


ID protocols

Overview

The Setup



Applications: physical world

- Physical locks: (friend-or-foe)
 - Wireless car entry system
 - Opening an office door




Login at a bank ATM or a desktop computer




Applications: Internet

Login to a remote web site after a key-exchange with one-sided authentication (e.g. HTTPS)




ID Protocols: how not to use

- ID protocol do not establish a secure session between Alice and Bob !!
 - Not even when combined with anonymous key exch.



ID Protocols: how not to use

- ID protocol do not set up a secure session between Alice and Bob !!
 - Not even when combined with anonymous key exch.
 - Vulnerable to man in to the middle attack



ID Protocols: Security Models

- 1. **Direct Attacker**: impersonates prover with no additional information (other than vk)
 - Door lock



- 2. Eavesdropping attacker: impersonates prover after eavesdropping on a few conversations between prover and verifier
 - Wireless car entry system
- **3. Active attacker**: interrogates prover and then attempts to impersonate prover
 - Fake ATM in shopping mall






ID protocols

Direct attacks

Basic Password Protocol (incorrect version)

• **PWD**: finite set of passwords

- Algorithm G (KeyGen):
 - choose $pw \leftarrow PWD$. output sk = vk = pw.



Basic Password Protocol (incorrect version)

Problem: vk must be kept secret

- Compromise of server exposes all passwords
- Never store passwords in the clear!


password file on server

Alice	pw _{alice}
Bob	pw _{bob}
•••	•••

Basic Password Protocol: version 1

H: one-way hash function from PWD to X

"Given H(x) it is difficult to find y such that H(y)=H(x)"



password file on server

Alice	H(pw _A)
Bob	H(pw _B)
•••	•••

Problem: Weak Password Choice

Users frequently choose weak passwords:

(SplashData, 2018, from more than 5 million passwords leaked on the Internet)

- 1. 123456
 - password
- 3. 123456789
- 4. 12345678
- 5. 12345

- 6. 111111
- 7. 1234567
- 8. sunshine
- 9. qwerty
- 10. iloveyou

Dictionary of 360,000,000 words covers about 25% of user passwords

- The 25 top passwords on the list cover more than 10% of users
- Nearly 3% of people use the worst password, 123456.

Online dictionary attack: attacker has a list of usernames. For each username the attacker tries the password '123456'.

• Success after 33 tries on average (!)

Can be mitigated by e.g., IP-based rate limiting

Offline Dictionary Attacks

Suppose attacker obtains a **single** vk = H(pw) from server

- Offline attack: hash all words in Dict until a word w is found such that H(w) = vk
- Time O(|Dict|) per password

Off the shelf tools (e.g. John the ripper):

- Scan through <u>all</u> 7-letter passwords in a few minutes
- Scan through 360,000,000 guesses in few seconds
 - ⇒ will recover 23% of passwords

Batch Offline Dictionary Attacks

Suppose attacker steals entire pwd file F

- Obtains hashed pwds for all users
- Example (2012): Linkedin (6M: SHA1(pwd))

Alice	H(pw _A)
Bob	H(pw _B)
	•••

Batch dict. attack:

• For each w ∈ Dict: test if H(w) appears in F (using fast look-up)

Total time: O(|Dict|+|F|) [Linkedin: 6 days, 90% of pwds. recovered]

Much better than attacking each password individually!

Preventing Batch Dictionary Attacks

Public salt:

- When setting password, pick a random n-bit salt S
- When verifying pw for A, test if $H(pw, S_{\Delta}) = h_{\Delta}$

id	S	h
Alice	S _A	$H(pw_A, S_A)$
Bob	S _B	$H(pw_B, S_B)$
•••	•••	•••

Recommended salt length, n = 64 bits

Attacker must re-hash dictionary for each user

Batch attack time is now: $O(|Dict| \times |F|)$

How to hash a password?

Linked-in: SHA1 hashed (unsalted) passwords

⇒ 6 days, 90% of passwords recovered by exhaustive search

The problem: SHA1 is too fast ...

attacker can try all words in a large dictionary

To hash passwords:

- Use a keyed hash function (e.g., HMAC) where key stored in HSM
- In addition: use a **slow**, **space-hard** function

How to hash?

PBKDF2, bcrypt: slow hash functions

- Slowness by "iterating" a crypto hash function like SHA256 Example: $H(pw) = SHA256(SHA256(... SHA256(pw, S_A) ...))$
- Number of iterations: set for 1000 evals/sec
- Unnoticeable to user, but makes offline dictionary attack harder
- **Problem**: custom hardware (ASIC) can evaluate hash function 50,000x faster than a commodity CPU
 - ⇒ attacker can do dictionary attack much faster than 1000 evals/sec.

