New Techniques for Noninteractive Zero-Knowledge

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Noninteractive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proof systems are fundamental primitives used in many cryptographic constructions, including public-key encryption secure against chosen ciphertext attack, digital signatures, and various other cryptographic protocols. We introduce new techniques for constructing NIZK proofs based on groups with a bilinear map. Compared to previous constructions of NIZK proofs, our techniques yield dramatic reduction in the length of the common reference string (proportional to security parameter) and the size of the proofs (proportional to security parameter times the circuit size). Our novel techniques allow us to answer several long-standing open questions in the theory of noninteractive proofs.

— We construct the first *perfect* NIZK argument system for all NP.
— We construct the first universally composable NIZK argument for all NP in the presence of an *adaptive* adversary.
— We construct a *non-interactive zap* for all NP, which is the first that is based on a standard cryptographic security assumption.

Categories and Subject Descriptors: E.3 [**Data Encryption**]: *Public key cryptosystems*; F.2.m [**Analysis of Algorithms and Problem Complexity**]: Miscellaneous

General Terms: Performance, Security, Theory, Verification

Additional Key Words and Phrases: Cryptography, noninteractive zero-knowledge proof, witness indistinguishability, universal composability, groups with bilinear map, decision subgroup assumption, decisional linear assumption

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This article subsumes two earlier conference papers [Groth et al. 2006a; 2006b].
The work of J. Groth was supported by NSF grants 0430254 and 0456717 and EPSRC grant EP/G013829/1. The work of R. Ostrovsky was supported in part by NSF grants 0430254, 0830803, 09165174, 1065276, 1118126, and 1136174; US-Israel BSF grant 2008411; OKAWA Foundation Research Award; IBM Faculty Research Award; Xerox Faculty Research Award; an equipment grant from Intel; B. John Garrick Foundation Award; Teradata Research Award; and the Lockheed-Martin Corporation Research Award. This material is based upon work supported by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency through the U.S. Office of Naval Research under Contract N00014-11-1-0392. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. The work of A. Sahai was supported in part from DARPA/ONR PROCEED Award; NSF grants 1136174, 1118096, 1065276, 0916574, 0830803, and 0456717; a Xerox Faculty Research Award; a Google Faculty Research Award; an equipment grant from Intel; and an Okawa Foundation Research Grant. This material is based upon work supported by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency through the U.S. Office of Naval Research under Contract N00014-11-01-0389. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.
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DOI 10.1145/2220357.2220358 http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2220357.2220358

ACM Reference Format:
Groth, J., Ostrovsky, R., and Sahai, A. 2012. New techniques for noninteractive zero-knowledge. J. ACM 59, 3, Article 11 (June 2012), 35 pages.
DOI = 10.1145/2220357.2220358 http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2220357.2220358

1. INTRODUCTION

Noninteractive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proofs allow a prover to create a proof of membership of an NP language. The proof can be used to convince anybody that indeed the statement in question belongs to the language, but the zero-knowledge property ensures that the proof will reveal nothing but the truth of the statement.

NIZK proofs are fundamental cryptographic primitives used in many constructions, including public-key encryption secure against chosen ciphertext attack, digital signatures, and various other cryptographic protocols. The main contribution of this article is a set of new techniques for constructing NIZK proofs based on groups with a bilinear map. Compared to previous constructions of NIZK proofs, our techniques yield significant reductions in the length of the common reference string and the size of the proofs.

The new techniques also allow us to answer long-standing open questions in the theory of noninteractive zero-knowledge.

— We construct the first perfect NIZK argument system for all NP languages.
— We construct the first universally composable NIZK argument for all NP languages in the presence of an adaptive adversary.
— We construct a non-interactive zap for all NP languages, which is the first that is based on a standard cryptographic security assumption.

We now describe our contributions in more detail.

1.1. Efficient Noninteractive Zero-Knowledge Proofs

Blum et al. [1988] introduced the notion of NIZK in the common random string model and showed how to construct *computational* NIZK proof systems for proving a single statement about any NP language. The first computational NIZK proof system for multiple theorems was constructed by Blum, et al. [1991]. Both Blum et al. [1988] and Blum et al. [1991] based their NIZK systems on certain number-theoretic assumptions (specifically, the hardness of deciding quadratic residues modulo a composite number). Feige et al. [1999] showed how to construct computational NIZK proofs based on any trapdoor permutation.

Much research has been devoted to the construction of efficient NIZK proofs [Boyar et al. 2000; Damgård 1992; Kilian and Petrank 1998], but until now the only known method to do so has been the "hidden random bits" method. By this we mean a method where the prover has a string of random bits, which are secret to the verifier. By revealing a subset of these bits, and keeping the rest secret, the prover can convince the verifier of the truth of the statement in question. Improvements in the efficiency of NIZK proofs have come in the form of various ways to set up a hidden random bits model and how to use it optimally.

From a birds eye perspective, the main contribution of this paper is to suggest a set of completely different techniques to construct NIZK proofs. We show that a special type of homomorphic commitment scheme, where it is possible to prove that a commitment contains 0 or 1, implies NIZK proofs for all NP languages. This yields very simple and efficient NIZK proof systems. We show that these homomorphic proof commitments can be constructed from specific number theoretic assumptions related to

Table I. Comparison of CRS Size and NIZK Proof Size for Efficient-Prover NIZK Proof Systems for Circuit SAT

Reference	CRS size	Proof Size	Assumption
[Kilian and Petrank 1998]	$O(\|C\|k^2)$	$O(\|C\|k^2)$	Trapdoor Permutations
[Boyar et al. 2000]	$O(\|C\|k^2)$	$O(\|C\|k^2)$	Quadratic Residuosity
[De Santis et al. 1999]	$O(k + \|C\|^\epsilon)$	poly$(\|C\|k)$	NIZK & One-Way Functions
This paper	$O(k)$	$O(\|C\|k)$	Subgroup Decision
This paper	$O(k)$	$O(\|C\|k)$	Decisional Linear

$|C|$ is the number of gates in the circuit, $\epsilon > 0$ is an arbitrary constant and k is a security parameter specifying the bit-length of an element in a group or the domain of a trapdoor permutation.

groups equipped with a bilinear map. For comparison with the most efficient previous work, please see Table I.

1.2. Perfect NIZK Arguments

The plethora of research on NIZK mainly considers the case where the zero-knowledge property is true computationally; that is, a computationally bounded party cannot extract any information beyond the correctness of the theorem being proven. In the case of *interactive* zero-knowledge, it has long been known that all NP statements can in fact be proven using *perfect* (or statistical) zero knowledge arguments [Brassard and Crèpeau 1986; Brassard et al. 1988]; that is, even a computationally unbounded party would not learn anything beyond the correctness of the theorem being proven; though we must assume that the prover, only during the execution of the protocol, is computationally bounded to ensure soundness. Such systems where the soundness holds computationally have come to be known as *argument systems*, as opposed to *proof systems* where the soundness condition must hold unconditionally.

Achieving perfect or statistical NIZK has been an elusive goal. The original work of Blum et al. [1988] showed how a computationally unbounded prover can prove to a polynomially bounded verifier that a number is a quadratic-residue, where the zero-knowledge property is perfect. Statistical ZK (including statistical NIZK[1]) for any non-trivial language were shown to imply the existence of a one-way function by Ostrovsky [1991] for both proofs and arguments. Statistical NIZK proof systems were further explored by De Santis et al. [1998] and Goldreich et al. [1999], who gave complete problems for the complexity class associated with statistical NIZK proofs. However, these works came far short of working for all NP languages, and in fact NP-complete languages cannot have (even interactive) statistical zero-knowledge proof systems unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses [Aiello and Håstad 1991; Fortnow 1987][2]. Unless our computational complexity beliefs are wrong, this leaves open only the possibility of argument systems.

Do there exist *statistical* NIZK arguments for all NP languages? Despite nearly two decades of research on NIZK the answer to this question was not known, see Table II. Here, we answer this question in the affirmative. A simple modification to the common reference string in our NIZK proof system transforms the protocol into one with perfect zero-knowledge.

[1]We note that the result of Ostrovsky [1991] implies the existence of one-way functions even for *honest-verifier* SZK, and does not require the simulator to produce the verifier's random tape. Therefore, it shows the existence of one-way functions from NIZK, even for a common reference string that is not uniform. See also Pass and Shelat [2005] for an alternative proof.

[2]See also Goldreich et al. [1998] appendix regarding subtleties of this proof, and Sahai and Vadhan [2003] for an alternative proof.

Table II. Existence of Zero-Knowledge Proof and Argument Systems for NP-Complete Languages

	Interactive	Non-interactive
Computational zero-knowledge proofs	[Goldreich et al. 1991]	[Blum et al. 1988]
Statistical zero-knowledge arguments	[Brassard and Crèpeau 1986]	This work

We remark that when it comes to perfect NIZK arguments some care is needed when defining soundness. Our perfect NIZK argument has non-adaptive soundness guaranteeing that a cheating prover cannot construct a convincing NIZK argument for a false statement that is chosen independently of the common reference string. We do not know whether our perfect NIZK argument has adaptive soundness, where the adversary may try to forge an NIZK argument for a false statement that is correlated with the common reference string. Indeed, subsequent to our work, Abe and Fehr [2007] have shown that so-called direct black-box reductions cannot be used to establish the adaptive soundness of a perfect NIZK argument so proving the adaptive soundness of any perfect NIZK arguments based on a standard cryptographic complexity assumption would require novel ideas. However, by using complexity leveraging techniques we can show that our perfect NIZK argument is adaptively sound for small statements, see Appendix A. Furthermore, we define a new notion that we call *adaptive culpable soundness*[3] and show that our perfect NIZK argument satisfies this notion of soundness. In our experience, adaptive culpable soundness suffices for most practical applications of NIZK arguments. We refer to Section 7.1 for the definition of adaptive culpable soundness and further discussion.

1.3. Universally Composable NIZK Arguments

We generalize our techniques to construct perfect NIZK arguments that satisfy Canetti's UC definition of security. Canetti introduced the universal composability (UC) framework [Canetti 2001] as a general method to argue security of protocols in an arbitrary environment. It is a strong security definition; in particular it implies nonmalleability [Dolev et al. 2000], and security when arbitrary protocols are executed concurrently.

We define an ideal functionality that captures the notion of NIZK proofs. We then suggest a protocol that securely realizes this functionality against adaptive adversaries in the erasure-free model. In the erasure-free model the adversary can adaptively choose which parties to corrupt and when corrupting a party it learns the internal state and the entire computational history of this party. Not only do we obtain this degree of security, our protocol is also perfect zero-knowledge at the same time.

Prior to our result, no NIZK protocol was known to be UC-secure against adaptive adversaries. In Canetti et al. [2002], it was observed that De Santis et al. [2002] achieve UC-security, but only for the setting with *static* adversaries. Canetti et al. [2002] and Damgård and Nielsen [2002] both suggest UC secure zero-knowledge proofs, but these protocols are interactive.

1.4. Noninteractive Zaps

Dwork and Naor [2000] proved a surprising result: that there exist "zaps", two-round witness-indistinguishable (WI) proofs in the plain model without a common reference string, where the verifier asks a single question and the prover sends back a single answer. Furthermore, Dwork and Naor [2000] showed that their constructions allowed

[3]In earlier versions of this article, posted online, we referred to this notion as "co-soundness." However, as many researchers have reported finding this terminology confusing, we have renamed it "adaptive culpable soundness" here, in hopes that this name is more descriptive.

for the first message (from verifier to prover) to be reused – so that between a particular pair of prover and verifier, only one message from verifier to prover is required even if many statements are to be proven. Such zaps were shown to have a number of fascinating and important applications, beyond the numerous applications of WI proofs already present in the literature. Dwork and Naor's work left open the following tantalizing question: does a *non-interactive* witness-indistinguishable proof, where the prover sends a single message to the verifier for some nontrivial NP-language, exist?

Barak et al. [2007] constructed the first noninteractive zaps for any NP relation by applying derandomization techniques to the construction of Dwork and Naor, based on trapdoor permutations and the assumption that (very good) Hitting Set Generators (HSG) against co-nondeterministic circuits exist. It is known that such HSG's can be built if there is a function in E that requires exponential-size *nondeterministic* circuits, that is, the assumption states that some uniform exponential deterministic computations can (only) be sped up by at most a constant power (Time 2^{cn} becomes $2^{\varepsilon n}$), when given the added power of nondeterminism and advice specific to the length of the input.

We give a new affirmative answer to the question by constructing a non-interactive zap. Our construction is completely different from the construction of Barak, Ong and Vadhan and uses a different, number-theoretic computational assumption. Furthermore, our construction is much more efficient than both the constructions of Dwork-Naor and Barak-Ong-Vadhan (even if these constructions were instantiated with very efficient NIZK proofs from this article).

A further point of comparison would be to look more closely at the assumptions used, for instance in the context of Naor's classification of assumption based on falsifiability [Naor 2003]. While our assumption, the decisional linear assumption, is an "efficiently falsifiable" assumption according to Naor's classification, it appears that the assumption about the existence of HSG's against co-nondeterministic circuits, or the assumption about functions in E with large nondeterministic circuits, are "none of the above" assumptions according to Naor's classification, since we wouldn't have time to actually "run" a suggested nondeterministic (or co-nondeterministic) circuit that claims to break the assumption.[4]

1.5. Subsequent Work, and the Impact of Our Techniques

Lossy Encryption. In Groth et al. [2006b], the original conference version of this article, we used a "parameter switching" technique in the encryption keys (see Section 3). In particular, we define homomorphic proof commitments that allow parameter switching in the key generation to allow either producing perfectly hiding or perfect binding keys, with the requirement that it is computationally indistinguishable to tell which of the two modes are being used. This "parameter switching" technique proved incredibly useful in cryptography. The technique was also named (and renamed) several times. Kol and Naor [2008], called it "Meaningful/Meaningless" encryption, Peikert et al. [2008], called it "Dual-Mode Encryption", and Bellare et al.

[4]We note that there is some uncertainty as to how to interpret Naor's classification with respect to these derandomization-style assumptions. We take a view that we think is consistent with the spirit of Naor's classification by asking the question – if the assumption is false, then is there necessarily a reasonably efficient (PPT) algorithmic demonstration of the falsehood of this assumption? To us, it appears that the answer is "Yes" for our assumption, but appears to be "No" for the Barak et al. [2007] assumptions; this is simply because for the latter assumptions, it is important that the breaking algorithm could be nondeterministic – and if it is, then how can we efficiently verify that it indeed does break the assumption? It would be very interesting if in fact there were a positive answer to this. Of course the question of falsifiability is less important than the question of whether an assumption is actually true; alas, we find ourselves unequipped to address this issue.

[2009] called it "Lossy Encryption". All these works utilized our "parameter-switching" methodology. The last name, of "Lossy Encryption" gained popularity. For example, Hemenway et al. [2011] gave constructions of "lossy encryption" from rerandomizable encryption, statistically hiding oblivious transfer, universal hash proofs, private information retrieval schemes and homomorphic encryption. For further discussion of the importance of lossy encryption, see [Hemenway and Ostrovsky 2010].

Groth-Sahai Proofs. Following our introduction of NIZK proofs based on groups with bilinear maps, there has been many works exploring this direction of research. Boyen and Waters [2006, 2007] developed NIZK techniques for groups with a bilinear map that were useful for constructing group signatures. Groth [2006] also worked on group signatures and formulated a general language for capturing statements arising in groups with a bilinear map with a corresponding NIZK proof that had a constant factor overhead. While the work presented in this article gives a statistical NIZK for circuit satisfiability, for the class of statements that can be formulated in terms of the operations associated with the bilinear group, Groth and Sahai [2008] showed direct constructions of statistical NIZK that do not require NP reductions and thus are efficient in practice in many applications. We note that while recent work on NIZK proofs [Groth 2010] has used other techniques to get NIZK proofs for Circuit SAT that are even more efficient than our techniques asymptotically, techniques based on bilinear maps introduced in this article and further developed in [Groth and Sahai 2008] remain the only ones so far to give practical NIZK proofs for a wide class of applications based on bilinear maps.

