

GROUP 1

# ECONOMICS OF HUMAN RIGHTS

THROUGH THE LENS OF GENOCIDE

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# REPORT OUTLINE

Definition of Genocide

Basics of Human Rights

Economic Analysis of Human Rights Violations

Domestic Intervention

International Intervention

# DEFINING KEY IDEAS

Defining Genocide

A Specific Approach

Data

Statistics and Trends

Authoritative Intervention

- **Genocide** means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:

- *Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Article II*

- Killing members of the group
- Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group
- Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group
- Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part
- Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

# A More Specific Approach

- **A mental element:** the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.
- **A physical element:** which includes the atrocities previously listed

- *United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect*


# Actors

- **Authority:** The organizations, nations, and businesses that make decisions regarding when and how to intervene, not necessarily collectively.
- **Perpetrators:** Those who actually commit the actions associated with the atrocity
- **Bystanders:** Those people who do not actively participate but also do not work to prevent or safeguard.
- **Genocidaires:** The decision-makers who are the leaders in planning the genocide, preparing the propaganda, assembling necessary resources, and determining the timing of the atrocity.

- *The Economics of Human Rights*, Dr. Elizabeth M. Wheaton

## Number of active genocides and politicides around the world

Our World  
in Data



Source: State Failure Problem Set, 1955-2014 - Political Instability Task Force (PITF)


OurWorldInData.org/genocides/ • CC BY

# Magnitude of genocides between 1955 and 2014

The shown magnitude of deaths from genocides is a non-linear measure – see the source tab further details.

Our World  
in Data

World



Source: Political Instability Task Force (PITF) State Failure Problem Set, 1955-2014 (Death Magnitude)  
Note: The death magnitude scale used is non-linear, for more information please consult the OWID page or PITF codebook.

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Death Magnitude	Number of deaths
0.0	Less than 300
0.5	300 – 1,000
1.0	1,000 – 2,000
1.5	2,000 – 4,000
2.0	4,000 – 8,000
2.5	8,000 – 16,000
3.0	16,000 – 32,000
3.5	32,000 – 64,000
4.0	64,000 – 128,000
4.5	128,000 – 256,000
5	More than 256,000



# Authoritative Intervention

- "The intent is the most difficult element to determine. To constitute genocide, there must be a proven intent on the part of perpetrators to physically destroy a national, ethnical, racial or religious group. Cultural destruction does not suffice, nor does an intention to simply disperse a group. It is this special intent, or *dolus specialis*, that makes the crime of genocide so unique..."

- *Genocide Prevention and The Responsibility to Protect*, The United Nations

# Authoritative Intervention

- "...Importantly, the victims of genocide are deliberately targeted - not randomly –
- because of their real or perceived membership of one of the four groups protected under the Convention (which excludes political groups, for example). This means that the target of destruction must be a group in its entirety, as such, and not just its members as individuals. However, genocide can also be committed against only a part of the group, as long as that part is identifiable (including within a geographically limited area) and 'substantial.'"

# Authoritative Intervention

- "The **legal definition of genocide is precise** and includes an element that is often hard to prove, the element of 'intent'. The determination as to whether a situation constitutes genocide is thus factually and legally complex and should only be made following a careful and detailed examination of the facts against relevant legislation. This examination has been carried out for the purpose of establishing State responsibility or individual criminal responsibility for the crime of genocide but 'only a few events have been determined by competent judicial bodies to constitute genocide.'"

- *When to refer to a Situation as Genocide*, The United Nations

# **HUMAN RIGHTS AND ECONOMICS**

# Different economic situations for perpetrators

- Violators of human rights operating at a national or international scale
  - Maintain partial immunity for economic, political, or militaristic reasons
- Violators of human rights operating at a small scale
  - Often caught and prosecuted (18 U.S. Code § 1091)
- In genocide, violators are often lawmakers

# Formal International Legal Violations

- Genocide is a combination of many heinous crimes
  - Violations in UDHR Articles 9, 2, 3
- Limitations of UDHR
  - Bureaucracy, enforcement, ethical leeway, political biases
- Majority will tweak their own laws for genocide
  - Case study: Bosnian genocide—refusal to acknowledge liberty

# Innovations that lead to Chaos

- Technological and ideological efficiencies
  - maximize output and impact, human rights take a backseat
- Limitations of Human Rights enforcement
  - Economists can only ask for what is efficient
- Genocide requires innovations in the distortion of ethics to maintain control
  - Case study: Holocaust—guillotine paradigm and prisoner paradigm

# **ECONOMIC ANALYSIS**

Defining Terms

Understand Costs and Benefits



- **ECONOMICS**

Study of choice when dealing with scarcity

- **MARGINAL BENEFIT/COST**

The additional benefit/cost gained from producing one additional unit of a good or service

- **COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS**

Analyzing the costs and benefits of the individual players to understand their decisions

- **NET BENEFIT**

Benefit gained from the total benefit minus the total cost

FIGURE 1.4 Increased marginal cost of stealing food





FIGURE 1.5 Decreased marginal benefit of stealing food



**"CALCULATING THE VALUE OF AN ENTIRE NATIONAL, ETHNIC, RACIAL, OR RELIGIOUS GROUP -- INCLUDING ITS HISTORY, CULTURE, TRADITION, AND COLLECTIVE MEMORY -- WOULD POST EXTRAORDINARY CHALLENGES"**

