

Profit-Sharing, Wages, and Worker Compensation: Evidence from Mexico

Agustina Colonna
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Lorenzo Aldeco *

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Abstract

Policies that mandate or encourage firms to compensate their workers through profit-sharing arrangements are common worldwide. Yet firms' incentives to adopt profit-sharing and its effect on total worker compensation remain unclear when firms can offset profit-sharing benefits by adjusting wages. This paper studies these questions in the context of mandatory profit-sharing in Mexico. Drawing on longitudinal establishment data and employer-employee data, we show that many firms circumvented mandatory profit-sharing through outsourcing arrangements, despite having the option to reduce worker compensation by simply lowering wages. A stylized model shows that the incentives to circumvent profit-sharing arise when firms face a labor supply curve that is less elastic to profit-sharing than to wages. Exploiting a reform that enforced profit-sharing by restricting outsourcing, we show that establishments responded to an increase in profit-sharing obligations by reducing wages. However, this wage adjustment was incomplete and average total worker compensation (wages + profit-sharing) increased, with no effect on employment—again consistent with a low labor supply elasticity to profit-sharing. We further show that this reduced elasticity cannot be fully explained by risk aversion and is partly due to workers' limited awareness and understanding of this benefit. These information frictions allowed firms to circumvent profit-sharing without fully compensating workers through higher wages, implying that affected workers benefited from profit-sharing enforcement.

*Colonna (corresponding author): University of Zurich (agustina.colonna@econ.uzh.ch), Aldeco: Banco de México (lorenzo.aldeco@banxico.org.mx). Agustina Colonna is very grateful to her advisors David Dorn and Lorenzo Casaburi for their guidance and support. We also thank David Atkin, David Autor, Ana Costa-Ramón, Nathan Lazarus, Elio Nimier-David, Dina Pomeranz, Felix Samy Soliman, Johannes Schmieder, José Vásquez, Andrea Vetrugno and Roberto Weber for comments that have substantially improved this paper. We thank participants at Doctorissimes 2024, EAYE 2024, SOLE 2024, SITE 2024, SED 2024, PacDev 2025, AIEL 2025, two Banco de Mexico referees and an associate editor of the Banco de Mexico Working Paper series for valuable comments. We are extremely thankful to Natalia Volkow Fernández and her team at INEGI's Lab. de Microdatos, especially Lourdes Garrido for help with the remote data access. We also thank Claudia Velázquez Villegas and Osvaldo Veloz from Banco de México for their support with the data access. IMSS data was accessed through the Econlab at Banco de Mexico. The EconLab collected and processed the data as part of its effort to promote evidence-based research and to foster ties between Banco de Mexico's research staff and the academic community. Inquiries regarding the terms under which the data can be accessed should be directed to econlab@banxico.org.mx. The views expressed do not reflect the views of INEGI nor Banco de México.

1 Introduction

Policies that require or incentivize firms to share profits with their workers are widespread across the world. These range from tax exemptions for worker compensation directly tied to firms' profits, to profit-sharing mandates (OECD, 1995; PEPPER V, 2024). The motivation for such policies is often redistributive, with profit-sharing arrangements viewed as a way for workers to benefit from the wealth created by firms. However, when firms can adjust wages downwards in response to these additional benefits, the impact of profit-sharing policies on total worker compensation is unclear. Additionally, in both policy and academic literature, it has been argued that compensating workers through profit-sharing rather than fixed wages can benefit firms by facilitating risk-sharing and improving performance (Weitzman, 1986; Kruse et al., 2010). Yet in practice, adoption of profit-sharing remains limited in many countries despite policy support, and evidence from contexts with mandatory profit-sharing indicates that firms even attempt to avoid this benefit.¹

What are the effects of profit-sharing policies on worker compensation in settings where firms can adjust wages? And why do firms lack incentives to adopt profit-sharing in the absence of government intervention? In this paper, we address these questions by studying the circumvention and enforcement of mandatory profit-sharing in Mexico. Our analysis draws on panel data on manufacturing plants and employer-employee data covering the near universe of formal workers in Mexico. We document and characterize a phenomenon wherein establishments were avoiding profit-sharing obligations by outsourcing their entire workforce to entities with minimal profits. Notably, these establishments could have reduced worker compensation by simply lowering wages, making the incentives for profit-sharing avoidance non-trivial to understand. To rationalize this behavior, we develop a wage posting model showing that incentives to avoid profit-sharing can arise when firms face a labor supply curve that is less elastic to profit-sharing than to wages. We then leverage a reform that restricted outsourcing and thereby enforced profit-sharing to assess the model and explore the factors driving workers' low responsiveness to profit-sharing. Through a difference-in-differences design, we find that the reform caused treated plants to partially offset the profit-sharing increase through lower wages, yet average total worker compensation (wages + profit-sharing) increased, with no effects on total employment. We empirically show that workers' insensitivity to profit-sharing cannot be completely explained by workers' risk aversion and is partly driven by limited worker awareness or understanding of this benefit. These information frictions around profit-sharing enabled firms to circumvent this benefit without compensating workers through higher wages. Therefore, workers employed by these firms benefited from profit-sharing enforcement.

Our analysis proceeds in four steps. First, we show that many establishments in Mexico outsourced their entire workforce, and we link this practice to the circumvention of mandatory profit-sharing. In a large scale survey of over 8000 manufacturing establishments, we find that 20% of the sample, representing 66% of plants with positive outsourcing, outsourced practically *all* of their workers. These establishments, which we refer to as *full outsourcing establishments*, reported positive revenues

¹For anecdotal evidence of non compliance in Peru and Ecuador, see SUNAFIL (2025); FLACSO Ecuador (2008); Nimier-David et al. (2023) discuss avoidance in France.

and costs but no legally hired workers.² The remaining one-third of plants using outsourcing, referred to as *partial outsourcing* establishments, had a much lower share of outsourced workers (averaging around 20%). We present evidence supporting the notion that full outsourcing establishments were carrying out this practice to avoid mandatory profit-sharing.³ By law, Mexican firms with annual profits above USD 15,000 must share 10% of their profits with workers, excluding managers and directors. Establishments carrying out this extreme form of outsourcing effectively did not pay any profit-sharing. By declaring a workforce of zero employees and outsourcing their workers to firms with zero or lower profits, frequently completely controlled by the parent firm, they circumvented the obligation to provide this benefit.⁴

We show that alternative reasons for outsourcing such as within-firm wage compression (Goldschmidt and Schmieder, 2017) and volatility in labor demand (Macaluso et al., 2023) are inconsistent with full outsourcing or lack empirical support, suggesting that circumventing profit-sharing was the primary aim of this practice. Additionally, our evidence indicates that profit-sharing avoidance was not a motivation for outsourcing among partial outsourcing establishments. As this paper studies profit-sharing avoidance, our primary focus lies on *full outsourcing* establishments. *Partial outsourcing* establishments are studied in detail in companion paper Colonna (2025).

Second, we set up a stylized model to understand the incentives behind firms' decision to avoid profit-sharing. While it might seem evident at first that profit-sharing avoidance allows firms to reduce labor costs, firms could alternatively be substituting profit-sharing with higher wages, consistent with the presence of compensating differentials. Additionally, even if full outsourcing did enable firms to lower overall compensation, another key question is why firms would choose to avoid profit-sharing rather than simply offer lower wages.⁵ In our model, firms are subject to mandatory profit-sharing payments, which they can avoid by paying a cost and outsourcing all workers. Firms post a compensation bundle of wages and profit-sharing, and face a firm-specific labor supply curve which depends on both forms of compensation. The key insight is that for profit-sharing avoidance to enable a reduction in worker compensation, the elasticity of labor supply with respect to profit-sharing must be lower than that to wages. This elasticity difference allows firms that avoid profit-sharing to attract workers without fully offsetting the lost benefit through higher wages, thereby reducing total compensation. In this scenario, highly productive firms will choose to bypass profit-sharing, consistent with our empirical patterns. We derive three predictions on the effects of enforcing profit-sharing: (i) Total firm employment should not decrease. (ii) Total compensation will rise when labor supply is indeed less elastic with respect to profit-sharing than to wages, as firms do not fully compensate the increased profit-sharing with lower wages. (iii) The effect on the *value* of total compensation for workers will depend on the factors driving these elasticity differences.

²We show in Section 4.1 that the vast majority of outsourcing establishments were either single-establishment firms or belonged to firms where all establishments were fully outsourcing. Therefore, one should think of full outsourcing establishments as mostly belonging to full outsourcing firms.

³We use the term 'avoid' rather than 'evade' because this practice was legal prior to the outsourcing reform.

⁴We show that the few workers that these establishments did hire in-house were likely to be managers or directors, who are not entitled to profit-sharing benefits. We also present evidence that contracting firms in this relationship had zero profits, or profits lower than the parent firm.

⁵Unlike the results in Nimier-David et al. (2023), we show that downward wage rigidity is unlikely to explain why firms cannot simply offer lower wages to compensate for profit-sharing payments.

We present and empirically assess two factors explaining workers’ inelasticity to profit-sharing. First, it can be partly attributed to the fact that workers are risk averse and value the stable income of wages relatively more than profit-sharing (Nimier-David et al., 2023). A second reason contributing to this low elasticity is that many workers have limited awareness or understanding of profit-sharing, which is typically less salient and more complex to evaluate than wages. This mechanism is consistent with recent evidence showing that information frictions generally weaken individuals’ responsiveness to incentives (Jäger et al., 2023; Enke et al., 2024). Importantly, while both risk aversion and information frictions can reduce elasticity to profit-sharing, these two mechanisms are conceptually different. Risk aversion reflects a genuine preference for predictable wages over variable pay, whereas information frictions represent constraints that prevent workers from accurately assessing profit-sharing, leading them to undervalue profit-sharing relative to wages (Enke et al., 2024; Handel and Kolstad, 2015). Our third model prediction states that if risk aversion alone explained the low elasticity, enforcing profit-sharing would not necessarily raise the (risk-adjusted) value of total compensation for workers, as higher nominal pay would merely compensate for the added earnings risk.

Third, we leverage the effect of a strict restriction on outsourcing implemented in 2021 to evaluate our model predictions. We perform a difference-in-differences analysis with longitudinal establishment data where we exploit heterogeneity in exposure to the reform depending on whether an establishment was using outsourcing prior to the policy to identify treated and control establishments. The reform caused most full-outsourcing establishments to insource their workers in-house and start incurring profit-sharing payments. We find no effect on total employment (outsourced + in-house workers), in line with the first model prediction. Moreover, using wage information from social security data, we find that treated establishments offset the increase in profit-sharing by a decrease in wage growth relative to the control group. However, average total worker compensation, i.e. wages + profit-sharing per worker, increased by around 3% post reform, indicating that employers were not able to fully offset the increase in profit-sharing costs through lower wages. Returning to our second model prediction, these results suggest that labor supply is indeed more inelastic to profit-sharing than to wages.

We empirically evaluate the role of risk aversion in explaining workers’ inelasticity to profit-sharing by estimating the impact on the *value* of total compensation for workers, accounting for the increased risk. We perform this analysis under different assumptions on workers’ risk-aversion and find positive impacts on the risk-adjusted value of total compensation, even under very conservative risk-aversion parameters. For instance, for a high relative risk-aversion of 5, only about one-third of the post-reform increase in total worker pay reflects a compensation for the extra risk from profit-sharing. Thus, the rise in total compensation exceeded what would be required to offset the added income risk from profit-sharing, implying that workers benefited from the reform. Interpreting these findings through our model’s third prediction points to information frictions as a contributing factor in reducing labor supply elasticity to profit-sharing. Consistent with this mechanism, we find that total compensation increased more among firms located in local labor markets where workers were less likely to be informed about profit-sharing. Meanwhile, effects on total compensation are similar across high- and low-volatility sectors.

Fourth, we present direct evidence of information frictions regarding profit-sharing. Recent re-

search has shown that misinformation on job opportunities can decrease labor supply elasticity (Jäger et al., 2023), and that individuals are more inelastic to economic fundamentals when decisions are complex (Enke et al., 2024; Gabaix and Graeber, 2024). Building on these findings, we design and implement a survey covering over 600 Mexican workers to show that awareness of profit-sharing is low, and that there exist information processing frictions related to the complexity of calculating this benefit. We show that these information constraints further reduce workers’ sensitivity to profit-sharing.

We first document low awareness: 20% of workers are unaware of profit-sharing altogether. Among those who know of the benefit, most do not know how it is calculated. 83% report never having considered profit-sharing when choosing their current job. Additionally, individuals who are less informed about profit-sharing are significantly less likely to have considered this benefit when choosing their job. This indicates that awareness is correlated with the weight workers place on profit-sharing in their labor supply decisions. We then test for information-processing frictions using a hypothetical job-offers experiment. Respondents repeatedly rank job offers that vary in both wages and profit-sharing. In each ranking, we vary the complexity with which profit-sharing is presented: in the low-complexity scenario, the amount is provided directly; in the high-complexity scenario, it must be calculated by the respondent. Results show that when faced with high complexity in profit-sharing, individuals are more likely to choose higher-wage jobs over alternatives with greater total compensation. This evidence suggests that calculation burdens make workers weigh profit-sharing less relative to wages when choosing among job offers. Taken together, our survey evidence shows that low awareness of profit-sharing among workers and difficulties in calculating this benefit contribute to lowering the labor supply elasticity. Therefore, the documented information frictions play two key roles in our setting: First, before the reform, they allowed firms to cut total compensation by avoiding profit-sharing without compensating with higher wages. Second, once profit-sharing was enforced, they limit firms’ ability to adjust wages downward, allowing workers to benefit from the reform.

Overall, our results suggest that profit-sharing policies can raise the value of workers’ total compensation even when firms retain the ability to adjust wages, precisely because the complexity and low salience of this benefit prevents workers from fully internalizing its value. These informational constraints, together with worker risk aversion, also help explain why firms may not have incentives to adopt profit-sharing. More broadly, our findings yield two insights relevant for understanding the circumvention and enforcement of non-wage benefits that are valued by workers, but are less salient or more difficult to understand than wages, such as health insurance benefits or pension contributions (Chetty et al., 2014; Handel and Kolstad, 2015; Ouimet and Tate, 2023). First, when enforcement of non-wage benefits is weak, firms are likely to adjust total compensation disproportionately by cutting less salient benefits rather than wages. This mechanism may help explain firms’ incentives to avoid providing such benefits, for example, by hiring workers informally.⁶ Second, enforcing or mandating complex non-wage benefits can raise workers’ total compensation, even in settings where wage adjustments are possible, since information frictions among workers limit firms’ incentives to fully offset

⁶Theories of voluntary informality suggest that worker preferences for wages vs non-wage benefits may lead them to prefer a contract with higher wages and no benefit provision (Maloney, 2004; Levy, 2008). Conversely, we pose that workers may overestimate the value informal contract, relative to a formal one, because they are *unaware* of all the (non-salient) benefits of formal employment.

these benefits with wage reductions.

This project contributes to the literature on policies promoting profit-sharing arrangements. Seminal theoretical work by [Weitzman \(1985, 1986\)](#) argued that profit-sharing schemes could present an effective way to combat unemployment and stagflation. In parallel, [Blanchflower and Oswald \(1987, 1988\)](#) offered a more critical perspective, highlighting potential drawbacks of profit-sharing policies. Today, mandatory profit-sharing is present in Ecuador, France, Mexico and Peru, and is encouraged through tax incentives and collective bargaining agreements in many countries including Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Italy, Ireland, and the United States ([OECD, 1995](#); [Marinakis, 2000](#); [PEPPER V, 2024](#)). Yet quasi-experimental evidence on the effects of these policies on worker compensation remains scarce. A notable exception is [Nimier-David et al. \(2023\)](#) who empirically study the effect of mandatory profit-sharing in France on firms and workers. They find profit-sharing is compensated by lower wages for high-skilled workers, but increased total worker compensation for low-skilled workers due to a binding minimum wage. We complement their findings by showing that imperfect substitution between profit-sharing and wages can still exist even if the minimum wage is not binding, if the elasticity of labor supply with respect to each of these components differs. Furthermore, our identification strategy allows us to estimate the effect of increasing profit-sharing payments on total employment.

By examining how firms and workers tradeoff profit-sharing compensation and wages, this study also contributes to the broader literature on non-wage compensation ([Mas, 2025](#)). The theory of compensating differentials ([Rosen, 1986](#)) states that in competitive labor markets, firms offering greater non-wage benefits should offset them with lower wages. Many studies assessing this hypothesis rely on approaches that leverage observed worker transitions across firms ([Sorkin, 2018](#); [Moser and Morchio, 2025](#); [Bell, 2025](#); [Lavetti and Schmutte, 2025](#)). Studies leveraging quasi-experimental variation in wage or non-wage benefits to assess how firms trade-off these forms of compensation are limited. [Dube et al. \(2022\)](#) use a survey experiment of Walmart workers to study interactions between wages and non-wage amenities related to “dignity at work”. [Lagos \(2022\)](#) measures amenities included in collective bargaining agreements in Brazil, and shows that they account for roughly 45% of the gains from increases in union bargaining power. [Wissmann \(2022\)](#) shows that after an indoor smoking ban in Germany, workers previously exposed to smoking experienced wage declines, consistent with compensating differentials. A related strand of research examines how worker preferences for non-wage benefits shape labor supply decisions ([Mas and Pallais, 2017](#); [Wiswall and Zafar, 2018](#); [Maestas et al., 2023](#)), but largely abstracts from differences in information frictions between wages and non-wage benefits. We contribute to this literature in two ways. First, we leverage within-firm variation in a form of non-wage compensation—mandatory profit-sharing—induced by a policy change to show that firms do (partially) compensate for the increase in this benefit via lower wages. Our results are consistent with an imperfect compensating differentials framework, in which the substitution between wages and profit-sharing is incomplete due to information frictions on the latter. Second, we show that not only preferences but also information frictions shape individuals’ responses to non-wage benefits relative to wages, and thus influence firms’ provision of these benefits.⁷

⁷If information frictions are stronger for profit-sharing for wages, the mix between wages and profit-sharing may not be chosen optimally. This result contrasts that in [Dube et al. \(2022\)](#) and [Lagos \(2022\)](#) who model a monopsonistic firm’s

A contemporaneous study to ours by [Estefan et al. \(2024\)](#) studies the same Mexican outsourcing reform as this paper. The authors show that the outsourcing reform reduced wage markdowns and, as in our paper, find that restricting outsourcing increased worker compensation without negative effects on employment. [Casco et al. \(2024\)](#) also examine the effect of the outsourcing restriction on worker wages and employment using social security data, but they do not measure nor study profit-sharing. Our paper differs by exploiting the outsourcing reform to study how firms and workers tradeoff wages and profit-sharing. Empirically, we distinguish between full and partial outsourcing practices, a distinction that is crucial for understanding firms’ motives for outsourcing and the heterogeneous consequences of its regulation. More broadly, our empirical and theoretical analysis examines *why* firms avoid mandatory profit-sharing and the effects of enforcing this benefit in a setting where firms can also adjust wages. Our results highlight how differences in workers’ responsiveness to wages versus profit-sharing help explain these patterns.

The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes institutional context. Section 3 presents the data and details on measurement. Section 4 presents evidence on the use of outsourcing to avoid profit-sharing. In Section 5 we present a theoretical framework. Section 6 describes the effects of the outsourcing reform. Section 7 presents the survey evidence on information frictions. Section 8 concludes.

2 Institutional setting

2.1 Profit-sharing in Mexico

Profit-sharing (or PTU for its name in Spanish: *Participación de los trabajadores en las utilidades*) in Mexico is mandated by the Mexican Constitution and Federal Labor Law (*Ley Federal del Trabajo*) ([LFT, 2021](#)). Firms with annual profits over 15.000 USD (300.000 Mexican pesos) are obliged to distribute 10% of pre-tax profits with all their permanent employees except directors and managers, and with temporary employees who have worked over 60 days of the fiscal year. Firms above the profit threshold excepted from profit-sharing are newly created firms in their first year of activities,⁸ newly created firms in the extractive industry, during the exploration period, NGOs, and public institutions ([Gobierno de México, 2023](#)).

Within the firm, the total amount of profit-sharing to be distributed is divided into two parts. 50% is allocated equally across all eligible workers, and 50% is distributed proportionally to the workers’ annual wage ([Gobierno de México, 2023](#)). Thus, low-paying workers receive lower profit-sharing in total, but a higher amount as a proportion of their baseline salaries. Additionally, profit-sharing income up to 15 days of the minimum wage is exempted from income taxes for workers, and in most states it is exempted from payroll tax ([AMCPDH, 2023](#)). The profit base used to calculate profit-sharing corresponds is the same as the corporate tax base, with two exceptions: profit-sharing itself is

decision to set wages and amenities and show that conditional on the value of the job, the mix of wages and amenities is chosen optimally. This is because in their theoretical framework, differences in the elasticity with respect to wages and amenities stem from worker preferences, not frictions.

⁸Up to second year of activity for firms dedicated to the production of a new product.

not deductible (profit-sharing contributions can be deducted from declared profits for corporate tax payments), and losses from the previous fiscal year cannot be carried forward. Investment expenses are deducted from the tax base for profit-sharing.

Similar mandatory profit-sharing schemes exist in France (Nimier-David et al., 2023), Peru (Gob Peru, 2023) and Ecuador (EcuadorLegal, 2023), though with different eligibility rules and amounts.⁹ Additionally, many countries in the European Union, Brazil, Canada, the United States, among others, offer tax incentives designed to encourage firms to share profits with workers (OECD, 1995; PEPPER V, 2024).

2.2 The outsourcing reform

Outsourcing in Mexico is regulated by the Federal Labor Law (LFT, 2021). Before 2021, establishments were permitted to outsource both specialized services and core business activities. Mexico had seen a significant rise in domestic outsourcing in the past 20 years, from 6% of the labor force in 2004 to over 15% in 2019 (Banco de Mexico, 2021). This rise came in hand with increasing concerns that outsourcing had been used as a means for firms to avoid labor regulations and decrease worker benefits, including profit-sharing (López-Chávez and Velázquez-Orihuela, 2021).

The first proposal for an outsourcing reform was presented in November 2020 by the López Obrador administration in Mexico. An important motivation for this initiative stated by the Secretary of Labor (STPS) was to stop the ‘abusive schemes’ facilitated by outsourcing (STPS, 2021).¹⁰ The final version of reform was approved in April 2021. Firms had until July 2021 to adapt to the main changes.¹¹ The main changes implemented were (LFT, 2021) (1) The outsourcing of workers for core activities¹² of the firm was prohibited. (2) All employment agencies must register in a new registry of the Ministry of Labor (REPSE), for which they must comply with certain labor regulations. (3) Three times per year, employment agencies must send detailed information to the Ministry of Labor on all the outsourcing contracts which took place during that period. Strict penalties including large fines and prison terms of up to three years were introduced for firms not abiding by the new law. Therefore, incentives for firms to comply with the new regulation were high.

⁹In France, for instance firms with over 50 employees must share 50% of excess profits with workers. In Peru, firms above a certain profit threshold, and with over 20 workers must distribute a certain fraction of profits. The proportion varies according to the firms’ economic sector. In Ecuador all firms with positive profits must distribute 15% of profits with employees.

¹⁰When justifying the outsourcing reform, Mexico’s president Andrés Manuel López Obrador stated that there are many responsible entrepreneurs, but ‘there are others, and they aren’t even entrepreneurs; they are middlemen, influencers who exploit all these mechanisms of hiring workers, and it adversely affects the workers.’ (El Economista, 2020)

¹¹Some fiscal measures came into effect on September 2021.

¹²The core activity of a firm was defined as the activities included in the company’s objects clause (*objeto social*) (LFT (2021), art. 13)

3 Data and Measurement

This section describes the main datasets and measurement details for the empirical analysis. Central to our empirical analysis is the measurement of outsourcing, as it was the labor arrangement firms employed to bypass mandatory profit-sharing requirements. We refer to three actors in an outsourcing relationship. The lead firm (or parent firm) is the firm that contracts out labor to a contracting firm, which is a different legal entity. The workers are supervised by and work at the premises of the lead firm, while being officially hired by the contracting firm (OECD, 2021). Figure A.1 shows a schematic graph of these three actors and the relationships between them. The following subsections detail the datasets and outline the approach used to measure outsourcing within each one.

3.1 Main datasets

The main datasets used in this project can be divided into two data blocks. Each data block allows us to measure different outcomes and the method to measure outsourcing differs in each block. Importantly, the datasets in each block are accessed through different institutions in Mexico and they cannot be linked using firm nor worker identifiers. Thus, we complement the information available in each type of dataset for our analysis.

