

existing explanations of where right-wing populist/nativist/anti-globalization movement is coming from in the United States

1. Contextual effects: changes in the local political environment like racial and ethnic demographics and trade exposure have made mass publics in specific areas more likely to hold right-wing populist attitudes and support right-wing populist candidates
 - a. Sociocultural
 - i. Rising immigration rates (Hopkins 2010, Hopkins 2011)
 - ii. Changing racial and ethnic demographics (Newman 2013, Hajnal and Abrajano 2015, Enos 2017, Craig and Richeson 2014)
 - iii. Especially when immigration or race and ethnicity are salient in the national news media as a result of exogenous events like terror attacks (Merolla and Zeichmeister 2009, Branton et al. 2011, Godefroidt 2022) or the emergence of candidates like Donald Trump who make choices to activate exclusive identities (Sides et al. 2018, Newman et al. 2021)
 - iv. But can we better endogenize the emergence of candidates like Donald Trump?
 - b. Economic
 - i. Labor market competition (Scheve and Slaughter 2001, Mayda 2006, Malhotra et al. 2013, Dancygier and Donnelly 2010)
 - ii. Welfare chauvinism (Hanson et al. 2007, Facchini and Mayda 2009)
 - iii. Trade exposure (Autor et al. 2013, Autor et al. 2020, Choi et al. 2024)
 - iv. Recessions (Dancygier 2010, Goldstein and Peters 2014)
 - v. But sociocultural variants of contextual effects explanations perform much better than economic variants when tested directly against each other or assessed against each in annual reviews (Citrin et al. 1997, Brader et al. 2008, Valentino et al. 2013, Hainmueller and Hangartner 2013, Reny et al. 2019, Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014, Alesina and Tabellini 2024)
2. Partisan polarization: the sorting of racial, religious, ideological, and place-based identities in the mass public into political parties has strengthened us-versus-them dynamics and empowered the right wing of the Republican Party (Hetherington and Weiler 2009, Levendusky 2009, Abramowitz 2010, Mason 2018, Abramowitz 2018, Tesler 2016, Maxwell and Shields 2019, Jardina 2019, Hajnal 2020, Cramer 2016, Rodden 2019, Ternullo 2024, Dasgupta and Ramirez 2024)
3. Faustian bargain: the center-right Republican establishment and its allies in the organized business community has made a Faustian bargain to support right-wing populist causes in exchange for cuts to taxation and government spending and deregulation (Hacker and Pierson 2010, Hacker and Pierson 2016, Hacker and Pierson 2020, Hertel-Fernandez 2019, Skocpol and Hertel-Fernandez 2016, Skocpol and Tervo 2020, Page, Seawright, and Lacombe 2018? large donors like David Koch at least?)

4. Coalitional changes: changes in the composition of the Republican coalition through entrances and exits at the level of organized groups and political elites have pushed the Republican Party to adopt right-wing populist policies and use right-wing populist rhetoric
 - a. Interest groups (Bawn et al. 2012, Masket 2009, Layman et al. 2010, Krimmel 2017, Lacombe 2021)
 - b. Social movements (Skocpol and Williamson 2012, Parker and Barreto 2014, Schlozman 2015, Tarrow 2021)
 - c. Ideological factions (Rae 1989, Noel 2013, Rosenfeld 2017, Hilton 2019, Blum 2020, Hemmer 2022, Shenk 2022, Page, Seawright, and Lacombe 2018? large donors like Carl Icahn maybe?)
 - d. Party organization decline (Polsby 1983, Schlozman and Rosenfeld 2024)