

Sinr and Wu (2021) Derivations

DSGE Model

KEY: ~~m~~ - Derivation, narrative ~~n~~ - Comment to reader ~~t~~ - Used for labeling

- In section 2, Sinr & Wu (2021) list the principal actors in the model: households, labor union, 4 types of production firms, financial intermediaries, a fiscal authority, and a central bank. This gives 6 major sectors in the model to solve.

① Households (following Appendix A.1)

Each household consists of two types of family members - workers and intermediaries (basically a "child"). Intermediaries have a probability of $(1-\alpha)$ of becoming workers. An equal number of workers take their place as intermediaries. New intermediaries are given a fixed amount of net worth to start.

Householders' lifetime utility is:

$$E_t \left[\sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \beta^j \left\{ \ln(C_{t+j} - b(C_{t+j-1})) - \frac{\chi L_{t+j}}{1+n} \right\} \right] \quad (\text{A.1})$$

with budget constraint:

$$P_t C_t + D_t - D_{t-1} \leq MRS_t L_t + DIV_t - P_t X_t - P_t T_t + (R_{t-1}^d - 1) D_{t-1} \quad (\text{A.2})$$

↑ Internal Habit
↑ Wage from being in a labor union
↑ Nominal Dividends
↓ Paid to new intermediaries
↓ Lump-sum tax
↓ Nominal interest rate on deposits
↑ Stock of deposits at beginning of period
↑ Price of goods ↑

Dividing by price to make this real:

$$C_t + \frac{D_t}{P_t} - \frac{D_{t-1}}{P_t} = mrs_t L_t + div_t - X_t - T_t + \frac{R_{t-1}^d - 1}{P_t} D_{t-1}$$

$$C_t + d_t - \frac{P_{t-1}}{P_t} d_{t-1} = mrs_t L_t + div_t - X_t - T_t + \left(\frac{P_{t-1}}{P_t} \right) (R_{t-1}^d - 1) d_{t-1}$$

Putting this in a Lagrangian:


$$\mathcal{L} = E_t \left[\sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \beta^j \left\{ \ln(C_{t+j} - b(C_{t+j-1})) - \frac{\chi L_{t+j}}{1+n} \right\} \right] + \lambda_t \left(mrs_t L_t + div_t - X_t - T_t + \left(\frac{P_{t-1}}{P_t} \right) (R_{t-1}^d - 1) d_{t-1} - C_t - d_t + \frac{P_{t-1}}{P_t} d_{t-1} \right)$$

$$\begin{array}{ccc}
 & \text{From this period} & \text{From next period} \\
 \text{FOCs: } & \downarrow & \downarrow \\
 \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial C_t} = \frac{1}{C_t - bC_{t+1}} - \beta E_t \left[\frac{b}{C_{t+1} - bC_t} \right] - u_t & = 0 & \\
 \rightarrow u_t = \frac{1}{C_t - bC_{t+1}} - \beta E_t \left[\frac{b}{C_{t+1} - bC_t} \right] & & \text{(A.3)} \\
 \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial L_t} = -\chi L_t^2 + mrs_t u_t & = 0 & \\
 \rightarrow \chi L_t^2 = mrs_t u_t & & \text{(A.4)} \\
 \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial a_t} = -u_t + \beta E_t \left[u_{t+1} (\Pi_{t+1}^{-1} (R_t^d - 1) + \Pi_{t+1}^{-1}) \right] & = 0 & \\
 \frac{1}{u_t} E_t \left[u_{t+1} \Pi_{t+1}^{-1} (R_t^d - 1 + 1) \right] = 1 & & \\
 E_t \left[\frac{\beta u_{t+1}}{u_t} \Pi_{t+1}^{-1} R_t^d \right] = 1 & & \\
 \text{Stochastic Discount Factor} = \lambda_{t+1} & & \text{(A.5)} \\
 E_t \left[\lambda_{t+1} \Pi_{t+1}^{-1} R_t^d \right] = 1 & & \text{(A.6)}
 \end{array}$$

This concludes the optimization problem for the household

(2) Labor Markets (following Appendix A3)

The labor markets work as follows:



So overall demand for labor is $\int_0^1 L_{dt}(h) dh$

$$L_{dt} = \left[S_0^1 L_{dt}(h)^{\frac{\varepsilon_w - 1}{\varepsilon_w}} dh \right]^{\frac{\varepsilon_w}{\varepsilon_w - 1}}$$

where $\varepsilon_w \neq 1$ is the elasticity of substitution

Define aggregate wage expenditure on labor:

$$\int_0^1 w_t(h) L_{dt}(h) dh \equiv Z_t$$

Then optimal demand for labor from each union is:

$$\begin{aligned}
 & \max_{L_{dt}(h)} \left[S_0^1 L_{dt}(h)^{\frac{\varepsilon_w - 1}{\varepsilon_w}} dh \right]^{\frac{\varepsilon_w}{\varepsilon_w - 1}} \text{ s.t. } \int_0^1 w_t(h) L_{dt}(h) dh \equiv Z_t \\
 & \quad \angle L_{dt}(h) \geq \frac{\varepsilon_w}{\varepsilon_w - 1} \cdot \frac{\varepsilon_w - 1}{\varepsilon_w} L_{dt}(h)^{\frac{-1}{\varepsilon_w}} \left[S_0^1 L_{dt}(h)^{\frac{\varepsilon_w - 1}{\varepsilon_w}} dh \right]^{\frac{1}{\varepsilon_w - 1}} - \lambda w_t(h) = 0 \\
 & \quad (\#) \quad \lambda w_t(h) = L_{dt}(h)^{\frac{1}{\varepsilon_w}} \left[S_0^1 L_{dt}(h)^{\frac{\varepsilon_w - 1}{\varepsilon_w}} dh \right]^{\frac{1}{\varepsilon_w - 1}} \\
 & \quad \lambda w_t(h) L_{dt}(h) = L_{dt}(h)^{\frac{\varepsilon_w - 1}{\varepsilon_w}} \left[S_0^1 L_{dt}(h)^{\frac{\varepsilon_w - 1}{\varepsilon_w}} dh \right]^{\frac{1}{\varepsilon_w - 1}}
 \end{aligned}$$

Integrate both sides:

$$\lambda \int_0^1 w_t(h) L_{d,t}(h) dh = \int_0^1 L_{d,t}(h)^{\frac{1}{\varepsilon_w - 1}} dh \left[\int_0^1 L_{d,t}(h)^{\frac{1}{\varepsilon_w - 1}} dh \right]^{\frac{1}{\varepsilon_w - 1}}$$

$$\lambda z_c = \left[\int_0^1 L_{d,t}(h)^{\frac{1}{\varepsilon_w - 1}} dh \right]^{\frac{1}{\varepsilon_w - 1}}$$

Define w_t as the aggregate wage. Then $w_t L_{d,t} = z_c$. So:

$$\lambda w_t L_{d,t} = L_{d,t}$$

$$\lambda = \frac{1}{w_t}$$

Sub λ into (*):

$$\frac{w_t(h)}{w_t} = L_{d,t}(h)^{\frac{1}{\varepsilon_w}} \left[\int_0^1 L_{d,t}(h)^{\frac{1}{\varepsilon_w}} dh \right]^{\frac{1}{\varepsilon_w - 1}}$$

$$\frac{w_t(h)}{w_t} = L_{d,t}(h)^{\frac{1}{\varepsilon_w}} L_{d,t}^{-\frac{1}{\varepsilon_w}}$$

$$L_{d,t}(h) = \left(\frac{w_t(h)}{w_t} \right)^{-\varepsilon_w} L_{d,t} \quad (\text{A.12})$$

Now take the total expenditure on labor:

$$w_t L_{d,t} = \int_0^1 w_t(h) L_{d,t}(h) dh \equiv z_t \quad \text{Sub in } L_{d,t}(h):$$

$$w_t L_{d,t} = \int_0^1 w_t(h) \left(\frac{w_t(h)}{w_t} \right)^{-\varepsilon_w} L_{d,t} dh$$

$$w_t = \int_0^1 w_t(h)^{1-\varepsilon_w} dh \quad w_t^{\varepsilon_w}$$

$$w_t^{1-\varepsilon_w} = \int_0^1 w_t(h)^{1-\varepsilon_w} dh \quad (\text{A.13})$$

Labor Unions have dividends of:

$$DIV_{L,t}(h) = w_t(h) L_{d,t}(h) - MRS_t L_t(h)$$

We impose $L_t(h) = L_{d,t}(h)$ (labor supply = labor demand)

$$DIV_{L,t}(h) = (w_t(h) - MRS_t) L_{d,t}(h)$$

Now substituting (A.12):

$$DIV_{L,t}(h) = (w_t(h) - MRS_t) \left(\left(\frac{w_t(h)}{w_t} \right)^{-\varepsilon_w} L_{d,t} \right)$$

$$= w_t(h)^{1-\varepsilon_w} w_t^{\varepsilon_w} L_{d,t} - MRS_t w_t(h)^{-\varepsilon_w} w_t^{\varepsilon_w} L_{d,t}$$

We also impose "sticky wages", where union have a probability of adjusting wages of $(1 - \phi_w)$ with $\phi_w \in [0, 1]$.

