

PRIVACY-PRESERVING SURVEILLANCE AS AN EDGE SERVICE

BY

ALEM HADDUSH FITWI

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PREVIEW

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Dr. Yu Chen, Chair  
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Binghamton University

Dr. Douglas Summerville, Member  
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Binghamton University

Dr. Xiaohua (Edward) Li, Member  
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Binghamton University

Dr. Kartik Gopalan, Outside Examiner  
Department of Computer Science, Binghamton University

# Abstract

As enshrined in the constitutional documents of many countries and defined in a number of published literature and textbooks, privacy is the freedom from any form of interference or intrusion to a personal space without one's knowledge and consent. It is the ability of a person or a group of people to have some control over how their personal information is collected and used. However, protecting the privacy of individuals in a highly surveilled world is a very challenging task. Today, video surveillance systems (VSS) using closed-circuit television (CCTV) cameras are widely deployed in many urban and suburban areas to garner a great deal of information about individuals' behavioral patterns and activities. The difficulty to preserve the privacy of individuals in the current practice of surveillance is mainly attributed to the facts that (i) there is no distinctively defined boundary between usability and privacy, (ii) video frames created and collected by the edge CCTV cameras could be intercepted by adversaries while in transit through the public network and spilled into the wider cyber space where there are more than 4.6 billion active users today, (iii) the preexisting VSS garners visual information about individuals indiscriminately due to lack of means to distinguish between criminal, suspicious, and innocuous activities or patterns of individuals, (iv) cameras and stored videos could be abused by personnel in charge of the VSS for personal or institutional gains, and (v) it is difficult to enforce the commonly used compute-intensive standard techniques as-is on the edge cameras owing to the availability of only limited computational resources.

In this work, with the aforementioned challenges being the main impetus, efficient solutions for Privacy-preserving Surveillance as an Edge service (PriSE) are proposed from two aspects based-on a hybrid architecture comprising edge cameras equipped with computational power equivalent to the Raspberry PI 4, fog/cloud servers, permissioned blockchain with connection to off-blockchain cloud storage sites, and surveillance operation centers (SOC). The first solution is based on the detection and scrambling of specific privacy attributes like faces, windows and minors. This scheme, however, is applicable to highly conditioned scenarios. The second facet is based on the practice of selective-surveillance that optimizes the balance between usability and privacy. It includes the design of lightweight deep/machine learning (D/ML)-based models for content-wise frame discrimination and secure end-to-end (E2E) privacy-preserving mechanisms based on computationally-thin chaotic maps. Generally, multiple architectures have been investigated, designed and experimented in this work but the best-performing proposed architecture comprises four major modules: (1) a simplified motion detector designed to differentiate between static or unchanging background objects and actual objects captured at the edge cameras by monitoring the background for significant changes, (2) a lightweight frame classifier designed to label frames as offensive and harmless depending on their contents to ensure the practice of selective surveillance following a frame approximation process, (3) novel chaotic-map-based image scrambling techniques that encipher frames or parts of a frame color-channel wise to ensure E2E privacy of individuals caught on CCTV cameras, and (4) a permissioned blockchain-based solution that enables authentic, authorized, accountable, and controllable access to stored surveillance videos to stymie the rife abuses. In other words, privacy is ensured in this work as the intersection of frame discrimination using ML/DNN-based models, chaotic frame scrambling schemes, and blockchain-based access management. The extensive analysis of the functionality, performance and security of the proposed schemes, and comparisons with pertinent previous works verify that the proposed solutions are valid, more feasible, robust and secure.

# Dedication

To

My Exceptionally Caring Mother, **Mihret Gebregziabher**

I am so honored to have the most sagacious, sacrosanctly principled, and exceptionally caring mother in the most unlikely environment. I am through and through the product of your many years' toils, incessant encouragement, and philosophical and principled teachings. Without you, I would have reached virtually no where. In addition, you are the most respectful and caring ever mother-in-law to my wife and a quintessential grandmother that my little princess (Emma Alem Haddush) and my prince (Brook Alem Haddush) will always proudly look up to. Hence, I affectionately and proudly dedicate this work to your name.

Your affectionate son and pupil,

A handwritten signature in black ink, featuring a stylized 'A' and 'H' with a cursive 'Fitwi' at the end.

