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CHAPTER 9

Epistemic Responsibility and Implicit Bias

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A topic of special importance when it comes to responsibility and implicit bias is responsibility for *knowledge*. Are there strategies for becoming more responsible and respectful knowers? How might we work together, not just as individuals but members of collectives, to reduce the negative effects of bias on what we see and believe, as well as the wrongs associated with epistemic injustice? To explore these questions, Chapter 9 introduces the concept of *epistemic responsibility*, a set of practices developed through the cultivation of basic *epistemic virtues*, such as open-mindedness, epistemic humility, and diligence that help knowers seek information about themselves, others, and the world.

Are we responsible for our knowledge and how we act on that knowledge? Can we be responsible for what we don't know? Are we responsible when we act on biases of which we are unaware? Are there strategies for making us better and more responsible knowers? What are the consequences of knowledge or lack of knowledge? These are some of the questions that epistemologists, philosophers who are concerned with how we gain knowledge and what counts as knowledge, ask about the world. Epistemologists use the term *epistemic agents* to refer to people who are capable of making choices about the amount and kinds of knowledge they have and how they go about getting it. Some individuals are epistemic agents and others are not. For example, we might not say that a

two-year old child is an epistemic agent, but we would say that most thirty-three-year old adults are epistemic agents.

When epistemologists talk about the methods people use to gain knowledge, they use the term *epistemic practices*. Epistemic practices are habits or practices that help individuals and communities gain knowledge about themselves, their communities, and the worlds they inhabit. For example, some people have the epistemic practice of asking a lot of questions and critically assessing the responses they get. Other people have the epistemic practice of going by their gut reaction. These epistemic practices help us to act more or less responsibly with respect to the knowledge we have and seek. Epistemic agents have a responsibility to create, transmit, and receive knowledge in the most accurate and just ways possible, and sometimes this means that we need to improve our epistemic practices.

This chapter is about how to understand the relationship between individual and collective epistemic responsibility and implicit bias. In this chapter we'll develop a model for understanding epistemic responsibility with respect to implicit bias. We will begin the chapter by discussing moral responsibility for implicit bias (see also Dominguez, Chapter 8, "Moral Responsibility for Implicit Biases: Examining Our Options"). We identify some of the shared assumptions underlying the existing debates about moral responsibility for implicit bias and argue that these approaches are insufficient for understanding our epistemic and moral obligations with respect to implicit bias. Specifically, we will argue that our moral responsibilities related to implicit bias must include a central role for seeking and disseminating knowledge and improving our epistemic practices. The framework of epistemic responsibility that we will use highlights

the *role of knowledge* in our responsibilities around implicit bias. Next, we argue that individuals and communities can behave in more epistemically responsible ways and, consequently, can lessen the effects and presence of implicit biases. We offer three concrete individual and collective epistemic practices that allow us to develop better habits for seeking, generating, conveying, and absorbing knowledge.

Section I: Implicit Bias, Responsibility, & Ignorance

Recall from Chapters 1 and 2 (Johnson, “The Psychology of Bias: From Data to Theory”; Leboeuf, “The Embodied Biased Mind”) that many people (particularly those occupying dominant social positions) have beliefs, feelings, and habits that

- a. they cannot reliably identify or introspectively access,
- b. they would not avow (e.g. report believing in, consciously assent to, agree with—this is what Johnson calls *divergence*),
- c. they think they are unlikely to possess, and
- d. influence thoughts and behavior in a way that they would not avow.

Taken together these features give us an idea of what implicit biases are like. We can also distinguish between the *influence* of implicit biases on behavior and the *having* of implicit biases themselves. It is plausible that one could have a biased attitude with the first three features (a.-c.) that fails to influence thought and behavior (d.). Nonetheless, implicit biases often lead to cognitive gaps (for more specifics, see Beeghly, Chapter 4, “Bias and Knowledge: Two Metaphors”; Siegel, Chapter 5, “Bias and Perception”, and Basu, Chapter 10, “The Specter of Normative Conflict: Does Fairness Require Inaccuracy?”). For example, an implicit bias may cause us to have epistemically

questionable habits for determining people's credibility related to race and economic class, such as the unquestioned credibility we tend to confer to white, male professors. In this section we will give an overview of a common way of thinking about our responsibilities for implicit bias within philosophy and raise some problems for thinking about it in this way.