For unions that can't update wages in a given period, wages can be written as: $w_t(h) \left(\frac{P_{t+j-1}}{P_{t-1}} \right)^{\delta_w} = w_{t+j}(h)$, with $\delta_w \in [0, 1]$ being an index on inflation

Putting all this together, the union's maximization problem is:

$$\max_{\{W_t(h)\}} E_t \left[\sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \phi_w^j \Lambda_{t,t+j} \left\{ W_{t+j}(h) \frac{1-\varepsilon_w}{P_{t+j}} L_{d,t+j} - MRS_{t+j} W_{t+j}(h) \frac{\varepsilon_w}{P_{t+j}} L_{d,t+j} \right\} \right]$$

↑ Probability of keeping last period's wage
 ↑ Discounting by household stochastic discount factor

Then sub in inflation indexing and make terms real:

$$\max_{\{W_t(h)\}} E_t \left[\sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \phi_w^j \Lambda_{t,t+j} \left\{ W_t(h) \left(\frac{P_{t+j-1}}{P_{t-1}} \right)^{1-\varepsilon_w} Y_w \frac{1-\varepsilon_w}{P_{t+j}} L_{d,t+j} - MRS_{t+j} W_t(h) \left(\frac{P_{t+j-1}}{P_{t-1}} \right)^{1-\varepsilon_w} Y_w \frac{\varepsilon_w}{P_{t+j}} L_{d,t+j} \right\} \right]$$

$$\max_{\{W_t(h)\}} E_t \left[\sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \phi_w^j \Lambda_{t,t+j} \left\{ W_t(h) \left(\frac{P_{t+j-1}}{P_{t-1}} \right)^{1-\varepsilon_w} Y_w \frac{1-\varepsilon_w}{P_{t+j}} L_{d,t+j} P_{t+j}^{\varepsilon_w-1} - MRS_{t+j} W_t(h) \left(\frac{P_{t+j-1}}{P_{t-1}} \right)^{1-\varepsilon_w} Y_w \frac{\varepsilon_w}{P_{t+j}} L_{d,t+j} \right\} \right]$$

$$\max_{\{W_t(h)\}} E_t \left[\sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \phi_w^j \Lambda_{t,t+j} \left\{ \left(\frac{P_{t+j-1}}{P_{t-1}} \right)^{1-\varepsilon_w} Y_w W_t(h) \frac{1-\varepsilon_w}{P_{t+j}} P_{t+j}^{\varepsilon_w-1} L_{d,t+j} - MRS_{t+j} \left(\frac{P_{t+j-1}}{P_{t-1}} \right)^{1-\varepsilon_w} Y_w W_t(h) \frac{\varepsilon_w}{P_{t+j}} P_{t+j}^{\varepsilon_w-1} L_{d,t+j} \right\} \right]$$

FOC:

$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial W_t(h)} = (1-\varepsilon_w) W_t(h)^{-\varepsilon_w} E_t \left[\sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \phi_w^j \Lambda_{t,t+j} \left(\frac{P_{t+j-1}}{P_{t-1}} \right)^{1-\varepsilon_w} Y_w \frac{1-\varepsilon_w}{P_{t+j}} W_{t+j}^{\varepsilon_w-1} L_{d,t+j} \right] + \varepsilon_w W_t(h)^{-\varepsilon_w-1} E_t \left[\sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \phi_w^j \Lambda_{t,t+j} MRS_{t+j} \left(\frac{P_{t+j-1}}{P_{t-1}} \right)^{1-\varepsilon_w} Y_w \frac{\varepsilon_w}{P_{t+j}} W_{t+j}^{\varepsilon_w-1} L_{d,t+j} \right] = 0$$

Since all unions are the same, the reset price is the same across all unions, so $W_t(h) = W^*$.

$$(E_w - 1) W^{*\varepsilon_w} E_t \left[\sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \phi_w^j \Lambda_{t,t+j} \left(\frac{P_{t+j-1}}{P_{t-1}} \right)^{1-\varepsilon_w} Y_w \frac{1-\varepsilon_w}{P_{t+j}} W_{t+j}^{\varepsilon_w-1} L_{d,t+j} \right] = E_w W^{*\varepsilon_w-1} E_t \left[\sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \phi_w^j \Lambda_{t,t+j} MRS_{t+j} \left(\frac{P_{t+j-1}}{P_{t-1}} \right)^{1-\varepsilon_w} Y_w \frac{\varepsilon_w}{P_{t+j}} W_{t+j}^{\varepsilon_w-1} L_{d,t+j} \right]$$

$$W^* = \frac{\varepsilon_w}{E_w - 1} E_t \left[\sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \phi_w^j \Lambda_{t,t+j} MRS_{t+j} \left(\frac{P_{t+j-1}}{P_{t-1}} \right)^{1-\varepsilon_w} Y_w \frac{\varepsilon_w}{P_{t+j}} W_{t+j}^{\varepsilon_w-1} L_{d,t+j} \right]^{-1}$$

$$W^* = \frac{\varepsilon_w}{E_w - 1} \frac{F_{1,t}}{F_{2,t}} \quad (\text{A.14})$$

where $F_{1,t} = MRS_t P_t^{\varepsilon_w} W_t^{\varepsilon_w} L_{d,t} + \phi_w \Lambda_{t,t+1} \prod_t^{t-1} F_{1,t+1}^{-\varepsilon_w} F_{1,t+1}$

$F_{2,t} = P_t^{\varepsilon_w-1} W_t^{\varepsilon_w} L_{d,t} + \phi_w \Lambda_{t,t+1} \prod_t^{t-1} F_{2,t+1}^{1-\varepsilon_w} F_{2,t+1}$

We can divide through by P_t to obtain real wage:

$$W^* = \frac{\varepsilon_w}{E_w - 1} \frac{f_{1,t}}{f_{2,t}}, \text{ where } f_{i,t} \text{ denotes the real value of the } F_{i,t} \text{ term}$$

$$f_{1,t} = m_r s_t w_t^{\varepsilon_w} L_{d,t} + \phi_w E_t \left[\lambda_{t,t+1}^{\varepsilon_w} \prod_{t+1}^{T-1} \frac{w_{t+h}}{P_{t+h}} f_{1,t+h} \right] \quad (A.15)$$

$$f_{2,t} = w_t^{\varepsilon_w} L_{d,t} + \phi_w E_t \left[\lambda_{t,t+1}^{\varepsilon_w-1} \frac{\delta_w(1-\varepsilon_w)}{P_t} f_{2,t+1} \right] \quad (A.16)$$

- Aggregating:

We can now aggregate, integrating A.12 over all regions:

$$\int_0^1 L_{d,t}(h) dh = \int_0^1 \left(\frac{w_t(h)}{w_t} \right)^{-\varepsilon_w} L_{d,t} dh$$

$$L_t = L_{d,t} \int_0^1 \left(\frac{w_t(h)}{w_t} \right)^{-\varepsilon_w} dh$$

$\equiv V_t^w$, wage dispersion

$$L_t = L_{d,t} V_t^w \quad (A.17)$$

Looking closer at V_t^w , we can impose wage stickiness:

$$V_t^w = \int_0^{1-\delta_w} \left(\frac{w_t(h)}{w_t} \right)^{-\varepsilon_w} dh + \int_{1-\delta_w}^1 \left(\frac{\left(\frac{P_{t-1}}{P_{t-2}} \right)^{\varepsilon_w} w_{t-1}(h)}{w_t} \right)^{-\varepsilon_w} dh$$

Using the same reset price:

$$= (1-\phi_w) \left(\frac{w_t}{w_t} \right)^{-\varepsilon_w} + \prod_{t-1}^1 w_t^{\varepsilon_w} \int_{1-\delta_w}^1 w_{t-1}(h)^{-\varepsilon_w} dh$$

Multiply right term by $\left(\frac{w_{t-1}}{w_{t-2}} \right)^{\varepsilon_w}$

$$= (1-\phi_w) \left(\frac{w_t}{w_t} \right)^{-\varepsilon_w} + \prod_{t-1}^1 w_t w_{t-1}^{\varepsilon_w - \varepsilon_w} \int_{1-\delta_w}^1 \left(\frac{w_{t-1}(h)}{w_{t-1}} \right)^{-\varepsilon_w} dh$$

$$= (1-\phi_w) \left(\frac{w_t}{w_t} \right)^{-\varepsilon_w} + \phi_w \prod_{t-1}^1 w_t^{\varepsilon_w} w_{t-1}^{-\varepsilon_w} V_{t-1}^w$$

We need the right term in real values:

The first term is already real, as we have multiplied & divided by P_t initially

$$\rightarrow = (1-\phi_w) \left(\frac{w_t}{w_t} \right)^{-\varepsilon_w} + \phi_w \prod_{t-1}^1 \frac{-\varepsilon_w Y_t}{P_t^{\varepsilon_w}} \frac{w_t^{\varepsilon_w}}{P_t^{\varepsilon_w}} \frac{w_{t-1}}{P_{t-1}^{\varepsilon_w}} V_{t-1}^w \left(\frac{P_t}{P_{t-1}} \right)^{\varepsilon_w}$$

$$= (1-\phi_w) \left(\frac{w_t}{w_t} \right)^{-\varepsilon_w} + \phi_w \left(\frac{P_t}{P_{t-1}} \right)^{\varepsilon_w} \left(\frac{w_t}{w_{t-1}} \right)^{\varepsilon_w} V_{t-1}^w \quad (A.18)$$