How to hash: a better approach

Scrypt: a slow hash function AND need lots of memory to evaluate

⇒ custom hardware not much faster than commodity CPU

Problem: memory access pattern depends on input password

- ⇒ local attacker can learn memory access pattern for a given password
- ⇒ eliminates need for memory in an offline dictionary attack

Is there a space-hard function where time is independent of pwd?

• Password hashing competition (2015): Argon2i (also Balloon)



ID protocols

Security against eavesdropping attacks

(one-time password systems)

Eavesdropping Security Model

Adversary is given:

- Server's vk, and
- the transcript of several interactions between honest prover and verifier. (example: remote car unlock)

adv. goal is to impersonate prover to verifier

A protocol is "secure against eavesdropping" if no efficient adversary can win this game


The password protocol is clearly insecure!



One-time passwords (secret vk, stateful)


Setup (algorithm G):

- Choose random key k
- Output sk = (k,0); vk = (k,0)





Identification:



often, time-based updates: $r \leftarrow F(k, time)$


[stateless]

The SecurID system

(secret vk, stateful)

"Thm": if F is a secure PRF then protocol is secure against eavesdropping

RSA SecurID uses AES-128:




Advancing state: $sk \leftarrow (k, i+1)$

- Time based: every 60 seconds
- User action: every button press

Both systems allow for skew in the counter value





Google authenticator

- 6-digit timed one-time passwords (TOTP) based on [RFC 6238]
- Wide web-site adoption:
 - Evernote, Dropbox, WordPress, outlook.com, ...

To enable TOTP for a user: web site presents QR code with embedded data: otpauth://totp/Example:alice@dropbox.com? secret=JBSWY3DPEHPK3PXP & issuer=Example

(Subsequent user logins require user to present TOTP)

Danger: password reset upon user lockout

Server compromise exposes secrets

March 2011:

- RSA announced servers attacked, secret keys stolen
 - ⇒ enabled SecurID user impersonation

Is there an ID protocol where server key vk is public?

The S/Key system


(public vk, stateful)

Notation:
$$H^{(n)}(x) = H(H(...H(x)...))$$

Algorithm G: (setup)

- Choose random key $k \leftarrow K$
- Output sk = (k,n); $vk = H^{(n+1)}(k)$

<u>Identification</u>:



Dan Boneh

The S/Key system

(public vk, stateful)

```
Identification (in detail):
```

- Prover (sk=(k,i)): send $t \leftarrow H^{(i)}(k)$; set $sk \leftarrow (k,i-1)$
- Verifier(vk=H⁽ⁱ⁺¹⁾(k)): if H(t)=vk then vk←t, output "yes"

Notes: vk can be made public; but need to generate new sk after n logins ($n \approx 10^6$)

"Thm": S/Key_n is secure against eavesdropping (public vk) provided H is one-way on n-iterates

SecurID vs. S/Key

S/Key:

- public vk, limited number of authentications
- Long authenticator t (e.g., 80 bits)

SecurID:

- secret vk, unlimited number of authentications
- Short authenticator (6 digits)




ID protocols

Security against active attacks

(challenge-response protocols)

Active Attacks




 Offline fake ATM: interacts with user; later tries to impersonate user to real ATM

Offline phishing: phishing site interacts with user;
later authenticates to real site

All protocols so far are vulnerable

MAC-based Challenge Response (secret vk)



"Thm": protocol is secure against active attacks (secret vk), provided (S_{MAC} , V_{MAC}) is a secure MAC

MAC-based Challenge Response

Problems:

- vk must be kept secret on server
- dictionary attack when k is a human pwd:

```
Given [ m , S_{MAC} (pw, m) ] eavesdropper can try all pw \in Dict to recover pw
```

Main benefit:


- Both m and t can be short
- CryptoCard: 8 chars each



Sig-based Challenge Response

(public vk)

Replace MAC with a digital signature:



"Thm": Protocol is secure against active attacks (public vk), provided (G_{SIG} , Sign, Verify) is a secure digital sig.

but t is long (≥20 bytes)

Summary

ID protocols: useful in settings where adversary cannot interact with prover during impersonation attempt

Three security models:

- Direct: passwords (properly salted and hashed)
- Eavesdropping attacks: One time passwords
 - SecurID: secret vk, unbounded logins
 - S/Key: public vk, bounded logins
- Active attacks: challenge-response

THE END