Four-Scenario Example

Two farmers. Cora has COnstant (relative) Risk Aversion:

$$U(C) = \frac{1}{1-\rho} C^{1-\rho}$$

Ira has Infinite Risk Aversion. Output of each farmer can be either 1 or 2 with equal probability; independent. Four "states" with probability $\frac{1}{4}$ each:

g – "good state" – each has output 2; total output 4. b – "bad state" – each has 1; total 2.

c – Cora has 2 and Ira has 1; total 3. i – Cora has 1 and Ira has 2; total 3.

Cora's budget constraint: $P_g C_g^c + P_c C_c^c + P_i C_i^c + P_b C_b^c = 2 P_g + 2 P_c + P_i + P_b$

Ira's budget constraint is P_g $C_g^i + P_c$ $C_c^i + P_i$ $C_i^i + P_b$ $C_b^i = 2$ $P_g + P_c + 2$ $P_i + P_b$

Equilibrium conditions: total demands must equal the total outputs in each state:

$$C_q^c + C_q^i = 4$$
, $C_c^c + C_c^i = 3$, $C_i^c + C_i^i = 3$, $C_b^c + C_b^i = 2$

We can find three relative prices using any three of these equations. Numerical solution:

Cora's Risk–Aversion	Cora's Consumption Quantities in Scenarios				Ira's Consumption Quantities	Prices of Arrow-Debreu Securities in Scenarios			
Coefficient ρ				arios L	(all Scenarios)	. 1			
Coefficient p	g	c	1	D D	(all Scellarios)	g	С	1	b
0.001	2.50	1.50	1.50	0.50	1.50	0.99	1.00	1.00	1.01
0.50	2.60	1.60	1.60	0.60	1.40	0.78	1.00	1.00	1.64
1.00	2.68	1.68	1.68	0.68	1.32	0.63	1.00	1.00	2.44
2.00	2.81	1.81	1.81	0.81	1.19	0.51	1.00	1.00	4.99
10.00	2.99	1.99	1.99	0.99	1.01	0.02	1.00	1.00	1013