

Reverse Engineering

COURSE WORK ONE

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Section 1: Executive Summary

SHA-256 hash	2FAA2637FEDC5788A9598691581000BA637DB86C8505FDE1DC9D7DBCA8CC41CD
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The sample PE is a keylogger malware sample first identified on Dec 14th, 2022. It is written in C, compiled with GCC and runs on the x86 Windows operating system. It records all keystrokes and implements a substitution cipher on the keystrokes them before sending them to a remote server at 192.168.100.156 on port 333 over multiple TCP connections.

YARA signature rules are attached in Appendix A. Malware sample and hashes have been submitted to VirusTotal for further examination.

Basic Information	
File Name	Sample.exe
Md5 hash	ebc19c36143ba91a6668a369e26d3c67
Sha-256	2FAA2637FEDC5788A9598691581000BA637DB86C8505FDE1DC9D7DBCA8CC41CD
File type	Win32 EXE
Target Machine	Windows x64
Is packed	False

Table 1 Basic Information

Section 2: Basic Static Analysis

Extracted Strings:

Some of the interesting strings found in the portable executable where					
[DOWN]	[UP]	[HOME]	[ESCAPE]	[CONTROL]	[BACKSPACE]
Socket	192.168.100.156	Send	GetAsyncKeyState		Connect
0123456789ELTFYBCDMSUXNWGVORHIAQPJZK			cos(7493) / cos(241); : %d		

Table 2 Interesting Strings

File Header Analysis:

Properties	Values
File Type	Portable executable (PE)
File can be executed	True
Compiler stamp	Tue Dec 13 16:56:30 2022 UTC
Signature	PE00
Sections	13
Virtual and raw size	32E4, 3400 [hex] values are very similar (probably not packed)

Table 3 File Header Analysis

Imported Libraries:

KERNEL32.dll	msvcrt.dll	msvcrt.dll	USER32.dll	WS2_32.dll
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Table 4 Imported Libraries

Used functions:

Some of the intersecting functions used in the portable executable				
IsDebuggerPresent	connect	htons	send	socket
GetAsyncKeyState	ExitProcess	Sleep	atexit	Cos & Sin

Table 5 Intersecting Functions

Summary of findings (Basic Static Analysis)

After analyzing the strings, file headers, imported libraries, and the used functions, I can **assume** that

1. The PE uses the GetAsyncKeyState function which allow the PE to know what keys where pressed.
2. The PE sends some data to a remote server the reason being the ws2_32 (sockets) library was imported and functions like socket, connect, and send indicate that sockets are being used. Also, I was able to extract this IP from the strings (192.168.100.156) further emphasizing my claim.
3. The PE uses the IsDebuggerPresent function which means that the program can I identify if there is a debugger running it.
4. The PE does some trigonometric equations using the sin and the cos functions, also I was able to extract "cos(7493) / cos(241)" from the strings further emphasizing my claim.
5. The file uses the sleep function witch according to malapi.io is commonly used for time-based evasion by adding delays in the code.

Basic Static Analysis screenshots

Command Prompt Output:

```

C:\Users\Farouk\Desktop> floss sample.exe
FL0SS static ASCII strings
!This program cannot be run in DOS mode.
.text
P'.data
.rdata
0@/4
0@.bss
.idata
.CRT
.tls
@B/29
B/41
B/55
B/67
$A`@
$4P@
$d`@
$w`@
$
$a@
$a@
$a@
$a@
$a@
$a@
$a@
$a@
$a@

```

PEView - C:\Users\Farouk\Desktop\sample.exe

pFile	Data	Description	Value
00000178	2E 74 65 78	Name	.text
0000017C	74 00 00 00		
00000180	000032E4	Virtual Size	
00000184	00001000	RVA	
00000188	00003400	Size of Raw Data	
0000018C	00000400	Pointer to Raw Data	
00000190	00000000	Pointer to Relocations	
00000194	00000000	Pointer to Line Numbers	
00000198	0000	Number of Relocations	
0000019A	0000	Number of Line Numbers	
0000019C	60500060	Characteristics	
	00000020	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE	
	00000040	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA	
	00500000	IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_16BYTES	
	20000000	IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE	
	40000000	IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ	

