

# Smart-LLaMA-DPO: Reinforced Large Language Model for Explainable Smart Contract Vulnerability Detection

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Smart contract vulnerability detection is a critical challenge in the rapidly evolving blockchain landscape. Existing vulnerability detection methods face two main issues: (1) Existing datasets lack comprehensiveness and sufficient quality, with limited vulnerability type coverage and insufficient distinction between high-quality and low-quality explanations for preference learning. (2) Large language models (LLMs) often struggle with accurately interpreting specific concepts in smart contract security. Through our empirical analysis, we found that even after continual pre-training and supervised fine-tuning, LLMs still exhibit limitations in precisely understanding the execution order of state changes in smart contracts, which can lead to incorrect vulnerability explanations despite making correct detection decisions. These limitations result in poor detection performance, leading to potentially severe financial losses. To address these challenges, we propose Smart-LLaMA-DPO, an advanced detection method based on the LLaMA-3.1-8B. First, we construct a comprehensive dataset covering four vulnerability types and machine-unauditable vulnerabilities, containing labels, detailed explanations, and precise vulnerability locations for Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT), as well as paired high-quality and low-quality

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ACM 2994-970X/2025/7-ARTISSTA009

<https://doi.org/10.1145/3728878>

outputs for Direct Preference Optimization (DPO). Second, we perform continual pre-training using large-scale smart contract code to enhance the LLM's understanding of specific security practices in smart contracts. Furthermore, we conduct supervised fine-tuning with our comprehensive dataset. Finally, we apply DPO, which leverages human feedback to improve the quality of generated explanations. Smart-LLaMA-DPO utilizes a specially designed loss function that encourages the LLM to increase the probability of preferred outputs while decreasing the probability of non-preferred outputs, thereby enhancing the LLM's ability to generate high-quality explanations. We evaluate Smart-LLaMA-DPO on four major vulnerability types: reentrancy, timestamp dependence, integer overflow/underflow, and delegatecall, as well as machine-unauditable vulnerabilities. Our method significantly outperforms state-of-the-art baselines, with average improvements of 10.43% in F1 score and 7.87% in accuracy. Moreover, both LLM evaluation and human evaluation demonstrate the superior quality of explanations generated by Smart-LLaMA-DPO in terms of correctness, thoroughness, and clarity.

**CCS Concepts:** • Software and its engineering → Domain specific languages; • Security and privacy → Software security engineering.

**Additional Key Words and Phrases:** Smart Contract, Large Language Models, Direct Preference Optimization

#### ACM Reference Format:

Lei Yu, Zhirong Huang, Hang Yuan, Shiqi Cheng, Li Yang, Fengjun Zhang, Chenjie Shen, Jiajia Ma, Jingyuan Zhang, Junyi Lu, and Chun Zuo. 2025. Smart-LLaMA-DPO: Reinforced Large Language Model for Explainable Smart Contract Vulnerability Detection. *Proc. ACM Softw. Eng.* 2, ISSTA, Article ISSTA009 (July 2025), 24 pages. <https://doi.org/10.1145/3728878>

## 1 Introduction

Blockchain technology has been rapidly adopted across various domains due to its decentralized architecture [58]. This innovative technology enables the creation of secure, distributed digital ledgers for recording transactions [26]. By utilizing advanced cryptographic methods, blockchain ensures the integrity and verification of each transaction[70, 75]. Within this ecosystem, smart contracts function as self-executing programs on the blockchain, automating the management of digital assets such as cryptocurrencies. These contracts are activated when specific conditions are met and, once deployed, become permanent components of the blockchain [80]. However, the immutability and inherent complexity of smart contracts pose significant security challenges [80]. The well-known DAO incident [16, 38] serves as a cautionary example, demonstrating the potential severity of such vulnerabilities. This security breach resulted in the illegal transfer of \$60 million worth of Ethereum, causing widespread impact on the blockchain community [4, 25].

Researchers have developed various techniques for smart contract vulnerability detection, such as symbolic execution (Oyente [36], Mythril [40]) and static analysis (Slither [21], SmartCheck [59]). However, these methods often rely on predefined patterns and perform poorly in complex scenarios. Qian et al. [49] proposed cross-modality learning approaches that leverage information from both bytecode and source code. Recently, researchers have begun to explore the potential of LLMs in smart contract vulnerability detection and explanation (iAudit [37]). While iAudit shows promise in detecting logic vulnerabilities, its two-stage architecture that separates detection and explanation tasks can lead to inconsistencies. For instance shown in Fig. 3, the detector incorrectly identifies a reentrancy vulnerability in the contract and misinterprets the sequence of external calls and state changes. While the Price Oracle Manipulation vulnerability is correctly identified, it is incorrectly attributed to insufficient access control rather than the critical issue of reliance on the Uniswap pool's instant price. Such inconsistencies, although mitigated by iAudit's Ranker-Critic mechanism, could still affect developers' remediation decisions. We conducted a systematic evaluation of existing smart contract vulnerability datasets, as shown in Table 1. While most existing datasets (A-D) provide only basic vulnerability labels without detailed explanations or location information, iAudit made progress by including these aspects. However, iAudit's dataset primarily

focuses on logic vulnerabilities, and its data enhancement process relies on LLMs without human expert verification after LLM generation. Furthermore, the current datasets lack the structured format to support Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) training [51], which significantly affects the LLM's ability to generate high-quality vulnerability explanations that match human expert standards.

Beyond iAudit, general LLMs also face significant challenges in the domain of smart contract vulnerability detection. They often encounter difficulties in dealing with smart contract-specific concepts and security implications. As shown in Fig. 1, when faced with two explanations, one being an incorrect explanation from a general LLM (LLaMA3.1-8B-Instruct) and the other a partially correct explanation from Smart-LLaMA-DPO (only after continual pre-training and supervised fine-tuning), the general LLM incorrectly identifies a reentrancy vulnerability in the contract. It misinterprets the meaning of external calls in the 'buyInternal()' function, failing to recognize that reentrancy vulnerabilities typically occur when contract state or balance changes are made after external calls, which is not the case in this contract. Smart-LLaMA-DPO (only after continual pre-training and supervised fine-tuning) correctly identifies the contract's security but still misunderstands the order of operations in its explanation. This subtle but critical misunderstanding highlights the limitations of relying solely on continual pre-training and supervised fine-tuning.

To address these challenges, we propose Smart-LLaMA-DPO, based on the LLaMA-3.1-8B model. This approach combines continual pre-training, supervised fine-tuning, and direct preference optimization (DPO). Unlike iAudit's two-stage architecture, which may lead to inconsistencies between detection and explanation, our approach leverages Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) [51] to align these tasks within a unified framework, enabling more consistent and context-aware results. By utilizing large-scale smart contract code for domain-specific pre-training, we enable the LLM to better understand the syntax and semantics of smart contracts, overcoming the limitations of general LLMs in understanding contract semantics as shown in Fig. 1. Subsequently, we construct a comprehensive smart contract vulnerability dataset containing detailed explanations and precise location information. The fine-tuning process utilizing this high-quality dataset enhances the LLM's capabilities, enabling it to not only detect vulnerabilities but also generate explanations. This approach effectively addresses the limitations of existing datasets as illustrated in Table 1. Finally, to address the issues in explanation quality that persist even after CPT and SFT training (as seen in Smart-LLaMA-DPO (only after CPT and SFT)'s partially incorrect explanation in Fig. 1), we innovatively introduce DPO [51]. By constructing a dataset containing pairs of model outputs with varying quality, DPO enables the LLM to learn to generate higher quality explanations that better align with human expert expectations. Each pair in this dataset consists of two outputs: one preferred by human experts, representing high-quality explanations, and another of lower quality. The core of the Smart-LLaMA-DPO approach lies in learning directly from expert preferences, without the need for explicit reward modeling or complex reinforcement learning processes. Smart-LLaMA-DPO uses a specially designed loss function that encourages the LLM to increase the probability of preferred outputs while decreasing the probability of non-preferred outputs.

In the data construction process, we used Qwen2.5-72B-Instruct and Mistral-Large-Instruct-2407-123B to generate initial explanations, scored by Llama-3.1-70B-Instruct. Smart contract security experts refined high-scoring explanations to create the SFT dataset. For the DPO dataset, experts rewrote lower-scored outputs into "suboptimal" versions, which, while correct, lack depth and clarity compared to high-quality outputs, creating a reasonable quality gap.

