country in the proper country in the proper country is a sent proper country in the prop	0,34 ner. Even though ion is encrypted sensitive nature. st initiate an in- nter measures. 0,33 en a security bug e impact on the
Security bugs in 3rd party software	is for covering system. 0,3 This occur ran the damage c and physical is vestigation an 0,5 There are strict is found, so it business. 0,3 It is unlikely this to limit moderately sm	g repair and repair on the second of the sec	0,5 uncommon eitle the informat not to be of a sent proper cound 0,2 r updating whe have very little 0,3 happen, compediscredit us. Teause of an IT-	ne access control 0,34 ner. Even though ion is encrypted sensitive nature. st initiate an in- nter measures. 0,33 en a security bug the impact on the 0,32 etitors might use
Security bugs in 3rd party software Denial of service against assets	is for covering system. 0,3 This occur ran the damage c and physical is vestigation and 0,5 There are strict is found, so it business. 0,3 It is unlikely this to limit is moderately so would limit the	g repair and repair on the secources or to nall damage be not second them to second them to secources for the secources or to nall damage be not second to secources or to nature the second to second the seco	0,5 uncommon eithe the informat not to be of a sent proper cound 0,2 r updating when have very little 0,3 happen, compediscredit us. Treause of an IT-diately.	0,34 ner. Even though ion is encrypted sensitive nature. st initiate an in- nter measures. 0,33 en a security bug e impact on the 0,32 etitors might use this would cause department that
Security bugs in 3rd party software	is for covering system. 0,3 This occur ran the damage c and physical is vestigation an 0,5 There are strict is found, so it business. 0,3 It is unlikely this to limit moderately sm	g repair and repair on the second of the sec	0,5 uncommon eitle the informat not to be of a sent proper cound 0,2 r updating whe have very little 0,3 happen, compediscredit us. Teause of an IT-	ne access control 0,34 ner. Even though ion is encrypted sensitive nature. st initiate an in- inter measures. 0,33 en a security bug the impact on the 0,32 etitors might use this would cause

Weighted Risk Analysiscontinued					
	Probability (0.5)	Damage cost (0.2)	Repair cost (0.3)	Total (1.0)	
				is not likely, but nents. The dam-	
				nal service pro-	
	_		•	ie to the process	
		nd enhancing th		to to the process	
Destruction of emergency systems	0,3	0,2	0,4	0,31	
	This is not like	ely, but still po	ssible due to it	s natural place-	
				is low since it is	
	the landlords task to maintain it. The repair cost is moderate				
				r work before its	
	-	l up to code ago	ain.		
Theft of user equipment	0,2	0,3	0,4	0,28	
				cident occurs is	
	the damage cost moderate since it contains information and				
	access to the business secured network, though the entire				
	system is encrypted and will wipe it self in case of theft. The				
	repair cost is moderate since one need to replace the equipment and implement mitigating controls for the incident.				
Power outage	0,4	0,2	0,1	0,27	
Tower outage		1 1	'	ort when it does	
	happen.	rarety arta is a	stately very one	when it does	
Theft of access credentials	0,3	0,2	0,1	0,22	
				occurs the dam-	
				ed to report this	
				it only involves	
			D-card with a		
Strong winds	0,3	0,1	0,1	0,20	
				ise any damage.	
				eberry does not	
				e temporary loss so low since it is	
				ng damage and	
				damage beyond	
	the demarcation		outly to reput	aamage beyona	
Internet outage	0,2	0,1	0,1	0,15	
				so the likelihood	
	that this woul	d happen is sm		would likely be	
	small so dama	ge is minimal.		-	
Power brownout	0,2	0,1	0,1	0,15	
			pact on the op	eration because	
	they still have	some power.			

3.2 Weighted Business Unit Analysis

The WBUA describes the impact Blueberry IT will endure when a certain business function is unable to function properly. The table below is extrapolated from table 2.3[6] in the book "Prin-

ciples of Incident Response and Disaster Recovery". The weights are modified to into three separate factors with modified weights. The impact on profitability describes this functions ability for Blueberry to actually make money, because of the importance is why the weight is set to 60%. The impact on the public image is set to 20% since it is not as important as the ability to make money, neither is the impact on internal operations which is also set to 20%.

Function prioritization					
Business function	Impact on	Impact on	Impact on in-	Total	
	profitability	public image	ternal operation		
Weighted score:	0.6	0.2	0.2	1.0	
Establish new project	0,9	0,7	0,9	0,86	
	Inability to est	ablish new proje	cts will result in sev	ere profit loss	
	since they can'	t start to work ur	itil they have a proje	ct area on the	
	IT system. This	will also impact	the public image sinc	e they can't do	
			ternal procedures wil		
	affected since t	hey can't correlat	e and perform their v	vork tasks.	
Manage invoicing	1,0	0,7	0,3	0,8	
			nely and make the bi		
	to receive any money for their work. This will also severely impact				
	the public image since it might seem like they are working on the				
	black market. The internal functions will not be affected in any bi				
	way since they still can do their work.				
Customer support	0,9	0,9	0,3	0,78	
	In the lack of having customer support will expose the business				
			reme damage. This i		
			public relations and		
			s will not be severely	affected since	
		e able to work on			
Manage customer accounts	0,8	0,9	0,5	0,76	
			stomer accounts will		
			are unable to handl		
			d history. This will a		
			ge. The internal oper		
	_		e unable to properly	maintain the	
F11	customer accou		0.0	0.7	
Enroll new customers	0,8	0,2	0,9	0,7	
			customers it will res		
			rnal operations. The		
			vay since it is possibl	e to engage in	
Managa marwall arratam		y business functio		0.6	
Manage payroll system	0,5	0,8	0,7	0,6	
			tem will the profital orale will drop. This		
			orate will arop. This which will impact the		
			rnich will impact the function as usual si		
		uce their work eff		nce employees	
Manage work projects	0,5	0,5	0,9	0.58	
manage work projects	0,3	0,3		ng on next page	
			Continui	iz on next page	