2. DEFINITIONS: NONINTERACTIVE PROOFS

Let R be an efficiently computable binary relation. For pairs $(x, w) \in R$ we call x the statement and w the witness. Let L be the language consisting of statements in R.

A noninteractive proof system [Blum et al. 1988] for a relation R consists of a common reference string generation algorithm K, a prover P and a verifier V. We require that they all be probabilistic polynomial time algorithms, that is, we are looking at *efficient prover* proofs. The common reference string generation algorithm produces a common reference string σ of length $\Omega(k)$. The prover takes as input (σ, x, w) and produces a proof π. The verifier takes as input (σ, x, π) and outputs 1 if the proof is acceptable and 0 if rejecting the proof. We call (K, P, V) a noninteractive proof system for R if it has the completeness and soundness properties described in this section.

Perfect Completeness. A proof system is complete if an honest prover with a valid witness can convince an honest verifier. For all adversaries $\mathcal{A}$, we have

$$\Pr\left[\sigma \leftarrow K(1^k); (x, w) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\sigma); \pi \leftarrow P(\sigma, x, w) : V(\sigma, x, \pi) = 1 \text{ if } (x, w) \in R\right] = 1.$$

Perfect or Computational Soundness. A proof system is sound if it is infeasible to convince an honest verifier when the statement is false. For all polynomial-size families $\{x_k\}$ of statements $x_k \notin L$ and all adversaries $\mathcal{A}$, we have

$$\Pr\left[\sigma \leftarrow K(1^k); \pi \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\sigma, x_k) : V(\sigma, x_k, \pi) = 1\right] = 0.$$

In computational soundness, we only quantify over nonuniform polynomial-time adversaries, and we only require the above probability to be negligible in k.[5]

[5]We call a function $f : \mathbb{N} \to [0, 1]$ negligible if for all $c > 0$ there exists a K so for all $k > K$ we have $f(k) \leq k^{-c}$. We write $f(k) \approx g(k)$ if $|f(k) - g(k)|$ is negligible. A function f is overwhelming if $f(k) \approx 1$.

Perfect Knowledge Extraction. A proof system is a proof of knowledge if the witness can be extracted from the proof. We call (K, P, V) a proof of knowledge for R if there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time knowledge extractor $E = (E_1, E_2)$ such that E_1 returns a correctly distributed common reference string σ with an extraction key ξ that allows E_2 to extract a witness from a proof.

For all adversaries $\mathcal{A}$, we have

$$\Pr\left[\sigma \leftarrow K(1^k) : \mathcal{A}(\sigma) = 1\right] = \Pr\left[(\sigma, \xi) \leftarrow E_1(1^k) : \mathcal{A}(\sigma) = 1\right],$$

and

$$\Pr\left[(\sigma, \xi) \leftarrow E_1(1^k); (x, \pi) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\sigma); w \leftarrow E_2(\sigma, \xi, x, \pi) : (x, w) \in R \text{ if } V(\sigma, x, \pi) = 1\right] = 1.$$

Since perfect knowledge extraction implies the existence of a witness for the statement being proven, it implies perfect soundness.

Computational or Perfect (Adaptive Multitheorem) Zero-Knowledge [Feige et al. 1999]. A proof system is zero-knowledge if the proofs do not reveal any information about the witnesses. We say a noninteractive proof (K, P, V) is zero-knowledge if there exists a polynomial-time simulator $S = (S_1, S_2)$, where S_1 returns a simulated common reference string σ together with a simulation trapdoor τ that enables S_2 to simulate proofs without access to the witness. For all nonuniform polynomial-time adversaries $\mathcal{A}$ we have

$$\Pr\left[\sigma \leftarrow K(1^k) : \mathcal{A}^{P(\sigma,\cdot,\cdot)}(\sigma) = 1\right] \approx \Pr\left[(\sigma, \tau) \leftarrow S_1(1^k) : \mathcal{A}^{S(\sigma,\tau,\cdot,\cdot)}(\sigma) = 1\right],$$

where $S(\sigma, \tau, x, w) = S_2(\sigma, \tau, x)$ for $(x, w) \in R$ and both oracles[6] output `failure` if $(x, w) \notin R$.

If the two probabilities are equal, we say that (K, P, V) is *perfect* zero-knowledge.

Nonerasure Zero-Knowledge. In modeling adaptive UC security without erasures, an honest prover may be corrupted at some time. To handle such cases, we want to extend the zero-knowledge property such that not only can we simulate an honest party making a proof, we also want to be able to simulate how it constructed the proof. Once the party is corrupted, the adversary will learn the witness and the randomness used; we want to create convincing randomness such that it looks like the simulated proof was constructed by an honest prover using this randomness.

We say a noninteractive proof (K, P, V) is a nonerasure NIZK argument or proof for R if there exists a probabilistic polynomial time simulator $S = (S_1, S_2, S_3)$ such that for all nonuniform polynomial-time adversaries $\mathcal{A}$ we have

$$\Pr\left[\sigma \leftarrow K(1^k) : \mathcal{A}^{PR(\sigma,\cdot,\cdot)}(\sigma) = 1\right] \approx \Pr\left[(\sigma, \tau) \leftarrow S_1(1^k) : \mathcal{A}^{SR(\sigma,\tau,\cdot,\cdot)}(\sigma) = 1\right],$$

where $PR(\sigma, x, w)$ picks randomness r, runs $\pi \leftarrow P(\sigma, x, w; r)$ and returns π, r, and where SR picks randomness ρ, runs $\pi \leftarrow S_2(\sigma, \tau, x; \rho); r \leftarrow S_3(\sigma, \tau, x, w, \rho)$ and returns π, r, both of the oracles outputting `failure` if $(x, w) \notin R$.

If the two probabilities are equal, we speak of perfect nonerasure zero-knowledge. Obviously, nonerasure zero-knowledge implies zero-knowledge, and perfect nonerasure zero-knowledge implies perfect zero-knowledge.

[6]The notation $\mathcal{A}^{P(\sigma,\cdot,\cdot)}$ and $\mathcal{A}^{S(\sigma,\tau,\cdot,\cdot)}$ means that $\mathcal{A}$ has access to a subroutine (called an oracle) that on input (x, w) returns a proof π. The adversary only sees this input-output functionality; it does not a priori know which type of oracle it has access to.

Witness-Indistinguishability and Noninteractive Zap. We call (P, V) a non-interactive zap for R if (P, V) is a non-interactive proof (with trivial key generation $K(1^k) = 1^k$) with witness-indistinguishability.

Witness-indistinguishability means that proof does not reveal which witness the prover used. For all nonuniform polynomial time interactive adversaries $\mathcal{A}$, we have

$$\begin{aligned}&\Pr\left[(x, w_0, w_1) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(1^k); \pi \leftarrow P(1^k, x, w_0) : \mathcal{A}(\pi) = 1 \text{ and } (x, w_0), (x, w_1) \in R\right]\\ \approx\ &\Pr\left[(x, w_0, w_1) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(1^k); \pi \leftarrow P(1^k, x, w_1) : \mathcal{A}(\pi) = 1 \text{ and } (x, w_0), (x, w_1) \in R\right].\end{aligned}$$

A hybrid argument shows that this definition of witness-indistinguishability is equivalent to a definition where we give the adversary access to multiple proofs using either witness w_0 or witness w_1.

3. HOMOMORPHIC PROOF COMMITMENTS

We will use a noninteractive commitment scheme with some special properties that we define in this section. Recall first that in a noninteractive commitment scheme there is a key generator, which generates a public commitment key ck. The commitment key ck defines a message space $\mathcal{M}_{ck}$, a randomizer space $\mathcal{R}_{ck}$ and a commitment space $\mathcal{C}_{ck}$. We will require that the key generation algorithm is probabilistic polynomial time and outputs keys of length $\theta(k)$. In general, it will be obvious which key we are using, so we will sometimes omit it in our notation. There is an efficient commitment algorithm com that takes as input the commitment key, a message and a randomizer and outputs a commitment, $c = \text{com}_{ck}(m; r)$. We call (m, r) an opening of c.

The commitment scheme must be binding and hiding. Binding means that it is infeasible to find two openings with different messages of the same commitment. Hiding means that given a commitment it is infeasible to guess which message is inside the commitment. We want a commitment scheme that has two different flavors of keys. The commitment key can be perfectly binding, in which case a valid commitment uniquely defines one possible message. Alternatively, the commitment key can be perfectly hiding, in which case the commitment reveals no information whatsoever about the message. In fact, we can create perfect hiding keys together with some trapdoor information such that we can open a commitment to any message. We require that these two kinds of keys are computationally indistinguishable.

We will consider commitments, where both the message space $(\mathcal{M}, +, 0)$, the randomizer space $(\mathcal{R}, +, 0)$ and the commitment space $(\mathcal{C}, \cdot, 1)$ are finite abelian groups. The commitment scheme should be homomorphic, that is, for all messages and randomizers we have

$$\text{com}_{ck}(m_1 + m_2; r_1 + r_2) = \text{com}_{ck}(m_1; r_1)\text{com}_{ck}(m_2; r_2).$$

We will require that the message space has a generator 1, and also that it has at least order 3. The property that sets homomorphic proof commitments apart from other homomorphic commitments is that there is a way to prove that a commitment contains 0 or 1. More precisely, if the key is of the perfect binding type, then it is possible to prove that there exists an opening $(m, r) \in \{0, 1\} \times \mathcal{R}$. On the other hand, if it is a perfect hiding key, then the proof will be perfectly witness-indistinguishable, that is, it is impossible to tell whether the message is 0 or 1.

Homomorphic Proof Commitment. $(K_{\text{binding}}, K_{\text{hiding}}, \text{com}, \text{Topen}, P_{01}, V_{01})$ is a homomorphic proof commitment scheme if it satisfies the following properties for all nonuniform polynomial-time adversaries $\mathcal{A}$.

Key indistinguishability.

$$\Pr\Big[(ck, xk) \leftarrow K_{\text{binding}}(1^k) : \mathcal{A}(ck) = 1\Big] \approx \Pr\Big[(ck, tk) \leftarrow K_{\text{hiding}}(1^k) : \mathcal{A}(ck) = 1\Big].$$

Homomorphic property.

$$\Pr\Big[\text{mode} \leftarrow \{\text{binding}, \text{hiding}\}; (ck, *) \leftarrow K_{\text{mode}}(1^k) : \forall (m_1, r_1), (m_2, r_2) \in \mathcal{M} \times \mathcal{R} : \\ \text{com}_{ck}(m_1 + m_2; r_1 + r_2) = \text{com}_{ck}(m_1; r_1)\text{com}_{ck}(m_2; r_2)\Big] = 1.$$

Perfect binding.

$$\Pr\Big[(ck, xk) \leftarrow K_{\text{binding}}(1^k) : \exists (m_1, r_1), (m_2, r_2) \in \mathcal{M} \times \mathcal{R} \text{ such that} \\ m_1 \neq m_2 \text{ and } \text{com}_{ck}(m_1; r_1) = \text{com}_{ck}(m_2; r_2)\Big] = 0.$$

Perfect trapdoor opening.

$$\Pr\Big[(ck, tk) \leftarrow K_{\text{hiding}}(1^k); (m_1, m_2) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(ck); r_1 \leftarrow \mathcal{R}; r_2 \leftarrow \text{Topen}_{tk}(m_1, r_1, m_2) : \\ \text{com}_{ck}(m_1; r_1) = \text{com}_{ck}(m_2; r_2) \text{ if } m_1, m_2 \in \mathcal{M}\Big] = 1.$$

Perfect trapdoor opening indistinguishability.

$$\Pr\Big[(ck, tk) \leftarrow K_{\text{hiding}}(1^k); (m_1, m_2) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(ck); r_1 \leftarrow \mathcal{R}; r_2 \leftarrow \text{Topen}_{tk}(m_1, r_1, m_2) : \\ m_1, m_2 \in \mathcal{M} \text{ and } \mathcal{A}(r_2) = 1\Big] \\ = \Pr\Big[(ck, tk) \leftarrow K_{\text{hiding}}(1^k); (m_1, m_2) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(ck); r_2 \leftarrow \mathcal{R} : m_1, m_2 \in \mathcal{M} \text{ and } \mathcal{A}(r_2) = 1\Big].$$

Perfect completeness.

$$\Pr\Big[\text{mode} \leftarrow \{\text{binding}, \text{hiding}\}; (ck, *) \leftarrow K_{\text{mode}}(1^k); (m, r) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(ck); \pi \leftarrow P_{01}(ck, m, r) : \\ V_{01}(ck, \text{com}_{ck}(m; r), \pi) = 1 \text{ if } (m, r) \in \{0, 1\} \times \mathcal{R}\Big] = 1.$$

Perfect soundness.

$$\Pr\Big[(ck, xk) \leftarrow K_{\text{binding}}(1^k); (c, \pi) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(ck) : \\ \exists (m, r) \in \{0, 1\} \times \mathcal{R} \text{ such that } c = \text{com}_{ck}(m; r) \text{ if } V_{01}(ck, c, \pi) = 1\Big] = 1.$$

Perfect witness indistinguishability.

$$\Pr\Big[(ck, tk) \leftarrow K_{\text{hiding}}(1^k); (r_0, r_1) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(ck); \pi \leftarrow P_{01}(ck, 0, r_0) : \\ r_0, r_1 \in \mathcal{R} \text{ and } \text{com}_{ck}(0; r_0) = \text{com}_{ck}(1; r_1) \text{ and } \mathcal{A}(\pi) = 1\Big] \\ = \Pr\Big[(ck, tk) \leftarrow K_{\text{hiding}}(1^k); (r_0, r_1) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(ck); \pi \leftarrow P_{01}(ck, 1, r_1) : \\ r_0, r_1 \in \mathcal{R} \text{ and } \text{com}_{ck}(0; r_0) = \text{com}_{ck}(1; r_1) \text{ and } \mathcal{A}(\pi) = 1\Big].$$

Perfect Extractability. We can strengthen the definition of a homomorphic proof commitment by requiring that we generate perfect binding keys such that we also have an extraction key that permits extraction of the message inside the commitment. We say the commitment scheme has perfect extractability if there is an extraction algorithm Ext such that

$$\Pr\Big[(ck, xk) \leftarrow K_{\text{binding}}(1^k) : \forall (m, r) \in \{0,1\} \times \mathcal{R} : \text{Ext}_{xk}(\text{com}_{ck}(m; r)) = m\Big].$$

Perfect Nonerasure Witness Indistinguishability. Consider a multi-party computation protocol, where we want to prove adaptive security. The adversary may corrupt some party, and in the security proof we may have to simulate the randomness and a computational history for this party that would explain its public view. If this party has computed some commitment and a proof that the commitment contains 0 or 1, then we can explain the randomness in the commitment by making a trapdoor opening. Here we will strengthen the witness indistinguishability such that we can also explain the proof. Given a proof, which may be created with one witness and some randomness, we want to come up with convincing randomness that could explain the use of another witness. Let $\mathcal{R}_{\text{proof}}$ be the randomizer space used in the proof. We say the commitment scheme has perfect nonerasure witness indistinguishability if there is a polynomial time simulator S_{01} such that for all interactive adversaries $\mathcal{A}$ we have

$$\begin{aligned}
&\Pr\Big[(ck, tk) \leftarrow K_{\text{hiding}}(1^k); (m, r_0, r_1) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(ck); \rho_0 \leftarrow \mathcal{R}_{\text{proof}}; \pi \leftarrow P_{01}(ck, m, r_0; \rho_0); \rho_1 \leftarrow S_{01}(ck, m, r_0, r_1, \rho_0) : \\
&\qquad (m, r_0, r_1) \in \{0,1\} \times \mathcal{R} \times \mathcal{R} \ \text{ and } \ \text{com}_{ck}(m; r_0) = \text{com}_{ck}(1-m; r_1) \ \text{ and } \ \mathcal{A}(\pi, \rho_1) = 1\Big] \\
= \ &\Pr\Big[(ck, tk) \leftarrow K_{\text{hiding}}(1^k); (m, r_0, r_1) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(ck); \rho_1 \leftarrow \mathcal{R}_{\text{proof}}; \pi \leftarrow P_{01}(ck, 1-m, r_1; \rho_1) : \\
&\qquad (m, r_0, r_1) \in \{0,1\} \times \mathcal{R} \times \mathcal{R} \ \text{ and } \ \text{com}_{ck}(m; r_0) = \text{com}_{ck}(1-m; r_1) \ \text{ and } \ \mathcal{A}(\pi, \rho_1) = 1\Big].
\end{aligned}$$

In the following sections, we give two candidates for commitment schemes with these properties.