When philosophers discuss implicit bias, they often focus on responsibility for particular acts that occur at specific times. On these accounts, whether or not a person is morally responsible for an act influenced by implicit bias is determined by considering whether the agent met a set of conditions for moral responsibility. Thus, on these accounts, one can be deemed "morally responsible" or "not morally responsible" for a particular act. Here's an example of how this might go:

Laura is an admissions counselor at a university, and it is her job to make the initial round of cuts in the application process. She decides who will make it to the next round of application review and who will not. Unbeknownst to Laura, she has implicit biases that lead her to dismiss applications with traditionally Latinx names, such as Carlos or Juanita. The influence of Laura's bias on the process means that fewer Latinx individuals are admitted to the university.

When philosophers think about this case, they will often ask, "Is Laura morally responsible for her behavior?" In other words, they wonder whether we can justifiably morally evaluate Laura for her actions even though her actions were influenced by implicit biases that she did not know about and did not control. In many ways, this kind of question is helpful to us in sorting out exactly what our responsibilities are with respect to implicit bias. However, we'll argue that asking these kinds of questions or

starting with individual moral responsibility can obscure both the stakes with respect to implicit bias and our individual and collective responsibilities to take action.

But, first, here's a little more about determining moral responsibility. As Dominguez (Chapter 8, "Moral Responsibility for Biases: Examining Our Options") explains, accounts of direct responsibility for implicit bias typically focus on necessary conditions for responsibility, such as control, knowledge, or attributability. On these accounts, an agent is morally responsible for an action when they have met some set of conditions at the time of the action. If the conditions aren't met, then the agent is said to be not morally responsible, which has consequences for our abilities to be justified in morally evaluating the person. Robin Zheng, for example, argues that in many cases implicitly biased behaviors fail to meet the conditions for responsibility (2016: 72; see also Kelly and Roedder 2008; Levy 2017). This is because in many cases, the individual does not *know* that implicit bias is influencing their behavior, and they have *done what they can be expected to do* to avoid implicit bias. On this account, we might conclude that Laura is not morally responsible for her actions, even though one's expectations, given her role, is that she act without bias. This method for thinking about implicit bias starts with the individual and what kind of state the individual was in when implicit bias influenced their behavior in order to determine whether or not the individual can be held responsible or be blamed for her actions.

The starting point for these accounts is often whether a particular individual is morally responsible for a specific action at a particular time, but in addition the accounts can be used to argue that we are indirectly responsible for implicit bias. In other words, we can talk about the ways we are responsible for failing to engage in practices that

reduce implicit bias or keep them from influencing our behaviors at a time prior to the behavior we are evaluating. For example, Washington and Kelly (2016) argue that in many cases we are in positions where we *should've* known (about implicit bias), even when in fact we did not know. In Laura's case, we might think that she *should've* known about her implicit biases, and thus, should've done something to prevent them from influencing her behaviors (by removing the names, for example). We may also be responsible for doing things in response to implicit bias influencing our behaviors; Zheng argues that we ought to be held *accountable* for our implicit bias even if we are not directly responsible. This means that we are still responsible for responding to and mitigating harms that come about as a result of our bias, just like we might pay for a vase that our child accidentally broke in a store. These accounts provide a straightforward way to think about our responsibilities for implicit bias.

Here we suggest, however, that the entire framing of the debate about the necessary conditions for moral responsibility is part of a cognitive framework that functions to *obscure* responsibility for matters relating to people who are oppressed in virtue of their group membership, such as race, gender, sexuality, and other salient social categories. We'll develop this point in the next two sections of the chapter. We will consider whether our collective energies would be better focused by shifting from assigning individual blame for implicit bias (who can we blame for this? How can I personally avoid blame?) to understanding implicit bias as one part of a much larger set of mechanisms that cause, support, and maintain conditions of oppression. We'll argue that conditions of oppression can be better mitigated by epistemic agents acting with a greater level of epistemic responsibility because epistemic agents who know more are

able to act more ethically. Thus, shifting from questions of moral responsibility for implicit bias to questions of epistemic responsibility we offer here will allow us to more clearly identify our responsibilities with respect to implicit bias.

