

# Safety-critical Control in Mixed Criticality Embedded Systems

An evaluation of the EMC<sup>2</sup> development platform used in  
vehicle platooning

Master Thesis  
Royal Institute of Technology  
Stockholm, Sweden

Emil Hjelm  
`emilhje@kth.se`

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Safety-critical Control in Mixed Criticality  
Embedded Systems

Emil Hjelm

Approved: (datum)	Examiner: Martin Törngren	Supervisor: Bengt Eriksson
	Uppdragsgivare: Alten	Kontaktperson: Detlef Scholle

## Abstract

Modern automotive systems contain a large number of Electronic Control Units, each controlling a specific system of a specific criticality level. To increase computational efficiency it is desired to combine multiple applications into fewer ECUs, this leads to mixed criticality embedded systems. The assurance of safety critical applications not being affected by non-critical applications on the same system is crucial.



Examensarbete MMK2017:Z MDAZZZ

Säkerhetskritisk kontroll i blandkritiska inbyggda  
system

Emil Hjelm

Godkänt: (datum)	Examinator: Martin Törngren	Handledare: Bengt Eriksson
	Uppdragsgivare: Alten	Kontaktperson: Detlef Scholle

## Sammanfattning

Denna del kommer att innehålla en sammanfattning av arbetet på svenska.

# Preface

Credit where credit is due.

Emil Hjelm  
Stockholm

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# Abbreviations

Abbreviation	Description
ECU	Electronic Control Unit
MCS	Mixed Criticality System
EMC <sup>2</sup>	Embedded Multi-Core systems for Mixed Criticality applications in dynamic and changeable real-time environments
RTOS	Real-Time Operating System
GPOS	General Purpose Operating System
FPGA	Field Programmable Gate Array
SIL	Safety Integrity Level
ASIL	Automotive Safety Integrity Level
DAL	Development Assurance Level
VMM	Virtual Machine Monitor
EMC <sup>2</sup> DP	EMC <sup>2</sup> Development Platform
RM	Rate Monotonic
DM	Deadline Monotonic
FP	Fixed Priority
EDF	Earliest Deadline First
AUTOSAR	AUTomotive Open System ARchitecture

# Chapter 1

## Introduction

This chapter will introduce the subject of mixed criticality embedded systems and the EU project "EMC<sup>2</sup>" to the reader.

### 1.1 Background

Today, modern automotive systems contain around 70-100 Electric Control Units (ECU)s [19]. Each ECU controls a subsystem of a specific criticality level such as safety-critical anti-lock brake system, or non-critical entertainment systems [25]. Having the ECUs isolated ensures that the numerous critical and non-critical applications do not interfere with each other, thus it is a simple task to certify an individual ECU. However, this approach leads to an inefficient use of system resources and expensive system implementation [10]. In order to lower the cost of the collective system and increase system efficiency (utilization), applications of different criticality levels can be integrated into a single multicore platform, leading to a Mixed Criticality System (MCS). However, this approach increases system complexity, and hinders the certification of safety-critical systems [30]. In order to facilitate the design, test, and certification of such systems, spatial and temporal partitioning can be used in the architecture of the system as described by [30].

Protecting the integrity of a component from the faults of another is desired in all systems hosting multiple applications. However, it is of higher significance if the different applications have different criticality levels. Without such protection all components on the same system would need to be engineered to the standards of the highest criticality level, potentially massively increasing development costs [10].

The EU project "Embedded Multi-Core systems for Mixed Criticality applications in dynamic and changeable real-time environments" (EMC<sup>2</sup>) was founded in order to "find solutions for dynamic adaptability in open systems, provide handling of mixed criticality applications under real-time conditions, scalability and utmost flexibility, full scale deployment and management of integrated tool chains, through the entire lifecycle" [25].

### 1.1.1 Definition of safety-critical systems

The term "safety-critical system" has many definitions, most quite similar. Most definitions relate to systems with the potential to harm humans if the system malfunctions. According to [13] it is defined as "A system in which any failure or design error has the potential to lead to loss of life." Further, [11] defines safety-critical systems as "A computer, electronic or electromechanical system whose failure may cause injury or death to human beings." A Wikipedia article, [27], defines a safety-critical system (or "life-critical system") as a system whose failure or malfunction may result in one (or more) of the following outcomes:

- death or serious injury to people
- loss or severe damage to equipment/property
- environmental harm

In this thesis, a safety-critical system will be defined as "a system whose failure may cause injury or death to human beings."