4. HOMOMORPHIC PROOF COMMITMENTS BASED ON THE SUBGROUP DECISION ASSUMPTION

Boneh et al. [2005] suggested an encryption scheme with interesting homomorphic properties that can be used to build a homomorphic proof commitment scheme. We first describe the setup used in this cryptosystem.

Let $\mathcal{G}_{\text{BGN}}$ be a randomized algorithm that on security parameter k outputs $(p, q, \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, e, g)$ such that

— p, q are primes with $p < q$;
— $\mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T$ are descriptions of cyclic groups of order $n = pq$;
— $e : \mathbb{G} \times \mathbb{G} \to \mathbb{G}_T$ is a bilinear map, that is, $\forall u, v \in \mathbb{G}\ \forall a, b \in \mathbb{Z} : e(u^a, v^b) = e(u, v)^{ab}$;
— g is a random generator for $\mathbb{G}$ and $e(g, g)$ generates $\mathbb{G}_T$;
— group operations, deciding group membership and the bilinear map are efficiently computable.

Let $\mathbb{G}_q$ be the subgroup of $\mathbb{G}$ of order q. The subgroup decision problem is to distinguish elements of $\mathbb{G}$ from elements of $\mathbb{G}_q$.

Definition 4.1. The subgroup decision assumption holds for generator $\mathcal{G}_{\mathrm{BGN}}$ if, for any nonuniform polynomial-time adversary, $\mathcal{A}$ we have

$$\Pr\left[(p,q,\mathbb{G},\mathbb{G}_T,e,g) \leftarrow \mathcal{G}_{\mathrm{BGN}}(1^k); n = pq; r \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_n^*; h = g^r : \mathcal{A}(n,\mathbb{G},\mathbb{G}_T,e,g,h) = 1\right]$$
$$\approx \Pr\left[(p,q,\mathbb{G},\mathbb{G}_T,e,g) \leftarrow \mathcal{G}_{\mathrm{BGN}}(1^k); n = pq; r \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^*; h = g^{pr} : \mathcal{A}(n,\mathbb{G},\mathbb{G}_T,e,g,h) = 1\right].$$

Example. Boneh et al. [2005] introduced the subgroup decision assumption and suggested the following candidate for a generator $\mathcal{G}_{\mathrm{BGN}}$. Pick k-bit primes $p < q$ and let $n = pq$. Find the smallest ℓ such that $P = \ell n - 1$ is prime and $P \equiv 2 \bmod 3$. Consider the points on the elliptic curve $y^2 \equiv x^3 + 1 \bmod P$. This curve has $P + 1 = \ell n$ points, such that it has a subgroup $\mathbb{G}$ of order n. Let $\mathbb{G}_T$ be the order n subgroup of $\mathbb{F}_{P^2}^*$ and let $e : \mathbb{G} \times \mathbb{G} \to \mathbb{G}_T$ be the modified Weil-pairing from Boneh and Franklin [2003]. To get a point (x, y) on the curve, we can pick at random $y \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_P$ and compute $x \equiv (y^2 - 1)^{\frac{P+1}{3}} \bmod P$. Letting $\gamma = (x, y)$ we now have that $g = \gamma^\ell$ is a random generator for $\mathbb{G}$ provided $g^p \neq 1$ and $g^q \neq 1$.

4.1. A Homomorphic Proof Commitment Scheme

We will use the subgroup decision assumption to create a homomorphic proof commitment scheme. To create a perfectly binding key, we set up groups with a bilinear map, where the subgroup decision problem is hard. We pick a generator g and an element h of order q. To commit to $m \in \mathbb{Z}_p$, we form $g^m h^r$ for random $r \in \mathbb{Z}_n$. This is the cryptosystem from Boneh et al. [2005]. On the other hand, if we want to make perfectly hiding commitments, we choose h of order n, in which case we have a standard Pedersen commitment [Pedersen 1991].

It is possible to make a noninteractive proof that a commitment contains 0 or 1. Consider the commitment $c = g^m h^r$. If $h \in \mathbb{G}_q$, this uniquely defines $m \in \mathbb{Z}_p$. Observe, $m \in \{0, 1\}$ if and only if one of c or cg^{-1} has order 1 or q. Our task therefore reduces to proving that $e(c, cg^{-1})$ has order 1 or q. Since

$$e(c, cg^{-1}) = e(g^m h^r, g^{m-1} h^r) = e(g^m, g^{m-1}) e(h^r, g^{2m-1} h^r) = e(h, (g^{2m-1} h^r)^r),$$

we can simply reveal the proof $\pi = (g^{2m-1} h^r)^r$ and the verifier can check the above equation. Since h has order q, this implies $e(c, cg^{-1})$ has order 1 or q.[7] With these ideas in mind, we offer a homomorphic proof commitment scheme in Figure 1.

THEOREM 4.2. *The protocol described in Figure* 1 *is a homomorphic proof commitment scheme with perfect extraction and perfect non-erasure witness indistinguishability if the subgroup decision assumption holds for* $\mathcal{G}_{\mathrm{BGN}}$.

PROOF. The subgroup decision assumption implies that it is hard to distinguish perfect binding keys and perfect hiding keys. It is straightforward to see that on either type of key the commitment scheme is homomorphic. When h has order q, we have perfect binding and perfect extraction. When h has order n, we have a unique trapdoor opening to any message. This leaves to demonstrate that we have a witness-indistinguishable proof of a commitment containing 0 or 1.

Let us first prove that we have perfect completeness. No matter whether ck is a perfect binding key or a perfect hiding key, it is the case that for $m \in \{0, 1\}$ we have $e(c, cg^{-1}) = e(g^m h^r, g^{m-1} h^r) = e(g, g)^{m(m-1)} e(h^r, g^{2m-1} h^r) = e(h, \pi)$.

[7] In the first version of this article, we had a more complicated proof for proving a commitment containing 0 or 1. Boyen and Waters [2006] observed that the simpler proof given here suffices for making a noninteractive witness-indistinguishable proof for a commitment containing 0 or 1.

Perfectly binding key generation $K_{\text{binding}}(1^k)$

(1) $(p, q, \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, e, g) \leftarrow \mathcal{G}_{\text{BGN}}(1^k)$
(2) $n = pq$
(3) $x \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^*$
(4) $h = g^{px}$
(5) Let $ck = (n, \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, e, g, h)$
(6) Let $xk = (ck, q)$
(7) Return (ck, xk)

Perfectly hiding key generation $K_{\text{binding}}(1^k)$

(1) $(p, q, \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, e, g) \leftarrow \mathcal{G}_{\text{BGN}}(1^k)$
(2) $n = pq$
(3) $x \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_n^*$
(4) $h = g^x$
(5) Let $ck = (n, \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, e, g, h)$
(6) Let $tk = (ck, x)$
(7) Return (ck, tk)

Commitment $\text{com}_{ck}(m)$

The key ck defines message space $\mathbb{Z}_p$, randomizer space $\mathbb{Z}_n$ and commitment space $\mathbb{G}$. To commit to message $m \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ do

(1) $r \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_n$
(2) Return $\text{com}_{ck}(m; r) = g^m h^r$

Extraction $\text{Ext}_{xk}(c)$

On a perfect binding key we can use $xk = (ck, q)$ to extract m of length $\mathcal{O}(\log k)$ from $c = g^m h^r$ as follows. Compute $c^q = (g^m h^r)^q = (g^q)^m$ and exhaustively search for m.

Trapdoor opening $\text{Topen}_{tk}(m, r, m')$

Given a commitment $c = g^m h^r$ under a perfectly hiding commitment key we have $c = g^{m'} h^{r-(m'-m)/x}$. So we can create a perfectly hiding commitment and open it to any value we wish if we have the trapdoor key $tk = (ck, x)$. The trapdoor opening algorithm returns $r' = r - \frac{(m'-m)}{x} \bmod n$.

WI proof $P_{01}(ck, m, r)$

Given $m, r \in \{0, 1\} \times \mathbb{Z}_n$ we make the WI proof for commitment to 0 or 1 as $\pi = (g^{2m-1} h^r)^r$.

Verification $V_{01}(ck, c, \pi)$

To verify a WI proof π of commitment c containing 0 or 1, check $e(c, cg^{-1}) = e(h, \pi)$.

Fig. 1. Homomorphic proof commitment scheme based on the subgroup decision assumption.

Let us now demonstrate that we have perfect soundness on perfect binding keys. We can always write $c = g^m h^r$ for some uniquely defined $m \in \mathbb{Z}_p$. We have $e(c, cg^{-1}) = e(g, g)^{m(m-1)} e(h, (g^{2m-1} h^r)^r)$. Since h has order q, $e(h, \pi)$ has order 1 or q. The verification $e(c, cg^{-1}) = e(h, \pi)$ implies that $e(c, cg^{-1})$ has order 1 or q. Since $e(c, cg^{-1}) = e(g, g)^{m(m-1)} e(h, (g^{2m-1} h^r)^r)$, we see that $e(g, g)^{m(m-1)}$ has order 1 or q. Since $e(g, g)$ is a generator for $\mathbb{G}_T$ this means that $m(m-1) = 0 \bmod p$ and therefore $m = 0 \bmod p$ or $m = 1 \bmod p$.

Finally, let us show that we have perfect nonerasure witness indistinguishability on a perfect hiding key. Suppose we have $c = g^0 h^{r_0} = g^1 h^{r_1}$. Since h is a generator for $\mathbb{G}$ there is a unique proof π such that $e(c, cg^{-1}) = e(h, \pi)$ and both witnesses make us produce the same proof. So we have perfect witness indistinguishability. Furthermore, since the prover algorithm is deterministic we automatically get perfect nonerasure witness indistinguishability since there is no randomness to reconstruct. □

5. HOMOMORPHIC PROOF COMMITMENTS BASED ON THE DECISIONAL LINEAR ASSUMPTION

We will now describe another example of a homomorphic proof commitment scheme, this time based on the linear encryption scheme by Boneh et al. [2004].

Let $\mathcal{G}_{\mathrm{DLIN}}$ be a randomized algorithm that takes a security parameter as input and outputs $(p, \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, e, g)$ such that

— p is a prime;
— $\mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T$ are descriptions of groups of order p;
— $e : \mathbb{G} \times \mathbb{G} \to \mathbb{G}_T$ is a bilinear map, that is, $\forall u, v \in \mathbb{G}\ \forall a, b \in \mathbb{Z} : e(u^a, v^b) = e(u, v)^{ab}$;
— g is a random generator of $\mathbb{G}$ and $e(g, g)$ generates $\mathbb{G}_T$;
— deciding group membership, group operations and the bilinear map are all efficiently computable.

The decisional linear assumption was first introduced by Boneh et al. [2004] and has since been used in several cryptographic constructions. We call a tuple of the form (f^r, h^s, g^{r+s}) a *linear tuple* with respect to (f, h, g). When the basis (f, h, g) is obvious from context, we omit mention of it. The decisional linear problem is to distinguish a linear tuple from a random tuple.

Definition 5.1 (*Decisional Linear Assumption*). We say the decisional linear assumption holds for the bilinear group generator $\mathcal{G}_{\mathrm{DLIN}}$ if for all nonuniform polynomial time adversaries $\mathcal{A}$ we have

$$\Pr\left[(p, \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, e, g) \leftarrow \mathcal{G}_{\mathrm{DLIN}}(1^k); x, y \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^*; r, s \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p : \mathcal{A}(p, \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, e, g, g^x, g^y, g^{xr}, g^{ys}, g^{r+s}) = 1\right]$$
$$\approx \Pr\left[(p, \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, e, g) \leftarrow \mathcal{G}_{\mathrm{DLIN}}(1^k); x, y \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^*; r, s, d \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p : \mathcal{A}(p, \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, e, g, g^x, g^y, g^{xr}, g^{ys}, g^d) = 1\right].$$

Example. Boneh and Franklin [2003] give an example of groups with a bilinear map, where the decisional linear assumption may hold. Let $p \equiv 2 \bmod 3$ be a k-bit prime, and choose a small ℓ such that $q = \ell p - 1$ is prime. Then, the elliptic curve $y^2 \equiv x^3 + 1 \bmod q$ has ℓp points. We can let $\mathbb{G}$ be the order p subgroup of this curve and $\mathbb{G}_T = \mathbb{F}_{q^2}^*$. The bilinear map is the modified Weil-pairing. We can pick a point on the curve by choosing $y \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$ at random and setting $x \equiv (y^2 - 1)^{\frac{q+1}{3}} \bmod q$. Let $\gamma = (x, y)$ and $g = \gamma^\ell$. Then g is a random generator for $\mathbb{G}$ provided $g \neq 1$.

5.1. A Homomorphic Proof Commitment Scheme

We will use the decisional linear assumption to create a homomorphic proof commitment. The idea is to let g, f, h be generators of $\mathbb{G}$ and u, v, w another triple of elements in $\mathbb{G}$. A perfect hiding commitment key will contain (u, v, w), which is a linear tuple with respect to g, f, h. Then for any message $m \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ and randomizer $(r, s) \in \mathbb{Z}_p \times \mathbb{Z}_p$ we have a commitment $(u^m f^r, v^m h^s, w^m g^{r+s})$, which is a random linear tuple itself and therefore reveals nothing about m. On the other hand, if (u, v, w) is not a linear tuple,

Perfectly binding key generation $K_{\text{binding}}(1^k)$

(1) $(p, \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, e, g) \leftarrow \mathcal{G}_{\text{DLIN}}(1^k)$
(2) $x, y \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^*$
(3) $f = g^x, h = g^y$
(4) $r_u, s_v \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$
(5) $(u, v, w) = (f^{r_u}, h^{s_v}, g^{r_u+s_v+z})$, where $z \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^*$
(6) Let $ck = (p, \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, e, g, f, h, u, v, w)$
(7) Let $xk = (ck, x, y, z)$ and return (ck, xk)

Perfectly hiding key generation $K_{\text{hiding}}(1^k)$

(1) $(p, \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, e, g) \leftarrow \mathcal{G}_{\text{DLIN}}(1^k)$
(2) $x, y \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^*$
(3) $f = g^x, h = g^y$
(4) $r_u, s_v \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$
(5) $(u, v, w) = (f^{r_u}, h^{s_v}, g^{r_u+s_v})$
(6) Let $ck = (p, \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, e, g, f, h, u, v, w)$
(7) Let $tk = (ck, r_u, s_v)$ and return (ck, tk)

Commitment $\text{com}_{ck}(m)$

The key ck defines message space $\mathbb{Z}_p$, randomizer space $\mathbb{Z}_p \times \mathbb{Z}_p$ and commitment space $\mathbb{G}^3$. To commit to message $m \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ pick $(r, s) \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p \times \mathbb{Z}_p$ and return

$$c = (c_1, c_2, c_3) = \text{com}_{ck}(m; r, s) = (u^m f^r, v^m h^s, w^m g^{r+s}).$$

Extraction $\text{Ext}_{xk}(c)$

On a perfect binding key we can extract m of length $\mathcal{O}(\log k)$ from $c = (c_1, c_2, c_3)$ as follows. Compute $(g^z)^m = c_3 c_1^{-1/x} c_2^{-1/y}$ and exhaustively search for m.