Establishment level data. The first block includes two establishment level datasets which were accessed on-site at INEGI’s installations in Mexico City. These datasets can be linked together at the establishment level.

Monthly manufacturing establishment survey (EMIM): Our main dataset to measure establishment-level outcomes over time is the monthly survey of manufacturing establishments (Encuesta Mensual de la Industria Manufacturera, or EMIM). This is a monthly plant-level panel dataset from 2017 to 2024. The data is collected and accessed through Mexico’s statistical office (INEGI). It covers monthly information on employment, wage bills, production, revenues, and variable costs. The same sample of establishments are surveyed each month, so this is a panel dataset. The survey design is primarily deterministic. For most sectors (NAICS 6-digits), the sampling proceeds by first ranking establishments within each 6-digit industry nationally by revenue. Establishments are then included in order until some threshold level of national revenue—from 60 to 85%, depending on the industry—is captured by the survey. For a minority of sectors, establishments are selected via a stratified random sampling approach, where establishments are stratified according to their size. Establishments from the largest stratum as selected with certainty, while the selection is random within the other strata (INEGI, 2015, 2023). Thus, in practice the survey is similar to a census of large Mexican plants.

Importantly, this survey includes information on the number of employees hired in-house and the number of employees hired through other firms (*personal suministrado por otra razón social*), allowing us to measure outsourcing at the establishment level. Additionally, establishments report monthly information on profit-sharing, wages, and social security contributions.

We work with a balanced panel of 8065 establishments, as we cannot distinguish between establishments that exit the survey because they went out of business, and those that exit because they

are no longer part of the sample.¹³ We show in Appendix C.2 that the exit patterns do not change around the time of the reform.

Economic Census 2019: This is a plant level dataset covering the universe of business establishments in Mexico in 2018¹⁴ which is also provided by INEGI. It provides more detailed information on establishments than the manufacturing survey, including sales, value added, profits, investment, capital, number of workers, salaried workers, social security, firm identifier and other outcomes. This census is carried out every five years starting in 1994.

Both these datasets combined allow us to identify and characterize parent firms in an outsourcing relationship (see Figure A.1). However, they do not provide any information on the contracting firm and they do not provide many details on workers, especially outsourced workers. In particular, it is challenging to accurately measure wages of outsourced workers in these datasets, which is a key outcome variable in our analysis (more details on this issue are provided in Section 6.1). Thus, to characterize these other actors in outsourcing relationships and accurately measure worker wages, we rely on our other main data block.

Employer - employee data. Our second data block consists of an administrative social security data from the Mexican Social Security Institute (Instituto Mexicano de Seguridad Social, IMSS). This dataset is accessed through the Econlab at Banco de México. This is an employer-employee dataset containing information on all formal employment relationships in the private sector. For each employer-employee pair, we have information on the establishment, firm, industry and municipality of the employer, and earnings, contract type and gender of the employee.

The information on earnings in this dataset is given by the worker’s daily taxable income (*salario base de cotización*). This can include various forms of compensation such as extra hours, bonuses and commissions. It also includes the 13th salary (*aguinaldo*) and the mandatory vacation bonus (*prima vacacional*). Importantly for our analysis, it does *not* include earnings received from profit-sharing benefits.¹⁵ Earnings are bottom coded at the minimum wage, and top coded 25 UMA’s (unit of measure and update).¹⁶ This dataset does not provide information on the number of hours or days worked per month. Nominal salaries are deflated using Banco de México’s CPI, with 2019 set as the base year. Finally, in the empirical analysis we focus on workers and firms in the manufacturing sector and limit the sample to firms with more than 20 employees to align with the coverage of the EMIM data. Appendix B.1 demonstrates that the two datasets are highly similar across different observable characteristics.

In addition to the datasets described above, we incorporate three supplementary data sources to address specific aspects of our analysis. First, to investigate the role of information frictions in explaining workers’ insensitivity to profit-sharing, we collected original survey data among Mexican

¹³Unfortunately, the data office in charge of the EMIM was not able to give us information on the reasons why each establishment exited the sample.

¹⁴The Census is published in 2019 but the data collection is carried out in 2018.

¹⁵This was clarified in July 2023 by the Social Security institute, who stated: ‘*employee profit-sharing (PTU) is not part of the base salary, since according to article 124 of the Federal Labor Law (LFT) it is not part of the integrated salary as stated in article 84 of the LFT*’ (Diario Oficial de la Federación, 2023; Deloitte México, 2023). Only the PTU exceeding the legal maximum of 3 months salary is included in the base salary.

¹⁶<https://en.www.inegi.org.mx/temas/uma/>

workers. We provide more details on the survey in Section 7. Additionally, we use firms’ tax records data from 2010-2015 to produce part of the descriptive evidence shown in Section 4.2. This dataset has been anonymized and made publicly available by the national tax office in Mexico (Servicio de Administración tributaria).¹⁷ The data provides information on each juridical person’s (*persona moral*) declared income, costs, profits and profit-sharing, deductible costs, and other items in the tax declaration. Finally, to improve our understanding of our quantitative findings, we have carried out 10 structured interviews with relevant stakeholders such as experts working in the outsourcing industry in Mexico, lawyers and HR Managers from companies affected by the reform.

3.2 Measuring outsourcing

In this section, we provide details on how we measure outsourcing relationships. For our analysis it is important to identify firms using outsourcing before the reform (lead firms), and workers who had been outsourced (were legally hired by a contracting firm) and were insourced (by the lead firm) after the reform. The method used to identify these differs in each dataset.

In the case of establishment surveys, identifying establishments that outsourced is relatively straightforward. These surveys inquire about the number of in-house workers and the number of outsourced workers per establishment during the reference month.¹⁸ The outsourcing question specifically pertains to individuals who worked for the establishment but were contractually affiliated with a separate company.¹⁹ Thus, we can quantify the number and share of outsourced workers per establishment in our sample. However, this dataset lacks worker-level information and precise data on outsourced workers’ wages. Thus, to measure this outcome, we rely on social security data.

Identifying lead firms that utilized outsourcing, contracting firms, and outsourced workers in the social security data poses a greater challenge. By nature, when a worker is outsourced, they appear in the social security data as employees of the contracting firm, with no indication of whether they are truly working for any other firm (i.e., the parent firm in an outsourcing arrangement). Nevertheless, the substantial flux of workers caused by the reform allows us to identify insourcing events, where a lead firm absorbed a worker from a contracting firm following the reform. The technique to measure outsourcing using insourcing events builds on the methodology introduced in the seminal paper Goldschmidt and Schmieder (2017). While that approach identifies outsourcing through worker movements from parent firms to contracting firms (outsourcing events), we use worker movements in the opposite direction, from contracting firms to parent firms (insourcing events).

Specifically, we classify a movement of workers from establishment A to establishment B as an insourcing event if it meets the following requirements: (i) the flow occurred between June and September 2021 (when the outsourcing restriction was enforced) (ii) the flow consisted of 20 employees

¹⁷http://omawww.sat.gob.mx/cifras_sat/Paginas/inicio.html. More details on the anonymization process and information available in this dataset can be found in the following link http://omawww.sat.gob.mx/cifras_sat/Documents/Lineamientos_articulo19LIF.pdf

¹⁸The original question in Spanish is: *Anote el número promedio de personas que dependieron de esta razón social durante el mes de referencia* and *Anote el número promedio de personas que no dependieron de esta razón social que trabajaron en este establecimiento durante el mes de referencia*.

¹⁹Importantly, the contracting company is a separate legal entity. It does not include workers in different establishments of the same firm.

or more *or* establishment A lost more than 40% of its workers that month (iii) establishment A and B do not belong to the same firm. This methodology allows us to identify the workers insourced post-reform, the establishments insourcing these workers, and the contracting agencies who were previously holding these workers. Figure 3 shows the number of workers in the social security data satisfying conditions (ii) and (iii) in each month of 2021. The shaded area are the worker movements classified as insourcing events with additional condition (i). The figure illustrates a relatively low number of worker movements that met the first two conditions outside of this specified time frame. 70% of these insourced workers in the shaded area were insourced in July 2021, meaning that most workers were insourced during the last month in which firms had the opportunity to adapt to the reform. Additionally, the majority of worker transitions during the reform occurred in blocks: 96% of workers involved in an insourcing event were insourced in a block of more than 20 workers.

4 Full outsourcing and profit-sharing avoidance

4.1 Evidence on full outsourcing

In this section we provide evidence on the use of outsourcing prior to the reform. 30% of establishments in EMIM reported having positive outsourcing in the year before the reform. Figure 1 displays the distribution of the average share of workers outsourced by each establishment in the year preceding the reform. Notably, there is a mass of observations with *all* workers outsourced, while there is a smaller mass at lower levels of outsourcing. In particular, 2/3 of establishments using outsourcing were outsourcing more than 95% of their workers.²⁰ This group covered 89% of outsourced workers pre-reform. In the Economics Census data, covering all firms in Mexico, we observe similar patterns: 78% of establishments using outsourcing, accounting for almost 2% of all Mexican establishments were outsourcing over 95% of their workforce.

In the social security data, we classify an establishment as full outsourcing if it insourced at least 5 workers around the reform (according to the conditions stated in Section 3.2) *and* if the establishment was not previously identified in the social security data before the reform,²¹ or if the firm size increased more than 20-fold following the insourcing event. 66% of the insourcing plants are classified as full outsourcing. Most of these establishments had *never* appeared in the social security data since 2004 (the earliest year where we have data). These statistics are very much in line with those found with the EMIM data. Figure B.1 in the Appendix shows the sectoral distribution of full outsourcing establishments identified in EMIM and IMSS data. Reassuringly, the results look very similar in each dataset.

Given these distinctive patterns in the use of outsourcing, we divide the establishments with positive outsourcing into two groups:

²⁰While Figure 1 is computed for observations between 2020 and 2021, there is considerable persistence in the outsourcing patterns across time. Table A.1 shows a transition matrix for the use of outsourcing between 2017 and 2020, where we aggregate the data at the yearly level. We can see that if an establishment was outsourcing more than 95% of its workers in a given year, the likelihood that it was doing so in the following year was 97%.

²¹Firms with no employees obviously do not appear in the social security data because they have no workers to report.

- *Full outsourcing establishments*: These are establishments that outsourced more than 95% of their workers for at least one month in the year before the reform.
- *Partial outsourcing establishments*: These are establishments that had positive outsourcing for at least one month in the year before the reform, but outsourced less than 95% of their workers.

As shown in Table 1, 1629 establishments are classified as *full outsourcing*, 855 as *partial outsourcing* and 5581 did not use outsourcing, and are classified as control. In the following sections, we present evidence that full outsourcing was a practice adopted by firms to avoid providing workers with profit-sharing, whereas this mechanism does not apply to partial outsourcing. Since this paper focuses on profit-sharing avoidance, our analysis concentrates on establishments engaging in full outsourcing. The motives behind partial outsourcing, as well as the effects of the reform on this group, are examined in detail in a companion paper (Colonna, 2025).

We choose the 95% cutoff, rather than 100% because there is a non-negligible mass of firms outsourcing a very high proportion (but not all) of their workers. In addition, we show in Figure 2 that for establishments outsourcing between 95% and 100% of their employees, the relative wages of in-house workers vs outsourced workers are much higher than for the rest of the establishments. Therefore these establishments were hiring relatively very high wage workers in-house, which are probably the owners or high-level managers of the company. As these workers are exempt from profit-sharing payments, firms holding only managers and directors can still avoid profit-sharing.²²

We focus on establishment level outcomes in this paper because in the manufacturing survey we cannot observe outcomes at the firm level. In the social security data, we can identify multi-establishment firms, which we define as establishments which share the same tax-id (*Registro Federal de Contribuyentes, RFC*). 59% of outsourcing establishments belong to single-establishment firms. Moreover, only 6% of firms where one establishment outsourced all workers had an establishment that was not outsourcing all workers before the reform.²³ Therefore, for the vast majority (97%) of the cases, one should think of full outsourcing establishments as belonging to full outsourcing firms.

The most defining features of full outsourcing establishments are that they are large, productive, with high profits. Table 1 shows that full outsourcing establishments tend to have more workers, and are more likely to belong to foreign owned firms. On average full outsourcing establishments have higher profits, higher revenue per worker and value added per worker. Figure B.1 shows the distribution of full outsourcing practices across sectors. Sectors where the practice was particularly frequent include Petroleum and coal product manufacturing, Chemical manufacturing, and Beverage and tobacco product manufacturing.

²²Slightly changing the value this cutoff does not affect our results.

²³In 17% of these firms, the establishment not outsourcing had less than 20 employees with exceptionally high wages, likely indicating managerial roles. Among the remaining 83%, non-outsourcing establishments tended to have a notably high proportion of temporary workers (16% on average, compared to the sample average of 5%), who are not eligible for profit-sharing.

4.2 Evidence on profit-sharing avoidance

In this section, we provide evidence consistent with the fact that the main reason behind full-outsourcing practices is the circumvention of mandatory profit-sharing. As outlined in Section 2.1, the Mexican Constitution and Federal Labor Law (*Ley Federal del Trabajo*) (LFT, 2021) require that nearly all companies with profits above 15,000 USD share 10% of their profits annually with almost all of their employees, excluding directors and managers. The 10% to be shared is fixed. Hence, firms can only avoid this obligation by either having no registered employees (or only managers), while outsourcing their workforce to an entity with either no profits or lower profits than the main establishment. Therefore, the circumvention of profit-sharing is likely to explain why establishments had incentives to outsource all of their workforce. It also clarifies why entities with only 5% of their workers employed in-house had high-wage workers who likely held managerial positions and were exempt from the profit-sharing law. Below, we present various lines of evidence indicating that establishments engaged in full outsourcing to avoid profit-sharing contributions they would have to pay under conventional employment relationships.

Figure 4 shows average monthly profit-sharing per worker (profit-sharing / total workers) in 1000s of Mexican Pesos recorded in EMIM for each group of establishments. In May of each year, the month when profit-sharing should be distributed by law, both control and partial outsourcing establishments feature positive profit-sharing, while full outsourcing establishments do not pay this contribution. This graph underscores the necessity for outsourcing *all* workers to circumvent profit-sharing contributions, as partial outsourcing establishments display similar profit-sharing patterns to the control group.²⁴

Figure A.2 presents additional evidence using official firm tax declaration data from 2010 to 2015. We categorize firms into 10 groups based on their average declared profits over the 5-year period. The blue line in the figure illustrates the share of firms in each profit size group that reported zero profit-sharing contributions for *some*, (but not all) periods. As expected, low-profit firms are more likely to report zero profit-sharing in some years, as they may fall below the profit threshold for positive profit-sharing during those years. The patterns for firms that reported zero profit-sharing contributions *every* year between 2010 and 2015 (in red) differ notably. The red line in the figure reveals a U-shaped relationship, where both low-profit and high-profit firms are more likely to have consistently reported zero profit-sharing. While we cannot directly measure outsourcing using tax data, it is highly likely that these high-profit firms are avoiding profit-sharing through the outsourcing practices described earlier.

Demonstrating that contracting firms exhibited zero or low profits is more challenging because we lack linked firm-to-firm data to establish this directly. Nevertheless, we present evidence to support this notion. In the 2019 Economic Census, firms are asked whether they outsource to a firm in their same corporate group. We find that, 64% of full outsourcing establishments were outsourcing to a firm that was a subsidiary of the leading establishment (albeit a different legal entity). Additionally, social security data indicates that over 50% of contracting firms in a full outsourcing relationship had

²⁴Importantly, we have consulted with the area at INEGI in charge of carrying out the surveys, and full outsourcing establishments are asked on their profit-sharing contributions, and technically can report a positive value even if they have all workers outsourced.

all their workers insourced by a single parent firm during the reform and over 70% had their workers insourced by at most three parent firms. Following the implementation of outsourcing reform, 77% of contracting firms exited the social security data completely. This evidence strongly suggests that profits of contracting firms were often determined by the parent company, which had incentives to keep them null or low. Furthermore, any profits accrued by the contracting firms would be included in the outsourcing costs reported in EMIM by the full outsourcing establishments. In Appendix C.3, we use this information to argue that it is highly unlikely that the profits of the contracting firm were nearly as high as those of the parent firm.

Finally, this motive for outsourcing was mentioned frequently in media outlets²⁵ and was mentioned in all of the interviews we carried out with experts who worked in the outsourcing industry, and HR managers from firms who used outsourcing before the reform.

4.3 Alternative reasons for full outsourcing

In this section we explore alternative explanations, apart from profit-sharing avoidance, that could potentially justify full outsourcing. We provide empirical evidence and assess the incentives created by the institutional context to show that these alternative reasons are unlikely to be significant drivers behind firms' decisions to entirely outsource their workforce.

Volatility. Firms could potentially outsource all workers to reduce adjustment costs when facing temporary changes in employment demand. We show that this explanation is not in line with empirical evidence. Columns 1 to 4 of Table A.2 show that full outsourcing establishments are not more likely to belong to sectors with high seasonality.²⁶ Columns 5-7 present the results of a regression of establishment-level employment volatility for the pre-reform period on a binary indicator for full outsourcing. The results suggest that these establishments do not exhibit higher volatility in the employment within the year during the pre-reform period.²⁷ This outsourcing motive among partial outsourcing establishments is analyzed in detail in companion paper (Colonna, 2025).

Within-firm wage compression. As mentioned above, outsourcing may enable firms to offer lower wages, especially when internal equality concerns exist. However, this motivation would typically justify the outsourcing of only a specific segment of a firm's workforce, rather than all workers.

Specialization. We posit that full outsourcing is unlikely to be driven by an increase in firm specialization and economies of scale. While outsourcing can enable firms to focus on core tasks by delegating non-core activities to external providers, this motive assumes that firms retain direct employment of workers for their core operations which they specialize in (Abraham and Taylor, 1996). In contrast, fully outsourced firms do not hire *any* workers in-house. Thus, while specialization would

²⁵Examples of articles where this was mentioned are Infobae (2019); Comunicado STPS (2021).

²⁶To compute sector seasonality, we carry out an additive time-series decomposition using moving averages (the same decomposition used for de-trending, but at the sectoral level) and extract the seasonal component of this decomposition. The seasonality for the variable x is calculated as the average absolute value of the seasonal component, divided by the average of x for 2017-19.

²⁷Employment volatility is calculated as the within-year coefficient of variation of de-trended employment. To de-trend variables we carry out an additive time-series decomposition using moving averages, where each variable is decomposed into a trend component, a seasonal component and an irregular component at the establishment level (using the *stats* package in R). De-trended variables are constructed as the original variable minus the trend component.

justify outsourcing non-core tasks such as IT, human resources, cleaning or security, it falls short in rationalizing the outsourcing of an entire plant’s workforce.

Avoidance of other mandatory contributions. In the media and policy discussions, it has been suggested that outsourcing allowed firms to decrease other mandatory contributions apart from profit-sharing (STPS, 2021). One such contribution is the mandatory labor risk premium in Mexico (INFOAVIT, 2022). Firms in Mexico are required to pay a risk contribution to social security which depends on the risk classification of the firm’s economic sector, and on past firm accidents. Thus, it was suggested that firms belonging to sectors with a high risk classification outsourced workers to avoid paying high risk premiums. For this to be a valid reason, it should be the case that high risk firms should outsource their workers to a firm with a lower risk classification than the parent firm. We do find that firms in an activity with a high risk classification are more likely to fully outsource. However, we do not find a consistent trend of outsourcing to lower risk classification firms. Specifically, 67% of fully outsourcing establishments outsourced to entities within the same risk classification as the parent establishment, while 19% outsourced to lower-risk entities, and 13% outsourced to higher-risk ones. Hence, although outsourcing to lower-risk establishments was slightly more common, this doesn’t appear to be a prevalent motive in our setting.

Additionally, outsourcing was claimed to help firms underreport wages and avoid 13th salary payments. If these were significant reasons for full outsourcing, we would expect an increase in declared earnings in social security records post-reform when workers are hired in-house. However, as detailed below, we do not find evidence of such an increase in declared earnings for workers insourced by fully outsourcing establishments. Moreover, underreporting is often reflected in wage bunching at regulatory thresholds (Feinmann et al., 2025). In Mexico’s social security system, the relevant thresholds before 2020 were the minimum wage and 25 times Mexico’s Unit of Measure and Update (UMA). Because reported wages in IMSS are capped at 25 UMA, we focus on bunching at the minimum wage. Specifically, we compare the share of workers earning exactly the minimum wage among those with earnings just above it (below 1.2 times the minimum wage) in the year prior to the reform. This share was 24% for workers outsourced by fully outsourcing establishments, compared to 35% in control firms. Thus, if anything, minimum-wage bunching among low-wage workers was lower in full-outsourcing firms. Taken together, this evidence suggests that wage underreporting was not a primary motive for full outsourcing.

Thus, while we cannot definitively reject all alternative explanations for full outsourcing, our evidence suggests that some of the main alternative motivations for this phenomenon were not playing an important role in our setting. Furthermore, in the following section we show evidence consistent with the notion that firms carrying out full outsourcing were those which benefited the most from avoiding profit-sharing obligations.

4.4 Discussion of incentives for profit-sharing avoidance

While Section 4.2 provides evidence that full outsourcing allows firms to avoid or reduce profit-sharing contributions, it is a priori not evident that this practice allows to decrease total worker compensation (wages + profit-sharing). If wages and profit-sharing were perfectly substitutable for workers and

firms, bypassing profit-sharing would only change the composition of total compensation, without changing its total value. This would align with the presence of compensating differentials between wages and profit-sharing (Rosen, 1986). Moreover, even if profit-sharing avoidance did allow firms to reduce total compensation, it is unclear why firms would choose this approach instead of simply offering lower wages.

Bypassing profit-sharing obligations would allow firms to reduce total compensation if profit-sharing and wages are not perfectly substitutable. One reason for this imperfect substitutability put forward in Nimier-David et al. (2023) is a binding minimum wage, which sets a limit to how much firms can reduce total compensation via wages. However, this does not seem to be the case in our setting. As can be seen in Table 4 full outsourcing firms paid relatively high wages. Only 2% of workers at these firms were earning less than 1.2 times the minimum wage in 2020 (6% were earning less than 1.5 times the minimum wage), and in more than half of full outsourcing establishments all workers were earning more than 1.2 times the minimum wage. The average Kaitz index (minimum wage over median wage) at these establishments was only 0.4 in 2020. The average Kaitz index post-reform was only 0.5, indicating that even after the salary decrease post reform (discussed in Section 6.2.4), the minimum wage was not strongly binding at these firms. These patterns indicate that downward wage rigidity does not seem to be the main cause for this practice.²⁸

In the next section, we build a theoretical framework where we state that the imperfect substitutability between wages and profit-sharing stems from the labor supply function. In particular, if workers are less sensitive to differences in profit-sharing than differences in wages when making labor supply decisions, firms can reduce total worker compensation by avoiding profit-sharing. In Section 6 we leverage the effect of the outsourcing restriction to demonstrate that this mechanism is consistent with our empirical results.

5 Theoretical framework

In this section, we introduce a simple theoretical framework to help explain the motivations behind profit-sharing avoidance. Our framework follows a static partial equilibrium posting model in the spirit of Card et al. (2018) where monopsonistic firms offer workers bundles of wages and profit-sharing and face a labor supply curve that depends on both forms of compensation. Firms can decide to avoid mandatory profit-sharing or not, and set worker wages in each of these cases. We set up the model and solve for firms' choice to avoid profit-sharing, jointly with what wage to offer. The full solution to the model is presented in Appendix D. We derive four predictions regarding the effects of restricting outsourcing, which guide our empirical analysis of the outsourcing reform in the next section.

²⁸Only approximately 10% of formal workers in Mexico are coverage by a collective bargaining agreement (in France is around 98%) (OECD Statistics, 2022), suggesting that wage floors set in CBAs are unlikely to create significant downwards wage rigidity.