### 1.1.2 Different levels of criticality

Different names of levels of criticality are typically Safety Integrity Level (SIL), Automotive Safety Integrity Level (ASIL) and Development Assurance Level (DAL). The IEC 61508 standard [15] defines four different levels and the ISO 26262 standard [16] and the DO-178C standard [12] define five different levels each. These levels range from low or no hazard up to life-threatening or fatal in the event of a malfunction requiring the highest level of assurance that the dependent safety goals are sufficient and have been achieved.

The number of criticality levels in the implementation part of this thesis will be restricted to two: "safety-critical" and "non-critical". This is due to the constraints presented in section 1.1.3 and 1.5.

### 1.1.3 EMC<sup>2</sup> development board

As a part of the EMC<sup>2</sup> project, Alten has developed a system for handling applications of mixed criticality on the same piece of hardware. The MCS developed at Alten is implemented on a Xilinx Zynq-7000 [29]. The development board is called EMC<sup>2</sup> Development Platform, or EMC<sup>2</sup>DP. It employs two operating systems to handle applications of different criticality. A General Purpose Operating System (GPOS) for non-critical applications and a Real-Time Operating System (RTOS) for safety-critical applications. A Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM) is used to alternate between the two.

Resources on the board are separated between safety-critical and non-critical via ARM TrustZone [3].

For more detailed information, see chapter 3 or the report by Zaki [30].

### 1.1.4 Platooning

”The platooning concept can be defined as a collection of vehicles that travel together, actively coordinated in formation. Some expected advantages of platooning include increased fuel and traffic efficiency, safety and driver comfort” [9].

## 1.2 Problem statement

An ideal MCS ensures partitioning between different criticality levels while still sharing resources efficiently. This leads to the underlying research question:

- ”How, in a disciplined way, to reconcile the conflicting requirements of partitioning for safety assurance and sharing for efficient resource usage?” [10]

The MCS developed at Alten (EMC<sup>2</sup>DP) 1.1.3 switches Operative System (OS) to enable partitioning between safety-critical and non-critical applications, which takes about 2  $\mu s$ . This mode switch introduces additional deadlines which makes processor scheduling more difficult.

To evaluate the performance of the system, a distance keeping control algorithm for platooning will be implemented on it. A demonstrator will be constructed in the form of a RC car capable of following a vehicle in front

of it at a specified distance. If the lead car exceeds a predefined maximum speed or deviates from the road, the following car should not exceed the maximum speed. The performance of the embedded controller and the control algorithm will be measured during heavy non-critical computational load, and without any non-critical load altogether.

It should be verified that no matter the computational load and eventual crashes of the Linux based non-critical system, the distance keeping algorithm on the RTOS should never crash.

This problem leads to the research question:

- How well can a safety-critical control system perform when implemented on a mixed criticality system using virtualization?

alternatively:

- Is virtualization an efficient approach when trying to reconcile the conflicting requirements of partitioning for safety assurance and sharing for efficient resource usage when implementing a safety-critical control system?

## 1.3 Purpose

Reducing the amount of computers in automotive systems would have many effects. Manufacturing costs would decrease and with fewer physical components maintenance costs would also decrease. However, the system complexity would increase and thereby increasing time and cost to design the system.

SafeCOP (Safe Cooperating Cyber-Physical Systems) is an European project that targets cyberphysical systems-of-systems whose safe cooperation relies on wireless communication [20]. SafeCOPs Use Case 3 (UC3) regarding "Vehicle control loss warning" together with the EMC2 goals tie well in with the problem statement and use case described in 1.2.

## 1.4 Goals

In this project there are both team goals and individual goals that do not always necessarily align with each other.

### **1.4.1 Team goal**

The team consists of five master thesis students. The students areas of work are: control theory and system modeling, data aggregation, safety-critical communication in MCS, lane detection and finally safety-critical control in MCS. Together the team will build a vehicle capable of following a vehicle ahead of it while keeping inside road markers.

### **1.4.2 Individual goal**

Verify quantitatively the performance of safety-critical distance keeping controller, see section 1.6. Solve the problems described in section 1.2.

## **1.5 Scope**

The work of this thesis and the implementation on the demonstrator will build upon the work of Youssef Zaki [30].

The embedded computer is constrained to the Xilinx Zynq-7000 SoC [29].