Trapdoor opening $\text{Topen}_{tk}(m, (r, s), m')$

Given a commitment $c = (u^m f^r, v^m h^s, w^m g^{r+s})$ under a perfectly hiding commitment key we have $c = (u^{m'} f^{r-(m'-m)r_u}, v^{m'} h^{s-(m'-m)s_v}, w^{m'} g^{r+s-(m'-m)(r_u+s_v)})$. We can create a perfectly hiding commitment and open it to any value using the trapdoor key $tk = (r_u, s_v)$ by returning (r', s') computed as $r' = r - (m' - m)r_u \bmod p$ and $s' = s - (m' - m)s_v \bmod p$.

WI proof $P_{01}(ck, m, (r, s))$

Given witness consisting of an opening $(m, r, s) \in \{0, 1\} \times \mathbb{Z}_p \times \mathbb{Z}_p$ we make a proof as follows. Choose $t \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$ and let

$$\begin{array}{lll} \pi_{11} = (u^{2m-1} f^r)^r & \pi_{12} = v^{(2m-1)r} h^{rs-t} & \pi_{13} = w^{(2m-1)r} g^{(r+s)r+t} \\ \pi_{21} = u^{(2m-1)s} f^{rs+t} & \pi_{22} = (v^{2m-1} h^s)^s & \pi_{23} = w^{(2m-1)s} g^{(r+s)s-t} \end{array}$$

Return the proof $\pi = (\pi_{11}, \pi_{12}, \pi_{13}, \pi_{21}, \pi_{22}, \pi_{23})$.

Verification $V_{01}(ck, c, \pi)$ On input (ck, c, π) compute $\pi_{3j} = \pi_{1j}\pi_{2j}$ for $j = 1, 2, 3$. Accept the proof if and only if

$$\begin{array}{ll} e(f, \pi_{11}) = e(c_1, c_1 u^{-1}) & e(f, \pi_{12}) e(h, \pi_{21}) = e(c_1, c_2 v^{-1}) e(c_2, c_1 u^{-1}) \\ e(h, \pi_{22}) = e(c_2, c_2 v^{-1}) & e(f, \pi_{13}) e(g, \pi_{31}) = e(c_1, c_3 w^{-1}) e(c_3, c_1 u^{-1}) \\ e(g, \pi_{33}) = e(c_3, c_3 w^{-1}) & e(h, \pi_{23}) e(g, \pi_{32}) = e(c_2, c_3 w^{-1}) e(c_3, c_2 v^{-1}). \end{array}$$

Fig. 2. Homomorphic proof commitment scheme based on the decisional linear assumption.

then the commitment is perfectly binding. The decisional linear assumption implies that it is hard to distinguish perfect binding keys and perfect hiding keys.

THEOREM 5.2. *The protocol in Figure 2 is a homomorphic proof commitment scheme with perfect extraction and perfect nonerasure witness-indistinguishability if the decision linear assumption holds for* $\mathcal{G}_{\text{DLIN}}$.

PROOF. Under the decisional linear assumption for $\mathcal{G}_{\mathrm{DLIN}}$ no nonuniform polynomial time adversary can distinguish between (u, v, w) being a linear tuple or not so perfectly binding keys and perfectly hiding keys are computationally indistinguishable.

The commitment scheme is homomorphic under entry-wise multiplication because for either type of commitment key we have

$$\begin{aligned}&\mathrm{com}_{ck}(m_1+m_2; r_1+r_2, s_1+s_2) = (u^{m_1+m_2} f^{r_1+r_2}, v^{m_1+m_2} h^{s_1+s_2}, w^{m_1+m_2} g^{r_1+r_2+s_1+s_2})\\ =\ &(u^{m_1} f^{r_1}, v^{m_1} h^{s_1}, w^{m_1} g^{r_1+s_1})(u^{m_2} f^{r_2}, v^{m_2} h^{s_2}, w^{m_2} g^{r_2+s_2}) = \mathrm{com}_{ck}(m_1; r_1, s_1)\mathrm{com}_{ck}(m_2; r_2, s_2).\end{aligned}$$

It is straightforward to see that the protocol is perfectly binding and has perfect extraction when (u, v, w) is not a linear tuple. On the other hand, when (u, v, w) is a linear tuple then every commitment is a linear tuple and thus perfectly hiding. We can compute a unique trapdoor opening of a commitment to an arbitrary message.

Perfect completeness of the witness-indistinguishable proof on either type of keys follows from direct verification. Let us now prove that the proof is perfectly sound on perfect binding keys.

The commitment uniquely defines $m, r, s \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ such that $c_1 = u^m f^r, c_2 = v^m h^r, c_3 = w^m g^{r+s}$. We wish to prove that, given a valid proof π, it must be the case that $m \in \{0, 1\}$. Define r_0, s_0, t_0 and r_1, s_1, t_1 such that $c = (f^{r_0}, h^{s_0}, g^{t_0})$ and $c = (uf^{r_1}, vh^{s_1}, wg^{t_1})$. For $i = 1, 2$, let

$$m_{i1} = \log_f(\pi_{i1}) \qquad m_{i2} = \log_h(\pi_{i1}) \qquad m_{i3} = \log_g(\pi_{i3}).$$

Let

$$m_{31} = m_{11} + m_{21} \qquad m_{32} = m_{12} + m_{22} \qquad m_{33} = m_{13} + m_{23}.$$

From the verification, we get

$$\begin{aligned} m_{11} &= r_0 r_1 & m_{12} + m_{21} &= r_0 s_1 + s_0 r_1\\ m_{22} &= s_0 s_1 & m_{13} + m_{31} &= r_0 t_1 + t_0 r_1\\ m_{33} &= t_0 t_1 & m_{23} + m_{32} &= s_0 t_1 + t_0 s_1\end{aligned}$$

This means

$$\begin{aligned}&(r_0 + s_0 - t_0)(r_1 + s_1 - t_1)\\ =\ &r_0 r_1 + r_0 s_1 + s_0 r_1 + s_0 s_1 + t_0 t_1 - (r_0 t_1 + t_0 r_1 + s_0 t_1 + t_0 s_1)\\ =\ &m_{11} + m_{12} + m_{21} + m_{22} + m_{33} - m_{13} - m_{31} - m_{23} - m_{32} = 0.\end{aligned}$$

We conclude

$$t_0 = r_0 + s_0 \quad \text{or} \quad t_1 = r_1 + s_1,$$

so at least one of (c_1, c_2, c_3) and $(c_1 u^{-1}, c_2 v^{-1}, c w^{-1})$ must be a linear tuple. This shows that c or $c \cdot \mathrm{com}_{ck}(-1; 0, 0)$ is a commitment to 0.

On a perfect hiding key, both c and $c \cdot \mathrm{com}_{ck}(-1; 0, 0)$ are linear tuples. Define, (r_0, s_0) and $(r_1, s_1) = (r_0 - r_u, s_0 - s_v)$ such that $c = (f^{r_0}, h^{s_0}, g^{r_0+s_0})$ and $c \cdot \mathrm{com}_{ck}(-1; 0, 0) = (f^{r_1}, h^{s_1}, g^{r_1+s_1})$. The witness is on the form $(0, r_0, s_0)$ or $(1, r_1, s_1)$. In the proof we pick $t \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$ at random. All we need to observe now is that opening $(0, r_0, s_0)$ with randomness t gives the same proof as using opening $(1, r_1, s_1)$ using randomness $t' = t + r_0 s_1 - s_0 r_1$. Perfect nonerasure witness indistinguishability now follows from the observation that if we have a proof generated with randomness t, then once we get the witness there are two possibilities: It can be the same witness as used in the proof, in which case we are done. Or it can be the other witness, which we with knowledge of r_u, s_v can compute and which also allows us to compute randomness t' corresponding to this witness. □

6. COMPUTATIONAL NIZK PROOF FOR CIRCUIT SAT

We will now describe an NIZK proof for Circuit SAT. We use a public key for a homomorphic proof commitment scheme as the common reference string. In the real proofs, the common reference string will be a perfect binding key while in the simulation it will be a perfect hiding key. The prover gets as input a circuit C, which without loss of generality consists of NAND-gates. He also gets a witness w, consisting of wires $w_1, \ldots, w_{\text{out}}$ such that the wires respect the circuit and the output wire is true, $w_{\text{out}} = 1$. We write $C(w) = 1$ when this is the case.

The prover's strategy is straightforward. He commits to each wire and for each commitment makes a proof that it contains 0 or 1. This way, the verifier is guaranteed that the prover has committed to truth values for each wire. The prover makes a trivial commitment to the output wire using randomness $r_{\text{out}} = 0$ such that the verifier can check that indeed the output is 1. What remains is to convince the verifier that the committed wires respect the NAND-gates of the circuit.

We make the following observation, leaving the proof to the reader.[8]

LEMMA 6.1. *Let $\mathcal{M}$ be a finite cyclic group with neutral element 0 and generator 1. Let $b_0, b_1, b_2 \in \{0, 1\}$.*

If the order of the group is at least 4, then

$$b_2 = \neg(b_0 \wedge b_1) \qquad \text{if and only if} \qquad b_0 + b_1 + 2b_2 - 2 \in \{0, 1\}.$$

If the order of the group is 3, then

$$b_2 = \neg(b_0 \wedge b_1) \qquad \text{if and only if} \qquad b_0+b_1+2b_2-2 \in \{0, 1\} \text{ and } b_0+b_1+b_2-1 \in \{0, 1\}.$$

In the following, we focus on the case where the message space of the commitment scheme has order at least 4, leaving the case of order 3 to the reader. Given commitments c_0, c_1, c_2 containing plaintexts b_0, b_1, b_2 the homomorphic property of the commitment scheme implies that $c_0 \cdot c_1 \cdot c_2^2 \cdot \text{com}_{ck}(-2; 0)$ is a commitment to $b_0+b_1+2b_2-2$. A proof that this commitment contains 0 or 1 shows that $b_2 = \neg(b_0 \wedge b_1)$. The prover will make such a proof for each NAND-gate in the circuit.

THEOREM 6.2. *The protocol in Figure 3 is an NIZK proof of knowledge for Circuit SAT. It has perfect completeness, perfect soundness, and computational zero-knowledge. If the homomorphic proof commitment scheme has perfect extractability, then the NIZK proof is a perfect proof of knowledge. If the commitment scheme has perfect nonerasure witness indistinguishability, then the NIZK proof has computational nonerasure zero-knowledge.*

PROOF. Knowing a satisfying assignment w for C, we have truth-values for all wires that are consistent with the NAND-gates and with the output wire being 1. Perfect completeness follows from the homomorphic property of the commitment scheme and the perfect completeness of the proofs of committed messages being either 0 or 1.

We prove in Lemma 6.3 that we have perfect soundness. If the commitment scheme is extractable, then we can extract the wire-values from the commitments, which by the perfect soundness corresponds to a witness w such that $C(w) = 1$.

By the indistinguishability of perfect binding keys and perfect hiding keys for the commitment scheme, we have

$$\Pr\left[\sigma \leftarrow K(1^k) : \mathcal{A}^{P(\sigma,\cdot,\cdot)}(\sigma) = 1\right] \approx \Pr\left[(\sigma, \tau) \leftarrow S_1(1^k) : \mathcal{A}^{P(\sigma,\cdot,\cdot)}(\sigma) = 1\right],$$

where the oracle outputs `failure` if $(x, w) \notin R$.

[8]Similar equations exist for all other binary gates so it is not necessary to restrict the circuit to NAND-gates. We only restrict ourselves to NAND-gates because it simplifies the exposition.

Common reference string:

(1) $(ck, xk) \leftarrow K_{\text{binding}}(1^k)$
(2) The common reference string is $\sigma = ck$.

Statement: The statement is a circuit C built from NAND-gates. The claim is that there exist wires $w = (w_1, \ldots, w_{\text{out}})$ such that $C(w) = 1$.

Proof: Input (σ, C, w) such that $C(w) = 1$

(1) Commit to each bit w_i as $r_i \leftarrow \mathcal{R}; c_i = \text{com}_{ck}(w_i; r_i)$
(2) For the output wire let $r_{\text{out}} = 0$ and $c_{\text{out}} = \text{com}_{ck}(1; 0)$
(3) For all c_i make a WI proof π_i of existence of an opening (w_i, r_i) so $w_i \in \{0, 1\}$ and $c_i = \text{com}_{ck}(w_i; r_i)$
(4) For all NAND-gates do the following: It has input wires numbered i, j and output wire k. Using message $w_i + w_j + 2w_k - 2$ and randomness $r_i + r_j + 2r_k$ make a WI proof π_{ijk} for $c_i c_j c_k^2 \text{com}_{ck}(-2; 0)$ containing message 0 or 1.
(5) Return the proof π consisting of all the commitments and proofs

Verification: Input (σ, C, π).

(1) Check that all wires have a corresponding commitment and $c_{\text{out}} = \text{com}_{ck}(1; 0)$.
(2) Check that all commitments have a proof of the message being 0 or 1.
(3) Check that all NAND-gates with input wires i, j and output wire k have a proof π_{ijk} for $c_i c_j c_k^2 \text{com}_{ck}(-2; 0)$ containing 0 or 1
(4) Return 1 if all checks pass, else return 0

Fig. 3. Computational NIZK proof for Circuit SAT.

Lemma 6.4 shows that if we simulate the common reference string by $(\sigma, \tau) = (ck, tk) \leftarrow K_{\text{hiding}}(1^k)$ then we have perfect zero-knowledge, so we conclude that we have computational zero-knowledge for (K, P, V). Lemma 6.4 also shows that we get perfect nonerasure zero-knowledge on a simulated common reference string, so we conclude that (K, P, V) has computational nonerasure zero-knowledge. □

LEMMA 6.3. *(K, P, V) has perfect soundness.*

PROOF. Since we prove for each wire that the commitment contains either 0 or 1, we have made a perfectly binding commitment to a truth-value for each wire. By Lemma 6.1, the WI proofs for the gates imply that all committed truth-values respect the NAND-gates. Finally, we know that the output commitment is $\text{com}_{ck}(1; 0)$, so the output bit is 1. □

LEMMA 6.4. *(S_σ, P, V), where S_σ is K_{hiding} restricted to the first part of its output, has perfect zero-knowledge. If the homomorphic proof commitment scheme has perfect nonerasure witness indistinguishability, then we get perfect nonerasure zero-knowledge.*

PROOF. Let us first describe the three simulator algorithms. $S_1 = K_{\text{hiding}}$ generates the common reference string $\sigma = ck$ as well as the simulation key $\tau = tk$.

S_2 on input (σ, τ, C) sets $c_{\text{output}} = \text{com}_{ck}(1; 0)$. For all other wires, it selects a commitment $c_i = \text{com}_{ck}(0; r_i)$ with $r_i \leftarrow \mathcal{R}$. Later, when S_3 learns a witness w it can compute the corresponding messages $w_i \in \{0, 1\}$ for all these ciphertexts and open them as $r'_i = \text{Topen}_{tk}(0, r_i, w_i)$.