5.1 Model setup

We consider a firm with productivity z_j that produces a final good in a perfectly competitive product market with a linear technology function in labor n_j .²⁹ Productivity is given by $z_j = \hat{z}_j + \xi_j$ where ξ_j is a random variable with $\mathbb{E}(\xi_j) = 0$ and firms are risk-neutral. Labor supply and demand decisions are made before the productivity realization. Thus, expected output for firm j is:

$$\mathbb{E}(y_j) = \mathbb{E}(z_j n_j) = \hat{z}_j n_j \quad (1)$$

There exists a level of mandatory total profit sharing which is a proportion ρ of pre-profit sharing payments profits, $\tilde{\Pi}_j$.

$$\text{mandatory profit sharing}_j = \rho \tilde{\Pi}_j = \rho(z_j n_j - w_j n_j) \quad (2)$$

Firms can pay a fixed cost k and a variable cost c to avoid mandatory profit-sharing. In our empirical setting, this includes the cost of outsourcing their workers to separate entity.³⁰ Total worker compensation is composed of wages and profit sharing per worker, $w_j + ps_j$, where $ps_j = \frac{\rho(z_j n_j - w_j n_j)}{n_j} = \rho(z_j - w_j)$ when the firm complies with mandatory profit sharing, and $ps_j = 0$ when it avoids it. Importantly, we assume that the firm determines worker wages in both the compliance and avoidance scenarios.³¹ For simplicity, we abstract from wage uncertainty and assume wages are set at the beginning of the period, before the realization of ξ_j , while ps_j is set after ξ_j is realized. Therefore, when hiring workers (before ξ_j is realized), firms offer a bundle of wages and expected profit sharing per worker. Firms face a labor supply curve which is increasing in both forms of compensation:

$$n_j^s = (w_j + \mu \cdot \alpha \cdot \mathbb{E}[ps_j])^\theta \quad (3)$$

We micro-found this labor supply function in Section D.1. $\theta > 0$ defines the absolute elasticity faced by the firm with respect to the value of the expression inside parenthesis.³² $\alpha \leq 1$ and $\mu \leq 1$ determine the *relative* elasticity of workers with respect to wages vs profit sharing offered by the firm.³³ The parameter α represents the discount workers apply to profit-sharing due to risk aversion, as profit-sharing is more uncertain than wages (Nimier-David et al., 2023).³⁴ In Section D.1 we show that α

²⁹We normalize the price of the final good to one.

³⁰These costs can include the search costs of contacting a contracting firm, the costs of performing an extra firm-to-firm transaction, and any markups charged by the contracting firm. They also include extra administrative costs of setting up a different entity to outsource the workers to and filing an extra tax declaration each year if the contracting firm is set up by the parent firm. In a more general setting, this cost can be interpreted as the expected cost and/or punishment from avoiding a non-wage benefit.

³¹This assumption is supported by empirical evidence indicating that contracting firms in full outsourcing relationships were often fully or largely controlled by their parent firms. Therefore it is very likely that full-outsourcing firms typically set the wages of their outsourced workers.

³²We assume that the firm faces a finite elasticity of labor supply, an assumption supported by a growing body of literature on firm wage-setting power (Manning, 2004), particularly in the context of developing countries (Felix, 2023; Estefan et al., 2024).

³³ $\eta_{n,w} = \frac{\theta w_j}{(w_j + \mu \cdot \alpha \cdot ps_j)}$ and $\eta_{n,ps} = \frac{\mu \cdot \alpha \cdot \theta ps_j}{(w_j + \mu \cdot \alpha \cdot ps_j)}$. Thus $\frac{\eta_w}{\eta_{ps}} = \frac{w_j}{\mu \cdot \alpha \cdot ps_j}$.

³⁴In our data, profit-sharing is more volatile than wages. Among control firms with a longer series of profit-sharing payments, the average within-firm, across-time coefficient of variation of profit-sharing is approximately 5 times that of wages.

can be expressed as $\frac{CE_{ps}}{\mathbb{E}[ps_j]}$ where CE_{ps} is the certainty equivalent of profit sharing. The parameter μ captures the reduced responsiveness of workers to profit-sharing as a result of information frictions, as in [Gabaix \(2019\)](#).³⁵ In Section 7, we present evidence on two types of information frictions related to profit-sharing which reduce the labor supply elasticity with respect to this benefit. The first is a lack of awareness of profit-sharing ([Jäger et al., 2023](#)). The second consists of information-processing frictions related to understanding and calculating profit-sharing ([Enke et al., 2024](#); [Oprea, 2024](#)). Following the literature, we assume that while the information frictions reflected in μ impact labor supply decisions, they are not related to workers' preferences for profit-sharing but rather to constraints that prevent them from valuing it properly when comparing job offers ([Enke et al., 2024](#); [Handel and Kolstad, 2015](#)). Conceptually, this differentiates μ from α . The former affects worker choices but not worker welfare once the labor supply decision has been made, while the latter does influence worker welfare once labor supply decisions have been made due to the uncertainty of profit-sharing income. The importance of this distinction will become clear in [Prediction 3](#).

When firms comply with mandatory profit-sharing, they post wages to maximize expected post-profit-sharing profits:

$$\mathbb{E} \left(\Pi_j^{comply \ ps} \right) = \max_{w_j} \{ (1 - \rho)(\hat{z}_j - w_j)n_j \} \quad (4)$$

subject to

$$\mathbb{E}[ps_j] = \rho(\hat{z}_j - w_j) \quad \text{and} \quad n_j = (w_j + \mu \cdot \alpha \cdot \mathbb{E}[ps_j])^\theta$$

When firms avoid the mandatory level of profit-sharing, they pay the cost of avoidance and maximize:

$$\mathbb{E} \left(\Pi_j^{avoid \ ps} \right) = \max_{w_j} \{ (z_j - w_j - c)n_j - k \} \quad (5)$$

subject to

$$n_j = (w_j + \mu \cdot \alpha \cdot \mathbb{E}[ps_j])^\theta$$

Firms will avoid profit-sharing if $\mathbb{E} \left(\Pi_j^{avoid \ ps} \right) > \mathbb{E} \left(\Pi_j^{comply \ ps} \right)$. In the following subsection we show how this decision depends on model parameters. We then derive three predictions on the effects of restricting outsourcing. The full model solution is provided in [Appendix D](#).

5.2 The decision to avoid profit-sharing

In [Appendix D](#) we show that a firms will decide to avoid profit-sharing only if the following condition is met:

$$k \leq \theta^\theta \left(\frac{\hat{z}_j}{\theta + 1} \right)^{\theta+1} \left[\left(1 - \frac{c}{\hat{z}_j} \right)^{1+\theta} - \left(\frac{1 - \rho}{1 - \alpha\mu\rho} \right) \right] \quad (6)$$

First, note that that if $\alpha \cdot \mu = 1$ the expression collapses to $k \leq D$ with $D \leq 0$. When labor supply is equally elastic with respect to wages and profit sharing, workers would have to be perfectly compensated by the absence of profit sharing with higher wages. In this case, profit-sharing avoidance would only occur if there are no costs associated with this practice.

³⁵Our parameter μ is akin to m in Section 2 of [Gabaix \(2019\)](#), with a prior mean of profit-sharing equal to zero.

The second point to note is that the right-hand side of Equation 6 is increasing in \hat{z}_j , as the cost per worker of profit sharing is increasing in \hat{z}_j , while the cost per worker to avoid it is decreasing in z . Therefore, if $\mu \cdot \alpha < 1$ (risk aversion and/or information frictions are present), more productive firms find it optimal to avoid mandatory profit sharing. This prediction aligns with Figure 5, which presents bin scatter plots showing that larger, more productive establishments are more likely to fully outsource.

5.3 The impact of restricting profit-sharing avoidance

In this section we use our model to assess the impacts of an increase in k , interpreted as a restriction to profit-sharing avoidance.³⁶ This raises the left-hand side of the inequality in Equation 6, leading to a decrease in the number of firms avoiding profit sharing. We derive three predictions regarding the impact of this restriction on firms that newly comply with profit-sharing requirements. We test these predictions empirically in the next section.

Prediction 1. *The effect on total firm employment is increasing in c .*

In Appendix D.4 we show that the change in firm employment can be expressed as:

$$\Delta n_j = c \cdot \left(\frac{\theta}{\theta + 1} \right)^\theta \quad (7)$$

Which is positive whenever $c > 0$. Notably, if avoiding involves only a fixed cost ($c = 0$), the effect on employment becomes zero, implying that enforcing profit sharing will not create a distortion in employment levels. This result is a notable aspect of profit-sharing and follows from the fact that, for a class of labor supply functions of the form $n_j = (w_j + Aps_j)^\eta$, profit-sharing does not affect the marginal cost of employment *at the optimum*, i.e. at the point where marginal profit is zero. This result is not restricted to the case of constant returns to scale and holds for any revenue function. We provide a detailed explanation of this result in Section D.4 and a graphical illustration of this result in our setting in Figure D.2.³⁷

Prediction 2. *If $\mu \cdot \alpha < 1$ expected total compensation $w_j + ps_j$ will increase. The effect will be decreasing in μ and α .*

In Appendix D.4 we show that the change in expected total compensation can be expressed as:

$$\Delta \mathbb{E}[\text{total compensation}] = \frac{\hat{z}_j \rho}{1 + \theta} \left(1 - \frac{1 - \rho}{\frac{1}{\mu\alpha} - \rho} \right) + c \frac{\theta}{\theta + 1} \quad (8)$$

The effect is positive if $\mu \cdot \alpha < 1$, and depends negatively on this term. The intuition for this result is that when workers are more reactive to a wage decrease than to a profit sharing increase ($\mu \cdot \alpha$ is low), offsetting increases in ps_j via lower wages is relatively costly for the firm, as it has a relatively large negative effect on its labor supply. This decreases firms' incentives to reduce w_j

³⁶One can interpret this increase as the getting caught and punished for this practice even when it is banned.

³⁷If we assume that there is a fixed cost of staying in business each period, then if mandatory profit sharing, ρ , is sufficiently high, the firm will exit the market.

to offset increases in profit sharing (Equation 52 in Section D.4), leading to an overall rise in total compensation.

Prediction 3. *If $\mu < 1$ the expected risk-adjusted value of total compensation $w_j + \alpha \mathbb{E}[ps_j]$ will increase. The effect is decreasing in μ and increasing in α .*

We define the risk-adjusted value of total compensation as w_j plus the amount of profit sharing workers would accept to avoid uncertainty, i.e. the certainty equivalent of profit-sharing CE^{ps} . In Section D.1.1 we show that this can be expressed as $w_j + \alpha \mathbb{E}[ps_j]$, where $\alpha = \frac{CE^{ps}}{E[ps_j]}$ is one minus the relative risk premium. In Appendix D.4, we demonstrate that:

$$\Delta \mathbb{E}[\text{value total compensation}] = \frac{\hat{z}_j \rho \alpha}{1 + \theta} \left(1 - \frac{1 - \alpha \rho}{\frac{1}{\mu} - \alpha \rho} \right) + c \frac{\theta}{\theta + 1} \quad (9)$$

This result implies that if the inelasticity of profit-sharing is solely attributed to risk aversion ($\mu = 1$), the value of total compensation for workers may not increase even in the presence of an overall increase in total compensation. In this scenario, an increase in total compensation would solely compensate workers for higher risk without leaving them better off. Conversely if information frictions regarding profit-sharing partly explain this inelasticity, the value of total compensation for workers should increase. This is because $\mu < 1$ reflects a reduced responsiveness to profit-sharing, not due to workers' true preferences, but because of information-related constraints - either a lack of awareness or difficulties in processing the complexity of profit-sharing benefits - which limit their ability to fully respond to this benefit.

In the following section we study the effect of the outsourcing restriction, focusing on four outcomes that emerge from these predictions: compliance with profit sharing, total employment, total worker compensation, and the risk-adjusted value of total compensation. In Section 7 we present empirical evidence on the role of information frictions in explaining workers' low responsiveness to profit-sharing.

6 The causal impact of the outsourcing restriction

This section estimates the effects of enforcing profit-sharing on employment, wages, total compensation and the risk-adjusted value of total compensation. To do so, we leverage the outsourcing reform, which restricted the use of outsourcing and thereby limited the practice firms had relied on to avoid profit-sharing.

6.1 Methodology

In this section we describe the methodology used to estimate the reform's impact across different datasets. As discussed in Section 3, the outcomes observed and the way outsourcing is measured differ between the establishment survey and the social security data. Therefore, the empirical strategy used to estimate the effect of the reform on each outcome depends on the information available in each dataset. Specifically, we use the establishment survey data (EMIM) to measure the effects of the reform on outsourcing, total employment, and profit-sharing. Estimating the reform's impact

on total labor costs with this dataset, however, poses challenges. In EMIM, establishments that outsource workers do not report outsourced workers’ wages, but rather the total amount paid to the contracting establishment providing these workers. Because these payments to the contracting firm likely encompass expenses beyond wages, it is challenging to precisely estimate average worker wages before the reform for establishments utilizing outsourcing.³⁸ Acknowledging these limitations in measuring the reform’s impact on wages using EMIM data, we turn to the comprehensive information on wages in social security data (IMSS) to estimate the reform’s effects on wages. Subsequently, we combine the wage information from IMSS with profit-sharing data from EMIM to estimate the overall impact on total compensation.

6.1.1 Methodology with establishment level data

In order to evaluate the effects of the reform using establishment survey data, we rely on heterogeneous exposure to reform across different plants. The main assumption behind this identification is that, conditional on controls, the outcome variables of establishments using outsourcing and those not using outsourcing would have followed similar trends in the absence of the reform (Saez et al., 2019; Carry, 2022). We perform the following dynamic difference in differences regression:

$$Y_{jsft} = \sum_{k=Q12018}^{Q12023} \beta_k \mathbb{1}_{t \in k} O_j + \lambda_j + \gamma_{st} + \eta_{ft} + \phi_g t + \xi_{jsft} \quad (10)$$

Where Y_{jsft} is the outcome of establishment j , in sector s , state f , at time (month-year) t . The treatment variable is O_j , and consists of an indicator equal to 1 if the establishment was fully outsourcing in any month in the year prior to the reform.³⁹ $\mathbb{1}_{t \in k}$ is a variable equal to one if month t falls into quarter k . λ_j denote establishment fixed effects. We include size-group specific linear trends $\phi_g t$ (establishments are divided into 6 groups according to their size pre-reform), as large firms are more likely to outsource, and also present a higher growth rate. 3 digit NAICS sector-time fixed effects and state-time fixed effects are included to account for sector and state specific seasonality patterns and idiosyncratic shocks. The coefficient for the last quarter of 2020 is normalized to zero. The control group includes establishments which had not used outsourcing in the year prior to the reform. Partial outsourcing establishments are excluded from the sample. Standard errors are clustered at the establishment level (Rambachan and Roth, 2022).

³⁸Additional costs potentially included in this figure are expenses related to worker training (mandated by law in Mexico), worker uniforms or equipment, and workers’ travel expenses. It is also possible that the contracting firm providing workers earned a minor profit (albeit lower than the parent firm’s profit to reduce profit-sharing contributions, see Section C.3), which would also be incorporated into this sum. Unfortunately, the EMIM dataset does not offer precise information on these costs, making it impossible to control for these components post-reform.

³⁹We prefer to use a dummy, rather than a continuous exposure variable, as continuous exposure measures can be problematic in the presence of heterogeneous treatment effects and non-linearities (Sun and Shapiro, 2022).

6.1.2 Methodology with social security data

In the social security data, establishments using outsourcing and their outsourced workers are identified through insourcing events occurring at the time of the reform. These insourcing events reveal that some contracting establishments had workers insourced by multiple parent establishments. In such cases, we can link workers to their parent establishments via the insourcing events, but this link cannot be made for workers who were not insourced during the reform. Consequently, it is not possible to identify *all* workers that had been outsourced by each parent establishment, only those involved in an insourcing event. This limits our ability to estimate the reform’s effect in the same way as with the establishment-level data. We therefore assess the reform’s impact in the social security data using two complementary approaches: a worker-level specification and an establishment-level specification, restricting the latter to cases where each contracting establishment is linked to exactly one parent firm.

Worker-level regression. We estimate the effect of the reform at the worker level through the following specification.

$$Y_{isft} = \sum_{k=2018}^{2024} \theta_k \mathbb{1}_{t=k} \text{Insourced}_i + \lambda_i + \gamma_{st} + \eta_{ft} + \phi_g t + \xi_{jsft} \quad (11)$$

Where Y_{isft} denotes the outcome of worker i in sector s , state f , at year t . Insourced_i is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the worker was insourced between April and September 2021. We normalize the coefficient of the pre-reform year (2020) to zero. λ_i denote worker fixed effects. Analogous to the establishment-level regressions, we include 3-digit NAICS sector-by-year fixed effects, state-by-year fixed effects, and firm-size group-specific linear trends $\phi_g t$.⁴⁰ Standard errors are clustered at the establishment level.⁴¹

The control group includes all workers who were not insourced during the reform and were working for firms with no insourcing events during the reform.⁴² We estimate this regression on a balanced sample of 103 703 workers. This sample is composed of workers who remained with the same employer in the 2 years prior to the reform and throughout the post-insourcing period.⁴³ Panel A of Table 4 presents summary statistics on the estimation sample. Average daily wage is 588 pesos for treated workers and 474 pesos for control workers, while average firm size is 1443 for the treated group and 1145 for the control group. We show below that the results are robust to less stringent sample

⁴⁰Four firm size groups are defined according to the size of the worker’s firm in September 2021, once the insourcing events have taken place.

⁴¹As workers are considered treated if they were insourced by a full-outsourcing establishment, treatment is assigned at the establishment level. We follow [Rambachan and Roth \(2022\)](#) and cluster at the level at which treatment is determined in our quasi-experimental setting.

⁴²We exclude workers that were not insourced, but were working for firms that insourced other workers, as these workers were indirectly affected by the reform due to an increase in the number of workers among which profit-sharing was distributed. This group may have also been affected by the reform due to other forms of within-firm rent sharing ([Deibler, 2021](#)).

⁴³This post-reform tenure restriction is necessary to identify how treated firms adjusted wages in response to the profit-sharing increase. As we show in Section 6.2.3, we find no effects of the reform on total employment of treated establishments, suggesting that this post-reform tenure restriction should equally affect the control and treatment group. We do not impose this sample restriction in the IMSS establishment-level specification described below.

restrictions.

Establishment-level regression. We complement the worker-level analysis with an establishment-level specification using the social security data. This allows us to estimate relevant changes in the within-firm wage distribution that cannot be captured in the previous specification, such as between incumbent workers and new hires. We focus on cases where the parent establishment maintained a one-to-one relationship with the contracting establishment. In other words, where all insourcing events involving a given parent establishment occurred with a single contracting establishment, and vice versa. In such cases, we can reconstruct the identity of the ‘true’ establishment both before and after the reform using social security data: the pre-reform firm corresponds to the contracting establishment’s identifier, and the post-reform firm corresponds to that of the parent establishment. This restriction yields a sample of 1,019 out of 2,851 full outsourcing establishments in the manufacturing sector identified in the social security data. Panel B of Table 4 reports 2018 summary statistics for the balanced panel of establishments in this sample. Average size of full outsourcing establishments is 237 workers, while the average daily wage at these establishments is 230 pesos. Based on these establishments, we estimate the following regression:

$$Y_{jsft} = \sum_{k=2018}^{2024} \delta_k 1_{t=k} O_j + \lambda_j + \gamma_{st} + \eta_{ft} + \phi_g t + \xi_{jsft} \quad (12)$$

Where, Y_{jsft} denotes the outcome of establishment j in sector s , state f , at year t . The treatment variable $O_j = 1$ if the parent establishment was classified as a full-outsourcing establishment (see Section 3.2). The control group includes manufacturing establishments that were not involved in any insourcing event. We restrict the sample to establishments in the manufacturing sector with over 20 workers. As in the other specifications, we include firm fixed effects, 3-digit NAICS sector-by-year fixed effects, state-by-year fixed effects, and establishment-size group-specific linear trends. We focus on a balanced panel of establishments.

In contrast to the establishment survey data, in the social security data we cannot identify all workers that had been outsourced (nor all firms that had been outsourcing), but rather only those that were involved in insourcing events during the reform. Thus, these estimates capture the reform’s effect on treated workers and firms that complied with the reform. As shown in Figure A.3, compliers constitute the vast majority of the treated group: 90 percent of full-outsourcing firms ceased full-outsourcing during the reform. Due to the inclusion of the different fixed effects, our identification is valid so long as insourced workers or firms were not subject to differential, within-industry or within-state time-varying shocks relative to the control group. Although compliance with the reform is an endogenous firm decision, the *timing* of insourcing events is exogenously determined by the policy. This mitigates concerns that firm-level insourcing events were driven by contemporaneous shocks, lending credibility to our identification assumption.

6.1.3 Methodology with combined social security and establishment data

In this section we describe the methodology to estimate the effect of the reform on total worker compensation, composed of wages plus profit-sharing income. As mentioned in Section 3.1, social security data does not contain information on profit-sharing income for workers. While the establishment survey data contains information on profit-sharing, information on wages of outsourced workers pre-reform is inaccurate, as explained at the beginning of this section. To circumvent these data limitations, we combine information on profit-sharing reported in the establishment survey data with wage information from the social security data to build a measure of total compensation (wages + profit-sharing). Because the two datasets cannot be linked at the firm level, we classify establishments and workers in both datasets into strata defined by sector \times state \times firm size \times treatment status. We then impute profit-sharing for each observation in the social security data using the average profit-sharing observed in their stratum, and we assign treated workers pre-reform a profit-sharing income equal to zero (our main specification assumes that treated workers were not receiving profit-sharing payments pre-reform). Details of this procedure are provided in Section B.2.⁴⁴ While we can measure wages for each individual worker, imputed profit-sharing is only measured at the stratum \times year level. Therefore, we can estimate how average total compensation in treated strata changed over time relative to control strata, but not for each individual worker. In other words, we can leverage within-stratum variation, rather than within-worker variation, across time to capture the effect of the reform on total compensation. These two approaches are closely related, though not identical, since workers may switch strata if they change firms or if their firm changes size category. We estimate the effects of the reform on total compensation using the following regression:

$$Y_{iwt} = \sum_{k=2018}^{2024} \alpha_k \mathbb{1}_{t=k} \text{Insourced}_i + \lambda_\omega + \gamma_{st} + \eta_{ft} + \phi_g t + \xi_{iwt} \quad (13)$$

Where Y_{iwt} is the outcome of worker i belonging to (sector \times state \times firm size \times treatment status) stratum ω . Insourced_i is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the worker was insourced between April and September 2021. λ_ω are stratum fixed-effects, which account for permanent differences between treated and control strata. γ_{st} and η_{ft} are state by time and sector by time fixed effects, and $\phi_g t$ are firm-size group linear trends.⁴⁵ Therefore, Equation 13 is the same as specification 11 but replaces worker fixed effects by stratum fixed effects and slightly changes the definition of firm-size groups. Under the assumption that, conditional on fixed effects, the average outcome of treated and control strata would have followed the same trend absent the reform, the coefficients from Equation 13 provide an unbiased estimate of the average effect of the reform on workers in treated strata relative to workers in control strata. This can be interpreted as a worker-weighted average of stratum-level effects. Indeed, when the outcome Y_{iwt} is in levels, the coefficients from regression 13 are numerically identical to those from estimating a stratum-level regression:

⁴⁴For this procedure to be valid, it is important that the sample in the social security data is similar to the sample covered in the establishment data. Appendix B.1 shows that the composition of the social security and establishment samples is closely aligned, and that average wages across sectors and regions are highly comparable across the two datasets.

⁴⁵We divide observations into 4 firm size groups depending on the average firm size of their stratum before the reform.

$$Y_{\omega t} = \sum_{k=2018}^{2024} \alpha_k \mathbb{1}_{t=k} T_{\omega} + \lambda_{\omega} + \gamma_{st} + \eta_{ft} + \phi_g t + \xi_{\omega t} \quad (14)$$

where $Y_{\omega t}$ is the average total compensation in stratum ω in year t , and each stratum \times time cell is weighted by the number of workers. In the following section we show that this specification produces identical coefficients to estimating Equation 14.

6.2 Results

6.2.1 Effect on outsourcing use

Figure 6 shows the estimated θ_k from Equation 10 for the share of outsourced workers and the number of in-house workers. It is apparent that the reform had a strong negative effect on the share of outsourced workers, and an increase in the number of in-house workers. Nearly 90% of full outsourcing establishments stopped outsourcing over 95% of their workforce post reform, and 80% stopped outsourcing altogether. Figure A.3 shows that these effects are also visible when plotting the raw share of establishments using outsourcing and outsourcing over 95% of workers.

The insourcing events in the social security data enable us to identify contracting establishments.⁴⁶ We find that 77% of contracting establishments associated with full outsourcing establishments exited within one year after the reform. Those that did not exit experienced a strong decrease in size, and remained very small (Figure A.4), possibly because they continued to employ workers which were not part of the parent firms' core activities, and thus still allowed to be outsourced. This evidence suggests that these contracting firms did not engage in any economic activity beyond providing workers to lead firms.