The architecture of the cooperative adaptive cruise control algorithm will be designed by Daniel Roshanghias.

The lane detection and lateral control will be developed by Sanel Ferhatovic.

## **1.6 Research design**

The plan is to conduct an confirmatory investigation using quantitative data/operations with a deductive approach. This is a quantitative research method. [14].

The position of the demonstrator will be read by a separate sensor of the same type as the one on the demonstrator. The performance of the control system and the embedded controller will be measured and compared with the same system without any non-critical computational load. This will also be done for a simulation of the system. The measures regarding control system performance will consist of

- Response time
- Overshoot

- Settling time

Data points for the performance of the embedded controller will be extracted from the RTOS, and the measures will consist of

- Missed deadlines
- CPU utilization

## **1.7 Ethical considerations**

When designing a MCS it is crucial to ensure that errors made by a lower criticality application cannot propagate to higher criticality applications. This could have catastrophic consequences. Because of this the requirement of partitioning must have higher priority than the need of sharing.

# Chapter 2

## State of the art

This chapter will go through relevant articles and already known knowledge on the subject of mixed criticality systems, vehicle platooning and safety standards in the automotive industry.

### 2.1 Mixed criticality systems

A MCS is achieved by letting applications of different criticality share resources. These resources could be the processor, memory, peripherals, input/output ports etc. The most explored area is sharing the CPU between multiple criticality levels [10]. The benefit of combining previously distributed systems is higher resource efficiency, which leads to economical benefits.

#### 2.1.1 Economical benefits of MCS

Potential benefits with pursuing MCS as opposed to distributed systems are reduced physical space required, reduced weight, reduced heat generation, reduced power consumption and reduced production costs [10]. This would all ultimately lead to economical benefits.

Potential downsides are increased complexity which could lead to higher system design costs. Building applications on the same platform to share resources could require engineering teams to work more closely together, potentially leading to administrative difficulties and costs. This needs to be investigated and could vary from industry to industry. To combat the potential downsides, the EMC<sup>2</sup> project aims at creating platforms for easier development of MCS.



The EMC<sup>2</sup> project lists several goals [26]:

- Reduce the cost of the system design by 15%
- Reduce the effort and time required for re-validation and re-certification of systems after making changes by 15%
- Manage a complexity increase of 25% with 10% effort reduction
- Achieve cross-sectorial reusability of Embedded Systems devices and architecture platforms that will be developed using the ARTEMIS JU results.

### **2.1.2 Sharing processor**

To deal with many different tasks needing processor time, different schedulers can be used to appropriately distribute processor time among the tasks.

#### **Conventional scheduling**

Fixed priority Deadline monotonic Rate monotonic Earliest deadline first Round robin

#### **Mixed criticality scheduling**

The area of sharing the processor in MCS was first explored by Steve Vestal [24] in 2007. His paper showed that neither Rate Monotonic (RM) nor Deadline Monotonic (DM) priority assignment was optimal for MCS; however Audsley's optimal priority assignment algorithm [4] was found to be applicable.

In 2008 Baruah and Vestal [8] showed that EDF (Earliest Deadline First) does not dominate FP when criticality levels are introduced, and that there are feasible systems that cannot be scheduled by EDF.

One MCS scheduling algorithm is Criticality Monotonic Priority Ordering (CrMPO). Tasks are assigned priorities first according to criticality (highest criticality first) and then according to deadline (shortest deadline first). Static Mixed Criticality with no run-time monitoring (SMC-NO) is the scheduler that was Vestal's original approach [24]. Another scheduler is SMC with run-time monitoring (abbreviated only as SMC). Yet another scheduling algorithm is Adaptive Mixed Criticality (AMC), described Baruah, Burns and Davis [7]: "To summarise the main difference between SMC and AMC, in

SMC any LO-critical task is descheduled if it executes for more than  $C(LO)$ . While in AMC, all LO-critical tasks are descheduled if any job (from any task) executes for more than  $C(LO)$ . If a HI-critical job executes for more than  $C(LO)$  (but no greater than  $C(HI)$ ) then, under SMC, LO-critical tasks continue to execute but may miss their deadlines; but under AMC they stop executing.”