	Function prior	ritizationcontin	ued	
	Profitability (0.6)	Reputation (0.2)	Internal Operation (0.2)	Total (1.0)
	the internal op area and CIA t be impacted ar	perations since the o where the work and since there will	s will result in a ser ey will not be able t projects are stored.' be pauses in the wo and downtime be sev	o manage the The profit will rk. The public
Manage employee work	0,5	0,6	0,7	0,56
	result in a seve meetings, doub public image d properly. The since some emp ale.	ere impact on bu ble book an empl lue to the fact th internal operatio bloyees will be in d	r employees work scisiness profit since the oyee. This results in at management is not man will also be seven disarray and have a l	ey might miss severe loss of ot functioning rely impacted ow work mor-
PR campaigns	0,8	0,1	0,1	0,52
	since other bullic image will	sinesses will not	will severely reduce know of their existe hough it will not gro be affected.	nce. The pub-
Terminate employee	0,5	0,5	0,6	0,52
	the resulting lo ployee which si on the public in	oss in profit severe hould have been f mage since they co resulting internal	nte an employee from e since they have to p fired. This results in o an't fire employees wi operations is affected	ay for an emasser impact which is bad for
Website advertisement	0,3	0,8	0,1	0,36
	pact the profito	ability, but will se based company.	their website does no werely affect the publ The impact on interr result in some extra	ic image since al procedures
Erase project information	0,2	0,5	0,2	0,26
	problems for that a severe impac	ne internal operat t on the public im	ormation will not car tions and profits. This nage since they can't ch does not belong to	s will result in erase sensitive
Terminate project	0,2	0,5	0,2	0,26
	in a severe way customer will n ments. It will r	y. It will however oot have their proj		age since they ontract agree- internal pro-
Erase customer	0,1	0,6	0,2	0,22
			Continui	ng on next page

	Function prior	ritizationcontinu	ıed	
	Profitability	Reputation	Internal Operation	Total (1.0)
	(0.6)	(0.2)	(0.2)	
	This is will no	t impact the profi	itability at all, but w	rill impact the
	public image s	ince they won't b	e able to erase sensi	tive materials
	which does not	belong to them.		
Update finance records	0,2	0,2	0,3	0,22
	Inability to upo	date finance recor	ds will not result in a	ıny significant
	profit loss and	public image sind	ce it is not based on t	the actual ser-
	vice Blueberry	provides. It will h	nowever result in a lo	oss of internal
	operations sinc	e it means they w	vill not be able to pro	perly manage
	the accounting	history.		
Hiring employees	0,2	0,1	0,2	0,18
	If Blueberry IT	lacks the ability	to hire new employ	ees it will not
	affect the publ	ic image, though	it will have a little	impact on the
	profit and the	internal procedu	res, since one will r	ot be able to
	replace employ	rees when needed.		

3.3 Incident Prioritization

Based on the risk analysis and business unit analysis we've have decided to develop plans for the scenarios depicted in table 3. This table shows the top ten scenarios from the external "Scenario Priority Document" which is maintained separately from the business contingency planning document to avoid confusion during an incident. This list of scenarios is prioritized and applies to both incident and disaster scenarios. A disaster scenario will take precedence over an incident scenario. A scenario which threatens human life will always take precedence over any other scenario. This means that in case there is multiple attacks on Blueberry IT Consulting, occurring at the same time, the attack-scenario highest on this list is to be dealt with. There is some exceptions to this, as described above. In addition to those points one might respond to several incidents if there is enough manpower to sufficiently respond to several attacks.

The prioritization is based on the weighting of the attacks impact on business functions, but due to statements in the policy will preservation of human life always take precedence over all other attacks.

	Incident prioritization		
#	Scenario	Description	
1	Fire	Since this attack endangers the life of the employees and its poten-	
		tially devastating impact it is of the highest priority. This attack could	
		potentially destroy Blueberry ITs HQ and all assets could be des-	
		troyed beyond the point of recovery. Due to off-site back-up routines	
		will very little information be lost.	
		It has not been developed any plans for this attack, due to time	
		limitations and should be developed within the next six months.	
		Continuing on next page	

		Incident prioritizationcontinued
#	Scenario	Description
2	Flood	This attack has a smaller chance of endangering human life, but can still occur with such severity. In addition to the factor of human life there is factor of damage to Blueberry ITs HQ which depending of the severity can create huge structural damage. This would involve construction work and downtime of information systems. This attack is fully developed and has three separate plans; incident notification, incident response, disaster and continuity as described in the subordinate plan addendum.
3	Sabotage of project and finance system	Sabotage of either system is an immediate danger to Blueberry IT Consulting due to the systems highly sensitive classification. This attack could result in severe loss of profit, embezzlement, and extreme loss or corruption of information. The reason why this takes precedence over so many incident is because of the potential ramifications it has towards the customers. It has not been developed any plans for this attack, due to time limitations and should be developed within the next six months.
4	Destruction of project management system	Destruction of the project management system is very important due to its sensitive nature and potential loss towards the business. A potential loss of this asset will render the business unable to give customer support or effectively work on a project in a secure environment. Though it is not a very likely scenario it will still have a big impact on Blueberry IT as a company. It has not been developed any plans for this attack, due to time limitations and should be developed within the next six months.
5	Destruction of finance system	Destruction of the finance system is not as severe as the destruction of project management system, but since this will render Blueberry IT unable to receive, distribute or maintain a financial history it is very important. During such an attack employees will not be able to receive paychecks, Blueberry IT can't distribute invoices etc. which in turn will make employees gradually reduce their work effort. Though it is not a very likely scenario it will still have an extreme impact on Blueberry IT as a company. It has not been developed any plans for this attack, due to time limitations and should be developed within the next six months.
6	Installation of Unauthorized Software	This attack is very likely to happen due to the wast amount of software available on the Internet. Installation of such software could potentially compromise or destroy the entire information system at Blueberry ITs HQ. This attack is fully developed and consists of; incident notification, incident response, disaster response and continuity plan. Continuing on next page

		Incident prioritizationcontinued
#	Scenario	Description
7	Unauthorized ac-	This attack will occur do to many people have access to the server
	cess to file server	and access credentials could be left open due to management error.
		The severity of this attack is of such proportions that any malicious
		intent will result in a severe loss for Blueberry IT.
		It has not been developed any plans for this attack, due to time
		limitations and should be developed within the next six months.
8	Functional bugs	This attack could result in loss of information either on the off-site
	in 3rd party soft-	back-up or the internal information system, or have a huge impact
	ware	on the overall business performance due to problems with payroll or
		other software solutions.
		It has not been developed any plans for this attack, due to time
		limitations and should be developed within the next six months.
9	Accidental dele-	This scenario is bound to happen in all degrees of severity, though it
	tion of data	is most often a trivial incident. Even though it is mostly trivial it also
		got the potential to become catastrophic if one accidentally deletes
		finance information or back-up tapes and other sensitive materials. Because of its probability rate and its potential to cause an extreme
		impact on Blueberry IT it has to be a response plan for it.
		It has not been developed any plans for this attack, due to time
		limitations and should be developed within the next six months.
10	Social engineer-	Due to todays many ways to perform social engineering it is bound to
10	ing attack via e-	happen, either because the attacker wants information about Blue-
	mail	berry ITs customers or to gain access to Blueberry IT itself. This at-
	mun	tack alone will not have serious consequences, but can lead to more
		serious attacks.
		This attack is fully developed and consists of; an incident noti-
		fication and response plan.