WILLIAM J. ACEVES

## **GENOCIDAIRES**

Benefits: Power, Money, other resources

Costs: Could be persecuted if caught

## **PERPETRATORS**

Benefits: Resources and fighting for the cause

Costs: Risk injury or death

## **VICTIMS**

Costs: Loss of resources and possibly life

# **COSTS AND BENEFITS OF GENOCIDE**



Indicators of genocide that could help stop these violations before they occur

**TABLE 2. Final Genocide Model Results**

Variable	Countries at Greater Risk	Countries at Lesser Risk	Odds Ratio	Coefficient	p Value	Probability of genocide given a single risk factor
Political upheaval excluding prior genocides	Higher	Lower	1.70	.048	.05	.047
Prior genocide	Prior post-1955 genocide	No prior genocide	3.39	1.220	.09	.090
Ideological orientation of ruling elite	Exclusionary ideology	No exclusionary ideology	2.55	.937	.07	.069
Regime type	Autocracies	Partial or full democracies	3.50	1.223	.03	.090
Ethnic character of ruling elite	Represents an ethnic minority	Represents most or all groups	2.56	.939	.09	.069
Trade openness	Lower	Higher	2.58	-1.242	<.01	.070

**Model Summary Statistics**

c	.83	
Number of problems	35	
Number of controls	91	
Threshold	.25	Setting the threshold at .25 rather than .26 increases by one the number of correctly classified genocides
% of genocides correctly classified	74% (26 cases)	Misclassified genocides: Afghanistan 1978, El Salvador 1980, Chile 1973, Uganda 1972, Iraq 1963, Yugoslavia, 1992, Sudan 1956, Philippines 1972, Sri Lanka 1989
% of nongenocides correctly classified	73% (66 cases)	Highest-risk nongenocides: Pakistan 1983, Brazil 1961, Algeria 1991, China 1988, Mozambique 1976, Bangladesh 1974, Indonesia 1997

*Note:* Political upheaval and trade openness coefficients are calculated using interval data on the full range of scores; other variables are dichotomous. The odds ratio for upheaval is based on the odds associated with the seventy-fifth percentile of upheaval scores relative to the twenty-fifth percentile. The odds ratio for trade openness is based on the odds associated with the twenty-fifth percentile of openness scores relative to the seventy-fifth percentile. The probability of geno-/politicide for a country with no risk factors is .028. Probabilities assume that a country is currently in state failure. The c-statistic is used to compare models in case-control analysis without limiting the comparison to one particular choice of model thresholds (Green and Swets 1966; Harrell et al. 1984). It is the fraction of concordant pairs in the data, i.e., the fraction of all possible problem and control pairs for which the model assigns a higher score to the problem than the control.

# **DOMESTIC INTERVENTION**

Cost-Benefit Analysis

Post Genocide Legislation

Domestic Government Responsibilities

## Cost-Benefit Analysis:

"Since resources that are used to fight and prevent human rights violations are limited and there are costs and benefits connected with decisions on resource allocation, economic cost-benefit analysis is used to analyze decision making"

Dr. Elizabeth M. Wheaton

- Genocidaires who control government use its power
- Costs of recognizing genocide

- **UDHR on Economic Rights**
- **Rwandan Discrimination Law**
- **Twa Tribe**
- **Importance of Rapid Action**



**"Genocides end, but it is unclear why they end.  
Determining these factors could lead to quicker ends to  
genocidal actions and decreased damage from genocide"**

**Dr. Elizabeth M. Wheaton**

- 
- Adequate Research
  - Proper Safeguards


# **INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION**

Optimization Theory

Costs of Intervention

Diversifying Resources

## HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES ARE A RESULT OF INDIVIDUAL CHOICES AND BEHAVIORS



## TYPES OF COSTS

### **EX: UNITED STATES' INTERVENTION** Techniques

Past: military intervention (mobilization of troops)

Present: tightened budget, weariness to intervene

## TYPES OF RESOURCES

### **PAST RESOURCES**

Military force/operations, occupation

### **NEW, DIVERSE RESOURCES**

Surveillance

Data collection

Modeling/forecasting

# INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION

Using Modeling and  
Forecasting

Table 1: Predicting Violence in a Country

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>
	Magnitude of Total Violence in a Country (1-6)
Economic Legitimacy Score	−0.614** (0.244)
Economic Legitimacy Score <sup>2</sup>	0.194** (0.082)
Economic Legitimacy*Economic Efficiency Scores	−0.156*** (0.034)
Fragility Score	0.350*** (0.016)
Constant	0.007 (0.136)
Observations	2,948
R <sup>2</sup>	0.192
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.191
Residual Std. Error	3.785 (df = 2943)
F Statistic	174.703*** (df = 4; 2943)

*Note:* \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

# CONCLUSIONS

Power of the Intersection of Economics and Human Rights

Cost-Benefit Analysis

Predict and Protect Against Genocide

Increase Costs for Genocidaires and Perpetrators

Decrease Costs of Intervention

Universal Application of Conclusions

# QUESTIONS



# CITATIONS

- Aceves, William J. Cost-Benefit Analysis and Human Rights. 92 St. Johns Law Review 431. 2018.
- Wheaton, Elizabeth M. The Economics of Human Rights. Routledge, 2019.
- Harff, Barbara. "No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust? Assessing Risks of Genocide and Political Mass Murder since 1955." The American Political Science Review, vol. 97, no. 1, 2003, pp. 57–73. JSTOR, [www.jstor.org/stable/3118221](http://www.jstor.org/stable/3118221).