To validate the effectiveness of Smart-LLaMA-DPO, we conducted a comprehensive experimental evaluation. We evaluated the Smart-LLaMA-DPO framework on a challenging dataset [49] covering four major vulnerability types (reentrancy, timestamp dependence, integer overflow/underflow, and delegatecall) and machine unauditability vulnerabilities (seven types) from [76]. The results show

that Smart-LLaMA-DPO significantly outperforms state-of-the-art methods across all vulnerability types. Smart-LLaMA-DPO achieves F1 scores 7.51%, 1.54%, 11.07%, and 6.06% higher than the previous best performance for reentrancy, timestamp dependence, integer overflow/underflow, and delegatecall vulnerabilities, respectively. In terms of accuracy, Smart-LLaMA-DPO surpasses the previous SOTA methods by 5.65%, 1.02%, 10.52%, and 3.90% for these four vulnerability types. For machine unauditable vulnerabilities, Smart-LLaMA-DPO surpasses the previous best baseline (iAudit) with an increase of 25.98% in F1 score and 18.25% in accuracy. Both LLM evaluation and human evaluation show that Smart-LLaMA-DPO produces more accurate, comprehensive, and concise explanations than baselines. Human evaluation gave positive scores (4 or 3 points) in 81.15%, 83.88%, and 94.63% for correctness, thoroughness, and clarity.

The main contributions of this paper are as follows:

- To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to introduce preference-based optimization in smart contract vulnerability detection and explanation.
- We propose Smart-LLaMA-DPO, a new method combining continual pre-training, supervised fine-tuning and direct preference optimization for smart contract vulnerability detection, achieving state-of-the-art performance across four major vulnerability types and machine unauditable vulnerabilities (seven types).
- We validate the effectiveness of Smart-LLaMA-DPO in generating high-quality explanations through both LLM evaluation and human evaluation.

## 2 Background and Motivation

### 2.1 Key Terms

**Solidity** [8] is the primary programming language for Ethereum smart contracts. **Call.value()** is a low-level function for sending Ether that may introduce reentrancy vulnerabilities [19]. **Delegatecall** executes target contract in the caller's context, useful for upgradeable contracts but potentially dangerous [20]. **Block.timestamp** is the block's timestamp that may be manipulated by miners [18]. **SmartBugs dataset** [22] is a curated dataset of vulnerable Ethereum smart contracts used for security research. **Qwen2.5-72B-Instruct** [50] developed by Alibaba and **Mistral-Large-Instruct-2407-123B** [39] developed by Mistral AI are two powerful instruction-tuned LLMs.

### 2.2 Problem Statement

We propose an automated approach to detect vulnerabilities in smart contracts and provide explanations. Our method assigns a label  $\hat{y}$  to each independent smart contract, where  $\hat{y} = 1$  indicates the presence of a vulnerability and  $\hat{y} = 0$  denotes security. We adopt the smart contract vulnerability taxonomy widely used in several recent studies [49, 73, 77], focusing on four key vulnerability types and seven machine-unauditable vulnerabilities.

**Reentrancy vulnerability** (RE) occurs when a contract calls an external contract or transfers assets (Ether or tokens) before completing internal state changes, allowing attackers to repeatedly call the vulnerable function and potentially withdraw funds multiple times.

**Timestamp dependence vulnerability** (TD) occurs when smart contracts rely on block timestamps for critical operations. Miners can manipulate these timestamps, potentially compromising contract integrity and leading to financial losses. This vulnerability often affects contracts using timestamps for random number generation or key decision-making processes.

**Integer Overflow/Underflow** (IO) occurs when the result of an arithmetic operation exceeds the storage range of the variable. In an overflow, the value "wraps around" to the minimum value for that type, while in an underflow, it "wraps around" to the maximum value. This can lead to unexpected contract behavior such as incorrect balances or out-of-control loops.

**Delegatecall** (DE) is a low-level function call that allows a contract to dynamically load code from another contract. While this provides powerful upgradeability, it can lead to severe security vulnerabilities if used improperly. The main risk is that the called contract executes in the context of the calling contract and can thus modify the calling contract's storage.

**Machine-unauditable Vulnerabilities** (MU) represent vulnerabilities that are difficult to detect through automated tools and require domain expertise to identify. These include: **Price Oracle Manipulation** (PO) from improper use of price oracle APIs, **Erroneous Accounting** (EA) from incorrect business model calculations, **ID Uniqueness Violations** (IU) from failures in ensuring unique identifiers, **Inconsistent State Updates** (IS) from incorrect correlated state variable updates, **Privilege Escalation** (PE) from insufficient access control, **Atomicity Violations** (AV) from interfering concurrent flows, and **Contract Implementation Specific** (CI) vulnerabilities requiring implementation context understanding.

We focus on these four vulnerability types and machine-unauditable vulnerabilities for the following reasons: (i) These four vulnerabilities account for approximately 70% of financial losses and occur with higher frequency in Ethereum smart contracts [12, 23, 46]. (ii) According to OWASP 2023 Smart Contract Top 10 [45], three of them are ranked as the top-3 vulnerabilities, with delegatecall also included as unchecked external calls. (iii) Recent research [77] shows machine-unauditable vulnerabilities represent a significant security challenge, with price oracle manipulation causing at least \$44.8M in losses (34% of real-world exploits).

### 2.3 Motivations

In this section, we analyze the motivations for improving smart contract vulnerability detection. Using real-world examples and datasets, we illustrate the limitations of current methods, emphasizing the need for high-quality datasets and DPO training.

Table 1. Comparison of Smart Contract Vulnerability Datasets.

Dataset	Label	Explanation	Location	DPO Format	Types
Dataset A [71]	✓	✗	✗	✗	1
Dataset B [79]	✓	✗	✗	✗	2
Dataset C [74]	✓	✗	✗	✗	3
Dataset D [49]	✓	✗	✗	✗	4
iAudit [37]	✓	✓	✓	✗	2*
Our Dataset	✓	✓	✓	✓	5+**

2\* : iAudit focuses on logic and traditional vulnerabilities

5+\*\* : includes 4 basic types and machine unauditble vulnerabilities (7 types) [77]

**Motivation 1: Insufficient Quality and Comprehensiveness of Datasets.** We conducted a systematic evaluation of existing smart contract vulnerability datasets. As shown in Table 1, while Datasets A [71], B [79], C [74], and D [49] provide vulnerability labels, they lack detailed vulnerability explanations and specific location information. Regarding vulnerability types, these datasets either have limited coverage, or like iAudit, focus mainly on logic vulnerabilities without detailed classification of traditional vulnerabilities. Notably, iAudit effectively leverages LLMs to provide vulnerability explanations and location information. While the positive samples are from verified audit reports, the negative samples and explanation enhancement rely on LLMs (including GPT-4 and GPT-3.5). Although constraints were added during explanation enhancement to ensure alignment with actual vulnerabilities, the process could benefit from more systematic verification

by human experts. In contrast, our dataset not only utilizes multiple LLMs (Qwen2.5 and Mistral) for initial explanation generation but also introduces a rigorous expert review process. More importantly, by constructing expert-verified pairs of high-quality and suboptimal explanations (for example, for a reentrancy vulnerability, high-quality explanations detail the trigger conditions, attack paths, and specific impacts, while suboptimal explanations merely mention the presence of reentrancy risk or misunderstand critical state update sequences), our dataset can support large language models in DPO training, which is crucial for generating explanations aligned with human expert preferences. Our dataset not only comprehensively covers four major vulnerability types (RE, TD, IO, and DE) but also includes 7 types of MU vulnerabilities identified in recent research [77].




Fig. 1. An motivation example to illustrate the limitations of LLM-based Explainable Smart Contract Vulnerability Detection, motivating the need for Direct Preference Optimization (DPO).

**Motivation 2: Limitations in Detection Performance and Explanation Quality of LLM-based Smart Contract Vulnerability Detection Methods.** As shown in Fig. 1, general LLMs (LLaMA3.1-8B-Instruct) fail in two aspects: they incorrectly identify a non-existent reentrancy vulnerability and provide inaccurate explanations. Although specialized LLMs like Smart-LLaMA-DPO (only trained through CPT and SFT) perform better in vulnerability detection, they still struggle to provide fully accurate explanations. The specialized LLM correctly identifies that the contract is safe against reentrancy attacks. However, its explanation contains a critical misunderstanding of the operation order. It erroneously states that the balance reduction occurs before the external call, whereas in the original code, the external call is executed first. This limitation in explanation quality persists despite the improvements from CPT and SFT. It underscores the need for further refinement in the LLM's understanding of smart contract vulnerability. Unlike traditional training methods that rely on absolute labels, DPO learns from relative preferences between paired explanations, which is crucial for smart contract security analysis. This approach is effective in two key aspects:

- (1) **Fine-grained Security Pattern Learning:** DPO's loss function explicitly models the relative preference between two explanations, enabling the capture of subtle security-critical details in smart contracts. For instance, in reentrancy vulnerability detection, it can learn the critical distinction between explanations that correctly identify the "checks-effects-interactions" pattern versus those that misunderstand execution order. This is crucial as minor execution order misunderstandings can cause catastrophic security breaches in smart contracts.
- (2) **Context-dependent Quality Assessment:** Smart contracts often contain complex interactions between multiple functions and state variables, making the quality of explanations

highly context-dependent. DPO’s preference learning mechanism is effective because it can capture how explanation quality varies with context via paired comparisons. For example, consider two explanations for a function containing both external calls and state updates: Explanation A: “This function updates the balance before making external calls.” Explanation B: “This function makes external calls after completing all internal state changes, following the checks-effects-interactions pattern.” While both explanations describe the same code behavior, Explanation B would be preferred in a reentrancy vulnerability analysis context as it explicitly links the ordering to a security pattern. However, for analyzing integer overflow vulnerabilities in the same function, Explanation A’s focus on balance updates might be more relevant.