Table 3: Top ten scenarios

3.4 Attack success scenario development

This section describes the scenarios details. This involves describing which assets are at risk, what damage the assets are exposed to, and which threat agents and vulnerabilities is involved. The template is extracted from the book "Principles of Information Security and Disaster Recovery" [7]. The purpose of this is to outline each threat scenarios damage extent when it succeeds, before continuing with its corresponding "potential damage assessment".

Installation of Unauthorized Software		
Date of analysis:	March 2, 2012	
Attack name/description:	Installation of unauthorized software as a result of human er-	
	ror	
Threat agents:	User carelessness/awareness	
	Continuing on next page	

T . 11	CTT 1 0 C 1		
	Installation of Unauthorized Softwarecontinued		
Known or possible vulnerabilities:	 Poorly revised user permissions Poorly training of user awareness Poorly security culture focus, carelessness 		
Likely precursor activities or indicators:	Change in system behaviour		
Information assets at risk from this attack:	All information systems		
Damage or loss to information assets likely from this attack:	Information system(s)Stored informationOrganization reputation		
Other assets at risk from this attack:	In worst case scenario: Partner(s) assets		
Damage or loss to other assets likely from this attack:	None likely		
Immediate actions indicated when this attack is under way:	Isolate system(s), revoke user permissions		
Follow-up actions after this attack was successfully executed:	Debrief, user awareness training		
Comments	None		

Flood	
Date of analysis:	27.02.2012
Attack name/description:	Flood impacting Blueberry IT Cons. HQ
Threat agents:	 Spring flood from the mountains during late late April/early May. Flood during a heavy rain season Faulty storm drain system
Known or possible vulnerabilities:	 The building is located in an area where flood water may cut off the access to the area Parts of the electrical system may need to be disabled, due to security reasons. The generator will not be operational if it is water in the machine room
Likely precursor activities or indicators:	 Heavy rain fall in a short period of time Announcements from weather reports and local authorities Rapid increase of the water levels Rapid melting of ice in mountains Unusual behaviour of storm drains Reports of faulty storm drains
Information assets at risk from this attack:	 Infrastructure and servers Physical and digital media User equipment Employees
	Continuing on next page

	Floodcontinued
Damage or loss to information assets likely from this attack:	 May result in temporary loss of infrastructure and servers Will result in downtime for the emergency generator May result in temporary loss of employees
Other assets at risk from this attack:	 Office spaces Building structure External services
Damage or loss to other assets likely from this attack:	 May result in temporary loss of access to the office May result in permanent/temporary damage to the building May result in loss of external services
Immediate actions indicated when this attack is under way:	 Shut down all unnecessary systems Back up the entire system to a secure facility Evacuate equipment and set up an external business facility
Follow-up actions after this attack was successfully executed:	 Review the performance of the incident response handling Perform recovery of the damage done to the building Move the hardware back to the main office Shut down the external facility
Comments	None at this time

Social Engineering Attack		
Date of analysis:	March 1, 2012	
Attack description:	Social engineering attack via e-mail or phone	
Threat agents:	CompetitorHackersOrganized crime	
Known or possible vulnerabilities:	 Easy to spoof an e-mail address E-mail addresses available online Phone numbers available online 	
Likely precursor activities or indicators:	Possibly announcement from security firms	
Information assets at risk from this attack:	Information about infrastructureSensitive information about employees	
Damage or loss to information assets likely from this attack:	Personal information about employees	
Other assets at risk from this attack:	None likely	
Damage or loss to other assets likely from this attack:	None likely	
Immediate actions indicated when this attack is under way:	Alert all employeesStart investigating who is responsibleDiscover if it was successful	
	Continuing on next page	

Social Engineering Attackcontinued	
Follow-up actions after this attack was successfully executed:	 Investigate what the perpetrator wanted. Investigate what the information was used for. Review procedures and make appropriate changes. Review staff involved and consider additional training.
Comments	None at this time

3.5 Potential Damage Assessment

The following describes the best, worst and most likely scenarios in great detail. The template which been used is extracted from the book "Principles of Incident Response and Disaster Recovery"[8]. The three different scenarios is detailed in four steps each. It starts with a detailed description of the incident and how the attack and countermeasures would behave. This is followed by a weight and a text describing the scenarios risk. The weight is of an arbitrary value like; "none", "low", "moderate" or "high". The "Scenario Risk" is followed by the "scenarios cost to the organization", which starts with an arbitrary weight followed by a description of the cost. The last part of the scenario description is the "probability for the attack scenario to continue and spread", which starts with an arbitrary weight followed by a description of the probability.

Installation of Unauthorized Software: addendum		
Date of analysis	03.03.2012	
Attack name/description	Installation of unauthorized software	
Comments	None at this time	

Best case scenario for this attack

Description: The best case scenario is when an employee understands that this is an illegal activity and calls the IT-support to get an authorization to install it. Then the software is investigated and authorized or banned.

Scenario risk: Low, in a firm like Blueberry employees are trained not to install such software on their job computers.

Scenario cost to organization: Low, the employee training can be done relatively easy and the extra work caused by the incident would at most require an hour of work to clean up. **Scenario probability of attack continuing and spreading:** Very low, depends on the software installed also, but in a best case scenario there will be no probability of spreading malware.

Worst case scenario for this attack

Description: When unauthorized harmful software is installed, and it gains root-access to critical systems. Due to network segmentation and good password policy only one area of the company network can be compromised, but that may be enough to gain access to organization critical information. Assets value and integrity might be at stake.

Scenario risk: Low, since Blueberry have mostly has employees with willingness to have a good security culture and mindset.

Scenario cost to organization: High, in worst case customers and website visitors might be attacked as well.

Scenario probability of attack continuing and spreading: High, if gone unnoticed this will continue to spread across the entire network until it is cleaned from all systems.

Most likely case scenario for this attack

Continuing on next page

Installation of Unauthorized Software ...continued

Description: The most likely scenario is that the employee installs a software program, but does not infect the system or network. Though this means extra work for the IT-service for performing cleaning and repairing the system.

Scenario risk: Moderate, due to human error this scenario might spread around the business. Even though the software does not contain any malware it might expose vulnerabilities which will not be patched by the IT-service.