Alem Haddush Fitwi

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# List of Acronyms

2DC	2D Chaos
ACLU	America Civil Liberties Union
AI	Artificial Intelligence
BC	Blockchain
BWC	Body Worn Camera
CAN	Campus Area Network
CCTV	Closed Circuit Television
CDC	Centers for Disease Control
CNN	Convolutional Neural Network
COVID-19	Coronavirus Disease of 2019
DNN	Deep Neural Network
D/ML	Deep/Machine Learning
DORI	Detection, Observation, Monitoring, and Identification
DyCIE	Dynamic Chaotic Image Enciphering
E2E	End-to-End
FPR	False Positive Rate
FPS	Frames Per Second
GIL	Global Interpreter Lock (python)
GPS	Gobal Positioning System
HD	High Definition
HBM	Haar-Based Model
HOG	Histogram Orient Gradient
IDJM	Improved De Jong Map
IIoT	Internet of Industrial of Things
ILM	Improved Logistic Map
IT	Information Technology
LDNN	Lightweight DNN
ML	Machine Learning
MTCNN	Multi-Tasked CNN
OID	Open Image frontal view Dataset
PPF	Pixel Per Foot
PPM	Pixel Per Meter
RCNN	Region Based Convolutional Neural Networks

ROI	Region of Interest
SCM	Sinusoidal Chaotic Map
SCNN	Standard CNN
SD	Social Distancing
SOC	Surveillance Operation Center
SSD	Single-Shot Detection
SVD	Singular value Decomposition
UGV	Unmanned Ground Vehicle
VSS	Video Surveillance Systems
WAN	Wide Area Network
WDM	Window Detection Model
YOLOv3	You Look Only Once version 03

PREVIEW

# 1. Introduction

## 1.1 Necessity of Privacy in Video Surveillance

The rapid advancement and ramification of electronic technologies over the last two decades have driven urban areas to become a lot smarter. At present, a multitude of cities around the world employ a spectrum of information and communication technologies (ICT), and Internet of Things (IoT) to improve the quality of urban services and to ensure the physical security and safety of their residents. Fixed and mobile mechanical surveillance technologies are among those widely deployed in a number of smart cities and suburban areas to provide public safety and physical security. Surveillance is often practiced through the use of both fixedly deployed closed circuit television (CCTV) cameras and cameras mounted on mobile manned or unmanned aerial and ground vehicles like airplanes, satellites, drones, manned ground patrolling vehicles, and unmanned ground vehicles (UGV). The ubiquitous and versatile deployment of these surveillance cameras in public places, including streets, city corners, stores, and marketplaces, enable first responders, government agencies, or security service providers to garner a great deal of audio-visual information about many individuals indiscriminately without their knowledge and consent.

As a result, there is a mixed public feeling in relation to the practice of mass-surveillance. On one hand, a number of people have a favorable view of the practice

of surveillance because they believe it has the potential to deter and reduce crime, and help monitor traffic, in addition to providing footage of crime scenes as an evidence in courts of law. On the other hand, many incidences of privacy breaches and abuse of personal information have been reported, which has caused grave concerns about the invasion of the privacy of individuals through the practice of non-selective surveillance. Hence, the public wants the surveillance system to be equipped with the ability to protect and/or anonymize privacy-sensitive attributes of individuals and the capability to selectively store only those data vital for future use in lieu of mass-storage to cut down on the risk of privacy breaches [33, 46, 60, 121].

With regards to the current practice of mass-surveillance, there are two lines of antithetical arguments. On one hand, the government and pro mass-surveillance people claim that there is no harm to good people that comes from large-scale mass-surveillance. Only bad people have reasons to want to hide things and care about their privacy. Then, they often mention the famous quote *“If you have got nothing to hide, you have got nothing to worry about”* to substantiate their argument. On the other hand, many argue to debunk the previous argument that it is never all about hiding something, it is all about an individual’s private things being no one else’s business. The quote *“I don’t have anything to hide, but I don’t have anything I feel like showing to you, either”* is used in an effort to corroborate this position [60]. However, the bottom line here is that there is a real threat of indiscriminate invasion and abuse of privacy and most people are concerned about it. Hence, they want to see privacy-conserving surveillance practices realized that enables the practice of video surveillance without unwarranted interference in the lives of individuals, allowing them to negotiate who they are and how they want to interact with the world around them. The privacy-mechanism should protect individuals from arbitrary and unjustified use of power by states, companies and other actors in relation to the practice of video surveillance. Then, as individuals who champion the practice of privacy-preserving surveillance, we have carried out