

INTRODUCTION

Formal Methods

BCS2133

Semester 1 Session 2014/2015

Software has become critical in modern life


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- Process control (oil, gas, water,.....)
- Transportation (air traffic control,)
- Health care (patient monitoring, device control,...)
- Finance (automatic trading, bank security,...)
- Defense (intelligence, weapons control,...)
- Manufacturing (precision milling, assembly,...)

Embedded Software

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- Most of Embedded systems are safety critical



- Failing software costs money and life!

Software systems are very large

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- Millions of Lines of Code (LOCs) in aircraft software
- Even for cars, GM Chevrolet Volt contains ~10M LOCs
 - ▣ Current cars admits hundreds of onboard functions: how we can verify their combination?
E.g.: does braking when changing the radio station and starting the windscreen wiper, will affect air conditioning?

Failing software costs money

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- ❑ Thousands of dollars for each minute of factory down-time.
- ❑ Huge losses of monetary and intellectual investment
 - ▣ Rocket boost failure – Arienne 5 (due to reusing soft from Arienne 4 and not taking into account specifics of Arienne 5 rocket)
- ❑ Business failures associated with buggy software
 - ▣ E.g.: Ashton-tate dBase.

Failing software costs lives

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- Potential source of problems:
 - ▣ Air-traffic control systems
 - ▣ Embedded software in cars
 - ▣ Space craft vehicle control
 - ▣ Software used to control nuclear power plants

- A well known and tragic example because of software failure – Therac 25 machine failures (this is radiation therapy machine, due to error in program patients were given massive overdoses of radiation)

The peculiarity of software systems

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Tiny faults can have catastrophic consequences:

- ▣ Arienne 5
- ▣ Therac 25
- ▣ Mars Climate Orbiter, Mars Sojourner
- ▣ London Ambulance Dispatch System
- ▣ Denver Airport Luggage Handling System
- ▣ Pentium Bug etc.

Motivation

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- Building software is what most of you will do after graduation
- You'll develop systems in the context we just mentioned
- Given the increasing importance of software
 - ▣ Everybody are liable to errors
 - ▣ Your success in job will depend on your ability to produce reliable systems
- How to develop reliable software?

Achieving Reliability in Engineering

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- Some well-known strategies from engineering:
 - ▣ Precise calculations/estimations of forces, stress, etc.
 - ▣ Hardware redundancy (“make it bit stronger than necessary”)
 - ▣ Robust design (single fault is not catastrophic)
 - ▣ Clear separation of subsystems (any airplane flies with dozens of known but minor defects)
 - ▣ Follows design patterns that are proven to work.

Why This Does Not Work For Software?

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- ❑ Software systems are discrete. Single bit-flip may change behavior completely.
- ❑ Redundancy as replication doesn't help against bugs. Redundant SW only viable in extreme cases.
- ❑ There is no physical separation of SW subsystems. Local failures often affect whole system.
- ❑ Software designs have high logical complexity.
- ❑ Design practice for reliable software is not yet mature.
- ❑ Most SW engineers untrained in checking

How to Ensure Software Correctness

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- A central strategy : Testing
- Others : flowing Process of SW design, peer reviews, using existing templates and libraries
- Testing against *inherent* SW errors (“bugs”)
 - ▣ Development of unit tests
 - ▣ Ensure that a system behaves as intended on them
- Testing against *external* faults
 - ▣ Inject faults (memory, CPU, communication) by simulation or radiation.

Testing: Static vs Dynamic Analysis

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- Static analysis of code → does not require execution of code
 - ▣ Lexical analysis of the program syntax, checks the structure and usage of individual statements
 - ▣ often automated and is first stage of compilation
- Dynamic analysis of code → at run of software system
 - ▣ Program run formally under controlled conditions
 - ▣ Branch testing

Limitation of Testing

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- Testing can show the presence of errors, but not their absence.
- Exhaustive testing is viable only for trivial systems.
- Representativeness of test cases/injected faults is subjective. How to test for the unexpected?
- Testing is labor intensive, hence expensive.

Complementary Testing : Formal Verification

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A Sorting Program:

```
int* sort (int* a) {  
    .....  
}
```

Complementary Testing : Formal Verification

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A Sorting Program:

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```

Testing sort() ;

- $\text{sort}(\{3,2,5\}) == \{2,3,5\}$
- $\text{sort}(\{\}) == \{\}$
- $\text{sort}(\{17\}) == \{17\}$

Complementary Testing : Formal Verification

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A Sorting Program:

```
int* sort (int* a) {  
    .....  
}
```

Testing sort() ;

- `sort ({3,2,5}) == {2,3,5}`
- `sort ({}) == {}`
- `sort ({17}) == {17}`

Missing test cases!

- `sort ({2,1,2}) == {1,2,2}`
- `sort (NULL) == exception`

Formal Verification as Theorem Proving

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Theorem : The program `sort ()` is correct;
For any given non-null integer array `a`, calling the program `sort (a)` returns an integer array that is sorted wrt \leq and is a permutation of `a`.