Scenario cost to organization: Low; a few extra hours of work for cleaning and restoring the system to its original state.

Scenario probability of attack continuing and spreading: High; if gone unnoticed and it does not impact service or performance this attack will continue. Depending on the popularity of the software, employees might spread it throughout the business.

Flood: addendum		
Date of analysis	03.03.2012	
Attack name/description	Flood of property	
Comments	None at this time	

Best case scenario for this attack

Description: The best case scenario is when it is a small and short flood, and the in place drainage systems is able to divert the flood water away from the property. The current drainage system outside is able to divert the normal spring flood occurring around April/may, but not the extreme cases of flood.

Scenario risk: Moderate; the assets for mitigating these threats is mostly out of Blueberry's control. Since the sewer and water systems is publicly owned and maintained, it is up to the local government to perform maintenance work and upgrades.

Scenario cost to organization: Very low; the cost of this scenario is insignificant to the organization due to the fact that it does not affect the business.

Scenario probability of attack continuing and spreading: Very low, the flood will not spread, and it will not continue since it is a short flood.

Worst case scenario for this attack

Description: The worst case scenario is that the mitigating controls fails and the entire property is flooded, including the basement levels and 1st floor. This involves severe damage to the buildings structural integrity and hindering of employees to access the building, in addition it would mean that the power generator is unable to function. In the case that Blueberry doesn't have an alternate business site, the cost of downtime and repositioning is significantly high.

Scenario risk: High; the only way to mitigate this attack is by move the entire business, to a less exposed environment or perform serious construction work to the building to properly divert the water stream.

Scenario cost to organization: Moderate; even though the cost of repairing the damages and draining the water out of the facility is high it is not a severe cost to Blueberry since they are renting offices from the landlord. Though, while the renovation and repairs is ongoing the cost of downtime and set-up of alternate location is moderate.

Scenario probability of attack continuing and spreading: Moderate, because of the placement of Blueberry's facilities the spreading of flood is not significant, but the flood will continue for a prolonged time until it dissipates.

Most likely case scenario for this attack

Continuing on next page

Flood ...continued

Description: The most like scenario is that there will not be any internal flooding of the building, but the employees will be unable or experience trouble gaining access to the premises. This is due to flooding of the outside premises and the storm drains inability to properly divert the flood water.

Scenario risk: Low; the risk of this scenario is low since there is no danger to the business assets, other than the inability to work at the office. Since the project management system, and all supporting IT-systems, is up and running the employees will be able to work on their current projects.

Scenario cost to organization: Moderate; the cost of this scenario depends on the length and severity of the flood, but a flood that usually lasts two days and is making it hard or impossible to access the premises. This makes the cost moderate since it means some lost work hours, and inability to properly maintain business procedures.

Scenario probability of attack continuing and spreading: Moderate; the attack will not spread, but it will continue until it dissipates, which is most likely between 1 to 5 days.

Social Engineering Attack: addendum		
Date of analysis	05.03.2012	
Attack description	Social engineering attack targeted at the organization	
Comments	None at this time	

Best case scenario for this attack

Description: The best case for this attack would that the target understands that a phishing attack is happening and the target follows protocol and warn her superiors.

Scenario risk: Low; minimal time and resources will be spent.

Scenario cost to organization: Low; the organization has to spend time training the employees, but it does not take up much time each year.

Scenario probability of attack continuing and spreading: Very low.

Worst case scenario for this attack

Description: The worst case happens if user has forgotten his training and the attacker gets access to company assets. This can lead to further attack.

Scenario risk: High; this attack would most likely lead to further attacks and compromise of several other systems.

Scenario cost to organization: High; highly sensitive information can go astray this way and the amount of resources cleaning up after a big attack could possibly be massive.

Scenario probability of attack continuing and spreading: Very high.

Most likely case scenario for this attack

Description: The most likely case for this scenario is that the target might supply the attacker with some information about employees, but nothing that is highly sensitive. This can happen in a phone call where the attacker pretend to be someone else, then it is easy for an attacker to obtain some information, but the employee will most likely remember his training and not give up any sensitive information

Scenario risk: Low; the information the attacker has obtained will have low value. It might be slightly useful as information gathering, but nothing else.

Scenario cost to organization: Low; The only cost is slight loss of time.

Scenario probability of attack continuing and spreading: Low; although information is lost, it is not sensitive and unlikely that it can be used in further attacks.

3.6 Subordinate Plan Classification

The last part of the BIA is the Subordinate Plan Classification which dictates what plans is to be made for the corresponding attack scenario and who it is passed on to. This template used is taken from the book "Principles of Incident Response and Disaster Recovery" [9].

Install. of Unauth. Software: subordinate plan classification		
Date of analysis	07.03.2012	
Attack name/description	Installation of unauthorized software	
Threat agents	User carelessness/awareness	
Known or possible vulnerabilities	 Poorly revised user permissions Poorly training of user awareness Poorly security culture focus, carelessness 	

Subordinate plan classification

Description: This attack is passed to the incident response planning team for developing incident response plans for the attack. After the incident response plans are finished, they, along with this document shall be passed on to the disaster recovery planning team. They will then develop disaster recovery plans in case of escalation of the initial incident. This incident will require a business continuity plan to be developed. This plan must dictate how to temporary replace and restore the original IT-systems when a disaster has occurred. At both levels the mitigating actions should specified along with current policies and guidelines for properly removing software and contaminated systems. In addition it should be specified guidelines for properly upholding sanctions for breach of policy.

Flood: subordinate plan classification		
Date of analysis	06.03.2012	
Attack name/description	Flood	
Threat agents	 Spring flood from the mountains during late late April/early May. Flash flood during a heavy rain season Faulty storm drain system 	
Known or possible vulnerabilities	 The building is located in an area where flood water may cut off the access to the area Parts of the electrical system may need to be disabled, due to security reasons. The generator will not be operational if it is water in the machine room 	

Subordinate plan classification

Description: This attack is passed to the incident response planning team for developing incident response plans for the attack. After the incident response plans are finished, they, along with this document shall be passed on to the disaster recovery planning team. They will then develop disaster recovery plans in case of escalation of the initial incident. This plan also requires a business continuity plan for relocating to a temporary location and back to a permanent location.

At both levels the mitigating actions should specified along with blueprints of the storm drains and current building structure.