6.2.2 Effect on profit-sharing

In this section, we show that the outsourcing restriction caused full outsourcing firms to begin paying profit-sharing contributions. Panel (a) of Figure 7 displays monthly profit-sharing contributions per worker for control and full outsourcing establishments from 2018 to 2024. After the reform, full outsourcing establishments clearly start reporting positive profit-sharing payments, with the peaks in the figure corresponding to May of each year. The positive effect of the reform on profit-sharing compliance is also evident in Panel (b) of Figure 7, which presents results from a difference-in-differences regression similar to Equation 10, but estimated at the yearly level. In this specification, the outcome variable is annual profit-sharing per worker, and the corresponding estimates are reported in Table 2. Importantly, the first year in which treated establishments paid profit-sharing contributions was 2022, not 2021, despite the insourcing events taking place in 2021. This timing reflects the fact that profit-sharing contributions for a given fiscal year are distributed in May of the following year,

⁴⁶We classify an establishment as a contracting establishment if at least 5 of its workers were involved in an insourcing event from that establishment (to another one).

while the insourcing events occurred in July 2021.⁴⁷

Table A.3 shows the average total profit-sharing, profit-sharing per worker, and profit-sharing per worker as a share of the monthly wage paid by full-outsourcing and control establishments for 2024-2024. Full outsourcing establishments had higher total profit-sharing contributions than control firms in both absolute and per worker terms. On average, profit-sharing per worker amounted to approximately half of the monthly wage for full outsourcing establishments, with slightly lower values for the control group.

6.2.3 Effect on employment

We evaluate Prediction **Prediction 1** of the model by estimating the effect on total firm employment (the sum of outsourced and in-house workers). Figure 8 presents the estimated θ_k from Equation 10 for the natural logarithm of total employment in full outsourcing establishments. The coefficients prior to the reform are not statistically different from zero and do not exhibit pre-trends. The post-reform coefficients indicate that the reform had no significant effect on total employment in full outsourcing establishments.⁴⁸ Table 3 reports the average treatment effect for the post-reform period, showing null effects for total workers, log total workers, and log average hours worked. Thus, on average, full outsourcing establishments insourced all workers after the reform, and did not alter their growth rate in the post-reform period. Interpreted through the lens of **Prediction 1** in the model, the absence of significant employment effects is consistent with a low marginal cost of outsourcing c .

Figure A.5 demonstrates that the results are robust across a range of alternative specifications of Equation 10. Specifically, the estimates are robust to (i) restricting the treated group to establishments that complied with the reform, (ii) limiting the sample to single-establishment firms (iii) constructing the treatment variable using a two-year pre-reform window instead of one, and (iv) estimating the regression on an unbalanced panel of establishments.

6.2.4 Effect on wages

In this section we evaluate the impact of the reform on worker wages, without including profit-sharing income. The red lines in Figure 9 plot θ_k from estimating worker-level Equation 11 where the outcome variable is the annual average of workers' daily wages, while the estimates are displayed in column 1 of Table A.6. We do not find evidence of significant pre-trends before the reform. Starting in 2022, which is the first full year post-reform and coincides with the initial disbursement of profit-sharing to treated workers, we observe a decrease in the real wages of treated workers relative to the control group. Treated worker's average daily real wages decreased by an average of approximately 9 Mexican pesos between 2022 and 2024 relative to control workers. This represents approximately 2% of the

⁴⁷Figure A.8 shows no significant effects on either investment levels or value added per worker following the reform. This suggests that the increase in profit-sharing neither discouraged investment nor improved firm productivity, consistent with the findings of Nimier-David et al. (2023).

⁴⁸It can be noted in that standard errors get smaller for coefficients closer to the left out time period. This is because our outcome variable is measured at the quarterly level and exhibits high serial correlation within establishments. As the coefficients are expressed in *relative* terms with respect to period -1, the residual variation in the outcome variable is lower for periods close to -1, resulting in lower standard errors.

average real daily wage of treated workers in the year prior to reform. Columns 2 and 3 of Table A.6 shows a 3% decline in average log wages, and a 4% decline when the outcome is the annual wage relative to the wage in 2020. Importantly, the observed negative effect is driven by a slower rate of wage growth, rather than nominal wage reductions. Indeed, the average nominal wage among treated workers increased approximately 12% per year in the post reform period.⁴⁹

Figure 10 reports the effects of the reform on establishment-level wage measures from Equation 12, with corresponding estimates for the post-reform period displayed in Table A.5. We find negative wage effects for both mean and median wages, but no effect at the 99th percentile of the within-establishment distribution, potentially because high earners are not eligible for profit-sharing. The wage decline is more pronounced lower in the wage distribution (relative to pre-reform wages), leading to a reduction in the 25/75 percentile ratio. Overall, these results are consistent with firms adjusting wages according to the share of profit-sharing in each worker’s base pay, implying that lower-wage workers, who receive larger profit-sharing payments relative to wages, experienced the largest downward adjustments. Finally, we find no effect on the relative wages of new hires compared to incumbents. Since it is typically easier for firms to adjust the wages of new hires downward, this null result provides additional evidence that wage rigidity is not a binding constraint on wage adjustments at these firms.

Columns 1 to 3 of Table A.4 show that the results are robust to alternative worker-level samples. In column 1 we include workers with only 1 year of tenure and workers that that did not stay at the same firm after 2021. In column 2 we extend the control group to include non-insourced workers working in firms that insourced other workers. In column 3 we exclude workers earning less than 1.5 times the average minimum wage in the pre-reform year, to isolate the effect of the strong increases in the minimum wage between 2019 and 2024 in Mexico, which could impact our results if treated and control workers are differentially exposed to the minimum wage. Results are also robust to this specification. Columns 4 and 5 show that the results are robust to the inclusion of alternative fixed effects. Finally, column 4 of Table 5 shows that the negative effect on worker wages persists when leveraging within-stratum variation using Equation 13. Column 6 confirms that the coefficients are identical when the regression is estimated on data aggregated to the stratum level, as discussed in Section 6.1.3.

Thus, our findings suggest that treated firms adjusted wage growth in response to the new profit-sharing obligations they had to meet. Wage measures in social security data encompass additional income components, such as commissions and performance-based bonuses. Therefore, it is possible that firms made adjustments through these aspects of compensation, rather than altering fixed monthly wages.⁵⁰

⁴⁹2022 and 2023 witnessed relatively high average nominal wage growth driven by elevated inflation rates and substantial increases in the minimum wage.

⁵⁰Anecdotal evidence (El Economista, 2022) suggests that post-reform firms made adjustments to different components of compensation.

6.2.5 Effect on total worker compensation

We now evaluate [Prediction 2](#) by estimating the effect of the reform on total compensation, which encompasses both wages and profit-sharing income. [Prediction 2](#) states that an increase in total compensation would be consistent with firms facing a labor supply that is less elastic to profit-sharing than to wages. Given that after the reform profit-sharing increased, but wages decreased for treated workers, the implications for total compensation are a priori ambiguous.

Figure 9 presents the estimated effect on total compensation from worker-level regression 13. Despite the negative effect on wages, total compensation for treated workers increased once firms began complying with profit-sharing, and the effect remains positive and significant four years after the reform. Between 2022 and 2024, average daily total compensation for treated workers rose by 16 pesos, corresponding to approximately a 3% increase relative to the treated group’s pre-reform compensation. The plotted results are shown in column 5 of Table 5, while column 7 confirms that we obtain numerically identical coefficients when estimating the regression at the stratum level using Equation 14, rather than at the individual level, as discussed in Section 6.1.3. Overall, the results show that the wage reductions documented in the previous section were more than offset by the gains from profit-sharing, leading to a net increase in total compensation.

Columns 6 and 7 of Table A.4 show that the results are robust to alternative fixed effects and to an alternative way of measuring profit-sharing per worker.⁵¹ Furthermore, as mentioned in Section 4.2, it is unlikely that contracting firms provided workers with profit-sharing contributions before the reform, justifying our assumption of zero profit-sharing payments for treated workers pre-reform. Nonetheless, in Figure A.6, we show that the results are robust to less stringent assumptions, namely that treated workers’ profit-sharing income pre-reform was a fraction p of their post reform profit-sharing.

Finally, Figure 11 shows the effect on total compensation from estimating establishment-level regression 12, replacing establishment fixed effects with stratum fixed effects (analogous to 13 but at the establishment level), together with the establishment-level wage effects. Corresponding estimates are in columns 1 and 5 of Table A.6. We again observe a rise in total worker compensation of approximately 3% relative to the pre-reform mean. The dynamics differ somewhat from the worker-level results, which may partly reflect differences in sample composition. Another potential explanation is that, while the establishment-level results include outcomes across both incumbent workers and new hires, the worker-level specification follows tenured workers over time, who may gradually learn about profit-sharing, allowing firms to make larger downward wage adjustments.

Referring back to [Prediction 2](#), these findings align with the presence of risk aversion and/or information frictions that make workers less sensitive to profit-sharing than to wages. As a consequence, firms affected by the reform did not fully offset the rise in profit-sharing payments through lower wage growth. As a first assessment of the risk-aversion channel, we compare wage and compensation effects across sectors with high and low profit-sharing volatility. If risk aversion were an important determinant of inelasticity to profit-sharing, total compensation should rise more in high-volatility

⁵¹We compute the weighted average of total profit-sharing in each cell from EMIM (instead of profit-sharing per worker). We then calculate average profit-sharing per worker for each cell as the average total profit-sharing (from EMIM) divided by the average firm size measured with IMSS data.

sectors. Figure A.7 shows little evidence of differential impacts: the reform’s effects on wages and total compensation are very similar across both types of sectors, with slightly larger increases in low-volatility sectors. This pattern suggests that risk aversion is unlikely to be the main factor behind workers’ weak responsiveness to profit-sharing. To assess its role more precisely, we next examine the reform’s effect on the risk-adjusted value of total compensation introduced in Prediction 3.

6.2.6 Effect on risk-adjusted value of worker compensation

Prediction 3 states that if the rise in total compensation shown in Figure 9 were solely to compensate workers for higher risk, the effect of the reform on the value of total compensation, once accounting for risk, would be significantly lower, or zero in the case of a low marginal cost of outsourcing c .⁵² We evaluate Prediction 3 and estimate the impact of the reform on the risk-adjusted value of worker compensation, defined as:

$$w_j + \alpha \mathbb{E}[ps_j] \quad (15)$$

where w_j is the wage, $\mathbb{E}[ps_j]$ is expected profit-sharing, and α is the value workers assign to each peso of uncertain profit-sharing relative to a guaranteed peso. A lower α reflects stronger risk discounting. In other words, this outcome represents the amount of certain compensation workers would be willing to accept to avoid the uncertainty in profit-sharing. To calculate the effect on the risk-adjusted value of total compensation, we empirically estimate α under different risk aversion assumptions and plug this empirical estimate into the expression in 15 to obtain a measure of the risk-adjusted value of total compensation for each worker.

The parameter α can be expressed as (see Section D.1.1):

$$\alpha = \frac{CE^{ps}}{\mathbb{E}[ps]}$$

where CE^{ps} is the certainty equivalent of profit-sharing. Its value depends on the volatility of wages and profit-sharing and on workers’ risk aversion. Therefore, to estimate α we proceed in three steps, detailed in Appendix C.1 and summarized here.⁵³ First, we estimate the certainty equivalent of profit-sharing \widehat{CE}_i^{ps} for each worker in the control group, under a CRRA utility function, using annual data on wages and profit-sharing from 2018 to 2024. This procedure is repeated for different levels of relative risk aversion, $\gamma \in [1 : 5]$, a range consistent with empirical estimates.⁵⁴ This step provides us with five measures of \widehat{CE}_i^{ps} for each worker in the control group, one for each risk aversion parameter. Second, we compute the ratio of the certainty equivalent to the average amount of profit-

⁵²As indicated in section 6.2.3 the null effect on employment is suggestive of a low c .

⁵³It is important to note that, since $\hat{\alpha}$ is calculated using the sample of control workers, this approach may underestimate the risk-discount if profits of fully outsourcing firms were significantly more volatile than those of control firms. We test this empirically and our results show that fully outsourcing establishments were significantly (at the 95% confidence level) *less* likely to experience changes of more than 2%, 5%, 10%, or 20% from one year to the next in the pre-reform period. Thus, if anything, fully outsourcing establishments exhibited lower profit volatility compared to the control.

⁵⁴Brown et al. (2019), using data from the Mexican Family Life Survey, nationally representative of the Mexican population, estimate that the median relative risk aversion in their sample is below 3.8.

sharing received by each worker $\hat{\alpha}_i = \frac{CE_i^{ps}}{ps_i}$. We then take the average $\hat{\alpha}_i$ across workers to compute $\hat{\alpha}$. We compute this average for each level of risk aversion. The estimates can be seen in row 1 of Table C.1. For instance, for a risk aversion of 2, one peso of profit-sharing is worth approximately 92 cents to workers on average. For a high risk aversion of 5, one peso of profit-sharing is worth approximately 85 cents. Third, we use the $\hat{\alpha}$ estimates reported in the first row of Table C.1 to construct the risk-adjusted value of total compensation for each worker:

$$\text{risk-adjusted value of total compensation}_{it} = w_{it} + \hat{\alpha} \cdot ps_{it}$$

Figure 12 plots the estimated effects of the reform on the risk-adjusted value of total compensation from the worker-level specification in Equation 13, under the assumption of relative risk aversion parameter $\gamma \in 1, 3, 5$. Table A.7 reports the corresponding post-reform averages for the range $\gamma \in [1, 5]$. We can see that the reform had a positive impact on the risk-adjusted value of total compensation, which is robust to conservative measures of risk aversion. For example, assuming a high risk aversion of 5, the average risk-adjusted value of daily compensation post-reform increased by a significant 13 pesos post-reform, approximately 2% relative to the pre-reform mean. Therefore, for this conservative risk aversion level, one-third of the increase in total compensation post reform can be explained by compensation to workers for the higher risk involved in profit-sharing. To eliminate the estimated post-reform effect on the risk-adjusted value of total compensation, $\hat{\alpha}$ would need to fall to at least 0.45 (see Table A.7). This corresponds to a relative risk aversion coefficient of approximately 18, which is implausibly high.⁵⁵

Importantly, these results imply that workers benefited from the reform because the increase in total compensation exceeded what would be required to offset the added income risk from profit-sharing. Returning to Prediction 3, this suggests that information frictions related to profit-sharing contribute to workers' inelasticity to this benefit. In the following section we provide empirical evidence on these information frictions.

6.2.7 Heterogeneous effects by levels of misinformation

Having shown that it is unlikely that risk aversion can fully explain workers' inelasticity to profit-sharing, we now provide evidence consistent with the role of information frictions in driving down this elasticity. As shown in Prediction 2, the increase in total compensation post-reform should be higher when μ is lower, i.e. when workers are more poorly informed about profit-sharing. This is because workers' low knowledge about profit-sharing makes them less elastic to this benefit, and thus prevents firms from being able to adjust for the profit-sharing increase post-reform by lowering wages.

We provide suggestive evidence for this prediction by comparing changes in total compensation across plants whose workforces are likely to be more or less informed about profit-sharing. We proxy this measure by comparing plants in local labor markets where many workers receive profit-sharing,

⁵⁵We estimate the level of risk aversion required for $\alpha = 0.45$ using a second order degree approximation of α from Equation 20. This expression implies that $\frac{1-\alpha(\gamma=\gamma^*)}{1-\alpha(\gamma=x)} \approx \frac{\gamma^*}{x}$. Replacing γ^* by 5 and $\alpha(\gamma=x)$ by 0.45 and using the values in Table C.1 we obtain $x \approx 18$.

with those where few workers receive profit-sharing. Specifically, we use the 2018 Economic Census to compute the share of workers employed at establishments not paying profit-sharing in each local labor market, defined as municipality \times 3-digit NAICS sector,⁵⁶ and merge this measure to the social security data. We then estimate the reform’s effect on wages and total compensation separately for plants located in local labor markets with above- and below-median shares of workers not receiving profit-sharing. The underlying assumption behind this analysis is that workers who do not receive profit-sharing are less informed about this benefit.⁵⁷ Therefore, firms in local labor markets where few workers receive profit-sharing are exposed to a labor supply that is less informed about profit-sharing.

Figure 13 shows the effect of the reform on establishment-level wages and total compensation for establishments located in labor markets with high and low exposure to profit-sharing. Coefficients are plotted relative to the pre-reform mean for the treated group to facilitate comparison. The results indicate that firms operating in markets with a low share of workers receiving profit-sharing adjust wages by less (Panel a) and therefore experience a larger increase in total compensation (Panel b) compared to firms in markets with higher profit-sharing levels. Interpreted through the lens of Prediction 2, these findings are consistent with the notion that when workers are less informed about profit-sharing, their labor supply is less elastic with respect to this benefit. This lower elasticity constrains firms’ ability to offset profit-sharing through wage reductions, leading to larger increases in total compensation.

7 Evidence on information frictions in profit-sharing

In this section, we present empirical evidence on information frictions stemming from limited awareness and understanding of profit-sharing. We distinguish between two types of information frictions. First, many workers are not well informed about profit-sharing. Second, we show evidence of information processing frictions related to complexity of profit-sharing calculations. We provide evidence consistent with both types of frictions contributing to a low elasticity of labor supply to profit-sharing ($\mu < 1$).

The analysis draws on a self-administered survey conducted through the online platform Prolific in August 2025. The survey includes multiple questions designed to identify information frictions related to profit-sharing and to measure how these frictions correlate with job decisions. The sample consists of 638 individuals in Mexico who are either employed or unemployed but actively seeking work. Table A.8 reports descriptive statistics for this survey and compares them with a nationally representative sample from Mexico’s National Employment Survey (ENOE) for the third quarter of 2024. Relative to ENOE, our survey sample is somewhat younger, includes a higher share of women, and overrepresents formal workers as well as those employed in large firms. Workers in our sample are also more likely to report receiving profit-sharing from their current employer. Therefore, if anything,

⁵⁶This share is computed excluding the workers in full-outsourcing firms, as these workers did receive profit-sharing post-reform. As explained in Section 2, firms with very low profits, new firms, or firms carrying out certain types of activities are not subject to profit-sharing obligations.

⁵⁷We provide evidence in line with this assumption in self-collected survey data described in Section 7, where we find that individuals that have not received profit-sharing in the past are significantly less informed about it.

the evidence presented in this section is likely to understate the extent of information frictions around profit-sharing in the broader Mexican labor force.

7.1 Limited awareness of profit-sharing

Previous literature has highlighted the role of misinformation and inattention in shaping workers' decisions to switch employers (Robinson, 1933; Jäger et al., 2023; Roussille, 2024), health insurance plan selection (Handel and Kolstad, 2015), and savings choices (Chetty et al., 2014). These studies show how such information frictions can make workers less responsive to changes in these options due to their lack of awareness or attention. We show that similar frictions, related to low awareness and salience of profit-sharing, are present in our context.

We begin by providing summary statistics from the survey sample showing that workers are poorly informed about profit-sharing. Table 6 shows that nearly 20% of respondents reported not knowing what profit-sharing is. This complete lack of awareness is likely to affect workers' labor supply decisions, as it is highly unlikely that workers consider profit-sharing when making these decisions if they do not know what this benefit is. The remaining rows of the table restrict the analysis to workers who were aware of the existence of profit-sharing, to provide evidence of information frictions among this group. Almost 40% of respondents do not know how profit-sharing is distributed within the firm. Interestingly, among workers employed by firms paying profit-sharing, over 80% indicated that their employer did not give them precise information on profit-sharing—either not mentioning it at all or not indicating how much this benefit could be approximately—during the hiring process. This suggests that even employers who provide profit-sharing do not make an effort to inform their workers on this benefit. Panel B shows that workers were more likely to answer incorrectly when asked about profit-sharing regulations than when asked about the rules for the minimum wage, vacation, or the 13th-month salary (aguinaldo).⁵⁸ Additionally, all of these measures of misinformation are stronger among workers with earnings below 10,000 MXN, indicating that information frictions may be more prevalent among low income workers.

Furthermore, we show evidence suggesting that limited information on profit-sharing plays a role in workers' assessment of job offers. Panel C of Table 6 reports the share of workers selecting different job attributes when asked what job characteristics they considered when choosing their current job. Profit-sharing was selected by only 17% of respondents. Among those not considering profit-sharing, almost 40% stated that this was due to lack of information or because they did not understand the benefit well, and 17% indicated that they had simply forgotten about it when evaluating their job offer. By contrast, only 20% reported that they did not consider profit-sharing because of the volatility of the benefit, and fewer than 5% pointed to the fact that it is paid as a lump sum in May rather than spread across the year.⁵⁹ Taken together this evidence suggests that workers do not place much weight on profit-sharing when making labor supply decisions, and that this attitude is associated with

⁵⁸The survey asked workers about: the size of the aguinaldo, the number of mandatory vacation days, the minimum wage in Mexico, the proportion of firm profits distributed as profit-sharing, and which firms are required to distribute profit-sharing.

⁵⁹Respondents could select more than one option in both the question on job attributes considered and in the question referring to why they did not consider profit-sharing.

their lack of understanding of the benefit.

To further examine the relationship between misinformation and inelasticity to profit-sharing, we evaluate whether workers who are poorly informed about profit-sharing are less likely to report considering this benefit when evaluating their current job offer. Specifically, we estimate regressions where the outcome is an indicator equal to one if the worker reported taking profit-sharing into account when accepting their current job (Panel C of Table 6). Explanatory variables are binary indicators of misinformation: incorrect answers about legal rules (share of profits, firms subject), not knowing which workers are eligible, not knowing how profit-sharing is distributed, reporting no information from the employer, not knowing how much profit-sharing they could receive elsewhere, or reporting that profit-sharing is complex. Figure 14 shows that misinformation is consistently associated with a lower likelihood of considering profit-sharing. Analogous regressions where the outcome indicated whether the respondent took into account wages and vacation days when selecting their job show no such pattern. These correlations indicate that workers with higher information frictions are less responsive to profit-sharing, consistent with a lower μ .

A natural question that arises is why workers in Mexico are often misinformed about profit-sharing. One likely explanation is that only a minority of workers in Mexico are employed at firms that pay this benefit. According to data from the Economic Census, in 2018 69% of workers in Mexico were employed at firms that did not provide profit-sharing, and full-outsourcing establishments were located in local labor markets where, on average, 77% of workers were also employed in firms that did not pay profit-sharing.⁶⁰ The high share of workers excluded from profit-sharing likely contributes to a general lack of awareness about this benefit.

7.2 Information processing frictions

Second, we show evidence consistent with the presence of information processing frictions. Recent work in Behavioral Economics by Enke et al. (2024) has shown that people’s decisions are less sensitive to changes relevant parameters when these decisions involve some level of complexity. In line with these findings, we argue that the calculation of profit-sharing creates complexity that reduces the weight workers assign to this component of compensation when evaluating job offers. In our survey, 50% of participants who reported knowing what profit-sharing is indicated that it is more complex to understand their expected profit-sharing than their expected wage.

To test the role of complexity, we implemented a hypothetical job-offer experiment with a subsample of 304 participants.⁶¹ We presented participants with four different job offers, each specifying wages and profit-sharing amounts. Workers were asked to rank these job offers from the best to the worst offer. At the beginning of this exercise, we explained how profit-sharing is calculated and instructed workers to consider it when performing this ranking. Each individual completed the ranking exercise more than once, with the same four job offers presented under different complexity

⁶⁰Local labor market is defined as a municipality \times 2-digit NAICS sector cell. These high proportions are not solely the result of avoidance through full-outsourcing. Most firms that do not pay profit-sharing do not outsource and are likely legally exempt from this requirement (see Section 2 for details).

⁶¹The experiment was pre-registered in the AEA RCT Registry (AEARCTR-0015228).

conditions. In the high-complexity condition, we provided information on firm profits, the number of workers, and wages, requiring respondents to calculate their profit-sharing income and add it to wages. In the low-complexity condition, we directly stated both wages and profit-sharing amounts. The four job offers were designed so that: (i) options with the first and second highest total compensation offered lower wages but higher profit-sharing than the third option; (ii) the option with the third highest compensation provided the highest wage; and (iii) the lowest total compensation option had the second-highest wage. This structure allows us to test whether workers shift toward higher-wage but lower-total-compensation offers when faced with greater complexity.⁶²

We then compare how workers ranked job offers in the high and low complexity scenarios. Therefore, this experiment leverages within-respondent variation. We focus the analysis on workers who indicated that they knew what profit-sharing is at the beginning of the survey. Panel (a) of Figure 15 displays difference in the share of workers who ranked each option first across the two complexity levels. Offers are ordered in the x-axis from highest to lowest total compensation. In high-complexity scenario, workers are less likely to choose the option with the highest total compensation as their top choice. This in itself may not be surprising: respondents made ranking errors more frequently when the task required additional calculations. The more interesting pattern, however, is that the option that replaced it was not the second-best in terms of total compensation, but rather the third-best, which corresponds to the offer with the highest wage. This pattern suggests that complexity shifts individuals to place greater weight on wages relative to profit-sharing when evaluating job offers. Panel (b) complements this finding by showing the difference in the share of workers ranking each offer second across complexity levels. The complex setting makes workers more likely to rank the second-highest wage option second, despite it being the offer with the lowest total compensation.