Methodology:

- Formalize this claim in a logical representation
- Prove this claim with the help of an automated reasoner.

What Are Formal Methods?

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- Specification language + formal reasoning
- The technique is supported by
 - ▣ Mathematical notation (Z, TLA, UPPAAL)
 - ▣ Reasoning tools and checkers (Z-Eves, TLC, UPPAAL)

Formal Methods

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- ❑ Rigorous design and development methods for computational (hardware/software) systems
- ❑ Based on discrete math (mostly, logic and set theory)
- ❑ Allow to increase confidence in the correctness/robustness/security of the system
- ❑ Consider two main artifacts:
 - ❑ System requirements (1)
 - ❑ System implementation (2)
- ❑ Are based on
 - ❑ A formal specification of (1)
 - ❑ A formal execution model of (2)
- ❑ Use tools to verify that (2) satisfy (1)

Formal Methods : The Objectives

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- Requirements specification
 - ▣ clarify customer's requirements
 - ▣ reveal ambiguity, inconsistency, incompleteness
- Software design
 - ▣ decomposition
 - specification of components structural relationships
 - specification of components behavior
 - ▣ refinement


Formal Methods : The Objectives

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- Verification
 - ▣ Are we building the system right?
 - ▣ Proving that a specific realization satisfies a system specifications
- Validation
 - ▣ Are we building the right system?
 - ▣ Use specification to determine test cases for testing and debugging
- Documentation
 - ▣ Communication among stakeholders for better understanding

Formal Methods: The Concepts

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Types of Specifications

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- Informal
 - ▣ Free form, natural language
 - ▣ Ambiguity and lack of organization lead to incompleteness, inconsistency and misunderstandings.
- Formatted
 - ▣ Standard syntax
 - ▣ Basic consistency and completeness checks
 - ▣ Imprecise semantics implies errors

Types of Specifications

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□ Formal

- Syntax and semantics rigorously defined. Precise mathematical form, allowing eliminate imprecision and ambiguity
- Translate non-mathematical description (usually, English text, diagrams, tables) into formal specification language.
- Precise description of behavior and properties of a system.
- Strict semantics of a language support formal deduction.
- Provide basis for verifying equivalence between specification and implementation

Formal Proofs

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- Complete and convincing proving validity of some property of the system
- Constructed as a series of steps, each of which is justified by a small set of rules
- Eliminates ambiguity and subjectivity inherent when drawing informal conclusions
- May be manual but usually constructed with automated assistance

Model Checking

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- Use Finite State Machine (FSM) model of a system in a one of notations (e.g. TLA)
- Model checker determines if a model satisfies requirements expressed as formulas in a given logic
- Basic method is to explore all reachable paths in a tree of states of the model

Desirable Properties of Formal Specifications

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- Unambiguous
 - ▣ exactly one (set of) properties satisfies it
- Consistency
 - ▣ No contradictions between requirements
- Completeness
 - ▣ all aspects of a system are specified
- Inference
 - ▣ Can be used to prove properties of a system

Benefits of Formal Specification in Software Development

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- Formal specifications ground the software development process in the well-defined basis of computer science
- Orientation goes from customer to developer
- Formal specifications are expressed in languages with formally defined syntax and semantics
 - ▣ hierarchical decomposition
 - ▣ mathematical foundation
 - ▣ graphical presentation
 - ▣ It can be accompanied by informal description

Benefits of Formal Specifications

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- Higher level of abstractions enables a better understanding of the problem
- Defects are covered that would likely go unnoticed with traditional specification methods
- Identify defects earlier in life cycle

Benefits of Formal Specifications

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- Formal specification enable formal proofs which can establish fundamental system properties and invariants
- Repeatable analysis means reasoning and conclusions can be checked by colleagues
- Encourages an abstract view of systems—focusing on what a proposed system should accomplish as opposed on how to accomplish it
- Abstract formal view helps separate specification from design

Limitation to Formal Methods

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- Used as an addition to, not a replacement for standard quality assurance methods
- Formal methods are not a panacea, but can increase confidence in a product's reliability if applied with care and skill
- Very useful for consistency checks, but can not assure completeness of a specification

Why Use Formal Methods

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- Potential to improve both quality and productivity in software development
- Becoming best and required practice for developing safety-critical and mission-critical software systems.
- To ensure that systems meet regulations and standards
- To avoid legal liability repercussions

Myths and limitations of Formal Methods

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- Able to guarantee that software is perfect
 - it only allows to validate a model of software
- Increase the cost of development
 - So mostly used for safety-critical systems
- Are not used on large-scale software
- Require highly trained mathematicians
- Application is needed if benefits are to exceed costs.
- Formal Methods and problem domain expertise must be integrated to achieve positive results.

Conclusion

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- ❑ FM are no panacea
- ❑ FM can detect defects earlier in life cycle
- ❑ FM can be applied at various levels of software systems developments
- ❑ FM can be integrated with existing process models of software systems development
- ❑ FM can improve quality assurance when applied judiciously to appropriate projects

Please ask your questions!