

While there remains robust debate about how to conceptualize right-wing populist movements and significant differences exist between movements in western Europe, the United States, and the Global South, researchers in political science, economics, communications, and a range of other fields have been drawn towards explaining why these movements seem to be taking place across so many contexts at the same time. They have wanted to understand how right-wing populist candidates and parties have achieved unprecedented levels of electoral success, including presidential election victories, parliamentary majorities, and entrance into coalition governments for the first time.

Existing explanations have generally fallen into two broad categories: demand-side theories that center the role of mass publics in responding to economic, social, and technological developments like globalization, post-materialism, and the Internet and supply-side theories that focus upon the parts played by political elites and political institutions in raising the salience of issues through framing or priming and either opening or closing political opportunities.<sup>1</sup> Both sets of explanations have tended to include a variety of proximate and distal proposed causes, structural and actor-centered hypotheses, and micro, meso, and macro variables.

Yet though there is no shortage of theorizing based on country-level and region-level findings, few studies have adopted a truly global lens. In light of the apparently global nature of the phenomenon and suggestive evidence of cooperation and collaboration across borders among right-wing populist movements, including borrowed messaging and resource sharing, we argue that there needs to be an explanatory agenda in work on right-wing populism that is global as well. We incorporate tools from comparative-historical analysis, in order to interrogate proposed causal chains across countries and regions and pay increased attention to issues of timing and sequence. To sharpen descriptive inferences about these movements and refine the concept of right-wing populism, we use text data from the speeches of incumbent right-wing populist presidents and prime ministers.

### **Demand-Side Explanations: Globalization**

The most prominent explanations that have been put forward by much of the existing literature across disciplines (as well as often by right-wing populist movements themselves) tend to focus upon the responses of mass publics to intensifying processes of economic, social, and political globalization. As demand-side theories, they have used analysis of national election surveys and public opinion polling in conjunction with geographically and temporally specific trade, unemployment, inequality, and migration data to study the correlates of right-wing populist voting at the individual level.

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<sup>1</sup> Klaus von Beyme, "Right-wing Extremism in Post-war Europe," in *Right-Wing Extremism in Western Europe*, ed. Klaus von Beyme (New York: Routledge, 1988), 15, Matt Golder, "Far Right Parties in Europe," *Annual Review of Political Science* 19 (2016): 478, and Sheri Berman, "The Causes of Populism in the West," *Annual Review of Political Science* 24 (2021): 73. See also, though: Kai Arzheimer, "Explaining Electoral Support for the Radical Right," in *The Oxford Handbook of the Radical Right*, ed. Jens Rydgren (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), 144-145 and Herbert Kitschelt, "Party Systems and Radical Right-Wing Parties," in *The Oxford Handbook of the Radical Right*, ed. Jens Rydgren (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), 176-180.

### *Economic Globalization: Trade, Financial Crises, Unemployment, and Inequality*

The clearest articulations have primarily come from economists interested in economic globalization, often operationalized through trade shocks and trade exposure, and its impact on political attitudes and voting behavior. Building upon economic theory showing the redistributive implications of trade liberalization and empirical evidence of local labor market effects, scholars have explored the political consequences of trade, particularly “the China trade shock,” finding increased voting for right-wing populist candidates and parties in affected areas in western Europe, the United States, and Latin America.<sup>2</sup> They have documented distinctive levels of electoral support for Donald Trump, the Leave campaign in the Brexit referendum, the National Front in France, and Pentecostal congressional candidates in Brazil. In the process, they have assembled one of the largest bodies of evidence on the causes of right-wing populist voting, though not one without empirical, theoretical, or methodological shortcomings.