Taken together our evidence suggests that there exist frictions in availability and processing of information related to profit-sharing among workers. These frictions seem to affect labor supply decisions by making workers less elastic to profit-sharing.

8 Conclusion

This paper examines firms' incentives to circumvent mandatory profit-sharing and the effects of enforcement in settings where wages can also be adjusted. Using rich establishment survey data and social security data, we document and characterize a phenomenon where a significant number of firms circumvented mandatory profit-sharing obligations by outsourcing all of their workers to entities with minimal profits. This practice was predominant among large, productive and profitable firms, which largely benefited from avoiding profit-sharing costs. We then show that a reform which enforced profit-sharing by imposing strict restrictions on outsourcing caused establishments to partially offset profit-sharing increases by lowering worker wages relative to a control group. However, this compensation was not complete, and total labor compensation, i.e. wages + profit-sharing per worker increased by around 3% post reform with no effects on total employment. Additionally, we show that

⁶²Workers were asked to assume no uncertainty in firm profits and that all workers were eligible for profit-sharing. We performed this exercise for two different sets of four job offers. Workers were assigned randomly to one of these sets. Results for the two sets of job offers are aggregated in the analysis.

the increase in total compensation exceeded what would be required to offset the added income risk from profit-sharing, implying that workers gained from the enforcement policy.

Our results are consistent with a labor market in which profit-sharing and wages are imperfect substitutes. This imperfect substitution stems from the labor supply function: workers are less sensitive to changes in profit-sharing compensation than to wages when making labor supply decisions. This difference in elasticities can explain why certain firms found it optimal to circumvent profit-sharing, rather than lower wages; *and* why the restriction of outsourcing increased profit-sharing and total worker compensation, without having a negative effect on employment. We build on results from prior literature and self-collected survey evidence to show that an important factor underlying this inelasticity is the prevalence of information frictions regarding profit-sharing. Therefore, before the reform, firms were leveraging these information frictions to circumvent profit-sharing without compensating workers with higher wages, while enforcement of profit-sharing benefited workers.

Finally, our results can also provide new insights on whether policies targeting avoidance of non-wage benefits are beneficial for workers. Policy discussions increasingly highlight that other non-wage benefits, including health insurance and pension contributions are avoided by firms through labor arrangements like independent contracting or informal labor. These benefits may be complex to understand and insufficiently salient to workers, suggesting that information frictions could also play a role in these settings. Understanding how information frictions influence firms' avoidance behavior and shape the impact of enforcement policies remains an important direction for future research.

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
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
Figures

Figure 1: Distribution in the proportion of outsourced workers pre-reform




Notes: This figure plots a histogram with the average share of workers outsourced between April 2020 and March 2021 (the 12 months before the outsourcing reform was approved) by each establishment in our EMIM dataset which has positive outsourcing in at least one month on the year prior to the reform.

Figure 2: Cost per in-house worker over cost per outsourced worker, by share outsourced




Notes: This figure plots the relationship between the cost average of in-house workers relative to the average cost of outsource workers, and outsourcing share. For each establishment, we compute the ratio of the average cost per in-house worker over the average cost per outsourced worker, in the pre-2020 period. We plot the average of this ratio against the proportion of workers outsourced in each establishment, rounded to the nearest 0.05. The shaded red area corresponds to establishments outsourcing over 95% of their workers.

Figure 3: Number of workers in an insourcing event (thousands)



Notes: This figure shows the number of workers amongst all workers in IMSS involved in a movement between establishments (A and B) where the flow consisted of 20 employees or more *or* establishment A lost more than 40% of its workers that month (condition (ii) in Section 3.2), and establishment A and B do not belong to the same firm (condition (iii) in Section 3.2) on each month between February and December 2021. The shaded area are the worker movements classified as insourcing events with the additional condition that the flow occurred between June and September (condition (i) in Section 3.2).

Figure 4: Monthly profit sharing per worker pre reform




Notes: This figure plots the average monthly profit sharing per worker in thousands of Mexican Pesos for each group of establishments. The peaks in each year correspond to May, which is when profit sharing is disbursed in Mexico. The series is built with balanced establishment-level panel dataset from EMIM. No outsourcing establishments are those that did not outsource employees in the year prior to the reform, partial outsourcing establishments have positive outsourcing but less than 95% of their workforce. Full outsourcing are establishments outsourcing more than 95% of their workforce pre reform. [Back to Section 4.2]

Figure 5: Full outsourcing and productivity measures




Notes: These figures plot the share of full outsourcing establishments across the deciles of different variables for 2018. The value of the y axis in each graph is the proportion of full outsourcing establishments in a particular decile of the distribution of that variable. They are built using establishment level data from EMIM and the 2018 Economic Census. Panel (a) plots deciles of value added Panel (b) plots the deciles of firm size, computed as number of workers at the firm (c) plots value added divided by total workers (d) plots value added divided by total machines.

Figure 6: Effect of the reform on outsourcing




Notes: This figure plots the β_k from Equation 10 and 95% confidence intervals. The estimation is carried out on a balanced panel of establishments from EMIM between 2018 and 2023. Treatment group includes establishments outsourcing over 95% of workers before the reform (full outsourcing). Control group includes establishments with no outsourcing before the reform. Establishments with positive outsourcing before the reform, but lower than 95% (partial outsourcing) are excluded from the estimation. The outcome variables in panel a are the share of workers outsourced by the establishment, and a binary variable equal to one if the establishment was outsourcing more than 95% of workers. The outcome variable in panel b is the number of inhouse workers of the establishment. β_{Q42020} is normalized to 0. Standard errors are clustered at the establishment level. [Back to Section 6.2.1]

Figure 7: Effect of the reform on profit sharing




(a) Monthly profit sharing per worker



(b) Diff in diff coeff. - Yearly profit sharing per worker


Notes: Panel (a) shows average real monthly profit sharing per worker in thousands of Mexican pesos for control establishments and full outsourcing establishments. The series is constructed using a balanced sample of establishments from EMIM. The peaks in each year correspond to may, when profit sharing is typically disbursed. Panel (b) shows the difference in differences coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from estimating Equation 10 aggregating establishment data at the yearly level. The treatment group includes establishments outsourcing more than 95% of their workers pre-reform. The control group are establishments not using outsourcing pre-reform. The outcome variable is real yearly profit sharing per worker in thousands of mexican pesos. Standard errors are clustered at the establishment level. Partial outsourcing establishment, i.e. those with positive outsourcing $< 95\%$ pre-reform are excluded from the sample in both figures. [Back to Section 6.2.2]

Figure 8: Effect on total number of workers




Notes: This figure plots the β_k from Equation 10 and 95% confidence intervals. The estimation is carried out on a balanced panel of establishments from EMIM between 2018 and 2023. Treatment group includes establishments outsourcing over 95% of workers before the reform (full outsourcing). Control group includes establishments with no outsourcing before the reform. Establishments with positive outsourcing before the reform, but lower than 95% (partial outsourcing) are excluded from the estimation. The outcome variable is the log of the total number of workers (outsourced + in-house). β_{Q42020} is normalized to 0. Standard errors are clustered at the establishment level. [Back to Section 6.2.3]

Figure 9: Effect of the reform on yearly wage and total compensation - Worker level




Notes: This figure shows the estimated θ_k and 95% confidence intervals from estimating Equation 11 on the yearly average of worker daily wages (red), and the estimated α_k and 95% CI from Equation 13 on daily total compensation (blue). The shaded grey area represents the year in which the outsourcing reform was approved. Regressions are estimated on a balanced sample of workers from IMSS described in Section 6.1.2. Standard errors are clustered at the establishment level. [Back to Section 6.2.4]

Figure 10: Effect on the within establishment wage distribution




Notes: This figure shows the estimated effects of the outsourcing reform on several measures of the within-firm wage distribution. Regressions are based on Equation 12. Outcomes are measured annually and include: (1) average firm wage; (2) median firm wage; (3) 99th percentile of the firm wage distribution; (4) the ratio of the 25th to the 75th percentile of the firm wage distribution; and (5) the ratio of the mean wage of new hires in a given year to the mean wage of incumbents employed since 2018. Regressions are estimated on the balanced IMSS establishment sample described in Section 6.1.2. Standard errors are clustered at the establishment level. [Back to Section 6.2.4]

Figure 11: Effect of the reform on yearly wage and total compensation - Establishment level




Notes: This figure shows the estimates δ_k and their 95% confidence intervals from estimating Equation 12 on the yearly average daily wages (red) and daily total compensation (wage + profit sharing) (blue). The shaded grey area represents the year in which the outsourcing reform was approved. Regressions are estimated on a balanced sample of establishments from IMSS described in Section 6.1.2. Standard errors are clustered at the establishment level. [Back to Section 6.2.4]

Figure 12: Effect on value of total compensation under different risk aversion values




Notes: This figure shows the estimates α_k and their 95% confidence intervals from estimating Equation 13 on the yearly average of the risk-adjusted value of worker daily total compensation, which is defined as $wage + \hat{\alpha} * profit\ sharing\ income$. The series shown in different shades of blue construct the outcome using alternative values of $\hat{\alpha}$ implied by distinct relative risk-aversion parameters γ (see Table C.1, row 1). The shaded grey area represents the year in which the outsourcing reform was approved. Regressions are estimated on a balanced sample of workers from IMSS described in Section 6.1.2. Standard errors are clustered at the establishment level. [Back to Section 6.2.6]

Figure 13: Effect on wage and total compensation - Heterogeneity by misinformation levels




Notes: This figure shows the estimates δ_k and their 95% confidence intervals from estimating Equation 12 on the yearly average daily wages (panel a) and daily total compensation (panel b). The coefficients and standard errors are expressed relative to the average compensation of treated workers in 2020. The shaded grey area represents the year in which the outsourcing reform was approved. Regressions are estimated on a balanced sample of establishments from IMSS described in Section 6.1.2. Establishments are divided into two groups based on a proxy for misinformation in the local labor market. ‘High misinformation LLM’ (‘Less misinformation LLM’) corresponds to establishments in LLM with above-median (below-median) share of workers not receiving profit-sharing in 2018. Standard errors are clustered at the establishment level. [Back to Section 6.2.7]

Figure 14: Correlation between profit-sharing misinformation and relevant job characteristics



Notes: This figure uses data from a self-administered survey of Mexican workers conducted in August 2025 (N = 638). Each panel reports coefficients from separate regressions where the outcome variable equals 1 if the worker selected a given benefit, profit-sharing (PTU), salary, vacation, as a response to the question: ‘When you chose to accept your current job, which of the benefits below did you take into account to evaluate whether the company’s offer was good or not? Please check all that apply.’ The explanatory variables capture different forms of misinformation or lack of knowledge about profit-sharing: giving incorrect answers about the legal formula (PTU as a share of profits or which firms are subject), not knowing which workers are eligible, not knowing how PTU is distributed, reporting that the firm provided no information, not knowing how much PTU they could receive if they changed jobs, or believing that PTU is complex to understand. All regressions include fixed effects for eight salary categories. [Back to Section 7]

Figure 15: Difference between high and low complexity scenarios in job offers ranking



Notes: The figure is based on data from a self-administered survey of Mexican workers conducted in August 2025. The sample includes respondents who reported knowing what profit-sharing is and who completed a hypothetical job-offer exercise with varying levels of complexity ($N = 304$). Each worker was asked to rank four job offers that differed in wages and profit-sharing. In the high-complexity condition, workers had to calculate the profit-sharing amounts themselves, whereas in the low-complexity condition these amounts were provided. Offers are ordered along the x-axis from highest to lowest total compensation. Panel a shows the difference in the share of workers ranking each option 1st between the high and low complexity scenarios. Panel b shows the difference in the share of workers ranking each option 2nd between the high and low complexity scenarios. Both panels include 95% confidence intervals of the estimated differences. [Back to Section 7]

Tables

Table 1: Summary Statistics on EMIM establishments by outsourcing use - 2018

Variable	Full Outsourcing	Partial Outsourcing	Control	All
N	1629	855	5581	8065
Total workers at establishment	410	547	399	417
Prop workers outsourced	0.96	0.23	0.01	0.23
Estab. outsourcing > 95%	0.97	0.03	0.01	0.21
Profit	407 607	309 614	150 265	216 727
Profit per worker	1099	440	429	566
Value added per worker	1808	861	816	1021
Investment per worker	65	41	23	34
Foreign	0.42	0.48	0.31	0.35
Prop. women	0.28	0.33	0.34	0.32
Prop white collar	0.27	0.24	0.21	0.23
Profit sharing	46	3855	3036	2519
Registered in IMSS	0.27	0.93	0.9	0.78

Notes: This table displays the average value of different variables across the three different outsourcing groups and for all establishments in EMIM. Figures are computed using 2018 data from EMIM and the Economic Census. Nominal variables are in thousands of Mexican Pesos (2018 value). Full outsourcing establishments are those outsourcing more than 95% of their workers in the year pre-reform (2020). Partial outsourcing establishments are those with positive outsourcing but less than 95% of their workers in the year pre-reform. Control establishments are those not outsourcing in the year pre-reform.

Table 2: Difference in Differences estimates - Profit sharing

	(1) Profit sharing	(2) Profit sharing / L
<i>Pre-reform years</i>		
2018	-98.25 (60.84)	-0.74* (0.3927)
2019	-164.3*** (47.45)	-0.48*** (0.1284)
<i>Post-reform years</i>		
2021	32.60 (63.68)	0.27 (0.1662)
2022	2,846.3*** (207.2)	6.96*** (0.4826)
2023	3,107.9*** (219.6)	7.75*** (0.4587)
2024	3,295.4*** (225.7)	8.47*** (0.5490)
Observations	47,096	47,093

Notes: This table shows the estimated β_k from Equation 10. Estimation on the balanced sample of establishments in EMIM from 2018 to 2024, where we aggregate the data at the yearly level for each establishment. The treatment group includes establishments outsourcing more than 95% of their workers pre-reform. The control group are establishments not using outsourcing pre-reform. The outcome variable is yearly profit sharing in column (1), and yearly profit sharing over total workers in column (2). Both variables are in thousands of mexican pesos. Both specifications include establishment fixed effects and year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the establishment level are in parenthesis. Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1 [Back to Section 6.2.2]

Table 3: Difference in Differences estimates - Employment

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>Panel A: First Stage</i>				
	Share outsourced	Any outsource	Outsource > 95%	Number outsourced
Post Reform * Full-outsourcing	-0.5895*** (0.0072)	-0.5382*** (0.0082)	-0.6063*** (0.0072)	-210.0*** (5.937)
Observations	454,132	454,132	454,132	454,230
<i>Panel B: Employment outcomes</i>				
	In-house workers	Log(Total workers)	Total workers	Log(Avg hs worked)
Post Reform * Full-outsourcing	256.2*** (9.869)	0.0161* (0.0091)	4.066 (4.278)	0.0016 (0.0030)
Observations	454,230	454,132	454,230	450,887

Notes: This table reports the outsourcing reform's treatment effects. Post reform is an indicator equal to 1 from 2021 onwards. Estimation on the balanced sample of establishments in EMIM from 2018 to 2023. Treatment group includes establishments outsourcing over 95% of workers pre-reform. Control group includes establishments with no outsourcing in the year pre-reform. In Panel A the outcomes are (1) share of workers outsourced, (2) a binary variable = 1 if the establishment outsourced (3) is a binary = 1 if the establishment outsourced over 95% of employees (4) The number of workers outsourced. In Panel B the outcomes are (1) number of in-house workers (2) is log of total workers (outsourced + in-house) (3) total workers (4) average hours worked at the establishment. All specifications include establishment fixed effects, 3-digits NAICS sector x date fixed effects, state x data fixed effects and six size-group specific time trends. Standard errors clustered at the establishment level are in parenthesis. Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1 [Back to Section 6.2.3]

Table 4: Summary statistics on worker and establishment samples - IMSS 2018

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>Panel A: Worker sample</i>				
	Insourced by full outsourcing		Not insourced and firm not outsourcing	
	All	Reg. Sample	All	Reg. Sample
Daily wage	517	588	381	474
Age	35	37	37	38
Share women	0.3	0.27	0.36	0.35
Firm size	1328	1443	928	1145
Firm size post-reform	1487	1580	-	-
Observations	58 566	26 639	205 353	77 064
<i>Panel B: Establishment regression sample</i>				
	Full outsourcing		No outsourcing	
Estab. size	-	237	-	171
Avg daily wage	-	536	-	311
P25 daily wage	-	316	-	197
P75 daily wage	-	639	-	346
Observations	-	788	-	14828

Notes: This table shows the mean of different variables across the worker and establishment level samples from the social security data (IMSS) from 2018. The statistics in Panel A are based on a 10% random sample of workers in the manufacturing sector in 2021. Columns (2) and (4) restrict this sample to workers remaining at the same firm between 2018-24, and working for a firm with at least 20 workers, which is the sample used to estimate 11. The Columns 1-2 represent workers who were insourced by a full outsourcing establishment during the reform. The Columns 3-4 represent workers who were not insourced and were working for firms that were not using outsourcing (control group). The statistics in Panel B are based on a balanced sample of establishments from 2018-24 where full outsourcing establishments are restricted to those that had a 1-to-1 relation with contracting establishments, which is the sample used to estimate 12. Column 2 represents establishments that outsourced over 95% of their workers pre reform. Column 4 represents establishments that did not outsource pre-reform. Nominal variables are in Mexican pesos (2019 value). [Back to Section 6.1.2]

Table 5: Worker level difference in differences: wage and total compensation

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
<i>Outcome variable:</i>	Worker - level regressions					Cell - level regressions	
	Wage	Ln Wage	$\frac{Wage}{Wage_{2020}}$	Wage	Total Compensation	Wage	Total Compensation
Treat x Year = 2018	-3.702 (2.266)	0.0025 (0.0039)	-0.0011 (0.0035)	-1.776 (2.666)	-5.044* (2.797)	-1.776 (2.983)	-5.044 (3.397)
Treat x Year = 2019	-1.154 (1.674)	0.0014 (0.0029)	-0.0010 (0.0028)	0.6946 (2.060)	-1.352 (2.156)	0.6946 (2.333)	-1.352 (2.699)
Treat x Year = 2021	0.8023 (1.530)	-0.0007 (0.0024)	-0.0022 (0.0027)	1.540 (2.141)	0.8680 (2.174)	1.540 (2.649)	0.8680 (2.867)
Treat x Year = 2022	-5.346** (2.618)	-0.0172*** (0.0043)	-0.0175*** (0.0054)	-3.584 (3.170)	19.98*** (3.713)	-3.584 (4.233)	19.98*** (4.473)
Treat x Year = 2023	-9.641*** (2.611)	-0.0331*** (0.0044)	-0.0399*** (0.0058)	-8.908*** (3.403)	14.76*** (3.873)	-8.908** (4.439)	14.76*** (4.588)
Treat x Year = 2024	-12.87*** (3.157)	-0.0450*** (0.0054)	-0.0602*** (0.0076)	-11.99*** (4.039)	12.56*** (4.667)	-11.99** (4.856)	12.56** (5.514)
$\bar{\theta}_{2022-24}$	-9.3	-0.03	-0.04	-8.2	15.8	-8.2	15.8
$\bar{\theta}_{2022-24}$ as prop. of mean outcome treated 2020	-1.5%	-	-	-1.4%	2.6%	-1.4%	2.6%
Worker FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No
Stratum FE	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	725,921	725,921	725,921	725,921	647,867	14,629	13,030

Notes: This table shows the effects of the reform on worker wages and total compensation using worker level regressions. Columns (1) to (3) show the estimates from Equation 11. In Column (1) the outcome is the average real daily wage in year t (in MX pesos). In Column (2) the outcome is the natural logarithm of $wage_t$. In Column (3) the outcome is the wage as a proportion of the wage in 2020. Columns (4) and (5) show the estimates from Equation 13 on wages and total compensation ($wage_t + profit\ sharing_t$). Columns (6) to (7) estimate Equation 11 using data aggregated at the state x sector x size group x year level and weighting observations by the number of workers in the cell. In Column (6) the outcome is $wage_t$. In Column (7) the outcome is ($wage_t + profit\ sharing_t$) and the sample is restricted to the cells that could be merged with profit sharing data from INEGI. All specifications include sector x year FE, state x year FE and pre-reform firm size specific linear trends. Estimation is based on worker sample from social security data explained in Section 6.1.2. Standard errors for columns (1) to (5) are clustered at the establishment level and at the stratum level for Columns (6) and (7). Signif. Codes: ***, 0.01, **, 0.05, *, 0.1 [Back to Section 6.2.4]


Table 6: Descriptive results survey on information frictions by monthly salary

	Share of respondents		
	Below 10k	Above 10k	All
<i>Panel A: Questions on profit-sharing awareness</i>			
Does not know what profit sharing is	0.29	0.13	0.19
Does not know how profit-sharing is distributed*	0.39	0.37	0.38
Firm gave no info on profit-sharing but then paid it***	0.87	0.84	0.83
<i>Panel B: Responded correctly to question on:*</i>			
Total profit sharing as % of profits	0.35	0.38	0.38
Firms subject to profit-sharing	0.16	0.17	0.16
Minimum wage	0.76	0.71	0.72
Mandatory vacation days	0.49	0.7	0.63
Aguinaldo	0.63	0.88	0.79
<i>Panel C: When choosing where to work considered:*</i>			
Salary	0.61	0.81	0.74
Vacation days	0.2	0.36	0.31
Pension benefits	0.09	0.13	0.11
Training opportunities	0.31	0.36	0.34
Profit sharing	0.1	0.21	0.17
<i>Panel D: Did not consider profit-sharing because:**</i>			
Lack of information or does not understand	0.43	0.35	0.37
They forgot	0.24	0.15	0.17
Does not trust employer	0.12	0.13	0.13
It is volatile	0.14	0.24	0.21
It is paid lump-sum in May	0.05	0.04	0.04
<i>Panel E: If changed job, do you think the offered (..) would be same / higher / lower / don't know*</i>			
Does not know (wage)	0.05	0.04	0.05
Does not know (profit sharing)	0.31	0.2	0.23
Observations	188	417	638

Notes: This table provide summary statistics on the share of workers providing specific answers to questions by monthly wage group (above and below 10,000 MXN), and was constructed with data from a self-conducted survey on Mexican workers using Prolific (N = 638) in August 2025. (*) indicates that the sample is restricted to workers who know what profit-sharing is. (**) indicates that the sample is restricted to workers who know what profit-sharing is but did not take it into account when evaluating their job offer. (***) indicates that the sample is restricted to workers whose employer provides profit-sharing. Panel A refers to question on profit-sharing awareness. Panel B shows the share of workers who provided the correct answer to questions regarding different work benefits in Mexico. Panel C reports the share of workers choosing different benefits when asked: ‘When you chose to accept your current job, which of the benefits below did you take into account to evaluate whether the company’s offer was good or not? Please check all that apply.’ Panel D reports the share of workers selecting each reason in response to the question ‘If in (question from Panel C) you did not select profit-sharing payments, please indicate the reasons why you did not take this benefit into account when choosing a job. You may select more than one option.’. Panel E reports the share of people answering ‘I don’t know’ to the questions: ‘Imagine you are forced to leave your current job and have three months to find employment in the same occupation with another employer. Do you think you would obtain a job with profit-sharing (wage) payments that are higher, the same, or lower?’. [Back to Section 7]


A Appendix A: Additional Tables and Figures

Figure A.1: Schematic graph illustrating outsourcing relationship




Notes: This figure shows a schematic graph of the actors in an outsourcing relationship. Blue lines indicate a payment from one actor to the other. Green lines indicate the existence of a contract between the two actors.