Social Engineering Attack: subordinate plan classification		
Date of analysis	March 6, 2012	
Attack name/description	Targeted social engineering attack via phone or e-mail.	
Threat agents	CompetitorHackersOrganized crime	
Known or possible vulnerabilities	 Easy to spoof an e-mail address E-mail addresses are available online Phone numbers available online 	

Subordinate plan classification

Description: This case is passed to the incident response planning committee for developing an incident response plan for this attack. Mitigating actions should be specified, including user awareness and review of protocols.

4 Incident response plan

All attack scenarios dictated, by the "subordinate plan classification addendum to end case", to create an incident response plan is added to this chapter. The template used for all incident response plans is taken from the "Principles of Incident Response and Disaster Recovery" [10]. This details each action to be taken during an incident, when the incident is declared over, what actions to be taken when the incident is over, when the restoration process is over and which actions is to be taken in advance to an incident.

In addition to the incident response plan it is added a shortened incident response plan which describes the notification response corresponding to the incident. This describes how the person which discovered the attack and which action they should take when notifying the correct personnel.

4.1 Installation of Unauthorized Software

Installation of Unauthorized Software		
Incident Detection Plan		
Attack type:	Unauthorized installation of software	
Trigger:	Suspicious of a co-worker.	
Reaction force and lead:	IT-department	
	Employee executive	
Notification method:	Phone	
	E-mail	
	Direct contact	
Response time:	10 minutes	
Actions to be taken during	this response:	
1: Notify the IT-department by phone, e-mail or direct contact.		
2: The IT-department decides whether the incident is real or not and executes the incident		
response plan.		
Incident is ended and actions cease when:		
- The IT manager has determined if the incident is real or not and has taken control over		
the incident.		
Preparation actions to be integrated into IR plans before incident response plan is		
needed:		
1. Awareness training for employees		

Installation of Unauthorized Software		
Incident Response Plan		
Attack type:	Unauthorized installation of software.	
		Continuing on next page

Installation of Unauthorized Softwarecontinued		
	Incident Response Plan	
Trigger:	Alert from employee.	
	Review of system logs.	
Reaction force and lead:	Lead is IT-department employee on duty, reaction force is dynamically allocated of the company dependent on the scale of the incident. If needed CEO and IT-manager are called in to assist.	
Notification method:	Phone	
	Direct contact	
	E-mail	
Response time:	2 hours	

Actions to be taken during this response:

- **1:** Debrief the employee that owns the system which the software is detected on and find out the following:
- Its origin
- How it was installed
- Other systems which its been installed on
- Other employees which may have the software
- 2: Isolate the system.
- **3:** Examine if the software is a potential malware.
- **4a:** If malware; perform in-depth analysis of the system to check for damage.
- **4b:** If not malware; isolate the infected systems from the internal network.

5a: If the damage of the malware has gained access to one of the following assets, the incident is escalated to disaster:

- The project management system
- The customer database
- The finance system
- Security systems, like firewalls, routers or NIDS
- The public website

5b: Uninstall software and secure the systems.

6: Review systems after uninstallation of software.

Incident is ended and actions cease when:

- All infected assets has been cleaned and are ready to be placed back into the network.
- The incident has been escalated to a disaster.

Actions to be taken after incident response is ended:

- 1: Review current rules and regulations and change if necessary.
- **2:** Interview the people responsible for the incident and issue an official reprimand if it is nessecary.
- **3:** Create a incident report and distribute it to the CEO and all other parties involved.
- 4: If not malware; analyse if the software could be usefull to business procedures.

Incident follow-up is ended and actions after the incident is complete when:

- Reports are finished.
- Managers are briefed on the incident.
- Regulations has been changed where necessary.
- Official reprimands has been issued.

Continuing on next page

Installation of Unauthorized Softwarecontinued
Incident Response Plan
Preparation actions to be integrated into IR plans before incident response plan is needed:
1: Develop rules to use company equipment.

- 2: Create user awareness of the risks.

4.2 Flood

Flood		
	Incident Detection Plan	
Attack type:	Flood	
Trigger:	Rapidly rising water level	
	Local weather reports	
	Notice of evacuation or flood warning from local authority	
	Reports from employees	
Reaction force and lead:	IT-manager, back-up CEO	
Notification method:	Verbal communication by telephone, physical interaction or	
	physical.	
Response time:	Maximum 12 hours from detection to notifying Helpdesk and	
	maximum 24 hours from being notified until an incident is dis-	
	carded and relayed to incident response task force.	
Actions to be taken during this response:		
1: Notify the current IT-manager by phone, text or physical verbal communication and		

- explain the situation
- 2: The IT-manager performs an initial assessment of the reported incident
- 3: The IT-manager decides if the incident is to be relayed to the incident response task force
- 4: The IT manager notifies the incident task force leader; CEO.

Incident is ended and actions cease when:

- The incident is discarded.
- The responsibility of the incident is shifted on to the task force leader: CEO

Preparation actions to be integrated into IR plans before incident response plan is needed:

- 1: Training the IT-managers to correctly assess a flood scenario.
- 2: Training the employees in how to notify
- **3:** Exercise routines for the call roster.

Flood		
Incident Response Plan		
Attack type:	Flood	
Trigger:	Report of incident from Helpdesk	
Reaction force and lead:	Leader: Chief Executive Officer, back-up CEO	
	Force: Chief Technical Officer, back-up CFO	
	This incident can seize as much manpower as needed depending	
	on the incident.	
Continuing on next page		

Floodcontinued		
Incident Response Plan		
Notification method:	Verbal interaction either by VoIP, telephone or physical interac-	
	tion.	
Response time:	Maximum 24 hours	
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Actions to be taken during this response:

- 1: Perform an assessment of the reported incident to achieve an overview of the situation.
- **2:** Mobilize the incident response team.
- 3: Gather all employees in main office and perform a head count of all employees
- **4:** If there's missing any employees, confirm their whereabouts or search the building for them.
- 5: Evacuate all unnecessary personnel from the premises
- 6: Notify the landlord and building manager, if they weren't the notifiers.
- 7: Notify the local authority, if they weren't the notifiers.
- 8: Inspect the sub-levels for flooding
- **9a:** If flooding inside building or the severity escalates; escalate to disaster.
- **9b:** If not; engage back-up procedures of finances and project management systems.
- 10: If needed, request help from the local authority to help with mitigating the incident.

Incident is ended and actions cease when:

- All employees is evacuated from the premises
- All infrastructure is properly secured
- The incident is properly mitigated

Actions to be taken after incident response is ended:

- 1: Assess the damage level
- **2:** If data was lost, recover the most recent back-ups.
- **3:** Restore the most essential business functions to normal operation.
- **4:** Restore the rest of the business functions to normal operation
- **5:** Assess all costs the incident caused.
- **6:** File claim to insurance company
- 7: Hold an AAR-meeting.