Other ways that researchers have attempted to operationalize economic globalization in evaluating its contributions towards right-wing populist electoral success include financial crises,

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<sup>2</sup> Dani Rodrik, *Has Globalization Gone Too Far?* (Washington: Institutional for International Economics, 1997), 13-17, Dani Rodrik, *The Globalization Paradox: Democracy and the Future of the World Economy* (New York: Norton, 2011), 64, Dani Rodrik, “Populism and the economics of globalization,” *Journal of International Business Policy* 1, no. 1 (2018): 13-16, Dani Rodrik, “Why Does Globalization Fuel Populism? Economics, Culture, and the Rise of Right-Wing Populism,” *Annual Review of Economics* 13 (2021): 134-135 and 141-148, David Autor, David Dorn, Gordon Hanson, “The Geography of Trade and Technology Shocks in the United States,” *American Economic Review* 103, no. 3 (2013): 2125, David H. Autor, David Dorn, and Gordon H. Hanson, “The China Shock: Learning from Labor-Market Adjustment to Large Changes in Trade,” *Annual Review of Economics* 8 (2016): 206-208, David Autor, David Dorn, Gordon Hanson, and Kaveh Majlesi, “A Note on the Effect of Rising Trade Exposure on the 2016 Presidential Election,” MIT working paper (2017): 1, David Autor, David Dorn, Gordon Hanson, and Kaveh Majlesi, “Importing Political Polarization? The Electoral Consequences of Rising Trade Exposure,” *American Economic Review* 110, no. 10 (2020): 3142, Jiwon Choi, Ilyana Kuziemko, Ebonya Washington, and Gavin Wright, “Local Economic and Political Effects of Trade Deals,” *American Economic Review* 114, no. 6 (2024): 1543, Christian Dippel, Robert Gold, and Stephan Heblich, “Globalization and its (Dis-)Content: Trade Shocks and Voting Behavior,” NBER Working Paper 21812 (2015): 1, Christian Dippel, Robert Gold, Stephan Heblich, and Rodrigo Pinto, “The Effect of Trade on Workers and Voters,” *The Economic Journal* 132, no. 1 (2022): 200, Clément Malgouyres, “Trade Shocks and Far-Right Voting: Evidence from French Presidential Elections,” EUI working paper (2017), 2, Italo Colantone and Piero Stanig, “Global Competition and Brexit,” *American Political Science Review* 112, no. 2 (2018), 201, Italo Colantone and Piero Stanig, “The Trade Origins of Economic Nationalism: Import Competition and Voting Behavior in Western Europe,” *American Journal of Political Science* 62, no. 4 (2018): 936, Guglielmo Barone and Helena Kreuter, “Low-Wage Import Competition and the Populist Backlash: The Case of Italy,” *European Journal of Political Economy* 67, no. 3 (2021): 101970, Mauro Caselli, Andrea Fracasso, and Silvio Traverso, “Globalization, robotization and electoral outcomes: evidence from spatial regressions for Italy,” *Journal of Regional Science* 61, no. 1 (2021): 88, Helen V. Milner, “Voting for Populism in Europe: Globalization, Technological Change, and the Extreme Right,” *Comparative Political Studies* 54, no. 13 (2021): 2287, Paula Retzl, “Economic Globalization and Populism in Latin America and Beyond,” *Right-Wing Populism in Latin America and Beyond*, ed. Anthony W. Pereira (New York: Routledge, 2023), Daniella Campello and Francisco Urdinez, “Voter and Legislator Responses to Localized Trade Shocks from China in Brazil,” *Comparative Political Studies* 54, no. 7 (2021): 1131, and Francisco Costa, Angelo Marcantonio Junior, and Rudi Rocha, “Stop suffering! Economic downturns and pentecostal upsurge,” *Journal of the European Economic Association* 21, no. 1 (2023): 217. See also, though: Yi Che, Yi Lu, Justin R. Pierce, Peter K. Schott, Zhigang Tao, “Does Trade Liberalization with China Influence U.S. Elections?” NBER Working Paper 22178 (2016): 3, Tobias Rommel and Stefanie Walter, “The Electoral Consequences of Offshoring: How the Globalization of Production Shapes Party Preferences,” *Comparative Political Studies* 51, no. 5 (2018): 557, and Pedro Molina Ogeda, Emanuel Ornelas, and Rodrigo R. Soares, “Labor unions and the electoral consequences of trade liberalization,” CEP Working Paper 1816 (2021): 18.

