

Adrien Wicht

Email : adrien.wicht@eui.eu

Mobile : +41 (0)79 532 22 08

Personal Website : <https://adrien-wicht.github.io/profile/>

RESEARCH INTERESTS

Dynamic Macroeconomics, International Macroeconomics, Sovereign Debt and Defaults, Optimal Contracts.

REFERENCES

Ramon Marimon European University Institute ramon.marimon@eui.eu +39 0554685911	Alexander Monge-Naranjo European University Institute alexander.monge-naranjo@eui.eu +39 0554685942	Dirk Krueger University of Pennsylvania dkrueger@sas.upenn.edu +1 2155731424
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EDUCATION

- **European University Institute** Florence, IT
PhD in Economics
Advisors: Ramon Marimon (1st) and Alexander Monge-Naranjo (2nd).
08.19– Current
- **University of Pennsylvania** Philadelphia, US
Visiting Scholar
Sponsor: Dirk Krueger.
09.21 – 02.22
- **European University Institute** Florence, IT
MRes in Economics
08.18 – 07.19
- **University of Zurich** Zurich, CH
MA in Economics
09.15 – 07.17
- **University of Fribourg** Fribourg, CH
BA in Economics
09.11 – 06.14
- **Collège Sainte-Croix** Fribourg, CH
Maturity with Major in Law and Economics
08.07 – 07.11

ADDITIONAL COURSEWORK

- **Florence School of Banking and Finance** Florence, IT
Sovereign Debt Risks
Instructor: Lee Buchheit, Mitu Gulati and Ugo Panizza.
23.05.22 – 25.05.22
- **Study Center Gerzensee** Gerzensee, CH
An Introduction to Macro-Finance
Instructor: Atif Mian.
02.05.22 – 06.05.22
- **University of Pennsylvania** Philadelphia, US
International Macroeconomics with Financial Frictions
Instructor: Enrique Mendoza.
08.21 – 12.21
- **University of Pennsylvania** Philadelphia, US
Topics in Macroeconomic Theory
Instructor: Alessandro Dovis.
08.21 – 12.21
- **Euro Area Business Cycle Network** Online
Continuous Time Methods in Macroeconomics
Instructor: Jesús Fernández-Villaverde and Galo Nuño.
28.09.20 – 30.09.20

RESEARCH ASSISTANCE

- **Robert Schuman Center of Advance Studies, European University Institute** Florence, IT
Advisor: Ramon Marimon.
09.20 – 08.21
 - Development and computation of dynamic macroeconomic models.
 - Data gathering, software programming and calibration.
- **International Policy Analysis Unit, Swiss National Bank** Zurich, CH
Head of unit: Alain Gabler.
07.17 – 07.18
 - Data processing and analysis.
 - Database management.
 - Involvement in policy-relevant research.

TEACHING ASSISTANCE

- **European University Institute** Florence, IT
Instructor: Alexander Monge-Naranjo. 04.23 – 05.23
 - **Macroeconomics III – Part. 2: Incomplete Markets:** PhD core course
- **European University Institute** Florence, IT
Instructor: Ramon Marimon. 09.22 – 10.22
 - **Advanced Macro Introduction:** PhD elective course
- **European University Institute** Florence, IT
Instructor: Ramon Marimon. 04.20 – 06.20
 - **Macro-Finance and Policy Design:** PhD elective course
- **European University Institute** Florence, IT
Instructor: Jesús Bueren. 01.20 – 03.20
 - **Macroeconomics II:** PhD core course

JOB MARKET PAPER

- **Efficient Sovereign Debt Management in Emerging Economies, 2023:** This paper assesses the sovereign debt management of emerging economies in terms of constrained Pareto efficiency. I derive a market economy in which a sovereign borrower trades non-contingent bonds of different maturities with a foreign lender. The borrower is impatient and lacks commitment. I show that the market economy cannot implement the Planner's constrained efficient allocation through defaults but instead by changes in maturity and costly debt buybacks. Moreover, as the lender must enforce those buybacks, the implementation often requires history-dependent strategies. Nevertheless, interpreting the borrower's impatience as a form of fading memory, small perturbations in the payoff of the market participants rule out any other strategies than Markov ones. In this case, the Planner's allocation can only be approximated by Markov debt management policies. I show that emerging economies such as Argentina and Brazil present evidence of such approximation albeit with different policies and outcome. In particular, conducting buybacks, the latter country comes quantitatively closer to constrained Pareto efficiency.

