



Functional Safety Concept Lane

Assistance

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Document history

[Instructions: Fill in the date, version and description fields. You can fill out the Editor field with your name if you want to do so. Keep track of your editing as if this were a real world project.

For example, if this were your first draft or first submission, you might say version 1.0. If this is a second submission attempt, then you'd add a second line with a new date and version 2.0]

| Date | Version | Editor | Description |
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| 26/08/201 7 | 1.0 | Bide Huang | Initial draft |
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Purpose of the Functional Safety Concept

The purpose of the functional safety concept is to identify new system level requirements and allocate these requirements to high level system diagrams for the lane assistance functionals afety project as pertain to the potential malfunctions of the electrical and electronic systems as defined by ISO 26262 standard.

Inputs to the Functional Safety Concept

Safety goals from the Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment

[Instructions:

REQUIRED:


Provide the lane departure warning and lane keeping assistance safety goals as discussed in the lessons and derived in the hazard analysis and risk assessment.

OPTIONAL:

If you expanded the hazard analysis and risk assessment to include other safety goals, include them here.

| ID | Safety Goal |
|----------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Safety_Goal_01 | The oscillating steering torque from the lane departure warning (LDW) function shall be limited |
| Safety_Goal_02 | The lane keeping assistance (LKA) function shall be time limited, and the additional steering torque shall end after a given time interval so that the driver cannot misuse the system for autonomous driving. |

Preliminary Architecture



Description of architecture elements

| Element | Description |
|-------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Camera Sensor | Responsible for capturing vehicle driving condition including detectable lane lines. |
| Camera Sensor ECU | Responsible for detecting lane lines and determining when the vehicle leaves the lane by mistake. |
| Car Display | Visual display responsible to displaying warning of lane departures and LKA and LDW activation and deactivations. |
| Car Display ECU | Responsible for communication with Camera ECU and controlling the display device. |
| Driver Steering Torque Sensor | Responsible for measuring how much steering torque the driver is applying to the steering wheel. |
| Electronic Power Steering ECU | Responsible for process driver torque sensor data and add appropriate amount of torque based on a lane assistance system torque request (LKA), and vibrates the steering wheel when the driver drifts away from center by mistake (LDW). |
| Motor | Actuatating torque request from the Electronic Power Steering ECU for either the LKA or the LDW functions. |

Functional Safety Concept

The functional safety concept consists of:

- Functional safety analysis
- Functional safety requirements
- Functional safety architecture
- Warning and degradation concept

Functional Safety Analysis

| Malfunction ID | Main Function of the Item Related to Safety Goal Violations Guidewords (NO, WRONG, EARLY, LATE, MORE, LESS) | | Resulting Malfunction | |
|----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--|
| Malfunction_01 | Lane Departure Warning (LDW) function shall apply an oscillating steering torque to provide the driver a haptic feedback | MORE: DV04 - Actor effect (torque amplitude) is too much | The lane departure warning function applies an oscillating torque with very high torque amplitude (above limit) | |
| Malfunction_02 | Lane Departure Warning (LDW) function shall apply an oscillating steering torque to provide the driver a haptic feedback | MORE: DV04 - Actor effect (torque frequency) is too much | The lane departure warning function applies an oscillating torque with very high torque frequency (above limit) | |
| Malfunction_03 | Lane Keeping Assistance (LKA) function shall apply the steering torque when active in order to stay in ego lane | NO: DV03 - Function always activated (No limit) | The lane keeping assistance function is not limited in time duration which leads to misuse as an autonomous driving function. | |

Functional Safety Requirements

Lane Departure Warning (LDW) Requirements:

| ID | Functional Safety Requirement | A S I L | Fault Tolerant Time Interval | Safe State |
|----------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------|---------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------|
| Functional Safety Requirement 01-01 | The lane keeping item shall ensure that the lane departure oscillating torque amplitude is below MAX_Torque_Amplitude | С | 50 ms | Set vibration torque amplitude to zero |
| Functional Safety Requirement 01-02 | The lane keeping item shall ensure that the lane departure oscillating torque frequency is below MAX_Torque_Frequency | С | 50 ms | Set vibration torque frequency to zero. |

Lane Departure Warning (LDW) Verification and Validation Acceptance Criteria:

| ID | Validation Acceptance Criteria and Method | Verification Acceptance Criteria and Method |
|----------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Functional Safety Requirement 01-01 | Validate MAX_Torque_Amplitude Verify that the system really does turn chosen is high enough to be detected by driver while low enough not to cause loss of steering. | Verify that the system really does turn off if the lane departure warning ever exceeded MAX_Torque_Amplitude. |
| Functional Safety Requirement 01-02 | Validate MAX_Torque_Fequency chosen is high enough to be detected by driver while low enough not to cause loss of steering. | Verify that the system really does turn off if the lane departure warning ever exceeded MAX_Torque_Fequency. |


Lane Keeping Assistance (LKA) Requirements:

| ID | Functional Safety Requirement | A S I L | Fault Tolerant Time Interval | Safe State |
|----------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------|---------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------|
| Functional Safety Requirement 02-01 | The electronic power steering ECU shall ensure that the lane keeping assistance torque is applied for only Max_Duration | В | 500 ms | Set lane keeping assistance torque to zero |

Lane Keeping Assistance (LKA) Verification and Validation Acceptance Criteria:

| ID | Validation Acceptance Criteria and Method | Verification Acceptance Criteria and Method |
|----------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Functional Safety Requirement 02-01 | Validate that the Max_Duration chosen really did dissuade drivers from taking their hands off the wheel | Verify that the system really does turn off if the lane keeping assistance ever exceeded Max_Duration |

Refinement of the System Architecture



Allocation of Functional Safety Requirements to Architecture Elements

Allocation of Functional Safety Requirements to Architecture Elements

| ID | Functional Safety Requirement | Electronic Power Steering ECU | Camera ECU | Car Display ECU |
|----------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------|---------------|-----------------|
| Functional Safety Requirement 01-01 | The lane keeping item shall ensure that the lane departure oscillating torque amplitude is below MAX_Torque_Amplitude | х | | |
| Functional Safety Requirement 01-02 | The lane keeping item shall ensure that the lane departure oscillating torque frequency is below MAX_Torque_Frequency | х | | |
| Functional Safety Requirement 02-01 | The electronic power steering ECU shall ensure that the lane keeping assistance torque is applied for only Max_Duration | х | | |

Warning and Degradation Concept

| ID | Degradation Mode | Trigger for Degradation Mode | Safe State invoked? | Driver Warning |
|--------|----------------------------|------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| WDC-01 | Turn off LDW functionality | Malfunction_01, Malfunction_02 | Yes, LDW torque shall be set to zero | Warning of malfunction adn lane assist inactive shall be indicated on Car display. |
| WDC-02 | Turn off LKA functionality | Malfunction_03 Malfunction_05 | Yes, LKA torque shall be set to zero | Warning of malfunction adn lane assist inactive shall be indicated on Car display. |