unemployment shocks, and economic inequality and insecurity in general. While each alternative independent variable moves further away from the commonly understood meaning of economic globalization as the increasing movement of goods and services across borders, scholars have demonstrated that they are linked to economic globalization and they have value in assessing more complex theoretical claims about its role, especially testing proposed causal mechanisms beyond trade.

Financial crises for example, which have been consistently linked by economists to the increasing movement of capital across borders, have been shown to motivate right-wing populist voting, with the 2008 financial crisis in particular often positioned as having laid the groundwork for right-wing populist movements in the mid-2010s.<sup>3</sup> Accounts focusing on the responses of voters to financial crises associated with increasing economic interconnectedness are troubled by the fact that a similar set of factors have been used in the past to explain socialist or left-leaning populist movements, like the “pink tide” in Latin America, which scholars have connected to the 1998-2002 economic crisis.<sup>4</sup> There is some emerging evidence from Latin America, however, that voters may have turned towards right-wing populist movements because of dissatisfaction with how left-wing populist governments handled economic downturns towards the end of the commodity boom, especially in Brazil after 2014.<sup>5</sup> At least when left-wing populist governments hold power and fail to address the concerns of voters, there is reason to believe that financial crises can drive right-wing populist voting.

Closely related to financial crises, unemployment shocks have been an additional angle through which scholars have examined the causes of right-wing populist electoral support, with recent contributions from economists supplementing an older literature in political science.<sup>6</sup> The

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<sup>3</sup> Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff, *This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009), 155-156, Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff, “This Time Is Different: A Panoramic View of Eight Centuries of Financial Crises,” *Annals of Economics and Finance* 15, no. 2 (2014): 220-221, Philip R. Lane, “Financial Globalization and the Crisis,” BIS Working Papers No. 397 (2012): 17, Manuel Funke, Moritz Schularick, and Christoph Trebesch, “Going to extremes: Politics after financial crises, 1870-2014,” *European Economic Review* 88, no. 1 (2016): 228, Gyoza Gyöngyösi and Emil Verner, “Financial Crisis, Creditor-Debtor Conflict, and Populism,” *Journal of Finance* 77, no. 4 (2022): 2472, John Ahlquist, Mark Copelovitch, and Stefanie Walter, “The Political Consequences of External Economic Shocks: Evidence from Poland,” *American Journal of Political Science* 64, no. 4 (2020): 905, and Atif Mian, Amir Sufi, and Francesco Trebbi, “Resolving Debt Overhang: Political Constraints in the Aftermath of Financial Crisis,” *American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics* 6, no. 2 (2014): 1. See also, though: Andreas Bergh and Anders Kärnä, “Globalization and populism in Europe,” *Public Choice* 189, no. 1 (2021): 52.

<sup>4</sup> Steven Levitsky and Kenneth M. Roberts, “Latin America’s Left Turn: A Framework for Analysis,” in *The Resurgence of the Latin American Left*, ed. Steven Levitsky and Kenneth M. Roberts (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011), 9-10 and Ugo Panizza and Monica Yañez, “Why Are Latin Americans So Unhappy About Reforms,” *Journal of Applied Economics* 8, no. 1 (2005): 23-24.

<sup>5</sup> Moisés Naím, “The Coming Turmoil in Latin America,” *The Atlantic*, October 8, 2015, Benjamin Junge, “‘Our Brazil Has Become a Mess’: Nostalgic Narratives of Disorder and Disinterest as a ‘Once-Rising Poor’ Family from Recife, Brazil Anticipates the 2018 Elections,” *Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Anthropology* 24, no. 4 (2019): 917, Rosana Pinheiro-Machado and Lucia Muru Scalco, “From hope to hate: The rise of conservative subjectivity in Brazil,” *Journal of Ethnographic Theory* 10, no. 1 (2020): 22.