Figure A.2: Share of firms with no declared profit sharing by profit size groups




Notes: This figure plots the proportion of firms that declared zero profit sharing on *every* year from 2010 to 2015 (red line), and the proportion of firms that declared zero profit sharing on *some* year, but not every year (blue line), against average declared profit between 2010 and 2015. The series is constructed with data from official corporate tax declarations from the national tax registry (Servicio de Administracion Tributaria). [Back to Section 4.2]

Figure A.3: Effect of the reform on outsourcing




Notes: This Figure shows the share of establishments with positive outsourcing on each month from January 2017 to November 2022 in each group. Results are constructed using a balanced sample of establishments from EMIM. Full outsourcing establishments are those outsourcing over 95% of workers in at least one month on the year prior to the outsourcing reform, partial outsourcing establishments are those positive outsourcing, but lower than 95%, in at least one month on the year prior to the outsourcing reform. Control group includes establishments not outsourcing before the reform. The dashed line corresponds to November 2020, when the reform was first presented.

Figure A.4: Evolution of firm size of surviving contracting firms post-reform




Notes: The figure shows the evolution of contracting firms after the reform, among the contracting firms that survived post-reform. The black line represents the average firm size over time. The figure is constructed using data from social security (IMSS). The dotted lines show the share of surviving contracting firms with less than 10 employees (red), less than 5 employees (blue), and with 1 employee (green). Time is measured relative to the reform date.

Figure A.5: Effect on total employment - robustness




Notes: This figure plots the β_k from Equation 10 and 95% confidence intervals. The estimation is carried out on different sub-samples of establishments from EMIM between 2018 and 2023. Outcome for all columns is the natural logarithm of total workers (outsourced + in-house). Treatment group includes establishments outsourcing over 95% of workers pre-reform. Control group includes establishments with no outsourcing in the year pre-reform. In Panel (a) the treatment group is restricted to the compliers defined as the establishments that were not full outsourcing two years post-reform. Panel (b) includes only establishments belonging to single-establishment firms. In panel (c) the treatment group is defined as establishments outsourcing over 95% of workers in the two years pre-reform (instead of 1 year in the original specification). Panel (d) estimates the regression on an unbalanced panel of establishments. Standard errors are clustered at the establishment level.

Figure A.6: Effect of the reform on yearly compensation - different assumptions on profit-sharing pre-reform




Notes: This figure shows the estimates θ_k and their 95% confidence intervals from estimating Equation 11 on daily total compensation (wage + profit-sharing income). The shaded grey area represents the year in which the outsourcing reform was approved. We plot the results on total compensation under the assumption that for treated workers their profit-sharing income pre-reform was a proportion p of profit-sharing post reform, for $p \in \{0.05, 0.1, 0.2\}$. Regressions are estimated on a balanced 10% random sample of workers from IMSS and include worker fixed effects, state x year and sector x year fixed effects and firm size group linear trends. Standard errors are clustered at the establishment level. [Back to Section 6.2.5]

Figure A.7: Effect of the reform on wage and total compensation - Heterogeneity by volatility levels



Notes: This Figure shows estimates θ_{post} and their 95% confidence intervals from estimating the effect of the reform at the worker level (Equation 11) and firm level (Equation 10), where we replace $1_{t=k}$ by an indicator variable equal to one in the post reform period, after 2021. The outcomes are wages daily total compensation (wage + profit-sharing income). Coefficients and standard errors are expressed in terms of the average wage of treated group in the pre-reform year. In both figures we split the sample into firms / workers in sectors above and below median volatility in profit-sharing. Standard errors are clustered at the establishment level. [Back to Section 6.2.5]

Figure A.8: Effects of reform on investment and value added per worker



Notes: This figure shows the difference in differences coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from estimating Equation 10 at the yearly level using the annual manufacturing establishment survey. The treatment group includes establishments outsourcing more than 95% of their workers pre-reform. The control group are establishments not using outsourcing pre-reform. The outcome in panel (a) is gross investment rate, measured as expenditure in tangible assets divided by the value of tangible assets. The outcome in panel (b) is net investment rate, measured as expenditure in tangible assets minus depreciation of tangible assets, divided by the value of tangible assets. The outcome in panel (c) value added over total workers. Standard errors are clustered at the establishment level. Partial outsourcing establishments, i.e. those with positive outsourcing < 95% pre-reform are excluded from the sample.

Table A.1: Transition Matrix by establishment type

	Full outsourcing	Partial outsourcing	No outsourcing
Full outsourcing	0.969	0.022	0.009
Partial outsourcing	0.025	0.853	0.122
No outsourcing	0.002	0.014	0.984

Notes: This table displays the yearly transition matrix across establishment types. Full outsourcing are establishments outsourcing more than 95% of workers on average in the year. Partial outsourcing are establishments with positive outsourcing in the year, but less than 95% of their workers on average. No outsourcing are establishment with zero outsourced workers in the year. The number in each cell in row r column c corresponds to the proportion of establishments that were classified as r in a certain year that were classified as c in the following year. The table is built using a balanced sample of establishments in EMIM from 2017 to 2020.

Table A.2: Outsourcing, Seasonality, and Employment Volatility

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Unit of Analysis	Sector level				Establishment level		
Dep. Var.	Seasonality Total workers	Seasonality Revenue	Seasonality Blue collar	Seasonality White collar	Volatility Total workers	Volatility Total workers	Volatility Blue collar
Full Outsourcing	-0.010 (0.009)	-0.020 (0.030)	-0.010 (0.010)	-0.007 (0.006)	-0.008*** (0.0019)	-0.003 (0.0017)	-0.003 (0.002)
Partial outsourcing	0.070* (0.040)	0.120* (0.070)	0.110* (0.060)	-0.007 (0.020)	0.0069** (0.003)	0.007** (0.003)	0.009*** (0.003)
Sector FE	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	86	86	86	86	290,340	290,340	288,408

Notes: Columns 1–4 present sector-level regressions of seasonal variation in different sector-level outcomes on the share of establishments classified as full or partial outsourcing. Sector seasonality for variable x is computed as the average absolute value of the seasonal component from an additive moving-average decomposition of x , divided by the average of x over the period. All specifications control for establishment size. Columns 5–7 show establishment-level regressions of employment volatility on a binary variable equal to 1 if the establishment is classified as full outsourcing and another equal to 1 if the establishment belongs to the partial outsourcing group. Volatility is measured as the within-establishment yearly coefficient of variation of the de-trended employment from 2017 to 2020. Employment is de-trended using an additive time-series decomposition, where we subtract the trend component from the original variable. All specifications control for establishment size. Robust (Col 1-4) or clustered 4-digit NAICS (Col 5-7) standard errors in parentheses. The results are constructed using establishment data from EMIM for the period 2017-2019. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. [Back to Section 4.3]

Table A.3: Summary Statistics on profit sharing 2022-2024

	Full outsourcing			Control		
	2022	2023	2024	2022	2023	2024
Total profit-sharing	3151 (6689)	3693 (7052)	3846 (7376)	2326 (5805)	2606 (6206)	2571 (6308)
Profit-sharing / L	7.48 (15.15)	8.62 (13.996)	8.92 (17.14)	6.26 (22.82)	6.62 (19.67)	6.19 (16.54)
Profit-sharing p.w. / monthly wage	0.45 (0.68)	0.49 (0.65)	0.52 (0.97)	0.43 (1.36)	0.43 (1.04)	0.42 (0.89)

Notes: This table presents the mean and standard deviation of profit-sharing statistics for full outsourcing establishments and control establishments, using 2022-2024 data from EMIM. Full outsourcing establishments are those that were outsourcing more than 95% of workers pre-reform. Control are establishments not outsourcing pre-reform. The first two rows display the average total profit-sharing costs and profit-sharing per worker, both measured in thousands of Mexican Pesos (deflated with 2019 base year), for each group of establishments. The last row shows the average yearly profit-sharing income per worker divided by the average monthly wage. [Back to Section 6.2.2]

Table A.5: Effect of reform on within-firm wage distribution

	(1) Mean wage	(2) Log mean wage	(3) $wage_{p25}$	(4) median wage	(5) $wage_{p75}$	(6) $wage_{p99}$	(7) $\frac{wage_{p25}}{wage_{p75}}$	(8) $\frac{\text{Avg wage new hires}}{\text{Avg wage incumbents}}$
Post Reform * Full-outsourcing	-15.51*** (3.723)	-0.0635*** (0.0071)	-12.43*** (2.877)	-13.71*** (3.890)	-19.73*** (5.957)	-8.173 (9.709)	-0.0070** (0.0033)	-0.0080 (0.0078)
Observations	109,312	109,312	109,312	109,312	109,312	109,312	109,312	90,598
Full-outs. pre reform mean	543	-	323	430	646	1715	-	-
δ_{post} as % of pre-reform mean	-2.8%	-	-3.8%	-3.2%	3%	0.4%	-	-

Notes: This table reports the estimated effects of the outsourcing reform on several measures of the within-firm wage distribution. Regressions are based on Equation 12, replacing $1_{t=k}$ with an indicator equal to 1 from 2021 onwards (Post-reform). Outcomes are measured annually and include: (1) average firm wage; (2) ln(average firm wage); (3) 25th percentile of within firm wage distribution (4) median firm wage; (6) 75th percentile of the firm wage distribution; (6) 99th percentile of the firm wage distribution; (7) the ratio of the 25th to the 75th percentile of the firm wage distribution; and (8) the ratio of the mean wage of new hires in a given year to the mean wage of incumbents employed since 2018. Regressions are estimated on the balanced IMSS establishment sample described in Section 6.1.2. Standard errors are clustered at the establishment level. [Back to Section 6.2.4]

Table A.4: Worker level difference in differences: wage and total compensation - robustness

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
<i>Outcome variable:</i>	Wage					Total compensation	
<i>Specification:</i>	Extended Sample I	Extended control grp	Excluding very low wage	Pre-period salary FE	2-digit Sector FE	2-digit Sector FE	Alternative P.S. Measure
Treat x Year = 2018	-5.129** (2.165)	-4.424* (2.300)	-2.978 (2.313)	-2.556 (3.370)	-3.077 (2.768)	-5.589* (2.995)	-4.544 (2.793)
Treat x Year = 2019	-1.923 (1.583)	-1.960 (1.731)	-1.302 (1.710)	1.240 (2.788)	-0.0520 (2.159)	-2.473 (2.364)	-1.201 (2.162)
Treat x Year = 2021	1.114 (1.449)	0.6901 (1.581)	0.6228 (1.565)	-0.7685 (2.628)	1.484 (2.108)	1.252 (2.119)	0.6112 (2.178)
Treat x Year = 2022	-5.126** (2.490)	-4.571 (2.800)	-5.514** (2.649)	-6.274* (3.482)	-4.267 (3.395)	18.95*** (3.558)	20.49*** (3.738)
Treat x Year = 2023	-9.180*** (2.525)	-7.060** (3.188)	-10.03*** (2.638)	-10.89*** (3.481)	-9.289*** (3.447)	14.88*** (3.725)	15.00*** (3.896)
Treat x Year = 2024	-12.12*** (3.039)	-8.374** (4.049)	-13.29*** (3.202)	-13.07*** (4.042)	-12.07*** (4.028)	14.21*** (4.540)	12.77*** (4.691)
Year x NAICS sector FE	3-digit	3-digit	3-digit	3-digit	2-digit	2-digit	3-digit
Year x pre-reform salary FE	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No
Firm-size linear trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Worker FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
Stratum FE	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	802,599	895,685	693,504	725,921	725,921	616,638	647,867

Notes: This table shows the results of estimating Equation 11 using different specifications. Column (1) and extends the original sample to workers that changed firm before 2020, or after 2022. Column (2) extends the the control group to include both the original control group and workers who were not outsourced but worked in firms that did do outsourcing pre-reform. Column (3) excludes workers which were earning less than 1.5 times the average minimum wage in the pre-reform period. Column (4) replaces the firm size linear trends by pre-reform wage quintile x time FE. Column (5) and (6) replace 3d NAICS sector FE by 2-digit NAICS sector FE. Columns (7) uses a different methodology to calculate average profit sharing per worker. We compute the weighted average of total profit-sharing in each cell from EMIM (instead of profit-sharing per worker). We then calculate average profit-sharing per worker for each cell as the average total profit-sharing (from EMIM) divided by the average firm size measured with IMSS data. All specifications include year x state fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1 [Back to Section 6.2.4]

Table A.6: Establishment level difference in differences: wage and total compensation

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
<i>Outcome variable:</i>	Establishment level regressions					Cell - level regressions	
	Wage	Ln Wage	$\frac{Wage}{Wage_{2020}}$	Wage	Total Compensation	Wage	Total Compensation
Treat x Year =2018	0.077 (4.406)	0.021*** (0.007)	0.019* (0.01)	-4.544 (4.555)	-5.193 (4.453)	-4.544 (5.620)	-5.193 (5.666)
Treat x Year =2019	1.762 (3.322)	0.016*** (0.005)	0.018** (0.009)	2.436 (3.272)	1.525 (3.315)	2.436 (4.220)	1.525 (4.386)
Treat x Year =2021	-1.459 (2.627)	-0.0003 (0.005)	0.002 (0.005)	-3.808 (3.294)	-1.866 (3.365)	-3.808 (4.552)	-1.866 (4.706)
Treat x Year =2022	-13.67*** (3.73)	-0.034*** (0.007)	-0.03*** (0.009)	-14.72*** (4.382)	10.22** (4.475)	-14.72*** (5.134)	10.22* (5.318)
Treat x Year =2023	-15.77*** (4.063)	-0.056*** (0.007)	-0.058*** (0.01)	-13.51*** (4.963)	10.97** (5.105)	-13.51** (5.853)	10.97* (6.081)
Treat x Year =2024	-16.84*** (4.576)	-0.074*** (0.009)	-0.082*** (0.012)	-10.24** (5.123)	17.10*** (5.244)	-10.24 (6.318)	17.10** (6.662)
$\bar{\delta}_{2022-24}$	-15.5	-0.06	-0.07	-11.3	14.1	-11.3	14.1
$\bar{\delta}_{2022-24}$ as prop. of mean outcome treated 2020	-2.8%	-	-	-2.1%	2.6%	-2.1%	2.6%
Establishment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No
Stratum FE	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	109,312	109,312	109,312	109,225	107,006	13,265	12,254

Notes: This table shows the results of estimating Equation 12 using data on wages from Mexican Social Security (IMSS) and data on profit sharing from the monthly manufacturing survey (EMIM). Treated establishments are those classified as full outsourcing. Columns (1) to (5) estimate the regression using establishment level data. In Column (1) the outcome is the average real daily wage of the establishment in year t in MX pesos. In Column (2) the outcome is the natural logarithm of $wage_t$. In Column (3) the outcome is the wage as a proportion of the wage in 2020. Columns (4) is the same regression as (1), replacing establishment FE by stratum (sector x firms size category x state x treatment status) FE. Column (5) the outcome is the establishment average total compensation ($wage_t + profit\ sharing_t$) and includes stratum FE. Columns (6) to (7) estimate Equation 12 using data aggregated at the state x sector x size group x year level and weighting observations by the number of establishment in the cell. In Column (6) the outcome is $wage_t$. In Column (7) the outcome is ($wage_t + profit\ sharing_t$) and the sample is restricted to the cells that could be merged with profit sharing data from INEGI. All specifications include sector x year FE, state x year FE and pre-reform establishment size specific linear trends. Standard errors for columns (1) to (5) are clustered at the establishment level and at the stratum level for Columns (6) and (7). Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1 [Back to Section 6.2.4]

Table A.7: Effect on the value of total compensation by risk discount factor

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	<i>Relative risk aversion coefficient</i>						
	1	2	3	4	5	10	$\hat{\alpha} = 0.45$
Treat x Post	16.24*** (3.46)	15.44*** (3.45)	14.76*** (3.45)	14.19*** (3.44)	13.70*** (3.44)	12.20*** (3.43)	4.736 (3.39)
Observations	647,867	647,867	647,867	647,867	647,867	647,867	647,867

Notes: This table reports the estimated effects of the outsourcing reform on the yearly average of the risk-adjusted value of worker daily total compensation, which is defined as $wage + \hat{\alpha} * profit\ sharing\ income$. Regressions are based on Equation 11, replacing $1_{t=k}$ with an indicator equal to 1 from 2021 onwards (post-reform). 1-6 $\hat{\alpha}$ is the average estimated α under the assumption of CRRA utility and a specific value of relative risk aversion γ . Details on the estimation in Section C.1. The values for $\hat{\alpha}$ can be seen in Table C.1 row 1. In last column $\hat{\alpha}$ is set at 0.45. Regressions are estimated on a balanced sample of workers from IMSS described in Section 6.1.2. Standard errors are clustered at the establishment level. Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1 [Back to Section 6.2.6]

Table A.8: Comparison between prolific sample and national employment survey (ENOE) sample

	Prolific	ENOE
Average age	30	39
Share female	53%	43%
Share unemployed and job seeking	7%	3%
Share informal (among employed)	20%	48%
Share receiving profit-sharing (among formal)	57%	42%
Employer size:		
≤ 10 workers	19%	43%
11 - 50 workers	21%	21%
51 - 250 workers	18%	13%
> 250 workers	42%	23%
Observations	638	181,167

Notes: This table reports summary statistics for two samples of Mexican workers. The first is a self-administered survey collected through Prolific in August 2025 (N = 638). The second is a nationally representative sample of individuals in the labor force (*población económicamente activa*), aged 18–65, from the National Employment Survey (ENOE) in the third quarter of 2024 (N = 181,167). [Back to Section 7]

B Appendix B: Data appendix


B.1 Comparing sample in IMSS data and EMIM data

For our results to be valid, it is crucial that the composition of our sample from establishment-level data closely aligns with that of the social security data sample. In other words, it is important that we are observing the same firms and workers in each sample. In this section, we provide evidence supporting the similarity of our samples in each dataset.

We first examine the proportion of full outsourcing establishments in each dataset. The relevant comparison group in EMIM are the full outsourcing establishments that insourced their workers (i.e. the compliers), as we are only able to identify full outsourcing establishments in the social security data if they insourced their workers during the reform. By January 2022, 17.2% of all establishments in EMIM fell into this category. When we restrict the IMSS dataset to establishments with over 20 employees, this proportion is 12%, and it stands at 16.8% when we further narrow the sample to establishments with more than 50 employees (we restrict the IMSS sample to align with EMIM, which strongly overrepresents large establishments in Mexico).

Figure B.1 visually demonstrates the correlation in the distribution of full outsourcing establishments across sectors in the various datasets. Barplots in Panel A depict the proportion, while Panel B illustrates the number of full outsourcing establishments in each 3-digit NAICS economic sector. We calculate these proportions using EMIM data, IMSS data with a sample restriction to establishments with over 20 employees, and IMSS data with a sample restriction to establishments with more than 50 employees. We can see that the distribution of full outsourcing establishments looks very similar in both datasets.

Figure B.1: Distribution full outsourcing establishments by economic sector. EMIM and IMSS data




(a) Proportion of full outsourcing estab. per sector

(b) Number of full outsourcing estab. per sector

Notes: This figure shows the distribution of full outsourcing establishments across 3-digit NAICS sectors. Panel (a) plots the share of all establishments in the sector that are classified as full outsourcing. Panel (b) plots the number of establishments in the sector that are classified as full outsourcing. These statistics are computed using different datasets for comparison. The dark red bars use EMIM data. The light blue bars use data from IMSS, restricting establishments to those with over 20 employees on 10/2021, and belonging to the manufacturing sector. The light dark bars use data from IMSS, restricting establishments to those with over 50 employees on 10/2021, and belonging to the manufacturing sector.

Second, we compare measurements on average wage paid by establishments in each dataset. We divide each dataset into groups and we calculate the average wage paid by establishments using both IMSS and EMIM data. Figure B.2 shows the relationship between the average wage measured in IMSS and in EMIM when we group establishments by outsourcing use (full outsourcing, partial outsourcing and no outsourcing) and sector (Panel a), and by outsourcing use and region (Panel b). In each graph, every dot represents a group, with the dot size reflecting the number of workers included in each group. For easy reference, we include the 45-degree line in each graph. Notably, the average wages measured in each dataset are remarkably similar, with a correlation of 0.76 for sector groups and 0.75 for region groups. This underscores the consistency in the measurement of average wages between IMSS and EMIM datasets.

Figure B.2: Average wage by establishment groups - EMIM and IMSS



Notes: This figure plots the relationship between the measured 2022 average daily wage using social security data (IMSS) and firm survey data (EMIM). The values in the X and Y axis correspond to the average daily wage for all workers corresponding to a particular group calculated using either IMSS (x-axis) or EMIM (y-axis). In panel (a) each point corresponds to a NAICS 3-digit sector x outsourcing status (employed by firm that had been full-outsourcing pre-reform, and employed by a firm that had not been outsourcing) group. In panel (a) each point corresponds to a region x outsourcing status groups. Average daily wage for workers in each group using IMSS is calculated as the average base salary across all workers in the group. Average daily wage for workers in each group in EMIM is calculated as the weighted average of the average wage across establishments, with weights equal to number of in-house workers in the establishment. The size and color intensity of each point vary based on the number of workers in each group. The red lines in each graph correspond to the 45-degree line.

B.2 Measurement of total worker compensation

This section provides an explanation of the matching procedure introduced in Section 6.1.3, which is carried out to compute total worker compensation using wage information from social security data (IMSS) and profit-sharing information from establishment level data (EMIM). As mentioned in Section 3.1, social security data does not contain information on profit-sharing income for workers.⁶³ While the establishment survey data contains information on profit-sharing, information on wages of outsourced workers pre-reform is inaccurate. To circumvent these data limitations, we combine information on profit-sharing reported in the establishment survey data with wage information from the social security data to build a measure of total compensation (wages + profit-sharing). Because we cannot match these two datasets at the firm level, we do not have a measure of profit-sharing income for each worker, nor for each firm in the social security data. Thus, we combine these two datasets on broader outsourcing status x sector x state x firm size cells. More specifically, we proceed in four steps.

⁶³This is because profit-sharing does not form part of the base salary (*salario base de cotización*) ([Diario Oficial de la Federación, 2023](#); [Deloitte México, 2023](#)).

1. First, we categorize establishments from EMIM into strata based on their size (divided into four size categories), economic sector (using NAICS 3-digit codes), state (across 32 states), and their utilization of outsourcing (full outsourcing, and no outsourcing). We exclude partial outsourcing establishments. Subsequently, using information from the establishment survey, we compute average profit-sharing income for workers in each stratum ω for each year t : $\overline{profit\ sharing\ per\ worker^{emim}}_{\omega t}$.⁶⁴
2. Second, we categorize workers in the social security data into strata based on the same variables (firm size, economic sector, state, and treatment status). We construct a dataset aggregated at the strata x year level which includes a measure of the average wage across workers in each stratum ω at year t : $\overline{wage^{imss}}_{\omega t}$.
3. Third, we merge the worker-level (non-aggregated) social security data with the stratum-level EMIM dataset defined in step 1 at the stratum x year level. For each worker, we construct a measure of total compensation as the sum of their individual wage and the average profit-sharing per worker in the stratum to which they belong:

$$total\ compensation_{it} = wage_{it}^{imss} + \overline{profit\ sharing\ per\ worker^{emim}}_{\omega t}$$

4. Fourth, we merge both these aggregated datasets by stratum x year, obtaining a dataset with information on average wages and profit-sharing in each stratum in each year. We then construct a measure of total compensation in a particular cell c corresponding to stratum ω at time t by adding the average wage in cell measured in step 2. plus the average profit-sharing per worker, using the measurement described in in step 1:

$$total\ compensation_{\omega t} = \overline{wage^{imss}}_{\omega t} + \overline{profit\ sharing\ per\ worker^{emim}}_{\omega t}$$

For this procedure to be valid, it is important that the sample in the social security data is similar to the sample covered in the establishment data. In Appendix B.1, we demonstrate that the composition of the samples in both datasets are closely aligned. Additionally, we show that the measured average wages across sectors and regions in both datasets align closely, adding validity to our procedure.

This procedure delivers measures of both wages and total compensation at the worker-by-year level and at the stratum-by-year level. Since profit-sharing is only measured at the stratum x year level, we can estimate the effect on total worker compensation only up to that level of aggregation. However, when the dependent variable is expressed in levels, Equation 11 exhibits a useful property: it yields identical coefficients whether estimated using worker-level data or data aggregated at the stratum x year level, provided that (i) each stratum x year cell is weighted by the number of workers it contains, and (ii) the regression includes stratum fixed effects (rather than worker fixed effects). Therefore, the coefficients from the stratum-level regressions 14 with outcomes $wage_{\omega t}$ and $total\ compensation_{\omega t}$

⁶⁴Specifically, we use the weighted average of profit-sharing per worker for establishments in EMIM in stratum ω in year t , where each firm is weighted by the number of workers it hires in that period.