Section II: Epistemic Responsibility

Epistemic responsibility is a set of habits or practices of the mind that people develop through the cultivation of some basic epistemic virtues, such as open-mindedness, epistemic humility, and diligence that help knowers engage in seeking information about themselves, others, and the world that they inhabit (Medina 2013). Open-mindedness is the practice of seeking and considering viewpoints that contrast with one's own. Epistemic humility is the practice of cultivating the right sort of self-reflection such that one attends to "one's cognitive limitations and deficits" (Medina 43). Epistemic diligence is the habit of responding to "epistemic challenges," such as those that call into question the efficacy of our other epistemic habits and responding to requests for self-critique and for more information or evidence (51). Thus, when a knower acts in an epistemically responsible manner, they are more likely to engage in effective knowledge-seeking practices and make truth-tracking judgments. A judgment is truth-tracking when it matches the way the world really is as opposed to the way it is not.

Just as people can cultivate and practice epistemic virtues that lead to epistemically responsible behavior, they also can cultivate and practice epistemic vices that lead to epistemically irresponsible behavior. Epistemic vices can be thought of as the inverse of the above virtues—close-mindedness, arrogance, and laziness, which are less likely to yield truth about the self, others, and the world. If an individual's goal is to gain accurate knowledge, then they need to cultivate and engage in epistemically virtuous

behaviors and mitigate epistemic vices. In addition, the development of epistemic responsibility will be essential to our moral lives—if we can know better, we can do better.

There are local (individual) and global (community or society) challenges for engaging in epistemically responsible behavior, and these can reinforce each other (see also Ayala-López and Beeghly, Chapter 11, “Explaining Injustice: Structural Analysis, Bias, and Individuals” and Madva, Chapter 12, “Individual and Structural Interventions”). As the epistemic virtues and vices are framed above, they are primarily thought of as practices of individuals. One is epistemically responsible to the extent to which one works to cultivate and engage in the above epistemic virtues. On an individual level, one’s ability to do so is shaped partly by internal motivation and experience, as well as by structural constraints. For example, a person might display very little interest or inclination to be humble in any aspects of life. Perhaps they were raised in a household where arrogance was viewed as a sign of strength and authority. It is not hard to imagine arrogant subjects. We encounter them all the time. Thus, it wouldn’t be surprising if the generally arrogant person was also epistemically arrogant and never questioned the limits of their knowledge or the holes in their reasoning processes. Therefore, on an individual-level, one might recommend that the arrogant knower be confronted about their behavior and given some tools to change it.

Yet arrogant knowers develop in communities. Thus, no knower is an arrogant or unvirtuous island in themselves. They are, at least to a degree, shaped by the situation in which they live. This is where the global challenges and opportunities for engaging in epistemic responsibility lie. These global challenges are frequently maintained and yet

obscured by the culture in which they arise, constructing individuals and communities who are ignorant of their own epistemic irresponsibility and invested in maintaining their ignorance because it feels “psychologically and social functional,” i.e., it helps them to maintain self-esteem and to get along with other ignorant and arrogant people, yet it is epistemically dysfunctional, i.e., is not truth-tracking (Mills 1997: 18).