<sup>6</sup> Robert W. Jackman and Karin Volpert, “Conditions Favoring Parties of the Extreme Right in Europe,” *British Journal of Political Science* 26, no. 4 (1996): 516, Matt Golder, “Electoral Institutions, Unemployment and Extreme Right Parties: A Correction,” *British Journal of Political Science* 33, no. 3 (2003): 528, Kai Arzheimer, “Contextual Factors and the Extreme Right Vote in Western Europe, 1980-2002,” *American Journal of Political Science* 53, no. 2

underlying theory is that economic globalization and its associated boom-and-bust cycles only lead to right-wing populist voting when local unemployment rates are high as a result. Voters who are out of work or living in communities with large numbers of unemployed residents will be more likely to seek alternatives to the status quo. Yet while there is empirical support from western Europe and the United States, the argument is less compelling in the Global South, where the formal sector has remained a smaller portion of the labor force and employment continues to be more precarious.

Beyond unemployment shocks from boom-and-bust cycles, researchers have also considered the political effects of economic insecurity and economic inequality in general that may be tied to economic globalization. The existing scholarly consensus is that economic globalization, while decreasing between-country income and wealth disparities, has increased within-country economic inequality worldwide.<sup>7</sup> While the potential effects of a widening gap within countries are difficult to measure, political scientists have theorized that a new political cleavage between the “winners” and “losers” of economic globalization has opened up across contexts, layered over long-standing cleavages of class, religion, and ethnicity.<sup>8</sup> The causal story is that economic globalization has advantaged some mass publics and disadvantaged others, in addition to and apart from its effects through trade shocks, financial crises, and unemployment shocks, and that those distributive consequences have been recognized and strong enough to create and sustain a division among voters.

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(2009): 272-273, Yann Algan, Sergei Guriev, Elias Pappaioannou, and Evgenia Passari, “The European Trust Crisis and the Rise of Populism,” *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity* (2017): 311, and Shuai Chen, “Unemployment, Immigration, and Populism: Evidence from Two Quasi-Natural Experiments in the United States,” LISER Working Paper (2020): 5. See also, though: Pia Knigge, “The ecological correlates of right-wing extremism in Western Europe,” *European Journal of Political Research* 34, no. 2 (1998): 266, Kai Arzheimer and Elisabeth Carter, “Political opportunity structures and right-wing extremist party success,” *European Journal of Political Research* 45, no. 3 (2006): 437, Marcel Lubbers, Mérove Gijssberts, and Peer Scheepers, “Extreme right-wing voting in Western Europe,” *European Journal of Political Research* 41, no. 3 (2002): 371, and Arzheimer, “Explaining Electoral Support,” 156.

<sup>7</sup> Ho-fung Hung, “Recent Trends in Global Economic Inequality,” *Annual Review of Sociology* 47, no. 1 (2021): 353, Arthur S. Alderson and François Nielsen, “Globalization and the Great U-Turn: Income Inequality in 16 OECD Countries,” *American Journal of Sociology* 107, no. 5 (2002): 1284, Axel Dreher and Noel Gaston, “Has Globalization Increased Inequality,” *Review of International Economics* 16, no. 3 (2008): 531, Branko Milanovic, *Global Inequality: A New Approach for the Age of Globalization* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016), 10-11, François Bourguignon, *The Globalization of Inequality* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016), 1-3. See also, Martin Ravallion, “Inequality and Globalization: A Review Essay,” *Journal of Economic Literature* 56, no. 2 (2018): 626-627.

