

# SecureChat: A PKI-Enabled Encrypted Messaging System

## CS-3002 Information Security – Assignment #2

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## 1. Introduction

This project implements **SecureChat**, a console-based secure communication system demonstrating how classical cryptographic primitives combine to achieve:

- **Confidentiality**
- **Integrity**
- **Authenticity**
- **Non-Repudiation (CIANR)**

The system is built entirely at the **application layer**, without relying on TLS/SSL, ensuring students understand how cryptographic mechanisms work internally in secure protocols.

SecureChat uses:

- **AES-128 (ECB + PKCS#7 padding)** for message confidentiality
- **Diffie–Hellman (DH)** for shared secret derivation
- **RSA-2048 + SHA-256** signatures for authenticity & message integrity
- **X.509 PKI (self-built CA)** for identity verification
- **MySQL** for securely storing salted password hashes

- **Signed transcript receipts** for non-repudiation

This report documents the design decisions, implementation process, and security guarantees achieved by the system.

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## 2. System Architecture

SecureChat is a client-server application built using plain TCP sockets (no TLS). All cryptographic protections are implemented manually.

### System Components

Component	Function
<code>scripts/gen_ca.py</code>	Generates Root CA and self-signed certificate
<code>scripts/gen_cert.py</code>	Issues server/client certificates signed by CA
<code>app/crypto/aes.py</code>	AES-128 ECB encryption/decryption
<code>app/crypto/dh.py</code>	Classical DH key exchange + SHA-256 → AES key
<code>app/crypto/pki.py</code>	Certificate validation (CA signature, expiry, CN)
<code>app/crypto/sign.py</code>	RSA SHA-256 signing & verification
<code>app/storage/db.py</code>	MySQL storage with salted SHA-256 password hashing
<code>app/storage/transcript.py</code>	Session transcript + transcript hash
<code>app/server.py</code>	Server control plane, authentication, chat logic
<code>app/client.py</code>	Client control plane, authentication, chat logic

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## 3. PKI Setup & Certificate Validation

A complete Public Key Infrastructure was implemented:

### 3.1 Root Certificate Authority (CA)

`gen_ca.py` generates:

- `root_ca.key` (private key)
- `root_ca.crt` (self-signed certificate)

The CA certificate is used to issue and validate all participants.

### 3.2 Server/Client Certificates

`gen_cert.py` produces:

- `server.key`, `server.crt`
- `client.key`, `client.crt`

Each certificate includes:

- CN (`server.local` / `client.local`)
- 1-year validity period
- RSA-2048 signing by Root CA

### 3.3 Certificate Validation Rules

During handshake:

- Server validates **client cert** CN = `client.local`
- Client validates **server cert** CN = `server.local`
- Expired or self-signed certs → `BAD_CERT`
- Signature must match CA public key
- Validity period must not be expired

This ensures **strong peer authentication**.

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## 4. Registration & Login Security

User credentials are stored securely in MySQL.

### 4.1 Password Handling

Server does NOT store plaintext passwords.

For each user:

- A **16-byte random salt** is generated
- Password hash = `SHA256(salt || password)`
- Stored fields:

Field	Type
email	VARCHAR
username	VARCHAR UNIQUE
salt	VARBINARY(16)
pwd_hash	CHAR(64)

### 4.2 Credentials in Transit

Credentials are **never sent in plaintext**.

During registration/login:

1. A temporary DH key is derived (K\_tmp)
2. Credentials are JSON-encoded
3. Encrypted with **AES-128(ECB)** using K\_tmp

4. Base64 encoded & sent

This protects confidentiality before authentication is established.

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## 5. Authenticated Key Exchange (Diffie–Hellman)

After authentication, a **fresh DH exchange** creates the **session key**:

- Client sends  $(g, p, A = g^a \bmod p)$
- Server responds with  $(B = g^b \bmod p)$
- Shared secret:

$$K_s = B^a \bmod p = A^b \bmod p$$

### AES-128 Key Derivation

$$K = \text{Trunc16}(\text{SHA256}(\text{big\_endian}(K_s)))$$

### Security Properties

- **Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS)** (new DH key per session)
  - Shared key never sent over network
  - Eavesdroppers cannot derive K
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## 6. Encrypted Chat: Confidentiality, Integrity & Authenticity

Every chat message provides 4 protections:

Property	How Achieved
Confidentiality	AES-128(ECB) encryption
Integrity	SHA-256 digest over metadata + ciphertext
Authenticity	RSA-2048 signature of hash
Freshness	Sequence number + timestamps

### 6.1 Message Structure

```
{  
  "type": "msg",  
  "seqno": <int>,  
  "ts": <unix ms>,  
  "ct": <base64 ciphertext>,  
  "sig": <base64 RSA signature>  
}
```

### 6.2 Sender Side Workflow

1. `seqno` increases strictly
2. `ts = now_ms()`
3. Encrypt plaintext → AES-128 → ciphertext `ct`
4. Compute digest:

```
h = SHA256(seqno || ts || ct)
```

5. Sign digest:

```
sig = RSA_SIGN(h)
```

### 6.3 Receiver Side Workflow

- Reject message if `seqno <= last_seqno` → `REPLAY`
- Recompute digest & verify signature → else `SIG_FAIL`
- Decrypt ciphertext → plaintext

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## 7. Non-Repudiation: Transcript & Session Receipt

SecureChat logs **every message** in an append-only transcript:

```
seqno | ts | ct_b64 | sig_b64 | peer_cert_fingerprint
```

After session termination:

### 7.1 Transcript Hash

```
TranscriptHash = SHA256(concatenate(all transcript lines))
```

### 7.2 Session Receipt (signed)

```
{  
  "type": "receipt",  
  "peer": "client" | "server",  
  "first_seq": ...,  
  "last_seq": ...,  
  "transcript_sha256": "<hex>",  
  "sig": "<base64 RSA signature>"  
}
```

}

This provides **cryptographic proof** of communication.

Any modification to the transcript invalidates verification, achieving **non-repudiation**.

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## 8. Testing & Security Validation

### 8.1 Wireshark Evidence

- All TCP payloads appear as unreadable ciphertext (AES encrypted)
- No plaintext credentials, messages, or salts visible

### 8.2 Invalid Certificate Test

- Self-signed client certificate → rejected (**BAD\_CERT**)
- Wrong CN → rejected
- Expired certificate → rejected

### 8.3 Tampering Test

Manually flip a bit in **ct**:

- Signature verification fails (**SIG\_FAIL**)
- Message rejected

### 8.4 Replay Test

Reinject previously captured message:

- Rejected due to outdated **seqno** (**REPLAY**)

### 8.5 Non-Repudiation Test



- Recompute transcript hash offline
  - Verify client/server signature using their certificates
  - Modification of transcript breaks verification
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## 9. Conclusion

SecureChat successfully demonstrates how classical cryptographic primitives combine to form a secure communication protocol providing **Confidentiality, Integrity, Authenticity, and Non-Repudiation**.

All requirements were implemented at the **application layer**, without relying on TLS.

The system is modular, transparent, and educational, providing full visibility into certificate handling, key exchange, authenticated encryption, and signature-based accountability.