In *The Racial Contract*, Mills (1997) described the active construction of ignorance by whites on matters related to race in the U.S. As Mills frames it, this epistemic state of ignorance depends on whites having a tacit, collective agreement to misinterpret the world. This ignorance, which results from “predictable epistemic gaps,” is pernicious in that it causes harm to individuals and communities (Dotson 2011: 238). Because this state of epistemic irresponsibility is “psychologically and socially functional,” as Mills argues, it is relatively unconscious and fits whites’ expectations of social and individual practices, it results in “the ironic outcome that whites will in general be unable to understand the world they themselves have made” (18). Thus, whites are unable to see their own collective epistemic irresponsibility and do not understand or even recognize the resulting social, physical, and psychological fallout. As numerous feminist and critical race philosophers have pointed out, epistemic ignorance is not confined to race (Frye 1983; Medina 2013; Ortega 2006; Sullivan 2007; Tuana 2006). This type of collective epistemic irresponsibility also can be seen in matters related to, for example, gender, country of origin, sexuality, sexual identity, ability, and poverty. The unifying component is that marginalized communities are primarily those who experience the multiple effects of epistemic irresponsibility, whereas empowered communities are

usually those who exist in an epistemic state of ignorance regarding the experiences of marginalized communities and how they may contribute to oppression.

On the other hand, because knowers do exist deeply enmeshed in communities, many of which are overlapping, this also presents an opportunity for what has come to be known as “epistemic friction,” which can result in more epistemically responsible knowers (Medina 2013). Beneficial epistemic friction is the epistemic trial that is presented to knowers when they come in contact with alternative viewpoints, frequently from engaging with communities, individuals, ideas, and knowledge systems different from their own. This sets up the conditions that “enable subjects and communities to detect and sensitize themselves” to cognitive gaps regarding themselves and others (Medina 176), such as those caused and maintained by various implicit biases. Yet, in order for this to occur, individuals must have the epistemic virtues of open-mindedness, humility, and diligence to consider these alternative viewpoints. Thus, epistemic responsibility requires both individual cultivation of epistemic virtues as well as social structures that enable epistemic friction.

Section III: DIY-T (Do It Yourself-Together)

Being epistemically responsible requires engaging in a set of practices or habits that help us develop a better understanding of ourselves, others, and society. We should all want to participate in these practices because they are more likely to lead us to truth-tracking judgments. Furthermore, the ignorance that promotes and is promoted by implicit bias has frequently harmful ethical and political effects, including but not limited to the killing of marginalized people; the denial of employment, housing, and educational

opportunities; and the general discounting of marginalized people's testimony and experiences. Thus, the stakes regarding implicit bias are high. We share an individual and collective need to mitigate them. (Remember, implicit bias is one within a much larger set of mechanisms that support oppressive conditions. But the fact that implicit bias is just one of many things we ought to worry about, does not change that we ought to worry about it.) But as José Medina (2013) argues, "[w]e cannot overburden the individual with the responsibility of identifying and undoing every" bias that they and their culture holds, and that "this responsibility cannot be so diffused in the collective social body that particular individuals, organizations, groups, and institutions do not feel compelled or under any obligation to repair" their implicit biases, shared ignorance, and resulting harms (Medina 176). Thus, we must devise strategies for developing epistemic responsibility that balance individual responsibility for developing virtues with the power of collective practices.

Many of the strategies proposed for mitigating implicit biases are individual practices meant to rid oneself of bias. It's a bit like an epistemic detox. Instead of eliminating harmful contaminants from one's body, such as heavy metals, the goal of this epistemic detox is to rid the mind of harmful biases. Just as bodily detox programs have both uses and limitations, so, too, do efforts toward epistemic detox. Some of these individual strategies are: considering what it would be like to have another person's experiences; affirming counterstereotypes, focusing on features of the individual instead of group-based stereotypes; and focusing on common interests, even trivial ones, instead of broader differences (Kawakami et al. 2007, Mallet et al. 2008, Devine et al. 2012, Madva 2017; Madva, Chapter 12, "Individual and Structural Interventions"). Some of


these strategies successfully reduce implicit bias, so they are worth doing, but their scope is limited because, as we argued above, no one is an epistemic island. Humans experience social messages on a regular basis that serve to reinforce and solidify implicit biases.

Because these individual strategies have their limitations, we need broader social and collective strategies to help individuals mitigate their implicit biases and practice epistemic responsibility. Thus, collective epistemic responsibility and accompanying strategies are called for to mitigate the effects and the further development of harmful implicit biases. An essential component of this is the presence of alternative epistemic viewpoints to illuminate our cognitive gaps.