<sup>8</sup> Hans-Georg Betz, *Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994), 32-33, Herbert Kitschelt, *The Radical Right in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1997), 9-10, Hanspeter Kriesi, Edgar Grande, Romain Lachat, Martin Dolezal, Simon Bornschieer, and Timotheos Frey, “Globalization and the transformation of the national political space: Six European countries compared,” *European Journal of Political Research* 45, no. 6 (2006): 922, Hanspeter Kriesi, Edgar Grande, Romain Lachat, Martin Dolezal, Simon Bornschieer, and Timotheos Frey, *West European Politics in the Age of Globalization* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), Jens Rydgren and Patrick Ruth, “Contextual explanations of radical right-wing support in Sweden: socioeconomic marginalization, group threat, and the halo effect,” *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 36, no. 4 (2013): 725-726, Jens Rydgren, “Introduction: class politics and the radical right,” in *Class Politics and the Radical Right* (New York: Routledge, 2013), 8-9,

Together, the demand-side explanations centered around the responses of mass publics to economic globalization have offered both specific operationalizations of the variable of interest like trade shocks and financial crises and more general theoretical frameworks like the opening of a cleavage between “winners” and “losers.” While the evidence ranges from cross-national regression studies to a variety of instrumental variable approaches – and few works explicitly incorporate tools from comparative historical analysis – they put the focus on changes in the global economy, a plausible starting point for investigations of the rise of right-wing populist voting.

### *Social and Political Globalization: Migration and Regional Integration*

If a focus on the increasing movement of goods and services across borders has defined much work on the relationship between globalization and right-wing populist electoral support, other strains have examined the effects of the increasing movement of people and intensifying processes of regional integration on public opinion in certain parts of the globe. Though weaker from a global perspective using tools from comparative historical analysis, the evidence from western Europe and the United States in particular merits consideration.

The motivation for looking at migration in greater depth as an explanation for right-wing populist movements comes from three sources. First, public opinion research, primarily in American politics, has carefully demonstrated with census and geocoded public opinion data that geographic areas with increasing rates of migration or growing migration-based communities have distinctive political attitudes.<sup>9</sup> At least when migration is salient in the national news media, which is typically modeled as a result of exogenous events like terror attacks, there seem to be contextual effects, with local public opinion moving in an anti-migrant direction. Second, when political scientists have tested the influence of economic and non-economic attitudes on attitudes towards migration, including with conjoint experimental designs, they have consistently found that non-economic attitudes perform more strongly.<sup>10</sup> While not providing direct evidence about

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<sup>9</sup> Daniel J. Hopkins, “Politicized Places: Explaining Where and When Immigrants Provoke Local Opposition,” *American Political Science Review* 104, no. 1 (2010): 40, Daniel J. Hopkins, “National Debates, Local Responses: The Origins of Local Concern about Immigration in Britain and the United States,” *British Journal of Political Science* 41, no. 3 (2011): 507, Benjamin J. Newman, “Acculturating Contexts and Anglo Opposition to Immigration in the United States,” *American Journal of Political Science* 57, no. 2 (2013): 378, and Marisa Abrajano and Zoltan L. Hajnal, *White Backlash: Immigration, Race, and American Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015), 18-19, and Dominik Hangartner, Elias Dinas, Moritz Marbach, Konstantinos Matakos, and Dimitrios Xefteris, “Does Exposure to the Refugee Crisis Make Natives More Hostile?” *American Political Science Review* 113, no. 2 (2019): 444.

<sup>10</sup> Jens Hainmueller and Daniel J. Hopkins, “Public Attitudes Toward Immigration,” *Annual Review of Political Science* 17 (2014), 227, Alberto Alesina and Marco Tabellini, “The Political Effects of Immigration: Culture or Economics?” *Journal of Economic Literature* 62, no. 1 (2024): 7, Paul M. Sniderman, Louk Hagendoorn, and Markus Prior, “Predisposing Factors and Situational Triggers: Exclusionary Reactions to Immigrant Minorities,” *American Political Science Review* 98, no. 1 (2004): 35, Jens Hainmueller and Michael Hiscox, “Attitudes toward Highly Skilled and Low-Skilled Immigration: Evidence from a Survey Experiment,” *American Political Science Review* 104, no. 1 (2010): 61, Jens Hainmueller and Dominik Hangartner, “Who Gets a Swiss Passport? A Natural Experiment in Immigrant Discrimination,” *American Political Science Review* 107, no. 1 (2013): 159, Jens Hainmueller and Daniel J. Hopkins, “The Hidden American Immigration Consensus: A Conjoint Analysis of Attitudes Toward Immigrants,” *American Journal of Political Science* 59, no. 3 (2015): 530, Dustin Tingley, “Public