Through this preference learning mechanism, DPO effectively addresses the limitations observed in models trained only with CPT and SFT. For instance, it helps prevent misunderstandings about operation ordering in reentrancy detection which is shown in Fig. 1.

### 3 Approach

Our Smart-LLaMA-DPO approach consists of four key stages illustrated in Fig. 2: SFT and DPO Data Construct, Continual Pre-Training, Supervised Fine-Tuning, and Direct Preference Optimization. The process is supported by open-source smart contract vulnerability data collection and evaluation of explanations. We chose LLaMA-3.1-8B as the base model for its open-source nature, efficient parameter size and strong fine-tuning potential [6, 35]. We would like to point out that compared to iAudit [37], Smart-LLaMA [73], and FTSmartAudit [69] which focus primarily on optimizing detection performance while providing explanations, we additionally emphasize explanation quality through Direct Preference Optimization. Furthermore, compared to Smart-LLaMA [73], our approach evaluates a broader range of vulnerability types and vulnerability instances.

#### 3.1 Open-source Smart Contract Vulnerability Data Collection

*3.1.1 Continual Pre-training.* We based our Continual Pre-training dataset on research from [55], which underwent extensive filtering and quality checks. The process involved using Google Big-Query to identify all Ethereum smart contract addresses with at least one transaction. The researchers then accessed Etherscan for the source code. For uniqueness, we employed the Jaccard Index [5] for token-based similarity detection. Smart contracts were decomposed into core business logic, library code, and imported files. This approach removed commonly repeated code while preserving unique implementation logic. Following [55, 65], we grouped contracts by filename and filtered them using a 0.9 similarity threshold, eliminating contracts with over 90% token similarity.

*3.1.2 Supervised Fine-Tuning and Direct Preference Optimization.* For Supervised Fine-Tuning and Direct Preference Optimization, we utilized labeled datasets from [33], [74] and [77], covering various smart contract vulnerability types. The smart contract in [33] were manually verified for accuracy. [74] is based on the SmartBugs dataset [22], with reentrancy vulnerabilities annotated by [71]. Zhang et al. [77] collects machine unauditble vulnerabilities from the highly reputable Code4rena contests. We selected 1,634 smart contracts containing `call.value` from [74] and identified 379 contracts with `delegatecall`, which we manually labeled. To expand our dataset, we collected verified contracts from Etherscan, GitHub repositories, and blog posts, all dated 2020-2024.

#### 3.2 SFT and DPO Data Construct

*3.2.1 Initial Data Generation.* We designed a multi-stage data generation process for our study, built upon recent work [66, 73]. We utilized Qwen2.5-72B-Instruct and Mistral-Large-Instruct-2407-123B as our initial models to generate detailed explanations of smart contract vulnerabilities.

These open-source LLMs were chosen for their powerful natural language processing and code comprehension capabilities, comparable to GPT-4 Turbo but at a lower cost [39, 50, 56, 72].

We designed specialized prompts for each vulnerability type (RE, TD, DE, IO, and MU), implementing label-guided analysis to help the LLM explain vulnerabilities and pinpoint their exact locations in the code.

For each vulnerability type, the prompts were tailored to focus on specific aspects:

- **RE:** Use of `call.value()`, operation order, external calls, access control, and internal function implementation.
- **TD:** Use of `block.timestamp` or `now`, time constraints in critical operations, potential miner manipulation, and precision of time measurements impacting contract logic.
- **DE:** Use of `delegatecall()`, context preservation, state variable manipulation, access control, and internal function implementation.
- **IO:** Arithmetic operations (especially on uint variables), use of SafeMath library or Solidity 0.8.x built-in overflow/underflow checks, use of the 'unchecked' keyword (Solidity 0.8.x or higher), arithmetic operations in critical operations, and type conversion.
- **MU:** Based on audit report analysis, prompts guide the LLM to identify vulnerabilities identified in [77], explaining their root causes and exploit mechanisms in detail.

**3.2.2 LLM Scoring.** We employed Llama-3.1-70B-Instruct (validated in Section 3.6.2) as an evaluation model to assess explanations from Qwen2.5 and Mistral based on three criteria: correctness (0.6 weight), thoroughness (0.3 weight), and clarity (0.1 weight), each on a 1-10 scale. Correctness evaluates vulnerability identification accuracy and reasoning logic. Thoroughness assesses coverage of vulnerability issues. Clarity measures explanation structure and applicability. Explanations with the highest weighted composite scores ( $\text{WCS} = 0.6 \times \text{correctness} + 0.3 \times \text{thoroughness} + 0.1 \times \text{clarity}$ ) were selected for human review.

**3.2.3 SFT Data Construction.** To minimize potential bias, we selected 8 senior PhD students specializing in blockchain: 4 with extensive smart contract security auditing experience and 4 with academic publications in top conferences. They were divided into 4 balanced groups, each containing one industry expert and one academic expert to review one specific vulnerability type. To ensure consistent vulnerability labeling, we established specific annotation guidelines: For **RE**, our labeling criteria cover execution order analysis between external calls and state variable updates, reentrancy risk assessment standards in cross-contract invocation scenarios, identification of hidden reentrant call points in contract inheritance (both ETH and token transfers), and evaluation of reentrancy guard effectiveness. For **TD**, we examine `block.timestamp`'s indirect impacts on contract state transitions. For randomness-related scenarios, we evaluate specific risks of timestamp-based random number generation in applications like gaming and lottery systems. For **IO**, we consider analysis of multiple overflow possibilities in complex expressions and overflow risks from type conversions (e.g., `uint8` to `uint256`). The annotation covers implementation requirements for overflow checking mechanisms across different Solidity versions and potential issues from improper 'SafeMath' usage. For **DE**, we refine storage layout analysis standards in proxy patterns. For contract upgrade mechanisms, we include access control defect identification criteria, verification methods for callee contract code integrity, and security risk assessment standards across different upgrade scenarios. For **MU**, we verify whether the LLM-generated explanations align with the corresponding audit reports. Any discrepancies are corrected to strictly match the reports. Experts reviewed high-scoring LLM explanations and made necessary corrections. To ensure review consistency, when significant disagreements arise between the two reviewers within a group, a third expert from another group is selected to arbitrate. The final modifications are

determined through a three-way discussion. To address potential bias, we introduced an external review stage after the initial annotation. Two senior blockchain and smart contract developers with extensive experience reviewed the annotated explanations which ensured broader perspectives.

**3.2.4 DPO Data Construction.** The DPO dataset consists of pairs of preferred and rejected outputs. Preferred outputs are taken from the high-quality outputs in the SFT dataset, following the annotation guidelines detailed in the SFT phase. For rejected outputs, experts rewrite a "suboptimal" version based on the lower-scoring outputs from LLaMA3.1. These suboptimal versions maintain basic correctness while intentionally reducing analysis depth: for **RE**, they only identify obvious external calls without analyzing execution ordering, inheritance-based reentrant risks, or token transfer scenarios; for **TD**, they merely mark direct block.timestamp usage without examining state transition impacts or analyzing timestamp-based randomness in gaming/lottery applications; for **IO**, they only flag simple overflow points without considering complex expressions, type conversions, or version-specific checking requirements; for **DE**, they simply identify basic DELEGATECALL usage without analyzing storage layout in proxy patterns or upgrade mechanism security. For **MU**, rejected outputs simplify or omit key details, such as audit findings or critical reasons. Experts ensure a noticeable but reasonable quality gap between preferred and rejected outputs.




Fig. 2. The Overview of our Smart-LLAMA-DPO.

### 3.3 Continual Pre-Training

In the Continual Pre-Training phase, we focus on enhancing the LLM's comprehension of smart contract security. This process is guided by a domain-specific language modeling objective:

$$L_{CPT} = -\mathbb{E}_{x \sim D} [\sum i=1^n \log P(x_i | x_{<i}, c_i)] \quad (1)$$

Here,  $D$  represents our curated dataset of smart contracts,  $x$  is a sequence of tokens from a contract,  $c_i$  denotes the contextual information surrounding  $x_i$ , and  $P(x_i | x_{<i}, c_i)$  is the LLM's predicted probability of token  $x_i$  given its preceding tokens and context.