Remember these alternative epistemic viewpoints “enable subjects and communities to detect and sensitize themselves” to cognitive gaps regarding themselves and others (Medina 176). Many of these cognitive gaps are predictable because they track and enable patterns of oppression and marginality. Thus, the kind of epistemic strategies needed are of the sort that would disrupt those patterns.

We want to present two paths to create the space for alternative epistemic viewpoints (see Figure 1). These paths are not mutually exclusive. Individuals and groups can move on and through both trajectories and these trajectories can support and reinforce each other. These paths are 1. the development of epistemic virtues and 2. the experience of epistemic friction. Each path has an individual and collective component. The development of epistemic virtue (1) can arise both from a personal commitment and through engagement within a community that values and supports such development. The experience of epistemic friction (2) arises from individuals interacting through specific community practices and through engaging with people whose experiences and

viewpoints are different from their own. In what follows, we'll offer three community practices that both develop particular epistemic virtues and produce epistemic friction. These three practices will highlight the ways in which the paths to alternative epistemic viewpoints can mutually reinforce one another.



The first practice is “world”-traveling, developed by Maria Lugones (1987), which is one strategy that can be an individual and a communal road to detecting one’s cognitive gaps by cultivating the epistemic virtue of open-mindedness. The challenge is that many of us live in experientially and ideologically homogeneous environments and thus need to find ways to be presented with viewpoints that differ from one’s own. You can think of this as getting out of your “bubble.” “World”-traveling can be an inroad to cultivating open-mindedness. It is a strategy that entails a person willfully shifting their perspective and, potentially, physical location to move out of one’s comfort zone into the “world” of another. The “world” one travels to is one “that has to be inhabited at present by some flesh and blood people” (9), because it is too easy to craft imaginative worlds with people and situations that mirror one’s own perceptions. “World”-travelling is an inroad to open-mindedness because it involves the *intentional* practice of considering other points of view that over time can lead to the habit of open-mindedness. One way to think about this differentiation is that in order to develop habits, we have to repeat *intentional practices* (e.g., “world”-traveling) in order for them to develop into habits (e.g., open-mindedness) that we do automatically. “World”-traveling is the intentional, but challenging, push that when repeated can get us in the habit of being open-minded.

However, unlike many other intentional practices with much lower stakes, such as having a reminder on your phone to ensure that you get to class on time, “world”-traveling forces us out of our comfort zone by presenting other ways of being in the world, including the ways in which others live in oppressive situations. This process can start through engaging the narratives and testimony of people whose lives and

experiences differ from one's own. One can think of this as studying up in order to come from a place of openness and exposure rather than from a place of ignorance. This is particularly important because the creation of epistemic friction puts a particular and likely unjust burden upon marginalized groups because it is their lives that are the subject of empowered groups' ignorance, yet it is their experiences and knowledge that provide an alternative viewpoint to allow for epistemic friction. The epistemic reciprocity that is needed for this type of endeavor is the very reciprocity that is endangered by epistemic ignorance and oppression. Thus, we must be very careful and intentional. Once one has sufficiently worked to develop an informed and self-critical perspective, one can be in a position to engage across differences and build reciprocal relationships with others and thus more fully "world"-travel.

An example of "world"-traveling that can result in open-mindedness that one of the authors of this piece, Nancy McHugh, engages in is teaching philosophy classes in a men's prison. She takes fifteen students from her university (referred to as outside students) to have class with fifteen men who are incarcerated (inside students) for a full semester. The class experience is as symmetrical as possible given that it is in a prison. All students have the same assignments, are graded the same, and receive the same college credit for the course. Even though the course subject is not about incarceration, one of the things that happens is the outside students learn to see through the experiences of the inside students in the class and this reframes the way they understand incarceration and people who are incarcerated. For example, one outside student stated:

I expected to walk into the classroom and see nothing but criminals. ... but I saw men who loved their families and wanted to further their educations ... they were

in no way what I had expected. So now I know that when I see prisoners being portrayed as nothing but hardcore criminals, I can tell people that's not the case, they are people just like you and me locked away. They have good hearts, they are kind, and they don't deserve to be stereotyped.