The last derivation in this section starts from A.13:

$$W_t^{1-\varepsilon_w} = \left[\int_0^1 w_t(h)^{1-\varepsilon_w} dh \right] \text{ Use sticky wages:}$$

$$W_t^{1-\varepsilon_w} = \int_0^{1-\delta_w} w_t(h)^{1-\varepsilon_w} dh + \int_{1-\delta_w}^1 \left(\left(\frac{P_{t-1}}{P_{t-2}} \right)^{\varepsilon_w} w_{t-1}(h) \right)^{1-\varepsilon_w} dh \quad \text{Suppose reset wage } w^*:$$

$$W_t^{1-\varepsilon_w} = (1-\phi_w)(w_t^*)^{1-\varepsilon_w} + \int_{1-\delta_w}^1 \left(\left(\frac{P_t}{P_{t-1}} \right)^{\varepsilon_w} w_{t-1}(h) \right)^{1-\varepsilon_w} dh.$$

If we consider w_{t-1} as the average wage (also as the aggregate wage) in $t-1$, then as $h \rightarrow \infty$, by the weak law of large numbers:

$$W_t^{1-\varepsilon_w} = (1-\phi_w)(w_t^*)^{1-\varepsilon_w} + \phi_w \left(\prod_{t-1}^1 \frac{Y_t}{P_t} \frac{w_{t-1}}{P_{t-1}} \right)^{1-\varepsilon_w}$$

Set this into real terms:

$$\frac{W_t^{1-\varepsilon_w}}{P_t^{1-\varepsilon_w}} = (1-\phi_w) \left(\frac{w_t^*}{P_t} \right)^{1-\varepsilon_w} + \phi_w \left(\prod_{t-1}^1 \frac{Y_t}{P_t} \frac{w_{t-1}}{P_{t-1}} \right)^{1-\varepsilon_w}$$

$$w_t^{1-\varepsilon_w} = (1-\phi_w) w_t^{\varepsilon_w} + \phi_w \left(\frac{\prod_{t-1}^1 Y_t}{P_t} w_{t-1} \right)^{1-\varepsilon_w} \quad (A.19)$$

(3) Production

There are 4 firms:

i. Representative Wholesaler - combines capital and labor to make $Y_{m,t}$.

ii. Competitive Capital Producer - creates new physical capital \hat{E}_t .

iii. Retail Firms: Repackage wholesale output using $Y_t(f) = Y_{m,t}(f)$.

iv. Competitive Final Goods Firm: Aggregate $Y_t(f)$ into Y_t using CES aggregation.

Then retailers face demand:

$$Y_t = \left[\int_0^1 Y_t(f)^{\frac{\varepsilon_p-1}{\varepsilon_p}} df \right]^{\frac{\varepsilon_p}{\varepsilon_p-1}}$$

Redefine Z_t as total expenditure on final goods: $Z_t = \int_0^1 P_t(f) Y_t(f) df$

Final goods firm face the following problem:

$$\begin{aligned} & \max_{Y_t(f)} \left[\int_0^1 Y_t(f)^{\frac{\varepsilon_p-1}{\varepsilon_p}} df \right]^{\frac{\varepsilon_p}{\varepsilon_p-1}} \quad \text{s.t. } Z_t = \int_0^1 P_t(f) Y_t(f) df \\ & \quad \left(Y_t(f) \geq \frac{\varepsilon_p}{\varepsilon_p-1} \cdot \frac{\varepsilon_p-1}{\varepsilon_p} Y_t(f) \right)^{\frac{1}{\varepsilon_p}} \left[\int_0^1 Y_t(f)^{\frac{\varepsilon_p-1}{\varepsilon_p}} df \right]^{\frac{1}{\varepsilon_p-1}} - \lambda P_t(f) = 0 \quad (\star \star) \\ & \quad \left[\int_0^1 Y_t(f)^{\frac{\varepsilon_p-1}{\varepsilon_p}} df \right]^{\frac{\varepsilon_p}{\varepsilon_p-1}} = \lambda P_t(f) Y_t(f) \\ & \quad \left[\int_0^1 Y_t(f)^{\frac{\varepsilon_p-1}{\varepsilon_p}} df \right]^{\frac{1}{\varepsilon_p-1}} = \lambda Z_t \end{aligned}$$

$$Y_t = \lambda Z_t \rightarrow Y_t = \lambda P_t Y_t \rightarrow \frac{1}{P_t} = \lambda$$

Sub into $(\star \star)$:

$$Y_t(f)^{\frac{1}{\varepsilon_p}} Y_t^{\frac{1}{\varepsilon_p}} = \frac{P_t(f)}{P_t}$$

$$Y_t(f)^{\frac{1}{\varepsilon_p}} = Y_t^{\frac{1}{\varepsilon_p}} \left(\frac{P_t(f)}{P_t} \right)^{-1}$$

$$Y_t(f) = \left(\frac{P_t(f)}{P_t} \right)^{-\varepsilon_p} Y_t \quad (A.20)$$

The aggregate price dynamics are:

$$P_t Y_t = \int_0^1 P_t(f) Y_t(f) df = Z_t$$

$$P_t Y_t = \int_0^1 P_t(f) \left(\frac{P_t(f)}{P_t} \right)^{-\varepsilon_p} Y_t df$$

$$P_t^{1-\varepsilon_p} = \int_0^1 P_t(f)^{1-\varepsilon_p} df \quad (A.21)$$

I. Retail Firms (from appendix A.4.1)

First, we define nominal dividends:

$$DIV_{R,t}(f) = P_t(f) Y_t(f) - P_{m,t} Y_{m,t}(f)$$

$$P_t Y_t - P_{m,t} Y_{m,t}$$

Set $Y_t(f) = Y_{m,t}(f)$, imposing demand = supply:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{DIV}_{R,t}(f) &= P_t(f) Y_t(f) - P_{m,t} Y_t(f) \quad \text{Sub in A.20:} \\ &= P_t(f) \left(\frac{P_t(f)}{P_t} \right)^{-\varepsilon_p} Y_t - P_{m,t} \left(\frac{P_t(f)}{P_t} \right)^{-\varepsilon_p} Y_t \\ &= P_t(f)^{1-\varepsilon_p} P_t^{\varepsilon_p} Y_t - P_{m,t} P_t(f)^{-\varepsilon_p} P_t^{\varepsilon_p} Y_t \end{aligned}$$

Like with wages, we impose sticky prices, where $(1-\phi_p)$ is the probability of adjusting price each period. Also like with wages, we can index to inflation w/ γ_p : $P_{t+j}(f) = P_t(f) \left(\frac{P_{t+j-1}}{P_{t-1}} \right)^{\gamma_p}$ for a firm that can't update prices. The retailers problem is then:

$$\begin{aligned} &\max_{P_t(f)} E_t \left[\sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \phi_p^j \mathbb{1}_{t,t+j} \left\{ P_{t+j}(f)^{1-\varepsilon_p} P_{t+j}^{\varepsilon_p} Y_{t+j} - P_{m,t+j} P_{t+j}(f)^{-\varepsilon_p} P_{t+j}^{\varepsilon_p} Y_{t+j} \right\} \right] \\ &= \max_{P_t(f)} E_t \left[\sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \phi_p^j \mathbb{1}_{t,t+j} \left\{ P_t(f)^{1-\varepsilon_p} \left(\frac{P_{t+j-1}}{P_{t-1}} \right)^{\gamma_p} P_{t+j}^{\varepsilon_p} Y_{t+j} - P_{m,t+j} P_t(f)^{-\varepsilon_p} \left(\frac{P_{t+j-1}}{P_{t-1}} \right)^{\gamma_p} P_{t+j}^{\varepsilon_p} Y_{t+j} \right\} \right] \end{aligned}$$

Convert to real values:

$$= \max_{P_t(f)} E_t \left[\sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \phi_p^j \mathbb{1}_{t,t+j} \left\{ P_t(f)^{1-\varepsilon_p} \left(\frac{P_{t+j-1}}{P_{t-1}} \right)^{(1-\varepsilon_p)\gamma_p} P_{t+j}^{\varepsilon_p} Y_{t+j} - P_{m,t+j} P_t(f)^{-\varepsilon_p} \left(\frac{P_{t+j-1}}{P_{t-1}} \right)^{-(1-\varepsilon_p)\gamma_p} P_{t+j}^{\varepsilon_p} Y_{t+j} \right\} \right]$$

The highlighted parts are what I believe to be corrections to the derivations in the appendix.

$$\begin{aligned} < P_t(f) > (1-\varepsilon_p) P_t(f)^{-\varepsilon_p} E_t \left[\sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \phi_p^j \mathbb{1}_{t,t+j} \left(\frac{P_{t+j-1}}{P_{t-1}} \right)^{(1-\varepsilon_p)\gamma_p} P_{t+j}^{\varepsilon_p} Y_{t+j} \right. \\ &\quad \left. + \varepsilon_p P_t(f)^{-\varepsilon_p-1} E_t \left[\sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \phi_p^j \mathbb{1}_{t,t+j} P_{m,t+j} \left(\frac{P_{t+j-1}}{P_{t-1}} \right)^{-\varepsilon_p \gamma_p} P_{t+j}^{\varepsilon_p} Y_{t+j} \right] \right] = 0 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Let } X_{1,t} &= \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \phi_p^j \mathbb{1}_{t,t+j} P_{m,t+j} \left(\frac{P_{t+j-1}}{P_{t-1}} \right)^{-\varepsilon_p \gamma_p} P_{t+j}^{\varepsilon_p} Y_{t+j} \\ \therefore X_{2,t} &= \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \phi_p^j \mathbb{1}_{t,t+j} \left(\frac{P_{t+j-1}}{P_{t-1}} \right)^{(1-\varepsilon_p)\gamma_p} P_{t+j}^{\varepsilon_p-1} Y_{t+j}. \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Recursively: } X_{1,t} &= P_{m,t} P_t^{\varepsilon_p} Y_t + \phi_p \mathbb{1}_{t,t+1} \prod_t^{-\varepsilon_p \gamma_p} X_{1,t+1} \\ X_{2,t} &= P_t^{\varepsilon_p-1} Y_t + \phi_p \mathbb{1}_{t,t+1} \prod_t^{(1-\varepsilon_p)\gamma_p} X_{2,t+1} \end{aligned}$$