right-wing populist voting, the results suggest the importance of separating migration from economic globalization as an independent variable and avoiding an understanding of migration attitudes as downstream from economic globalization. Finally, when political scientists have descriptively analyzed the policies and rhetoric of right-wing populist candidates and parties, opposition to migration has been a distinguishing feature, with some review essays going so far as to describe right-wing populism as a “myth” better characterized as “nativism.”<sup>11</sup> The large bodies of research on local public opinion, migration attitudes, and right-wing populist policies and rhetoric, though mostly limited to western Europe and the United States, have all pointed towards the need to study migration as a distinct causal factor.

The evidence on migration and right-wing populist voting, however, remains mixed, even before incorporating cases from the Global South. Cross-national regression studies in western Europe tend to find positive effects of national migration levels on right-wing populist electoral support, while regression analysis of political attitudes on voting for Donald Trump in the 2016 U.S. presidential election suggest the influence of anti-migrant attitudes, especially relative to economic attitudes.<sup>12</sup> But recent work using local-level migration data and instrumental variable approaches for causal inference in economics and political science have produced conflicting results. In western Europe, researchers have found robust evidence of rising local migration rates

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Finance and Immigration Preferences: A Lost Connection?” *Polity* 45, no. 1 (2013): 29, Allison Harell, Stuart Soroka, Shanto Iyengar, and Nicholas Valentino, “The Impact of Economic and Cultural Cues on Support for Immigration in the United States and Canada,” *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 45, no. 3 (2012): 519, and Nicholas A. Valentino, Stuart N. Soroka, Shanto Iyengar, Toril Aalberg, Raymond Duch, Marta Fraile, Kyu S. Hahn, Kasper M. Hansen, Allison Harell, Marc Helbling, Simon D. Jackman, and Tetsuro Kobayashi, “Economic and Cultural Drivers of Immigrant Support Worldwide,” *British Journal of Political Science* 49, no. 4 (2017): 1201.

<sup>11</sup> David Art, “The Myth of Global Populism,” *Perspectives on Politics* 20, no. 3 (2022): 1000, Cas Mudde, *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 15-16, Elizabeth Ivarsflaten, “What Unites Right-Wing Populists in Western Europe? Re-Examining Grievance Mobilization Models in Seven Successful Cases,” *Comparative Political Studies* 41, no. 1 (2008): 18, Cas Mudde, “Why Nativism, Not Populism, Should Be Declared Word of the Year,” *The Guardian*, December 7, 2017, and Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, “Studying Populism in Comparative Perspective: Reflections on the Contemporary and Future Research Agenda,” *Comparative Political Studies* 51(2018): 1673.