This formulation encourages the LLM to learn key aspects: (1) Solidity syntax and semantics (keywords like 'function', 'uint256', 'require') for contract comprehension. (2) Design patterns

like 'Checks-Effects-Interactions' to prevent reentrancy attacks, along with other security best practices, helping the LLM identify vulnerabilities. (3) Security-critical functions ('transfer', 'send', 'call.value()'), crucial for fund transfers and inter-contract interactions, allowing the LLM to recognize their correct usage and risks. (4) Contextual analysis skills to detect vulnerabilities by understanding contract structures, function interactions, and state variables. To maintain general capabilities and avoid catastrophic forgetting, diverse data from mathematics, coding, and linguistics is incorporated, enhancing its ability to generalize to novel contract patterns.

### 3.4 Supervised Fine-Tuning

The Supervised Fine-Tuning phase focuses on optimizing the LLM for vulnerability detection and explanation generation. We employ a balanced objective function:

$$L_{SFT} = \frac{1}{2}(L_{detect} + L_{explain}) \quad (2)$$

where:

$$L_{detect} = - \sum_{(x,y) \in D_{vul}} \log P(y|x; \theta) \quad (3)$$

$$L_{explain} = - \sum_{(x,e) \in D_{exp}} \sum_{i=1}^{|e|} \log P(e_i|x, e_{<i}; \theta) \quad (4)$$

In this formulation,  $x$  denotes the input smart contract code, while  $y$  and  $e$  represent the target outputs for the detection task (vulnerability labels) and generation task (explanations), respectively. The parameter  $\theta$  encompasses all trainable components of the LLM, including attention mechanisms, feedforward networks, and embedding layers.

This balanced loss function ensures that the LLM is effectively trained on both vulnerability detection and explanation generation tasks. The domain-specific knowledge acquired during the Continual Pre-Training stage serves as a crucial foundation for this fine-tuning phase. It enables the LLM to comprehend the intricate context and subtle nuances of smart contracts while simultaneously honing its ability to detect vulnerabilities and generate informative explanations.

### 3.5 Direct Preference Optimization

In the final stage, we employ Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) [51] to align the LLM's outputs with the preferences of human experts in smart contract vulnerability analysis. DPO offers a simplified approach to preference learning without explicit reward modeling or reinforcement learning.

The core of DPO is based on the insight that the optimal policy  $\pi^*$  for a reward function  $r^*$  under a KL-constrained optimization objective can be expressed as:

$$\pi^*(y|x) = \frac{1}{Z(x)} \pi_{ref}(y|x) \exp\left(\frac{1}{\beta} r^*(x, y)\right) \quad (5)$$

where  $Z(x)$  is a normalization factor (also known as the partition function),  $\pi_{ref}$  is a reference policy, and  $\beta$  is a temperature parameter. In our smart contract vulnerability detection scenario:

- $x$ : represents the input smart contract code snippet
- $y$ : represents the LLM-generated vulnerability analysis and explanation
- $\pi_{ref}$ : is our reference policy, typically the initially fine-tuned model such as the Smart-LLaMA-DPO model trained in the SFT stage
- $\pi^*$ : is the final optimized model we aim to obtain, capable of generating vulnerability analyses that align with expert preferences

By rearranging this equation, we can express the reward function in terms of the optimal policy:

$$r^*(x, y) = \beta \log \frac{\pi^*(y|x)}{\pi_{\text{ref}}(y|x)} + \beta \log Z(x) \quad (6)$$

This allows us to reformulate the Bradley-Terry preference model in terms of policies rather than rewards:

$$p^*(y_1 > y_2|x) = \sigma \left( \beta \log \frac{\pi^*(y_1|x)}{\pi_{\text{ref}}(y_1|x)} - \beta \log \frac{\pi^*(y_2|x)}{\pi_{\text{ref}}(y_2|x)} \right) \quad (7)$$

where  $\sigma$  is the logistic function, and  $y_1$  and  $y_2$  represent two different vulnerability analysis results.

Based on this, we can define the DPO loss function:

$$\mathcal{L}_{\text{DPO}}(\pi_\theta; \pi_{\text{ref}}) = -\mathbb{E}_{(x, y_w, y_l) \sim \mathcal{D}} \left[ \log \sigma \left( \beta \log \frac{\pi_\theta(y_w|x)}{\pi_{\text{ref}}(y_w|x)} - \beta \log \frac{\pi_\theta(y_l|x)}{\pi_{\text{ref}}(y_l|x)} \right) \right] \quad (8)$$

where:

- $(x, y_w, y_l)$  are triples from our curated dataset  $\mathcal{D}$ , representing input, preferred output, and non-preferred output respectively
- $x$ : smart contract code snippet that serves as the input for vulnerability analysis and forms the context for the LLM's assessment
- $y_w$ : expert-preferred vulnerability analysis result, which represents the high-quality output that aligns with expert judgment and security best practices
- $y_l$ : expert non-preferred vulnerability analysis result, typically containing errors, omissions, or less comprehensive explanations compared to  $y_w$
- $\pi_\theta$ : our policy model being optimized, initialized as  $\pi_{\text{ref}}$ , which learns to generate outputs that align with expert preferences through the training process

This loss function encourages the LLM to assign higher probability to preferred outputs ( $y_w$ ) compared to non-preferred outputs ( $y_l$ ), effectively learning from expert preferences. By minimizing this loss, we directly optimize our policy model  $\pi_\theta$  to align with the preferences of smart contract security experts, without the need for a separate reward model.

### 3.6 Evaluation of Explanations

To comprehensively evaluate the quality of vulnerability explanations, we developed an evaluation framework inspired by [64, 73], focusing on three aspects: correctness, thoroughness, and clarity. Each aspect is rated using a 4-point Likert scale [28]. It differs from the 10-point scoring system used in dataset annotation (Section 3.2.2). The 10-point system offers fine granularity for curating high-quality explanations, while the 4-point Likert scale emphasizes simplicity and practicality.

**3.6.1 Evaluation Criteria.** Our evaluation focuses on three core aspects using a 4-point scale (1-Strongly disagree to 4-Strongly agree):

**Correctness:** Measures logical reasoning and vulnerability identification accuracy. Scores range from 1 (significant errors in logic and identification) to 4 (correct logic with precise identification and localization).

**Thoroughness:** Assesses comprehensive coverage of all potential vulnerability points. Scores range from 1 (omits key vulnerabilities) to 4 (comprehensive coverage with detailed explanations).

**Clarity:** Evaluates whether explanations are clear, concise, and applicable. Scores range from 1 (verbose with unclear key points) to 4 (precise, lucid, directly applicable, no redundancy).

**3.6.2 LLM Evaluation.** We employed Llama-3.1-70B-Instruct for automated assessment, selected after comparing multiple LLMs on 40 explanation samples (8 per vulnerability type). Llama-3.1-70B-Instruct achieved 90% agreement with human expert judgments, matching GPT-4 Turbo and outperforming GPT-4o (87.5%), Qwen2.5-72B-Instruct (85%), and GPT-3.5-Turbo (82.5%), while being more cost-effective. Using carefully crafted prompts with scoring guidelines, the LLM evaluated explanations on correctness, thoroughness, and clarity using a 4-point Likert scale [28].

**3.6.3 Human Evaluation.** To further validate the evaluation results, we enlisted five experienced smart contract security experts for human evaluation. Each expert dedicated 8 hours to assessing explanations for one vulnerability category, totaling 40 hours. The experts utilized the same 4-point Likert scale [28] as the LLM, scoring each explanation on correctness, thoroughness, and clarity. They also provided detailed scoring rationales and overall quality assessments.

## 4 Experiments

### 4.1 Research Questions

To evaluate our Smart-LLaMA-DPO approach, we examine the following research questions:

- **RQ1:** How does Smart-LLaMA-DPO perform in detecting four key smart contract vulnerabilities compared to state-of-the-art methods?
- **RQ2:** Can Smart-LLaMA-DPO effectively detect machine-unauditable vulnerabilities that traditionally require manual analysis?
- **RQ3:** How do individual modules and Chain of Thought (COT) reasoning affect Smart-LLaMA-DPO’s effectiveness?
- **RQ4:** How effective are the explanations generated by Smart-LLaMA-DPO in terms of correctness, thoroughness, and clarity?
- **RQ5:** How does Smart-LLaMA-DPO compare to existing methods in terms of practical applicability in real-world scenarios?