Import Table:

library (5)	duplicate (0)	flag (1)	bound (0)	first-thunk-original (INT)	first-thunk (IAT)	type (1)	imports (66)	description
KERNEL32.dll	-	-	-	0x00009078	0x00009194	implicit	21	Windows NT BASE API Client
msvcrt.dll	-	-	-	0x000090D0	0x000091EC	implicit	2	Windows NT CRT Library
USER32.dll	-	-	-	0x000090C0	0x000091F8	implicit	33	Windows NT CRT Library
WS2_32.dll	-	x	-	0x00009164	0x00009280	implicit	2	Multi-User Windows USER API Client Library
WS2_32.dll	-	-	-	0x00009174	0x00009290	implicit	7	Windows Socket Library

Figure 1 Basic Static Analysis Screenshots

Section 3: Basic Dynamic Analysis

Process Monitoring:

After running Procmon to monitor the processes, I was able to understand that the sample PE **does not** start other processes. Meaning that any action done by the PE is only done through the main process.

File Monitoring:

After deep analysis of the file system, I was able to see that the PE **does not** create, delete, or modify any files in the file system. Figure 2 below shows a screen shot of Procmon after applying a createfile filter on the PE process. Although there are many matches all of them have to do with the dll imported and **no new files were created**.




Figure 2 Basic Dynamic Analysis (File Monitoring)

Network traffic monitoring:

For the network monitoring section, I filtered the actions in Procmon to only display network related activities. As shown In Figure 3 below, The PE connects multiple times in the same minute to 192.168.100.156 on port 333. To further investigate I opened Wireshark and started analyzing packets sent and received from 192.168.100.156. I was able to see that every few seconds a new TCP connection is created, and the PE sends some bits of data when decoded in ascii it was sometimes [Down],[Control],[.], a random letter, or even a random number.




Figure 3 Network traffic monitoring

Summary of findings (Basic Dynamic Analysis)

I was able to know from the basic static analysis done earlier that the PE has the ability of recording keystrokes using the function GetAsyncKeyState. And since there were a lot of TCP connections every connection **holding a random letter or number**, I can assume that the sample PE is a keylogger that sends keystrokes in real time to 192.168.100.156:333. I was also able to prove my hypothesis by deeply analyzing the traffic with Wireshark and noticing that the more keys I pressed the more traffic generated; similarly, if no keys were pressed no traffic was generated. I can also assume that the keylogger does not store the keystrokes in a file since there were no file changes.

Section 4: Advanced Static Analysis

Main Function Analysis:

```
; Attributes: bp-based frame fuzzy-sp
; int __cdecl main(int argc, const char **argv, const char **envp)
public __main
__main proc near
    vKey= dword ptr -0Ch
    var_4= dword ptr -4
    argc= dword ptr 8
    argv= dword ptr 0Ch
    envp= dword ptr 10h

; __unwind {
    lea    ecx, [esp+4]    ; test
    and    esp, 0FFFFFFF0h
    push   dword ptr [ecx-4]
    push   ebp
    mov    ebp, esp
    push   ecx
    sub    esp, 24h
    call   __main
    call   _CuTxGrVk
    fld    _X
    fstp   qword ptr [esp] ; X
    call   _sin
    fstp   st
    fld    _X
    fstp   qword ptr [esp] ; X
    call   _cos
    fstp   st
    call   _IsDebuggerPresent@0
    test   eax, eax
    jz     short loc_401ABE
}
```

This code appears to be the **beginning of the main function**. It sets up a stack frame using the ebp register and then makes a call to the `__main` function. It then calls the `CuTxGrVk` and `IsDebuggerPresent` functions and depending on the result of the call to `IsDebuggerPresent`, it **either jumps to the `loc_401ABE` label or continues execution**.

No Debugger

```
loc_401ABE:
    fld    _X
    fstp   qword ptr [esp] ; X
    call   _sin
    fstp   st
    fld    _X
    fstp   qword ptr [esp] ; X
    call   _cos
    fstp   st
```

performing a calculation involving the `sin` function.

