Summary of Changes for (Paper #13) *Nation-State Hegemony in Internet Routing*

1. Address in more depth the comparison to related work and highlight the novelty of RAN in light of Alibi and DeTor routing. [**We added more detail and justification of how and why RAN is different from Alibi Routing and DeTor in Section 2.]**

2. Address reviewer A and D concerns about placement and scalability of the relays. Reviewer A asks specifically about the relationship between relay placement and ability to avoid countries. Reviewer D asks about overload on relays should RAN get frequent use. [**To address Reviewer A's comments on the relationship between relay placement and ability to avoid countries, we added text in Section 4.1 and Section 6.2.1. To address Reviewer D's comments on overload on relays given frequent we use, we added Subsection 6.1 on adding relays/oracles, how to recover from failed relays/oracles, and how RAN can scale to large numbers of users.**]

3. Examine whether the measurements can be improved based on techniques mentioned in Review A. If they cannot, be clear about the limitations of the measurement methodology. [**We added some additional justification for the choices we made in our measurement methods in Section 3.1. We had already justified the number of vantage points, the countries chosen, the destination points (Alexa Top 100), and the number of relays (detouring points) – these are all due to resource constraints on the RIPE Atlas platform. We had already highlighted the limitations of geo-location services and the nature of RAN not guaranteeing any country avoidance. We also addressed this reviewers comment on the locations of detouring points (relays) when we addressed #2 (above).**]

4. Detangle the causes of unavoidability more clearly, per Review D. [**To better explain the different causes of unavoidability more clearly, we added a metric for calculating the upper bound on avoiding a given country based on where the client is located in Section 4.2. This helps differentiate when 1) there's no path to the content even though the content is not located in the country to be avoided and 2) when the only replica of the content is located in the country to be avoided. We also highlight the results of the upper bound calculation in Section 4.3 and the caption of Table 3.**]