### 4.2 Dataset

**Continual Pre-training:** We employ a dataset derived from the work of Storhaug et al. [55]. This dataset comprises 186,397 unique smart contract instances from the Ethereum blockchain, totalling 501.62M tokens. We also augment this dataset with an additional 100,000 instances from various domains, including general code, mathematics, English, and Chinese text, totalling 118.94M tokens. This results in a comprehensive dataset of 286,397 instances, totaling 620.56M tokens.

**Supervised Fine-Tuning:** Our Supervised Fine-Tuning dataset is curated from multiple sources, primarily drawing from Liu et al. [33] and Yu et al. [74]. We incorporate manually verified vulnerabilities from [33] and the SmartBugs dataset [22], with RE vulnerabilities annotated by Wu et al. [71]. Additionally, the dataset includes MU vulnerabilities extracted from Zhang et al. [77]. To enrich the dataset, we manually annotated contracts from [74], Etherscan, GitHub repositories, and blog posts, all dated 2020-2024. For Etherscan-sourced contracts specifically, we focused on token-level RE vulnerabilities. All datasets for SFT and DPO adhere to strict selection criteria: they are peer-reviewed and verified real-world contracts. The final dataset comprises 3,390 RE, 1,167 TD, 1,013 IO, 698 delegatecall, and 1281 MU instances, totalling 8.90M tokens.

**Direct Preference Optimization:** Our DPO dataset draws from the same sources as our SFT dataset, with no overlap between the two. The dataset contains 270 RE, 227 TD, 260 IO, 265 DE, and 420 MU instances, totaling 1.98M tokens.

**Evaluation:** Our evaluation dataset combines four vulnerability types from [49] (RE, TD, IO, DE) and machine-unauditable (MU) vulnerabilities from [77]. Following [49]’s methodology, we sampled 20% for RE, TD, and IO, while including all DE samples due to their limited number. We enhanced

the dataset with ERC20 token RE cases and collected additional samples for all vulnerability types from EtherScan, GitHub repositories, and blog posts, all dated 2020-2024. We performed systematic cleaning to remove incorrect labels (e.g., cases mistakenly labeled as vulnerable where there were no state changes after `call.value`). The refined dataset contains 3,542 samples: RE (116/470, 13.27%), TD (568/896, 25.30%), IO (354/1,458, 41.16%), DE (76/340, 9.60%), and MU (116/378, 10.67%). MU vulnerabilities include seven categories: PO (25/57), PE (15/46), IU (13/53), IS (23/59), EA (20/55), CI (10/55), and AV (10/53). Numbers in parentheses represent (vulnerable/total samples, percentage in evaluation dataset). The MU vulnerabilities are sourced from Zhang et al. [77], EtherScan, GitHub repositories, and blog posts, with no overlap between evaluation data and training data. For explanation quality evaluation, considering manual review costs, we maintained the same vulnerable/total samples ratios as in the refined dataset and randomly sampled approximately 200 samples per vulnerability type, resulting in 1,061 samples: RE (58/235), TD (142/224), IO (59/243), DE (38/170), and MU (58/189).

### 4.3 Baselines

Our evaluation includes a range of baselines for Smart Contract Vulnerability Detection, representing state-of-the-art approaches in four categories: rule-based, neural network-based, pre-trained model-based, and LLM-based techniques. **Rule-based techniques** include tools such as Mythril [40], Osiris [61], Oyente [36], Slither [21], Conkas[63], Smartian [13], Confuzzius [60], sFuzz [42], Solhint [47], Sailfish [9], Securify [62], and Smartcheck [59]. **Neural network-based techniques** include GCN [30], TMP [79], AME [32], SMS [49] and DMT [49]. We faced challenges reproducing some neural network-based baselines, and in cases of significant discrepancies, we used the higher of the reproduced or reported results for fairness in comparisons. **Pre-trained models-based techniques**, rely on pre-trained models like CodeT5 [67] and fine-tuning techniques to identify smart contract vulnerabilities, including Peculiar [71] and PSCVFinder [74]. **LLM-based techniques**, rely on LLMs to identify smart contract vulnerabilities, including Llama3.1-8B-Instruct [17], Llama3.1-70B-Instruct [17], Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct [72], Qwen2.5-72B-Instruct [72], GPT-4o (gpt-4o-2024-08-06) [44], Claude-3.5-Sonnet (claude-3-5-sonnet-20241022) [7], GPTScan [57], GPTLens [27], and fine-tuning approaches such as FTSmartAudit [69] and iAudit [37]. All baselines were evaluated under consistent conditions using the same evaluation dataset. To ensure fairness, we fine-tuned FTSmartAudit [69] and iAudit [37] on their original datasets using their respective configurations but observed performance declines on our broader evaluation dataset. To address this, we fine-tuned on our training dataset to adapt them to the expanded evaluation scope.

### 4.4 Metrics

We evaluated our model performance from two dimensions: vulnerability identification capability and explanation quality. For vulnerability identification, we adopted four standard metrics: Precision measures the ratio of actual vulnerabilities among predicted positives, Recall indicates the proportion of detected vulnerabilities among all actual vulnerabilities, F1-score provides a balanced measure through the harmonic mean of Precision and Recall, and Accuracy reflects the overall correctness of predictions. For vulnerability explanation quality, we employed three key metrics: Correctness, Thoroughness, and Clarity, with detailed evaluation criteria specified in Section 3.6.1.

### 4.5 Implementation Details

We perform Continual Pre-training, Supervised Fine-Tuning and Direct Preference Optimization using LlamaFactory [78] and DeepSpeed [52] with fp16 enabled. We calculate loss with cross-entropy and optimize parameters using AdamW [34] with  $\beta=(0.9, 0.99)$  and  $\epsilon=1e-8$ . For all our models, we employ full parameter tuning. During Continual Pre-training, we set the batch size to 64

Table 2. Performance comparison with baselines (Part 1). Note: LLM-based techniques use Instruct versions of Llama3.1 and Qwen2.5. GPTScan and iAudit were originally designed primarily for logic vulnerabilities. Minor discrepancies ( $\pm 0.01$ ) between F1 and its calculation from precision/recall are due to rounding.

Methods	Reentrancy				Timestamp Dependency			
	A(%)	P(%)	R(%)	F1(%)	A(%)	P(%)	R(%)	F1(%)
Mythril	57.66	33.73	74.14	46.36	43.30	56.79	44.19	49.70
Osiris	36.38	26.84	91.38	41.49	51.00	72.47	36.62	48.65
Oyente	70.85	42.22	49.14	45.42	42.52	66.67	18.66	29.16
Slither	42.13	16.09	31.90	21.39	46.88	56.50	70.42	62.70
Smartcheck	48.30	30.09	82.76	44.14	39.51	57.30	17.96	27.35
Conkas	68.09	38.36	48.28	42.75	17.86	32.79	28.17	30.30
Smartian	53.62	27.03	51.72	35.50	23.66	39.26	37.32	38.27
Confuzzius	74.04	48.05	63.79	54.81	—	—	—	—
sFuzz	48.09	10.98	15.52	12.86	16.96	31.67	26.76	29.01
Solhint	65.53	36.78	55.17	44.14	35.27	48.60	36.62	41.77
Sailfish	76.17	51.16	75.86	61.11	—	—	—	—
Securify	55.32	28.04	51.72	36.36	—	—	—	—
GCN	73.21	74.47	73.18	73.82	75.91	74.93	77.55	76.22
TMP	76.45	76.04	75.30	75.67	78.84	78.68	76.09	77.36
AME	81.06	79.62	78.45	79.03	82.25	81.42	80.26	80.84
SMS	83.85	79.46	77.48	78.46	89.77	89.15	91.09	90.11
DMT	89.42	83.62	81.06	82.32	94.58	93.60	96.39	94.97
Peculiar	65.11	35.00	48.28	40.58	68.30	77.10	71.13	73.99
PSCVFinder	64.68	34.94	50.00	41.13	39.29	52.17	50.70	51.43
LLaMA3.1-8B	33.19	25.13	86.21	38.91	56.25	68.64	57.04	62.31
Qwen2.5-7B	25.53	24.89	100.00	39.86	69.20	68.34	95.77	79.77
LLaMA3.1-70B	24.68	24.68	100.00	39.59	63.39	63.39	100.00	77.60
Qwen2.5-72B	25.96	25.00	100.00	40.00	63.39	63.39	100.00	77.60
GPT-4o	57.45	34.78	82.76	48.98	49.55	80.85	26.76	40.21
Claude-3.5-Sonnet	26.38	25.11	100.00	40.14	70.09	85.05	64.08	73.09
GPTScan	32.77	25.96	93.10	40.60	60.27	62.56	92.96	74.79
GPTLens	27.23	25.33	100.00	40.42	62.50	63.06	98.59	76.92
FTSmartAudit	32.34	26.07	94.83	40.89	71.88	83.19	69.72	75.86
iAudit	72.77	46.88	77.59	58.44	62.50	63.81	94.37	76.14
<b>Smart-LLaMA-DPO</b>	<b>94.47</b>	<b>90.91</b>	<b>86.21</b>	<b>88.50</b>	<b>95.54</b>	<b>97.83</b>	<b>95.07</b>	<b>96.43</b>

per device, gradient accumulation steps to 16, epochs to 2, learning rate to 1e-5 with cosine decay, warmup steps to 0, cutoff length to 2048, and save steps to 500. During Supervised Fine-Tuning, we set the batch size to 8 per device, gradient accumulation steps to 8, epochs to 3, learning rate to 1e-5 with cosine decay, warmup steps to 0, cutoff length to 2048, and save steps to 50. For DPO training, we set the cutoff length to 1024, batch size to 8 per device, gradient accumulation steps to 1, learning rate to 1e-5 with cosine decay, epochs to 10, and warmup steps to 0. All models were trained on a server equipped with 8 NVIDIA H800 GPUs, each with 80GB memory. For evaluating our Smart-LLaMA-DPO, we use greedy decoding with do\_sample set to false.