Because each retailer has the same pricing problem, all reset prices are the same, P_t^* . Rearranging the first-order condition gives:

$$(1-\varepsilon_p) P_t^{*\varepsilon_p} X_{2,t} = \varepsilon_p P_t^{*(\varepsilon_p-1)} X_{1,t}$$

$$\frac{P_t^*}{P_t} = \frac{\varepsilon_p-1}{\varepsilon_p} \cdot \frac{X_{1,t}}{X_{2,t}} \quad \text{Set in real terms:}$$

$$P_t^* = \frac{\varepsilon_p}{\varepsilon_p-1} \cdot \frac{X_{1,t}}{X_{2,t}}$$

$$\frac{X_{1,t}}{P_t^{\varepsilon_p}} = X_{1,t} = P_{m,t} Y_t + \phi_p E_t \left[\mathbb{1}_{t,t+1} \prod_t^{-\varepsilon_p \gamma_p} \frac{P_t^{\varepsilon_p}}{P_t} X_{1,t+1} \right] \quad \therefore \quad (\text{A.22})$$

$$(\text{A.23})$$

$$\frac{x_{2,t}}{p_t^{1-\varepsilon_p}} = x_{2,t} = Y_t + \phi_p E_t \left[\prod_{t+1}^{(1-\varepsilon_p)} \frac{p_{t+1}^{\varepsilon_p-1}}{p_t^{1-\varepsilon_p}} x_{2,t+1} \right] \quad (\text{A.24})$$

- Aggregating:

Integrate A.20 over all f :

$$\int_0^1 Y_t(f) df = \int_0^1 \left(\frac{p_t(f)}{p_t} \right)^{-\varepsilon_p} Y_t df \quad \text{Imposing eq'n:}$$

$$\int_0^1 Y_{m,t}(f) df = Y_t \int_0^1 \left(\frac{p_t(f)}{p_t} \right)^{-\varepsilon_p} df$$

$Y_{m,t} = Y_t v_t^\rho$ Price dispersion

(A.25)

Looking at just v_t^ρ and introducing Calvo pricing:

$$\begin{aligned} v_t^\rho &= \int_0^1 p_t^{1-\varepsilon_p} df + \int_{1-\varepsilon_p}^1 \left(\frac{\pi_{t+1}^{\varepsilon_p} p_t^{-1-\varepsilon_p}}{p_t} \right)^{-\varepsilon_p} df \\ &= (1-\phi_p) p_t^{1-\varepsilon_p} + \prod_{t+1}^{\infty} p_t^{\varepsilon_p} p_{t+1}^{-\varepsilon_p} \int_{1-\varepsilon_p}^1 \left(\frac{p_{t+1}(f)}{p_{t+1}} \right)^{-\varepsilon_p} df \\ &\xrightarrow{f \rightarrow \infty} (1-\phi_p) p_t^{1-\varepsilon_p} + \phi_p \left(\frac{\pi_t}{\pi_{t+1}} \right)^{\varepsilon_p} v_{t+1}^\rho \end{aligned} \quad (\text{A.26})$$

Now rewriting A.21 w/ Calvo pricing:

$$\begin{aligned} p_t^{1-\varepsilon_p} &= \int_0^1 p_t^{1-\varepsilon_p} df + \int_{1-\varepsilon_p}^1 \left(\frac{p_{t+1}(f)}{p_{t+1}} \right)^{1-\varepsilon_p} df \\ &\xrightarrow{f \rightarrow \infty} (1-\phi_p) p_t^{1-\varepsilon_p} + \phi_p \prod_{t+1}^{\infty} \left(\frac{p_{t+1}}{p_{t+1}} \right)^{1-\varepsilon_p} \quad \text{Divide by } p_t^{1-\varepsilon_p}: \\ 1 &= (1-\phi_p) p_t^{1-\varepsilon_p} + \phi_p \prod_{t+1}^{\infty} \left(\frac{p_{t+1}}{p_{t+1}} \right)^{1-\varepsilon_p} \end{aligned} \quad (\text{A.27})$$

II. Wholesale Firms (from section 2 and appendix A.4.2)

Production technology: $Y_{m,t} = A_t (\omega_t k_t)^{\alpha} L_{d,t}$ Capital utilization (apparently a choice variable) (2.19)

Law of Motion: $K_{t+1} = \hat{I}_t + (1-\delta(\omega)) K_t$ (2.20)

Loan-in-advance constraint: $\psi p_t^k \hat{I}_t \leq Q_t C F_{m,t} = Q_t (F_{m,t} - k F_{m,t+1})$ (2.21)

Dividends: $DIV_{m,t} = P_{m,t} A_t (\omega_t k_t)^{\alpha} L_{d,t} - W_t L_{d,t} - p_t^k \hat{I}_t - F_{m,t-1} + Q_t (F_{m,t} - k F_{m,t})$ (2.22)

Write dividends in real terms:

$$\frac{DIV_{m,t}}{P_t} = \frac{P_{m,t}}{P_t} A_t (\omega_t k_t)^{\alpha} L_{d,t} - \frac{W_t}{P_t} L_{d,t} - \frac{p_t^k}{P_t} \hat{I}_t - \frac{P_{t-1}}{P_t} \frac{F_{m,t-1}}{P_{t-1}} + Q_t \left(\frac{F_{m,t}}{P_t} - \frac{k P_{t-1}}{P_t} \frac{F_{m,t-1}}{P_{t-1}} \right)$$

$$div_{m,t} = p_{m,t} A_t (\omega_t k_t)^{\alpha} L_{d,t} - W_t L_{d,t} - p_t^k \hat{I}_t - \frac{F_{m,t-1}}{P_{t-1}} + Q_t \left(\frac{F_{m,t}}{P_t} - k \frac{F_{m,t-1}}{P_{t-1}} \right)$$

Write in Lagrangian:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{L} = E_t \left[\sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \lambda_{t+j,t+j} \left\{ p_{m,t+j} A_{t+j} (\omega_{t+j} k_{t+j})^{\alpha} L_{d,t+j} - W_{t+j} L_{d,t+j} - p_{t+j}^k \hat{I}_{t+j} - \prod_{t+j}^{-1} \frac{F_{m,t+j-1}}{P_{t+j-1}} + Q_{t+j} \left(\frac{F_{m,t+j}}{P_{t+j}} - \frac{k P_{t+j-1}}{P_{t+j}} \frac{F_{m,t+j-1}}{P_{t+j-1}} \right) \right\} \right. \\ \left. + \lambda_{1,t+j} (\hat{I}_{t+j} + (1-\delta(\omega_{t+j})) K_{t+j} - k F_{m,t+j+1}) + \lambda_{2,t+j} \left(Q_{t+j} \left(\frac{F_{m,t+j}}{P_{t+j}} - \frac{k P_{t+j-1}}{P_{t+j}} \frac{F_{m,t+j-1}}{P_{t+j-1}} \right) - \psi p_{t+j}^k \hat{I}_{t+j} \right) \right] \end{aligned}$$

loan-in-advance constraint in real terms

Take FOCs wrt $L_{d,t}$, \hat{I}_t , U_t , K_{t+1} , $F_{m,t}$

$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial L_{d,t}} = (1-\alpha) p_{m,t} A_t(U_t K_t)^{\alpha} L_{d,t}^{1-\alpha} - w_t = 0 \quad (\text{A.28})$$

$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial \hat{I}_t} = -p_t^k + \lambda_{1,t} - \psi p_t^k \lambda_{2,t} = 0 \rightarrow \lambda_{1,t} = p_t^k - \psi p_t^k \lambda_{2,t} \quad (\text{A.29})$$

$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial U_t} = p_{m,t} A_t^\alpha K_t^{\alpha-1} L_{d,t}^{1-\alpha} - \lambda_{1,t} \delta'(U_t) K_t = 0 \quad (\text{A.30})$$

$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial K_{t+1}} = -\lambda_{1,t} + E_t \left[\alpha A_t U_t p_{m,t+1} A_{t+1} K_{t+1}^{\alpha-1} L_{d,t+1}^{1-\alpha} + \lambda_{1,t+1} (1-\delta(U_{t+1})) \right] = 0 \quad (\text{A.31})$$

$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial F_{m,t}} = \frac{Q_t}{P_t} + \lambda_{2,t} \frac{Q_t}{P_t} - E_t \left[A_{t+1} \left(\prod_{t+1}^{-1} P_t^{-1} + Q_{t+1} \lambda \prod_{t+1}^{-1} P_t^{-1} + \lambda_{2,t+1} Q_{t+1} \lambda \prod_{t+1}^{-1} P_t^{-1} \right) \right] = 0 \quad (\text{A.32})$$

Let $M_{1,t} = 1 + \psi \lambda_{2,t}$ $\Rightarrow M_{2,t} = 1 + \lambda_{2,t}$. Then A.29 becomes $\lambda_{1,t} = p_t^k M_{1,t}$.