To evaluate the performance of the different scheduling algorithms Baruah, Burns and Davis [7] tested the scheduling algorithms AMC, SMC and CrMPO for scheduling sporadic tasks of a taskset of 20 tasks where on average 50% where of high criticality and 50% where of low criticality. The tasks of high criticality where allowed an execution time that was twice its low criticality execution time. The comparison of the performance of the schedulers can be seen in Figure 2.1. In the graph the UB-H&L line bounds the maximum possible number of schedulable task sets.




Figure 2.1: Percentage of schedulable tasks. [7]

For a more complete review of work done on MCSs with a shared processor, see the paper by Burns [10].

## **2.2 Standards**

Safety practices are becoming more regulated as industries adopt a standardized set of practices for designing and testing products.

### **2.2.1 IEC 61508**

IEC 61508 [15] is intended to be a basic functional safety standard for electrical and electronic systems applicable to all kinds of industry. It defines four different safety integrity levels, SIL 1 being the least dependable up to SIL 4 which is the most dependable level.

### **2.2.2 ISO 26262**

ISO 26262 [16] addresses the needs for an automotive-specific international standard that focuses on safety critical components. ISO 26262 is a derivative of IEC 61508.

#### **ASILs**

ISO 26262 describes five different Automotive Safety Integrity Levels (ASIL) relating to hazard and risk. Ranked from lowest (no) hazard to highest hazard, these levels are: QM, A, B, C and D. A function is assigned an ASIL depending on the severity if the function fails, the probability that the function fails and the controllability of the function, see table 2.1.

Severity	Probability	Controllability		
		C1	C2	C3
S1	E1	QM	QM	QM
	E2	QM	QM	QM
	E3	QM	QM	A
	E4	QM	A	B
S2	E1	QM	QM	QM
	E2	QM	QM	A
	E3	QM	A	B
	E4	A	B	C
S3	E1	QM	QM	A
	E2	QM	A	B
	E3	A	B	C
	E4	B	C	D

Table 2.1: ASIL as a function of severity, probability and controllability.

The various integrity levels can be translated into integers (ASIL  $QM = 0$ ;  $A = 1$ ;  $B = 2$ ;  $C = 3$  and  $D = 4$ ). If a hazard requires several components to fail, the added ASIL of these components is used to determine if there is an violation, assuming the components faults are statistically independent of each other. For example, a safety level ASIL B can be met by two independent components which each individually only meet ASIL A (and thus effectively  $A + A = B$ ). [6]

The different ASILs can relate to cost according to various cost heuristics, see table 2.2.

Cost Heuristic	QM	A	B	C	D
Linear	0	10	20	30	40
Logarithmic	0	10	100	1000	10000
Experimental-I [6]	0	10	20	40	50
Experimental-II [6]	0	20	30	45	55

Table 2.2: ASIL cost heuristics.

### Freedom from interference

In ISO 26262, Part 1, Definition 1.49, freedom from interference is defined as: Absence of cascading failures between two or more elements that could lead to the violation of a safety requirement. A cascading failure is defined

as "failure of an element of an item causing another element or elements of the same item to fail" (ISO 26262, Part 1, Definition 1.13), and an element is defined as: "system or part of a system including components, hardware, software, hardware parts, and software units" (ISO 26262, Part 1, Definition 1.32)

### **2.2.3 AUTOSAR**

"AUTOSAR (AUTomotive Open System ARchitecture) is a international development partnership of automotive interested parties founded in 2003. It pursues the objective of creating and establishing an open and standardized software architecture for automotive electronic control units (ECUs) excluding infotainment. Goals include the scalability to different vehicle and platform variants, transferability of software, the consideration of availability and safety requirements, a collaboration between various partners, sustainable utilization of natural resources, maintainability throughout the whole "Product Life Cycle"." [5]

The AUTOSAR Architecture distinguishes on the highest abstraction level between three software layers: Application, Runtime Environment (RTE) and Basic Software (BSW) which run on a Microcontroller. [5] See figure 2.2.

- The application software layer is mostly hardware independent.
- The RTE represents the full interface for applications.
- The BSW is divided in three major layers and Complex Drivers: Services, ECU Abstraction and Microcontroller Abstraction. Services are divided furthermore into functional groups representing the infrastructure for System, Memory and Communication Services.