For each of these commitments S_2 using witness $(0, r_i)$ makes a WI proof that they contain 0 or 1. For each NAND-gate with wires i, j and k, S_2 trapdoor opens c_k to 1 as $r'_k \leftarrow \text{Topen}_{tk}(0, r_k, 1)$. Using the witness $(0, r_i + r_j + 2r'_j)$ it can now make a WI proof that $c_i c_j c_k^2 \text{com}_{ck}(-2; 0)$ contains 0 or 1.

Later, S_3 learns the witness w and therefore knows the messages $w_i \in \{0, 1\}$. It trapdoor opens all commitments as $r'_i \leftarrow \text{Topen}_{tk}(0, r_i, w_i)$. Now $c_i = \text{com}_{ck}(w_i; r'_i)$, where $C(w) = 1$. By the perfect witness indistinguishability of the proofs, we cannot distinguish the simulation from a proof having used this witness. Furthermore, if the WI proofs have perfect non-erasure witness indistinguishability then we can reconstruct randomness in the WI proofs that corresponds to these openings of the commitments. □

COROLLARY 6.5. *If the subgroup decision assumption holds for $\mathcal{G}_{\text{BGN}}$, then there exists an NIZK proof for Circuit SAT with perfect completeness, perfect soundness, perfect knowledge extraction and computational nonerasure zero-knowledge. The common reference string has size $\mathcal{O}(k)$ and the proofs have size $\mathcal{O}(|C|k)$.*

COROLLARY 6.6. *If the decisional linear assumption holds for $\mathcal{G}_{\text{DLIN}}$, then there exists an NIZK proof for Circuit SAT with perfect completeness, perfect soundness, perfect knowledge extraction and computational nonerasure zero-knowledge. The common reference string has size $\mathcal{O}(k)$ and the proofs have size $\mathcal{O}(|C|k)$.*

Remark on the Uniform Random String Model. Consider the homomorphic proof commitment in Section 5 based on the decisional linear assumption. We note that if we let g, f, h, u, v, w be randomly chosen elements of $\mathbb{G}$, then with overwhelming probability they will form a viable common reference string such that (u, v, w) are a nonlinear tuple with respect to (f, h, g) and therefore the resulting commitment scheme is perfectly binding. If, for instance, the group is the one suggested by Boneh and Franklin [2003], then all that is needed to define $\mathbb{G}$ is the prime p. Thus, we can implement our NIZK proofs in the uniform random string model, where the random string is first used to obtain a k-bit prime p using standard methods (just dividing up the uniform random string into k-bit chunks and checking one-by-one if they are prime will do), and then the remaining randomness is used to randomly determine g, f, h, u, v, w (by picking random order p points on the curve). Such an NIZK proof will not have perfect soundness, but it will have statistical soundness since the probability of (u, v, w) being a linear tuple is exponentially small in k. In the uniform random string model this is optimal, since for any NIZK proof system with a uniform random string there is a risk of accidentally selecting a simulation string so it is impossible to achieve perfect soundness.

7. PERFECT NIZK ARGUMENT FOR CIRCUIT SAT

In this section, we will construct an NIZK argument for Circuit SAT with perfect zero-knowledge. The main idea is a simple modification of the NIZK proof for Circuit SAT in Figure 3. Instead of using a perfect binding key as the common reference string, we use a perfect hiding key as the common reference string.

THEOREM 7.1. *(S_σ, P, V) is an NIZK argument for Circuit SAT with perfect completeness, computational soundness and perfect zero-knowledge, where S_σ is K_{hiding} restricted to the first part of its output. If the homomorphic proof commitment scheme has perfect nonerasure witness indistinguishability, then the protocol is perfect nonerasure zero-knowledge.*

PROOF. As in the proof of Theorem 6.2, we can show that the protocol has perfect completeness. Perfect zero-knowledge and perfect nonerasure zero-knowledge follows from Lemma 6.4. This leaves us with the question of soundness.

Consider a nonuniform polynomial-time adversary $\mathcal{A}$ and an arbitrary family of polynomially bounded size unsatisfiable circuits $\{C_k\}$. From the key indistinguishability of the homomorphic proof commitment scheme and the perfect soundness of (K, P, V), we have

$$\begin{aligned} &\Pr\left[\sigma \leftarrow S_\sigma(1^k); \pi \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\sigma, C_k) : V(\sigma, C_k, \pi) = 0\right] \\ \approx\ &\Pr\left[\sigma \leftarrow K(1^k); \pi \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\sigma, C_k) : V(\sigma, C_k, \pi) = 0\right] \ =\ 0. \end{aligned}$$

□

7.1. Adaptive Culpable Soundness

In the examples based on the subgroup decision assumption and the decisional linear assumption, we do not know whether (S_σ, P, V) is an NIZK argument with computational adaptive soundness where the adversary can choose the statement x after seeing the common reference string. When an adversary can choose a statement adaptively it may express properties about the common reference string itself. For instance, C could be a circuit corresponding to the statement that ck is a perfectly hiding commitment key. Now we can no longer argue soundness on the basis that the two common reference strings are indistinguishable, since switching from S_σ to K also switches to a setting where C is satisfiable. The best we can do (see Appendix A) is to use complexity leveraging techniques to get adaptive soundness for circuits that are small (but nontrivial) compared to the security parameter.

Although we do not know whether our perfect NIZK argument system has adaptive soundness, we can prove that the perfect NIZK argument has a useful adaptive soundness property, which we will call *adaptive culpable soundness*. Consider any NP-language L_{guilt} that only contains unsatisfiable circuits. Adaptive culpable soundness says that it is infeasible for an adversary to find an unsatisfiable circuit and a witness for membership of L_{guilt} and at the same time form a valid perfect NIZK argument for satisfiability. One way of interpreting adaptive culpable soundness is that if the adversary proves a false statement, then it cannot *know* that it succeeded in proving a false statement. (Intuitively, a witness for the unsatisfiability of a circuit in L_{guilt} is seen as the "proof of knowledge" of guilt.)

Definition 7.2 (*Adaptive Culpable Soundness for a NIZK for Circuit Satisfiability*). We say that a NIZK proof system for circuit satisfiability (S_σ, P, V) has adaptive culpable soundness if for all polynomial-time decidable binary relations R_{guilt} consisting of unsatisfiable circuits C and witnesses w_{guilt}, and for all nonuniform polynomial time adversaries $\mathcal{A}$, we have that

$$\Pr\left[\sigma \leftarrow S_\sigma(1^k); (C, \pi, w_{\text{guilt}}) \leftarrow A(\sigma) : V(\sigma, C, \pi) = 1 \text{ and } (C, w_{\text{guilt}}) \in R_{\text{guilt}}\right] \approx 0.$$

THEOREM 7.3. *The perfect NIZK argument for circuit satisfiability* (S_σ, P, V) *based on homomorphic proof commitments has adaptive culpable soundness.*

PROOF. By the indistinguishability of perfect binding keys and perfect hiding keys and the perfect soundness of (K, P, V), we have for all nonuniform polynomial-time adversaries $\mathcal{A}$ that

$$\begin{aligned} &\Pr\left[\sigma \leftarrow S_\sigma(1^k); (C, \pi, w_{\text{guilt}}) \leftarrow A(\sigma) : V(\sigma, C, \pi) = 1 \text{ and } (C, w_{\text{guilt}}) \in R_{\text{guilt}}\right] \\ \approx\ &\Pr\left[\sigma \leftarrow K(1^k); (C, \pi, w_{\text{guilt}}) \leftarrow A(\sigma) : V(\sigma, C, \pi) = 1 \text{ and } (C, w_{\text{guilt}}) \in R_{\text{guilt}}\right] \ =\ 0. \end{aligned}$$

□

Let us give an example to illustrate the significance of Theorem 7.3. Consider a scenario where first a common reference string and public key/private key pair for some

(binding) encryption scheme are chosen honestly, and given to an adversary. Then, the adversary chooses a arbitrary ciphertext c. An adversary might try to cheat and create a fake NIZK argument that the plaintext for c has some property, which it does not have. Unfortunately, since the ciphertext was chosen after the common reference string, ordinary nonadaptive soundness does not seem to prevent this. However, according to Theorem 7.3 this cheating is not possible, because the private decryption key serves as a witness that the statement is false: Using the decryption key, one can decrypt the ciphertext and check that the statement is false.

In the next section, we will see that adaptive culpable soundness of the perfect NIZK argument is exactly what we need to build universally composable NIZK arguments. Due to the great generality of the UC framework, we take this as an indication that adaptive soundness may not be so important after all and that adaptive culpable soundness suffices for most real-life applications.

8. UNIVERSALLY COMPOSABLE NON-INTERACTIVE ZERO-KNOWLEDGE

8.1. Modeling Noninteractive Zero-Knowledge Arguments

The universal composability (UC) framework (see Canetti [2001] for a detailed description) is a strong security model capturing security of a protocol ϕ under the concurrent execution of arbitrary other protocols. We model all other things not directly related to the protocol through an environment $\mathcal{Z}$. The environment can at its own choosing give inputs to the parties running the protocol, and according to the protocol specification, the parties can give outputs to the environment. In addition, there is an adversary $\mathcal{A}$ that attacks the protocol. $\mathcal{A}$ can communicate freely with the environment. It can also corrupt parties, in which case it learns the entire history of that party and gains complete control over the actions of this party. The environment learns whenever a party is corrupted.

To model security, we use a simulation paradigm. We specify the ideal functionality $\mathcal{F}$ that the protocol should realize. The ideal functionality $\mathcal{F}$ can be seen as a trusted party that handles the entire protocol execution and tells the parties what they would output if they executed the protocol correctly. We look at an ideal process where the parties simply pass on inputs from the environment to $\mathcal{F}$ and whenever receiving a message from $\mathcal{F}$ they output it to the environment. In the ideal process, we have an ideal process adversary $\mathcal{S}$. $\mathcal{S}$ does not learn the content of messages sent from $\mathcal{F}$ to the parties, but is in control of when, if ever, a message from $\mathcal{F}$ is delivered to the designated party. $\mathcal{S}$ can corrupt parties and at the time of corruption it will learn all inputs the party has received and all outputs it has sent to the environment. As the real world adversary, $\mathcal{S}$ can freely communicate with the environment.

We now compare running the real protocol with running the ideal process and say that ϕ securely realizes $\mathcal{F}$ if no environment can distinguish between the two worlds. This means, the protocol is secure, if for any polynomial time $\mathcal{A}$ running in the real world with ϕ, there exists a polynomial time $\mathcal{S}$ running in the ideal process with $\mathcal{F}$, so no non-uniform polynomial time environment can distinguish the two worlds.

The standard zero-knowledge functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{ZK}}$ as defined in Canetti [2001] goes as follows: On input (**prove**,P, V, *sid*, *ssid*, x, w) from a party P the functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{ZK}}$ checks that $(x, w) \in R$ and in that case sends (**proof**,P, V, *sid*, *ssid*, x) to V.[9] It is thus part of the model that the prover will send the proof to a particular receiver and that this receiver will learn who the prover is. This is a very reasonable model when we talk about interactive zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge. We remark that we can securely

[9]The role of the session identifier *sid* and subsession identifier *ssid* is to distinguish different functionalities $\mathcal{F}$ and calls to these functionalities.

Parameterized with relation R and running with parties $P_1, \ldots, P_n$ and adversary $\mathcal{S}$.

Proof: On input (**prove**,$sid, ssid, x, w$) from party P ignore if $(x, w) \notin R$. Send (**prove**,x) to $\mathcal{S}$ and wait for answer (**proof**, π). Upon receiving the answer store (x, π) and send (**proof**, $sid, ssid, \pi$) to P.

Verification: On input (**verify**, $sid, ssid, x, \pi$) from V check whether (x, π) is stored. If not send (**verify**,x, π) to $\mathcal{S}$ and wait for an answer (**witness**,w). Upon receiving the answer, check whether $(x, w) \in R$ and in that case, store (x, π). If (x, π) has been stored return (**verification**,$sid, ssid$,1) to V, else return (**verification**,$sid, ssid$,0).

Fig. 4. NIZK argument functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{NIZK}}$.

realize this functionality with only small modifications in the UC NIZK argument that we are about to suggest.

When we talk about NIZK arguments we do not always know who is going to receive the NIZK argument. We simply create a string π, which is the NIZK argument. We may create this string in advance and later decide to whom to send it. Furthermore, anybody who intercepts the string π can verify the truth of the statement and can use the string to convince others about the truth of the statement. The NIZK argument is not deniable [Pass 2003]; quite the contrary, it is transferable. For this reason, and because the protocol and the security proof becomes a little simpler, we suggest a different functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{NIZK}}$ to capture the essence of NIZK arguments, see Figure 4.

In Section 8.3, we will give a universally composable NIZK argument in the common reference string model. We model the access to the common reference string as an ideal functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{CRS}}$ (see Figures 5 and 6) that generates a common reference string Σ according to some probability distribution and sends (**crs**, *sid*, Σ) to all parties. We will show that in the $\mathcal{F}_{\text{CRS}}$-hybrid model where parties can get a trusted common reference string they can securely realize $\mathcal{F}_{\text{NIZK}}$. We will not consider how to implement $\mathcal{F}_{\text{CRS}}$-hybrid model, there are various options ranging from blindly trusting a single party to generate common reference strings to using multiparty computation in a pre-processing step. However, the universal composition theorem [Canetti 2001] shows that any protocol that securely realizes $\mathcal{F}_{\text{CRS}}$ can be used as a subroutine in the UC NIZK protocol ϕ_{NIZK} to securely realize $\mathcal{F}_{\text{CRS}}$.

8.2. Tools

We will use an adaptive culpable sound (the concrete language L_{guilt} of import will appear in the security proof) perfect nonerasure NIZK argument (S_σ, P, V) with nonerasure zero-knowledge simulator (S_1, S_2, S_3) as described in the previous section. In addition, we use the following cryptographic tools to securely realize $\mathcal{F}_{\text{NIZK}}$.

Perfectly Hiding Commitment Scheme with Extraction. A perfectly hiding commitment scheme with extraction $(K_{\text{extract}}, K_{\text{hiding}}, \text{com}, \text{Ext})$ works as follows. We can run a key generation algorithm $hk \leftarrow K_{\text{hiding}}(1^k)$ to get a hiding key hk, or we can alternatively run a key generation algorithm $(hk, xk) \leftarrow K_{\text{extract}}(1^k)$ in which case we get both a hiding key hk and an extraction key xk. $(K_{\text{hiding}}, \text{com})$ is a perfectly hiding commitment scheme. On the other hand, $(K_{\text{extract}}, \text{com}, \text{Ext})$ is a commitment scheme with perfect extractability (i.e., a public-key cryptosystem with errorless decryption) as defined here.

$$\Pr\left[(hk, xk) \leftarrow K_{\text{extract}}(1^k) : \forall (m, r) : \text{Ext}_{xk}(\text{com}_{hk}(m; r)) = m\right] = 1. \tag{1}$$

Common reference string generation:

(1) $hk \leftarrow K_{\text{hiding}}(1^k)$
(2) $(ck, tk) \leftarrow K_{\text{tag}-\text{com}}(1^k)$
(3) $(pk, dk) \leftarrow K_{\text{pseudo}}(1^k)$
(4) $(\sigma, \tau) \leftarrow S_1(1^k)$
(5) Return $\Sigma = (hk, ck, pk, \sigma)$

Proof: On input (Σ, C, w) such that $C(w) = 1$ do

(1) $(vk, sk) \leftarrow K_{\text{sign}}(1^k)$
(2) For $i = 1$ to ℓ select r_i at random and let $c_i = \text{commit}_{ck}(w_i, (vk, C); r_i)$
(3) For $i = 1$ to ℓ select R_{w_i} at random and set $c_{i,w_i} = E_{pk}(r_i; R_{w_i})$ and choose $c_{i,1-w_i}$ as a random string.
(4) Choose r at random and let $c = \text{com}_{hk}(c_1, c_{1,0}, c_{1,1}, \ldots, c_\ell, c_{\ell,0}, c_{\ell,1}; r)$
(5) Create an NIZK argument π for the statement that there exists w and randomness such that c has been produced as described in steps 3,4 and 5 and $C(w) = 1$.
(6) $s \leftarrow \text{sign}_{sk}(C, vk, c, \pi)$
(7) Return $\Pi = (vk, c, \pi, s)$

Verification: On input (Σ, C, Π)

(1) Parse $\Pi = (vk, c, \pi, s)$
(2) Verify that s is a signature on (C, vk, c, π) under vk.
(3) Verify the NIZK argument π
(4) Return 1 if all checks work out, else return 0

Fig. 5. UC NIZK argument $(K^{\text{UC}}, V^{\text{UC}}, P^{\text{UC}})$.