(defined in point 4 above) can be interpreted in the same way as those from the worker-level regressions 13 with outcomes $wage_{it}$ and $total\ compensation_{it}$ (defined in point 3 above), respectively. The comparison can be seen in Columns 4 and 6, and 5 and 7 of Table 5 where we see that the coefficients are indeed identical.

We apply an analogous four-step procedure to construct a measure of total compensation in the IMSS establishment-level dataset, using the establishment’s average wage from IMSS and the average profit-sharing per worker in the establishment stratum, measured in EMIM.⁶⁵ As shown in Columns 4–6 and 5–7 of Table A.6, the coefficients from the stratum-level regressions—weighted by the number of *establishments* in each stratum-year cell in this case—are identical to those from the establishment-level regressions.

C Appendix C: Additional empirical results

C.1 Estimation of certainty equivalent and risk-adjusted value of total compensation

The risk-adjusted value of total compensation, defined in 5, is composed of the wage plus profit-sharing, where profit-sharing is discounted by a factor α due to worker risk aversion: $wage + \alpha \cdot profit\ sharing$. As noted in Section D.1, α , can be expressed as the ratio of the certainty equivalent of profit-sharing to its expected value: $\frac{CE^{ps}}{\mathbb{E}[ps]}$. In this section, we outline the methodology used to compute three key variables that allow us to obtain an estimate of the effect of the reform on the risk-adjusted value of total compensation: (i) the certainty equivalent of mandated profit-sharing in the sample, (ii) the parameter α , and (iii) the risk-adjusted value of total compensation. Our approach closely follows that detailed in Nimier-David et al. (2023).

Our procedure follows three steps. First, we calculate the certainty equivalent of profit-sharing for each worker in the control group under alternative levels of risk aversion. Second, we compare this certainty equivalent to the average profit-sharing actually received by the worker. This provides us with an estimate of the average value of each uncertain peso of profit sharing, in terms of a certain peso (α_i). We then average α_i across workers to obtain a single estimate of the risk-adjusted value of profit-sharing, $\hat{\alpha}$. We then use the estimated $\hat{\alpha}$ to assess the effect of the reform on the risk-discounted value of total compensation: $wage + \alpha \cdot profit\ sharing$. The remainder of this section describes each step of the estimation in detail.

Step 1: Estimation of certainty equivalent of profit-sharing. The certainty equivalent of profit sharing for worker i is defined as:

$$\mathbb{E}[u(w_i + CE_i^{ps})] = \mathbb{E}[u(w_i + ps_i)]$$

⁶⁵The only difference between the procedure followed for the worker level and establishment level IMSS datasets is that for the establishment level dataset, the average profit-sharing income in each stratum ω in year t , $profit\ sharing\ per\ worker^{emim}_{\omega t}$, is the *unweighted* average of profit-sharing per worker for establishments in EMIM in that stratum.

Where w_i is the yearly wage, ps_i is the yearly amount of profit sharing the worker receives and CE_i^{ps} is the certainty equivalent of profit sharing. As in the micro-foundation of the labor supply function in Section D.1, we assume CRRA utility with relative risk aversion parameter γ :

$$\mathbb{E} \left(\frac{(w_i + CE_i^{ps})^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma} \right) = \mathbb{E} \left(\frac{(w_i + ps_i)^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma} \right) \quad (16)$$

Given the absence of a closed-form expression for CE_i^{ps} , we solve numerically for CE_i^{ps} for each worker. We focus on the sample of workers in the control group (i.e. working for firms not doing any outsourcing), because for this group we have a longer time period with positive profit-sharing income (7 years), while treated workers only have three years with positive profit-sharing. For each worker, we compute $u(w_i + ps_i)$ for each year between 2018 and 2024.⁶⁶ We then average these values of the utility function over 2018-2024 for each worker to approximate the expected utility over this period, i.e. the expression on the right hand side of Equation 16. Subsequently, we numerically solve for CE_i^{ps} using the equality in Equation 16 for each worker, plugging in the estimated expected utility on the right-hand side, and using information on worker wages from 2018 to 2024 on the left hand side.⁶⁷

$$\frac{1}{7} \sum_{t=2018}^{2024} \frac{(w_{it} + \widehat{CE_i^{ps}})^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma} = \frac{1}{7} \sum_{t=2018}^{2024} \frac{(w_{it} + ps_{it})^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma} \quad (17)$$

Intuitively, we search for the guaranteed amount of profit sharing (CE_i^{ps}) that makes the worker indifferent to the risky stream they actually face. This process is repeated for different values of the relative risk aversion coefficient $\gamma \in \{1, 2, 3, 4, 5\}$. For $\gamma = 1$, the utility function corresponds to log utility. This provides us with an estimated value $\widehat{CE_i^{ps}}$ for each worker, for each risk aversion parameter.

Step 2: Estimation of $\hat{\alpha}$. We then compare the certainty equivalent to the average value of profit sharing for the 2018-2024 period. We define the relative risk premium:

$$\pi_i^R = 1 - \frac{CE_i^{ps}}{\mathbb{E}(ps_i)}$$

which indicates how much workers are willing to pay to avoid risk for each peso of expected profit sharing. Conversely, $\frac{CE_i^{ps}}{\mathbb{E}(ps_i)}$ represents the value workers place on each peso of uncertain profit sharing in terms of a certain peso. Note that this is the expression for α in the risk discounted value of total

⁶⁶As mentioned in Section 6.2.5, we do not have information on profit-sharing income at the firm level. We have this information aggregated at the stratum x year level, where each stratum is defined by sector x state x size group x outsourcing use group level. If we were to assign each worker a value of ps_t equal to the average profit sharing per worker in their stratum, we would likely underestimate the variance in ps_t across time for each worker. Thus, in order to compute ps_t for each worker we take a random draw from a gamma distribution, with the mean equal to the average ps_t in the stratum the worker belongs to for that year, and the variance equal to the size-weighted average within-firm, across time variance of ps_t for firms in that stratum.

⁶⁷We verify our numerical solution by computing the equality with our CE_i^{ps} values, demonstrating the accuracy of the solution method.

compensation defined in [Prediction 3](#) of [Section 5](#):

$$\alpha_i = 1 - \pi_i^R = \frac{CE_i^{ps}}{\mathbb{E}(ps_i)}$$

We estimate α_i for each worker using the estimated certainty equivalent, and approximating the expected value in the denominator using the average profit sharing received during the 2018-2024 period.

$$\hat{\alpha}_i = \frac{\widehat{CE_i^{ps}}}{\overline{ps_i}} \quad (18)$$

We then take the average value of α_i across workers to obtain a single estimated value of $\hat{\alpha}$ for each risk aversion parameter.

$$\hat{\alpha} = \frac{1}{n} \sum_i \hat{\alpha}_i \quad (19)$$

The results are presented in row 1 of [Table C.1](#). For a relative risk aversion of 2, one peso of profit sharing is valued at 92 cents on average by workers. As risk aversion increases, the value per peso of profit-sharing decreases, reflecting a stronger discounting of risk. For a high risk aversion value of 5, workers value one peso of profit sharing at 85 cents. Rows 2 and 3 show the values of α_i at the median and the 25 percentile of the distribution. Row 4 shows the average certainty equivalent over the average profit-sharing value (as used in [Nimier-David et al. \(2023\)](#)).

Table C.1: Certainty equivalent over profit sharing for different values of relative risk aversion

	Relative risk aversion parameter				
	1	2	3	4	5
$\hat{\alpha} = \text{mean } \hat{\alpha}_i$	0.96	0.92	0.89	0.87	0.85
50 th percentile $\hat{\alpha}_i$	0.98	0.95	0.92	0.90	0.87
25 th percentile $\hat{\alpha}_i$	0.93	0.85	0.79	0.72	0.67
$\frac{\text{Average } \widehat{CE_i^{ps}}}{\text{Average } \overline{ps_i}}$	0.94	0.90	0.86	0.83	0.81

Notes: This table shows the relationship between the calculated certainty equivalent and average profit sharing received by workers in our sample. The certainty equivalent is calculated on the sample of control workers from 2018 to 2024, assuming a CRRA utility function, for different values of relative risk aversion. The first row reports $\hat{\alpha}$ defined in [Equation 19](#) as the average $\hat{\alpha}_i$ across workers. The second and third rows report the value at the 50th and 25th percentile of the distribution of $\hat{\alpha}_i$. The fourth row reports the ratio between the average certainty equivalent and the average profit sharing received by workers in our sample $\frac{\frac{1}{n} \sum_i \widehat{CE_i^{ps}}}{\frac{1}{n} \sum_i \overline{ps_i}}$. [[Go to Section 6.2.6](#)]

Step 3: Estimation of risk-adjusted value of total compensation. Using the estimated $\hat{\alpha}$, we construct the risk-adjusted value of total compensation, defined as:

$$risk\ adj.\ value\ total\ compensation_{it} = wage_{it} + \hat{\alpha} \cdot profit\ sharing_{it}$$

This outcome variable captures how much workers discount profit-sharing due to risk, on average, treating one peso of profit-sharing as worth only $\hat{\alpha}$ pesos of wage income on average. We construct this outcome for different values of relative risk aversion, using the values of $\hat{\alpha}$ from the first row of Table C.1.

We then estimate the effect of the reform using Equation 11 on the risk adjusted value of total compensation across different risk aversion parameters. The results for $RRA \in \{1, 3, 5\}$ are presented in Figure 12. We can see that even for a very high relative risk aversion of 5, the value of total compensation increases for workers after the reform, although the increase is approximately 20% lower than the rise in total compensation when risk discounting is not considered. The results are discussed in Section 6.2.6.

A natural question that arises from these results is why the estimated discount for risk is so low. We argue that an important reason is that profit sharing constitutes a small proportion of total worker compensation. If we abstract from wage uncertainty and apply a first-order Taylor approximation to the left-hand side of Equation 16, along with a second-order Taylor approximation to the right-hand side around $\mathbb{E}(ps_i)$, we derive the following expression:

$$\pi_i^R = 1 - \frac{CE_i^{ps}}{\mathbb{E}(ps_i)} \approx \frac{1}{2} \cdot \gamma \cdot \sigma^2 \cdot \frac{\mathbb{E}(ps_i)}{w_i + \mathbb{E}(ps_i)} \quad (20)$$

Where σ^2 is the variance of $\frac{ps_i}{\mathbb{E}(ps_i)}$ and γ is the relative risk aversion parameter. In our setting, profit sharing represents only about 4% of total annual income. Consequently, the last term on the right-hand side of the equation is small. This indicates that for workers to significantly discount risk, the variance of profit sharing would need to be much higher than what we observe in our sample.


C.2 Establishment Exit from EMIM

As is mentioned in Section 3.1, the establishment surveys do not provide any information on why an establishment exits the survey sample. An establishment that ceases to appear in our sample may have exited the sample because it suspended its operations, switched to industries not covered by the survey, merged with other establishments or failed to answer the survey for some other reason (Verhoogen, 2008). Because we are not able to distinguish each of these reasons, and each reason would have a very different economic interpretation, we work with a balanced sample of establishments in our main analysis. In this section, we show that the patterns in exit do not change around the time of the reform. This suggests that the reform did not affect establishments' exit decisions. Thus, using the balanced sample of establishments in our main analysis does *not* condition on an endogenous outcome of the reform (i.e. not exiting).

Panel (a) of Figure C.1 shows the proportion of establishments exiting the EMIM sample in each year from 2017 to 2022. We do not find evidence of particularly high or low exit in the post-reform years 2021 and 2022. In Panel (b) we compare exit rates across time between outsourcing and non

outsourcing establishments. The blue line represents the difference in the proportion of establishments exiting in each period between establishments using outsourcing and in 2017 and those not outsourcing any workers. The black line shows this same difference dividing establishments into those outsourcing over 95% of workers and those falling below this threshold. We do not find evidence indicating changes in this differential exit rate following the reform, thereby suggesting the absence of endogenous exit dynamics.

Figure C.1: Establishment exit from EMIM



Notes: This figure shows the evolution in establishment exit in EMIM from 2017 to 2022. Panel (a) plots the share of establishments that exited in each year. Panel (b) plots the coefficients from a regression where we regress a binary variable equal to 1 if the establishment exited between date t and $t + 1$ on date dummies interacted with a binary variable equal to 1 if the establishment was outsourcing more than 95% of workers on date t , controlling for date fixed effects. For the coefficients in blue, we eliminate establishments with positive outsourcing, but less than 95% from the sample.

C.3 Evidence on profits of contracting firms

We argue in Section 4.2 that full outsourcing firms were outsourcing all or most of their workers to contracting firms, ensuring that these contracting firms had zero profits, or lower profits than the parent firms, and thus avoiding profit-sharing contributions with their workers. Evidence on parent firms having zero profit-sharing is clear. Showing that contracting firms had zero or low profit-sharing is challenging with our data, which does not allow us to link parent and contracting firms. However, if a contracting firm had positive profit-sharing payments, it must have had positive profits. These profits would be embedded in the payments made by the parent firm to the contracting firm, a variable recorded in EMIM. We can express this relationship as:

$$\text{payments to contracting firm} = \text{wages} + \text{other costs} + \text{profit} \quad (21)$$

Here, wages include social security contributions, while other costs may encompass overhead, training, and employee transportation. The measurement error introduced by these costs is discussed

in Section 6. Since total profit-sharing is given by $0.1 \cdot \text{profits}$, we can rewrite the equation as:

$$\text{payments to contracting firm} = \text{wages} + \text{other costs} + \frac{\text{profit sharing}}{0.1}$$

Rearranging, we obtain an upper bound for outsourced workers' wages:

$$\text{wages} \leq \text{payments to contracting firm} - \frac{\text{profit sharing}}{0.1} \quad (22)$$

Since we can directly observe the *payments to contracting firm* in EMIM, we estimate an upper bound for outsourced workers' pre-reform wages under different assumptions about contracting firms' profit-sharing.⁶⁸ This estimate serves as an upper bound due to the presence of other costs in the equation. The change in worker wages after the reform can then be expressed as:


$$\Delta \log(\text{wages}) \geq \underbrace{\log(\text{wages}_{\text{post}})}_{\text{observed in EMIM}} - \log \left(\underbrace{\text{payments to contracting firm}_{\text{pre}}}_{\text{observed in EMIM}} - \underbrace{\frac{\text{profit sharing}_{\text{pre}}}{0.1}}_{\text{assumed}} \right) \quad (23)$$

This equation provides a lower bound for the reform's impact on wages. Equation 23 also highlights that the higher the assumed pre-reform profit-sharing, the lower the employment-related payments to the contracting firm, as a greater portion of payments is attributed to profits. Consequently, assuming higher contracting firm profits results in lower estimated pre-reform wages and a larger estimated wage increase due to the reform.

Figure C.2 illustrates the estimated impact of the reform on average worker wages under four hypothetical scenarios for pre-reform profit-sharing: (i) equal to post-reform levels, (ii) 75% of post-reform levels, (iii) 50% of post-reform levels, and (iv) one-third of pre-reform levels. We eliminate the year 2021 for the estimation, as this was the transition year when worker insourcing took place. The results suggest that if contracting firms' profits had matched those of parent firms, wages would have needed to increase by at least 20% relative to the control group post-reform. If contracting firm profits were 75% of parent firm profits, wages would have needed to rise by at least 19%, and if contracting firm profits were 50% or one-third of parent firm profits, wages would have had to increase by at least 8% and 2%, respectively. These findings are inconsistent with results from social security data - where we accurately measure wage - leading us to conclude that contracting firms' profits were either zero or significantly lower than those of fully outsourced firms.

⁶⁸In this exercise, we assume firm employment remains constant, consistent with our empirical finding that the reform did not affect total employment.

Figure C.2: Hypothetical increase in employment costs under different assumptions of contracting firm profits



Notes: This figure shows the difference in differences coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from estimating Equation 10 aggregating establishment data at the yearly level. The treatment group includes establishments outsourcing more than 95% of their workers pre-reform. The control group are establishments not using outsourcing pre-reform. The outcome variable is hypothetical log yearly average wage under different assumptions of the profits of contracting firms pre-reform. Wages for full outsourcing establishments pre-reform are calculated using the expression in the RHS of Equation 22. Standard errors are clustered at the establishment level. Partial outsourcing establishment, i.e. those with positive outsourcing < 95% pre-reform are excluded from the sample.

C.4 Potential bias introduced by the cap on profit-sharing

When the outsourcing reform was approved, the Mexican government also introduced a specific limit on the total shared profits per employee. The formulation of this cap was the outcome of negotiations between policymakers and corporate stakeholders conducted before the implementation of the outsourcing reform. This limit was calculated based on the higher of two values: either three times the monthly salary of the employee or the average profit-sharing amount received over the past three years. Consequently, if an employee's corresponding profit-sharing income in 2022 surpassed *both* three times their monthly salary and the average received in the previous three years, the cap would come into effect. In such instances, the employee would receive the higher amount between these two values. Consequently, control firms that had been distributing profit-sharing contributions exceeding three times the monthly wages before the reform might be impacted by this cap, particularly if 2022 turned out to be an exceptionally profitable year. This cap could have reduced employment costs for these control firms, potentially introducing a bias into our results. We provide evidence that any potential effects of the cap on the control group were likely to be minimal.

Unfortunately, we lack precise data on the exact profit-sharing amounts received by individual workers in the EMIM dataset. Nevertheless, we estimate the average profit-sharing contributions per worker and their relationship with the average wage paid to blue-collar workers. We estimate profit-

sharing as a proportion of blue-collar wages, as these workers that should receive higher profit-sharing as a proportion of their wages. We find that only around 3% of control firms reported profit-sharing contributions exceeding three times monthly blue-collar wages between 2017 and 2020. Additionally [C.3](#) displays the results of an event-study estimation exclusively for the control group. In these regressions, the outcome variable is binary, taking the value of one if profit-sharing per employee exceeded 3 or 4 monthly wages that year. The results do not show evidence of the reform having had a negative effect on profit-sharing costs for control firms. In summary, the introduction of the profit-sharing cap, is unlikely to significantly impact the results, as the evidence suggests that the majority of control firms did not surpass the cap threshold, and the event-study analysis does not reveal a negative effect on profit-sharing costs.

Figure C.3: Change in profit sharing post-reform. Control establishments



Notes: This figure shows the results of an event-study regression using the sub-sample of establishments from EMIM that were not using outsourcing before the reform. The data is aggregated at the yearly level from 2017 to 2022. The outcome is a binary variable, taking the value of one in panels (a) and (b) if profit-sharing per worker exceeded 3 or 4 times the monthly average wages that year; and equal to one in panels (c) and (d) if profit-sharing per worker exceeded 3 or 4 times the monthly average wages of blue-collar workers that year. The dashed lines in each graph mark the date the outsourcing reform was passed.

D Appendix D: Theoretical Model

In this section, we solve the model presented in Section 5. We first micro-found the firm specific labor supply curve presented in Equation 3. We then derive the analytical solution for the model and the results in Predictions 1 to 3.

D.1 Micro-founding the labor supply function

In this section we micro-found the firm specific labor supply function

$$n_j = (w_j + \mu \cdot \alpha \cdot E[ps_j])^\theta \quad (24)$$

Presented in Section 5, where w_j represents the wage offered by firm j and $E[ps_j]$ denotes the expected profit-sharing per worker offered. We use a static discrete choice framework where workers have heterogeneous preferences for firms, as is common in the monopsony literature (Card et al., 2018; Berger et al., 2022). As mentioned in Section 5, labor supply and demand decisions are made before the realization of z_j , when there is no uncertainty on w_j but there is uncertainty on ps_j . Thus, to model workers' labor supply decision we consider the expected utility from working in a firm j from the worker's perspective. This value includes information frictions which may prevent the worker from correctly estimating her true expected utility. The indirect ex-ante utility of worker i for working in firm j is:⁶⁹

$$\mathbb{E}_{ps}[U_i(w_j, ps_j)] = \mathbb{E}_{ps} \left(\frac{(w_j + \tilde{ps}_{ij})^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma} \right) \cdot \epsilon_{ij} \quad (25)$$

Where ϵ_{ij} is an idiosyncratic preference shock of working at firm j which follows a Fréchet distribution with shape parameter $\frac{1}{\theta}$. We define $\tilde{ps}_{ij} = \mu_i \cdot ps_j$ as the worker's perceived profit-sharing, which may be different from the true profit sharing offered by the firm. The parameter $\mu_i \leq 1$ is a measure of the information frictions present when evaluating profit sharing. A low μ_i can indicate that profit sharing is not very salient for workers, or that they are not well informed about this benefit. This decreases the importance of profit sharing in workers' expected utility because they put less weight on this factor. A low μ can also reflect that the complexity of profit-sharing leads workers to assign less weight to this benefit.⁷⁰ Using the expression for \tilde{ps}_{ij} and the definition of the certainty equivalent of profit sharing CE_{ps} ,⁷¹ the right hand side of 25 can also be expressed as:

$$\mathbb{E}_{ps}[U_i(w_j, ps_j)] = \frac{(w_j + \mu_i \cdot \alpha_j E[ps_j])^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma} \cdot \epsilon_{ij} \quad (26)$$

⁶⁹Our utility specification follows the framework of Dube et al. (2022), but we focus on a single non-wage attribute—profit-sharing and assume perfect substitution between wages and profit-sharing, as both are monetary forms of compensation. In addition, we place greater emphasis on understanding the parameters that govern the relative importance of wages and profit-sharing in the utility function.

⁷⁰For this second type of information frictions, μ_i can be expressed in terms of a 'simplicity equivalent': the simply described amounts individuals consider equally valuable to the complex benefit (Oprea, 2024).

⁷¹ $u(w + CE_{ps}) = \mathbb{E}[u(w + ps)]$

Where $\alpha_j = \frac{CE_{ps}}{E[ps_j]} \leq 1$ is a measure of how much the workers discount risk associated to profit sharing. Importantly, α_j will affect workers' labor supply decision through worker preferences. If $\alpha_j < 1$ workers will value each unit of profit sharing less than each unit of wages, due to the additional risk associated with profit sharing. However, while the information frictions reflected in μ_i impact labor supply decisions, they do not affect utility once the worker is employed by a particular firm. In other words, these frictions are not related to workers' preferences for profit sharing but rather to constraints that prevent them from valuing it properly ex-ante.

We assume all workers have the same awareness of profit sharing $\mu_i = \mu$, and $\alpha_j = \alpha \forall j$, the likelihood of choosing employer j is:

$$p_j = \frac{(w_j + \mu \cdot \alpha E[ps_j])^\theta}{\sum_{k \in \{1 \dots J\}} (w_k + \mu \cdot \alpha E[ps_k])^\theta} \quad (27)$$

Where $\theta = (1 - \gamma)\tilde{\theta}$. For simplicity, we assume that the number of firms is sufficiently large, and that there are no strategic interactions between firms, such that Equation 27 can be approximated by $p_j = \lambda(w_j + \mu \cdot \alpha E[ps_j])^\theta$. Aggregating across workers, yields the firm specific upward-sloping labor supply curve:

$$n_j^s(w_j, E[ps_j]) = N\lambda(w_j + \mu \cdot \alpha \cdot E[ps_j])^\theta \quad (28)$$

If we normalize the size of the labor force N to $\frac{1}{\lambda}$ we obtain the labor supply function in 24.

D.1.1 Risk-adjusted value of total compensation

We now define the risk-adjusted value of total compensation, which is introduced in Prediction 3. Total expected compensation is given by $w_j + \mathbb{E}[ps_j]$. However, worker' valuation of this total compensation is affected by their risk-aversion and the uncertainty surrounding profit-sharing. To account for this, we introduce the concept of the risk-adjusted value of total compensation, which is the risk-free amount of total compensation that workers would value equally to the risky total compensation, absent any information frictions.

$$U(\text{risk adj value total comp}) = \mathbb{E}(U(w + ps_j) | \mu = 1)$$

Note that this value can also be thought of as the certainty equivalent of total compensation.⁷²

$$\frac{(\text{risk adj value total comp})^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma} = \mathbb{E} \left(\frac{(w_j + ps_j)^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma} \right) \cdot \epsilon_{ij}$$

Under the assumption of no uncertainty in wages, and using the definition of the certainty equivalent of profit-sharing introduced in D.1 we can re-write the expression as:

⁷²Throughout the paper, we focus on uncertainty in profit-sharing payments and abstract from wage uncertainty

$$\text{risk adjusted value of total comp}_j = w_j + CE^{ps} = w_j + \alpha_j \cdot \mathbb{E}[ps_j]$$

This value is relevant when considering the effect of enforcing profit-sharing on workers, as an increase in total compensation may not necessarily reflect an increase in the value of total compensation when accounting for workers' risk preferences and the uncertainty associated with profit-sharing.