Figure 2.2: AUTOSAR. [5]

## 2.3 Mixed criticality platform solutions

### 2.3.1 Hypervisors

A virtual machine monitor, or hypervisor, can be seen as an interface between the operative systems and the hardware of a system. In order to facilitate for multiple operative systems of different criticality an appropriate hypervisor should be used. A system will only be as secure as its hypervisor, so it is important that the hypervisor has been engineered to at least the same standards as the most critical functions that will be implemented on the system. Other things to consider is that some hypervisors can accommodate multiple instances of operative systems, and some only facilitate for two. A description of a few available open-source hypervisors will follow.

#### SafeG

SafeG is a hypervisor developed by the TOPPERS group of Nagoya University in Japan [23]. It can host two operating systems on the same hardware, partitioning them into Trusted and Non-Trusted states via ARM TrustZone [3]. This provides full system access to the software running in Trusted state, and limits the access and capabilities of the software running in Non-Trusted state.

The features of SafeG as described on their website are as follows:

- Enables the concurrent execution of RTOS and GPOS on either single-core or multi-core ARM-based platforms.
- Devices and memory regions that are configured as Secure are protected against illegal GPOS accesses.
- Normal world devices can be accessed from both GPOS (Non-Trusted) and RTOS (Trusted) software.
- Real-time requirements are guaranteed in RTOS (Trusted) via the utilization of FIQ and IRQ interrupts, where FIQ interrupts are issued for RTOS and IRQ interrupts are issued for GPOS. While in the Trusted state, IRQ interrupts are disabled so that GPOS can not disturb the execution of the RTOS. Therefore, GPOS only executes when the RTOS issues the Secure Monitor Call (SMC) instruction, which causes the SafeG monitor to switch from the Trusted world (RTOS) to the Non-Trusted world (GPOS). Furthermore, FIQ interrupts are active during the execution of GPOS, which enables RTOS to retake control of the system. For example, a cyclic execution of RTOS/GPOS can be controlled by an FIQ interrupt of a system timer.
- GPOS does not require any major changes, and can execute with minimal overhead.
- Includes an efficient guest-to-guest communication mechanism (i.e. referred to as SafeG COM).

Figure 5.1 depicts the SafeG architecture. It shows a simplified view of a TrustZone enabled ARM processor together with partitioned memory and device IO. The memory and device IO are configured as either Trusted (Secure) or Non-Trusted (Non-Secure), and their access is controlled by the NS bit of the bus (see subsection 3.2.9). The SafeG Monitor is the gateway between the GPOS and the RTOS. During the switch operation, it is responsible for saving the state of one world and loading the state of the other. The RTOS tasks are statically mapped to each processor during compilation. On the other hand, the GPOS uses all available virtual CPUs in SMP (Symmetric Multi-Processor) mode. Furthermore, the GPOS does not have access to Secure memory regions and Secure device IO. However, the RTOS can access all system resources. Therefore, by designating a resource as Non-Secure and making the RTOS aware of its existence, both the GPOS and RTOS can gain access, which is essential for communication between the two regions.

## **SICS Thin hypervisor**

SICS Thin Hypervisor (STH) is a light-weight hypervisor designed for ARM-based devices [35]. STH runs directly on top of the hardware (bare metal), and achieves system virtualization through paravirtualization. As a result, guest systems require some modifications to the OS kernel, including the addition of a hypercall \* interface. STH strengthens the security of embedded systems through the isolation capabilities of virtual machines, and allows for the existence of heterogeneous operating systems on the same platform. Current STH version supports ARMv5 (926EJ-S) and ARMv7 Cortex-A8 only. However, STH is a highly flexible and portable hypervisor that uses a hardware abstraction layer with minimal size.

## **Sierra visor**

Sierraware offers a bare metal universal hypervisor (SierraVisor) that is available as open-source under the GNU GPL v2 license or with a commercial license [33]. It supports paravirtualization, TrustZone virtualization, and hardware assisted virtualization. SierraVisor is compatible with Cortex-A9/A15 and ARM11 based SoCs, but only Cortex-A15 supports the hardware assisted virtualization option \*. The TrustZone virtualization approach allows for the integration of guest operating systems without any kernel modifications. Each guest kernel and applications run in their usual privilege mode, supervisor and user mode respectively. Furthermore, each guest executes in an isolated container with low overhead.