<sup>12</sup> Knigge, 266, Matt Golder, “Explaining Variation in the Success of Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe,” *Comparative Political Studies* 36, no. 4 (2003): 454, Christopher J. Anderson, “Economics, Politics, and Foreigners: Populist Party Support in Denmark and Norway,” *Electoral Studies* 15, no. 4 (1996): 506-507, Duane Swank and Hans-Georg Betz, “Globalization, the welfare state and right-wing populism in Western Europe,” *Socio-Economic Review* 1, no. 1 (2003): 230, Arzheimer, “Contextual Factors,” 267, Lubbers, Gijsberts, and Scheepers, 364, Arzheimer and Carter, 433-434, Jens Rydgren, “Immigration skeptics, xenophobes or racists? Radical right-wing voting in six European countries,” *European Journal of Political Research* 47, no. 6 (2008): 738, Diana Mutz, “Status threat, not economic hardship, explains the 2016 presidential vote,” *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 115, no. 19 (2018), 4338, Tyler T. Reny, Loren Collingwood, and Ali A. Valenzuela, “Vote Switching in the 2016 Election: How Racial and Immigration Attitudes, Not Economics, Explain Shifts in White Voting,” *Public Opinion Quarterly* 83, no. 1 (2019): 92, John Sides, Michael Tesler, and Lynn Vavreck, *Identity Crisis: The 2016 Presidential Campaign and the Battle for the Meaning of America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018), 165-179, Nazita Lajevardi and Marisa Abrajano, “How Negative Sentiment toward Muslim Americans Predicts Support for Trump in the 2016 Presidential Election,” *Journal of Politics* 81, no. 1 (2018): 297, Todd Donovan and David Redlawsk, “Donald Trump and right-wing populists in comparative perspective,” *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion, and Parties* 28, no. 2 (2018): 203.

(and shares) leading to increased right-wing populist voting across a wide range of contexts.<sup>13</sup> In the United States however, the well-established influence of local migration rates on migration attitudes and migration attitudes on vote choice in the 2016 election in regression analyses has not translated to positive results for local migration rates on electoral support for Donald Trump, except for low-skilled migration rates in one study.<sup>14</sup> Even in the Global North, the relationship between the movement of people across borders and right-wing populist voting is conditional and subject to variation.

Regional integration, a political manifestation of globalization, is even more limited as an explanation for the electoral success of right-wing populist movements worldwide. A political development that has been mostly concentrated to western Europe in the form of the European Union, regional integration gives limited purchase to analyzing right-wing populist candidates and parties in the United States or the Global South. A combination of cross-national regression studies and a few instrumental variable approaches offer some evidence, but right-wing populist electoral support appears to be a global phenomenon.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> Guglielmo Barone, Alessio D'Ignazio, Guido de Blasio, and Paolo Naticchioni, "Mr. Rossi, Mr. Hu and politics. The role of immigration in shaping natives' voting behavior," *Journal of Public Economics* 136, no. 1 (2016): 2, Sascha O. Becker and Thiemo Fetzer, "Does Migration Cause Extreme Voting," Warwick working paper (2017): 2, Sascha O. Becker, Thiemo Fetzer, and Dennis Novy, "Who voted for Brexit? A comprehensive district-level analysis," *Economic Policy* 32, no. 92 (2017): 605, Beatrice Brunner and Andreas Kuhn, "Immigration, cultural distance and natives' attitudes towards immigrants: evidence from Swiss voting results," *Kyklos* 71, no. 1 (2018): 55, Caselli, Fracasso, and Traverso, 88-89, Elias Dinas, Konstantinos Matakos, Dimitrios Xeferis, Dominik Hangartner, "Waking up the Golden Dawn: Does exposure to the refugee crisis increase support for extreme-right parties?" *Political Analysis* 27, no. 2 (2019): 246, Christian Dustmann, Kristine Vasiljeva, and Anna Piil Damm, "Refugee Migration and Electoral Outcomes," *The Review of Economic Studies* 86, no. 5 (2019): 2036, Anthony Edo, Yvonne Giesing, Jonathan Öztunc, Panu Poutvaara, "Immigration and electoral support for the far-left and the far-right," *European Economic Review* 115, no. 1 (2019): 100-101, Christer Gerdes and Eskil Wadensjö, "The impact of immigration on election outcomes in Danish municipalities," SULCIS working paper (2010): 20, Martin Halla, Alexander F. Wagner, and Josef Zweinmüller, "Immigration and Voting for the Far Right," *Journal of the European Economic Association* 15, no. 6 (2017): 1344 and 1369, Nikolaj A. Harmon, "Immigration, ethnic diversity, and political outcomes: evidence from Denmark," *Scandinavian Economic Journal* 120, no. 4 (2018): 1045, Ildefonso Mendez, Isabel M. Cutillas, "Has immigration affected Spanish presidential elections results?" *Journal of Population Economics* 27, no. 1 (2014): 137, Simone Moriconi, Giovanni Peri, Ricardo Turati, "Skill of the Immigrants and the Vote of the Natives: Immigration and Nationalism in European Elections, 2007-2016" NBER Working Paper 25077 (2018): 4-5, Alkis Henri Otto and Max Friedrich Steinhardt, "Immigration and election outcomes — evidence from city districts in Hamburg," *Regional Science and Urban Economics* 45, no. 1 (2014): 67, Stelios Roupakias and Michael Chletsos, "Immigration and far-right voting: evidence from Greece," *Annals of Regional Science* 65, no. 1 (2020): 594, Paul Vertier, Max Viskanic, and Matteo Gamalerio, "Dismantling the 'jungle': migrant relocation and extreme voting in France," *Political Science Research Methods* 11, no. 1 (2023): 131-132, and Massimiliano Bratti, Claudio Deiana, Enkelejda Havari, Gianluca Mazzarella, and Elena Claudia Meroni, "Geographical proximity to refugee reception centres and voting," *Journal of Urban Economics* 120, no. 1 (2020): 103290. See also, though: Andreas Steinmayr, "Contact versus Exposure: Refugee Presence and Voting for the Far Right," *Review of Economics and Statistics* 103, no. 2 (2021): 311 and Max Schaub, Johanna Gereke, and Delia Baldassarri, "Strangers in a Hostile Land: Exposure to Refugees and Right-Wing Support in Germany's Eastern Regions," *Comparative Political Studies* 54, no. 3-4 (2021): 689.