This type of shift in understanding was common among the outside students. These outside students “world”-traveled to prison for 15 weeks and meaningfully engage “flesh and blood” people who have some experiences and viewpoints that differ from their own. Because of the consistency of this experience, the outside students experienced epistemic friction that jars their conception of who is incarcerated and why they are incarcerated, thus moving them in the direction of developing the epistemic virtue of open-mindedness. Although this particular type of opportunity may not be available at all universities, most have similar opportunities for “world”-traveling, and students should exercise the responsibility for seeking these out.

The second practice is progressive stacking. Progressive stacking is a community practice that centers the voices of those most marginalized by our current social and political structures. In an unmediated discussion, those with the loudest voices, those most comfortable with interrupting others, and those trained to take up air time and space are those people that get heard and those whose ideas, suggestions, and perspectives are integrated into the group's decisions. The basic practice of stacking involves identifying one person to “take stack,” which merely requires the individual to record the names of those individuals who wish to speak (perhaps indicated by a quick wave raise of the hand). The individual responsible for stacking then moves through the list of those wanting to speak. Progressive stacking adds another layer to this process. Rather than

moving through the list of those who wish to contribute “in order,” the individual responsible for taking stack calls on those who occupy identities that are relatively more marginalized by current power dynamics first. Of course, the individual practice of identifying marginalized individuals will be difficult and as such communities need to be diligent about developing this skill (and doing so may be a part of being an epistemically responsible agent) and careful about whom they select for this difficult role. Because not every oppression can be identified by sight, this is most easily done in a group of people who know and trust one another at least to some extent. This practice makes spaces for voices that are often unheard or silenced due to our individual and collective habits, often bolstered by our implicit bias, of listening and engaging.

This practice has many benefits, and also supports and develops the virtue of epistemic humility and results in epistemic friction. Cultivating epistemic humility means cultivating the right sort of self-reflection such that individuals attend to cognitive limitations and deficits. Progressive stacking supports the individual development of epistemic humility by highlighting that one’s experiences may both limit and obscure one’s knowledge of the world. Epistemic friction arises from hearing the testimonies of others and the individual’s attempts at integrating the testimony into their own worldviews. Friction occurs in particular when something within the testimony is inconsistent with an individual’s attitudes or beliefs about the world. Because the practice is supported by the community, the individual is motivated to develop epistemic humility. Notice here that individuals will be more open to friction when they already practice epistemic humility and that the friction will lead them to further develop the virtue. The paths that lead to epistemic counterpoints are distinct, yet they interact and support one

another. Also notice that this practice will be difficult without a commitment to epistemic humility. For example, when individuals who embody dominant identities are moved to the bottom, without a commitment to epistemic humility, they may experience this as oppression or an act of silencing. Recognizing one's own gaps is an integral part of being comfortable with progressive stacking. When introducing the practice, switching between stacking and progressive staking allows for a balance of friction and development of epistemic humility.

The third sets of practices are calling-in and calling-out. Both involve an individual or group confronting another individual or group about something said or done. Typically, the motivation behind identifying a particular utterance or action is that the utterance or action perpetuates systems of oppression. For example, one might confront a friend for using the n-word or for telling a racist joke, or one might write an open letter expressing one's intolerance of a company's labor practices. The distinction between calling-in and calling-out has to do with the goal of the interaction as well as the style. The practice of calling-in is focused on building and expanding relationships, where calling-out need not have this focus (but may). Calling-in often works toward restoring community between all involved, and calling-out demands the utterance or action be stopped or corrected. For example, if someone in a group of friends calls another individual in the group "mixed" in a group conversation, that individual may pull aside the person and say, "I'm multiracial and would prefer if you didn't use the term mixed. Here's why..." In this case, an individual has called-in another individual. Now, imagine that a group has committed to using progressive stacking, and a person who embodies dominant identities continually interrupts others who have been called before

them in the stack. Someone might say something like, “You are violating our shared agreements and taking up space at the expense of other voices with experiences we need to hear about. Please remain silent for the rest of the meeting.” This person has been called-out. As one can see, both practices are useful depending on one’s context and goals.