## **Xen hypervisor**

The Xen hypervisor is widely used in enterprise and is now making its way to embedded systems. It was developed in Cambridge University, and is available as open-source software under the the general public license (GNU). The Xen hypervisor is implemented as the guest console architecture, as discussed in subsection 4.2.4. The hypervisor layer is a thin software layer that resides above the hardware layer. It is the first program that runs after the boot-loader, and is responsible for managing the CPU, Memory, and interrupts. By default, the Xen hypervisor uses Credit as the CPU scheduler, which allows the user to allocate a percentage of the CPU time for each VM, or allow the hypervisor to automatically balance the workload across active CPUs in the system. Alternatively, the user can specify Simple Earliest Deadline First (SEDF) algorithm for the scheduler. However, the load-balancing feature will be unavailable [28]. The hypervisor is responsible for launches Dom0, which is a special virtual machine that has privileged access rights



to the physical I/O resources. It handles I/O accesses and interacts with the other virtual machines. All other VM instances operate in Domain U (DomU), which runs in unprivileged mode. The guest virtual machines can be either paravirtualized (PV) or fully virtualized a.k.a. Hardware-assisted Virtual Machine (HVM). The PV guest are modified operating systems such as: Linux, Solaris, FreeBSD, or other UNIX operating systems. In order to facilitate I/O sharing, Xen uses split-driver architecture. This approach manages I/O accesses of DomU PV guests. The split-driver technique divides the driver into a front-end, located in the DomU PV guest, and a back-end, located in the Dom0 guest. DomU PV guests are aware that they do not have direct access to the hardware and that they are running alongside other virtual machines on the same hardware. However, DomU HVM guests are unaware of the presence of other VMs, and of the fact that they are sharing hardware resources. Instead of split-drivers, in the HVM architecture, a special daemon is started in Dom0 guest for each DomU HVM guest. The Xen hypervisor is available for both Intel and ARM devices. However, it is not recommended to use Xen with devices that do not contain IOMMU units because the hypervisor can be easily subverted by DMA capable devices [29].

### **Xen zynq**

The open-source Xen hypervisor has recently been ported to the new Xilinx Zynq Ultrascale+Multi-Processor System-on-Chip (MPSoC) device [30]. Xen Zynq Distribution is released under the GNU General Purpose License 2 (GPL2). The processing platform features a quad-core ARM Cortex-A53, a dual-core ARM Cortex-R5, a Mali-400MP2 GPU, and FPGA fabric that supports run-time reconfiguration. This device is the successor of Xilinx Zynq SoC, which features a dual-core Cortex-A9 processor and FPGA fabric.

### **SEL4 microkernel**

The sel4 microkernel is based on the L4 microkernel, which is one of the smallest kernels available today. Sel4 is the first formally verified microkernel, which implies that its specification is verified mathematically. Sel follows the "minimality principle", which dictates that the kernel shall only contain functionalities that can not be implemented at the user-level [31]. As a result, the microkernel is small, efficient, and robust. All device drivers are excluded from the microkernel level and execute in unprivileged mode, except for a timer driver and an interrupt controller driver. The microkernel supports a small number of services that enable applications to create and manage threads, virtual memory spaces, and interprocess communication (IPC). Fur-

thermore, sel4 follows a "capability-based access control model" in order to manage the access rights to all kernel services. Capabilities are unforgeable tokens that contain metadata about a specific kernel object, including its access rights. The use of capabilities as a control mechanism allows the system to maintain strong isolation between software components [32]. The sel4 microkernel implements a fixed-priority round-robin scheduler policy, mainly because its current "time" abstraction method is under- developed and does not yield satisfactory results. As proposed in [31], reservations can be added to sel4 in order to provide a suitable temporal isolation solution for real-time systems. Sel4 provides IOMMU support for Intel-based architectures (IA-32), which allows the safe integration of DMA enabled devices. Furthermore, Sel4 can support multicore systems via multikernel bootstrapping. However, this feature is only available for x86 machines; only uniprocessor is supported for ARM-based devices.

## 2.4 Platooning

Platooning, road trains or convoy driving is the concept of a chain of vehicles traveling at a given (short) intermediate distance in order to utilize the reduced air friction behind the vehicle in front. The primary objective for each vehicle with respect to safety is to maintain its distance to the preceding vehicle in the platoon.

### 2.4.1 Benefits of platooning

Potential benefits of vehicle platooning includes lower fuel consumption, less road space required and more efficient traffic flow.

Using simulations of platooning, Alam, Gattami, and Johansson [1] showed in 2010 that there is a 4.7–7.7% fuel reduction potential in heavy duty vehicle platooning at a set speed of 70 km/h with two identical trucks.

