(Applied) Cryptography Tutorial #5

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1 - Use OpenSSL to calculate the SHA256 value of the pdf slides of this week's class. Check if it equals: 4748dfe624d759009e3486fd062cd21dcf1858be435ea51c7ec7b4e53f52e02e

- 1.1 What does this tell you about the integrity of the file?
- 1.2 Suppose you alter the first 4 bytes of the original pdf file, and recompute the SHA256 value of this altered file. How many bytes do you expect to be affected by this change?
- 2 Use python to crack the security of predictable passwords in crack_hash.py
 - The file has the twenty most common passwords of 2019.
 - The code produces hash values of passwords (salted and non-salted), then they are shuffled.
 - From the shuffled hashes and the list of most common passwords, retrieve the original passwords!
- 2.1 Follow the instructions given as comments in the code. Can you retrieve the passwords?
- 2.2 Include a succinct analysis of how long it would take to do the following attacks:
 - Cracking this set of passwords without salt
 - Cracking this set of passwords with the same 1 byte salt, where all hashes use the same salt
 - Cracking this set of passwords with the same 8 byte salt, where all hashes use the same salt
 - Cracking this set of passwords with the same 8 byte salt, where all hashes use different salts
- 3 Use the tool available <u>here</u> (or any other tool that works) to construct two PDFs with the same SHA-1 value. Check out the SHAttered paper and explain how the attack works.
- 4 A length extension attack works as follows.
 - Application generates secret key k, which is kept hidden
 - At some point application computes h = H(k||m) for some message m and publishes (m,h).
 - Intuitively it should be impossible for some attacker to compute H(k||m') for $m \neq m'$.
 - However, for some hash functions, it is possible to compute such a value using only (M, h). This technique has been explained in theoretical classes for the SHA-2 family. Demonstrate the attack by constructing:
 - A Python program that generates k, computes h = SHA2(k||m) for some m and saves k, m and h into different files.
 - Another Python program that reads m and h (but not k!) and generates some m' and h' into different files. Is must be the case that SHA2(k||m') = h' and that $m \neq m'$.