Subbing $M_{1,t}$ & $M_{2,t}$ leads to the equation in section 2:

$$\text{From A.28: } w_t = (1-\alpha) p_{m,t} A_t(U_t K_t)^{\alpha} L_{d,t}^{1-\alpha} \quad (\text{2.23})$$

$$\text{From A.30: } p_{m,t} A_t^\alpha K_t^{\alpha-1} L_{d,t}^{1-\alpha} = \lambda_{1,t} \delta'(U_t) K_t$$

$$M_{1,t} A_t^\alpha K_t^{\alpha-1} L_{d,t}^{1-\alpha} = p_t^k M_{1,t} \delta'(U_t) K_t$$

$$p_{m,t} A_t^\alpha K_t^{\alpha-1} U_t^{1-\alpha} L_{d,t}^{1-\alpha} = p_t^k M_{1,t} \delta'(U_t) \quad (\text{2.24})$$

$$\text{From A.31: } E_t \left[\alpha A_t U_t p_{m,t+1} A_{t+1} U_{t+1}^{\alpha-1} K_{t+1}^{1-\alpha} L_{d,t+1}^{1-\alpha} + \lambda_{1,t+1} (1-\delta(U_{t+1})) \right] = \lambda_{1,t}$$

$$E_t \left[\alpha A_t U_t p_{m,t+1} A_{t+1} U_{t+1}^{\alpha-1} K_{t+1}^{1-\alpha} L_{d,t+1}^{1-\alpha} + p_t^k M_{1,t+1} (1-\delta(U_{t+1})) \right] = p_t^k M_{1,t} \quad (\text{2.25})$$

$$\text{From A.32: } \frac{Q_t}{P_t} + \lambda_{2,t} \frac{Q_t}{P_t} = E_t \left[A_{t+1} \left(\prod_{t+1}^{-1} P_t^{-1} + Q_{t+1} \lambda \prod_{t+1}^{-1} P_t^{-1} + \lambda_{2,t+1} Q_{t+1} \lambda \prod_{t+1}^{-1} P_t^{-1} \right) \right]$$

$$\frac{Q_t}{P_t} M_{2,t} = \frac{1}{P_t} E_t \left[A_{t+1} \left(\prod_{t+1}^{-1} + Q_{t+1} \lambda \prod_{t+1}^{-1} M_{2,t+1} \right) \right]$$

$$Q_t M_{2,t} = E_t \left[A_{t+1} \prod_{t+1}^{-1} (1 + Q_{t+1} \lambda M_{2,t+1}) \right] \quad (\text{2.26})$$

$$\text{Divide } M_{1,t} \text{ by } M_{2,t}: \quad \frac{M_{1,t}-1}{M_{2,t}-1} = \frac{\psi \lambda_{2,t}}{\lambda_{2,t}} = \psi \quad (\text{2.27})$$

III. Capital Producer

Sims & Wu (2021) give the capital producer investment technology:

$$\hat{I}_t = \left[1 - S\left(\frac{I_t}{I_{t-1}}\right) \right] I_t \quad (\text{A.34})$$

where I_t = uncorrected final output, $S(\cdot)$ = adjustment cost function. The dividend function is:

$$\Omega IV_{K,t} = p_t^k \left[1 - S\left(\frac{I_t}{I_{t-1}}\right) \right] I_t - p_t I_t \quad \text{Make into real terms:}$$

$$div_{X,t} = p_t^k \left[1 - S\left(\frac{I_t}{I_{t-1}}\right) \right] I_t - I_t$$

The maximization problem is:

$$\max_{\{I_t\}} E_t \left[\sum_{j=0}^{\infty} A_{t+j} \left\{ p_{t+j}^k (1 - S(\frac{I_{t+j}}{I_{t+j-1}})) I_{t+j} - I_{t+j} \right\} \right]$$

$$\langle I_t \rangle = p_t^k \left(1 - S\left(\frac{I_t}{I_{t-1}}\right) \right) - p_t^k \frac{I_t}{I_{t-1}} S'\left(\frac{I_t}{I_{t-1}}\right) + E_t \left[\lambda_{t,t+1} p_{t+1}^k \left(\frac{I_{t+1}}{I_t}\right)^{\alpha} S'\left(\frac{I_{t+1}}{I_t}\right) \right] \quad (\text{A.35})$$

④ Financial intermediaries (following Appendix A.2)

Sims & Wuu (2021) provide the financial intermediary net worth equation (2.8):

$$N_{i,t} = (R_c^F - R_c^d) Q_{t-1} F_{i,t-1} + (R_c^B - R_c^d) Q_{B,t-1} B_{i,t-1} + (R_c^{re} - R_c^d) RE_{i,t-1} + R_c^d N_{i,t-1}$$

Divide by P_{t-1} :

$$\frac{1}{P_{t-1}} N_{i,t} = (R_c^F - R_c^d) Q_{t-1} F_{i,t-1} + (R_c^B - R_c^d) Q_{B,t-1} B_{i,t-1} + (R_c^{re} - R_c^d) RE_{i,t-1} + R_c^d N_{i,t-1}$$

$$\Pi_t N_{i,t} = (R_c^F - R_c^d) Q_{t-1} F_{i,t-1} + (R_c^B - R_c^d) Q_{B,t-1} B_{i,t-1} + (R_c^{re} - R_c^d) RE_{i,t-1} + R_c^d N_{i,t-1} \quad (\text{A.7})$$

$$N_{i,t} = \Pi_t^{-1} \left[(R_c^F - R_c^d) Q_{t-1} F_{i,t-1} + (R_c^B - R_c^d) Q_{B,t-1} B_{i,t-1} + (R_c^{re} - R_c^d) RE_{i,t-1} + R_c^d N_{i,t-1} \right]$$

Forward this equation, discounting by the stochastic discount factor and multiplying both sides by $\Delta_{t+1} = 1 - \sigma + \sigma \theta_{t+1} \phi_{t+1}$

Probability of financial intermediary surviving to the next period
given in 2.15. Sims & Wu (2021) say that it is an endogenous leverage ratio.

Problem of bond value
financial intermediaries can always write.

$$\lambda_{t,t+1} \Delta_{t+1} N_{i,t+1} = \lambda_{t,t+1} \Delta_{t+1} \Pi_{t+1}^{-1} \left[(R_c^F - R_c^d) Q_t F_{i,t} + (R_c^B - R_c^d) Q_{B,t} B_{i,t} + (R_c^{re} - R_c^d) RE_{i,t} + R_c^d N_{i,t} \right] \quad (\text{A.8})$$

We can write equation 2.8 recursively:

$$V_{i,t} = \max_{E_{t+1}} \left\{ \underbrace{(1-\sigma) E_t [\lambda_{t,t+1} N_{i,t+1}]}_{\text{Value of firm today}} + \underbrace{\sigma E_t [\lambda_{t,t+1} V_{i,t+1}]}_{\substack{\text{Value next period, time} \\ \text{the probability of surviving}}} \right\}$$

Plug-in $N_{i,t+1}$:

$$V_{i,t} = \max_{E_{t+1}, b_{i,t+1}, r_{e,i,t+1}} \left\{ \underbrace{(1-\sigma) E_t [\lambda_{t,t+1} \Pi_{t+1}^{-1} ((R_c^F - R_c^d) Q_t F_{i,t} + (R_c^B - R_c^d) Q_{B,t} B_{i,t} + (R_c^{re} - R_c^d) RE_{i,t} + R_c^d N_{i,t})]}_{\substack{\text{Sims & Wu (2021)} \\ \text{call this F_{i,t}}}} + \underbrace{\sigma E_t [\lambda_{t,t+1} V_{i,t+1}]}_{\substack{\text{Value next period, time} \\ \text{the probability of surviving}}} \right\}$$

Putting this into a Lagrangian with an incentive compatibility constraint (2.9) and a reserve requirement constraint (2.10):

$$\mathcal{L} = V_{i,t} + \lambda_t (V_{i,t} - \theta_t (Q_t F_{i,t} + \Delta Q_{B,t} B_{i,t})) + w_t (r_{e,i,t} - \bar{r}_{e,i,t}) \quad \text{Sub-in } V_{i,t} :$$

Sims & Wu (2021)
call this F_{i,t}

$$\mathcal{L} = \max \left\{ (1+\lambda_t) E_t \left[(1-\sigma) \lambda_{t,t+1} \left\{ (R_c^F - R_c^d) \Pi_{t+1}^{-1} Q_t F_{i,t} + (R_c^B - R_c^d) \Pi_{t+1}^{-1} Q_{B,t} B_{i,t} + (R_c^{re} - R_c^d) \Pi_{t+1}^{-1} RE_{i,t} + R_c^d \Pi_{t+1}^{-1} N_{i,t} \right\} + \sigma \lambda_{t,t+1} V_{i,t+1} \right] \right\} - \lambda_t \theta_t (Q_t F_{i,t} + \Delta Q_{B,t} B_{i,t}) + w_t (r_{e,i,t} - \bar{r}_{e,i,t})$$