Incident follow-up is ended and actions after the incident is complete when:

- Fully operational business management is restored at at primary or secondary location

Preparation actions to be integrated into IR plans before incident response plan is needed:

- 1: Training for performing an emergency evacuation of the premises
- 2: Training for performing a correct emergency back-up procedure
- **3:** Training the CSO to perform a correct assessment of a flood situation.
- **4:** Periodic review of the incident response plan.

4.3 Social engineering attack

Social Engineering Attack		
Incident Detection Plan		
Attack type:	Social engineering attack	
Trigger:	Suspicious e-mail, phone call or visitor.	
Reaction force and lead:	All employees.	
		Continuing on next page

Continuing on next page

Social Engineering Attackcontinued		
	Incident Detection Plan	
Notification method:	E-mail, phone or verbal communication.	
Response time:	5 min.	
Actions to be taken during	this response:	
1: Determine if the attack is	s real.	
2: Alert the IT department by phone.		
Incident is ended and actions cease when:		
- The IT-department has been alerted.		
Preparation actions to be integrated into IR plans before incident response plan is		
needed:		
1: Awareness training for employees		

Attack type: Social engineering One or more of the following: Employee alerts according to their IR plan. Suspicious e-mail. Suspicious phone call. Suspicious visitor. IT manager is in charge of the IR plan. The IT manager is also in charge of delegating tasks as he see fit over other employees in the IT department. Notification method: E-mail, phone or verbal communication. Response time: 20 min. Actions to be taken during this response: 1: Determine which employees have been targeted. 2: Determine which employees have been targeted. 3: Make sure the attack has stopped by alerting the appropriate employees. 4: Protect any assets which security might have been weakened by the information lost. Incident is ended and actions cease when: When employees have been alerted and the attack has stopped. Actions to be taken after incident response is ended: 1: If sensitive information about employees or customers have been lost, alert the affected parties. 2: Document the timeline and patterns of the attack. 3: Determine if protocols were followed. 4: Determine if more training is required. 5: Determine if a change in protocol is needed. Incident follow-up is ended and actions after the incident is complete when: - All affected parties have been notified. - The reason the attack was successful/unsuccessful has been found. Preparation actions to be integrated into IR plans before incident response plan is	Social Engineering Attack		
Trigger: One or more of the following: Employee alerts according to their IR plan. Suspicious e-mail. Suspicious visitor. Reaction force and lead: IT manager is in charge of the IR plan. The IT manager is also in charge of delegating tasks as he see fit over other employees in the IT department. Notification method: E-mail, phone or verbal communication. Response time: 20 min. Actions to be taken during this response: 1: Determine which employees have been targeted. 2: Determine what kind of information was lost. 3: Make sure the attack has stopped by alerting the appropriate employees. 4: Protect any assets which security might have been weakened by the information lost. Incident is ended and actions cease when: - When employees have been alerted and the attack has stopped. Actions to be taken after incident response is ended: 1: If sensitive information about employees or customers have been lost, alert the affected parties. 2: Document the timeline and patterns of the attack. 3: Determine if protocols were followed. 4: Determine if more training is required. 5: Determine if a change in protocol is needed. Incident follow-up is ended and actions after the incident is complete when: - All affected parties have been notified. - The reason the attack was successful/unsuccessful has been found.			
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1: Define clear policy and procedures as to what the employees should do.

needed:

Social Engineering Attack ... continued

Incident Response Plan

- 2: Define clear policy and procedures as to what the IT department should do.
- **3:** Perform a walk-through on different incident at least once a year. The Chief Technical Officer is in charge of this walk-through.
- **4:** Perform a simulation at least once a year. This simulation will be started by the Chief Technical Officer and should come as a surprise to all other parties involved.
- **5:** Review policy at least once a year regardless of incidents.

5 Disaster response plan

The disaster response plan describes the actions to be taken by the disaster response team during an escalated incident scenario or disaster scenario. The template is extracted from "Principles of Information Security and Disaster Recovery" [11] and describes the response plan step by step. First it describes the same as incident planning of the organizational aspect before the instruction set is shown. Then it describes the steps to take during the disaster, before stating when a disaster is officially ended. Then it might be over or it might escalate and the business continuity plan needs to be invoked. The plans also covers recovery on the primary site regardless of the business continuity plan.

5.1 Installation of Unauthorized Software

Installation of Unauthorized Software				
Disaster Response Plan				
Disaster type:	Disaster type: Unauthorized installation of software			
Trigger:	System behavior			
	Employee notification			
	Confidential information available in public domain			
Team lead:	CTO and System Administrator. Backup is IT-manager and CEO.			
Notification method:	Calling			
	Direct contact			
	Email			
Response time:	Should be initiated within 10 minutes			
Actions during disaster				

Actions during disaster:

- 1: Notify everybody on the DR-notification list
- 2: Prevent spread out of Blueberry ITs LAN by severing the hardlines.
- **3:** Determine the spread of the attack in correspondence with proper procedure for handling potential evidence
- **4:** Isolate the infected systems in correspondence with proper procedure for handling potential evidence
- **5:** Take down the infected machines in correspondence with proper procedure for handling potential evidence

Actions during disaster are complete when:

- The disaster is properly mitigated
- Infected systems is taken offline and isolated

Actions after disaster:

- 1: If IT-systems was taken down, assess the need for replacement
- 2: If replacement is needed; invoke the corresponding BCP for replacing the IT-systems
- **3:** Determine where the attack originated, if a targeted attack on Blueberry IT engage the local authority.

Continuing on next page

Installation of Unauthorized Softwarecontinued			
Disaster Response Plan			
4: Notify the system distributor/owner of the vulnerability			
5: Close the vulnerability			
6: Determine the extent of the damage			
7: Correlate and recover lost or damaged information			
8: Properly clean and restore the IT-system			
9: Restore proper business function to the original IT-systems			
10: Close the case with a formal report and debrief all involved parties			
11: Hold an AAR-meeting			
Actions after disaster are complete when:			
- The original or new IT-system is restored to normal business functionality			
Actions before disaster:			
1: User awareness training			
2: IT-department training within response and digital forensic			
3: Walkthrough of the IR/DR-plans			

