Phase 3: Defensive Strategy Proposal

Objective

The goal of this phase was to apply a defensive strategy on the previously compromised victim machine and validate its effectiveness against the same attack vector used in Phase 1 (SMB exploitation using EternalBlue).

Defense Implemented

- Disabled SMBv1 protocol using a PowerShell command to modify the Windows registry.
- Simulated patching for MS17-010 to emulate a protected system environment.



Figure 1: PowerShell command used to disable SMBv1 on the victim machine.

Expected Result

By disabling the SMBv1 protocol and simulating the MS17-010 patch, the victim machine should no longer be vulnerable to the EternalBlue exploit.

Validation Procedure

Launched the same Metasploit module (ms17_010_eternalblue) that was successful in Phase 1.
Used identical payload and options for consistency.
Observed that no session was established, and the exploit resulted in a timeout or connection failure.



Figure 2: Metasploit output showing failed exploit attempt post-defense.

Conclusion

The implementation of this defensive strategy successfully blocked the exploit used in the initial attack. Disabling SMBv1 combined with the appropriate patching proved effective in mitigating the EternalBlue vulnerability. This highlights the importance of protocol hardening and timely patching as foundational defense mechanisms in securing legacy systems.