Looking for Lacunae in Bitcoin Core's Fuzzing Efforts

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ABSTRACT

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Bitcoin is one of the most prominent distributed software systems in the world, and a key part of a potentially revolutionary new form of financial tool, cryptocurrency. At heart, Bitcoin exists as a set of nodes running an implementation of the Bitcoin protocol. This paper describes an effort to investigate and enhance the effectiveness of the Bitcoin Core implementation fuzzing effort. The effort initially began as a query about how to escape saturation in the fuzzing effort, but developed into a more general exploration once it was determined that saturation was largely illusory, a byproduct of the (then) fuzzing configuration. This paper reports the process and outcomes of the two-week focused effort that emerged from that initial contact between Chaincode labs and academic researchers. That effort found no smoking guns indicating major test/fuzz weaknesses. However, it produced a large number of additional fuzz corpus entries to add to the Bitcoin QA assets, clarified some long-standing problems in OSSFuzz triage, increased the set of documented fuzzers used in Bitcoin Core testing, and ran the first mutation analysis of Bitcoin Core code, revealing opportunities for further improvement. We contrast the Bitcoin Core transaction verification testing with similar tests for the most popular Ethereum and dogecoin implementations. This paper provides an overview of the challenges involved in improving testing infrastructure, processess, and documentation for a highly visible open source target system, from both the state-of-the-art research perspective and the practical engineering perspective.

CCS CONCEPTS

• Software and its engineering → Dynamic analysis; Software testing and debugging.

KEYWORDS

fuzzing, saturation, test diversity, mutation analysis

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1 INTRODUCTION

Bitcoin is the most popular cryptocurrency, and one of the most visible "new" systems based on software to rise to prominence in the last decade. As we write, while volatile, Bitcoin consistently has a market cap of over half a trillion dollars since January of 2021. Due to its distributed, decentralized nature, Bitcoin in some sense is the sum of the operations of the code executed by many independent Bitcoin nodes, especially nodes that mine cryptocurrency. Bitcoin Core (https://github.com/Bitcoin/Bitcoin) is by far the most popular implementation, and serves as a reference for all other implementations. To a significant degreee, the code of Bitcoin Core is Bitcoin. The main Bitcoin Core repo on GitHub has over 57,000 stars, and has been forked more than 30,000 times.

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Because of its fame and the high monetary value of Bitcoins, the Bitcoin protocol and its implementations are a high-value target for hackers (or even nation states interested in controlling cryptocurrency developments).

2 INITIAL CONTACT AND THE PROBLEM OF **SATURATION**

Chaincode labs (https://chaincode.com/) is a private R&D center based in Manhattan that exists solely to support and develop Bitcoin. In March of 2021, Adam Jonas, the head of special projects at Chaincode, contacted the first author to discuss determining a strategy to improve the fuzzing of Bitcoin Core. In particular, at the time, it seemed that the fuzzing was "stuck": neither code coverage nor found bugs were increasing with additional fuzzing time. After some discussion, an 80 hour effort was determined as a reasonable scope for an external, research-oriented, look at the fuzzing effort. Before that effort, conducted over the summer of 2021, began, the problem of saturation resolved itself, but the issue that drove the initial desire for a researcher investigation is well worth examining. Moreover, understanding why Bitcoin Core fuzzing was, temporarily but not fundamentally, saturated, may be useful to help other fuzzing campaigns avoid the same false saturation problem.

We Hold the World Ransom For... ONE MILLION FUZZER ITERATIONS

3 ADDING FUZZER DIVERSITY: USING ECLIPSER AND TRYING ENSEMBLE **FUZZING**

Eclipser [1] is a fuzzer that combines afl-like¹ coverage-driven mutation-based fuzzing with a scalable form of grey-box concolic testing.

¹In fact, the latest version of Eclipser simply uses afl for non concolic fuzzing.

4 SIDE ISSUES: TRIAGE, SPACE USAGE, AND FRUSTRATING BUGS

5 TRYING SWARM FUZZING

DeepState [2] provides strong support for swarm fuzzing. However, while there are similarities to the bitcoin core developed infrastucture for fuzz targets and the DeepState API, re-writing the fuzz targets to use DeepState is too large an effort for the likely payoff at this time, even though DeepState would also provide additional fuzzer diversity.

6 MUTATION ANALYSIS

We used the universal mutator (https://github.com/agroce/universalmutator) [3] to mutate the code.

6.1 Comparison with Geth and Dogecoin

7 CONCLUSIONS

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


Figure 1: The Gaping Maw of Cthulhu