Table 3. Performance comparison with baselines (Part 2). Note: LLM-based techniques use Instruct versions of Llama3.1 and Qwen2.5 models. GPTScan and iAudit were originally designed primarily for logic vulnerabilities. Minor discrepancies ( $\pm 0.01$ ) between F1 and its calculation from precision/recall are due to rounding.

Methods	Overflow/Underflow				Delegatecall			
	A(%)	P(%)	R(%)	F1(%)	A(%)	P(%)	R(%)	F1(%)
Mythril	42.46	20.25	46.61	28.23	61.76	33.73	73.68	46.28
Osiris	67.97	41.27	75.42	53.35	—	—	—	—
Oyente	77.78	55.00	46.61	50.46	67.65	30.23	34.21	32.10
Slither	56.93	27.01	45.48	33.89	52.65	31.11	92.11	46.51
Smartcheck	56.04	24.51	38.98	30.10	55.29	25.32	51.32	33.91
Conkas	51.85	22.12	38.98	28.22	75.29	47.22	89.47	61.82
Smartian	76.95	51.90	69.49	59.42	79.41	52.83	73.68	61.54
Confuzzius	79.84	58.33	59.32	58.82	72.35	41.82	60.53	49.46
sFuzz	79.01	58.33	47.46	52.34	67.06	36.76	65.79	47.17
Solhint	—	—	—	—	69.41	40.54	78.95	53.57
GCN	67.53	69.52	70.93	70.22	65.76	69.01	69.74	69.37
TMP	70.85	70.26	69.47	69.86	69.11	68.18	70.37	69.26
AME	73.24	71.36	71.59	71.47	72.85	70.25	69.40	69.82
SMS	79.36	78.14	72.98	75.47	78.82	76.97	73.69	75.29
DMT	85.64	85.44	74.32	79.49	82.76	84.61	77.93	81.13
Peculiar	82.72	61.64	76.27	68.18	84.12	65.71	60.53	63.01
PSCVFinder	64.20	33.72	49.15	40.00	90.59	76.19	84.21	80.00
LLaMA3.1-8B	54.32	30.00	66.10	41.27	65.29	34.33	60.53	43.81
Qwen2.5-7B	74.90	47.50	32.20	38.38	67.06	40.22	97.37	56.92
LLaMA3.1-70B	79.42	55.42	77.97	64.79	64.12	38.38	100.00	55.47
Qwen2.5-72B	81.96	65.02	55.65	59.97	68.24	41.30	100.00	58.46
GPT-4o	72.02	44.44	61.02	51.43	57.65	34.55	100.00	51.35
Claude-3.5-Sonnet	77.37	51.75	100.00	68.21	54.71	33.04	100.00	49.67
GPTScan	45.68	27.33	74.58	40.00	47.06	29.37	97.37	45.12
GPTLens	57.61	31.67	64.41	42.46	70.59	43.18	100.00	60.32
FTSmartAudit	79.42	59.18	49.15	53.70	56.47	32.69	89.47	47.89
iAudit	69.55	40.96	57.63	47.89	40.59	27.34	100.00	42.94
<b>Smart-LLaMA-DPO</b>	<b>94.65</b>	<b>94.23</b>	<b>83.05</b>	<b>88.29</b>	<b>94.12</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>73.68</b>	<b>84.85</b>

#### 4.6 Experimental Results

1) RQ1: To answer this question, we compared Smart-LLaMA-DPO’s performance against baseline methods across four different vulnerability types. The results are presented in Table 2 and Table 3.

Smart-LLaMA-DPO excelled across all vulnerability types, consistently outperforming state-of-the-art (SOTA) methods. For Reentrancy vulnerabilities, it achieved an F1-score of 88.50% and accuracy of 94.47%, surpassing DMT by 7.51% in F1-score and 5.65% in accuracy. In Timestamp Dependency detection, it led with an F1-score of 96.43% and accuracy of 95.54%, outperforming DMT by 1.54% and 1.02%, respectively. For Overflow/Underflow vulnerabilities, it maintained the top position with an F1-score of 88.29% and accuracy of 94.65%, exceeding DMT by 11.07% and 10.52%. Finally, for Delegatecall vulnerabilities, it achieved an F1-score of 84.85% and accuracy of

94.12%, surpassing PSCVFinder by 6.06% in F1-score and 3.90% in accuracy. Compared to iAudit and FTSmartAudit, Smart-LLaMA-DPO benefits from the integration of DPO and CPT. iAudit's two-stage architecture separates detection and explanation tasks, which may affect its ability to leverage contextual information effectively. Meanwhile, FTSmartAudit, which lacks DPO, cannot achieve fine-grained preference learning. Notably, Smart-LLaMA-DPO consistently outperformed static analysis tools such as Mythril, Slither, Smartian, Solhint and Conkas, as well as LLM-based approaches including GPT-4o, Claude-3.5-Sonnet, GPTScan, and GPTLens across all metrics.

**Answer to RQ1:** Smart-LLaMA-DPO consistently outperformed state-of-the-art baseline methods across all four types of vulnerabilities (reentrancy, timestamp dependency, integer overflow/underflow, and delegatecall).

2) RQ2: We evaluate Smart-LLaMA-DPO's capability in detecting 7 types of machine-unauditable vulnerabilities identified in [77]. Table 4 presents the comparative results with baseline methods. Smart-LLaMA-DPO demonstrates superior performance across all seven vulnerability types. For Price Oracle Manipulation, it achieves 87.7% accuracy and 86.3% F1-score, significantly surpassing iAudit. Notably, for Privilege Escalation, it achieves 91.3% accuracy and 84.6% F1-score, with improvements of 2.47% and 3.80% compared to iAudit. Even for complex vulnerabilities like Inconsistent State Updates, it maintains robust performance with 89.8% accuracy and 85.0% F1-score.

Table 4. Performance Comparison on Machine-unauditable Vulnerabilities. LLaMA3.1-8B denotes LLaMA3.1-8B-Instruct. Total represents the overall performance across all MU vulnerabilities.

Method	PO Acc/F1	EA Acc/F1	IU Acc/F1	IS Acc/F1	PE Acc/F1	AV Acc/F1	CI Acc/F1	Total Acc/F1
LLaMA3.1-8B	47.4/60.5	43.6/39.2	58.5/52.2	45.8/57.9	34.8/42.3	20.8/30.0	21.8/31.8	39.2/45.8
GPT-4o	49.1/62.3	54.6/59.0	58.5/50.0	69.5/71.0	67.4/66.7	49.1/27.0	58.2/41.0	57.9/56.4
FTSmartAudit	57.9/25.0	69.1/32.0	86.8/63.2	72.9/50.0	84.8/69.6	84.9/33.3	87.3/46.2	77.3/44.9
iAudit	40.4/55.3	52.7/55.2	88.7/72.7	88.1/82.9	89.1/81.5	88.7/62.5	92.7/80.0	76.7/66.2
Ours	87.7/86.3	87.3/80.0	92.5/83.3	89.8/85.0	91.3/84.6	92.5/77.8	94.6/82.4	90.7/83.4

**Answer to RQ2:** Smart-LLaMA-DPO outperforms all baselines in detecting 7 types of machine-unauditable vulnerabilities, achieving the highest accuracy and F1-score across all vulnerability types.