Given that $V_{i,t}$ is linear in $N_{i,t}$. That is: $V_{i,t} = \theta_t Q_t N_{i,t}$ (2.16)

FOCs:

$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial f_{i,t}} = (1+\lambda_t)(1-\sigma) Q_t E_t \left[\mathbb{1}_{t,t+1} \prod_{t+1}^{-1} (R_{t+1}^F - R_t^d) \right] + (1+\lambda_t)\sigma E_t \left[\mathbb{1}_{t,t+1} \frac{\partial v_{i,t+1}}{\partial f_{i,t}} \right]$$

$$= \lambda_t \theta_t Q_t$$

$$(1-\sigma) E_t \left[\mathbb{1}_{t,t+1} \prod_{t+1}^{-1} (R_{t+1}^F - R_t^d) \right] + \sigma E_t \left[\mathbb{1}_{t,t+1} \theta_{t+1} \phi_{t+1} (R_{t+1}^F - R_t^d) \prod_{t+1}^{-1} \right]$$

$$= \frac{\lambda_t}{1+\lambda_t} \theta_t$$

$$E_t \left[\mathbb{1}_{t,t+1} (1-\sigma + \sigma \theta_{t+1} \phi_{t+1}) \prod_{t+1}^{-1} (R_{t+1}^F - R_t^d) \right] = \frac{\lambda_t}{1+\lambda_t} \theta_t$$

$$\equiv \Omega_{t+1}$$

Lump extra terms in here

$$E_t \left[\mathbb{1}_{t,t+1} \Omega_{t+1} \prod_{t+1}^{-1} (R_{t+1}^F - R_t^d) \right] = \frac{\lambda_t}{1+\lambda_t} \theta_t \quad (2.11)$$

$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial v_{i,t}} = (1+\lambda_t)(1-\sigma) E_t \left[\mathbb{1}_{t,t+1} \prod_{t+1}^{-1} Q_{B,t} (R_{t+1}^B - R_t^d) \right] + (1+\lambda_t)\sigma E_t \left[\mathbb{1}_{t,t+1} \frac{\partial v_{i,t+1}}{\partial v_{i,t}} \right] = \lambda_t \theta_t \Delta Q_{B,t}$$

$$(1-\sigma) E_t \left[\mathbb{1}_{t,t+1} \prod_{t+1}^{-1} (R_{t+1}^B - R_t^d) \right] + \sigma E_t \left[\mathbb{1}_{t,t+1} \prod_{t+1}^{-1} \theta_{t+1} \phi_{t+1} (R_{t+1}^B - R_t^d) \right] = \frac{\lambda_t}{1+\lambda_t} \theta_t \Delta$$

$$E_t \left[\mathbb{1}_{t,t+1} \Omega_{t+1} \prod_{t+1}^{-1} (R_{t+1}^B - R_t^d) \right] = \frac{\lambda_t}{1+\lambda_t} \theta_t \Delta \quad (2.12)$$

$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial r_{i,t}} = (1+\lambda_t)(1-\sigma) E_t \left[\mathbb{1}_{t,t+1} \prod_{t+1}^{-1} (R_t^{re} - R_t^d) \right] + (1+\lambda_t)\sigma E_t \left[\mathbb{1}_{t,t+1} \frac{\partial v_{i,t+1}}{\partial r_{i,t}} \right] = -\omega_t$$

$$(1-\sigma) E_t \left[\mathbb{1}_{t,t+1} \prod_{t+1}^{-1} (R_t^{re} - R_t^d) \right] + \sigma E_t \left[\mathbb{1}_{t,t+1} \prod_{t+1}^{-1} \theta_{t+1} \phi_{t+1} (R_t^{re} - R_t^d) \right] = \frac{-\omega_t}{1+\lambda_t}$$

$$E_t \left[\mathbb{1}_{t,t+1} \Omega_{t+1} \prod_{t+1}^{-1} (R_t^{re} - R_t^d) \right] = \frac{-\omega_t}{1+\lambda_t} \quad (2.13)$$

Now assume that 2.9 binds, that is, that $v_{it} = \theta_t(Q_t f_{i,t} + \Delta Q_{B,t} b_{i,t})$. Set this equal to the guess:

$$\theta_t(Q_t f_{i,t} + \Delta Q_{B,t} b_{i,t}) = \theta_t \phi_t n_{it}$$

$$\phi_t = (Q_t f_{i,t} + \Delta Q_{B,t} b_{i,t}) n_{it}^{-1} \quad (2.17)$$

Now take the expectation of A.8:

$$E_t \left[\mathbb{1}_{t,t+1} \Omega_{t+1} n_{i,t+1} \right] = E_t \left[\mathbb{1}_{t,t+1} \Omega_{t+1} \prod_{t+1}^{-1} \left[(R_{t+1}^F - R_t^d) Q_t f_{i,t} + (R_{t+1}^B - R_t^d) Q_{B,t} b_{i,t} + (R_t^{re} - R_t^d) r_{i,t} + R_t^d n_{i,t} \right] \right]$$

$$= E_t \left[\mathbb{1}_{t,t+1} \Omega_{t+1} \prod_{t+1}^{-1} (R_{t+1}^F - R_t^d) \right] (Q_t f_{i,t} + \Delta Q_{B,t} b_{i,t})$$

$$+ E_t \left[\mathbb{1}_{t,t+1} \Omega_{t+1} \prod_{t+1}^{-1} (R_t^{re} - R_t^d) \right] r_{i,t} + E_t \left[\mathbb{1}_{t,t+1} \Omega_{t+1} \prod_{t+1}^{-1} \right] R_t^d n_{i,t}$$

$$= \frac{\lambda_t}{1+\lambda_t} \theta_t \phi_t n_{it} - \frac{\omega_t}{1+\lambda_t} + E_t \left[\mathbb{1}_{t,t+1} \Omega_{t+1} \prod_{t+1}^{-1} \right] R_t^d n_{it}$$

Δ do not know how this term was derived

We can write A.9 in a similar manner:

$$v_{it} = \theta_t \phi_t n_{it} = \max \left\{ E_t \left[\mathbb{1}_{t,t+1} \Omega_{t+1} n_{i,t+1} \right] \right\}$$

$$= \frac{\lambda_t}{1+\lambda_t} \theta_t \phi_{t+1,t} - \frac{w_t}{1+\lambda_t} r_{t+1,t} + E_t \left[A_{t+1} \Omega_{t+1} \Pi_{t+1}^{-1} \right] R_t^d n_{t+1}$$

If we assume that $\frac{r_{t+1,t}}{d_{t+1,t}} = \frac{r_{t+1}}{d_t}$, then the reserve requirement (2.10) implies that

$s_t = \frac{r_{t+1}}{d_t}$ when the constraint binds. Assuming the same holds for n_{t+1} ($n_{t+1} = n_t$):

$$\theta_t \phi_t = \frac{\lambda_t}{1+\lambda_t} \theta_t \phi_t - \frac{w_t}{1+\lambda_t} \frac{r_{t+1}}{n_t} + E_t \left[A_{t+1} \Omega_{t+1} \Pi_{t+1}^{-1} \right] R_t^d$$

$$(1 - \frac{\lambda_t}{1+\lambda_t}) \theta_t \phi_t = - \frac{w_t}{1+\lambda_t} \frac{r_{t+1}}{n_t} + E_t \left[A_{t+1} \Omega_{t+1} \Pi_{t+1}^{-1} \right] R_t^d$$

$$\frac{1}{1+\lambda_t} \theta_t \phi_t = - \frac{w_t}{1+\lambda_t} \frac{r_{t+1}}{n_t} + E_t \left[A_{t+1} \Omega_{t+1} \Pi_{t+1}^{-1} \right] R_t^d$$

$$\theta_t \phi_t = (1 + \lambda_t) E_t \left[A_{t+1} \Omega_{t+1} \Pi_{t+1}^{-1} \right] R_t^d - \frac{w_t r_{t+1}}{n_t} \quad (A.11)$$

$$\phi_t = \frac{(1 + \lambda_t) E_t \left[A_{t+1} \Omega_{t+1} \Pi_{t+1}^{-1} \right] R_t^d}{\theta_t} - \frac{w_t r_{t+1}}{\theta_t n_t} \quad (2.15)$$

Two other important equations (given):

$$R_t^F = \frac{1 + \lambda Q_{t+1}}{Q_{t+1}} \quad (2.6) \quad R_t^B = \frac{1 + \lambda Q_{t+1}}{Q_{B,t+1}} \quad (2.7)$$

Since 3 Wu (2021) go on to derive derivation of the value function with respect to n_{t+1} . I skip this, as I do not see the point of going through the math.

(5) Fiscal Authority (following Appendix A.5)

Sinn & Wulff (2021) assume that the fiscal authority consumes an exogenously determined, stochastic amount of Y_t , denoted by G_t . G_t is financed by lump-sum taxes on the household and by issuing bonds, $B_{G,t}$ (nominal).