Common reference string: On input (**start**,sid) run $\Sigma \leftarrow K^{\text{UC}}(1^k)$. Send (**crs**,$sid, \Sigma$) to all parties and halt.

Fig. 6. Common reference string functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{CRS}}$ used in our UC NIZK protocol ϕ_{NIZK}.

We demand that no nonuniform polynomial time adversary $\mathcal{A}$ can distinguish between keys generated by either K_{hiding} and K_{extract}. This implies that the cryptosystem is semantically secure against chosen plaintext attack since the perfectly hiding commitment does not reveal what the message is. Observe that homomorphic proof commitment schemes with extraction imply the existence perfectly hiding commitment schemes with extraction.

Encryption with Pseudorandom Ciphertexts. A public-key cryptosystem $(K_{\text{pseudo}}, E, D)$ has pseudorandom ciphertexts of length $\ell_E(k)$ if for all nonuniform polynomial-time adversaries $\mathcal{A}$ we have

$$\begin{aligned} &\Pr\left[(pk, dk) \leftarrow K_{\text{pseudo}}(1^k) : \mathcal{A}^{E_{pk}(\cdot)}(pk) = 1\right] \\ \approx\ &\Pr\left[(pk, dk) \leftarrow K_{\text{pseudo}}(1^k) : \mathcal{A}^{R_{pk}(\cdot)}(pk) = 1\right], \end{aligned} \tag{2}$$

where $R_{pk}(m)$ runs $c \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{\ell_E(k)}$ and every time returns a fresh c. We require that the cryptosystem has errorless decryption.

Trapdoor permutations over domain $\{0,1\}^{\frac{\ell_E(k)}{2}-1}$ imply pseudorandom cryptosystems as we can use the Goldreich-Levin hard-core bit [Goldreich and Levin 1989] of a trapdoor permutation to make a one-time pad. Trapdoor permutations over $\{0,1\}^{\frac{\ell_E(k)}{2}-1}$ can

for instance be constructed from the RSA assumption assuming $\ell_E(k)$ is large enough [Canetti et al. 1996].

In our concrete setting, we note that the example we gave for $\mathcal{G}_{\mathrm{BGN}}$ implies the existence of a public-key cryptosystem with pseudorandom ciphertexts assuming the subgroup decision assumption holds. The public key is $(n, \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, e, g, h)$ where $n = pq$ and h has order q and a ciphertext is of the form $c = g^m h^r$. Recall that we constructed $\mathbb{G}$ as the order n supgroup of the points on the elliptic curve $y^2 \equiv x^3 + 1 \bmod P$, where $P = \ell n - 1$ and $P \equiv 2 \bmod 3$. One can sample a random nontrivial point $\rho = (x, y)$ on the curve of by picking $y \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_P$ and setting $x \equiv y^{\frac{P+1}{3}}$. The point ρ^n is a point of order at most ℓ. The point $(x', y') = \rho^n c$ therefore uniquely defines c. By choosing c' at random in $\{0,1\}^{\ell_K(k)}$ such that $c' \equiv y' \bmod P$ we get a pseudorandom encoding of c in $\{0,1\}^{\ell_E(k)}$. To decrypt c' we first compute $y' \equiv c' \bmod P$ and $x' \equiv (y')^{\frac{P+1}{3}} \bmod P$ and then $c = (x', y')^d$, where $d \equiv 0 \bmod \ell$ and $d \equiv 1 \bmod n$. We can now decrypt c by computing $c^q = (g^q)^m$ and doing a brute force search for m provided it is small enough.

The example we gave for $\mathcal{G}_{\mathrm{DLIN}}$ also implies the existence of public-key encryption with pseudorandom ciphertexts under the decisional linear assumption. Here we get a ciphertext consisting of three group elements $(u, v, w) = (f^r, h^s, g^{r+s}m)$, which can be encoded as three strings of length $\frac{\ell_E(k)}{3}$ using the same technique as the one we described above for $\mathcal{G}_{\mathrm{BGN}}$.

Tag-Based Simulation-Sound Trapdoor Commitment. A tag-based commitment scheme has four algorithms $(K_{\mathrm{tag-com}}, \mathrm{commit}, \mathrm{Tcom}, \mathrm{Topen})$. The key generation algorithm $K_{\mathrm{tag-com}}$ produces a commitment key ck as well as a trapdoor key tk. There is a commitment algorithm that takes as input the commitment key ck, a message m and any tag tag and outputs a commitment $c = \mathrm{commit}_{ck}(m, tag; r)$. To open a commitment c with tag tag we reveal m and the randomness r. Anybody can now verify $c = \mathrm{commit}_{ck}(m, tag; r)$. As usual, the commitment scheme must be both hiding and binding.

In addition, to these two algorithms there are also a couple of trapdoor algorithms $\mathrm{Tcom}, \mathrm{Topen}$ that allow us to create an equivocal commitment and later open this commitment to any value we prefer. We create an equivocal commitment and an equivocation key as $(c, ek) \leftarrow \mathrm{Tcom}_{tk}(tag)$. Later we can open it to any message m as $r \leftarrow \mathrm{Topen}_{ek}(c, m, tag)$, such that $c = \mathrm{commit}_{ck}(m, tag; r)$. We require that equivocal commitments and openings are indistinguishable from real openings. For all nonuniform polynomial-time adversaries $\mathcal{A}$, we have

$$\begin{aligned} &\Pr\left[(ck, tk) \leftarrow K_{\mathrm{tag-com}}(1^k) : \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{R}(\cdot,\cdot)}(ck) = 1\right] \\ \approx\ &\Pr\left[(ck, tk) \leftarrow K_{\mathrm{tag-com}}(1^k) : \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}(\cdot,\cdot)}(ck) = 1\right], \end{aligned} \tag{3}$$

where $\mathcal{R}(m, tag)$ returns a randomly selected randomizer and $\mathcal{O}(m, tag)$ computes $(c, ek) \leftarrow \mathrm{Tcom}_{tk}(m, tag); r \leftarrow \mathrm{Topen}_{ek}(c, m, tag)$ and returns r. Both oracles ignore tags that have already been submitted once.

The tag-based simulation-soundness property means that a commitment using tag remains binding even if we have made equivocations for commitments using different tags. For all nonuniform polynomial-time adversaries $\mathcal{A}$, we have

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr\Big[&(ck, tk) \leftarrow K(1^k); (c, tag, m_0, r_0, m_1, r_1) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}(\cdot)}(ck) : tag \notin Q \text{ and} \\ &c = \mathrm{commit}_{ck}(m_0, tag; r_0) = \mathrm{commit}_{ck}(m_1, tag; r_1) \text{ and } m_0 \neq m_1\Big] \approx 0, \end{aligned} \tag{4}$$

where $\mathcal{O}(\text{commit}, tag)$ computes $(c, ek) \leftarrow \text{Tcom}_{tk}(tag)$, returns c and stores (c, tag, ek), and $\mathcal{O}(\text{open}, c, m, tag)$ returns $r \leftarrow \text{Topen}_{ck}(ek, c, m, tag)$ if (c, tag, ek) has been stored, and where Q is the list of tags for which equivocal commitments have been made by $\mathcal{O}$.

The term, *tag-based simulation-sound commitment*, comes from Garay et al. [2006], while the definition presented here is from MacKenzie and Yang [2004]. The latter paper offers a construction based on one-way functions.

Strong One-Time Signatures. We remind the reader that strong one-time signatures allow a nonuniform polynomial time adversary to ask for a signature on one arbitrary message. It must be infeasible to forge a signature on any different message and infeasible to come up with a different signature on the same message. Strong one-time signatures can be constructed from one-way functions.

8.3. UC NIZK

The standard technique to prove that a protocol securely realizes an ideal functionality in the UC framework is to show that the ideal model adversary $\mathcal{S}$ can simulate the entire protocol execution including the adversary $\mathcal{A}$ and the parties $P_1, \ldots, P_n$ on top of the ideal functionality. We use the notation $\tilde{P}_i$ for a real party in the ideal process, which simply forwards inputs and outputs between the environment and the ideal functionality, and P_i for a simulated party. In our case, there are two hurdles to overcome in constructing a UC NIZK argument and proving that it is secure: First, $\mathcal{S}$ may learn that a statement C has been proved by $\tilde{P}$ and has to simulate the UC NIZK argument π output by P without knowing the witness. Furthermore, if P is corrupted at some point then $\mathcal{S}$ can corrupt $\tilde{P}$ and learn the witness but must now simulate the randomness of P that would lead it to produce π. The second problem is that whenever $\mathcal{S}$ sees an acceptable UC NIZK argument π for a statement C then an honest verifier would accept. $\mathcal{S}$ must therefore input a witness w to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{NIZK}}$ such that the ideal functionality can instruct $\tilde{V}$ to accept.

The main idea in overcoming these hurdles is to commit to the witness w and make a nonerasure NIZK argument that the commitment contains a witness w such that $C(w) = 1$. The nonerasure property of the NIZK argument allows us to simulate NIZK arguments and the prover's random coins.

This leaves us with the commitment scheme. On the one hand, when $\mathcal{S}$ simulates UC NIZK arguments we want to make equivocal commitments that can be opened arbitrarily since $\mathcal{S}$ does not know the witness yet. On the other hand, when $\mathcal{S}$ sees a UC NIZK argument that it did not construct itself we want it to be able to extract the witness, since it havs to give a witness to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{NIZK}}$.

We construct such a commitment scheme from the tools specified in the previous section in a manner related to the construction of a UC commitment by Canetti et al. [2002]. We use a tag-based simulation-sound trapdoor commitment scheme to commit to each bit of w. If w has length ℓ, this gives us commitments $c_1, \ldots, c_\ell$. For honest provers, $\mathcal{S}$ can use the trapdoor key tk to create equivocal commitments that can be opened to arbitrary bits. This enables $\mathcal{S}$ to simulate the commitments of the honest provers, and when learning w upon corruption it can simulate the randomness the provers used to commit to the witness w.

We still have an extraction problem since $\mathcal{S}$ may not be able to extract a witness from tag-based commitments created by the adversary. To solve this problem, we encrypt the openings of the commitments. Now, $\mathcal{S}$ can extract witnesses, but we have reintroduced the problem of equivocation. In a simulated commitment, there may be two different openings of a commitment c_i to respectively 0 and 1, however, if the

Proof: Party P waits until receiving (**crs**,sid, Σ) from $\mathcal{F}_{\mathrm{CRS}}$.
On input (**prove**,$sid, ssid, C, w$) such that $C(w) = 1$ run $\Pi \leftarrow P^{\mathrm{UC}}(\Sigma, C, w)$. Output (**proof**,$sid, ssid, \Pi$).

Verification: Party V waits until receiving (**crs**,sid, Σ) from $\mathcal{F}_{\mathrm{CRS}}$.
On input (**verify**,$sid, ssid, C, \Pi$) run $b \leftarrow V^{\mathrm{UC}}(\Sigma, C, \Pi)$. Output (**verification**,$sid, ssid, b$).

Fig. 7. Protocol ϕ_{NIZK} securely realizing $\mathcal{F}_{\mathrm{NIZK}}$ using $(K^{\mathrm{UC}}, V^{\mathrm{UC}}, P^{\mathrm{UC}})$ from Figure 5.

opening is encrypted then we are stuck with one possible opening. This is where the pseudorandomness property of the cryptosystem comes in handy. $\mathcal{S}$ can simply make two ciphertexts, one containing an opening to 0 and one containing an opening to 1. Since the ciphertexts are pseudorandom, $\mathcal{S}$ can later open the ciphertext containing the desired opening and plausibly claim that the other ciphertext was chosen as a random string. To recap, the idea so far to commit to a bit b is to make a commitment c_i to this bit, and create a ciphertext $c_{i,b}$ containing an opening of c_i to b, while choosing $c_{i,1-b}$ as a random string.

The commitment scheme is once again equivocable, however, once again we must be careful that $\mathcal{S}$ can extract a message from an adversarial commitment during the simulation. The problem is that since $\mathcal{S}$ equivocates commitments for honest provers it may be the case that the adversary can produce equivocable commitments. This means, the adversary can produce some simulation-sound commitment c_i and encryptions $c_{i,0}, c_{i,1}$ of openings to respectively 0 and 1. To resolve this issue, we will select the tags for the commitments in a way so the adversary is forced to use a tag that has not been used to make an equivocable commitment. When an honest prover is making a commitment, $\mathcal{S}$ select keys for a strong one-time signature scheme $(vk, sk) \leftarrow K_{\mathrm{sign}}(1^k)$ and uses $tag = (vk, C)$ when making the commitment c_i. The verification key vk will be published together with the commitment the commitment (as well as something else) will be signed under this key. The adversary must use different tags since it cannot forge signatures and therefore the commitment is binding and only one of the ciphertexts can contain an opening of c_i.

If the adversary corrupts a party P that has used vk earlier, then it may indeed sign messages using vk and can therefore use vk in the tag for commitments. However, since we also include the statement C in the tag for the commitment using vk, the adversary can only create an equivocable commitment in a UC NIZK argument for the same statement C. We observe that in this particular case $\mathcal{S}$ does not need to extract the witness w because it is revealed during the corruption of the prover $\tilde{P}$.

Finally, in order to make the UC NIZK argument perfect zero-knowledge we wrap all the commitments c_i and the ciphertexts $c_{i,b}$ inside a perfectly hiding commitment c. In the simulation, however, $\mathcal{S}$ generates the key for this commitment scheme in a way such that it is instead a cryptosystem enabling it to extract the plaintexts. This last step is only added to make the UC NIZK argument perfect zero-knowledge; it can be omitted if perfect zero-knowledge is not needed.

The resulting protocol can be seen in Figure 5. We use the notation from Section 8.2.

THEOREM 8.1. *The protocol ϕ_{NIZK} described in Figure 7 securely realizes $\mathcal{F}_{\mathrm{NIZK}}$ in the $\mathcal{F}_{\mathrm{CRS}}$-hybrid model.*

PROOF. Let $\mathcal{A}$ be an arbitrary polynomial time adversary. We will describe a corresponding polynomial time ideal process adversary $\mathcal{S}$ such that no non-uniform polynomial time environment can distinguish whether ϕ_{NIZK} is running in the $\mathcal{F}_{\mathrm{CRS}}$-hybrid

model with parties $P_1, \ldots, P_n$ and adversary $\mathcal{A}$ or the ideal process is running with $\mathcal{F}_{\text{NIZK}}$, $\mathcal{S}$ and dummy parties $\tilde{P}_1, \ldots, \tilde{P}_n$.