<sup>14</sup> Seth J. Hill, Daniel J. Hopkins, and Gregory A. Huber, "Local demographic changes and US presidential voting, 2012-2016," *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 116, no. 50 (2019): 25024 and Anna Maria Mayda, Giovanni Peri, and Walter Steingress, "The Political Impact of Immigration: Evidence from the United States," *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics* 14, no. 1 (2022): 359-360.

<sup>15</sup> Arzheimer, "Contextual Factors," 268-270.

and partisan identification

of right-wing populist voting against each other,

Mass publics adopt anti-immigrant political attitudes and identify with right-wing populist candidates and parties.

demand-side explanations

- response to globalization
  - response to economic globalization
    - trade shocks
    - financial crises



- unemployment shocks
- inequality in general
  - response to neoliberalism?
  - in conjunction with policies (Huber, Bartels, Piketty)
  - one critique is policies not economic globalization causes inequality (Huber, Bartels, Piketty)
  - but economic globalization is facilitated by policy which leads to nativism (Peters)
- response to migration (social/cultural/human globalization?)
- response to political globalization → European integration (very briefly)
- cultural backlash
  - response to rise of post-material values
  - response to decolonization and civil rights movement
  - response to sexual revolution (abortion, LGBT rights)
- role of Internet/social media?
  - formation of echo chambers?
  - advantageous to extremes?

supply-side explanations

political elites (issue salience, framing, priming)

social media → social movement organizations, wealthy donors

party system competition/convergence

\*\*\*transnational linkages missing\*\*\*

Thomas Piketty, *Capital in the Twenty-First Century* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2017)

Thomas Piketty, *Capital and Ideology* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2020)

Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez, "Income Inequality in the United States, 1913-1998," 2003

Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez, "The Evolution of Top Incomes: A Historical and Institutional Perspective," 2006

Anthony Atkinson, Thomas Piketty, and Emmanuel Saez, "Top Incomes in the Long Run of History," 2011

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is there one move to the far right that is global or is it country by country or is it clusters of countries?

cross-national linkages between countries in same networks

middle-ground argument is probably true