3) RQ3: Our ablation study elucidates the crucial roles of DPO and CPT. To provide a feedback loop and enhance explanation transparency, we further incorporate Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning in our analysis. Following LLM4Vuln [56], we design our CoT prompt to first instruct LLMs to summarize the functionality of the smart contract, then analyze vulnerabilities by examining relevant security patterns based on the specific vulnerability type, and finally determine whether it is vulnerable with explanations. The base model represents the full performance, "Base+CoT" shows the base model with CoT, "w/o dpo" indicates the model without DPO, "w/o cpt" represents the LLM without CPT, and "w/o dpo & cpt" shows the performance without both components.

**For RE**, removing DPO training significantly reduces performance (accuracy drops from 94.47% to 83.40%, F1 from 88.50% to 73.47%), while removing CPT has a smaller impact (accuracy 86.38%, F1 77.78%). This shows that reentrancy detection relies more on DPO for fine-grained preference learning. This aligns with the need to distinguish subtle differences in the "Checks-Effects-Interactions"

Table 5. Ablation Study of Smart-LLaMA-DPO. MU represents machine-unauditable vulnerabilities.

Types	Metric	Base	Base+CoT	w/o dpo	w/o cpt	w/o dpo & cpt
RE	Acc(%)	94.47	94.47	83.40	86.38	90.21
	F1(%)	88.50	88.50	73.47	77.78	79.65
TD	Acc(%)	95.54	93.75	80.80	82.14	69.64
	F1(%)	96.43	95.30	85.32	86.39	69.64
IO	Acc(%)	94.65	93.42	89.71	83.95	85.19
	F1(%)	88.29	86.21	81.75	53.01	56.10
DE	Acc(%)	94.12	94.12	93.53	93.53	91.76
	F1(%)	84.85	84.85	83.08	83.08	78.12
MU	Acc(%)	90.74	91.53	78.84	86.24	72.22
	F1(%)	83.41	85.19	71.22	80.60	66.88

pattern, primarily learned through paired examples in DPO training. **For IO**, removing CPT causes a significant drop in performance (F1 drops from 88.29% to 53.01%), while removing DPO has minimal impact. Detection relies on understanding Solidity’s type system and arithmetic rules, which is mainly acquired through CPT. While DPO improves explanation, core detection relies on CPT’s domain knowledge. **For TD**, both CPT and DPO have significant impacts. The full model achieves an F1 score of 96.43%, but removing either component significantly degrades performance, and removing both drops accuracy to 69.64%. This reflects the dual complexity of timestamp dependency vulnerabilities, which require CPT to capture block.timestamp semantics and DPO to optimize risk differentiation in time-dependent scenarios. **For DE**, CPT and DPO have relatively balanced roles. Detection requires CPT to understand EVM storage mechanics and DPO to identify storage layout mismatch risks, with either component’s removal leading to moderate performance degradation. **For MU**, results reveal significant reliance on DPO training (removing DPO: accuracy drops from 90.74% to 78.84%, F1 from 83.41% to 71.22%), highlighting the importance of fine-grained preference learning. Removing CPT has a smaller impact (accuracy 86.24%, F1 80.60%), but still shows that domain-specific knowledge from pre-training enhances detection. The integration of CoT reasoning shows mixed effectiveness. For simpler vulnerabilities like TD and IO, performance drops (TD: -1.87% accuracy, -1.17% F1; IO: -1.30% accuracy, -2.36% F1), likely due to CoT overcomplicating these straightforward pattern recognition tasks. For DE and RE vulnerabilities, performance remains stable. However, for complex vulnerabilities like MU, CoT improves performance (+0.87% accuracy, +2.13% F1), highlighting its strength in analyzing complex logic and dependencies.

**Answer to RQ3:** Our findings confirm that the combination of continual pre-training and DPO training creates strong complementary effects, effectively addressing the diverse requirements of different vulnerability types and achieving SOTA detection performance across all vulnerability types.

4) RQ4: Table 6 presents the quality assessment results of explanations generated by the Smart-LLaMA-DPO and other baselines. The evaluation comprises two parts: LLM Evaluation and Human Evaluation, each assessing three dimensions: Correctness, Thoroughness, and Clarity. Our model significantly outperformed the best baseline (iAudit) in both LLM evaluation and human evaluation. In the LLM evaluation, when combining scores 4 (agree) and 3 (somewhat agree), our model achieved higher total positive ratings across all metrics: 86.62% compared to the baseline’s 75.12%

for correctness (834+85 and 713+84 respectively), 90.10% compared to 75.12% for thoroughness (731+225 and 586+211 respectively), and 97.46% compared to 93.03% for clarity (565+469 and 747+240 respectively). Similarly in human evaluation, our model maintained consistently higher combined positive ratings (scores 4 and 3): 81.15% compared to the baseline’s 70.22% for correctness (646+215 and 388+357 respectively), 83.88% compared to 72.76% for thoroughness (544+346 and 188+584 respectively), and 94.63% compared to 83.98% for clarity (569+435 and 473+418 respectively).

**Answer to RQ4:** Smart-LLaMA-DPO has demonstrated its capability to generate explanations for smart contract vulnerability detection that are correct, thorough, and clear, as validated by both LLM Evaluation and Human Evaluation.

Table 6. Ratings of Correctness, Thoroughness, and Clarity (LLaMA3.1-8B refers to the Instruct version).

	Correctness				Thoroughness				Clarity			
	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
LLM Evaluation												
LLaMA3.1-8B	116	201	165	579	42	229	332	458	30	204	578	249
FTSmartAudit	101	234	161	565	53	167	351	490	41	165	454	401
iAudit	135	129	84	713	48	216	211	586	27	47	240	747
Ours	56	86	85	834	9	96	225	731	2	25	469	565
Human Evaluation												
LLaMA3.1-8B	76	303	326	356	70	266	457	268	29	212	623	197
FTSmartAudit	127	234	352	348	126	184	523	228	28	165	482	386
iAudit	61	255	357	388	48	241	584	188	27	143	418	473
Ours	19	181	215	646	18	153	346	544	9	48	435	569

5) RQ5: We demonstrate the effectiveness of Smart-LLaMA-DPO in smart contract vulnerability detection through a comparative case study as shown in Fig. 3.

**Why we choose GPT-4o in GPT family and iAudit for this RQ.** GPT-4o (gpt-4o-2024-08-06) was chosen for its superior detection performance, with the highest average accuracy (58.91%) and F1-score (49.67%) across five vulnerability types, outperforming GPT-4 (accuracy: 56.49%, F1-score: 48.50%) and GPT-4 Turbo (accuracy: 50.61%, F1-score: 49.54%). Among works focusing on generating smart contract vulnerability explanations iAudit was selected for its higher average performance (accuracy: 64.42%, F1-score: 58.32%) compared to FTSmartAudit (accuracy: 63.48%, F1-score: 52.65%).

In the FundManager contract, GPT-4o identifies a reentrancy vulnerability risk, noting that the refund function updates the balance after an external call. iAudit also identifies a reentrancy vulnerability but incorrectly assumes that the balance is updated before the external call. In contrast, Smart-LLaMA-DPO provides more nuanced analysis, acknowledging the non-standard pattern usage while explaining how the onlyOwner modifier enhances security. For the LockYourLove contract, while GPT-4o and iAudit warn about potential block.timestamp manipulation by miners, Smart-LLaMA-DPO explains that the timestamp is only used for logging purposes and doesn’t affect critical operations or contract logic, thus not constituting an actual vulnerability. For the LendingContract, GPT-4o and Smart-LLaMA-DPO correctly identify the root cause of the Price Oracle Manipulation vulnerability: reliance on the Uniswap pool’s instant price. iAudit, however, focuses on secondary issues like access control permissions, reflecting how its two-stage architecture can lead to inconsistencies between detection and explanation.