D.1.2 Heterogenous μ_i

Section 7 presents empirical evidence consistent with the presence of information constraints related to profit-sharing. Among the findings, we demonstrate that some workers are entirely unaware of the existence of profit-sharing in Mexico. These workers likely exhibit $\mu = 0$ as they are unlikely to factor in this benefit at all when making labor supply decisions if they are unaware of it. Furthermore, we show that the information processing constraints present in understanding and calculating profit-sharing reduce the weight workers assign to this benefit, suggesting a $\mu \in (0, 1)$ for some workers. Conversely, some workers are well-informed about profit-sharing and fully incorporate this benefit into their labor supply decisions, indicating a $\mu = 1$. Together, this evidence supports the existence of heterogeneous μ values across workers. Consequently, we extend the model to assume that workers have varying levels of misinformation about profit sharing, but that firms cannot discriminate between these different types. We demonstrate that even if *some* workers are well-informed about profit sharing ($\mu_i = 1$ for some i), the firm's overall elasticity of labor supply with respect to profit sharing will be affected if the average level of awareness is lower than that for wages ($\exists i$ s.t. $\mu_i < 1$). Thus, the lack of awareness of profit sharing in some workers will have effect on the average total compensation for all workers in the labor market, under the assumption that the firm cannot offer workers of the same labor market different amounts of total compensation. In other words, under the assumption that the firm cannot perfectly price discriminate in the labor market, as is commonly assumed in monopsony models (Card et al., 2018).

We assume $\mu_i \in [0, 1]$ has discrete probability $P(\mu_i = \mu_g) = p_g$. Then the likelihood of choosing employer j for a worker with awareness parameter μ_g is:

$$P(\max_{k \in \{1, \dots, J\}} \{U_k\} = U_j \mid \mu_g) = \lambda_g(w_j + \mu_g \cdot \alpha E[ps_j])^\theta \quad (29)$$

If we assume that firms cannot discriminate between workers of different μ_g , then using the rules of conditional probability,⁷³ we obtain that the likelihood of any given worker choosing employer j is:

$$P(\max_{k \in \{1, \dots, J\}} \{U_k\} = U_j) = \sum_{g \in G} p_g \lambda_g(w_j + \mu_g \cdot \alpha E[ps_j])^\theta \quad (30)$$

Then, the labor supply curve faced by the firm is:

⁷³ $P(A) = \sum_n P(A \mid B_n)P(B_n)$.

$$n(w_j, E[ps_j]) = N \sum_{g \in G} p_g \lambda_g (w_j + \mu_g \cdot \alpha \cdot E[ps_j])^\theta \quad (31)$$

We can see that the elasticity of the labor supply curve with respect to profit sharing depends on the distribution of the level of awareness of workers in the labor market, $\bar{p} = \{p_1 \dots p_G\}$ and $\bar{\mu} = \{\mu_1 \dots \mu_G\}$. This implies that if firms cannot offer different amounts of total compensation to different types g , the level of awareness of profit sharing among some workers affects the total compensation for all workers.⁷⁴

For $\theta = 1$ Equation 31 can be expressed in a form identical to Equation 24. For $\theta \neq 1$ this is not possible. However, both hold the property that if workers are risk averse ($\alpha < 1$) or at least one group of workers has information friction ($\exists g$ s.t. $\mu_g < 1$), the partial derivative of labor supply with respect to w_j will be greater than the partial derivative with respect to ps_j for all values of w_j, ps_j .⁷⁵ This implies that avoiding profit sharing allows firms to decrease total worker compensation. In the following section, we present the analytical solution to the model for the case of homogeneous μ_i . For the case of heterogeneous μ_i , we solve the model numerically under different parameter values and provide evidence illustrating our predictions for specific parameter values in Figures D.1 and D.3.

D.2 Analytical solution to the model

To solve the model, we start by deriving the optimal firm choice of wages, and profit sharing in two scenarios. The first is the scenario in which the firm decides to pay fixed cost k and marginal cost c , avoids mandatory profit sharing and chooses w_j . In the second scenario the firm decides not to avoid mandatory profit sharing. In this case, $E[ps_j]$ is determined by the firms' expected pre-profit-sharing profits,⁷⁶ and the firm decides optimally on w_j . We then compare expected post-profit-sharing profits in both scenarios to derive an optimal decision rule regarding whether to avoid mandatory profit sharing or not.

Case 1: If firm avoids mandatory profit sharing

If firm the decides to avoid mandatory profit sharing, it pays the marginal cost c and fixed cost k of avoidance, and chooses w_j to maximize profits. Under the assumption that the firm is risk neutral, the firm maximizes:

$$\max_{w_j} \mathbb{E}(z_j n_j - w_j n_j - c \cdot n_j) = \hat{z}_j n_j - w_j n_j - c \cdot n_j \quad (32)$$

subject to:

$$n_j = (w_j + \mu \cdot \alpha \cdot \mathbb{E}[ps_j])^\theta$$

⁷⁴The intuition behind this result is similar to the argument for the micro-foundation of monopsony through differentiation across firms. In this scenario, differential preferences for firms across workers affect the wage received by all workers if firms cannot perfectly discriminate.

⁷⁵ $\frac{\partial n_j^s}{\partial w_j} - \frac{\partial n_j^s}{\partial E[ps_j]} > 0 \quad \forall w_j, ps_j$.

⁷⁶We refer to pre-profit-sharing profits as the firm profits before distributing profit-sharing, and post-profit-sharing profits as the firm profits after distributing profit-sharing.

which can be written as $n_j = (w_j)^\theta$ since $\mathbb{E}[ps_j] = 0$.

In the equality of Equation 32 we use the fact that productivity z_j follows a random process $z_j = \hat{z}_j + \xi_j$ where $\mathbb{E}(\xi_j) = 0$, and that w_j and n_j are set before the productivity shock is drawn. Solving the firm's maximization problem, we obtain the following expressions for wages and total compensation:

$$w_j = (\hat{z}_j - c) \frac{\theta}{\theta + 1} \quad (33)$$

$$\mathbb{E}[\text{total compensation}_j] = (\hat{z}_j - c) \frac{\theta}{\theta + 1} \quad (34)$$

The resulting labor n_j and expected profits Π_j are:

$$n_j = \left((\hat{z}_j - c) \frac{\theta}{\theta + 1} \right)^\theta \quad (35)$$

$$\mathbb{E}(\Pi_j) = (\hat{z}_j - c) \frac{1}{\theta + 1} \left((\hat{z}_j - c) \frac{\theta}{\theta + 1} \right)^\theta - k \quad (36)$$

Case 2: If firm does not avoid mandatory profit sharing

If firm decides **not** to avoid mandatory profit sharing, then total profit sharing, PS_j is a proportion of pre-profit sharing profits:

$$PS_j = \rho(z_j - w_j)n_j \quad (37)$$

And expected profit sharing per worker is:

$$\mathbb{E}[ps_j] = \rho(\hat{z}_j - w_j) \quad (38)$$

The firm's maximization problem is now:

$$\max_{w_j} \mathbb{E}[(1 - \rho)(z_j n_j - w_j n_j)] = (1 - \rho)(\hat{z}_j n_j - w_j n_j) \quad (39)$$

subject to:

$$n_j = (w_j + \mu \cdot \alpha \cdot \rho(\hat{z}_j - w_j))^\theta$$

Where in Equation 39 we again use the fact that $\mathbb{E}[z_j] = \hat{z}_j$ and that wages and labor are determined before the realization of z_j , and we replace $\mathbb{E}[ps_j]$ by the expression in Equation 38 in the labor supply function. Solving the firm's maximization problem, we obtain:

$$w_j = \hat{z}_j \frac{\theta}{\theta + 1} - \frac{\rho\mu\alpha \cdot \hat{z}_j}{(1 + \theta)(1 - \rho\mu\alpha)} \quad (40)$$

Using Equation 38 again, expected total compensation will be equal to:

$$\mathbb{E}[\text{total compensation}_j] = \left(\hat{z}_j \frac{\theta}{\theta + 1} - \frac{\rho\mu\alpha \cdot \hat{z}_j}{(1 + \theta)(1 - \rho\mu\alpha)} \right) (1 - \rho) + \rho\hat{z}_j \quad (41)$$

The resulting labor n_j and expected post-profit sharing profits Π_j are:

$$n_j = \left(\hat{z}_j \frac{\theta}{\theta + 1} \right)^\theta \quad (42)$$

$$\mathbb{E}(\Pi_j) = \left(\hat{z}_j \frac{\theta}{\theta + 1} \right)^\theta \cdot \left(\frac{\hat{z}_j}{(1 + \theta)(1 - \rho\mu\alpha)} \right) (1 - \rho) \quad (43)$$

Expected profit-sharing per worker is:

$$\mathbb{E}[ps_j] = \left(\frac{\rho\hat{z}_j}{(1 + \theta)(1 - \rho\mu\alpha)} \right) \quad (44)$$

D.3 Decision on whether to avoid mandatory profit sharing

The firm will decide to avoid profit sharing if the expected profits of doing so are greater than the profits of not avoiding:

$$\underbrace{(\hat{z}_j - c) \frac{1}{\theta + 1} \left((\hat{z}_j - c) \frac{\theta}{\theta + 1} \right)^\theta - k}_{\text{expected profits when avoiding mandatory p.s.}} \geq \underbrace{\left(\hat{z}_j \frac{\theta}{\theta + 1} \right)^\theta \left(\frac{\hat{z}_j}{(1 + \theta)(1 - \rho\mu \cdot \alpha)} \right) (1 - \rho)}_{\text{expected profits when paying mandatory p.s.}} \quad (45)$$

By re-arranging the terms, we arrive at the inequality 6 in Section 5.2.

$$k \leq \frac{\hat{z}_j}{1 + \theta} \left(\hat{z}_j \frac{\theta}{\theta + 1} \right)^\theta \left[\left(1 - \frac{c}{\hat{z}_j} \right)^{1+\theta} - \left(\frac{1 - \rho}{1 - \mu\alpha\rho} \right) \right] \quad (46)$$


A few things to note from Equation 46:

- If $\mu \cdot \alpha = 1$ the expression collapses to $k \leq D$ with $D < 0$, i.e. the cost of avoidance has to be negative for the firm to avoid profit-sharing. If $\mu \cdot \alpha = 1$ and $c = 0$ the expression collapses to $k \leq 0$.
- If $\mu \cdot \alpha = 1$ and $k = 0$ the expression above collapses to $c \leq 0$.
- The right hand side of the inequality is increasing in ρ and z_j , such that higher profit sharing requirements and higher levels of productivity will lead firms to avoid profit-sharing.

- The right hand side of the inequality is decreasing in c and $\mu \cdot \alpha$, such that lower avoidance costs and lower elasticity of labor supply with respect to profit-sharing will incentivize profit-sharing avoidance.

Figure D.1 illustrates this result for heterogenous μ_i with simulations. The red (blue) lines correspond to simulations where there is a high (low) share of misinformed workers (i.e. workers with low μ_g). The shaded areas indicate the firms that choose to avoid profit-sharing in each simulation. Panel (a) displays total profit-sharing costs across different productivity levels z_j , showing that higher-productivity firms are more likely to avoid profit-sharing. Additionally, the proportion of firms opting to avoid profit-sharing is greater in the scenario with a higher share of misinformed workers. Panel (b) depicts firm profits as a fraction of what profits would be if firms did not avoid profit-sharing. When firms do not avoid profit-sharing, this ratio equals 1. As firms begin to avoid, the ratio exceeds 1, indicating that avoiding profit-sharing yields higher profits than complying with it.

Figure D.1: Model simulations for heterogenous μ_g : decision to avoid profit-sharing



Notes: This figure shows the results of simulations of the model for different productivity levels $z_j \in [35 : 75]$ and different shares of misinformed workers. Panel (a) shows total profit-sharing costs as a function of z_j . Panel (b) depicts total profits, as a share of total profits if profit-sharing avoidance was not possible. For all simulations $\bar{\mu} \in \{0, 0.5, 1\}$. For the results in red (high share misinformed), $\bar{p} = \{0.5, 0.4, 0.1\}$. For the results in blue (low share misinformed), $\bar{p} = \{\frac{1}{3}, \frac{1}{3}, \frac{1}{3}\}$. The shaded regions indicate the firms that opt to avoid profit-sharing under each parametrization of \bar{p} . The parameters for the simulations are $\theta = 1.5$, $c = 0$, $k = 200$, $\alpha = 0.7$, $\rho = 0.1$.

D.4 An increase in k

As can be seen in Equation 46 increase in the cost avoiding profit-sharing k will lead some firms to shift from avoiding profit-sharing, to complying with profit-sharing.

Employment. Using Equations 42 and 35, we derive the result presented in Prediction 1, which states that the effect on firm employment will be:

$$\Delta n_j = c \cdot \left(\frac{\theta}{\theta + 1} \right)^\theta \quad (47)$$

Note that if $c = 0$, the effect on employment will be zero. The reason behind this results is that profit sharing does not distort the marginal cost of employment at the point where marginal profits are zero, i.e. where profits are maximized. We proceed to derive this result. The labor supply curves and inverse labor supply curves when the firm avoids, and when the firm complies with profit-sharing can be expressed as:

$$\begin{aligned} n_j^{avoid} &= w_j^\theta & n_j^{comply} &= (w_j + \alpha\mu ps_j)^\theta \\ w(n_j)^{avoid} &= n_j^{\frac{1}{\theta}} & w(n_j)^{comply} &= n_j^{\frac{1}{\theta}} - \alpha\mu \cdot ps_j \end{aligned}$$

Thus, the marginal cost of employment when the firm avoids, and when the firm complies with profit-sharing are:

$$MC_n^{avoid} = w(n_j)^{avoid} + \frac{\partial w_j^{avoid}}{\partial n_j} n_j = n_j^{\frac{1}{\theta}} \left(1 + \frac{1}{\theta} \right) \quad (48)$$

$$MC_n^{comply} = w(n_j)^{comply} + \frac{\partial w_j^{comply}}{\partial n_j} n_j \quad (49)$$

Which can be expressed as:

$$MC_n^{comply} = \underbrace{\left(1 + \frac{1}{\theta} \right) n_j^{\frac{1}{\theta}}}_{MC_n^{avoid}} - \alpha\mu \left(\underbrace{ps_j}_* + \underbrace{\frac{\partial ps_j}{\partial n_j} n_j}_{**} \right) \quad (50)$$

Where:

$$\frac{\partial ps_j}{\partial n_j} = \frac{\partial \frac{\rho\Pi}{n_j}}{\partial n_j} = \rho \frac{\Pi' n_j - \Pi}{n_j^2} \quad (51)$$

Notice that when $\Pi' = 0$, we have $\frac{\partial ps_j}{\partial n_j} = \frac{-ps_j}{n_j}$, causing the second term in Equation 49 to collapse to zero. Thus, at the optimal level of labor, where profits are maximized, the marginal cost of employment with profit-sharing is identical to the marginal cost of employment without profit sharing. Importantly, this result holds without imposing any specific revenue function, and applies to any labor supply functions of the form $(A_1 w_j + A_2 ps_j)^\theta$. This result is notable as it implies that profit sharing does not distort labor decisions, even if we take into account the fact that it affects labor supply.

The intuition behind this result lies in the two effects of profit sharing on the marginal cost of labor. First, for a given level of employment, the firm can offer a wage that is $\alpha\mu \cdot ps_j$ lower, thereby

reducing the first term after the first equality sign in the marginal cost expression in 49, this is term (*) in Equation 50. Second, an increase in the number of workers reduces the profit-sharing amount allocated to each worker (for a concave profit function, the numerator in Equation 51 is always negative), requiring an upward wage adjustment for every worker to compensate for this decline, equal to $\alpha\mu|\frac{\partial ps_j}{\partial n_j}|$. This adjustment raises the second term of the marginal cost and is in term (**) in Equation 50. When marginal profits are positive ($\Pi' > 0$), hiring an additional worker increases the total profit available for distribution. As a result, the firm does not need to reduce the profit-sharing allocations of existing workers as much to provide profit-sharing to the new hire. At the optimal level of employment, profits do not change at the margin ($\Pi' = 0$). **Thus, any profit-sharing given to the new worker must be exactly offset by the total reductions in profit-sharing for existing workers.** Consequently, the initial wage savings from offering the new worker profit sharing is perfectly canceled out by the wage increases needed to compensate the existing workforce. As a result profit sharing does not alter marginal costs at the optimal employment level.

A graphical representation of this result for a linear production function is shown in Figure D.2. The labor supply curves when complying with profit-sharing in this case is $n_j = ((1 - \rho\alpha\mu)w_j + \rho\alpha\mu\hat{z}_j)^\theta$. These two curves intersect when $w = \hat{z}_j$. The marginal cost curves also intersect at $MC = MPL$, the point that determines optimal employment. Consequently, employment is identical in both scenarios. This is illustrated with a dashed vertical black line in Figure D.2, which also shows that while employment levels are the same, wages are higher in the avoiding scenario than in the non-avoiding scenario.




Figure D.2: Graphical illustration of optimal w_j and n_j

Notes: This figure provides a graphical illustration of the firm's optimal choices for w_j (wage) and n_j (employment) under two scenarios: when the firm does **not** provide profit-sharing (red), and when it provides profit-sharing (blue). The solid lines represent the labor supply curves: $n_j = w_j^\theta$ in the avoidance scenario and $((1 - \rho\mu\alpha)w_j + \rho\mu\alpha\hat{z}_j)^\theta$ in the compliance scenario. The dashed lines depict the marginal cost in each case. The horizontal dark orange line indicates the marginal revenue product of labor, \hat{z}_j , and the dashed vertical black line marks the optimal employment level where $MCL = MPL$. w_p is the optimal wage with profit-sharing, and w is the optimal wage with **no** profit-sharing. The figure is generated with parameters $\theta = 1.5$, $\rho = 0.3$, $\rho\mu = 0.5$, and $\hat{z}_j = 30$. The fact that n_j^* is equal in both scenarios illustrates **Prediction 1**.

Wage and total compensation. Additionally, using Equations 33, 40, 34 and 41 we obtain the

following expressions for the change in wages, profit sharing per worker, and total compensation for these firms. This last result is stated in [Prediction 2](#).

$$\Delta wage = c \frac{\theta}{\theta + 1} - \frac{\hat{z}_j \rho \mu \alpha}{(1 + \theta)(1 - \rho \mu \alpha)} \quad (52)$$

$$\Delta \mathbb{E}[ps_j] = \frac{\hat{z}_j \rho}{1 + \theta} \left(1 - \frac{\rho \mu \alpha}{1 - \rho \mu \alpha} \right) \quad (53)$$

$$\Delta \mathbb{E}[total\ compensation] = \frac{\hat{z}_j \rho}{1 + \theta} \left(1 - \frac{1 - \rho}{\frac{1}{\mu \alpha} - \rho} \right) + c \frac{\theta}{\theta + 1} \quad (54)$$


The expression in Equation 54 is increasing $\frac{1}{\mu \alpha}$, indicating that when labor supply is highly inelastic with respect to profit sharing, restrictions on profit-sharing avoidance lead to a larger rise in total compensation. In Section D.4.1 we show that the same result is obtained if wages are set via Nash bargaining, rather than wage posting.

Risk-adjusted value of total compensation. As mentioned above, α affects workers' utility derived from profit sharing, while μ does not. As explained in Section D.1.1, we define the change in the risk-adjusted value of total compensation for workers as $\Delta(w_j + \alpha \mathbb{E}[ps_j])$. This represents the change in the value of total compensation for workers, accounting for the additional risk involved in profit sharing, absent any information frictions. The effect of an increase in k on this variable presented in [Prediction 3](#) and is:

$$\Delta \mathbb{E}[value\ total\ compensation] = \frac{\hat{z}_j \rho \alpha}{1 + \theta} \left(1 - \frac{1 - \alpha \rho}{\frac{1}{\mu} - \alpha \rho} \right) + c \frac{\theta}{\theta + 1} \quad (55)$$

Figure D.3 illustrates simulations for the effect of an increase in k on total compensation (panels a,b) and the risk-adjusted value of total compensation (panels c,d) for heterogenous μ_i . Panel (a) and (c) plot the results when there is a high share of misinformed workers, while panel (b) and (d) plot the results when there is a lower share of misinformed workers. The black line in each graph represents the effect on the outcome variable when k increases, leading firms that were previously avoiding profit-sharing to start complying with it. As shown in the figures, the effect on both total compensation and the risk-adjusted value of total compensation is positive, and it is higher in the scenario with a larger share of misinformed workers.

Figure D.3: Model simulations for heterogeneous μ_g : increase in k



Notes: This figure shows the results of simulations of the model for different productivity levels $z_j \in [35 : 75]$ and different shares of misinformed workers. Panels (a) and (b) show total compensation ($w + \mathbb{E}[ps]$). Panels (c) and (d) show the risk-adjusted value total compensation ($w + \alpha \mathbb{E}[ps]$). For all simulations $\bar{\mu} \in \{0, 0.5, 1\}$. In Panels (a) and (c) (high share misinformed), $\bar{p} = \{0.5, 0.4, 0.1\}$. For Panels (b) and (d) (low share misinformed), $\bar{p} = \{\frac{1}{3}, \frac{1}{3}, \frac{1}{3}\}$. The shaded regions indicate the firms that opt to avoid profit-sharing under low k the black dotted lines in each graph depict the effect of an increase in the cost of avoiding profit-sharing, k . The parameters for the simulations are $\theta = 1.5$, $c = 0$, $k_{low} = 200$, $k_{high} = 1e^{10}$ $\alpha = 0.7$.

D.4.1 Alternative Setup: Wage Setting under Nash Bargaining

In this section, we show that the result in **Prediction 2** also holds when wages are determined through Nash bargaining.⁷⁷ When the firm **complies with profit-sharing**, the firm's value of a filled and unfilled vacancy is:

$$J = (1 - p)(z - w), \quad V = 0$$

⁷⁷For simplicity we assume $c = 0$ in this section. The results also hold if $c > 0$, as this would decrease the value of total compensation under avoidance.

The value of a being employed and unemployed for workers is the following, where we define:

$$TC = w + \alpha\mu \cdot p(z - w), \quad U = b$$

Here, TC represents the value of total compensation to the worker, accounting for the fact that workers discount profit-sharing due to risk aversion (α) and information frictions (μ). The actual total compensation received is $tc = w + p(z - w)$. Workers and firms bargain over the value of total compensation for workers through Nash bargaining, solving:

$$\max_{TC} (TC - U)^\Psi (J - V)^{1-\Psi}$$

The first-order condition implies:

$$(TC - U)(1 - \Psi) = (J - V)(\Psi)$$

Substituting in the expressions for TC , U , J , and V , and rearranging terms, we derive the wage and total compensation under profit-sharing compliance:

$$w^{comply} = \frac{(1-p)\Psi z - \alpha\mu pz(1-\Psi) + b(1-\Psi)}{(1-\Psi)(1-\alpha\mu p) + (1-p)\Psi}$$

$$tc^{comply} = w^{comply} + p(z - w^{comply}) = (1-p) \cdot \frac{(1-p)\Psi z - \alpha\mu pz(1-\Psi) + b(1-\Psi)}{(1-\Psi)(1-\alpha\mu p) + (1-p)\Psi} + pz$$

When the firm **avoids profit-sharing**, the bargaining is over the wage alone, leading to the standard Nash bargaining outcome

$$tc^{avoid} = \Psi z + (1 - \Psi)b$$

We compare total compensation when the firm avoids and when the firm complies with profit-sharing to assess the impact of compliance on total compensation:

$$\Delta[total\ comp] = \underbrace{(1-p) \cdot \frac{(1-p)\Psi z - \alpha\mu pz(1-\Psi) + b(1-\Psi)}{(1-\Psi)(1-\alpha\mu p) + (1-p)\Psi} + pz}_{\text{total compensation when complying with profit sharing}} - \underbrace{\Psi z + (1 - \Psi)b}_{\text{total compensation when avoiding p.s.}}$$

This simplifies to:

$$p(1 - \Psi)^2(1 - \alpha\mu)(z - b)$$

which is greater than zero as long as $\alpha\mu < 1$. When $\alpha\mu = 1$, $tc^{avoid} = tc^{comply}$. This reproduces

the result in **Prediction 2**.