$\mathcal{S}$ starts by invoking a copy of $\mathcal{A}$. It will run a simulated interaction of $\mathcal{A}$, the parties and the environment. In particular, whenever the simulated $\mathcal{A}$ communicates with the environment, $\mathcal{S}$ just passes this information along. And whenever $\mathcal{A}$ corrupts a party P_i, $\mathcal{S}$ corrupts the corresponding dummy party $\tilde{P}_i$.

Simulating $\mathcal{F}_{\text{CRS}}$. $\mathcal{S}$ chooses the common reference string in the following way: It selects, $(hk, xk) \leftarrow K_{\text{extract}}(1^k); (ck, tk) \leftarrow K_{\text{tag-com}}(1^k); (pk, dk) \leftarrow K_{\text{pseudo}}(1^k)$ and $(\sigma, \tau) \leftarrow S_1(1^k)$. This means $\mathcal{S}$ is capable of extracting plaintexts committed under hk, able to create and equivocate simulation-sound trapdoor commitments, decrypt pseudorandom ciphertexts and simulate NIZK arguments and later upon learning a witness simulate convincing randomness for creating this witness.

Let $\Sigma = (hk, ck, pk, \sigma)$. $\mathcal{S}$ simulates $\mathcal{F}_{\text{CRS}}$ sending (**crs**,*sid*, Σ) to all parties. Whenever the simulated $\mathcal{A}$ decides to deliver such a message to a party P_i, $\mathcal{S}$ will simulate P_i receiving this string.

Simulating Uncorrupted Provers. Suppose $\mathcal{S}$ receives (**proof**,*sid*, *ssid*, C) from $\mathcal{F}_{\text{NIZK}}$. This means that some dummy party $\tilde{P}$ received input (**prove**,*sid*, *ssid*, C, w), where $C(w) = 1$. $\mathcal{S}$ must simulate the output a real party P would make, however, it may not know w.

$\mathcal{S}$ creates $(vk, sk) \leftarrow K_{\text{sign}}(1^k)$, sets $tag = (vk, C)$ and forms ℓ equivocal commitments $(c_i, ek_i) \leftarrow \text{Tcom}_{tk}(tag)$. $\mathcal{S}$ then simulates openings of the c_i's to both 0 and 1. For all $i = 1$ to ℓ and $b = 0$ to 1, it computes $\rho_{i,b} \leftarrow \text{Topen}_{ek_i}(c_i, b, tag)$. It selects $r_{i,b}$ at random and sets $c_{i,b} = E_{pk}(\rho_{i,b}; r_{i,b})$. $\mathcal{S}$ computes $c = E_{hk}(c_1, c_{1,0}, c_{1,1}, \ldots, c_\ell, c_{\ell,0}, c_{\ell,1}; r)$ for a random r. Let x be the statement that there exists a witness w and randomness such that c has been correctly generated using w and $C(w) = 1$. $\mathcal{S}$ chooses randomness ρ and simulates the NIZK argument for x being true as $\pi \leftarrow S_2(\sigma, \tau, x; \rho)$. Finally, $\mathcal{S}$ creates a one-time signature s on (C, vk, c, π).

Let $\Pi = (vk, c, \pi, s)$ and return (**proof**,Π) to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{NIZK}}$. $\mathcal{F}_{\text{NIZK}}$ subsequently sends (**proof**,*sid*, *ssid*, Π) to $\tilde{P}$ and $\mathcal{S}$ delivers this message so $\tilde{P}$ can output the proof to the environment.

Simulating Uncorrupted Verifiers. Suppose $\mathcal{S}$ receives (**verify**,C, Π) from $\mathcal{F}_{\text{NIZK}}$. This means an honest dummy party $\tilde{V}$ has received (**verify**,*sid*, *ssid*, C, Π) from the environment.

$\mathcal{S}$ checks the UC NIZK argument, $b \leftarrow V^{\text{UC}}(\Sigma, C, \Pi)$. If invalid, it sends (**witness**,`no witness`) to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{NIZK}}$ and delivers the resulting message (**verification**,*sid*, *ssid*, 0) to $\tilde{V}$ that outputs this rejection to the environment.

On the other hand, if Π is valid, $\mathcal{S}$ must extract a witness w. If C has ever been proved by an honest prover that was later corrupted, $\mathcal{S}$ already knows a witness and does not need to run the following extraction procedure. If the witness is not known already, $\mathcal{S}$ uses the extraction key xk to extract a plaintext $c_1, c_{1,0}, c_{1,1}, \ldots, c_\ell, c_{\ell,0}, c_{\ell,1}$ from c. Since $\mathcal{S}$ knows the decryption key dk, it can then decrypt all $c_{i,b}$. This gives $\mathcal{S}$ plaintexts $\rho_{i,b}$. It checks for each i whether $c_i = \text{commit}_{ck}(b, (vk, C); \rho_{i,b})$ and in that case b is a possible candidate for the i-th bit of w.

If successful in all of this, $\mathcal{S}$ lets w be these bits. However, if any of the bits are ambiguous, that is, w_i could be both 0 and 1, or if any of them are inextractable, then $\mathcal{S}$ sets $w =$ `no witness`. $\mathcal{S}$ sends (**witness**,w) to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{NIZK}}$ and delivers the resulting output message to $\tilde{V}$ that outputs it to the environment.

We will later argue that the probability of the UC NIZK argument being valid, yet $\mathcal{S}$ not being able to extract a witness to give to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{NIZK}}$ is negligible. That means, with

	H0 (ϕ_{NIZK})	H1	H2	H3	H4	H5	H6	H7 $\equiv$ SIM ($\mathcal{F}_{\text{NIZK}}$)
Hiding key hk	K_{hiding}	Generated by K_{extract}						
Tag-based commit. c_i	Commit to w_i		Equivocated tag-based commitment to w_i					
Ciphertexts $c_{i,1-w_i}$	Random bit-string			Encrypts opening of c_i to $1-w_i$				
Verifying signature s	Adversary wins if forgery				Disallow forged one-time signatures			
Verifying Π						Abort unless unique c_i openings		
Verifying Π							Extract witness w	
Proof π	Make real NIZK proof π							Simulate π

Fig. 8. Sketch of the difference between the hybrid experiments H0 through H7.

overwhelming probability $\mathcal{S}$ inputs a valid witness w to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{NIZK}}$ when Π is an acceptable UC NIZK argument for satisfiability of C.

Simulating Corruption. Suppose a simulated party P_i is corrupted by $\mathcal{A}$. Then, $\mathcal{S}$ has to simulate the transcript of P_i. $\mathcal{S}$ starts by corrupting $\tilde{P}_i$ thereby learning all UC NIZK arguments the party has verified. It is straightforward to simulate P_i's internal tapes when running these verification processes.

$\mathcal{S}$ also learn all statements C that the party has proved together with the corresponding witnesses w. Recall, the UC NIZK arguments Π have been provided by $\mathcal{S}$. We now describe how $\mathcal{S}$ can simulate the randomness that would lead P_i to produce such a UC NIZK argument Π. Since $\mathcal{S}$ created $c_i, c_{i,0}, c_{i,1}$ such that $c_{i,0}$ contains a 0-opening of c_i and $c_{i,1}$ contains a 1-opening of c_i it can produce good looking randomness to claim that the party committed to w_i. This also gives us convincing randomness for constructing all these commitments and for producing the ciphertext c. $\mathcal{S}$ can now run the simulator algorithm S_3 to simulate randomness that would lead the prover to have produced the proof π.

Hybrids. We wish to argue that no nonuniform polynomial-time environment can distinguish between the adversary $\mathcal{A}$ running with parties executing ϕ_{NIZK} in the $\mathcal{F}_{\text{CRS}}$-hybrid model and the ideal adversary $\mathcal{S}$ running in the $\mathcal{F}_{\text{NIZK}}$-hybrid model with dummy parties. In order to do so, we define several hybrid experiments and show that the environment cannot distinguish between any of them. Figure 8 gives an overview of how different components of the proofs are handled. We will now give the full description of the hybrid experiments and the security proof.

H0. This is ϕ_{NIZK} running in the $\mathcal{F}_{\text{CRS}}$-hybrid model with adversary $\mathcal{A}$ and parties $P_1, \ldots, P_n$.

H1. We modify H0 by running $(hk, xk) \leftarrow K_{\text{extract}}(1^k)$ instead of $hk \leftarrow K_{\text{hiding}}(1^k)$ when generating the common reference string Σ.

H0 and H1 are indistinguishable, because it is hard to distinguish which key generation algorithm creates hk.

H2. We modify H1 in the way an uncorrupted prover P creates tag-based simulation-sound trapdoor commitments $c_1, \ldots, c_\ell$ to the bits of the witness. Let $tag = (vk, C)$ as chosen in the protocol. Instead of creating c_i by selecting r_i at random and setting $c_i = \text{commit}_{ck}(w_i, tag; r_i)$, we create an equivocal commitment $(c_i, ek_i) \leftarrow \text{Tcom}_{tk}(tag)$ and subsequently produce randomness $\rho_{i,w_i} \leftarrow \text{Topen}_{ek_i}(c_i, w_i, tag)$. We continue the proof using ρ_{i,w_i} instead of r_i.

H1 and H2 are indistinguishable because it is hard to distinguish tag-based commitments and their openings from tag-based equivocal commitments and their equivocations to the same messages (3).

H3. In H3, we make another modification to the procedure followed by an honest prover. We are already creating c_i as an equivocal commitment and equivocating

it with randomness ρ_{i,w_i} that would open it to contain w_i. We run the equivocation procedure once more to also create convincing randomness that would explain c_i as a commitment to $1 - w_i$. This means, we compute $\rho_{i,1-w_i} \leftarrow \text{Topen}_{ek_i}(c_i, 1 - w_i, tag)$. Instead of selecting $c_{i,1-w_i}$ as a random string, we choose to encrypt $\rho_{i,1-w_i}$ as $c_{i,1-w_i} = E_{pk}(\rho_{i,1-w_i}; r_{i,1-w_i})$ for a randomly chosen $r_{i,1-w_i}$. We still pretend that $c_{i,1-w_i}$ is a randomly chosen string when we carry out the NIZK proof π or if the prover is ever corrupted.

H2 and H3 are indistinguishable because of the pseudorandomness property of the cryptosystem (2). Suppose we could distinguish H2 and H3, then we could distinguish between an encryption oracle and an oracle that supplies randomly chosen strings.

H4. Consider the case where an honest party V receives (**verify**,*sid*, *ssid*, C, Π). Suppose Π is indeed an acceptable UC NIZK argument and the one-time signature scheme has verification key vk. If vk was selected by an honest party in making a UC NIZK argument and this party is still uncorrupted, yet (C, Π) differ from the UC NIZK argument this honest party produced, then we output `failure` to the environment.

To argue that H3 and H4 are indistinguishable, we need to show that the probability of failure is negligible. This follows from the fact that outputting `failure` corresponds to creating a forgery of the strong one-time signature scheme.

H5. Again, we look at the case of an uncorrupted verifier that has an acceptable UC NIZK argument Π for some C to verify. If (C, Π) were produced by an uncorrupted prover, we do not change the protocol, neither do we modify the protocol if C has been proved by an honest prover that has later been corrupted. In all other cases, we use the extraction key xk in an attempt to decrypt c to get a plaintext on the form $c_1, c_{1,0}, c_{1,1}, \ldots, c_\ell, c_{\ell,0}, c_{\ell,1}$. Then, we use the decryption key dk to attempt to decrypt the $c_{i,b}$'s to get $\rho_{i,b}$ so $c_{i,b} = \text{commit}_{ck}(b, (vk, C); \rho_{i,b})$. We output `failure` if we encounter a $c_i = \text{commit}_{ck}(0, (vk, C), \rho_{i,0}) = \text{commit}_{ck}(1, (vk, C), \rho_{i,1})$.

Tag-based simulation-soundness (4), of the commitment scheme implies that H4 and H5 are indistinguishable. To see this consider the tag (vk, C). Outputting `failure` corresponds to breaking the binding property of the commitment scheme, unless we have previously created an equivocal commitment with tag (vk, C). In H4, we ruled out the possibility of vk coming from a UC NIZK argument of a party that is still uncorrupted. This leaves us with the possibility of $\mathcal{A}$ corrupting an honest prover P, learning the secret key sk corresponding to vk and making a UC NIZK argument using the tag (vk, C). If we have ever created an equivocal commitment using this tag, we did it for this prover. However, this means that C stems from the same honest prover that has now been corrupted, and in that case we do not try to extract $\rho_{i,b}$'s.

H6. As in H5, we try to extract $\rho_{i,0}, \rho_{i,1}$'s. We output `failure` if we cannot decrypt c to get $c_1, c_{1,0}, c_{1,1}, \ldots, c_\ell, c_{\ell,0}, c_{\ell,1}$. We also output `failure` if there is an i such that we cannot decrypt either $c_{i,0}$ or $c_{i,1}$ to give us $\rho_{i,b}$ so $c_i = \text{commit}_{ck}(b, (vk, C); \rho_{i,b})$. We ruled out the possibility of both $\rho_{i,0}$ and $\rho_{i,1}$ being an opening of c_i in H5, so if everything is OK so far we have a uniquely defined w such that for all i we have $c_i = \text{commit}_{ck}(w_i, (vk, C); \rho_{i,w_i})$. We output `failure` if $C(w) \neq 1$.

Call c well-formed if we can extract $c_1, c_{1,0}, c_{1,1}, \ldots, c_\ell, c_{\ell,0}, c_{\ell,1}$ from c using xk, and for all $i = 1$ to ℓ at least one of the $c_{i,0}, c_{i,1}$ will have a proper $\rho_{i,b}$ so $c_i = \text{commit}_{ck}(b, (vk, C); \rho_{i,b})$, and if all of these openings are unique then the bits constitute a witness w for $C(w) = 1$. Observe, from the perfect extractability of the commitment scheme and the errorless decryption property of the pseudorandom

cryptosystem, we have that the randomness used in creating (hk, xk) and (pk, dk) is a witness to c being malformed unless indeed it is well-formed. This gives us an NP-language L_{guilt} of malformed c for which we know a malformation-witness. The adaptive culpable soundness of the NIZK argument now tells us that with overwhelming probability c is well-formed and we have negligible chance of outputting `failure`. This means H5 and H6 are indistinguishable.

H7. Instead of making real NIZK arguments for uncorrupted provers we use the nonerasure zero-knowledge simulators. We use $\pi \leftarrow S_2(\sigma, \tau, \cdot; \rho)$ with ρ random to simulate the honest provers' NIZK arguments that c has been correctly generated. Finally, if any such prover is corrupted we use $r \leftarrow S_3(\sigma, \tau, x, \pi, \cdot, \rho)$ to create convincing randomness that would make the prover output π on the witness for c being correctly generated.

The nonerasure zero-knowledge property of the NIZK proof implies that H6 and H7 are indistinguishable.

SIM. This is the ideal process running with $\mathcal{F}_{\text{NIZK}}$ and $\mathcal{S}$.

H7 is already very similar to the ideal process. Honest provers in H7 make UC NIZK arguments in the same way as $\mathcal{S}$ without using the knowledge of the witness w for anything. It therefore makes no difference that $\mathcal{S}$ only learns w upon corruption of a party P when it has to simulate the random tape of said party.

Whenever an honest verifier has to verify a proof C, Π we are also very close to what happens in the simulation. If C, Π has been produced by an honest prover, it returns 1, as will the dummy verifier in the ideal process. If C is a statement proved by an honest prover, but this prover has later been corrupted, then in H8 the verifier will return 1 if Π is an acceptable UC NIZK argument. $\mathcal{S}$ in a similar situation will have corrupted the dummy prover that made the UC NIZK argument, and therefore it will know the witness. If Π is an acceptable UC NIZK argument, it can therefore give this witness to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{NIZK}}$ that will make the dummy verifier output an acceptance to the environment. Finally, in the remaining case we have argued in H7 that we manage to extract a witness w if Π is acceptable and this extraction procedure is carried out exactly as it is done by $\mathcal{S}$. Therefore, $\mathcal{S}$ can submit this witness to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{NIZK}}$.