Assume the quantity of real bonds is fixed then $b_{G,t} = \bar{b}_G$. Also assume $B_{G,t} = P_t \bar{b}_G$. Then the fiscal authority's budget constraint is:

$$\underbrace{P_t G_t}_{\text{Nominal Expenditure}} + \underbrace{P_{t-1} \bar{b}_G}_{\text{Bond payments in the period}} = \underbrace{P_t T_t}_{\text{Taxes collected}} + \underbrace{P_t T_{cb,t}}_{\text{Transfer from Central Bank}} + \underbrace{Q_{B,t} P_t \bar{b}_G (1 - \chi \pi_t^{-1})}_{\text{Value of bonds sold in the period}} \quad (\text{A.36})$$

$$G_t + \Pi_t^{-1} \bar{b}_G = T_t + T_{cb,t} + Q_{B,t} \bar{b}_G (1 - \chi \pi_t^{-1}) \quad (\text{in real terms})$$

(6) Central Bank (following section 3)

i. Conventional Policy:

Sinn & Wulff (2021) define their Taylor rule as:

$$\ln(R_t^{TR}) = (1 - p_r) \ln(R_t^{TR}) + p_r \ln(R_{t-1}^{TR}) + (1 - p_r) [\phi_\pi (\ln \pi_t - \ln \pi) + \phi_y (\ln Y_t - \ln Y_{t-1})] + s_r \epsilon_{r,t} \quad (\text{3.1})$$

↑ Deviation from target inflation

Deviation from trend

Interest rate shock

$$\cdot \text{Normal times: } R_t^d = R_t^c = R_t^{TR} \quad (\text{3.2})$$

$$\cdot \text{Zero-lower bound: } R_t^c = R_t^d = \max\{1, R_t^{TR}\} \quad (\text{3.3})$$

↑ I'm not sure why 1 is used here as the alternative

ii. Quantitative Easing

$$\text{Central Bank balance sheet: } Q_t F_{C,t} + Q_{B,t} B_{C,t} = RE_t \quad (\text{3.4})$$

$$\text{Remittance: } T_{C,t} = (1 + \chi Q_t) \Pi_t^{-1} f_{C,t-1} + (1 + \chi Q_{B,t}) \Pi_t^{-1} b_{C,t-1} - R_{t-1}^c \Pi_t^{-1} r_{C,t-1} \quad (\text{Remit})$$

a) Exogenous QE: holdings follow AR(1) processes:

$$f_{C,t} = (1 - p_f) f_{C,t-1} + p_f f_{C,t-1} + s_f \epsilon_{f,t} \quad (\text{3.5})$$

$$b_{C,t} = (1 - p_b) b_{C,t-1} + p_b b_{C,t-1} + s_b \epsilon_{b,t} \quad (\text{3.6})$$

b) Endogenous QE: Private holdings follow a Taylor rule

$$f_{cb,t} = (1-\rho_f) f_{cb} + \rho_f f_{cb,t-1} + (1-\rho_f) \varphi_f [\alpha_\pi (\ln(\pi_t) - \ln(\pi)) + \alpha_y (\ln(y_t) - \ln(y_{t-1}))] + S_f \varepsilon_{f,t} \quad (5.1)$$

- At zero lower-bound, $\varphi \neq 0$.

- In normal times, $\varphi = 0$.

iii. Forward Guidance

Sinn & Wu (2021) model this as a shock to 3.1 with a credibility parameter attached. Therefore, a forward guidance shock is:

$$\gamma S_f \varepsilon_{f,t} \quad \text{with } \gamma \in [0, 1]$$

↑ ↑ perfectly credible
No credibility

iv. Negative Interest Rate Policy

This allows the interest rate on reserves to go negative. So:

$$R_t^d = \max\{1, R_t^{rc}\}, \quad R_t^{rc} = R_t^{TR} \quad (3.7)$$

Negative rates are introduced by negatively shocking R_t^{TR} when 2.10 binds.

⑦ Aggregation and Exogenous Processes (following Appendix A.6)

There are 3 exogenous processes: A_t , G_t , and Θ_t . Each follow an AR(1) as log:

$$\ln(A_t) = \rho_A \ln(A_{t-1}) + S_A \varepsilon_{A,t} \quad \leftarrow \text{Mean } A = 1, \text{ so } \ln(A) = 0 \quad (A.37)$$

$$\ln(G_t) = (1-\rho_G) \ln(G) + \rho_G \ln(G_{t-1}) + S_G \varepsilon_{G,t} \quad (A.38)$$

$$\ln(\Theta_t) = (1-\rho_\Theta) \ln(\Theta) + \rho_\Theta \ln(\Theta_{t-1}) + S_\Theta \varepsilon_{\Theta,t} \quad (A.39)$$

Bond market clearing requires:

$$\begin{array}{l} \text{Wholesaler bonds issued} \\ \text{Government bonds issued} \end{array} \quad \boxed{f_{mt} = f_t + f_{cb,t}} \quad \begin{array}{l} \text{Bonds held by FIs} \\ \text{Bonds held by the central bank} \end{array} \quad (A.40)$$

$$\boxed{\bar{b}_G = b_G + b_{cb,t}} \quad (A.41)$$

where $f_t = \sum_i f_{i,t}$ and $b_t = \sum_i b_{i,t}$

Aggregate the financial intermediaries' balance sheets (2.4):

$$\sum_i Q_{t,F,i,t} + Q_{B,t,B,i,t} + RE_{i,t} di = \sum_i D_{i,t} + N_{i,t} di$$

$$Q_{t,F,t} + Q_{B,t,B,t} + RE_t = D_t + N_t \quad \text{Divide by } P_t :$$

$$Q_{t,F,t} + Q_{B,t,B,t} + r_{et} = d_t + n_t \quad (\text{A.42})$$

Aggregate financial intermediaries' net worth (A.7):

$$\sum_i N_{i,t} di = \sum_i \Pi_i^{-1} [(R_{t-1}^F - R_{t-1}^d) Q_{t-1,F,i,t-1} + (R_{t-1}^B - R_{t-1}^d) Q_{B,t-1,B,i,t-1} + (R_{t-1}^{re} - R_{t-1}^d) r_{et-1}] di$$

$$N_t = \Pi_t^{-1} [(R_t^F - R_{t-1}^d) Q_{t-1,F,t-1} + (R_t^B - R_{t-1}^d) Q_{B,t-1,B,t-1} + (R_t^{re} - R_{t-1}^d) r_{et-1} + R_{t-1}^d n_{t-1}]$$

Adjust to reflect a surviving firm and X start-up funds:

$$N_t = \Pi_t^{-1} [O_t [(R_t^F - R_{t-1}^d) Q_{t-1,F,t-1} + (R_t^B - R_{t-1}^d) Q_{B,t-1,B,t-1} + (R_t^{re} - R_{t-1}^d) r_{et-1} + R_{t-1}^d n_{t-1}]] + X \quad (\text{A.43})$$

Aggregate the leverage ratio (2.17):

$$\sum_i \phi_i n_{i,t} di = \sum_i Q_{t,F,i,t} + \Delta Q_{B,t,B,i,t} di$$

$$\phi_t n_t = Q_{t,F,t} + \Delta Q_{B,t,B,t} \quad (\text{A.44})$$

Derive the Aggregate Resource Constraint:

Start with the household budget constraint (A.2):

$$P_t L_t + D_t - D_{t-1} = MRS_t L_t + DIV_t - P_t X - P_t T_t + (R_{t-1}^d - 1) D_{t-1} \quad \text{Put in real terms:}$$

$$C_t + d_t - \frac{P_{t-1}}{P_t} d_{t-1} = mrs_t L_t + div_t - X - T_t + \left(\frac{P_{t-1}}{P_t}\right)(R_{t-1}^d - 1) d_{t-1}$$

$$C_t + d_t = mrs_t L_t + div_t - X - T_t + \Pi_t^{-1} R_{t-1}^d d_{t-1}$$

$$C_t + d_t = mrs_t L_t + div_t - X - G_t - \Pi_t^{-1} \bar{b}_G + T_{cb,t} + Q_{B,t} \bar{b}_G (1 - X \Pi_t^{-1}) + \Pi_t^{-1} R_{t-1}^d d_{t-1}$$

$$C_t + G_t = mrs_t L_t + div_t - X - \Pi_t^{-1} \bar{b}_G + T_{cb,t} + Q_{B,t} \bar{b}_G (1 - X \Pi_t^{-1}) + \Pi_t^{-1} R_{t-1}^d d_{t-1} - d_t$$

$$C_t + G_t = mrs_t L_t + div_{m,t} + div_{n,t} + div_{r,t} + \Pi_t^+ - X - \Pi_t^{-1} \bar{b}_G + T_{cb,t} + Q_{B,t} \bar{b}_G (1 - X \Pi_t^{-1}) + \Pi_t^{-1} R_{t-1}^d d_{t-1} - d_t \\ = mrs_t L_t + f_{m,t} - w_t d_t - \cancel{P_t^k I_t} - \cancel{P_t^k f_{m,t-1}} + Q_t (f_{m,t} - X \Pi_t^{-1} f_{m,t-1}) + \cancel{\frac{P_{t-1}}{P_t} \left[\frac{(I_t^+ - I_t^-)}{I_{t-1}} \right] I_t} - I_t$$

$$+ Y_t - \cancel{P_{m,t} V_{m,t}} + \Pi_t^+ - X - \Pi_t^{-1} \bar{b}_G + T_{cb,t} + Q_{B,t} \bar{b}_G (1 - X \Pi_t^{-1}) + \Pi_t^{-1} R_{t-1}^d d_{t-1} - d_t$$