Flood

5.2 Flood

Disaster Response Plan				
Disaster type:	Flood			
Trigger:	Escalating incident which threatens structural integrity			
iligger.	Internal flooding			
	Severe flood			
	Notice of evacuation from local authority			
Team lead:				
leam lead:	CEO, back-up Chief Technical Officer			
	IT manager, back-up CFO			
	Team lead may seize as much manpower as needed.			
Notification method:	Verbal communications either by telephone or physical interac-			
	tion.			
Response time:	Maximum 5 hours before initiating the disaster response plan			
Actions during disaster:				
1: Assess the situation with	internal flooding and flood severity in mind.			
2: Perform emergency shut down of all IT infrastructure				
3: If possible; evacuate all employees from the premises				
4: If not possible; notify local emergency personnel to help out with the evacuation				
5: Notify local authority to help out with performing activities to mitigate the incident.				
6: Restrict access to the premises				
Actions during disaster are complete when:				
- IT-systems is securely shut down				
- Employees is successfully evacuated from the premises				
- The disaster is successfully mitigated				
Actions after disaster:				
1: Notify everybody on the DR-notification list				
2: Assess the damage level and time to restore it to its pre-disaster state.				
Continuing on next page				

Flood ...continued

Disaster Response Plan

- **3:** If there is water inside the building: Hire an external contractor to pump out the remaining water.
- **4:** If business relocation or replacement of IT-system is needed invoke the corresponding Business Contingency Plan
- 5: Restore functionality to the IT-system
- **6:** Correlate information and restore any lost information.
- 7: Perform damage assessment and file claim to insurance company
- **8:** Restore normal business function at primary location.
- 9: Hold an AAR-meeting to review the actions taken during the incident.
- 10: Resume normal business functionality.

Actions after disaster are complete when:

- Full business functionality is restored at primary or secondary location

Actions before disaster:

- 1: Review the disaster response plan as instructed by the policy
- 2: Training for emergency evacuation as instructed by the policy
- 3: Review systems for diverting floods
- **4:** Set up a contractual agreement with a business for renting submersible water pumps for the aftermath.
- 5: Maintaining mutual relocation agreement with Strawberry Inc.

6 Business Continuity Plan

The BCP dictates how Blueberry IT is to transition from a fixed state to a temporary state, before transitioning back again. So in this case we have developed two possible situations where business continuity is needed. One is when the IT systems are down and the company has to set up a new temporary IT system. Another scenario is when the whole company has to relocate for some period of time. In the case of flood, it might be necessary to implement both plans.

6.1 IT-system replacement

Replacement of the IT-system		
Business Continuity Plan		
Prerequisites:		
The IT-system is partially down and needs temporary replacement.		
The IT-system is completely down and needs temporary replacement.		
Actions during BCP:		
1: Determine what system is lost		
2: Prioritize the recovery process		
3: Obtain suitable replacement system		
4: Recover lost data from backup		
5: Restore function to the system		
Business Continuity actions is ended when		
- The IT systems business functionality is properly restored.		
Relocating back to primary systems:		
1: Ensure that the original system is properly cleaned and secure		
2: Restore the system to its proper state		
3: Schedule the recovery process to happen during the weekend or night.		
4: Restore the current information to the system from the backups		
5: Replace temporary system with the original system		
6: Recover proper business functionality to the IT-system		
7: Properly clean all information from the temporary system.		
Relocation actions is ended when:		
- The IT-system is fully restored		
- Proper business function is restored at primary or secondary location		

6.2 Business Relocation

Business	Relocation
Business Co	ntinuity Plan
Prerequisites:	
	Continuing on next page

Business Relocation ...continued

Business Continuity Plan

- a: More than one week of repair is needed and all systems is down.
- **b:** More than one week of repair is needed, but IT-systems is able to function

Actions during BCP:

- 1: Invoke the mutual temporary workplace agreement with Strawberry Inc.
- **2a:** Invoke the BCP for replacement of IT-systems
- **2b:** Secure the primary locations IT-system and run the essential systems on generators.
- **3:** Establish essential business procedures at secondary location(IT, finance and management).
- 4: Correlate information and restore lost information.
- **5:** Set up home-offices for all consultants, specialists and other which primarily is working at outside Blueberry ITs HQ.
- **6:** Hold an AAR-meeting to review the actions taken during the incident.
- 7: Restore business procedures.
- **8:** If it is impossible to relocate to primary location, begin searching for a new primary location

Business Continuity actions is ended when

- Business procedures is up and running at the temporary locations

Relocating back to primary site:

- 1: Plan and schedule the move during a weekend followed by a slow week.
- 2: Perform a complete backup of all IT-systems
- 3: Move the less important IT-systems during the evening of week days.
- 4: Move critical infrastructure during the weekend
- 5: Restore Infrastructure at primary location
- **6:** Restore backups
- 7: Move all inventory to the primary location
- 8: If needed obtain missing assets
- **9:** Move all personnel to primary location
- **10:** Restore full business functionality at the primary location.

Relocation actions is ended when:

- Business functionality is fully restored at the previous or new primary location.

7 Appendix: A (Basic information)

Table 23, 24 and 25 are based on templates from the book Principles of incident response and disaster recovery[12] which was collected from Texas State library[13]

	Emergency call she	et
Service:	Contact person:	Number:
Ambulance	Hans Hansen	11 22 33 44
Electrician	Petter Pettersen	22 33 44 55
Plumber	Karl Karlsen	33 44 55 66

Table 23: An example over how an Emergency call sheet might look like, some sample emergencies are included.

Location of emergency equipment			
Emergency: Placement:			
Fire extinguisher	At help desk		
Electricity	Basement		

Table 24: An example of how to enumerate all emergency equipment, should be placed on map.

Equipment outside the company				
Item: Contact/company: Number:				
Sprinkler system	Building janitor	99 88 77 66		
Backup web server	Evry	88 77 66 55		

Table 25: An example of how to enumerate all equipment not in company care, and how to reach a contact employee.

The numbers in table 26 are based on the following criteria. The rating is inspired by the book Principles of incident response and disaster recovery[14].

- 1: Salvage at all costs.
- 2: Salvage if time allows it.
- **3:** Dispose of as part of general cleanup.

Salvage priority list				
Item: Location: Priority:				
Backups	2. floor IT department	3		

Salvage priority list continued			
Item:	Location:	Priority:	
Personal computers	At personal desk	2	
Database server	2. floor IT department server room	2	
File server	2. floor IT department server room	2	
Other servers	2. floor IT department	2	
Non-storage equipment	2. floor	2	
over 10.000NOK			
Non-storage equipment	2. floor	1	
below 10.000NOK			

Table 26: List of all assets in priority human lives are not in the list, but always have top priority. This list shall be followed when several assets are at risk from one or several incidents at the same time.