On its face, it may seem that calling-in is better than calling-out, but two worries arise around calling-in: one, appeals to call-in (rather than call-out) are sometimes used to control the ways in which marginalized individuals confront those in dominant positions (e.g. to keep individuals from getting “angry” and police their tone, rather than responding to the substance of their claims) and, two, it is sometimes used to protect and maintain dominant identities (e.g. those in dominant positions don’t want to be embarrassed or have their feelings hurt). Thus, it is particularly important for those embodying dominant identities to be open to being both called-in and called-out. In addition, there is often a tendency for white people to label *any* instance of feedback from people of color as “being called out.” This is tied to white fragility (DiAngelo 2018) and ideas about people of color being dangerous or violent. Receiving feedback and being called in or out are all opportunities to learn about one’s self and question one’s own ways of knowing in ways that lead to improved individual and collective epistemic practices. The epistemic virtue that can either support or be developed through calling-in and calling-out is epistemic diligence.

Epistemic diligence is the habit of responding to “epistemic challenges,” like calling-in and calling-out, by calling into question our other epistemic habits and responding positively to requests for self-critique and for more information or evidence

(Medina 2013, 51). The practices of calling-in and calling-out and the ways in which we respond to such calls, for example not being defensive or shutting down, serve as the types of epistemic challenges required for the development of epistemic diligence. In addition, the practices give rise to epistemic friction in that they make one aware of the limits of one's epistemic habits and access to the world. The mutually supporting friction and development of virtue allow these practices to play an important role in epistemic responsibility.

These strategies have many positive epistemic and moral benefits. They reduce the effects of implicit bias, specifically, for several interacting reasons: 1. They give rise to alternative epistemic viewpoints that make us aware of the cognitive gaps that arise due to our implicit biases. 2. One develops the epistemic habit of being self-critical and potentially self-correcting. 3. One is now enmeshed in a community which has also developed the habit of collective monitoring and, therefore, can point to not only individual cognitive gaps, but also potentially be situated to recognize, point out, and act upon communal cognitive gaps. Thus, one is positioned to effectively practice epistemic responsibility. By practicing epistemic responsibility, we not only improve our epistemic practices, but we also can become effective moral agents in our community. In traditional moral responsibility debates, ignorance is an excusing condition, but what if you're responsible for your ignorance? The importance of the condition-based approaches (focusing on knowledge and control) given in Section II becomes minimized through our recommendations because, by contrast, the epistemic practices have robust moral outcomes, ones that cannot be achieved through acting from one's own moral island.

Conclusion: Know Better, Do Better

In this chapter we have argued that the epistemic responsibility framework that we offer leads us closer to achieving our moral and epistemic goals than the individual and condition-based notions of responsibility often discussed with respect to implicit bias. The robust framework of epistemic responsibility allows us to see that implicit bias is just one of the many things that influences and maintains devastating epistemic practices that lead to oppressive conditions and widespread harm along social identity lines. Specifically, we have discussed the cultivation of three epistemic virtues to fulfill our epistemic responsibilities: open-mindedness, epistemic humility, and epistemic diligence. We've shown that communities can support individual commitments to the development of these virtues and develop these virtues more fully as a collective by engaging in practices that lead to epistemic friction. With improved epistemic practices, we are able to know more about ourselves, our communities, and our world.

As we become more epistemically responsible through these practices, we are able to shift outcomes in morally significant ways. When we know better, we are able to do better. It is essential that we address our patterns of attention and habits of mind—some of which are caused by our implicit biases—in order to achieve different outcomes and work collectively toward a better world. What we hope that you take from this chapter is not only the importance of being epistemically responsible subjects and the importance of cultivating epistemically responsible communities, but also that there are concrete strategies that you can employ to increase your efficacy as epistemically responsible agents.

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