In 2014, Lammert et. al. [18] showed in tests that platooning can result in reduced fuel consumption of up to 5.3% for the lead vehicle and up to 9.7% for following vehicles.

Tests by truck manufacturer Scania have shown that platooning can reduce fuel consumption by up to 12% [21].

### 2.4.2 Safety requirements for platooning

With shorter distance between vehicles, the margin of error also decreases. This puts high requirements on the system controlling the speed of the vehicles in the platoon.

In the article by Alam et al. [2], safe sets for heavy duty vehicle platooning are computed to calculate minimum distance between the vehicles in a platoon without endangering safety. System uncertainties or varying vehicle parameters, such as mass, air resistance and road gradient, could cause a difference in braking capabilities between the vehicles, thereby changing the shape of the safe sets. If the follower vehicle has a higher braking capacity, it will be able to lie closer without endangering a collision. The minimum safe relative distance is therefore shorter compared to the case of two identical vehicles. However, if the lead vehicle has a greater braking capability the relative distance must be increased significantly. Delays for the platoon control system commonly occur due to detection, transmission, computation, and producing the control command. A delay in the system implies that the lead vehicle will be able to act, change the relative velocity and distance, before the follower vehicle is able to react. A delay can be translated into a shift of the reachable set. However, no change occurs in the follower vehicle's velocity, since it does not react. Depending on the radar and the collision detection algorithm, a worst-case delay is approximately 500 ms for the considered vehicles. Hence, the lead vehicle will be able to reduce the relative velocity by 3.25 m/s and the relative distance by 0.8 m if it is driving 25 m/s at normal mode. Thus if the follower vehicle maintains a distance of at least 2 m, a collision can always be avoided for two identical vehicles [2].

## 2.5 Lane detection and lateral control

# Chapter 3

## Current system

This chapter will describe the EMC<sup>2</sup> development platform, for more information see the report by Zaki [30].

### 3.1 Soft overview

The EMC<sup>2</sup> Development Platform (EMC2DP) consists of a Zynq-7000 System on Chip (SoC). Connections. I/O. Bild.

### 3.2 Hardware

The Zynq-7000 SoC has a Processing System (PS) consisting of a hardwired application processing unit, memory controller, and peripheral devices. The main processing unit is a dual-core Cortex-A9 ARM processor. Connected to the PS region is a Programmable Logic (PL) region. The PL is based on Xilinx's 7-series FPGA technology. Due to the flexible nature of the PL, systems can be designed to reach a new level of performance. For example, the PL region can be used to instantiate standard or custom IP hardware modules that can serve as accelerators for the PS. Additionally, the PL region enables the PS to access system resources that are only accessible by the PL. An overview of the interfaces between the PS and the PL can be seen in Figure 3.1.




Figure 3.1: Overview of the interfaces between the PS and PL regions. [30]

The interfaces between the PS and PL regions can be divided into two categories:

- Functional interfaces: include the Advanced eXtensible Interface (AXI) ports such as AXIGP for general purpose master/slave device interface between PS and PL regions, extended MIO (EMIO) which enable PL IPs to access most I/O peripherals, interrupts, DMA flow control, clocks, and debug interfaces.
- Configuration interfaces: these signals are connected to the configuration block of the PL, which allow the PS to control the configuration of the PL.

Resources are separated as secure and non-secure using ARM TrustZone [3].

### 3.3 TrustZone

TrustZone is a security feature by ARM that is available in their modern processors. TrustZone creates a security infrastructure in order to protect

critical system assets from being accessed by non-trusted sources. This is achieved by enabling the partitioning of system components, both hardware and software, into either a Secure or Normal zone. Resources that are marked as Normal are not permitted to access Secure resources. This mechanism is enforced by the AMBA3 (Advanced Microcontroller Bus Architecture) AXI bus system. It contains an extra control signal for each of the read and write channels that dictate the access rights Non-secure bus masters to the Secure slaves. Each processor with an enabled TrustZone security extension can be partitioned into a Normal and a Secure virtual CPU. The virtual processors execute in a time-multiplexed fashion, and use the "Monitor Mode" state to create an efficiently switching mechanism between Normal and Secure zones. [30]

### 3.4 Operative systems

The EMC2DP uses two Operative Systems (OS) to create temporal and spatial separation between safety-critical and non-critical applications using TrustZone. In its current setup the Real-Time Operative System (RTOS) FMP by TOPPERS [22] is used for safety-critical applications. This RTOS follows the uITRON4.0 specification [17], which is a widely used RTOS specification for Japanese embedded systems. For non-critical applications, the General Purpose Operative System (GPOS) Linux kernel 4.4 is used. Instead of Linux another instance of FMP could be used for non-critical applications.