$$C_t + I_t + G_t = Y_t + \cancel{div_{L,t}} + mrs_t L_t - \cancel{w_t d_t} - \Pi_t^+ f_{m,t} + Q_t (f_{m,t} - X \Pi_t^{-1} f_{m,t-1}) + \Pi_t^+ - X \\ - \Pi_t^{-1} \bar{b}_G + T_{cb,t} + Q_{B,t} \bar{b}_G (1 - X \Pi_t^{-1}) + \Pi_t^{-1} R_{t-1}^d d_{t-1} - d_t$$

$$C_t + I_t + G_t = Y_t - \Pi_t^1 f_{m,t-1} + Q_t (f_{m,t} - \kappa \Pi_t^1 f_{m,t-1}) + n_t^* - X - \Pi_t^1 \bar{b}_G + T_{cb,t}$$

$$+ Q_{B,t} \bar{b}_G (1 - \kappa \Pi_t^1) + \Pi_t^1 R_t^d d_{t-1} - d_t$$

$$\begin{aligned} C_t + I_t + G_t - Y_t &= Q_t f_{m,t} - \Pi_t^1 f_{m,t-1} - Q_t \kappa \Pi_t^1 f_{m,t-1} + Q_{B,t} \bar{b}_G - \Pi_t^1 \bar{b}_G - Q_{B,t} \bar{b}_G \kappa \Pi_t^1 \\ &+ \Pi_t^1 R_t^d d_{t-1} - d_t + n_t^* - X + T_{cb,t} \\ &= Q_t f_{m,t} - \Pi_t^1 f_{m,t-1} - Q_t \kappa \Pi_t^1 f_{m,t-1} + Q_{B,t} \bar{b}_G - \Pi_t^1 \bar{b}_G - Q_{B,t} \bar{b}_G \kappa \Pi_t^1 \\ &+ \Pi_t^1 R_t^d (Q_{t-1} f_{t-1} + Q_{B,t-1} b_{t-1} + r_{t-1} - n_{t-1}) - (Q_t f_t + Q_{B,t} b_t + r_t - n_t) + \Pi_t^1 - X \\ &+ (1+kQ_t) \Pi_t^1 f_{cb,t-1} + (1+kQ_{B,t}) \Pi_t^1 b_{cb,t-1} - R_t^c \Pi_t^1 r_{t-1} \\ &= Q_t f_{m,t} - \Pi_t^1 f_{m,t-1} - Q_t \kappa \Pi_t^1 f_{m,t-1} + Q_{B,t} \bar{b}_G - \Pi_t^1 \bar{b}_G - Q_{B,t} \bar{b}_G \kappa \Pi_t^1 \\ &+ \Pi_t^1 R_t^d (Q_{t-1} f_{t-1} + Q_{B,t-1} b_{t-1} + r_{t-1} - \cancel{R_t^c} \cancel{(R_t^F - R_t^d)} \cancel{(Q_{t-1} f_{t-1} - (R_t^F - R_t^d) Q_{t-1} b_{t-1})} Q_{B,t-1} b_{t-1} \\ &- (R_t^c - R_t^d) r_{t-1}) + \cancel{X} - Q_t f_t - Q_{B,t} b_t - r_t + \cancel{n_t} + \cancel{\kappa} \cancel{X} - X \\ &+ (1+kQ_t) \Pi_t^1 f_{cb,t-1} + (1+kQ_{B,t}) \Pi_t^1 b_{cb,t-1} - \cancel{R_t^c} \cancel{\Pi_t^1 r_{t-1}} \\ &= \cancel{Q_t f_{m,t}} - \Pi_t^1 f_{m,t-1} - Q_t \kappa \Pi_t^1 f_{m,t-1} + \cancel{Q_{B,t} \bar{b}_G} - \Pi_t^1 \bar{b}_G - Q_{B,t} \bar{b}_G \kappa \Pi_t^1 \\ &+ \Pi_t^1 R_t^d (Q_{t-1} f_{t-1} + Q_{B,t-1} b_{t-1} + R_t^d \left[(R_t^F - R_t^d) Q_{t-1} f_{t-1} + (R_t^F - R_t^d) Q_{B,t-1} b_{t-1} \right] \\ &- \cancel{Q_t f_t} - \cancel{Q_{B,t} b_t} - \cancel{Q_{t-1} f_{t-1}} - \cancel{Q_{t-1} b_{t-1}} + (1+kQ_t) \Pi_t^1 f_{cb,t-1} \\ &+ (1+kQ_t) \Pi_t^1 b_{cb,t-1} \\ &= -\Pi_t^1 f_{m,t-1} - Q_t \kappa \Pi_t^1 f_{m,t-1} - \Pi_t^1 \bar{b}_G - Q_{B,t} \kappa \Pi_t^1 \bar{b}_G \\ &+ \cancel{\Pi_t^1 R_t^d Q_{t-1} f_{t-1}} + \cancel{\Pi_t^1 R_t^d Q_{B,t-1} b_{t-1}} + \cancel{\Pi_t^1 (R_t^F - R_t^d) Q_{t-1} f_{t-1}} \\ &+ (R_t^F - R_t^d) Q_{B,t-1} b_{t-1} + \Pi_t^1 f_{cb,t-1} + \kappa Q_t \Pi_t^1 f_{cb,t-1} \\ &+ \Pi_t^1 b_{cb,t-1} + \kappa Q_{B,t} \Pi_t^1 b_{cb,t-1} \\ &= -\Pi_t^1 f_{m,t-1} - Q_t \kappa \Pi_t^1 f_{m,t-1} - \Pi_t^1 \bar{b}_G - Q_{B,t} \kappa \Pi_t^1 \bar{b}_G \\ &+ \Pi_t^1 R_t^F Q_{t-1} f_{t-1} + \Pi_t^1 R_t^B Q_{B,t-1} b_{t-1} + \Pi_t^1 f_{cb,t-1} \\ &+ \kappa Q_t \Pi_t^1 f_{cb,t-1} + \Pi_t^1 b_{cb,t-1} + \kappa Q_{B,t} \Pi_t^1 b_{cb,t-1} \\ &= -\Pi_t^1 Q_{t-1} \left(\frac{1-\kappa Q_t}{Q_{t-1}} \right) f_{m,t-1} - \Pi_t^1 Q_{B,t-1} \left(\frac{1-\kappa Q_{B,t}}{Q_{B,t-1}} \right) \bar{b}_G \\ &+ \Pi_t^1 R_t^F Q_{t-1} f_{t-1} + \Pi_t^1 R_t^B Q_{B,t-1} b_{t-1} + \Pi_t^1 Q_{t-1} \left(\frac{1-\kappa Q_t}{Q_{t-1}} \right) f_{cb,t-1} \\ &+ \Pi_t^1 Q_{B,t-1} \left(\frac{1-\kappa Q_{B,t}}{Q_{B,t-1}} \right) b_{cb,t-1} \quad \text{Using 2.6 } \stackrel{?}{=} 2.7 : \end{aligned}$$

$$= \cancel{\Pi_t^{-1} Q_{t-1} R_t^F f_{m,t-1}} - \cancel{\Pi_t^{-1} Q_{B,t-1} R_t^B b_G} + \cancel{\Pi_t^{-1} R_t^F Q_{B,t-1} f_G} + \cancel{\Pi_t^{-1} R_t^B Q_{B,t-1} b_G}$$

$$+ \cancel{\Pi_t^{-1} Q_{t-1} R_t^F f_{G,t-1}} + \cancel{\Pi_t^{-1} Q_{B,t-1} R_t^B b_{G,t-1}}$$

$$Y_t = C_t + I_t + G_t \quad (A.45)$$

⑧ Equilibrium (following Appendix A.7)

There are 50 variables in 50 equations:

<u>Equation Number</u>	<u>Labels</u>	<u>Economic Sector</u>
1-4	A.3 - A.6	Households
5-7	A.14 - A.16	Labor Market
8-10	A.22 - A.24	Retail Firms
11-18	2.19-2.21 & 2.23-2.27	Wholesale Firms
19-20	A.34 & A.35	Capital Firms
21-27	2.6, 2.7, & 2.11-2.15	Financial Intermediaries
28	A.36	Fiscal Authority
29 & 30	3.4 & Permit	Central Bank
31-35	3.1, 3.2, ^{ZLB or NIRP} 3.3 or 3.7, 3.6, & 5.1	Monetary Policy
36-50	A.37-A.45, A.17-A.19, & A.25-A.27	Aggregation & Exogenous Parameters

Variable Category

Interest Rates

Variables

$R_t^F, R_t^B, R_t^{rc}, R_t^d, R_t^{TR}$

Bond Prices

$Q_t, Q_{B,t}$

Stochastic Discounting

$\lambda_{t,t+1}$

Auxiliary

Σ_t, ϕ_t

Inflation

Π_t

Shadow Values

λ_t, W_t, M_t

Net Worth

N_t, F_t, f_t, b_t

Household

C_t, L_t, d_t, mrs_t

Labor

$w_t^e, f_l, t, f_{\sigma, t}, w_t, v_t^w$

Production

$L_{it}, p_t^e, x_{1,t}, x_{2,t}, \rho_{m,e}, Y_t, Y_{m,t}, U_t, K_t, \bar{I}_t, p_t^k, f_{mt}, M_{1,t}, M_{2,t}, I_t, A_t, v_t^p$

Central Banks

$T_{cb,t}, f_{cb,t}, b_{cb,t}$

Fiscal

G_t, T_t

Misc.

θ_t