Reentrancy	Timestamp Dependency	Price Oracle Manipulation
<pre>contract FundManager{     mapping(address =&gt; uint) public balances;     address public immutable owner;     constructor() {         owner = msg.sender;     }     modifier onlyOwner() {         require(msg.sender == owner, "Only owner");     } } function refund(address investor) public onlyOwner {     uint amount = balances[investor];     (bool success,) = investor.call{value: amount}("");     balances[investor] = 0; }</pre>	<pre>contract LockYourLove {     struct Lovelitem {         address lover_s_address; uint block_number; uint block_timestamp;         string love_message; string love_url;     }     address public owner;     mapping(bytes32 =&gt; Lovelitem) private mapLovelitems;     uint public price;     function addLovers(bytes32 love_hash, string lovemsg, string loveurl)     payable {         require(msg.value &gt;= price);         mapLovelitems[love_hash] = Lovelitem(msg.sender, block.number,         block.timestamp, lovemsg, loveurl);         owner.transfer(price);     } }</pre>	<pre>contract LendingContract {     IERC20public WETH; IERC20public USDC; IUniswapV2Pair public pair;     mapping (address uint) public debt;     mapping (address uint) public collateral;      function liquidate (address user) external {         uint dAmount = debt[user]; uint cAmount=collateral[user];         require(getPrice() * cAmount &gt;= dAmount,"the given user's         fund cannot be liquidated");         address _this=address(this);         USDC.transferFrom(user,_this,dAmount);         WETH.transferFrom(_this,user,cAmount); }      function getPrice() view returns (uint) {         return (USDC.balanceOf(address(pair)) / WETH.balanceOf(address(pair)));     } }</pre>
<b>GPT-4o</b> ✗ The contract does have a potential <a href="#">reentrancy vulnerability</a> . The refund function updates the balance after making an external call to the investor, which could allow reentrancy if the investor is a contract. To prevent this, you should update the balance before the external call. This follows the checks-effects-interactions pattern, ensuring state changes before external interactions.	<b>GPT-4o</b> ✗ The contract might have a <a href="#">timestamp dependency issue</a> since block.timestamp in addLovers can be manipulated by miners. It's recommended to minimize reliance on it or ensure its manipulation doesn't affect the contract. Additional considerations include using call instead of transfer for payments and specifying visibility for the addLovers function.	<b>GPT-4o</b> ✓ The contract has a <a href="#">Price Oracle Manipulation vulnerability</a> . The getPrice function calculates the price based on the ratio of USDC and WETH balances in the Uniswap liquidity pool. This price is easily manipulatable by attackers making large trades in the pool. Once the price is manipulated, the attacker can forcefully meet the liquidation conditions to maliciously liquidate a user's assets and profit.
<b>iAudit</b> ✗ The contract is vulnerable to <a href="#">reentrancy attacks</a> . The refund function uses call.value() to transfer funds, which is a known reentrancy risk. It sets the investor's balance to 0 before the external call, allowing the recipient to reenter the contract before the state change is finalized. This could result in the recipient repeatedly withdrawing funds, potentially draining the contract.	<b>iAudit</b> ✗ The contract is vulnerable to <a href="#">timestamp manipulation</a> . The block.timestamp in addLovers can be manipulated by miners to create backdated timestamps, allowing users to reorder Lovelitems in mapLovelitems. Similarly, using block.timestamp in the constructor to set the price can let miners lower the price, enabling users to underpay for Lovelitems or gain an unfair advantage.	<b>iAudit</b> ! The contract is vulnerable to <a href="#">price oracle manipulation</a> . The primary issue lies in the oracle's price fetching mechanism, which lacks sufficient access control. The getPrice() function can be abused by malicious users, making it necessary to implement permission checks. Additionally, price updates should occur periodically via trusted administrators rather than allowing instant fetches during liquidation.
<b>Smart-LLaMA-DPO</b> ✓ The contract is secure against reentrancy attacks. The structure of the refund function shows a deviation from the standard "Checks-Effects-Interactions" pattern, as the state update occurs after the external call. This sequencing typically raises reentrancy concerns in smart contracts. However, the implementation of the onlyOwner modifier adds a significant security layer by restricting the function's execution to the contract owner, thus reducing the potential attack surface despite the non-standard pattern usage.	<b>Smart-LLaMA-DPO</b> ✓ The contract uses block.timestamp in the Lovelitem struct which can be manipulated by miners. However, there are no critical operations depending on precise time measurements or comparisons that could be exploited. The timestamp is used for logging purposes and does not influence contract logic or state transitions that could be manipulated by miners to their advantage. Therefore, while the use of block.timestamp is noted, it does not introduce a vulnerability that could be exploited to affect the contract's security.	<b>Smart-LLaMA-DPO</b> ✓ The contract contains a Price Oracle Manipulation vulnerability. The core issue lies in the getPrice() function directly using Uniswap V2 pool's instant balance for price calculation, making the price oracle susceptible to manipulation. Attackers can exploit this by borrowing large tokens via flash loans in the same block, manipulating Uniswap pool ratios, affecting the price returned by getPrice() and triggering improper liquidations. The recommended fix involves using TWAP or trusted oracles like Chainlink.

Fig. 3. Case Study of Smart Contract Vulnerability Detection Using Smart-LLaMA-DPO.

**Answer to RQ5:** Compared to GPT-4o and iAudit which produce false positives, Smart-LLaMA-DPO provides contextual security analysis by accurately assessing both potential risks and implemented security measures, enabling reliable distinction between theoretical vulnerabilities and actual security threats.

## 5 Related Work

### 5.1 Smart Contract Vulnerability Detection

Research in smart contract vulnerability detection has evolved significantly. Early approaches relied on program analysis techniques: some used symbolic execution to explore execution paths and identify vulnerabilities [36], while others employed pattern matching against known vulnerability signatures [40, 59] or applied formal verification with custom compliance patterns [62]. The field then progressed to machine learning, particularly deep learning models, offering improved accuracy and generalization. Notable examples include bidirectional LSTMs with attention mechanisms for specific vulnerability detection [48], and deep learning for measuring similarity to known vulnerable contracts [24]. Graph neural networks (GNNs) gained popularity due to their ability to capture contract structural information [32, 79]. Recent advancements include pre-trained models like Peculiar [71] for improved generalization, and innovative approaches such as prompt-tuning to bridge pre-training and downstream tasks [74]. Cross-modality learning approaches have also emerged, leveraging information from both bytecode and source code [49]. The latest frontier involves Large Language Models (LLMs). Studies by Chen et al. [11] and David et al. [15] evaluated LLMs on real-world datasets, revealing both potential and challenges. Hu et al. [27] explored LLMs' reasoning capabilities, while Sun et al. [57] introduced GPTScan for program analysis. FTSmartAudit

[69] fine-tunes smaller LLMs for smart contract auditing, achieving comparable performance to state-of-the-art models. Ma et al. [37] proposed iAudit, a two-stage LLM framework for vulnerability detection and explanation, though its separated design may lead to inconsistencies.

## 5.2 Reinforcement Learning in Software Engineering

Reinforcement learning (RL) has gained increasing attention in software engineering in recent years [3, 10, 43, 53, 54]. Several studies have explored RL applications in software tasks. Kim et al. [29] introduced ARAT-RL, an adaptive REST API testing technique using RL to prioritize operations. Corradini et al. [14] proposed DeepREST for automated REST API testing using deep RL. In repository-level code completion, Wang et al. [68] presented RLCoder for improving code generation. Li et al. [31] developed IRCoCo, applying deep RL to code completion. More recently, Nashaat et al. [41] proposed the CodeMentor framework, which utilizes reinforcement learning with human feedback (RLHF) to optimize the performance of LLMs in software review tasks. However, the application of these techniques to explainable smart contract vulnerability detection remains unexplored. Our work applies preference-based optimization to this critical task. While not strictly reinforcement learning, our approach shares the goal of improving performance based on feedback.

## 6 Threats to Validity

**Internal Validity:** Our Smart-LLaMA-DPO occasionally produces redundant information in its outputs. We currently address this by truncating the generated text to retain only the initial portion. This issue likely stems from the reinforcement of certain patterns during the fine-tuning or DPO training process. To improve output quality, we are exploring advanced post-processing methods and refined post-training techniques for future iterations.

**External Validity:** The development of Smart-LLaMA-DPO relied heavily on a large corpus of annotated training data. Our data preparation involved a multi-step process using multiple LLMs and human verification. Despite these efforts, we cannot guarantee the absolute accuracy of every reasoning step in our training datasets. Furthermore, our current Smart-LLaMA-DPO's scope is limited to specific vulnerability types due to resource limitations. Future research will focus on developing more efficient data annotation methods and expanding our Smart-LLaMA-DPO's capability to address a wider array of smart contract vulnerabilities.

## 7 Conclusion

In this paper, we propose Smart-LLaMA-DPO, an advanced smart contract vulnerability detection approach based on LLMs. Unlike prior work, Smart-LLaMA-DPO utilizes a three-stage post-training process: continual pre-training, supervised fine-tuning, and direct preference optimization. In addition, we construct a comprehensive dataset covering four major vulnerability types and machine-unauditable vulnerabilities for both SFT and DPO. Our approach significantly outperforms state-of-the-art methods and can provide reliable explanations. While our current implementation only focuses on Solidity, Smart-LLaMA-DPO can be easily extended to other Domain-Specific Languages like Bash, SQL, and SysML by adapting the training corpus and annotation guidelines.

## 8 Data Availability

All the source code and data are available at [2], and the trained model weights are available at [1].

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This work was supported by the National Key Research and Development Program of China (No.2023YFB3307203) and the Alliance of International Science Organizations Collaborative Research Program (No.ANSO-CR-KP-2022-03).

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Received 2024-10-31; accepted 2025-03-31