



HA NOI UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
SCHOOL OF INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY

Introduction to Cryptography and Security

Public key encryption from Diffie-Hellman

Outline

1 Diffie-Hellman Protocol

2 The ElGamal Public-key System


Exercise

You are given a prime $p = 4969$ and the corresponding multiplicative group \mathbb{Z}_{4969}^* .

- 1 Determine how many generators exist in \mathbb{Z}_{4969}^* .
- 2 What is the probability of a randomly chosen element $g \in \mathbb{Z}_{4969}^*$ being a generator?
- 3 Determine the smallest generator $g \in \mathbb{Z}_{4969}^*$ with $a > 1000$.

The Diffie-Hellman protocol

Public parameter: g, p



Exercise

Compute the two public keys and the shared key K for Diffie-Hellman protocol with the parameters $p = 467$ and $g = 2$, and

- ① $a = 3, b = 5$
- ② $a = 400, b = 134$
- ③ $a = 228, b = 57$

DH protocol over Galois field $GF(2^m)$

- All arithmetic is done in $GF(2^5)$ with $P(x) = x^5 + x^2 + 1$ as an irreducible field polynomial.
- The generator for Diffie-Hellman protocol is $g = x^2$. The private key are $a = 3$ and $b = 12$.
- What is the shared key K ?

DH protocol over Galois field $GF(2^m)$

- All arithmetic is done in $GF(2^5)$ with $P(x) = x^5 + x^2 + 1$ as an irreducible field polynomial.
- The generator for Diffie-Hellman protocol is $g = x^2$. The private key are $a = 3$ and $b = 12$.
- What is the shared key K ?

```
1 sage: K.<x>=GF(2^5,name='x',modulus=x^5+x^2+1)
2 sage: K=((x^2)^3)^12
3 sage: K
4 x^4 + 1
```

- Eavesdropper sees:

$$p, g, A = g^a \bmod p, \text{ and } B = g^b \bmod p$$

- Can she compute $g^{ab} \bmod p$?
- More generally, we define

$$\text{DH}_g(g^a, g^b) = g^{ab} \bmod p$$

- How hard is the DH function $\bmod p$?

How hard is the DH function $(\text{mod } p)$?

- Suppose prime p is n bits long.
- Best known algorithm (GNFS): run time $\exp(O(\sqrt[3]{n}))$

Cipher key size	Modulus size	Elliptic Curve size
80 bits	1024 bits	160 bits
128 bits	3072 bits	256 bits
256 bits (AES)	15360 bits	512 bits


- As a result: slow transition away from $(\text{mod } p)$ to elliptic curves

Exercise


Compute the following values in \mathbb{Z}_{13}^* :

- $\text{DH}_7(10, 5)$
- $\text{DH}_2(12, 9)$

Insecure against man-in-the-middle



Another look at DH




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1 Diffie-Hellman Protocol

2 The ElGamal Public-key System

Recap: public key encryption



Constructions

Previous lecture: based on trapdoor functions (such as RSA)


- Schemes: ISO standard, OAEP+, ...

This lecture: based on the Diffie-Hellman protocol

- Schemes: ElGamal encryption and variants (e.g. used in GPG)


The Diffie-Hellman protocol

Public parameter: g, p



ElGamal: converting to pub-key encryption

Public parameter: g, p



The ElGamal Scheme: Idea

Let Alice have public key g^a and secret key a .

If Bob wants to encrypt m for Alice, he

- Picks b and computes $k = g^{ab} = (g^a)^b$
- Sends ciphertext $c = (g^b, m \cdot k)$ to Alice.

Alice can recompute $k = g^{ab} = (g^b)^a$ because

- g^b is in the received ciphertext
- a is her secret key

and she can decrypt $m = c \cdot k^{-1}$.

Exercise

Encrypt the following messages with the Elgamal scheme ($p = 467$ and $g = 2$):

- ① secrete key $a = 105$ and $b = 213$ and message $m = 33$
- ② secrete key $a = 105$ and $b = 123$ and message $m = 33$
- ③ secrete key $a = 300$ and $b = 45$ and message $m = 248$
- ④ secrete key $a = 300$ and $b = 47$ and message $m = 248$

ElGamal system (a modern view)

- G : finite cyclic group of order n
- (E_s, D_s) : symmetric encryption defined over (K, M, C) ;
- $H : G^2 \rightarrow K$: a hash function.

We construct a pub-key encryption system (G, E, D) .

ElGamal system (a modern view)

Key generation $G()$:

- choose random generator g in G and random a in \mathbb{Z}_n
- output $sk = a$, $pk = (g, h = g^a)$

Encryption $E(pk = (g, h), m)$:

$b \leftarrow \$ \mathbb{Z}_n$, $u = g^b$, $v = h^b$, $k = H(u, v)$, $c \leftarrow E_s(k, m)$
return (u, c)

Decryption $D(sk = a, (u, c))$:

$v = u^a$, $k = H(u, v)$, $m = D_s(k, c)$
return m

ElGamal performance

Encryption & Decryption

$E(pk = (g, h), m) :$

$$b \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_n, u = g^b, v = h^b$$

$D(sk = a, (u, c)) :$

$$v = u^a$$

Encryption: 2 exp. (fixed basis)

- Can pre-compute $\{g^{(2^i)}, h^{(2^i)} \mid \text{for } i = 1, \dots, \log_2 n\}$
- 3x speed-up (or more)

Decryption: 1 exp. (variable basis)

Computational Diffie-Hellman Assumption

- G : finite cyclic group of order n
- Computational Diffie-Hellman assumption holds in G if:

$$g, g^a, g^b \not\Rightarrow g^{ab}.$$

For all efficient algorithms A :

$$\Pr \left[A(g, g^a, g^b) = g^{ab} \right] < \text{negligible}$$

where $g \leftarrow \{ \text{generators of } G \}$, $a, b \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_n$.



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Thank you!