Debugger is present

```
fld    _X
fstp   qword ptr [esp] ; X
call   _sin
fstp   st
fld    _X
fstp   qword ptr [esp] ; X
call   _cos
fstp   st
mov    eax, 0
jmp    loc_401B44
```

```
loc_401B44:
    mov    ecx, [ebp+var_4]
    leave  ecx, [ecx-4]
    retn
; } // starts at 401A50
__main endp
```

This code appears to be performing a calculation involving the `sin` and `cos` functions. Then jumps to the `loc_401B44` label, which **appears to be the end of the main function**.

```
loc_401AE7:
    mov    eax, [ebp+vKey]
    mov    [esp], eax    ; vKey
    call   _GetAsyncKeyState@4
    sub    esp, 4
    cmp    ax, 8001h
    jnz    short loc_401B35

mov    eax, [ebp+vKey]
mov    [esp], eax
call   _LW0jgcIF
fld    _X
fstp   qword ptr [esp] ; X
call   _sin
fstp   st
fld    _X
fstp   qword ptr [esp] ; X
call   _cos
fstp   st
mov    dword ptr [esp], 2 ; dwMilliseconds
call   _Sleep@4
sub    esp, 4
```

This code appears to be calling the `GetAsyncKeyState` function, passing in the value of the `vKey` variable as an argument. It then compares the value returned by the function (in the ax register) to the value `8001h` and, if they are not equal, jumps to the `loc_401B35` label. If the values are equal, the code then calls the `LW0jgcIF` function

LWOjgcIF Function Analysis:

LWOjgcIF function contains a long switch with all the letters and numbers and depending on the return value of the **GetAsyncKeyState** this function calls the **JHsQRJDy** function passing a **static value** to it this value can be a **number**, a **letter**, or a different value like **[Shift]**.

Figure 5 LWOjgcIF Function Analysis

JHsQRJDy Function Analysis:

This fragment appears to define several local variables, including **WSADATA**, **s**, and **Str**, and then contains a sequence of instructions that perform various math operations like by calling the **sin** and **cos** functions. It then calls the **_connect** and the **_send** functions. I can assume that this function connects and sends the keystrokes to the remote server.

Figure 6 JHsQRJDy Function Analysis

Summary of findings (Advanced Static Analysis)

After analyzing the **LWOjgcIF**, **JHsQRJDy**, and the **main** function I can **predict** that the main function

- First, looks for a debugger and if there is a debugger the program will close. If there is no debugger the program will continue executing.
- Second, the program calls the **GetAsyncKeyState** function and passes the result to **LWOjgcIF**
- Third, the **LWOjgcIF** functions maps the input to a static number or letter or special characters and calls the **JHsQRJDy** function **for example the letter A is statically mapped to E**
- Finally, the **JHsQRJDy** function connects and sends to the server at IP 192.168.100.156 the newly mapped static number, letter, or special characters.

It is also very clear from the function names that the developer is trying to obfuscate the code by naming the functions wired names. It also appears that the trigonometric equations preformed do not severe a real purpose and may be a form of logical obfuscation.

Claim Three: (LWOjgcIf functions maps the input to a static number or letter or special characters and calls the JHsQRJDy function that is used to send to the server)

For this claim I was correct, it is seen in the EAX registry that the input key gets changed. Before sending it to the **JHsQRJDy** function which calls the connect and send function to send the keystroke to the server. It is also visible that the sin and cos functions get called multiple time without doing anything with the output confirming that the trigonometric functions are used for only for obfuscation.

After proving that the **LWOjgcIf** functions preforms substitution cypher I returned to Ida and to decrypt the substitution cypher. Bellow is a sample of how I decrypted the cypher. The full table of the decrypted cypher can be found in the [Appendices](#) section.

Appendices

A. Decrypted Cypher

Keystroke	Mapped to	Keystroke	Mapped to
A	E	N	W
B	L	O	G
C	T	P	V
D	F	Q	O
E	Y	R	R
F	B	S	H
G	C	T	I
H	D	U	A
I	M	V	Q
J	S	W	P
K	U	X	J
L	X	Y	Z
M	N	Z	K

B. Yara Rules for detecting this malware

```
rule CW_keylogger{
    meta:
        last_updated = "2022-12-15"
        author = "Farouk"
        description = "A keylogger that infects windows operating systems"
    strings:
        $string1 = "0123456789ELTFYBCDMSUXNWGVORHIAQPJZK" ascii
        $string2 = "192.168.100.156" ascii
        $PE_magic_byte = "MZ"
        $suspicious_hex_string = {4465 6275 6767 6572}
    condition:
        $PE_magic_byte at 0 and
        ($string1 and $string2) or
        $suspicious_hex_string
}
```