CURRENT WORK AND WORKING PAPERS

- **Seniority and Sovereign Default: The Role of Official Multilateral Lenders, 2023:** Sovereign countries do not necessarily repay all its creditors. There is a clear pecking order in which (official) multilateral lenders – i.e. the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank – are given priority in repayment. Yet, this preferred status is a market practice and is not legally binding. This paper documents the implications of this *de facto* seniority structure of sovereign debt. Empirically, I present strong evidence that defaults involving multilateral lenders are infrequent, last relatively longer and are associated with greater private creditors' losses. To rationalize those findings, I build a model of endogenous defaults and renegotiations. I show that the typical no-lending-into-arrear policy adopted by multilateral lenders can explain most of the aforementioned empirical facts. In addition, the *de facto* seniority generates important spillovers on other creditors and is a source of fiscal discipline. The borrower values the use of multilateral debt and would not necessarily prefer other seniority regimes.
- **Making Sovereign Debt Safe with a Financial Stability Fund (joint with Yan Liu and Ramon Marimon), 2023:** We develop an optimal design of a Financial Stability Fund that coexists with the international debt market. The sovereign can borrow defaultable bonds on the private international market, while having with the Fund a long-term contingent contract subject to limited enforcement constraints. The Fund contract does not have ex ante conditionality, but requires an accurate country-specific risk-assessment (DSA), accounting for the Fund contract. The Fund periodically announces the level of liabilities the country can sustain to achieve the constrained-efficient allocation. The Fund is only required minimal absorption of the sovereign debt, but it must provide insurance (Arrow-securities) to the country. Furthermore, with the Fund all sovereign debt is safe independently of the seniority structure; however, seniority of the Fund, with respect to the private lenders, may require a greater minimal absorption than a *pari passu* regime. We calibrate our model to the Italian economy and show it would have had a more efficient path of debt accumulation with the Fund.
- **On a Lender of Last Resort with a Central Bank and a Stability Fund (joint with Giovanni Callegari, Ramon Marimon and Luca Zavalloni), 2023:** We explore the complementarity between a central bank and a financial stability Fund in stabilizing sovereign debt markets. The central bank pursuing its mandate can intervene with public sector purchasing programs, buying sovereign debt in the secondary market, provided that the debt is safe. The sovereign sells its debt to private lenders, through market auctions. Furthermore, it has access to a long-term state-contingent contract with a Fund: a country-specific debt-and-insurance contract which accounts for no-default and sustainability constraints. The Fund needs to guarantee gross-financial-needs and no-over-lending. We show that these constraints, if they are binding at the steady-state, endogenously determine the optimal debt maturity structure that minimizes the Required Fund Capacity (RFC) to make all sovereign debt safe. However, the Fund may have limited absorption capacity and not be able to cover its RFC. But the central bank may be able to cover the difference, in which case there is perfect complementarity and the joint institutions act as an effective lender of last resort. We calibrate our model to the Italian economy and find that with of a Fund contract its optimal maturity is 3 years with a RFC of 125% of its GDP, above what the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) could reasonably absorb, but may be feasible with an ECB Transmission Protection Instrument (TPI) intervention. In contrast, the average maturity of Italian sovereign debt has been circa 6.2 years, with a needed absorption capacity around 135% of GDP, which calls for a maturity restructure to ease the activation of TPI.