### 3.5 Virtual Machine Monitor

A Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM) or "Hypervisor" is used to alternate between the safety-critical (S\_OS) and non-critical (NS\_OS) OS. The VMM used is SafeG [23], also developed by TOPPERS. It switches processor state via a hardware switch. See figure 3.2. The switching takes  $2 \mu s$ .




Figure 3.2: Flowchart of the boot sequence of the CPU. [30]

The time it takes the VMM to switch processor state bounds the maximum frequency a task can have while the processor still manages to maintain its switching capabilities. The maximum frequency,  $f_{max}$ , can be calculated as

$$f_{max} = \lim_{e_s, e_{ns} \rightarrow 0} \frac{1}{e_s + e_{ns} + 2e_{switch}} = 250 \text{ kHz}$$

where  $e_s$  is the computational time of the tasks on the S-OS,  $e_{ns}$  is the computational time of the tasks on the NS-OS and  $e_{switch}$  is the time required for the mode-switch.

An basic overview of the hardware and the software of the system can be seen in Figure 3.3.





designed hardware platform, which are used for software development. Xilinx SDK tool is used to create the Board Support Package (BSP) and the First Stage Boot Loader (FSBL) that correspond to the designed system. In general, after the FSBL initialization process completes, and depending on boot sequence, the CPU can do any of the following actions: configure the FPGA, initiate the Second Stage Boot Loader SSBL, or jumps to the first address of the main program. The SDK tool is also used to generate a boot file (BOOT.bin), which must at least contain the FSBL (fsbl.elf). In the implemented system, the BOOT.bin file also includes the bitstream file (system.bit) and the SSBL (uboot.elf \* ). Once the system is initialized and the PL is configured, the system starts executing the u-boot instructions present in the BOOT.bin. U-boot is a full system on its own, and has many useful features. In particular, u-boot can be used to load executables and other system files from a remote server into the DDR3 memory using protocols such as Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP), see Figure 3.4.

Figure 3.4 provides a summary of the different dependencies for the system and the required flow for building the system. The keyword "step x" indicates instances where dependencies exists within a build directory. Software tools are indicated by the circular shape, such as Vivado, SDK, and GNU Compiler Collection (GCC) (make).




Figure 3.4: System build procedure. [30]

For more information about the build and the system, see the report by Zaki [30].

# Chapter 4

## System design

This chapter will derive the design of the controller to be implemented.

# Chapter 5

## Implementation

This chapter will describe the implementation of the control system in the demonstrator.

# Chapter 6

## Results

This chapter will present results from the demonstrator to the reader.

# Chapter 7

## Discussion

Discussion about the results produced by the thesis.

### 7.1 Information retrieval

Printing to SYSLOG takes time and affects the system that's being monitored.

### 7.2 Utilization

Deterministic system - work towards 100%, anything under that: reduce clock frequency to reduce power consumption and reach 100%.

Sporadic system - probably want to be around 50% utilization to maintain 100% schedulability, higher depending on requirements on performance versus requirements on efficiency.

# Chapter 8

## Future work

This chapter will contain thoughts and ideas for future work building on this thesis or in the area of MCS in general.

### 8.1 MCS using virtualization

Facilitate for more than two different criticality levels.  
Examine different scheduling methods.

### 8.2 MCS using other means of partitioning

Examine limitations for other configurations of MCS, for example different CPUs for different criticality levels.

### 8.3 Amount of criticality levels

Research should be done to investigate how many different levels of criticality,  $n$ , to facilitate for on MCS in different industries. In the automotive for example,  $n$  should be between 1 and 5 since ISO26262 defines 5 different ASILs. If the applications in a car are spread uniformly across all criticality levels it might be of higher interest to have  $n$  closer to 5. Similarly, if the applications are heavily concentrated on a certain criticality level,  $n$  probably should be closer to 2.

## 8.4 Economical benefits for pursuing MCS

It is not clear how much the potential economical benefit would be from pursuing MCS. The economical impacts of MCS might be different in different industries. It must be calculated more exactly how large the potential benefits would be to gauge the need for pursuing MCS.



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