In conclusion, H7 is perfectly indistinguishable from the ideal process. Since there is a path of indistinguishable hybrid experiments from H0 to SIM this shows us that running ϕ_{NIZK} as in H0 is indistinguishable from running the ideal process as in SIM. □

THEOREM 8.2. *The UC NIZK argument in Figure* 5 *has perfect zero-knowledge.*

PROOF. We start by describing the simulator $S^{\text{UC}} = (S_1^{\text{UC}}, S_2^{\text{UC}})$. S_1^{UC} runs $hk \leftarrow K_{\text{hiding}}(1^k); (ck, tk) \leftarrow K_{\text{tag-com}}(1^k); (pk, sk) \leftarrow K_{\text{pseudo}}(1^k); (\sigma, \tau) \leftarrow S_1(1^k)$. Let $\Sigma = (hk, ck, pk, \sigma)$. S_1^{UC} outputs (Σ, τ).

Consider next S_2^{UC} that is given a circuit C on which to simulate a UC NIZK argument Π for satisfiability. It generates keys for the strong one-time signature scheme $(vk, sk) \leftarrow K_{\text{sign}}(1^k)$. Then it generates a perfectly hiding commitment $c \leftarrow \text{com}_{hk}(0)$. It simulates an argument $\pi \leftarrow S_2(\sigma, \tau, x)$ for the statement x that c has been correctly formed and contains a witness w so $C(w) = 1$. Finally, S_2 creates a one-time signature on everything, $s \leftarrow \text{sign}_{sk}(C, vk, c, \pi)$. It outputs the simulated UC NIZK argument $\Pi = (vk, c, \pi, s)$.

Perfect zero-knowledge of the NIZK argument system implies that for all adversaries $\mathcal{A}$ we have

$$\Pr\left[\Sigma \leftarrow K^{\text{UC}}(1^k) : \mathcal{A}^{P(\Sigma,\cdot,\cdot)}(\Sigma) = 1\right] = \Pr\left[(\Sigma, \tau) \leftarrow S_1^{\text{UC}}(1^k) : \mathcal{A}^{PS(\Sigma,\tau,\cdot,\cdot)}(\Sigma) = 1\right],$$

where PS is an oracle that on input (Σ, τ, C, w) outputs `failure` if $C(w) = 0$ and otherwise creates a UC NIZK argument $\Pi = (vk, c, \pi, s)$ by following the provers algorithm for creating vk, c, s but simulating the NIZK argument π.

Next, we argue that, for all adversaries $\mathcal{A}$, we have

$$\Pr\left[(\Sigma, \tau) \leftarrow S_1^{\mathrm{UC}}(1^k) : \mathcal{A}^{PS(\Sigma,\tau,\cdot,\cdot)}(\Sigma) = 1\right] = \Pr\left[(\Sigma, \tau) \leftarrow K^{\mathrm{UC}}(1^k) : \mathcal{A}^{S'(\Sigma,\tau,\cdot,\cdot)}(\Sigma) = 1\right],$$

where $S'(\Sigma, \tau, C, w)$ checks that $C(w) = 1$ and in that case returns $\Pi \leftarrow S_2^{\mathrm{UC}}(\Sigma, \tau, C)$.

The only difference between the two oracles PS and S' is the message inside the commitment c. However, since the commitment scheme is perfectly hiding, this does not change the distributions. □

COROLLARY 8.3. *Homomorphic proof commitment schemes with perfect extraction and public-key cryptosystems with pseudorandom ciphertexts imply the existence of a noninteractive perfect zero-knowledge protocol that securely realizes* $\mathcal{F}_{\mathrm{NIZK}}$.

COROLLARY 8.4. *If the subgroup decision assumption holds for the example of bilinear groups based on elliptic curves as described in Section* 4*, then there exists a noninteractive perfect zero-knowledge protocol that securely realizes* $\mathcal{F}_{\mathrm{NIZK}}$.

COROLLARY 8.5. *If the decisional linear assumption holds for the example of bilinear groups based on elliptic curves as described in Section* 5*, then there exists a noninteractive perfect zero-knowledge protocol that securely realizes* $\mathcal{F}_{\mathrm{NIZK}}$.

9. NONINTERACTIVE ZAPS FOR CIRCUIT SAT

We now give a construction of non-interactive zaps for Circuit SAT. The main idea is to select two correlated common reference strings in such a way that the verifier can check that at least one of them is a perfect binding commitment key. The prover then forms two proofs, one for each common reference string. Since one of them is perfect binding we get perfect soundness. At the same time, we also generate the two correlated common reference strings in such a way that one of them can be used to simulate proofs and the adversary cannot tell which one of them is a perfect hiding key. This is what will give us witness indistinguishability.

Verifiable Correlated Key Generation. We say a homomorphic proof commitment scheme has verifiable correlated key generation, if there exists two efficient algorithms K_2, V_2 with the following characteristics. $K_2(1^k, b)$ generates a perfect binding key ck_{1-b} and a perfect hiding key ck_b together with the trapdoor key tk_b. It outputs (ck_0, ck_1, tk_b). V_2 takes as input two commitment keys ck_0, ck_1 and outputs 1 only if at least one of the commitment keys is a perfect binding commitment key. We require that the correlated key generation and the verification is perfectly correct, that is, V_2 always accepts the output of K_2. We also require that it must be hard to tell, which one of ck_0 and ck_1 is perfectly hiding. Formally, for all nonuniform polynomial-time adversaries $\mathcal{A}$ we have

$$\Pr\left[(ck_0, ck_1, tk) \leftarrow K_2(1^k, 0) : \mathcal{A}(ck_0, ck_1) = 1\right] \approx \Pr\left[(ck_0, ck_1, tk) \leftarrow K_2(1^k, 1) : \mathcal{A}(ck_0, ck_1) = 1\right].$$

If the decisional linear assumption holds for the elliptic curve example of bilinear groups from Boneh and Franklin [2003] described in Section 5, then the corresponding homomorphic proof commitment scheme has verifiable correlated key generation. To generate a pair of keys, K_2 generates $(ck_b, tk_b) = ((p, \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, e, g, f, h, u, v, w_b), (ck, r_u, s_v)) \leftarrow K_{\mathrm{hiding}}(1^k, b)$. Then, it sets $ck_{1-b} = (p, \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, e, g, f, h, u, v, wg^{1-2b})$. The verification algorithm V_2 first checks that $(p, \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, e)$ describes an elliptic curve with a bilinear map. This is straightforward

Proof: The prover given $1^k, C$ and wires w such that $C(w) = 1$ proceeds as follows.

(1) Generate a *verifiable* pair of commitment keys $(ck_0, ck_1, tk_0) \leftarrow K_2(1^k, 0)$
(2) Use the NIZK prover to obtain a proof π_0 of the statement with respect to the common reference string ck_0
(3) Use the NIZK prover to obtain a proof π_1 of the statement with respect to the common reference string ck_1
(4) The resulting proof is $\pi = (ck_0, ck_1, \pi_0, \pi_1)$

Verification: On input C and a proof π as described above, accept if and only if the following procedure succeeds

(1) Verify that at least one of ck_0, ck_1 is a perfect binding key $V_2(ck_0, ck_1) = 1$
(2) Verify π_0 with respect to the common reference string ck_0
(3) Verify π_1 with respect to the common reference string ck_1

Fig. 9. Noninteractive zap for Circuit SAT.

because it simply corresponds to verifying that $p \equiv 2 \bmod 3$ is a prime. Next, it checks that g, f, h, u, v, w_0, w_1 are points on the curve and elements of the group and that g, f, h are non-trivial. Finally, it checks that ck_0, ck_1 are the same strings, except for the last elements w_0, w_1 and that $w_1 = w_0 g$. At least one of (u, v, w_0) and $(u, v, w_0 g)$ must be a non-linear tuple and therefore at least one of the keys is perfectly binding.

Not all homomorphic proof commitments have correlated key generation. For instance, we do not know how to use the subgroup decision assumption to get a homomorphic proof commitment scheme with correlated key generation. The stumbling block in the subgroup decision setting is that, given h_0 and h_1, we do not know how to guarantee that at least one of them has order q without revealing which one it is.

THEOREM 9.1. *The protocol in Figure* 9 *is a noninteractive proof in the plain model for Circuit SAT with perfect completeness, perfect soundness and computational witness indistinguishability if the homomorphic proof commitment scheme has verifiable correlated key generation.*

PROOF. The protocol is perfectly complete because the NIZK proofs for Circuit SAT are perfectly complete both on perfect binding keys and perfect hiding keys and the correlated key generation has perfect correctness.

Perfect soundness follows from the fact that given $V_2(ck_0, ck_1) = 1$ at least one of ck_0 and ck_1 must be a perfect binding key. The perfect soundness of the proof system over this common reference string then implies that C must be satisfiable.

We now argue that the zap is computationally witness indistinguishable assuming verifiable correlated key generation for the homomorphic proof commitment scheme by means of a hybrid argument. The adversary generates a circuit C and two witnesses w_0 and w_1.

(1) In the first hybrid, we run the real zap generating the keys using $K_2(1^k, 0)$ and the proof using witness w_0.
(2) The second hybrid proceeds as the first, except that π_0 is generated using witness w_1 instead of using witness w_0.
Hybrid 1 and Hybrid 2 are identically distributed. This follows from the fact that ck_0 is a perfect hiding key and therefore the proof π_0 has perfect zero-knowledge.
(3) The third hybrid proceeds as the second, except that it uses $(ck_0, ck_1, tk_1) \leftarrow K_2(1^k, 1)$ to generate the common reference strings. Now ck_0 is a perfectly binding key and ck_1 is perfectly hiding.

Hybrid 2 and Hybrid 3 are computationally indistinguishable since no nonuniform polynomial-time adversary can distinguish between generating the keys using $K_2(1^k, 0)$ or $K_2(1^k, 1)$.

(4) The fourth hybrid proceeds as the third, except that for π_1, it uses witness w_1 to obtain π_1 instead of using witness w_0.
Hybrid 3 and Hybrid 4 are identically distributed. This follows from the fact that ck_1 is a perfect hiding key and therefore the proof π_1 has perfect zero-knowledge.

(5) Finally, the fifth hybrid proceeds as the fourth, except that it uses $(ck_0, ck_1, tk_0) \leftarrow K_2(1^k, 0)$ to generate the common reference strings. This is precisely the zap using witness w_1.
Hybrid 4 and Hybrid 5 are computationally indistinguishable since no nonuniform polynomial-time adversary can distinguish between generating the keys using $K_2(1^k, 0)$ or $K_2(1^k, 1)$. □

COROLLARY 9.2. *If the decisional linear assumption holds for the elliptic curve based bilinear groups in Boneh and Franklin [2003], then noninteractive zaps exist.*

APPENDIX

A. PERFECT NIZK ARGUMENT WITH ADAPTIVE SOUNDNESS

Adaptive Soundness. A noninteractive zero-knowledge argument (K, P, V) is said to have adaptive soundness, if for all nonuniform polynomial time adversaries $\mathcal{A}$ we have

$$\Pr\left[\sigma \leftarrow K(1^k); (x, \pi) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\sigma) : V(\sigma, x, \pi) = 1 \text{ and } x \notin L\right] \approx 0.$$

Consider the perfect NIZK argument (S_σ, P, V) from Section 7. We will bound the probability of an adversary breaking the adaptive soundness on circuits of size less than $\ell(k)$.

THEOREM A.1. *If perfect binding keys and perfect hiding keys can be distinguished with at most probability $\nu_{\text{KeyDist}}(k) < \ell(k)^{-\ell(k)}\nu(k)$, where ν is a negligible function, then (S_σ, P, V) has adaptive soundness for circuits of size $\ell(k)$.*

PROOF.

$$\begin{aligned}
&\Pr\left[\sigma \leftarrow S_\sigma(1^k); (C, \pi) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\sigma) : C \notin L \text{ and } |C| \le \ell(k) \text{ and } V(\sigma, C, \pi) = 1\right] \\
&= \sum_{C \notin L : |C| \le \ell(k)} \Pr\left[\sigma \leftarrow S_\sigma(1^k); (C', \pi) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\sigma) : C' = C \text{ and } V(\sigma, C, \pi) = 1\right] \\
&\le \sum_{C \notin L : |C| \le \ell(k)} \Pr\left[\sigma \leftarrow S_\sigma(1^k); (C', \pi) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\sigma) : V(\sigma, C, \pi) = 1\right] \\
&\le \sum_{C \notin L : |C| \le \ell(k)} \nu_{\text{KeyDist}}(k) \quad < \quad \sum_{C \notin L : |C| \le \ell(k)} \ell(k)^{-\ell(k)}\nu(k) \quad \le \quad \nu(k).
\end{aligned}$$ □

Let us make a back-of-the-envelope estimate of how large circuits we can hope to have adaptive soundness for if we are using the subgroup decision assumption, where $\nu_{\text{KeyDist}} = \nu_{\text{SD}}$, the upper bound on the advantage in deciding the subgroup decision problem. If the subgroup decision assumption is broken, it is still not clear whether it leads to an attack on adaptive soundness. However, let us be conservative and aim for circuits of size $\ell(k)$ such that $\ell(k)^{\ell(k)}\nu_{\text{SD}}(k)$ is negligible.

The best attack on the subgroup decision assumption we can think of consists of factoring n. The number field sieve algorithms factors n in heuristically

$$e^{(1.92+o(1))(\ln n)^{1/3}(\ln\ln n)^{2/3}} = 2^{(\log e)^{2/3}(1.92+o(1))k^{1/3}\left(\ln\left(\frac{k}{\log e}\right)\right)^{2/3}}$$

steps. From this, we make a guess that there exists an algorithm that decides the subgroup decision problem with advantage $2^{-(\log e)^{2/3}(1.92+o(1))k^{1/3}\left(\ln\left(\frac{k}{\log e}\right)\right)^{2/3}}$. This implies that $2^{-(\log e)^{2/3}(1.92+o(1))k^{1/3}\left(\ln\left(\frac{k}{\log e}\right)\right)^{2/3}} < \nu_{\mathrm{SD}}(k)$, so

$$\ell(k)^{\ell(k)}2^{-(\log e)^{2/3}(1.92+o(1))k^{1/3}\left(\ln\left(\frac{k}{\log e}\right)\right)^{2/3}}$$

must be negligible. Letting $\ell(k) = k^{\varepsilon}$ gives us

$$2^{k^{\varepsilon}\log(k^{\varepsilon})-(\log e)^{2/3}(1.92+o(1))k^{1/3}\left(\ln\left(\frac{k}{\log e}\right)\right)^{2/3}}$$

must be negligible, which is true for any constant $\varepsilon < 1/3$.

Picking, for instance, $\varepsilon = 1/4$ works. Requiring that the common reference string is at least of size $\ell(k)^4$ bits is not unreasonable in comparison with earlier constructions of computational NIZK proofs. However, security relies on the very strong assumption that any nonuniform polynomial-time adversary has at most $\nu_{\mathrm{SD}}(k) = 2^{-(\log k/4)k^{1/4}}$ advantage in the subgroup decision problem.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

We thank Brent Waters for bringing to our attention the fact that witness-indistinguishable proofs (instead of NIZK proofs) for a commitment to 0 or 1 would suffice in our construction. That observation made the composite-order scheme presented here simpler than the scheme presented in our original proceedings version [Groth et al. 2006b]. We also thank Brent for participating at an early stage of building NIZK schemes based on the decisional linear assumption.

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Received September 2006; revised March 2011, February 2012; accepted February 2012