- **Commitment in the Canonical Sovereign Default Model (joint with Xavier Mateos-Planas, Sean McCrory and Jose-Victor Rios-Rull), 2023:** We study the role of lack commitment in shaping the allocations of the canonical incomplete-markets sovereign default model of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981). We show how the equilibrium with commitment to the circumstances under which default can be undertaken involves a very different set of functional equations than in the equilibrium without commitment. It turns out that, in practice, under commitment default does not exist in all but very extreme quantitative environments. We document how the standard specification of Arellano (2008) displays no default if there is commitment, even in the absence of both utility cost and exclusion from borrowing. While less standard specifications can produce some default under commitment, we provide examples that demonstrate how rare default is. We interpret default as a recourse of last resort.
- **The Generalized Euler Equation and the Bankruptcy-Sovereign Default Problem (joint with Xavier Mateos-Planas, Sean McCrory and Jose-Victor Rios-Rull), 2022:** This paper characterizes the equilibrium of the standard incomplete markets models with defaults and long-term debt. A risk-averse borrower issues long-term non-contingent bonds but cannot commit to its future selves to repay. We characterize and solve for the Markov equilibrium of the dynamic game with successive borrowers through a Euler equation with derivative on future actions – i.e. a generalized Euler equation. We disentangle the effect due to default and dilution of legacy creditors and show that the price and policy functions exhibit jumps in various places. Taking the limit of finite horizon, we show existence and uniqueness of the Markov equilibrium. We also present conditions under which the price and policy functions are differentiable almost everywhere.

PUBLISHED WORK

- **Demographics and the Current Account (joint with Joschka Gerigk and Miriam Rinawi), 2018, Aussenwirtschaft, Vol. 69(1), pp. 45-76:** This paper investigates the relationship between demographics and the current account. We analyze the impact of recent demographic changes and provide a forecast of its future impact. Overall, we find a strong and robust, non-linear demographic effect. In particular, we find a positive association between the current account and the share of a population's prime-age individuals and a negative association with the share of the elderly. Our forecast suggests that, given the dramatically aging population in most industrialized countries, demographics will likely decrease the current account balance in the near future in those countries.

POLICY PAPERS

- **Euro Area fiscal policies and capacity in post-pandemic times (joint with Ramon Marimon), 2021:** The main legacy of the post-Covid-19-crisis euro area fiscal framework should be the development of a unique integrated fiscal policy and of a permanent and independent Fiscal Fund to implement it. To arrive at this conclusion, we analyse the challenges and build on current research on the optimal design of a fiscal fund. We characterise the fiscal policy, and the development of the Fund, together with the role and form that the Stability and Growth Pact can take in the new fiscal framework.

CONFERENCES, SEMINARS AND WORKSHOPS

- **17th End-of-Year Conference of Swiss Economists Abroad:** University of Basel, 22.12.22
- **Society of Economic Dynamics (SED) annual Meeting:** University of Madison-Wisconsin, 28-30.06.22
- **A Dynamic Economic and Monetary Union (ADEMU) Workshop:** BSE Summer Forum, 15-16.06.22
- **5th Interdisciplinary Sovereign Debt Research and Management Conference (DebtCon5):** EUI, Georgetown University, The Graduate Institute of Geneva, Sovereign Debt Forum, 25-26.05.22
- **21st Doctoral Meeting in International Trade, International Macroeconomics and Urban Economics:** Sciences Po Paris, 28-29.04.22
- **Macro Student Talk:** University of Pennsylvania, 17.02.22.
- **Philadelphia Fed Seminar:** Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, 16.02.22.
- **Macro Lunch Seminar:** University of Pennsylvania, 22.10.21.
- **A Dynamic Economic and Monetary Union (ADEMU) Workshop:** European Stability Mechanism, EUI and University of Luxembourg, 08-09.10.20

AWARDS AND GRANTS

- Doc Mobility Grant, Swiss National Science Foundation, 09.21-02.22.
- EUI PhD Grant, Swiss Grant-awarding Authority, 2018-2022.
- The Ernst & Young Award, University of Fribourg, Best Bachelor of Arts in Economics, 2014.
- Prix de la Banque Cantonale de Fribourg, Collège Sainte-Croix, Best GPA in Law and Economics section, 2011.
- Prix du Fonds Tesch, Collège Sainte-Croix, Best GPA in the French-speaking section, 2011.

SKILLS SUMMARY

- **Languages:** French (native), German (fluent), Swiss German (fluent), English (fluent), Italian (intermediate).
- **Text editors:** Latex, MS Office and Apple applications.
- **Software:** Excel VBA, Fortran, Julia, Matlab, MySQL, OpenMP, QGIS, R, Stata.