8 Appendix: B (Inter-company Contact Info)

Company Call sheet				
Position:	1. phone:	2. phone:	E-mail:	Address:
Chief Executive Officer	555-1234	555-4321	ceo@blueberry.no	Strandgata 19, 2819 Gjøvik
Chief Marketing Officer	555-2345	555-5432	cmo@blueberry.no	Industrigata 1, 2819 Gjøvik
Chief Financial Officer	555-3456	555-6543	cfo@blueberry.no	Bedriftgata 20, 2819 Gjøvik
Chief Technical Officer	555-4567	555-7654	cto@blueberry.no	Gjøvikgata 5, 2819 Gjøvik
IT manager	555-5678	555-5678	itm@blueberry.no	itveien 1, 2819 Gjøvik
Network administrator	555-6789	555-9876	netadmin@blueberry.no	Nettverksgata 21, 2819 Gjøvik
System Administrator	555-1122	555-2211	sysadmin@blueberry.no	Systemveien 7, 2819 Gjøvik
Accounting manager	555-2233	555-3322	accountman@bluebery.no	Økonomiveien 9, 2819 Gjøvik
Senior Product manager	555-3344	555-4433	spm@blueberry.no	Produktveien 6, 2819 Gjøvik

Table 27: Call sheet for leader positions that are responsible for handling an incident.

9 Appendix: C (Evaluation of contingency plan)

Executive summary

The executive summary clearly sums up what we found out during the course of developing the business contingency plan. It briefly describe our process and whats left. It also depicts the importance of proper implementation. We've focused on keeping it short and concise so it would be easy to read and understand our findings.

It might be missing bit deeper insight to some of the issues we found, but by adding this would make far too long to be a functional summary.

Contingency planning policy

The policy encourages continuity training, and this covers the activities described in the report as well. The scope of continuity planning activities is set by the time intervals for revision in the policy. The different responsibilities, though not very precise, is stated in the policy along with whom is responsible for the development of the different plans.

The policy also states how the funding for business contingency planning is to be divided and used.

Quality of the writing

The quality is generally clear and concise, though there are some places where it could benefit from a better language structure. When the reader reads this entire report he/she might be able to distinguish the different authors of the report.

Since we've been using templates from the book it has a good quality of its structure which gives a good quality of the text.

Report structure

The report is logically structured and divided into chapters and sections, with the result that one can intuitively access the different areas of the report without reading the whole document. The structure of the report is built so it is easy to access the incident and disaster response plans during the annually revision. Though in an incident/disaster response scenario this report structure is not adequate, but could be solved by separating and placing the response plans in a separate folder.

In "Appendix: A", chapter 7, it is added collection of information documents which is meant to help during an incident. This appendix contains the salvage priority list, number register, and equipment location register for when it is needed to call plumbers, employees or find equipment around the premises. In "Appendix: B" we have added the call list for all employees in case of an emergency.

We've purposely left out the "Scenario Priority Document" due to it would possibly confuse

employees during an incident. Instead we have added the top ten of scenarios in the BIA.

Comprehensiveness

Because we chose a fictional company to review it was important to create a comprehensive "Business Description". We used a lot of time getting the business description right since it would later on make it easier to analyze and develop the different attack scenarios. We've described Blueberry ITs assets, network topology and the physical layout of their office in the Business description, though we have mainly focused on their network topology and business functions.

The analysis in the "Business Impact Analysis" and "Business Unit Analysis" is comprehensive and describes all the threats and business functions related to Blueberry IT, though some of the threat descriptions might be vague. During the development of "attack success scenarios" we decided to narrow our scope and took out three scenarios from the "Incident Prioritization"-section to focus on. The scenarios we chose where "unauth. installation of software", "flood" and "phishing" attacks.

When we developed the incident and response plans we focused on the same scenarios as we did in the "Potential Damage Assessment". We struggled with finding the correct structure for this section, so after checking out existing plans we landed on our own structure which is divided into two parts; a short incident detection plan and an incident response plan. This way we could have a short plan which all employees can use and a plan which is meant for the incident response team. This is followed by our disaster response plan which handle the escalated incident or pure disaster incident.

The last part, part 6, contains the "Business Continuity Plans" which describes how Blueberry is to perform a partial or full relocation of the business, and how they would recover from a partial or full loss of their IT-systems. This structure was developed by us by using a similar template as the IR/DR-plans.

The other reason why we only developed plans for three scenarios is because of the time limitations and the fact that Blueberry IT is a small company which doesn't have the time or resources to properly train or respond to every incident, though they could be developed. Since this project had a time sensitive schedule it meant we had to hold a rather narrow scope on hour report.

Implementable

We've taken into consideration that Blueberry IT is a small company with only thirty employees and therefor focused on limiting the scenarios which they have train and focus their resources on. Because of their size we've in the policy stated that Blueberry IT is required to annually hold a security seminar. In this seminar all employees will participate in the learning of how to properly notify people during an incident and of the current risk in relation to Blueberry ITs business functions.

The policy also dictates the revision and training intervals for the different attack scenarios. We've here set the training exercises to occur on different intervals since some of them are more critical. In example: testing the "Emergency Backup"-procedure is done each quarter since it is imperative that it functions properly and the testing does not affect the business procedures. On

the other side, testing the "Emergency Shutdown of IT-system"-procedure is performed annually due to its critical due to its severe effect on the business function.

In the we decided on setting a limit of ten for how many scenarios Blueberry IT is supposed to arrange training sessions on during the course of a year.

Team roles

The report clearly states who has the different responsibilities and roles within the company, but it does not clearly states who has the authority to make decision. Though its stated that during an incident that the task force leader has the authority during an incident/disaster.

Incident prioritization

Incident prioritization is based on which assets is at risk from the incident. Based on this will the incidents be prioritized by the salvage priority list, in table 26. This means that if two scenarios would at the same time and threaten the same assets it is up to the task force to make the judgement call on which to pursue.

Reporting procedures

As a part of the incident response plan we have developed another set of plans which we've called incident detection plans. They clearly state what the incident is and where/whom to report it to along with the instructions for what the recipient is to do. If the detected incident is regarded to be real it will trigger the incident response plan.

Formal aspects and references

We've been using MEX for this project in cooperation with the "guc-master-thesis" style for hour project. Since we've been working across country lines during this project we used MEX in addition with the IT-departments project management system, their Subversion system. During our start up sessions we developed a group contract and set up our development environment. During our project we've had meetings twice a week over Skype on Mondays and Thursdays in the beginning and then later on on Mondays and Fridays, due to changes in our schedules. During our project we have continuously added references to the books, figures, tables and resources we've used in an orderly fashion in our report.

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